The Dragoon forces accomplished a great deal from the time they landed in southern France to their linkup with Third Army on 12 September. They liberated Toulon and Marseille, advanced more than 480 miles from the coast to Besançon and Belfort, captured approximately 96,000 prisoners, and inflicted an additional 35,000 casualties on the retreating German armies. Seventh Army and French Army B lost approximately 4,500 battle casualties each.1 Both pursuer and pursued were tired from a month of continuous combat operations; Allied supply lines were stretched to the limit, and the German lines of communication became shorter as they neared the Rhine. For the Franco-American Allies, it was time to reorganize the command structure, rebuild the ports and railroads, and bring up reinforcements.
Sixth Army Group headquarters became officially operational on 15 September 1944, although it had been functioning as a command post for Devers since 1 August. Before the invasion of southern France, the headquarters’ advance section was in Bastia, a small port on the northeast coast of Corsica. There, it served as the advance headquarters of both AFHQ and the army group.2 Although the advance section moved to St. Tropez on 31 August, most of the staff and support personnel remained in Italy until early September. Once communications were established with Seventh Army, AFHQ, and SHAEF, Devers and his operations and intelligence officers were able to work effectively from St. Tropez.3
Devers traveled a great deal in the first week of September, meeting with Eisenhower in Granville, Bradley in Versailles, and Patch and de Lattre in Lyon. He returned to St. Tropez on 9 September to brief his staff on Eisenhower’s strategy and the army group’s role in it. He also met with Admiral Hewitt, who was in charge of getting the ports of Marseille and Toulon back into operation. Hewitt acquainted him with the difficulties involved in clearing mines and removing underwater obstacles, but he promised that Marseille would be open for ships within a week.4 By the time Devers’s headquarters moved to Lyon on 15 September, the first Liberty ships were docking in Marseille.
Figure 13.1. Battle of attrition, 16 September–15 December 1944
Figure 13.2. Sixth Army Group’s plan of attack, November 1944
As Sixth Army Group set up operations in Lyon, the enemy, who “had been reeling drunkenly backwards, was beginning to stabilize his defenses.” The army group intelligence officer (G-2), Brigadier General Frank Allen, estimated that the “Germans would attempt to hold a line running generally west of Belfort and tying into the easily defended Vosges mountains to the north.”5 Evidence soon corroborated this assessment, as the Germans stopped the French short of Belfort and fought stubbornly to slow Seventh Army’s crossing of the Moselle, west of the Vosges.
General Allen believed the enemy was done withdrawing and seemed determined to hold the current front: “Defensive works, terrain, a large number of second rate troops and the possible arrival of reinforcements seem to satisfy him as to his ability to hold this area. The Vosges Mountains offer natural positions for defense which the enemy has built up considerably to form the center of his line. The build-up of armored strength which is continuing along the German First and Nineteenth Army boundary (Luneville-Sarrebourg area) shows that the enemy is obviously aware of the danger to his forces should any penetration in the Luneville area open the road net to Strasbourg and the Rhine.”6
Once the French First Army had consolidated its two corps on the right flank, the army group’s front faced north-northeast from the Swiss border near Belfort and ran west to the Moselle River. The French held the eastern two-thirds of the line, and Seventh Army’s single corps held the western third. Seventh Army’s junction with Third Army was at Chaumont, on the Moselle, where XV Corps anchored the right of Patton’s army. The provisional airborne force, commanded by Major General Robert Frederick, protected the long eastern flank of the army group from the Mediterranean to near Geneva, Switzerland.7 Faced with stiffening opposition and a very long front, Sixth Army Group needed additional combat forces to continue offensive operations. During a 22 September meeting with Eisenhower and Bradley, Devers asked that a corps with two divisions be transferred from Twelfth to Sixth Army Group.
Marshall, meanwhile, was pressuring Eisenhower to build up Seventh Army by transferring a corps with two or three divisions from Bradley’s army group. Ike agreed, mainly because the southern lines of communication, based on the ports of Marseille and Toulon, were capable of supporting additional forces in Sixth Army Group, whereas Twelfth Army Group’s lines of communication back to Normandy were badly overstretched.
In response to the logistical situation and to Marshall’s prodding, Eisenhower and Bradley decided to transfer XV Corps, commanded by Major General Wade Hampton Haislip, to Sixth Army Group. “Ham” Haislip was a talented and hard-driving corps commander. A 1912 graduate of the Military Academy and a combat veteran of the First World War, he had handled his corps, composed of the 79th Infantry Division, the 5th Armored Division, and the 2nd French Armored Division, in an exemplary fashion during the drive east from Normandy. Haislip and Devers had been classmates at the Command and General Staff College, and Haislip had served on the West Point faculty at the same time Devers commanded the artillery detachment (1921–1924). Haislip spoke fluent French, had attended the French Ecole Superieure de Guerre (1925–1927), and had mastered the difficult art of commanding Leclerc, the mercurial and aggressive leader of the French 2nd Armored Division—in French, the Division Blindee (DB). He was also one of Eisenhower’s oldest army friends and had introduced Ike to his wife Mamie.8
Initially, Haislip brought only the 79th Infantry Division and the French 2nd DB to Sixth Army Group. Eisenhower promised Devers an additional infantry division from Twelfth Army Group and three more infantry divisions that were en route from the United States and were scheduled to land in Marseille in October and November.9 Bradley and Patton resented the transfer of XV Corps to Sixth Army Group, although they were forced to admit the logistical and tactical logic of it. When Devers saw Patton on 22 September, he noticed that Patton “was subdued and I got the impression, rather hostile.”10 Patton wrote in his diary on 21 September, “If Jake Devers gets the XV Corps, I hope his plan goes sour.”11 After being told on 25 September that he had to give up XV Corps, Patton wrote in his diary: “May God rot his guts. . . . As usual, Devers is a liar and, by his glibness, talked Eisenhower into giving him the Corps.”12 This unprofessional attitude was typical of Patton.
Bradley kept his feelings to himself, leading Devers to believe that at least Bradley was not antagonistic toward him. He wrote to Georgie: “I am very happy about Omar. He is an excellent commander in a difficult place at the moment but will come out on tops as always.”13 Eisenhower’s biographer identified a different side of Bradley, noting that “behind his mild-mannered façade,” Bradley “bore grudges longer and with far more vehemence than Patton.”14 After his visits to SHAEF, Twelfth Army Group, and Third Army, Devers realized he was “going to need all my old luck to keep abreast of the undercutting that goes on.” Still, he felt that “Eisenhower and Smith who are my bosses were exceptionally friendly in their way.”15 Clearly, his relationship with SHAEF was not a warm one.
Eisenhower’s decision to move XV Corps to Sixth Army Group gave Devers the forces he needed to make Seventh Army a balanced combat force. Devers noted in his diary, “Patch and I are in complete agreement and accord, and I believe that when we once get 7th Army on a proper basis of two corps of two divisions each, that this army, which has been a great fighting army, will be even greater.”16 Haislip’s XV Corps joined Sixth Army Group and Seventh Army on 29 September, and the boundary between the Seventh and Third Armies was moved north to include the existing XV Corps zone. By that date, VI Corps had captured Epinal and three bridgeheads over the Moselle.17
After his conference with Eisenhower on 22 September, Devers believed that Sixth Army Group’s mission was to drive through the Vosges Mountains and the Belfort Gap, destroy the enemy forces in Alsace, and then establish bridgeheads across the Rhine.18 This view accurately reflected SHAEF’s 26 September order to Sixth Army Group, which instructed it to protect Twelfth Army Group’s right flank by securing the Luneville area. In turn, Sixth Army Group issued “Letter of Instruction Number One” to its armies, directing them to continue offensive actions “to destroy the enemy in zone west of the Rhine, secure crossings over the Rhine, and breach the Siegfried line.”19 Seventh Army was to direct its offensive toward Luneville and then Strasbourg, while de Lattre was to aim his forces through the Belfort Gap toward Mulhouse and Colmar. Both armies were “to take advantage of any opportunity to seize [a] bridgehead and exploit across the Rhine without instructions from Sixth Army Group.”20
Seventh Army’s Field Order 6, issued on 29 September, stated the missions of XV and VI Corps: to continue the offensive and “prepare to cross the Rhine and breach the Siegfried Line.”21 Patch, anticipating that his army would have to launch an assault across the Rhine somewhere near Strasbourg, ordered his army’s engineer, Brigadier General Garrison Davidson, to establish river-crossing schools to train engineers and infantrymen for this type of assault. Davidson had already anticipated the need for such training and, “independent of any directive or suggestion from above, made an engineering plan for an assault crossing of the Rhine” and “started assembling the necessary equipment and supplies.”22 Davidson assigned two engineer regiments the mission of establishing schools on the Rhône and Doubs Rivers. Army and corps engineers rotated through these schools, attending courses that lasted ten days. The instruction included the operation of DUKWs, the construction of pontoon bridges, and the use of infantry assault boats. Sixth Army Group still had two battalions of DUKWs under its control and made one, with about 250 DUKWs, available to Seventh Army for river-crossing operations.23 Davidson and the Seventh Army chief of staff also organized a planning board to prepare for the crossings. Davidson assured Patch that, “given 72 hours-notice the army engineers are prepared to cross a corps on a two division front in accordance with loading plans already prepared.”24
Devers was briefed about these plans on 30 September, and Patch suggested that when Seventh Army crossed the Rhine, it should advance in the general direction of Saarburg-Stuttgart-Nurnberg.25 Patch also told his boss that the army would not be ready to cross before 1 November because it needed to accumulate ammunition and supplies and rest several divisions. The Seventh Army staff thought the crossing should be made somewhere near Rastatt.26
Devers and his commanders believed they could accomplish their missions. One of the key conditions for success was adequate logistical support for the two armies operating nearly 500 miles from Marseille. Further offensive operations depended on the engineers’ ability to repair the French railways and bridges, allowing the armies to be supplied by rail. Fortunately, the railway system in southern France was in reasonably good shape, as Sixth Army Group’s history described:
Southeastern France was served by a rail net adequate for normal requirements in peace. The German retreat was so precipitate that time and means were lacking for the complete destruction of railways as was brought to a fine art in Italy. The many railway bridges, however, were practically all destroyed and there were numerous blocks caused by the strafing and destruction of enemy trains. One such block, eighteen miles long, included in its wreckage guns and other items so heavy that no available wrecking equipment could clear them from the tracks and it was necessary to lay a new track to by-pass the block.27
Seventh Army initiated limited traffic on a small coastal railway east of Toulon on 18 August. Over the next month, railway traffic was extended and expanded into the Rhône valley through the combined efforts of the U.S. Military Railway Service and French railway organizations. Efforts were focused on rebuilding key bridges and segments of line that produced the quickest increase in tonnage hauled. Few railway and engineer personnel had been assigned to the early landing phases of Dragoon, so Devers ordered the accelerated arrival of units of the 1st Military Railway Service from Italy. Consequently, a number of railway and engineer units arrived a month earlier than planned, thanks to Devers’s decision and the availability of additional air and sea transportation. On 14 September Brigadier General Carl Gray moved the 1st Military Railway Service’s headquarters from Rome to Lyon.28
By 2 October, rail lines were operating from Marseille to Dijon and Besançon. Rail operations were facilitated by the fact that far more rolling stock and locomotives had survived Allied bombing and FFI demolitions than had been anticipated by the planners.29 By 10 October, the Seventh and French First Armies “could shift from a hand-to-mouth consumption of artillery ammunition and begin the slow accumulation of forward reserves” for major offensive operations. During October, a daily average of 5,690 tons of supplies was hauled to the forward supply dumps by rail.30
Although the accomplishments of the logisticians were impressive, major problems remained in the army group’s supply systems. During the first month of operations in France, Seventh Army had been responsible for the supply and maintenance of its own and the French forces. After French First Army was activated on 19 September, Seventh Army logisticians believed that French logistical organizations should take care of de Lattre’s forces. As a result, in late September Seventh Army directed the lion’s share of gasoline and ammunition to its own forces and gave a much smaller allocation to the French, even though the French army was bigger. Devers became aware of this situation on 26 September, when Patch told him the French had reported a shortage of gasoline. Thinking that the problem stemmed from a waste of available fuel, Devers encouraged de Lattre to conserve the scarce gasoline supplies. In his view, the causes of fuel “wastage” were fast driving, unnecessary trips, and diversion of gasoline from military to civilian purposes.31 In reality, the cause of the gasoline shortage was more complicated.
On 28 September Devers visited de Lattre and de Monsabert and expressed his admiration for the French troops’ determination and the French commanders’ skill. Devers noted that de Lattre seemed optimistic: “He feels he will be able to punch through as soon as we can get enough ammunition up to him.” Devers assured de Lattre that this was a major priority and told him, “We should solve it in the next 3–4 days.”32 He also arranged for the shipment of weapons, clothing, and equipment from American depots in North Africa to equip 12,000 recruits from the FFI who had joined de Lattre’s ranks.33
When Devers next met with Patch and his staff on 30 September, he pointed out that de Lattre had expressed concern about supply shortages. Seventh Army’s chief of staff replied that investigations had revealed that these shortages “were due to slow handling of supplies by the French, even though those supplies had been turned over to them for delivering to proper destinations.”34 The same day, de Lattre talked with Patch about “his urgent need for supplies and requested assistance” from American logistical units. After looking into the matter, Patch’s G-4 phoned de Lattre and told him, “What little supplies could be spared by VI U.S. Corps had to be given to XV Corps, recently placed under Seventh Army control.”35
De Lattre also sent Devers two messages on 30 September. In the first, he pointed out that the northward shift of Seventh Army’s right boundary would force his II Corps to stretch its forces across a wider front, making offensive operations difficult. In the second message, he told Devers that in the last week, Seventh Army had received 2,102 tons of supplies by rail each day, while the larger French army had received just 968 tons a day. Devers responded by postponing the movement of the army’s boundary and by ordering that supplies to the French “be more normally assured.”36
The following day the French army’s chief logistician visited Sixth Army Group headquarters and briefed Devers on the serious French supply problems. Devers thought the situation was due in large part “to the French themselves in not building up surpluses” and to Seventh Army’s failure to “properly supervise the supply arrangements” of the French army. That evening Devers wrote in his diary, “I have taken energetic steps to correct the shortages of ammunition and gasoline in order that this army may pick up its momentum.”37 As a result, Seventh Army provided 65,000 gallons of gasoline, 53,000 rations, and 279 tons of ammunition to the French on 1 October and promised another 60,000 gallons of fuel the next day. Seventh Army also agreed to provide additional fuel and rations until the revised rail delivery schedules had time to take effect.38 With these measures taken, Devers believed that “everything is now buttoned up in this line and that from now on supply will work smoothly and build up.”39
During this period, Devers understood that the French people were suffering the effects of five years of war. In a letter to Georgie he noted that France “is a land of barter. Money does not mean much. You will see these dregs of the world trading their canned goods sent to them by relatives for eggs, chickens, and what not.” But there was little he could do for the civilians, since “we outran our supplies and have to catch up.”40 In this same letter, Jake gave Georgie some news about their son-in-law and shared his feelings about the Italian campaign:
Almost caught up with Alex a few days ago. They tell me he is Division Artillery Officer of the 4th AD [Armored Division] and that he is doing a splendid piece of work. . . . Sandy Patch’s big fine boy, graduated from the Point in 42, has been wounded twice but is in fine form again and anxious to get going. . . . I am certainly glad to get out of Italy. I never believed in that campaign and I was right. . . . Now the going is tough for they rested for no reason at all [in June] and gave the Germans a chance to rest and get set and that always hurts.41
On 4 October Devers and his chief of staff, Major General David Barr, flew to Versailles for a meeting with Eisenhower and the other army group commanders. SHAEF staff briefed them on the current situation: the British Operation Market Garden had failed to establish a bridgehead over the Rhine, the Canadian army had failed to clear the sea approaches to Antwerp, and Twelfth Army Group was beginning a limited offensive to capture Aachen. SHAEF also announced its decision to transfer the 44th Infantry Division from Twelfth to Sixth Army Group and to land the 100th and 103rd Infantry Divisions and the 14th Armored Division in Marseille and assign them to Devers.42
Eisenhower did not make any changes in his strategy. Devers concluded that the mission of his and Bradley’s army groups remained to “destroy the German army west of the Rhine River”; after that, “the advance across the Rhine and on to Berlin should be easy.” He continued to believe that “we emphasize too much the capture of terrain,” and he thought Montgomery’s failure to open the approaches of Antwerp “may delay the end of this war until next year.”43 Eisenhower also informed Devers and Bradley that Marshall would arrive in France on 6 October and planned to visit Twelfth and Sixth Army Groups. Eisenhower and Bedell Smith met Marshall at Orly Airport on 6 October, and Eisenhower accompanied him to Bradley’s headquarters in Verdun the next day.44 Ike remained with Marshall and Bradley throughout the day before returning to Paris that evening.
On the morning of 8 October Marshall flew to Eindhoven, in the Netherlands, to visit Field Marshal Montgomery. This visit was less than pleasant, as Montgomery regaled Marshall with criticism of Eisenhower. Montgomery later recalled telling Marshall that “since Eisenhower had himself taken personal command of the land battle . . . the armies had become separated nationally and not geographically. There was a lack of grip, and operational direction and control was lacking.”45 For the sake of Allied unity, and in an effort to stay out of Ike’s business, Marshall refrained from responding to Montgomery’s observations. He later recalled, “It was very hard for me to restrain myself because I didn’t think there was any logic in what he said, but overwhelming egotism.”46
Marshall’s next stop was Sixth Army Group. He arrived at the headquarters of French II Corps in Luxiel, where he met Devers, de Lattre, and de Monsabert. Up to this point, Marshall’s visit had gone smoothly, but de Lattre soon changed that. As Devers described in his diary: “On his [Marshall’s] visit to the French Army General de Lattre staged a show with the idea of impressing General Marshall that the French Army had not received proper logistical support in its advance up from the beaches and went into a lot of anti-Patch talk, all of which was very unfair and untrue. Later, de Lattre promised me that he would hereafter forget the past and start with the future. He goes into these tirades at least twice a week, at which times he seems to lose his balance.”47
According to de Lattre, Marshall seemed surprised but recognized that the complaint about supply shortages was “well-founded and promised me that he would put the matter right.”48 Marshall, however, had a different memory of his reaction to the Frenchman’s complaints. In 1956 Marshall recalled that he had been “outraged” and had set de Lattre straight by telling him, “The truth was there were no supplies to get. A division was supposed to have nine hundred tons a day, I think, and they were cut down. Patton was getting only three hundred tons. . . . And on top of that de Lattre was making this a triumphant march and they were delaying in villages after villages and cities [to celebrate].”49
De Lattre was totally out of line to discuss supply issues and his views of his American colleagues with Marshall. His criticism of Patch (and possibly Truscott and Devers) in front of reporters was politically stupid and remarkably wrong. Marshall was certainly outraged, but his response was likely more measured than he later recalled. In his 1973 biography of Marshall, Forrest Pogue wrote, “Marshall’s temper flared, but he decided to avoid a scene by terminating the discussion.” He went on to say that the chief of staff got even with de Lattre several years later when the Frenchman wanted to be named ground forces commander in the NATO theater. In that case, according to Pogue, Marshall told de Lattre, “That was the most outrageous business of yours. I restrained myself, very, very carefully from tearing you down to the ground.”50
After their meeting with de Lattre, Marshall and Devers flew to Sixth Army Group headquarters in Vittel, where they spent the night. The next morning Marshall traveled with Devers and his G-3, Brigadier General Reuben Jenkins, to Seventh Army headquarters in Epinal, where they were met by Patch. After a short briefing, the group visited the headquarters of XV and VI Corps and all six divisions in Seventh Army. Marshall talked with a number of soldiers and traveled to division and regimental headquarters very close to the front.51
That afternoon Marshall went on to visit Patton’s Third Army. On the way, the chief of staff took the time to write a note to Devers, telling him, “You arranged my program in such a way that I was able to see a maximum of activity in a minimum of time. I was particularly glad to be able to work in a visit to the French. Thank you for your thoughtfulness and hospitality. I noticed especially the high state of discipline and morale in your command, and along with this expression of appreciation, I send my congratulations.”52 Clearly, de Lattre’s tirade had not soured Marshall’s visit to Sixth Army Group. However, it must have embarrassed and irritated Devers. After talking with his boss, Barr wrote a note to Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. that reflected Devers’s feelings:
It is quite apparent from the visit of General George C. Marshall, Lieutenant General Jacob L. Devers and party to the First French Army on 8 October 1944, that much spade work of an educational nature must be accomplished by you and your staff, particularly along supply lines, in order that unwarranted criticism by General de Lattre and his assistants, including Major Bullitt, shall cease. The French must be made to realize (it is believed that Lieutenant Colonel Gazounand, their G-4 is familiar with the facts) that the method of supply and maintenance under the Joint Rearmament Program and subsequent War Department instructions has not changed in the slightest since the arrival of the French in Metropolitan France.53
Sixth Army Group formally established a liaison section commanded by Lodge on 17 October to work with and monitor the French army.54
For his part, Devers learned several things from the latest incident with de Lattre. First, he realized that the French “do not know how to support themselves logistically, and I believe I will have to give them every possible assistance.”55 This response to the situation was far more productive than anger or frustration. Devers ordered Sixth Army Group’s G-4 to play a greater role in the support of the French, who, as Devers had realized as early as June, did not have sufficient service units of their own and did not have enough experienced and trained administrative personnel. Devers also noted that he had “to give more definite instructions to the two armies in order that their attacks may bring the greatest good to the common cause. At the moment there seems to be some misunderstanding which I shall straighten out.”56 This insight was remarkably important to Devers’s development as an army group commander. Throughout his career he had tried to empower subordinates to run their own organizations, with guidance, ideas, and counsel from him as needed. Now he had to learn how to coordinate two armies of different nationalities so that their efforts were mutually supporting.
One of the most important aspects of making Sixth Army Group more tactically effective was to reorient the staff to their current situation and responsibilities. On 11 October Devers assembled his staff officers “and gave them a short orientation talk, stressing the fact that the Sixth Army Group headquarters was small and going to be kept small.” He emphasized that he wanted the atmosphere of his headquarters “to be one of aggressiveness and helpfulness.” He warned that anything else would not be tolerated. Finally, he “particularly wanted them to be helpful to the French Army and to be sure that they understood the French methods and that the French understood what we are trying to do, in order that we may make a most successful team.”57 Characteristically, after giving these stern instructions, Devers presented three staff officers with service awards.
Devers also thought about his role as the commander of a multinational force. He wrote to Georgie: “I am using all my personality and psychology on the French. They are a great people but one must understand them and their problems. Lodge is most helpful for he speaks and writes fluent French and is smart and wise.”58 Just as Eisenhower and Marshall realized they needed to deal with Montgomery in a diplomatic fashion, Devers learned how to work with de Lattre and his countrymen in ways that were conducive to getting the most out of their army. For example, on 16 October Devers traveled with de Lattre to Besançon, where he presented the thorny Frenchman with the Legion of Merit in a public ceremony. As a result of such actions, Franco-American relations in Sixth Army Group improved, and ways were found to sustain French First Army in the coming offensive.
October 1944 was a frustrating month for the Allied armies in the west. With the stabilization of the front by the Germans, Eisenhower realized that an “operational pause” was required; however, this did not mean the cessation of all offensive action. In the north, Twenty-First Army Group finally concentrated its forces and resources in an operation to clear the water approaches from the North Sea to Antwerp. By 7 November, Montgomery’s two armies had cleared the Germans from the banks and islands of the Scheldt estuary, allowing the Royal Navy to remove the extensive minefields there. Bradley’s Twelfth Army Group hammered away at the German defenses in Aachen and began to penetrate the Huertgen Forest, hoping to establish a good jumping-off point for the next big Allied offensive.59
Since it had its own lines of communication and supply, Sixth Army Group was able to continue its push through the Vosges Mountains and the Belfort Gap to reach the Alsatian plain and the west bank of the Rhine. Haislip’s XV Corps and Truscott’s VI Corps reached and crossed the Mortagne River and aimed at Baccarat and the town of St. Die, respectively. They found the fighting in the forests costly and time-consuming as the Germans took advantage of the mountainous terrain. Consistently bad weather prevented close air support, and the narrow roads in the area made supply and armor operations difficult. By the end of the month, it was clear that Seventh Army needed a pause in order to bring up the 44th, 100th, and 103rd Infantry Divisions and to rotate tired divisions out of the line to recuperate and absorb replacements.60
To ensure close liaison with Third Army on his army group’s left flank, Devers visited Patton on a number of occasions. During a visit in mid-October, Patton sent for Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Graham, allowing Devers to see his son-in-law. In a letter to Georgie a few days later, Jake reported that “Alex is full of himself. He has been doing an outstanding job and is well thought of by all and I saw many of his superiors.” Graham was serving as an artillery officer in the 4th Armored Division and had seen steady action since Third Army broke out of Normandy. Jake closed his letter by telling Georgie, “I love you dearly and am glad you have Frances with you. Tell her that her Alex is as good a killer as I am only he does it better.”61
There was also a change of command in VI Corps in late October. Lucian Truscott was promoted to lieutenant general and was in line to command the next army formed in France. In the end, Truscott took command of Fifth Army in Italy when Mark Clark was selected to command the Allied Fifteenth Army Group in that theater.62 Truscott would be missed. In the words of the official history, Truscott “had in many ways dominated the Allied campaign in southern France from the Riviera beaches to the Vosges Mountains. For over two months he had feverishly kept his three American infantry divisions on the move, forever harassing the retreating Germans and allowing them little time to rest and reorganize.”63 Truscott’s replacement was Major General Edward Brooks, who had successfully commanded the 2nd Armored Division in Normandy and during the drive across France. “Ted” Brooks, an artilleryman and combat veteran of the First World War, had served as Devers’s chief of staff in the Armored Force in 1942. He arrived in VI Corps on 20 October to help plan the next attack, and he assumed command of the corps on 25 October. Devers was sorry to see Truscott leave but was pleased to have Brooks as a corps commander in Sixth Army Group.64
French First Army’s main offensive efforts in October were in the high Vosges, north of Belfort. De Monsabert had convinced de Lattre that his II Corps could outflank the Belfort Gap from the north by seizing Le Tholy and Gerardmer and then advance over the Bussang and Oderen passes.65 These efforts proved costly and produced only slight gains in the face of skillful German resistance, forcing de Lattre to order de Monsabert to cease offensive operations at the end of the month and rebuild his units.
The Allies’ most critical effort across the Western Front in October was a logistical one. The French rail, canal, and road systems were put back into operation. American engineers continued to repair and improve the ports of Cherbourg and Marseille, and Lieutenant General J. C. H. Lee’s Communications Zone personnel established and stocked a system of forward depots to support operations along the German border. In the south of France, Brigadier General Tom Larkin’s SOS troops and engineers opened the French rail system and pushed a gasoline pipeline from the coast of Provence to Dijon. With increased logistical capacity in the forward areas, Twelfth and Sixth Army Groups were able to sustain more forces in the front lines and bring more divisions forward. Sixth Army Group reached a strength of eight American and seven French divisions by early November.
The arrival of the 44th, 100th, and 103rd Infantry Divisions in Seventh Army’s forward areas allowed Patch to rotate divisions out of the line to rest, receive replacements, and retrain infantry units. Beginning on 24 October, Major General Ira Wyche’s 79th Infantry Division of Haislip’s XV Corps was withdrawn from the front and replaced by the 44th Division. The 79th was badly in need of rest and recuperation, having fought its way across France without a letup.66
The 79th Division was of special interest to Lieutenant General Patch, whose son, Captain Alexander “Mac” Patch, was a company commander in its 315th Infantry Regiment. General Patch wrote to his wife, Julia, on 24 September, telling her that he had learned through a small notice in Stars and Stripes that Mac had been “slightly wounded.” The following day Patch visited the 79th Division’s medical authorities to inquire about his son’s condition and was told that “the wound was clean and not serious.” Patch also told Julia that “an old Warrant Officer . . . made a special point of telling me that the boy’s reputation in his regiment was very high,” although “people in the regiment considered that he was too careless in taking sensible precautions.” Patch noted in his letter that “I did not listen to this much because I was trying to conceal my pride in the information I was getting.”67
Once he had located Mac in a hospital in England, Patch got permission for him to recuperate at Seventh Army headquarters. In a letter to Julia on 4 October, Patch told her the latest news of their son:
Jul Darling:
Seems to me it has been a long time since I’ve been able to write you. I know you will appreciate what an immense satisfaction it is to have Mac with me for a short spell. Finally I learned the location of the hospital he had been sent to—it was in England—So I had John Warner fly over, get him out of that hospital (I got the aid of a high ranking medical officer) and spend his recuperation at my Hqtrs. He is having physical therapy treatments to restore the muscles of his right shoulder back to normal. He looks as well as ever and surely there is nothing wrong with his appetite or his morale.68
General Wyche informed Patch that Mac would receive the Silver Star for bravery and called him a “grand and courageous battlefield officer.” Patch told Julia, “I had the greatest strain imaginable in trying to conceal my pride, pleasure, and satisfaction.”69
Captain Patch was equally pleased to be with his father, as he related in a letter to his wife: “In the interval since my last letter the store of experiences that I have accumulated since I last saw you has been doubled. There will be so much to tell you my precious when we are together again. My past two days have been rich indeed. Seeing Dad again, of course, tops them all. Your father-in-law, beloved, is a very great man. I say that with prejudice, naturally, but it is none-the-less true. How great only a very few will ever know—not the public; only some of his close associates.”70
Mac enjoyed the days spent with his father immensely, accompanying him on visits to Seventh Army units and talking with senior staff officers. He wrote in a letter to his mother and sister that it is “very elucidating” for “an anonymous company commander to travel abroad in the higher brackets and observe the machinations which shape his destiny.” He found his father “the same as ever” and noted that they lived very comfortably in a villa that was the “former property of one of those unfortunate Frenchmen who bet on the wrong horse.” Mac was “overcome with the smooth urbanity and art exhibited by our master in his relations with the French. . . . He out-flatters and out-compliments the French deputations and officials with the ease of an old campaigner. I can assure you that he makes firm friends for the U.S. in all his contacts.” He found Lorraine a beautiful region, “but the weather is abominable. I fear your son and brother is in for a hard winter.”71
All good times must come to an end, as they did for Mac when he wrote on 15 October, “I have at last been pronounced fit and ready for duty.” He looked forward to being back with the “familiar faces and old friends” in his company and hoped “there have not been too many changes.” He also expressed his feelings for his father:
The opportunity of having had so long a visit with Dad I will always appreciate. I’ve enjoyed every minute of it. It has, I think, been grand for both of us. We are not readily given to compliments and expressions of emotions, your males, as you well know, yet father and son know and feel the mutual pride and respect that exist between us. What greater satisfaction can life hold than that? I have been able to face him squarely knowing that I stood the test, and in turn I know that there is no man of greater integrity and courage than my father, I know of no family more closely bonded together than we Patches. It will always be so.72
Captain Patch rejoined the 79th Infantry Division a week before it was scheduled to rotate out of the line, just as it launched an attack on 21 October.73
General Patch spent the night of 21 October at the division’s headquarters. The next day he flew over the battlefield, “imagining I was seeing Mac leading his men.” When he got back to Wyche’s headquarters, he learned that Mac’s company had been the first unit to reach its objective. As he told Julia, “you will know the pride I felt.”74 When he returned to Seventh Army headquarters that evening, Patch received the worst news possible. He shared his emotions in a letter to his wife:
Had I not been to church this morning and remained afterwards to take communion, I doubt if I would have had the strength to write to you—for my heart is bleeding and my emotions . . . are close to breaking. Fate is unpredictable—How strange that our dear friend Lil Spragins should have been given the mission of notifying me that our beloved Mac had been killed. . . . Only three days ago I personally delivered our boy Mac back to his division. . . . I’m trying desperately, my darling Julia, to control my emotions tonight—I can only do so by writing you—I will not allow any other person to observe how I feel. He was such a magnificent boy. . . . Darling, I would so love to be able to be with you tonight, principally to try to add whatever strength I possess in comforting you.75
Seventh Army pulled the 79th Infantry Division out of the line on 24 October. Mac was buried the same day at the U.S. military cemetery in Epinal, France.76
Patch remained in command of Seventh Army, but he took four days off following the death of his son.77 He had “recurring moments when it is hard for me to control my grief,” but his response was “to think clearly and realize” that Mac’s suffering was over.78 On 28 October Patch returned to full duty, and his staff closed ranks around him.79 Julia and his daughter Julia Ann encouraged him to go on and to rely on their love.80 Devers wrote to tell him that Mac “was a fine soldier, a true son of his father and mother. Words cannot express what I want to say. I want you to know that you are a great soldier, a fine leader, an outstanding character in whom I repose all my confidence and affection.”81
Patch was one of a number of senior officers whose sons or stepsons were killed in action. Major General “Iron Mike” O’Daniel’s son was killed in Operation Market Garden in September. General Marshall’s stepson was killed in Italy in May. Brigadier General Cuthbert Stearns’s son was killed by a land mine on 19 October, while serving in Sixth Army Group. Major General Donald Stroh’s son was killed in September. In their own way, each of these generals carried on. O’Daniel’s response to sympathy for his loss was typical. He wrote in reply to a condolence letter: “I am more determined than ever to eliminate as many of the enemy as possible.”82
The Germans’ tough resistance along the western borders of the Reich in October ended the euphoria felt by so many Allied leaders in September. Field Marshal Montgomery blamed Eisenhower for the Allies’ strategic reverse, and another series of meetings was held to clarify goals and objectives for the three army groups. Eisenhower’s strategy had been consistent from the beginning of the campaign. The Allied armies were to advance on a broad front to the Rhine, with the main effort occurring in the north and carried out by Twenty-First and Twelfth Army Groups. Nonetheless, Montgomery argued doggedly against Ike’s strategy, maintaining that his Twenty-First Army Group should make a powerful thrust through the German defenses, cross the Rhine north of Cologne, and push on to Berlin. Eisenhower repeatedly rejected a single thrust by Montgomery in the north, insisting on a continuous front and the participation of both army groups.83
In Eisenhower’s mind, the seizure of crossings over the Rhine would be accomplished after the west bank of the Rhine, from Switzerland to the North Sea, had been cleared of German forces. But his guidance to his army group commanders did not make this clear. Devers believed that if his army group had an opportunity to cross the Rhine before the other groups reached the river, he should do so. Perhaps if Ike had spent more time discussing options with Devers, this misunderstanding would not have occurred. But after Sixth Army Group joined the crusade in Europe, Eisenhower failed to communicate effectively with Devers. For example, he did not give Devers prior warning of his 16 October visit to Sixth Army Group. Devers was at de Lattre’s headquarters in Besançon when he was informed, during lunch, that Ike and Bradley would arrive at his headquarters in Vittel at 1600. Devers flew back to his headquarters, where he, Bradley, and Eisenhower discussed logistical issues but apparently not the forthcoming offensive.84 On 17 October Devers and Eisenhower traveled by car to Epinal to visit Seventh Army headquarters, but we do not know what they discussed. Ike then spent an hour and a half with Patch before traveling on to Haislip’s command post.85 It is telling that on the few occasions when Eisenhower did go south, he spent more time at his friend Haislip’s XV Corps’ headquarters than he did at Devers’s. Eisenhower also spent a great deal of time with Bradley and communicated often with Montgomery. This gave him plenty of opportunity to make his intentions clear to them. Ike and Bradley were also close friends; they talked often on the phone and spent considerable time together. Bradley had always been subordinate to the rising Eisenhower, whereas Devers had originally outranked Ike and never paid him the deference that might have made for a better relationship.
Although Devers sent a daily personal situation report to SHAEF, both Devers and Eisenhower were at fault for failing to meet face-to-face when critical matters were discussed. For instance, Eisenhower did not include Devers in an important meeting with Montgomery and Bradley on 18 October, when he outlined his vision for the November offensives. In these discussions, Sixth Army Group was cast in a supporting role.86 Carlo D’Este has pointed out that Devers tried to stay out of Eisenhower’s way, realizing the low regard the supreme commander had for him. According to D’Este, Eisenhower likewise avoided personal contact with Devers, often using Bedell Smith or Pinky Bull, his G-3, to convey orders to Devers.87 Such poor personal relationships led to serious misunderstandings between the two men.
The 18 October meeting involving Eisenhower, Montgomery, and Bradley led to the promulgation of Eisenhower’s 28 October directive for a coordinated Allied offensive in November. Eisenhower specifically ordered Devers “to act aggressively with the object, initially, of overwhelming the enemy west of the Rhine and, later, in advancing into Germany.” The southern group of armies was to advance in zone to the Rhine, secure crossings, and “deploy in strength across the Rhine.” Eisenhower stressed that Sixth Army Group was to “protect the southern flank of the Central Group of Armies.” Five days earlier, Eisenhower had informed Devers that the Allied forces “have had to shift the center of gravity of our forces further to the north” and stressed that the location of Seventh Army’s main crossing of the Rhine would be in the vicinity of Mannheim and Karlsruhe. As noted by the authors of the official history, “Not surprisingly, given Eisenhower’s indifference to the potential of the 6th Army Group,” this directive did not specify a date for Devers to commence his attacks.88
As October came to an end, Devers, de Lattre, and Patch planned for their coordinated offensive. Seeking a better way to command an army group, Devers had authorized his G-3, Major General Reuben Jenkins, to create a Joint Planning Staff. The newly formed First Tactical Air Force (Provisional), commanded by Major General Ralph Royce, was represented on this planning staff, as were the intelligence and logistics sections of the army group’s staff.89 The Joint Planning Staff was to provide information “necessary to form an integrated plan and mold such information into feasible operational plans” for the two armies.90
Jenkins and his staff developed a plan that called for Seventh Army to be the main effort, while French First Army tied down German forces in its sector by launching a preliminary attack in the high Vosges, north of Belfort. The French attack, aimed at Colmar, would be supported by all available heavy artillery in the army group. Once it drew the German reserves to the French front, the artillery would shift to Seventh Army for the main attack. Jenkins believed that, “since we lacked the artillery and other resources to keep strong attacks by two armies going successfully, we should mass our means behind first one army and then the other in rapid succession in an effort to break the very obvious stalemate that was developing on our front.”91 Devers approved this preliminary plan on 15 October.
De Lattre, however, had a different vision of his army’s role in the big offensive. He had concluded that it was nearly impossible to punch through the German defenses in the Vosges north of Belfort. Consequently, he completely reoriented his forces for the November drive. General Bethouart’s I Corps, with four divisions, would attack south of the Belfort Gap, while de Monsabert feinted with two divisions in the mountains to the north. He also thought his army should attack at about the same time as Seventh Army launched its offensive. On 27 October de Lattre traveled to Vittel to submit this plan to Devers. De Lattre later wrote that, faced with the French “wish to effect a breach in the German lines on the Doubs and to break into the Belfort Gap,” Devers “eagerly ratified my plan” and allocated several American battalions of heavy artillery to support it.92
As Sixth Army Group prepared for the offensive, Seventh Army continued local actions to obtain better jumping-off positions. It was rough going, as Devers noted in a letter to Georgie: “We are still moving in spite of the bad weather. . . . [I] was with Ham Haislip who is one of my top commanders. Towns are on fire everywhere. The Germans loot then set them on fire. However, many pay with their lives.”93 Devers was referring to Hitler’s “scorched earth” policy. As the Germans fell back in the Vosges, they destroyed as many farms and villages as possible, leaving the civilian population destitute and without shelter for the winter.
While planning the offensive, Devers and de Lattre had to deal with a major threat to the French army’s ability to carry out its ambitious plan. On 25 October Devers noted in his diary that the SHAEF G-3, Major General H. R. Bull, “arrived with some additional responsibilities for me. The trouble with the higher command is that they will not give you a directive, with what means you have at your disposal and a policy, and let you go ahead.”94 Sixth Army Group’s additional responsibility was to send forces to western France and clear the Gironde estuary of German forces, thus opening Bordeaux, France’s second largest port.95 This mission was based on de Gaulle’s initial request that two divisions from French First Army be sent to Paris and Toulouse to prevent communist-leaning FFI units from taking control.96 That request morphed into one asking for regular forces to clear the Germans out of their enclaves in southwestern France. Devers and de Lattre were not consulted until after Eisenhower had already agreed to the request.97 When Bull visited Devers on 25 October, he directed that a French corps headquarters and two French divisions be sent, with the first units departing Lorraine on 11 November. De Gaulle specifically asked for the French 1st DB and the French 1st Infantry Division, since these units were officered by men who were loyal to de Gaulle.98
When de Lattre received the order to send these forces west, he “rushed to Vittel, ready to plead, vehemently if necessary” against the operation. The French army commander demanded that the deployment be postponed until after his planned offensive, set to begin on 13 November, and he wanted to substitute the French 2nd DB from Seventh Army for the 1st DB. Devers agreed that the timing of this diversion of roughly 15 percent of the combat strength of Sixth Army Group and 25 percent of the French army was problematic. He refused to substitute Leclerc’s 2nd DB for the 1st, but he postponed the departure of the first units to 16 November and eliminated the requirement to send a corps headquarters. Over the next three weeks, as the offensive unfolded, Devers repeatedly delayed the transfer of the French divisions, allowing events to change the plans SHAEF had imposed on Sixth Army Group with little thought for its operations.99
In all these discussions, Devers had to deal with the volatile French general. When de Lattre demanded that the mission be changed or canceled on 7 November, Devers refused to disobey the order from SHAEF. In response, de Lattre “went into a tirade,” which Devers firmly curbed. De Lattre then became “a little more rational.” As Devers noted in his diary, “He is a very difficult man to handle. . . . I have been very careful to use a good interpreter and to have people present in order that there be no misunderstanding due to his poor understanding of English and my lack of French.”100
Beyond curbing de Lattre’s tirade, Devers informed him that he considered French First Army and U.S. Seventh Army to have the same status and assured him, “I would certainly make sure that neither of them failed insofar as my powers permitted.” Devers struck the right tone, knowing that although de Lattre was temperamental, he also craved “success and has great courage and I believe he will fight the 1st French Army realistically and effectively” in the upcoming offensive.101 Again, Devers responded to this crisis in a productive manner and did not let superficial differences get in the way of effective communications and operations.
As preparations were under way for the November battles, Devers was finally replaced as the American Mediterranean theater commander and the deputy supreme Allied commander. Lieutenant General Joseph McNarney assumed those duties on 22 October and visited Devers on 1 November in Vittel. McNarney had already met with Clark in Italy, where he learned the Fifth Army commander loathed Devers. In Devers’s view, Clark “felt he was abused; that we hadn’t visited him enough; that troops had been taken away from him and that I was personally responsible. . . . Clark is a problem child, and childish, particularly when he is under pressure and not winning.”102 He had earlier shared his view of Clark with General Handy, the War Department’s operations officer: “I do not recommend Clark either as Deputy Supreme Allied Commander or as Theater Commander. . . . He is very selfish and sees all his problems through himself and how it will affect him.”103 Devers was pleased to be finished with his multiple duties in the Mediterranean theater and to be clear of Clark.
By 1 November, detailed plans for Seventh and French First Armies had been approved, and stocks of ammunition, food, and fuel had been accumulated for a sustained offensive. The question not yet answered was when to begin the attacks, since SHAEF had not specified a date for Sixth Army Group to start its major push.104 Thus, it was up to Devers to determine when to launch his two armies against the German defenses. According to the final report of Sixth Army Group’s G-3:
Headquarters 6th Army Group, Seventh Army, and Third Army had studied the German habits [of defensive operations]. One of the enemy characteristics recalled was the habitual timing of his use of general reserves. Almost without fail, the German moved his general reserves on the evening of the second day or the morning of the third day of our attack. We decided to make this trait pay dividends. . . . 6th Army Group [would attack] not earlier than three days and not later than five days after Third Army’s attack [began]. By this it was hoped that the second attack would catch the German general reserves on the move.105
Devers visited Bradley and Patton on 5 November to coordinate his plans with them. Patton hoped to begin his attack in the Metz area between 10 and 15 November, so Devers set Sixth Army Group’s initial assaults for between 13 and 18 November. Seventh Army was to attack at least one day before the French kicked off their drive south of Belfort.106
Patch’s objective was to push his two corps through the Vosges to Strasbourg. Initially, VI Corps was supposed to be the main effort, with Haislip’s XV Corps supporting VI Corps’ efforts to reach St. Die by driving toward the Saverne Gap. In the end, Patch was more flexible and allowed whichever corps was more successful to become the main effort. As planning progressed, the 100th and 103rd Infantry Divisions entered VI Corps’ line, allowing Brooks to take the 3rd and 45th Divisions out to rest. By 10 November, XV Corps had two divisions in its front lines and two in reserve, while VI Corps had three divisions in its front lines and two in reserve. The additional divisions that had reached Sixth Army Group made it possible to begin the offensive with mostly rested units.107
As a preliminary operation with Seventh Army, de Monsabert’s corps launched a diversionary attack on 3 November in the high Vosges to draw German attention and reserves from north and south of the army group’s front. This effort reinforced German perceptions that the main Allied effort would come in the high Vosges.108 De Lattre also carried out elaborate deceptions to convince the enemy that II Corps was the main effort. He even issued an order that would have allowed many troops to take leave and visit their homes in mid-November. Then he planned to launch Bethouart’s I Corps in an attack between the Swiss border and Belfort, bypassing the industrial city of Montbeliard.109
On 8 November, without prior warning, Patton commenced his attack two days earlier than anticipated. Bradley and SHAEF also failed to tell Sixth Army Group that First and Ninth Armies were going to delay their jump-off until 16 November, hoping that the weather would improve and allow air support.110 Caught off guard, Devers had to decide whether to move up the date for his armies’ attacks to 13 November. Jenkins’s Joint Planning Staff, “after a hurried conference and a review of G-4 [logistical] implications . . . agreed that the attack was feasible.” Devers agreed and ordered Seventh and French First Armies to attack on 13 November. “As time for the attack approached, the weather on the 6th Army Group front grew progressively worse. Blinding rain or snowstorms raged through the whole area. In the Vosges area roads were already clogged by snow drifts and temperatures dropping below freezing. Streams and rivers through the lower areas had over-spilled their banks.” Devers considered waiting for better flying weather, but late on 12 November he decided that the attacks must go ahead, since “the Germans will not expect us to attack in such weather. We will get surprise.”111
After this decision, Devers visited the two corps expected to lead the offensive. On 11 November he visited XV Corps and concluded, “I am confident that the XV Corps, under the able leadership of Haislip, will break through into the Rhine Valley by the first of the month.” The next day he visited “General Bethouart at his command post [of French I Corps]” and observed, “I am much impressed with his layout and his plan for attack. If I can get this French army to attack, I am quite sure they too will end up in the Rhine Valley by the first of the month, and probably sooner.”112
Figure 13.3. XV Corps’ capture of Strasbourg, 13–23 November 1944
At 0700 hours on 12 November, Seventh Army attacked. XV Corps, aiming for Sarrebourg and Saverne, was initially given priority for artillery support. Haislip had his two infantry divisions punch a hole through the German front lines, which they found lightly occupied. Then the French 2nd DB passed through, following the numerous small roads to the east, north, and south of the Saverne Gap. By 21 November, Leclerc’s division had outflanked the German defenses in the Saverne Gap and captured the town of Saverne, on the edge of the Alsace plain.113
Meanwhile, on 12 November, de Lattre requested that his attack be postponed due to the weather. He also had an unexpected visit from de Gaulle and Churchill, who arrived that morning and spent most of the day at his headquarters. When they left, Churchill implored de Lattre not to attack in the atrocious weather.114 Devers, who believed that a French attack on 13 November was essential, sent Lodge to plead with de Lattre to stick with the plan. Lodge arrived at de Lattre’s headquarters just as de Gaulle and Churchill did, and he later recalled that he followed “them around all the time so that if the opportunity arose, I could get in and talk to General de Lattre.” Only after Churchill left that afternoon was Lodge able to remind the Frenchman of “the importance we attached to his attacking and going through the Belfort Gap while Patch went through the Saverne Pass.” De Lattre “didn’t say anything,” Lodge said, “he just listened to me.”115
De Lattre had already decided to attack on 13 November, as planned. However, the snow was so bad the next morning that he was forced to postpone the offensive anyway. As it turned out, this delay reinforced his deception plan. When the French infantry divisions attacked at midday on 14 November, they took the Germans completely by surprise. The French artillery barrage caught the Germans out of their entrenchments and killed General Oschmann, commander of the 338th Volksgrenadier Division, which was covering the front. The French found a map on Oschmann’s body detailing the German positions and minefields, greatly facilitating their advance. Over the next three days, the French broke the German defenses and drove north and then east toward the Rhine. By outflanking the German fortifications around Belfort, they were able to move swiftly. Their lead elements reached the Rhine River on the evening of 19 November, and Belfort fell on 20 November.116
On 22 and 23 November Haislip’s infantry divisions followed the French 2nd Armored Division into Alsace and deployed to defend the left flank of XV Corps. VI Corps also began to make progress in the high Vosges, reaching St. Die on 22 November and St. Blaise-la-Roche the next day.117 Seventh Army was firmly established on the Alsatian plain by these advances. But the most spectacular action of the day was Leclerc’s armored columns’ swift dash across the Alsatian plain and into Strasbourg, where they completely surprised the enemy.118
It was clear to Devers that the Seventh and French First Armies’ offensives were achieving spectacular success. On 19 November he wrote to Georgie about the breakthroughs in the Saverne and Belfort Gaps. “This in spite of the great tacticians who have a fear of the Vosges and the weather and our ability to get the most out of our meager means for we are not the favored sons.” He further observed, “The soldiers are well taken care of at the front and do not complain about anything and I question many of them.”119
Figure 13.4. VI Corps’ advance, 12–26 November 1944
The next day Devers was on his way to visit Seventh Army and later noted in his diary, “I met Ted Brooks on the road and stopped to chat with him for a few minutes. He had just been up to needle the 100th Division to move a little faster. He is a great general and a great fellow, always three jumps ahead and driving on.” When Devers caught up with Haislip, he learned that the 79th Infantry Division’s assault had been a “masterpiece” and that XV Corps’ units were moving forward, “even though bottlenecked by the mud, the rain and high water in the streams.” He concluded, “This brilliant XV Corps is making tremendous progress.”120 Devers again demonstrated his understanding that a senior commander, even at the army group level, had to be well forward in an offensive to keep up the troops’ morale and to keep his finger on the pulse of operations.
Figure 13.5. First French Army’s advance through the Belfort Gap, 14–25 November 1944
During the army group’s offensive, Devers sent daily reports to Eisenhower on the progress of his armies. He heard nothing back from Ike. On 23 November he vented some of his frustration to Major General Bull, the SHAEF G-3, and wrote in his diary: “Had a long talk with Bull in which I tried to impress him with the fact that we belong to SHAEF, that we are not just a piece on the end; that we are just as important as the 12th Army Group; and that we had not asked for any help except when we thought it vitally necessary; that we wanted him to understand that when we asked for something, we really needed it; and that we have just performed a brilliant maneuver in this Army Group which would have far reaching consequences for the future.” He would have done better to hide his light under a bushel, but Devers could not pass up the opportunity to crow and stick a pin in Patton’s reputation. “Patton is stopped on my left and I will have to do something to get him going again,” he wrote in his diary. “This, in my opinion, was because he jumped off a little too early, and also because of the terrifically bad weather which dogged his footsteps.”121 Whether or not he actually said this to Bull, his exuberance was probably excessive.
The question now was what to do with the astounding victories of his two armies. Devers’s orders were to clear the enemy from the west bank of the Rhine and seize a bridgehead over the river.
Between 13 and 23 November 1944, Sixth Army Group’s armies smashed through the German defenses in the Vosges Mountains and reached the Rhine in two places. Seventh Army broke through the Saverne Gap, seized Strasbourg, and prepared to cross the Rhine. French First Army broke through the Belfort Gap, unhinged German defenses in the high Vosges, and seized Mulhouse. These successes provided Devers’s Sixth Army Group with several opportunities on the morning of 24 November.
With the collapse of German defenses in the Saverne and Belfort Gaps, Devers expected the French to clear all German forces from west of the Rhine in Alsace, and he expected Patch’s Seventh Army to send forces across the Rhine north of Strasbourg. If Seventh Army could establish a bridgehead across the Rhine, it might unhinge the German defenses facing Patton’s Third Army in Lorraine. A mood of euphoria permeated the headquarters of Sixth Army Group and Seventh Army as the staffs prepared orders for an assault across the Rhine.122 It was clear to everyone that they would attempt to establish a bridgehead over the Rhine as soon as Strasbourg was cleared and a strong front had been established on the left flank of the army group facing north. On 20 November Sixth Army Group asked SHAEF for a minimum of two airborne regimental combat teams to seize critical terrain east of the Rhine sometime between 10 and 20 December.123
On 21 November Brigadier General Davidson, Seventh Army’s engineer officer, ordered the 40th Combat Engineer Regiment to assemble river-crossing equipment for an assault on a two-regiment front and to have it ready to move by 23 November. The next day Devers conferred with Patch, and Seventh Army ordered XV Corps to protect the left flank and “reconnoiter the Rhine between Strasbourg and Munchhouse and take advantage of any opportunity for a quick crossing of the Rhine.” The same day, Sixth Army Group asked SHAEF for two heavy pontoon battalions, in addition to the three already in the group’s engineer depots.124 SHAEF promptly refused to supply the airborne units or the extra bridging material.
With the capture of Strasbourg and the arrival of the French on the Rhine near Mulhouse, Sixth Army Group contemplated three courses of action, as described in the G-3’s final report: “One was to hold on the north and divert forces to the south to assist the French in closing to the Rhine; Another was to follow exactly SHAEF’s directive and launch an attack to the north in conjunction with Third Army to breach the Siegfried Line, while leaving the French to complete the job to the south. Seventh Army and planners of Headquarters 6th Army Group posed a third course of action. . . . Seventh Army wanted to cross the Rhine in stride.”125
At this point, Generals Eisenhower and Bradley visited Sixth Army Group. As Devers wrote in his diary on 24 November, “Apparently Eisenhower came down to tell me that I was going to have to give some help to Patton and to change my mission. Instead of exploiting a crossing of the Rhine and then proceeding north, he wanted me to throw my forces directly to the north and west of the Rhine and break through the Siegfried Line in conjunction with Patton.”126 This climactic discussion took place in Vittel, after Eisenhower had visited Haislip’s headquarters. While he was there, XV Corps successfully defeated a German counterattack north of Sarrebourg, but the Germans’ attempt indicated that they still had plenty of fight left. The G-3’s final report tersely noted that, “in a conference in Vittel, on 24 November, attended by General Eisenhower and General (then Lieutenant General) Bradley, the situation was discussed. Following the conference, Seventh Army was directed to swing the bulk of its forces northward in an attack to breach the Siegfried Line.” French First Army was to clear the remaining Germans from the west bank of the Rhine.127
The next morning, Seventh Army ended all plans to jump the Rhine, and Patch began the time-consuming process of orienting the bulk of his forces north. The following day, Sixth Army Group ordered Seventh Army to drive north to help Twelfth Army Group, and it instructed the French to protect the right flank along the Rhine after eliminating German forces in a bridgehead around Colmar.128
David Colley, in his book Decision at Strasbourg, maintains that Eisenhower made a serious strategic mistake when he prevented Devers’s Sixth Army Group from pushing across the Rhine in late November 1944. According to Colley, if the supreme commander had allowed Devers to send forces across the Rhine north of Strasbourg, “many young men’s lives might have been spared,” and “almost certainly the war would have been shortened.” Instead, Colley concludes, “the Germans were given a free hand to continue their massive troop buildup in the Ardennes in preparation for the Battle of the Bulge.”129
Seventh Army staff officers, including Brigadier General Gar Davidson, believed the army could have seized a bridgehead. When he learned of Eisenhower’s decision, Davidson stated, “I [wish I] could have been in on the high level meeting for I doubt if anyone there really understood the extent of our engineering preparations and therefore the high probability of a swift crossing in force that could be sustained.”130 So perhaps Colley and others are right about the feasibility of the operation and the missed opportunity. But the problem with such “what if” scenarios is that we can never know how the alternative version would have played out. The authors of the army’s official history agree that Eisenhower’s decision had a profound effect on the campaign in the west in 1944. It also illustrated Eisenhower’s unwillingness to exploit unexpected success and his poor relationship with Devers. Because Devers was one of his top two American ground force commanders, their dysfunctional relationship hindered decision making and the execution of Eisenhower’s strategy for the defeat of Germany in 1944.
Devers was bitterly disappointed when he was ordered to end all preparations for a crossing of the Rhine near Strasbourg. He was shocked that the supreme commander chose to stick to his “broad front” strategy of advancing all Allied armies to the Rhine before establishing bridgeheads, rather than taking advantage of such a good opportunity in Alsace. Was Devers right to want to send forces across the Rhine in late November? And could he have done so while still accomplishing his assigned missions from Eisenhower?
Several other questions need to be considered to determine whether Eisenhower made a strategic blunder when he stopped Sixth Army Group from crossing the Rhine. First, how did Sixth Army Group fit into Eisenhower’s strategy, and did a crossing of the Rhine in Alsace in late November conform to his vision? Second, was it possible for Seventh and French First Armies to cross the Rhine in late November with the forces at hand and maintain themselves there in the face of the logical German response?
In answer to the second question, Sixth Army Group’s history, written in May 1945 by men who had come to respect the power and capabilities of the German army in the fall and winter of 1944–1945, concluded, “Neither army had a reasonable chance to seize a bridgehead.” The French lacked the necessary amphibious and bridging equipment, and Seventh Army was not strong enough to both protect Patton’s right flank and secure a bridgehead. Further, if Seventh Army had crossed, “The G-2 estimated that when a place of crossing was known to the enemy he could, with little delay bring three infantry and two armored divisions to attack the bridgehead.” This action by the Germans would have required SHAEF to reinforce Sixth Army Group if it were to hold the bridgehead. Such a movement of forces would have compelled Eisenhower to change his main strategic effort from north of his front to south of it.131
The tactical situation was not favorable for an assault across the Rhine, given Seventh Army’s condition and resources. When Patch ordered Haislip’s XV Corps to prepare to cross the Rhine, he assumed the troops would come from the 44th and 79th Infantry Divisions. However, these divisions had been in action since 12 November and were spread across a thirty-mile front from Sarrebourg to Hagenau. The 45th Infantry Division was XV Corps’ reserve, but it had been badly battered in the Vosges and was refitting. Haislip’s other division, the French 2nd DB, encountered heavy fighting in Strasbourg from 23 through 25 November. At the same time, XV Corps was attacked by the Panzer Lehr Division near Rauwiller, north of Sarrebourg. Haislip’s troops were badly stretched, and the 44th Infantry Division was able to turn back the Germans’ Panzer Lehr only with help from the 4th Armored Division, borrowed from Third Army.132 Meanwhile, Patch’s VI Corps was still enmeshed in the high Vosges and was expected to send one division to relieve the French 2nd DB in Strasbourg.
It is hard to see how Patch could have both maintained his exposed northern flank and sent a force across the Rhine that was large enough to defend itself against the inevitable German counterattacks. In such a scenario, a great deal of artillery support would have been needed to stop the enemy’s armor, especially since adverse weather prevented reliable air support from the First Tactical Air Force. Further, there was a critical shortage of 105mm and 155mm artillery ammunition in Sixth Army Group after two weeks of offensive action by its armies. In fact, on 23 November Sixth Army Group reported to SHAEF that it had dramatically reduced its rate of artillery fire and, at the current allocation rates, could maintain only defensive operations.133
In answer to the question of whether a Rhine crossing in November would have conformed to the army group’s mission, clearly, it would not. The offensive launched by Sixth Army Group was governed by a 28 October 1944 directive that called for taking advantage of any opportunities to “seize” bridgeheads east of the Rhine during the first phase of the action, while operations leading to their “capture” were reserved for the second phase. The term “seize” implied sudden action against little or no resistance. Yet the army group G-2’s estimate of enemy reaction indicates that the element of surprise did not exist, and an assault over the Rhine would have encountered a strong German response. In SHAEF’s 28 October order, Sixth Army Group’s main mission was to protect the right flank of Twelfth Army Group. Spreading its forces across the Rhine would have jeopardized that mission. All along, Eisenhower had assumed that all his armies would advance to the Rhine before any of them crossed it. Unfortunately, he failed to make this clear to Devers in advance. At the end of the conference in Vittel, “the early success of Sixth Army Group caused but little change in General Eisenhower’s plans. His apparent decision was to continue operations for decisive defeat of the enemy West of the Rhine and to await a more favorable opportunity for opening the SECOND PHASE involving the capture of bridgeheads over the RHINE and deployment on the East bank.”134
Devers was sorely disappointed by Eisenhower’s decision, but he loyally complied. He also characteristically gave credit where credit was due for his army group’s dramatically successful operations:
The First French Army, in a manner reflecting the highest credit on French Arms and traditions, has stormed and breached the main defenses of the Belfort Gap. . . . The Seventh U.S. Army, increasing the weight of its blows, has surged forward. It has freed many French towns . . . and is exploiting to the Northeast with strong forces. . . . The First Tactical Air Force, composed of American and French units . . . is supporting the attacks of the two armies in a decisive manner. The successful attacks of both armies have been ably supported by the Supply Services. . . . The noteworthy success of these operations has again revealed the superior leadership of our army commanders. The mettle of each officer, noncommissioned officer and soldier of the American and French forces . . . has been shown by these operations.135
In his diary, Devers revealed his personal feelings about Eisenhower’s decision: “The decision not to cross the Rhine was a blow to both Patch and myself for we were really poised and keyed up to the effort, and I believe it would have been successful.”136
The way ahead was unclear, and Devers had little time to reflect on the past. He had to concentrate on getting the French to accomplish the difficult task of eliminating what became known as the Colmar pocket while pushing Patch to the Siegfried Line. The German Nineteenth Army still had a bridgehead on the west bank of the Rhine; it had received significant reinforcements and was dug in for a long fight. Seventh Army was shifting forces north to aid Third Army, as Eisenhower had ordered, and it would have few reserves to spare to assist the French in an offensive against the Colmar pocket. In fact, the French army was nearing the point of exhaustion as de Lattre dealt with replacement and logistical problems and the planned diversion of forces to western France as ordered by de Gaulle.
