UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON SQUARE,
NEW YORK, May 24, 1875.
MY DEAR GENERAL: Now, I suppose, there can be no doubt that your decision to publish your war memoirs was correct. One would have supposed that, whatever else might be denied, your origination of the “march to the sea” would never have been called in question. Yet you see it is! If there is to be a battle upon that or any other point, it is better that it should be fought now, while you who know all the facts of the case are here to take care of your own reputation. If claims that every one has for the last ten years admitted to be just can be called in question now, what would not be possible hereafter?
I do not see with what face the persons who are engaged in this disreputable attempt can proceed. How are they going to get over your letter of October 10th to Grant, or those of the same day to Howard and to Thomas? Surely you would not have presumed, in writing to Grant on October 10th, to say, “Had I better not execute the plan of my letter,” if the operation contemplated had been advised by him. Nor would you the next day have sent him the cipher dispatch that you did. To the same effect is your letter to Halleck of October 19th, and that of November 2d to Grant. Grant in his letter to you of that same date does not say, “Go on as I proposed,” but “Go on as you propose.”
So I repeat, as there is to be a controversy, let it come now. Of course, it is a disagreeable thing to have such an affair on one’s hands—an affair which one would very gladly avoid if possible, but I think you are fortunate in discovering what envious rivals are ready to do.
I received from Appletons this morning a copy of the “Memoirs” as presented by yourself, and heartily thank you for bearing me in mind. They have got the book up in very good style, and in that respect have left nothing to be desired. In the course of this and the next week I shall read it through, but I did not care to delay writing to congratulate you on the event.
General Grant could by half a dozen words stifle all these shameful claims, and do you justice. He ought to do so.
With kindest regards to your family, believe me, my dear general,
Very truly yours,
J. W. DRAPER.
General SHERMAN.
WEST POINT, May 29, 1875.
DEAR GENERAL: The presentation to me of a copy of your “Memoirs” was no less pleasing than unexpected.
I have refrained from writing until I could finish the book, which I have read with absorbing interest. I feel personally indebted to you for this contribution to history, which will not only enhance your reputation, but, what will be more gratifying to you, will attract the attention of Europe to the achievements of our army and open up a fertile field of illustration to the future students of strategy and grand tactics. I see there are some criticisms in the press, but all lovers of the truth will be glad that you have been faithful in your narration. I can safely say, from my knowledge of the character of some of the delinquent officers, that you have treated them with tender consideration. I am glad to have read your book before going abroad, as it has made clear and well defined my knowledge of operations in the West and South, which before was but vague and shadowy, and will thus enable me to talk intelligently with all officers who may seek information. I wrote a few days since to the Secretary of War about my tour, and mentioned Audenried as a desirable officer to accompany me. The Secretary replied that Audenried had been abroad once, and that he thought it ought to be given to some officer serving with troops. I owe this tour entirely to you, and would be glad to have you suggest some one to accompany me—Alexander might like to go, but I doubt if he would like to leave his family so long. With many thanks for the “Memoirs,” ever
Very respectfully yours,
E. UPTON.
NOTE.—Lieutenant-Colonel George A. Forsyth, of Lieutenant-General Sheridan’s staff, and Captain Joseph P. Sanger, of the First Artillery, accompanied General Upton on his tour around the world, and have since contributed largely of military knowledge to the profession.
W. T. S.
ST. LOUIS, 1885.
NEW YORK, December 12, 1875.
MY DEAR GENERAL: It has often been a subject of discussion between not only officers of the volunteer and regular army, but military critics, as to how far General Lee’s plans and movements during the campaign immediately preceding his surrender were influenced by your “march to the sea.” Thinking the following extract of a letter written by General Lee, three years after the close of the war, might not have come under your notice, and regarding it as having a most important bearing upon the discussion referred to, being the unprejudiced testimony of the only person who could give the facts and reasons which controlled the movements of the Confederate forces operating for the defense of the Confederate capital, I have made a transcript of the following:
“WARM SPRINGS, VIRGINIA, JULY 27, 1868.
“General W. S. SMITH.
. . . . . . . . .
“As regards the movements of General Sherman, it was easy to see that, unless they were interrupted, I should be compelled to abandon the defense of Richmond, and with a view of arresting his progress I so weakened my force by sending reënforcements to South and North Carolina that I had not sufficient men to man my lines.
“Had they not been broken, I should have abandoned them as soon as General Sherman reached the Roanoke.
(Signed)
“R. E. LEE.”
Yours truly,
G. A. CUSTER,
Brevet Major-General, United States Army.
General W. T. SHERMAN, United States Army.
11 GROSVENOR MANSION,
VICTORIA STREET, S. W., LONDON, December 25, 1875.
General W. T. SHERMAN.
MY DEAR SIR: There could be no more desirable gift than that which has just reached me of your (red) second volume from the publishers. I thank you again heartily, and add special thanks for your valuable remarks touching European war. I have nothing at present to offer you in return if it was at all possible to balance such a work, which it assuredly is not. I have been writing a little again on the Prussians, but mainly in the “Edinburgh,” which I know is regularly republished with you. The newest foreign thing, however, is Ducrot’s little book on “Tirailleurs,” interesting mainly as showing how close the best French officers are copying the Germans. I am taking the liberty of sending you a copy, one of the first got over here.
Mrs. Chesney desires me to thank you heartily for the promise of the photograph, for which she will look anxiously. She unites with me in best wishes, and I am always
Yours very sincerely,
C. C. CHESNEY.
P. S.—I ought not to close this without adding that, deep as is my interest in your book, I never thought of your campaign as “all confusion.” Indeed, may I not hope you remember my lecturing on your Atlanta advance very soon after it had taken place? One part only I had been very doubtful about—your Meridian campaign. I, of course, am the more pleased to now have it fully cleared.
C. C. C.
(Colonel of Engineers, English Army).
STAFF COLLEGE, FARNBRO STATION,
(NEAR ALDERSHOT, ENGLAND), July 28, 1875.
DEAR GENERAL SHERMAN: I have just had the greatest satisfaction to receive a copy of your “Memoirs,” most valuable in any case; but my pleasure is greatly increased by the book being your own gift. I shall look with pride at its place on my shelves after my careful and profitable study of it. I was on the point of ordering it from a publisher’s when it arrived. The world is greatly indebted to you for furnishing such important and authentic material toward the record of the second great historical epoch of your country, and students of military art owe you much for the clear narrative of matters essential to be known, but generally omitted from the histories of wars. Coming from whatever hand, the details of transport movement and supply would be of great value; but from you, who devised the plans and gave the orders, they are inestimable.
Last September, I and the officers under my charge went through a little sham campaign as training for staff duties, and I afterward published the record of it. I can scarcely expect that a leader who has conducted such famous operations will care to look at it; but I venture to send it for your kind acceptance, as well as a pamphlet I lately published on what may be called the philosophy of outposts, and I should consider it a great honor if you think them worthy of a glance. With renewed thanks for the kind favor, believe me, dear general,
Yours sincerely,
E. B. HAMLEY.
SONOMA, CALIFORNIA, December 15, 1880.
FRIEND SHERMAN: From time to time I have observed some unfavorable criticism of your “Memoirs,” which is accounted for by your just estimate of newspaper correspondents in the closing of your “Military Lessons of the War.” Those writers, having found employment on newspapers in every part of the country, never forget or forgive. However, as falsehood and ridicule are ephemeral, and truth eternal, you have the best of it.
I have just finished reading the volumes of your “Memoirs,” and find them the most interesting pages I have ever perused. All the facts and circumstances, given as they occurred, are so faithfully and plainly related that they fairly photograph themselves upon the understanding.
It was a wise conclusion of yours to write that book, for I am now well convinced that justice never would have been meted out to you by future historians; the envy of others would have warped their judgment. The fact is, no one else could have given such details, for they could not be concentrated in the brains of any other individual.
If the history of the war was to be written for the schools, yours could not be condensed to advantage; and if for a standard library work, yours could not be improved as far as it goes.
Your triumphs never have been and never will be equaled, your glory will never be dim, and generations yet unborn will do honor to your name. Like every true American, I am proud of you, and take this occasion to say so.
Being now seventy, I am living on borrowed time. I see you will be sixty-two next April. I shall, on the 27th of that month, be seventy-one. Please reply. I want your signature. Remember me kindly to your wife and children.
Your friend,
A. M. WINN.
General W. T. SHERMAN, Washington, D. C.
COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA, June 22, 1872.
General W. T. SHERMAN, Washington, D. C.
GENERAL: I have just finished reading your “Memoirs,” written by yourself, and have been so much pleased with them that I cannot resist the temptation to write you a line. I never before in my life became so much interested in a book. I could not put it down after commencing it, especially the second volume. It carries with it the stamp of truth in every line, and no one reading it can fail to see it. When your army moved in the spring of 1864, I was a captain in the Seventh Connecticut (General A. H. Terry’s old regiment); was captured June 2d, and taken to Macon, Georgia; was there, and never shall I forget the day, when McPherson was killed. Not a prisoner but seemed to feel it as though he had been a brother. The feeling was, I assure you, not confined to Western soldiers. I remember well Stoneman’s coming into stockade. When you took Atlanta I was in Charleston. The papers there tried to convince the people that Atlanta did not amount to much anyhow, and it was better on the whole that you should have it. On October 4th I was sent to this place, and with the rest of the officers, about eighteen hundred, sent into stockade on the Lexington side of the Congaree River. I made an unsuccessful attempt at escape on the 4th of November; was recaptured and brought back. Got out again on the night of 28th November, reached gunboat off Georgetown on morning of December 8th, and was at Hilton Head when you took Fort McAllister. On our passage down the river we laid up our boat in the day and traveled nights, and were furnished with provisions by the negroes, and never knew one to fail to respond with the best he or she could obtain when asked. We had been unable for some time to hear from you, or to know what was going on. I felt sure, however, you would go to Savannah. One morning I came across an old negro with more than ordinary intelligence, and I said to him, “Do you hear anything from General Sherman?” “Oh, yes, we hear young massa talk about Mr. Sherman” (it was and is now to a great extent the custom to call you Mr. Sherman by both whites and blacks, instead of General). “What does he say?” “He says Mr. Sherman cross de river, and dey don’t know whar he’s gwine, but dat dey got a army behind that can’t catch up with him, and de army in front of him can’t get out de way.” I am much pleased with your plain talk about some of the rebel generals. The feeling of the people in this State toward the United States Government has not changed one iota, or toward those who fought in the Union cause, no matter how much they try, and do gloss it over at the centennials, where they are feted and treated. I have lived here nine years among them, and know. I think every lover of the Union should have in his house your book, and that his children should read it as soon as they can read anything, to see and to know what it cost in life, hardship, and treasure to preserve for them this Government.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JOHN B. DENNIS,
Late Brevet Brigadier-General U. S. Volunteers.
TREASURY OF THE UNITED STATES,
WASHINGTON, June 22, 1875.
MY DEAR GENERAL: I have just finished your “Memoirs.” It is the only book, save one, that I have read in twenty years. You cannot imagine how I enjoyed it from beginning to end, for which please accept my thanks.
I was residing in the city of New York in 1846 when the “armed emigration” under Colonel Stevenson was organized, and saw the regiment leave for the Pacific coast. So I was able to follow you all the way through for twenty years to the close of the war of the rebellion, in which you acted so very conspicuous a part, and added so much to the glorious history of our country.
Entertained, instructed, and pleased as I was all the way through your narrative, I was particularly struck with the justice of your ideas and the force with which you expressed them, at the conclusion, in regard to your staff.
But comparatively, the evils flowing from this branch of the public service are to a degree limited, and show themselves in a mild form in the army, while in the civil departments they are intolerable.
The lowest clerk, and even a messenger, in the office proper of the head of a department is considered competent, and authorized to direct the official actions of the chiefs of the various bureaus.
This is utterly subversive of efficiency in the offices, and an absolute obstruction and hinderance to the correct and proper transaction of the public business.
Again thanking you for the enjoyment the reading of your book has afforded me, I am, most sincerely,
Your friend,
F. E. SPINNER.
General WILLIAM T. SHERMAN, St. Louis, Missouri.
WASHINGTON, D. C., July 5, 1875.
MY DEAR GENERAL: Since I parted with you at Columbus, I have read your two volumes of “Memoirs” very carefully, and I cannot let the occasion pass without telling you how much pleasure they have given me. Though the general history of the war was very familiar to me, I read these volumes with a keenness of interest which I have rarely experienced. The fresh and vivid style, the graphic description of persons and events would make your book attractive even were the subject-matter less interesting than it is. While you have very frankly given your opinion of your associates in the war, I do not believe that a just criticism will charge you with doing any intentional injustice to any one. It was not possible that such great events could have transpired without bringing into sharp collision individual interests and opinions; and I believe it is far better that all controverted opinions should be debated while the actors are living. Judging from the effect of your book upon myself, I cannot doubt that it will greatly strengthen the affection with which you are cherished by the American people. With kindest regards, I am very truly yours,
J. A. GARFIELD.
General W. T. SHERMAN, St. Louis, Missouri.
ATHENS, OHIO, July 12, 1875.
General W. T. SHERMAN.
DEAR SIR: I have from time to time read the ingenious and rather bitter reviews of certain portions of your “Memoirs” by General Boynton, in the Cincinnati Gazette.
So much as relates to your published comments and historical statements of the campaigns of General George H. Thomas, and more especially his last great campaign of 1864, I have read with great interest. Neither to General Boynton nor any one else do I yield the palm for devotion to the memory and history of General Thomas. I served under him, often under his observation, from October, 1862, until the end of the war, and until November 22, 1865. I commanded a brigade at Nashville, and served all through his campaigns of that year.
It may be in some degree gratifying to you that, jealous as I am of the fame of Thomas, gratified as I am for his unsought indorsement of my own character as a soldier, and confident as I am that his record is without a blemish, or “spot, or wrinkle, or any such thing,” yet nothing that you have written of him and his campaigns do I criticise as untrue, unjust, or even injudicious and ill-timed.
The misgivings you had in your tent away off from us pressed heavily upon us around our camp-fires at Nashville. We who were in inferior positions of command felt, or at least feared, that the long delays were likely to be fatal in the end; and often, between November 30th and December 15th, as I rode along the familiar lines of our army, and saw the solid works of Hood going up, I felt the moments of delay were golden, and perhaps fatal ones to us.
That my impatience and misgiving was without reasonable cause now appears affirmatively; and yet it existed, and was reasonable at the time. Our apprehensions did not take the shape of doubts of the zeal or competency of Thomas, so much as a dread of some obstacles to our progress, of the existence and magnitude of which we did not know and comprehend.
I am, general, your obedient servant,
C. H. GROSVENOR.
KALAMA, WASHINGTON TERRITORY, JULY 13, 1875.
DEAR GENERAL: I have just finished reading your “Memoirs,” and want to thank you for that valuable addition to the literature of our country. Many of the critics seem surprised that you should publish facts instead of fiction, and I don’t wonder, as the latter has become so fashionable. The facts of your book will be invaluable in the future to the conscientious historian. I could but wonder at the ill-natured criticisms of some, without regard to your comments on Generals Blair and Logan. Your views of these gentlemen as soldiers are precisely the same as those expressed by hundreds of volunteer officers during the war, and who felt for both those gentlemen only the highest respect and most kindly feelings.
I am sure every soldier who had the good fortune to serve with you in the late war will, if possible, feel an increased affection for you, and wonder that you were able to draw so true a picture of the scenes of which you were the central figure.
Please accept, general, my grateful thanks, and believe me,
Respectfully, your sincere friend, JOHN W. SPRAGUE.
General W. T. SHERMAN, United States Army, St. Louis, Missouri.
LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY,
BATON ROUGE, LOUISIANA, JULY 17, 1875.
General W. T. SHERMAN, St. Louis, Missouri.
DEAR GENERAL: I have read your book pretty carefully, especially the chapter on Louisiana.
The book will no doubt prove what you design it to be, a valuable contribution to the future historian who may wish to write of the origin and conduct of our great civil war.
The chapter on California I could almost anticipate page after page. I had heard you talk it all in 1860–’61, and the California story is, I think, the best part of the work. I am sorry you left out Florida and West Point; and it would have been all the better had you gone back to Ohio, and “Nosey Josey,” and other old Western characters that you used to have us laugh at.
As to the Louisiana portion of the “Memoirs,” it is true in its aim and purpose, and almost faultless even in its details, and you know I had a good opportunity of testing its accuracy. From January 1, 1860, until you left the seminary, in February, 1861, I knew you very intimately, officially and personally. Our isolation in the pine-woods, and messing together, enabled our little party of professors to see and know more of each other than would otherwise have been the case. And, with the exception of a few minor and unimportant details, your account of our school, yourself, and your relations to it and to the State, and of Louisiana affairs generally, as given in your book, is true—given with remarkable fidelity. You may recollect that I staid at the seminary for you during the vacation of 1860, while you visited your family in Ohio. You necessarily wrote me on business frequently, and as the country (North and South) was then in considerable agitation, pending the presidential election, you wrote a good deal also of politics. All those letters I have preserved, as well as those you did me the honor to write me after you had left us in 1861, from New Orleans and St. Louis, as late as May 13th, and they bear you out in what you say in your book on Louisiana. Regarding what I knew of your opinions and intentions, gathered from daily talk and discussions, you were a Clay Whig (if you were of any party at all), and I a Calhoun Democrat; you denying the right of secession, and I maintaining it. I need only say that, for six months before Louisiana seceded, you even then, and at all times, denounced secession as treason; said if Louisiana did secede, you would resign your superintendency of our school, and go away, and you did so. All the while, however, you expressed the hope that there would be no secession of any of the Southern States; and I shall never forget how you received the news of the secession of South Carolina. I happened to be in your room with you when the mail was brought in, and when you read of the actual passage of the formal and solemn withdrawal by that State from the Union, you cried like a little child, exclaiming: “My God, you Southern people don’t know what you are doing! Peaceable secession! There can be no peaceable secession. Secession means war. The North will fight you, and fight you hard, and God only knows how or where it will end!” Yet, even after that, you seemed to have a vague hope that something would take place to bring back the seceding States, and to prevent actual war, and your letters to me show that to have been your hope, as late as April 4, 1861. But all the while, before you left Louisiana and afterward, you said that, if war did come, every true man must take sides one way or the other; and, as for you, you would go with the North, or the Union, as it was then understood. Nevertheless, your letters from St. Louis, of April and May, show clearly that you were then checked, or restrained, from actively taking sides with the North, by what you believed to be the partisan nature of Mr. Lincoln’s Administration, and from feelings of friendship for us in the South. I remember well how it grieved you to leave us, and how sorry were we to see you go, and how great an influence was brought to bear on you to keep you at your post at the head of our school.
Moore and Bragg and Beauregard and Dick Taylor all wrote you most urgently to stay. Some of these letters, left by you among the official letters, I recollect seeing as late as 1863. One of a very friendly nature from Beauregard, particularly, I remember seeing there. And General Taylor told me, during the war, that he had thought you would not leave the seminary after you had received a certain letter from him. All these gentlemen, so distinguished afterward, seemed attached to you personally, and were very anxious that you should remain as president of our school; and my impression then was, and now is, that they thought you could do so without compromising yourself in politics, or taking actively any part for the South, should war take place. I recollect a little incident at Manassas that tends to confirm me in this view. A few days after the battle, some of us from Louisiana spoke of the false rumor that you had been captured, when Dr. S. A. Smith, our Vice-President of the Board of Supervisors, said: “By Gemminy, I wish it had been so; I would like to have a good long talk with him, and then make him go back home to the seminary!” The letters of Beauregard, Bragg, and others alluded to, you might possibly find. Major Gillespie, of Macon, Missouri, says that he removed all the books, papers, apparatus, etc., from the old seminary in 1864, by order of General T. Kilby Smith, of the Federal army, and that General Smith took charge of some of the articles himself. Who knows but he may have preserved those letters? [He did.—W. T. S.]
Any account of the war, however accurate and liberal, must be, to even Confederates, full of sadness. We made a struggle such as history may never tell of again. We lost so much of our best blood, only to fail!
There are some few things in your book that I regret. You have mistaken the character of some of the Confederate leaders. If you had known Mr. Davis and General Hampton personally and well, I know you well enough to say that you would not have done them the injustice you have in your book.
The burning of Columbia accounts for itself—one army retreating, stragglers falling behind; the other advancing, bummers in front, Confederate storehouses fired, and cotton (which the Confederates were afraid to burn, lest they would burn the town) unbaled and scattered through the streets, with liquor everywhere! Nothing but a miracle could have saved Columbia from burning. Such is the account given me in 1866, by one who was present, a Southern lad, a son of a prominent New Orleans gentleman; and I have always felt that neither you nor Hampton were to blame, and that there ought never to have been a word between you about it.
Mr. Jefferson Davis, whatever else may be said of him, is a humane, Christian gentleman. He was really opposed to the war, thought secession premature, but, as a States-rights man, went along with Mississippi into the Confederacy, and became, without his seeking, its president. He entered into the great struggle with his whole soul, and failed simply because God seems not to have meant us (of the South) to break up the Union! How else can you account for the death of Albert Sidney Johnston, from a mere scratch, just in the height of his victory at Shiloh; and the calling back of Jackson, by Lee, when in the act of making his final rush on McClellan at Harrison’s Bar, when McClellan says (under oath) he expected to surrender his whole army? And the killing of Jackson, by his own men, when Hooker’s condition was so desperate at Chancellorsville? And Ewell standing still in the streets of Gettysburg and quietly looking on at Meade slowly and timidly crowning the heights with men and guns? And a commissioned officer five days slow in carrying to Dick Taylor and Kirby Smith the terrible straits of General Banks’s army and Admiral Porter’s fleet at Grand Ecore, after the defeat at Mansfield? And, that army captured and that fleet destroyed, would not the blockade of the Mississippi River have been raised, and Nashville fallen to Hood, and Jubal Early have taken Washington? The issues of war turn often upon trifles too small for man to see or consider; but God observes them all, integrates all such differentials, and uses them for His own wise purposes. He never meant us of the Confederacy to succeed, and it is the duty of every true Confederate soldier to acquiesce in His decision; to thank Him for the abolition of slavery, and the preservation of the American Union.
But I have wandered off from Mr. Davis. He had no more to do with the assassination of Mr. Lincoln than you had; and the sensible, far-seeing man he is must, for the sake of his own dear South, have regretted his death even more than you could have done. For then Mr. Lincoln’s good sense and firmness had saved the Union; and we needed his kindness of heart and liberal views to save the South. It was a sad day for the South (and for the Union) when Mr. Lincoln was killed (by a crazy actor), and the national government fell into the hands of partisans and demagogues, and cowards and thieves, and nobody knew that better than Jefferson Davis; no one so soon felt it in his own person, and ever since, the outrageous and ignominious treatment which he received at Fortress Monroe, from men who would have done you likewise, if they had dared—an indignity imposed upon him merely because he was the able and conscientious bearer of a gallant and earnest (though unfortunate) people. I loved Jefferson Davis dearly, and I shall teach my children to love him and to revere his memory.
Please pardon the liberty I have taken as a friend to speak to you frankly, not too fully, about your book. In the last letter I had from you at St. Louis (May 13, 1861), before you had entered actively into the war, you say, “No matter what happens, I will ever consider you my personal friend.” I am proud to know that this promise shown to me has been verified, and in all this great country, outside of your own immediate family, there is not one who rejoices more in your personal success and great fame than
Your humble but devoted friend,
D. F. BOYD.
FORT WAYNE, MICHIGAN, September 24, 1875.
General W. T. SHERMAN.
DEAR GENERAL: I have carefully read your “Memoirs,” and desire to express my admiration of the work as a vivid picture of the great part of the war your experience was made in. It is not to be supposed, indeed it is not possible, that all the actors in their varied scenes should be satisfied with the parts assigned them, neither is it possible that you could have a perfect and personal acquaintance of the circumstances of every portion of your widely extended theatres of movements and battles.
On page 581, second volume of the “Memoirs,” it is stated: “General Stanley had come up on the left of General Davis, and was deploying, though there could not have been on his front more than a skirmish-line. Had he moved straight by the flank, or by a slight circuit to his left, he would have inclosed the whole ground occupied by Hardee’s corps, and that corps could not have escaped us.” I have no copy of my official report with me, but have a copy of the daily journal of my chief of staff, Colonel J. S. Fullerton, written the night of September 1, 1864. I also ask you to read the inclosed extracts from letters to me from General Nathan Kimball, John Newton, and William Grose, to each of whom I addressed a note in order to get their recollections of the day’s movements, and the state of the case. I give only extracts, as each of these letters contains private matter only interesting to myself.
In regard to the day’s result at Jonesboro’, I assure you I felt at the time, and have since felt, as discontented as yourself. I urged the movement in person, and at the time thought Newton unnecessarily slow (I think since he did all he could under the circumstances). The only criticism I have to make is the one made by General Grose, that “too much time was spent tearing up railroads.” About 2, or half-past 2, P.M., Colonel Willard Warner came to me and said that you directed that a thorough destruction of the railroad be made. If we had marched on the enemy during the hours we spent burning ties, and making bows and loops of iron rails, we would have ruined Hardee’s corps, sure enough. General Thomas never came near me, nor did I meet any one that afternoon who could give me the least information with regard to the situation of affairs. I accompanied Newton’s division in its deployment, and urged them on. Just at dark I received a contused wound from a musket-ball in the groin that disabled me for the remainder of that day. I submit these papers to you, with the utmost good nature, to show you that your supposition in regard to the force of the enemy upon my front is a mistaken one. The great difficulty was the dense tangle of underbrush we had to traverse under artillery-fire, and the impossibility in consequence of the ranking generals being able to push the advance rapidly by any personal influence.
I am aware that there was much severe criticism made upon the Fourth Corps at the time, but I have always felt we had a record that could stand a little hammering, and this communication is intended only for yourself.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
D. S. STANLEY, Colonel Twenty-second Infantry,
Brevet Major-General, U. S. Army.
[INCLOSURES.]
Extract from Diary of Brevet Brigadier-General J. S. Fullerton, Chief of Staff, Fourth Army Corps, U. S. Army, for the 1st day of September, 1864.
ATLANTA & MACON RAILROAD, BELOW
ROUGH AND READY, GEORGIA.
4 A.M.—Our working parties commenced to destroy the railroads.
4.30 A.M.—Received a note from department headquarters, of which the following is a copy:
“RENFREWS, GEORGIA, August 31, 1864.
“Major-General D. S. STANLEY,
“Commanding Fourth Army Corps.
“GENERAL: The major-general commanding directs that tomorrow morning early you commence the destruction of the Macon & Western Railroad in connection with General Schofield, who will receive orders from General Sherman.
“You will destroy, as far as you can, in the direction of Jonesboro’, or until you meet with General Baird’s division of the Fourteenth Corps, which you will probably find engaged in the same kind of work. Should you meet or overtake General Baird, you will report for further orders. Brigadier-General Garrard has been ordered to cover the flank of your column during your march down the road.
“Very respectfully,
“WILLIAM D. WHIPPLE, A. A. G.
“P. S.—General Baird struck the railroad at 5 P.M. to-day, and went to work immediately breaking the road.
W. D. W.”
5.30 A.M.—Directed division commanders to make immediate preparations to march. General Kimball’s division to move down the railroad toward Jonesboro’, followed by General Newton, these two divisions to destroy the railroad. General Wood’s division to march carefully down the Griffin road (which runs parallel with the railroad) toward Jonesboro’, and to take the artillery with him, all save two guns, which are to move with the column down the railroad.
8 A.M.—Kimball commenced to move down the railroad, followed by Newton, destroying the road as they marched.
10 A.M.—Arrived at the point on the railroad where Baird had destroyed it; he only destroyed about three hundred yards of it, and that partially. Went over to report our arrival at this point to General Thomas; this is at Morris Station.
11 A.M.—Found General Thomas; he said he had sent General Wood from the Macon (or Griffin) road to join the rest of the corps at Morris Station, and that, as soon as he arrived there, for General Stanley to put his troops in column, and to send a man on and report his readiness to move to him (General Thomas) as soon as he can. Gave the message to General Stanley at 12.15 P.M.
12.45 P.M.—General Wood has joined the command and started to General Thomas to inform him of the fact; found him near Jonesboro’ with General Howard at 2.30 P.M. He sent word to General Stanley to push forward down the railroad for Jonesboro’ at once. This message was delivered to General Stanley at 3.30 P.M., and the column commenced to move at 3.40 P.M., General Kimball leading, followed by Newton, then Wood.
4.45 P.M.—Head of the column arrived at a point near Jonesboro’, where the enemy was fortified. General Davis’s corps (Fourteenth) was then going into position (his formations are made) on the right of the railroad to assault the enemy’s works. (Kimball and Newton only.)
4.50 P.M.—Orders were given division commanders to deploy on the left of the railroad, and to advance immediately after their formations were made upon the enemy’s position, for the purpose of assaulting the same and assisting General Davis. These orders were obeyed, and the troops commenced to form for advance immediately—Kimball’s division on the right and Newton’s on the left, while Wood’s division was massed close in the rear of our line for support to any part of the same. The troops of the First and Second Divisions made their formations and moved forward as rapidly as possible. In front of the First Division the underbrush was so thick that it was almost impossible to move through it, and Newton could not go before this division. It was necessary to keep up connection with it.
5.30 P.M.—We drove in the enemy’s skirmishers after a brisk fight, and Kimball’s division came up to the enemy’s works at about 5.40 P.M. They were in a strong place, and just beyond a deep ravine, and he thought it not practicable to assault them; he made a feeble attempt to do so, and found he could not succeed. Newton moved up as fast as possible through such thick wood between, it was dark before he reached the enemy. He had completely turned his right flank, but it was too late in the day to accomplish anything.
7 P.M.—We commenced to barricade along our front.
7.30 P.M.—Received instructions to move upon the enemy’s works tomorrow morning at daylight. At once directed division commanders to prepare for an assault at daylight, to get up plenty of ammunition, etc. We lost in killed and wounded about one hundred and fifteen to-day. Day clear and very hot. Thoroughly destroyed about five miles of the Macon railroad-track to-day. Took seventy enlisted men and five commissioned officers prisoners to-day.
A true copy:
D. S. STANLEY, Colonel Twenty-second Infantry.
Letter from Major-General Nathan Kimball.
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, July 3, 1875.
General D. S. STANLEY, Fort Wayne, Michigan.
DEAR GENERAL: Yours of June 14th ult. was duly received, but, being necessarily absent, I could not answer earlier. I note your reference to General Sherman’s “Memoirs,” which I have read, and regret that he has made such a great mistake.
Your recollection of the disposition of the enemy’s force, and especially as to his position and strength at Jonesboro’, to which you call my attention, is correct, as I remember it, and, though I have not my notes, journal, or any of my papers here to refresh my memory, I am certain that General Sherman is mistaken. My division, the First of the Fourth Corps, was deployed, my right resting on the railroad, and joined to Jeff. C. Davis’s left. I found the enemy well posted on a ridge, or hill, being the bluff bank of a ravine, and in great force—whether Hardee’s corps alone or more, I do not know. Their works or positions extended beyond my left, so that General Newton’s division, which deployed and formed on my left, found them in his front, or at least in front of his right. Newton’s left came round, when the enemy were yet resisting us, and captured their hospital just after dark. I know that my entire line was resisted by both infantry and artillery. You remember what difficulty I had in getting my battery in position under the fire from theirs. You were slightly wounded at that point just at dark. The line of works, barricade of logs and earth made and occupied by the enemy, continued from the railroad, at a point immediately opposite, to the line of works carried by Morgan’s brigade of Jeff. C. Davis’s command diagonally to the left along the ridge or bluff mentioned. The only way we could have passed around them by a flank movement would have been to march miles away to make the circuit, and left Jeff. C. Davis’s left entirely exposed, and this would have enabled Hardee to turn Davis’s flank and attack our line (Davis) in rear. After deploying we met a heavy skirmish-line, which retired to their main line, and fought us with as much determination as they ever did in any engagement. My own impression was, at the time, that the enemy was preparing to move around Davis’s left, and believe that he would if we had not come up at the time we did. Their line of works encountered by us were freshly made, seemingly designed to retire to in case of failure to flank Davis, or on meeting a resisting column. Sherman is much mistaken in his ideas of that fight, so far as my division was concerned, and of your movement.
I am, as ever, truly your friend,
NATHAN KIMBALL.
A true copy:
D. S. STANLEY, Colonel Twenty-second Infantry.
Extract from Letter of Brevet Major-General John Newton.
NEW YORK, June 22, 1875.
General D. S. STANLEY.
DEAR GENERAL: Yours of the 14th came to hand, and I have been trying to refresh my memory of the events spoken of.
Most of the details have escaped my mind. My impression is, that the order to you, having to come through several hands, was delayed in delivery. I remember this, because that, while the facts were fresh in my mind, I defended you against Sherman himself, who thought you were slow in coming up that day.
I remember the difficult ground through which my division forced its way, and how it was urged on both by you and myself, and that no time was lost, but we came in too late, i. e., at dark. I have only a slight remembrance about Kimball’s action that day. For him to have advanced by a flank would have been absurd.
Yours truly,
JOHN NEWTON.
A true copy:
D. S. STANLEY, Colonel Twenty-second Infantry.
Extract from Letter of Brigadier-General William Grose.
NEWCASTLE, July 2, 1875.
General D. S. STANLEY.
MY DEAR GENERAL: Your kind note of 30th ult. came last evening. Truly glad and surprised to hear from you. It would do me so much good to see you and talk over old times.
General Sherman’s “Memoirs” are creating quite a buzz. I inclose you an extract from my official report of the campaign covering the Jonesboro’ day. I always thought the fault of that day’s work lay in spending too much time in destroying railroads. From the time I had orders to leave the railroad and prolong line of First Brigade, it would have been impossible, even with a slight circuit to the left, to have gained Hardee’s rear in daylight of that day by one unacquainted with the situation of the grounds.
Believe me, your humble friend and obedient servant,
WILLIAM GROSE.
A true copy:
D. S. STANLEY, Colonel Twenty-second Infantry.
Extract from Report of General William Grose, commanding Third Brigade, First Division, Fourth Army Corps.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 5, 1864.
. . . . . . . . .
September 1st.—Our division marched at 6 A.M., First Brigade in advance, moving on the railroad toward Jonesboro’, and under orders spent most of the day in destruction of railroad as we advanced. At about four o’clock, P.M., the advance brigade of our division made junction with the left of the Fourteenth Corps on the railroad at a point about two miles north of Jonesboro’, the First Brigade forward in line, its right near or upon the railroad. I was ordered by General Kimball to prolong the left of the First Brigade, which I did without halting until my advance was checked by getting into a thick bramble of underbrush and a swamp in a dense woodland, through which it was impossible to ride, and the enemy, with a heavy skirmish-line in our front, and his artillery in reach playing upon us, contributed to impede our progress. The course or direction when I entered the woods seemed to be about south, and upon emerging from it, at a distance from one-half to three-fourths of a mile, the brigade to my right had shifted to the right such an extent that I had to move right oblique to fill the space, and my left swinging around, so that when my lines came upon the lines of the enemy behind barricades, my front was about southwest, and by the time we got the lines straightened up, and the enemy’s driven back, and the position of the enemy discovered, night came on. Yet my lines, Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania, Eighty-fourth and Eightieth Illinois, and Ninth Indiana in front line, pressed forward under a heavy canister-fire from the enemy’s guns to within three hundred yards of their barricaded lines, when the fighting ceased at dark. One of General Newton’s brigades had moved up toward my left, and his skirmish-line connected with the left of my front battle-line. The barricade of the enemy ceased opposite the left of my lines. During the night the enemy withdrew.
. . . . . . . . .
A true copy:
D. S. STANLEY, Colonel Twenty-second Infantry.
TOLEDO, October 19, 1875.
MY DEAR GENERAL: I have seen it stated in the newspapers that you are preparing a second edition of your “Memoirs,” and that you have intimated you would add, as an appendix, the letters of any officers explaining acts or events in which they deemed you had not done them justice. I hope I am not too late to be heard when I advise you to do no such thing. There can be no good reason for making your book the vehicle of unlimited controversy. You are under no obligations to square your account of affairs by other men’s memory, or to gauge your judgment of their conduct by their own estimate of it. Your book is your testimony, based on your memory, aided by orders and other memoranda, of what occurred under your own eye and command. As such it has very great historical value, though you would yourself be probably the last man to claim that it is infallible, or that other witnesses will not be examined by future historians. The time will come when not only public documents will be minutely scrutinized, but even for centuries new evidence will be discovered in private diaries, soldiers’ correspondence, both Union and Confederate, and in the thousand-and-one unsuspected and unthought-of sources of circumstantial evidence, which will throw strong direct or side lights upon the events of the war. You cannot, if you would, embody all these in your book, and the controversy, if opened in the form hinted at in the beginning of this letter, would weigh your book down with bulky matter, which should be published, if at all, in some other form.
It is to be hoped that every officer who would be likely to contribute to the “Appendix” will give his own narrative of events in which he took part. He need not write a history. A pamphlet in the form of a “mémoire pour servir” would find a welcome place on the shelves of every public library, where it will be safe against the day when the case will be authoritatively and judicially made up by an historian worthy of the theme. Meanwhile, however, your book is your contribution to this material, and, in my opinion, it ought to be kept in its integrity as such.
I assume that in the cases in which you have expressed opinions of men’s capacity, character, or efficiency, you would not be likely to change your mind by anything they could write. In nearly every instance in which your book expresses your judgment of men, I know from my personal intercourse with you that you held the same opinion in 1864–’65, and at all times since. Such rooted opinions must therefore be accepted as a fixed judgment from which the appeal should be taken, if any one feels wronged, by means of separate publications, and not through an appendix to your book. While on this subject permit me to say further that in my opinion it is too late to consider the question whether on the whole you would prefer not to have anything to say which could wound personal pride or feeling. If you were convinced that you had erred, I am confident you would take pleasure in admitting it frankly; but, if you are not, you owe it to yourself, in all good temper, to stand firmly by what you have said. No omissions from a new edition could take the facts away from the possession of the public. You used your best judgment in giving what you thought it would be useful and interesting to the world to know. We, who know you intimately, know that you have done it without rancor or desire to harm any one, and that you felt that the lesson of the war would not be properly taught if you did not have the courage of your opinions enough to say when a subordinate failed as well as when he succeeded. Instead of omitting anything which you still believe to be true, you should rather, as it seems to me, support your former statement by such circumstantial matters as will more perfectly put others in a position to understand the grounds of your conclusions. There are several instances in the book in which, judging from the impression left on my own mind, I think this should be done.
I have read the book with some care, and I can honestly say I have noticed but a single and that an unimportant instance, in which my memory of your opinion at the time differs from that you now express, and only one in which you seem to have made a slight mistake as to a fact within my personal knowledge. The latter I will mention, as it involves the credit due to another person. On page 629 of the second volume you speak of the reconnaissance made from Rome in October, 1864, to determine the course taken by Hood’s army, and say that it was made by General Corse, and resulted in the capture of two guns and some prisoners, besides obtaining the information desired. The guns and prisoners were in fact taken by Kenner Garrard’s cavalry, acting under my command, on the northwest side of the Coosa, Corse being on the southeast side. On first reading the passage, I thought it was a mere typographical error; but, on looking back at your special field order No. 90, I find (what I had forgotten) that Corse was ordered to make the reconnaissance on the southeast side of the river, and Elliot (paragraph II) to send cavalry on the other side, which he did by detaching Garrard’s division. But from news you had you changed the order after it was written, and directed me orally and in person to follow Garrard out with the Twenty-third Corps, and take command of the whole reconnaissance on that side. We found the enemy’s cavalry in position behind a fence-barricade, and at Garrard’s request I let his dismounted cavalry charge them, simply keeping my own infantry in supporting distance. Garrard’s work was very handsomely done, and I think you will recollect on reflection how pleased Elliot was when I reported the gallantry of the cavalry and their capture of the guns, for you were at the time feeling a little dissatisfied with what the mounted troops had accomplished for a little while before that. We brought you the definite news that Hood was on our side of the Coosa, making toward Resaca. It would be a miracle if in some small matters of this kind there should be absolutely no error of remembrance, especially as the written order seemed to accord best with the statement you have given. It is one of the exceptions which prove the rule.
I need not say what by this time so many have told you, that the country is your debtor for the writing of the book, and that, despite some irritations and heart-burnings, you will in the end find abundant reason to be glad of having written it.
Sincerely yours,
J. D. COX.
General W. T. SHERMAN.
314 EAST 120TH STREET,
NEW YORK CITY, October 30, 1876.
General W. T. SHERMAN, Washington, D. C.
GENERAL: Having read your “Memoirs,”I confess to being disappointed at the entire absence of any notice of the operations of my command (Second Division, Sixteenth Army Corps, Army of the Tennessee) during the Atlanta campaign of 1864. Knowing your high sense of justice, and that it is your intention to correct any mistakes or errors you may have unintentionally made in your first edition, I have the honor to inclose herewith extracts from my military history submitted to the Retiring Board, by which I was retired in May, 1870.
Hoping you will give this matter a favorable consideration, I have the honor to subscribe myself, general,
Your most obedient servant,
T. W. SWEENY, Brigadier-General, U. S. Army.
NOTE.—The “Atlanta army” consisted of three separate armies, embracing six corps, made up of nineteen divisions of infantry and four of cavalry. To have embraced these latter in the “Memoirs” would have swelled them to an unwieldy size, and I aimed to limit my narrative to the main armies, with occasional reference to the corps and detachments, leaving to history to collect the details.
W. T. S.
St. Louis, 1885.
Extracts of my Military Record, submitted to the Retiring Board, by which I was retired in May, 1870.
Left Pulaski, Tennessee, with my division (Second Division, Sixteenth Army Corps) April 29, 1864; passed through Huntsville, Alabama, on the 2d of May, and encamped on Chickamauga Creek on the 7th; took possession of Snake-Creek Gap on the afternoon of the 8th, skirmishing heavily with the enemy. At daylight on the morning of the 9th the rebels attacked me with vigor and drove back my advance guard some distance, wounding the commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Phillips, Ninth Illinois Mounted Infantry; but I finally succeeded in clearing the “Gap” and driving them before me into the works of Resaca. I held the heights commanding them the greater part of the day, and was prevented from making an assault by the orders of General G. M. Dodge. Prisoners captured that morning informed me that Resaca was garrisoned by one brigade of infantry and ten guns. Soon after my arrival, however, column after column of rebels came down on the run, and late in the afternoon we received orders to fall back to the mouth of the “Gap” and fortify. My division were the first troops of our army that entered the “Gap.”
. . . . . . . . .
On the 14th of May my division was detached and ordered to force a passage across the Oostenaula River at “Lay’s Ferry.” I made feints at two points, one above and the other below the real point of attack, and, while the enemy’s attention was distracted, succeeded in throwing a few companies across in pontoon-boats. At this stage of affairs I received information from our cavalry that the enemy were laying a pontoon-bridge at Calhoun Ferry, about three miles above, evidently with the intention of crossing a large force to attack me. At the same time I received a message from our signal corps that heavy columns of the enemy’s infantry were moving down on the opposite side of the river in the direction of Lay’s Ferry, and cautioned me to be on my guard. I hastily recalled the companies I had thrown across the river, and sent a brigade to watch the enemy at Calhoun Ferry and report positively whether they intended to cross there or not. After a careful reconnaissance I discovered that the enemy were fortifying the other side, but showing no disposition to cross. I saw at once they concluded that that was the real point of attack, and I made my preparations accordingly. The withdrawal of the troops I had thrown across the river helped to strengthen this idea in their minds. At daylight on the morning of the 15th I commenced crossing in a flat-boat I had brought from the other side the evening before, and, when I had two regiments over, commenced laying my pontoon-bridges and fortifying on both sides. The bridges were soon laid, and two brigades crossed, when my artillery was put in position on the north bank so as to sweep the ground in front of the troops on the opposite side, the trees that obstructed the river having been cut down for the purpose. The enemy did not allow me to carry out my plans, however, unmolested. General Walker’s division of Hardee’s corps made a fierce charge just as I had got my two brigades across, with the intention of driving me into the river, but was handsomely repulsed, not without considerable loss to us, however. I then crossed the Third Brigade of my division, strengthened my position, my artillery remaining on the right bank of the river, and received orders from General Sherman through General Corse, who was with me, to hold the position at all hazards. I knew General Johnson had to do one of two things, as my position threatened his main line of retreat—either to mass heavily in my front during the night and drive me across the river, or abandon his position at Resaca. I therefore threw out a thin line of skirmishers selected for the purpose, with instructions to advance cautiously and feel the enemy and find out what he was doing. The movement commenced about midnight, and at two o’clock on the morning of the 16th I received the report that General Johnson’s army was in full retreat south. When General Sherman heard it, he sent me orders to move out at daylight as far as the Rome and Calhoun cross-roads (about two and a half miles) and strike the enemy’s flank. I did, and had Hardee’s corps hurled at me in order to protect the railroad by which they were retreating. A sharp fight took place here, in which I lost several valuable officers, among them General Burke (Sixty-sixth Illinois and captain in the Fourteenth Regulars) and one of my brigade commanders. I held my position, however, until the rest of the Army of the Tennessee came to my assistance.
. . . . . . . . .
Engaged in the battle of the 22d of July, 1864, in front of Atlanta, when General McPherson was killed. On the 21st Garrard’s cavalry was sent about forty miles south to destroy part of the Augusta Railroad, leaving our left flank entirely exposed. The enemy was not slow in taking advantage of it. Blair’s and Logan’s corps were intrenched, and my division was moving from the right of the Fifteenth to the left of the Seventeenth Corps, when I learned from a scout of General Thomas that the enemy’s columns were then forming in the woods with the intention of making a flank attack on the Army of the Tennessee while they attacked in front at the same time. I immediately moved forward, threw my division into position so as to receive the attack, and, after a severe fight which lasted between five and six hours, repulsed the enemy at every point, capturing nine hundred prisoners, four battle-flags, and killed the rebel General Walker. After the repulse, the Second Brigade of my division, Colonel Mersey, Ninth Illinois, commanding, was ordered by General Logan to recapture the works lost by the Second Division, Fifteenth Army Corps, and still held by the rebels, which they did in a very handsome manner, and recovered Captain De Gress’s battery of twenty-pound Parrott guns.
T. W. SWEENY, Brigadier-General, U. S. Army.
BURNING OF COLUMBIA.
BEFORE THE MIXED COMMISSION ON AMERICAN AND BRITISH CLAIMS.
(Composed of Count Corti, of Italy; Hon. Russell Gurney, M. P., of London; and Hon. James S. Fraser, of Indiana.)
Depositions for Defence.
WASHINGTON, December 10, 1872.
Commission met pursuant to notice.
. . . . . . . . .
Deposition of O. O. Howard.
The deposition of O. O. Howard, a witness produced, sworn, and examined on the part and behalf of the United States in the cause above entitled, now depending before the above-named Commission, taken before me, a United States Commissioner, in and for the District of Columbia, at Washington, in said District, on the 10th day of December, 1872, pursuant to a notice to that effect duly given by the agent and counsel for the United States.
Mr. A. S. Worthington appeared on behalf of the United States; Messrs. George R. Walker, Bartley, Denver, Mackay, and Wells, on behalf of claimants.
The said O. O. Howard, having been first by me duly sworn to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, deposes and says:
My name is O. O. Howard; my age is forty-two years; my residence is District of Columbia; I am a native of Maine; my position is that of a brigadier-general in the United States Army.
Preliminary questions propounded by the officer taking this deposition:
Have you any interest, direct or indirect, in the claim which is the subject-matter of the above-entitled cause, or of this examination? If so, state the nature and extent of such interest.
Answer. I have no interest.
Being examined by Mr. Worthington, of counsel for the United States, the witness further deposes and says:
Question. State what your rank in the United States Army was in February, 1865.
A. I was major-general of volunteers at that time; I think I was not a brigadier-general in the regular army until March following.
Q. What was your command in February, 1865?
A. I commanded the Army of the Tennessee, constituting the right wing of General Sherman’s army.
Q. Operating in the State of South Carolina?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Please state the principal points through which your command passed in the march from Savannah to Goldsboro.
A. The principal portion of my command was transported to Beaufort, South Carolina; thence (marched) northward through Pocotaligo, Orangeburg, Columbia, Cheraw, Fayetteville; subordinate columns swept into different towns; General Slocum had the left wing; he was at the north of me; mine was the right line of march.
Q During that march, under what orders from General Sherman were you acting in respect to private property?
A. They were to take such provisions as were necessary for the subsistence of the army, but generally to spare private property, with some few exceptions; cotton was excepted; I was directly instructed again and again to destroy the cotton.
(Objected to by Mr. Walker, as the orders will show for themselves, they being the best testimony.)
A. (Continued.) I will put in evidence the orders I received from General Sherman, and the orders I issued on the subject, if it be desired.
Q. On what day did you enter the town of Columbia yourself?
A. The 17th of February, 1865.
Q. Please state, in your own way, your recollection of the circumstances attending the occupation of that city, and the destruction of a portion of it.
A. On the 15th of February, in the vicinity of Columbia, opposite thereto, across the Congaree, we met with much resistance at Little Congaree Creek, and had to push our way very slowly, the enemy retiring before us; when we arrived opposite Columbia, we found the bridge across the Congaree destroyed by fire; we moved up to where the two rivers, the Saluda and the Broad, conjoined to form the Congaree; the bridge across the Saluda was destroyed by fire by the enemy; we bridged that and crossed our troops; the other bridge, when we reached the land intervening between the two rivers, was still standing, but as we attempted to cross it, it was set on fire by the enemy, and having been covered with rosin, was in flames in a moment, so that even the Confederate cavalry rushed northward to save themselves, some of them without crossing; our troops spent the whole night getting across the Broad, which was a very difficult river; we ferried over a brigade at the beginning by means of ropes and boats; that brigade was the brigade of Colonel Stone, and pushed its way up the hill slowly against the enemy, retiring; the enemy passed through Columbia, and the mayor came to the outside of the city and surrendered the city, I think between ten and eleven o’clock, say ten o’clock; in the mean time a regular bridge was laid across the Broad River, and General Sherman and myself crossed over, riding side by side, before any other troops than this leading brigade had passed; it was about half-past ten that General Sherman and I rode over ahead of all the remaining portion of the troops that had not been ferried over, and rode directly on to the city, a distance of about three miles, entering it in what we called the main street; I believe the name, as it appears on the map, is Richardson Street; it was the one that leads directly to the Capitol; at every corner of the street we met crowds of people, principally negroes; not very far from the market-house we met the mayor of the city, who had a short conversation with General Sherman; as my troops alone were to have charge of the city, I observed very carefully the disposition of the guards of the leading brigade, Colonel Stone’s; sentinels were located in front of buildings of any considerable importance, and on the main street the principal portion of the brigade was in rest, waiting for orders; there was only that one brigade; we were ahead of all the rest; near the brigade was an immense pile of cotton; bales were broken open in the middle of the streets, and were on fire; an engine was playing upon the fire, and soldiers and citizens were engaged apparently in extinguishing it; General Sherman was met with much enthusiasm by a company of soldiers; observing them closely, I saw that some of them were under the influence of drink.
Mr. Walker:
Q. How do you know that?
A. Only from the testimony of a great many who saw it. [The statement of the witness as to the rebel soldiers having set the depot on fire, was objected to by Mr. Walker, on the ground that the witness does not know it of his own personal knowledge.]
A. (Continued.) We rode to a foundry where guns had been cast, and observed that, and went afterward through several streets together, when I separated from General Sherman, selected my headquarters, and gave the necessary orders for the thorough care of the troops and of the city for the night. General Sherman took his headquarters at the house of Blanton Duncan, and I mine at a house near the university, belonging to one of the professors; after this disposition I lay down to take a little rest, and was awaked first about dark by one of my aides, who said the city was on fire. I sent the aide, Captain Gilbreth, immediately to ascertain where the fire was, and to call upon General Charles R. Wood, the division commander, who had the immediate command of the city, to prevent the extension of the fire; I then at once dressed myself and went to the scene; there I met General John A. Logan, who was my next in rank, and who commanded the corps; we consulted together, and took every precautionary measure we could think of to prevent the extension of the flames, sometimes ordering the tearing down of sheds and small buildings, protecting citizens, assisting them in the care of their property, and guarding it; much of the property was thrown into the streets; personally I set a great many soldiers during the night to extinguish the flames from the houses, and they went to the tops of the houses where water was passed up to them; nearly everything in my immediate vicinity was saved; a perfect gale from the northwest had commenced about the time we crossed the bridge, or before that, and continued all night or until, I should say, between two and three o’clock in the morning; it seemed at first utterly useless to attempt to stop the flames; they were so hot that many of our own soldiers were burnt up that night; when the wind changed, however, it was easy to prevent any further extension of the fire; it was done; some of our men behaved badly on account of being under the influence of drink, but they were replaced by fresh men as soon as their conduct came to the knowledge of the officer in charge; the first brigade—Stone’s—was relieved by another brigade of General Wood’s division, and finally the entire division of General Hazen was brought into the city to assist; all the men who misbehaved that we could seize upon were kept under guard until the next day and punished; there were quite a number of our men who had been taken prisoners and were held by the Confederates; they appeared in the streets of Columbia soon after our arrival; I do not know myself where they were confined; the penitentiary was also opened, and all its prisoners loosed; I found, during the night, a reckless mob very often, sometimes insulting ladies, and sometimes rushing into houses and pillaging; I did not see anybody setting fires; General Sherman himself staid up with us for the most of the night; General Logan and General Wood were on the ground all the time until the fire abated, and I believe did everything they could to prevent it. General Sherman’s order to me to destroy certain classes of property is a part of our record, and I remember the tenor of it.
[Objected to, on the ground that the record testimony should be produced.]
A. (Continued.) I would like to make it a part of my testimony.
Mr. Worthington:
Q. State your recollection of it, General Howard.
A. It was that certain buildings of a certain nature should be destroyed, such as arsenals, armories, powder-mills, depots; but that private property and asylums so called should be protected. I saw that the wind was so high that it would be impossible to destroy that class of buildings by fire on the evening of the 17th of February, and therefore refrained at that time from putting the order into practical execution; on the 18th and 19th those buildings of that class that were left from the flames were destroyed. I have in my report an accurate list of them; the flames of this burning of the night of the 17th had destroyed a part of these other buildings included in the order. We destroyed also the railroad-track. Though the order was to destroy cotton in South Carolina, yet no cotton remained that I know of after this fire to be destroyed; none was destroyed, according to my recollection.
Q. State what actual hostilities occurred near Columbia immediately before its occupation, if any.
A. We had very heavy resistance on the other side in the vicinity of Congaree Creek, and all the way along; we had also very heavy resistance in crossing the Broad—the last river—the enemy’s troops being posted in a very covered position; we hardly could reach them; they annoyed our troops and killed many; then we had our sleeping-camp shelled during the preceding night—the night of the 15th, if I remember correctly—from the Columbia side, from a battery in the vicinity of Columbia; it excited the hostile feeling of the officers and soldiers very much indeed; they thought it was contrary to the rules of war. After we crossed the river there was scarcely any resistance; I think there was none in the immediate vicinity of Columbia after the mayor met us.
Q. Do you know where those drunken soldiers obtained their liquor?
A. I know they obtained it in Columbia.
Mr. Walker: I would like the witness to state how he knew this; whether it is hearsay, or what.
The witness. It was not hearsay; I know the troops obtained it in Columbia; I know they had not any until they went into the city; I have testimony—for I investigated very thoroughly—that citizens carried pails of whiskey along the ranks, and that the men of the leading brigade of Colonel Stone drank with dippers out of pails.
Mr. Worthington:
Q. You have said that you made every disposition for the security of the private property immediately after your entry into the city. I wish you would state more particularly what measures you took for the security of private property.
A. The orders were general as to the manner of locating a brigade or division in a city, and this brigade or division conformed to the general order; I saw them, by my own observation, taking up a central place for the main portion of the brigade, and distributing different detachments to different parts of the city; locating sentinels very much as policemen are located in a city for its care: then I gave verbal instructions to General Charles R. Wood, General Logan not happening to be near me; they should have been given to General Logan, but I gave them directly to General Wood, and he, doubtless, reported my orders to General Logan; he, at any rate, obeyed the order. Seeing some of these men in the First Brigade under the influence of drink, my first order to him was to send in another brigade that had not had any drink, which he did; my next order went through General Logan, to send a division into the city, which was General Hazen’s division; General Logan himself took the immediate disposition of those two divisions; they were under his command and formed a part of it; he had four divisions, and these were two of them; the sentinels I tested myself as to the orders that had been given them, and those in front of houses told me that they had orders to watch against all fires, or against any pillaging parties, and to see that no wrong should be done to private property where they were located; one or two executed the orders so thoroughly that after fire had caught roofs they hindered people from going in, but those sentinels were at once replaced, as it was the effect of the whiskey which did that; I took pains myself, as did my staff, to go about and to see as far as possible that everything was done rightly as ordered, for it was a fearful condition of things with such a fire, and with so many women and children in the city.
I would further say, to show our disposition toward the inhabitants, that, though we were in war, we left five hundred cattle for the people who had been burned out, and who were without food, and also provisions, and had them carted to the State-House, and we also assisted the mayor in a method by which he could get provisions from those outside the city.
Q. Were any applications made to you by the citizens before or during the war for guards to protect their property?
A. Constantly.
Q. What was your reply to them?
A. I always sent them; where we had not soldiers immediately at hand, my aides themselves went; Lieutenant McQueen, one of my staff-officers, stood sentinel the whole night, and protected the property of the Rev. A. T. Porter, of the Episcopal Church, and received his gratitude for it.
Q. Do I understand you to say that no cotton was burned in Columbia by your order?
A. None whatever.
Q If the fire had not occurred, what would you have done with the cotton in Columbia?
Mr. Walker: I object to all answers to that question, and to all testimony elicited by it.
A. I had no specific orders to burn the cotton in Columbia, and I should not have burned it without consulting with the general-in-chief; if he had ordered it to be burned, I should have burned it; and if he had ordered it to be spared, I should have spared it.
By Mr. Worthington:
Q. Do you know anything about some rockets having been sent up in the vicinity of the State-House on the night of the 17th of February?
A. I do.
Q. State what you know about that.
A. The rockets were sent up by the signal corps; the left wing was quite a distance from us. General Blair’s corps was located outside of the city, and one-half of General Logan’s, and it was customary for the signal officers attached to each division or corps to communicate with their neighbors as to where they were, or to give any events of the day; they did it in the daytime by flags, and at night by rockets, and this was done at night; the signals meant nothing else, that I know of.
Q. Do you know of any understanding before the occupation of Columbia, or after it was occupied, that it was to be destroyed?
A. On the part of whom?
Q. On the part of anybody?
A. By the officers there was a distinct understanding that it should not be destroyed, and those were the orders; that is, the private property, asylums, etc.; on the part of the men I don’t know anything about it; I have no knowledge whatever; they always had to obey orders.
. . . . . . . . .
I, James O. Clephane, United States Commissioner for the District of Columbia, do hereby certify that, at the request of counsel for the United States, I caused the above-mentioned O. O. Howard, deponent in the foregoing deposition, to come before me at the time and place in the caption mentioned; that said deponent was by me sworn to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth; that said deposition was reduced to writing by me, and was carefully read to or by deponent before being signed by him, and deponent then and there, in my presence, subscribed the same; and I further certify that I have no interest, direct or indirect, in the claim to which the above deposition relates, and am not the agent or attorney of any person having any interest therein.
Witness my hand, at the city of Washington, D. C., this 10th day of December, 1872.
JAMES O. CLEPHANE.
. . . . . . . . .
NOTE.—Judgment in these cases was for the United States. W. T. S.
ALBANY, NEW YORK, May 15, 1876.
MY DEAR GENERAL: If you revise your “Memoirs,” and wish to strengthen your position regarding the burning of Columbia, you are welcome to my testimony, etc. I was a prisoner of war at Columbia, and escaped at the time, and in the same manner and with Adjutant Byers, author of “The March to the Sea.” From time of escape till the occupation, I was concealed in a barn on the outskirts of Columbia, and was an eye-witness to the going out of town of Hampton’s troops, and their firing the depot, or surrounding warehouses, previous to departure. I was in the streets of the city before your coming in personally, and saw the cotton burning then. I am, general, very truly yours,
IRA B. SAMPSON,
Formerly Captain Company G, Second Massachusetts Artillery, at time of capture, March, 1864, Chief of Artillery sub-district of the Albemarle, North Carolina, under General H. W. Wessels.
To General W. T. SHERMAN, St. Louis.
POMEROY, OHIO, August 31, 1875.
General W. T. SHERMAN, General of the Army.
GENERAL: In your “Memoirs,” giving the grand movements of the war, it is, of course, not to be expected that you could take time to verify all small details. And yet most of the officers as well as men were engaged only in details. It is a matter of little moment to history whether the commander is called Smith or Brown; but to the commander the difference is, whether he really was present in the war or not.
I confess when I first read your book I was vexed, because it looked as if you intentionally blotted me out of the war; not by mere omission to mention, for that might easily happen, but by describing some things I did, and giving credit for them to others.
I certainly was present in your command. From Acworth to the 21st July my brigade was the very whip-lash of the army: it always constituted the very extreme of one of the flanks, sometimes the right, sometimes the left. Though I then commanded only a brigade, General McPherson used to send orders directing me by name to command little expeditions. I had only four staff-officers besides a quartermaster. Yet, from Kenesaw to Pocotaligo, three of my staff were killed outright; one was mortally wounded; one was taken prisoner; and two were sent to hospital, broken down with exhaustion. I was myself wounded on the 22d July; at the time it was supposed to be a mortal wound. The Seventeenth Corps forced a crossing at Orangeburg; you say it was done by the divisions of Mower and Giles Smith. My division is not named or in any way referred to.
On the 10th February, the Seventeenth Corps lay in camp on the south fork of the Edisto, below Binnaker’s Bridge. In the afternoon my division was moved across the river, and two miles beyond. At seven o’clock A.M. next day, I set out under orders to push to the crossing of the north fork at Orangeburg, and save the bridge, but not attempt to cross. I moved so rapidly that General Howard coming up found a gap of four miles between the rear of my train and the head of the next following division. On reaching the swamp bordering the river, I detached the Twentieth Ohio, which double-quicked over the causeway, charging and driving the hostile cavalry so that they could not pause to injure the causeway or the bridges over the small streams of the Edisto. Near the main stream the road bends, and a battery on the farther side of the river commanded the bridge and the road to the bend. I drew the men off the road at this point, and posted the Twentieth Ohio in the water under the trees that skirted the main stream, so as to cover the bridge with their rifles. Four of the enemy, dead, were picked up, and seven unhurt were captured in the swamp. I sent a party under Colonel Wiles, of the Second Brigade, up-stream, and a party from the First Brigade (Colonel Fairchild) down-stream, to find a place for crossing. Colonel Wiles found a place where, by clambering over fallen trees, men could scramble over singly. The other party found a place little more than a mile below the bridge, which, on their report, I went to examine, and found solid ground on our side extended to the river, while the farther side was a stretch of swamp. After supper I reported to General Blair. You and General Howard were both present. The instant I finished my verbal report to General Blair, you said to him: “Yes, the lower place is the place to cross; make your movement there—your feint at the bridge, your diversion above.” My division was withdrawn from the bridge in the night, relieved by Giles Smith; and a road constructed for the pontoon train to the proposed crossing. In the morning I marched to the crossing-place. The pontoon-bridge was laid; I crossed over; General Mower’s division was brought down to be in readiness in case of need, but did not cross. Emerging from the swamp on the farther side, I formed the division in lines in a long, open field, which extended all the way to the town. The enemy’s battery was meanwhile playing across the river, over the bridge on to Giles Smith. I sent the Second Brigade, by a by-road across the woods, to the railroad below the town, and marched with the other brigade on to the enemy’s battery at the bridge-head. It then turned its fire on to me, and withdrew as I approached. My skirmishers, dashing on through the town, fired on the train that left with the last of the enemy’s infantry. I took possession of the town, and detailed the Twelfth Wisconsin, Colonel Proudfit, as provost guard. When my skirmish-line was passing through the town, and the first brigade was ascending the slope between the bridge and the town, an officer and three men from Giles Smith’s division scrambled over the scantling of the bridge (for the enemy in the night had succeeded in burning some of the planking of the bridge without injuring the timbers) and joined me at the edge of the town. The bridge was repaired, and Giles Smith and Mower, later in the afternoon, marched their divisions over it. General Mower stood ready to support me, just as, on the night of the 9th, I stood ready to support him at Binnaker’s Bridge, but my division alone made the crossing at Orangeburg; and, moreover, I there saved the bridge, the only instance in your campaign where a contested bridge was saved and used by the army in crossing. I happened to be in advance the day we reached Orangeburg, and so made the crossing there; just as Mower and Giles Smith made the crossing of the rivers when they happened to be in advance.
You say that General Blair, while lying at Pocotaligo, kept General Mower busy making demonstrations upon the river to amuse and deceive the enemy. The fact is, one day General Mower took his division out to make a demonstration, but the country was so over-flowed by water that he could not approach the river. Another day I made a demonstration on the high ground near the railroad-bridge. On the 30th January, the day we moved, I was sent to the river to make another. Next day, the Army of the Tennessee lying in camp, I was sent back to where the enemy had a work on the farther side of the river and silenced its fire. The work was reënforced, and kept up such a racket with artillery, that General Howard sent a staff-officer to inquire if there was a gunboat in the river. This was the only one of the four “demonstrations” that amounted to anything. Of the four, I made three, General Mower one, and you name General Mower as the only officer employed.
You give quite a detailed account of the battle of Atlanta of the 22d of July and the preliminary movements. On the 20th the Seventeenth Corps moved out from Decatur, General Gresham in front, my brigade (of General Leggett’s division) supporting en échelon on his left; the rest of General Leggett’s division in reserve. In the skirmishing during this advance General Gresham was wounded in the ankle and sent to the rear. At sunset his division halted at the base of a ridge, and I went into line and bivouacked on its left. The enemy, slightly intrenched on the summit of the hill, kept up a dropping fire through the night, so that I had to change my sleeping-place on the ground, my blankets being cut by their balls. Early next morning, the 21st, General Leggett came to the front and said to me, “I think I shall have to ask you to carry this hill.” I made my own dispositions, formed the brigade into two lines with fixed bayonets, sent a skirmish-line dashing up the smooth surface of the hill to distract the fire of General Cleburne’s men, who held it. I went up myself with the first line; Captain Walker, my adjutant, with the second. The men fell in groups under the fire, but closed continually on their colors, and swept over the works with a line as precise as on parade. The Twelfth and Sixteenth Wisconsin formed the first; Twentieth, Thirtieth, and Thirty-first Illinois the second line. The enemy fell back along the line some distance, but, as my brigade had no support, and I occupied only the extreme right of their line, they soon returned to the rest of their line, and I was subjected to a severe enfilading fire. I asked General Leggett to send up some twenty-four-pound howitzers attached to the division, and with them cleared out the woods until my men could throw up a line of work facing Atlanta, with a refused line from my right running down-hill toward my rear, so as to protect my right flank. General Leggett then brought up the rest of his division on to my left, extending the line that way, as it was threatened by bodies of troops in front. The night of the 21st I threw up heavy traverses, five to each regiment, and strengthened the works. In the night the enemy abandoned their line; and next morning, the 22d, the Fifteenth Corps moved up to my right, and Giles Smith, having succeeded General Gresham, moved out to General Leggett’s left. In the battle of the 22d the enemy rolled up our line till they came to my brigade, intrenched in the traverses, and advanced no farther. In the two days forty per cent, of my brigade was lost. The Twentieth Illinois marched up the hill on the 21st over one hundred and fifty strong. At sunset of the 22d it numbered one officer and seventeen men, but held its place. Captain Walker, my assistant adjutant-general, was wounded. After ten years of suffering, he died of his wounds last winter. While making a tourniquet for him on the field, I was shot through the face. I was brevetted major-general “for especial gallantry before Atlanta on the 22d July”—the only brevet entitled “for especial gallantry” in that campaign. You mention General Gresham as the general officer who was wounded; and go so far into detail as to mention that Colonel Reynolds (lieutenant-colonel of one of my regiments) was wounded, yet my name is nowhere referred to in any way.
I might mention other similar instances. Taken together they all have an air of an intentional exclusion of my name as a participant in the war. Of course, there is nothing of the sort. You simply have not bothered yourself with details. But, if another edition of your book should be published, I hope this memorandum may secure a revision of these matters, of little moment to the world, or, indeed, to history, but of some moment to
Very respectfully and truly yours,
M. F. FORCE.
NOTE.—This may be another instance in which, by attempting to avoid details, which would swell the bulk of my intended volume into too large proportions, I may seem to have done individual injustice. There was not in the whole army a more intelligent, conscientious, zealous, or brave officer than General Force, for whom I always entertained the most profound respect and personal affection. I indorse all he says, have made the corrections, and publish his letter entire in this the final edition of my “Memoirs.”
ST. LOUIS, 1883.
W. T. S.
General G. M. Dodge’s account of the part taken by the Sixteenth Army Corps in the movement on Resaca. Attack of the 4th of July, and battle of Atlanta, July 22, 1864.
General W. T. SHERMAN, St. Louis, Missouri.
DEAR GENERAL: Your suggestion to send you a brief résumé of the part taken by my corps (the Sixteenth) of the Army of the Tennessee, in the Atlanta campaign, was received some time ago. I reply as early as possible, in view of absence and other engagements.
I wish to refer to only such parts of the Atlanta campaign as have been to some extent the subject of public comment, through your “Memoirs,” and to which my personal testimony may contribute light.
I shall therefore confine myself to the attempted surprise of Resaca, May 9, 1864, and some following events, and to the repulse of General Hood’s rear movement at Atlanta, July 22d.
The Sixteenth Corps, as the vanguard of General McPherson’s army, penetrated, first, through the Chattanooga Mountains, and made the attack of Resaca. The same corps, while moving to a new position around Atlanta, fell across the way of Hood’s army, and met him on such opportunely good ground that the battle was accepted on the spot. I have never published my official report of the operations of the corps. I state these general facts to save you the trouble of explaining them again if you should ever make use of this letter. Your rapid and general summary of a maze of events, in which the part of a corps is more or less lost in the movement of several armies, has attracted my admiration for its clearness, and I can well see how the limitations of your book have compelled a severe distribution of prominence to the many detachments.
The left wing of the Sixteenth Corps (Dodge’s), the other wing not being in this campaign, arrived at Chattanooga May 5th, in the evening, in the cars, the batteries and transportation following by road from Pulaski, Tennessee, and Athens, Alabama.
The same evening General McPherson’s orders arrived to take the initiative for his army, and to move to Gordon’s Mills. While marching there the next day, verbal orders came to push a portion of my command forward toward Villanow, and seize Ship’s Gap. Sprague’s brigade, of the Fourth Division, did this at midnight of the same day, and the next day we had passed through and occupied Villanow.
The third day (May 8th) my command, with the Second Division in advance, moved rapidly to Snake-Creek Gap, one day before my orders had contemplated, they advising me to march when the Fifteenth Army Corps had closed upon me. I had heard from General McPherson personally, however, that the object was to threaten Johnston’s flank and communications, and the Ninth Illinois Mounted Infantry, supported by the Thirty-ninth Iowa Infantry, went forward through the gap to Sugar-Creek Valley, a portion of the corps without transportation following, and intrenching that night, thus holding its eastern outlet. On the evening of May 8th, instead of May 9th, I was astonished to find this strong position, the side-gate to Johnston’s rear, not only undefended but unoccupied, though a few men might have held it long. Having reported the fact to General McPherson, and also that Colonel Phillips reported Resaca occupied by a brigade of the enemy, I received his orders to march at six o’clock next morning, the 9th of May, toward Resaca, and to advance as far as Rome cross-roads in Sugar-Creek Valley, and there await specific orders and instructions. The object of the movement was stated to be a demonstration upon Resaca, while other troops cut the railroad north of that place.
At daylight on the 9th my advance, as before—a regiment of mounted infantry, supported by a regiment of infantry—was attacked by Ferguson’s brigade of the enemy’s cavalry, and Colonel Phillips was severely wounded. We drove the enemy rapidly before us to Rome cross-roads, where I received orders to advance upon Resaca, to press forward until I should succeed in developing the enemy in line of battle, or in his fortifications, but not to attack him there without orders. I was also ordered to hold the Calhoun and Dalton cross-roads, about two miles west of Resaca, if I became possessed of it, until the Fifteenth Army Corps arrived. These orders were obeyed, my force skirmishing heavily the entire distance to the Calhoun cross-roads.
The enemy was discovered in line of battle on a bald hill, three-quarters of a mile west of Resaca, and also in his works at Resaca.
I placed the Fourth Division at the cross-roads, formed the Second Division in two lines, and carried the hill, and holding there under instructions, awaited my orders from General McPherson, to whom I had promptly reported, sending, I think, my staff-officer, Captain Edward Jonas, telling General McPherson that, if we could make a prompt attack, we could carry Resaca, as the enemy in my front gave way readily, and that though prisoners had reported the arrival of Canty’s brigade, the night before, I did not believe it, as no such force as a division showed in our front. General McPherson soon came upon the ground in person; he directed me to send some mounted men up the Dalton road to reconnoitre the country, and find an approach to the railroad, while he would go back and bring up the Fifteenth (Logan’s) Corps. Until that corps arrived, I was to hold the bald hill indicated, and the Dalton and Calhoun crossroads. I sent all the mounted men I had with me at the time, eighteen in number (of the Ninth Illinois), under Captain Hughes. They proceeded toward Dalton, struck the railroad two miles south of Tilton, and found it strongly patrolled by cavalry; they cut the telegraph-wires, burned a wood station, and reported to me again at dark. Meantime the enemy came marching out of Resaca up the Dalton Railroad, and I ordered the Fourth Division to march from Calhoun cross-roads and to intercept them, and to take position on the railroad north of Resaca. This order was reported to General McPherson promptly; he replied that I must hold the cross-roads until relieved. It was about four o’clock when I finally received from one of General McPherson’s staff-officers the information that the Fifteenth Army Corps was closing up, and that I was now at liberty to carry out my movement against the railroad. It was intrusted by me to General Veatch, with Fuller’s and Sprague’s brigades of his division, the Fourth. The Second Division was stationed on the bald hill I had occupied about noon, and the left of this division was now assailed with musketry, while the marching division was fired upon as they advanced in column in full view of the enemy. Fuller, in the advance, moved with spirit across the west fork of Mill Creek, crossed an open field, and the skirmish-line was up to the timber skirting the railroad, when another order came from General McPherson to look well to my right, as the enemy was massing to strike me there. I was with Fuller’s advance at this time, and the enemy that had come out of Resaca had opened on Fuller’s troops in the open field. Near by was a good cover of woods on the east side of the creek, to attain which I changed the direction of Fuller’s column more to the north; his skirmish-line took some prisoners; the morning rumor was confirmed by them that Canty’s brigade had arrived. Fuller steadily advanced, however, and as soon as his skirmish-lines debouched from the woods, a regiment of the enemy’s infantry and a battery in position opened directly upon his right and front. Another notice had been received from General McPherson, as we got to the roads, that Sprague’s brigade was not following us, having been arrested by him to hold the space between the Second and the advance of the Fourth Division. While Fuller was executing the movement to gain the railroad, a final order came to me from General McPherson to halt the column, and to repair in person to him back of the bald hill occupied by the Second Division. There I found General McPherson and General Logan with the advance of Logan’s Fifteenth Corps. They were discussing the propriety of an attack upon Resaca. General Logan asked me what I thought of the situation, and if we could carry the place. I replied, I thought we could. Logan responded that he was glad I had so much faith. McPherson appeared to feel the responsibility of his orders from the commander of the army, as well as the responsibility of holding the gap we had already seized. He listened attentively to the conversation, to my description of the position, and to the nature of the orders I had given. He reluctantly gave us orders to immediately return. The Sixteenth Corps withdrew over the eight miles they had already marched that day, reaching the eastern débouche of the gap at midnight. I had with the entire corps only seventeen wagons since leaving Chattanooga. My transportation had not yet come up, and the men and the animals had been without other food for a day and a half than what could be afforded by the poor and picked country we had marched over.
A day or two after our return to the gap, General McPherson stated to me the contents of a letter or letters from General Sherman commenting upon the march to Resaca. He seemed to feel that their criticism amounted to censure, but he had assumed the responsibility. He said a part of one of his corps was still west of the gap, guarding trains, that he could not have thrown his whole force across the railroad, as they were situated, and that he looked for his vindication to the successful termination of the campaign. He said: “We had ascertained, from prisoners taken the day of the advance to Resaca, that the enemy knew just what force had passed through the gap, and where the balance of the army was. He made the final decision to return to the gap between five and six o’clock in the afternoon, being satisfied nothing could be accomplished by attacking an intrenched post that late in the day.”
At Snake-Creek Gap we waited three days, seeing the whole army move through the pass we had captured “to Johnston’s complete surprise,” and fortifying Sugar-Creek Valley. May 13th, the Fourth Division of my corps formed on the right of the Fifteenth Corps, resting on the Oostenaula River, and took part in the attack on Resaca. My second division, Sweeney’s, May 14th went on to Lay’s Ferry, below Resaca, to cross the Oostenaula River and threaten Johnston’s communications. General Rice with the advanced brigade crossed in the face of Walker’s division. As soon as this movement in the rear was accomplished, Johnston began to retreat from Resaca, which he had defended a second time, and now with his whole army, and which he “only evacuated because his safety demanded it.”
Attack of July 4, 1864.
I desire only to refer to the action of July 4th, described in the “Memoirs” as “noisy but not desperate.”
The Fourth Division of my corps, under General Fuller, pressed forward on that day, crossing the Nickajack Creek at Ruff’s Mill, driving the enemy before us, until, after two miles of skirmishing, we developed him in strong intrenchments, and in very heavy force. The “Memoirs” imply that this was the head of column of the Army of the Cumberland, and unintentionally leave it to be inferred that the storming of the works was General Thomas’s performance. It was General McPherson who sent me a message to attack at discretion, or if I thought I could carry the works. Prisoners informed me that Hood’s corps was before me, and I proceeded to reconnoitre their works, which I found very strong, but, as I observed a singular confusion there, indicative of retreating, and knew that the 4th of July would be a good day to assault, I formed a charging column of a part of the Fourth Division, the Thirty-ninth and Twenty-seventh Ohio, and the Sixty-fourth Illinois Infantry of my corps, under command of Colonel E. F. Noyes. A supporting column was made up of the Sixty-sixth Illinois and the Second Iowa infantry, of the Second Division. Noyes moved forward with gallantry, although he fell at the first fire, and lost his leg, but through almost impenetrable abatis and fallen timber, the men went over the intrenchments, and took one hundred prisoners, and they so settled the enemy’s confusion, if any there was, that the whole of that line was soon abandoned.
I come, now, to the last subject of my letter, the battle of the 22d of July, where General McPherson lost his life.
Battle of Atlanta.
The movement ordered by General Sherman, of the transfer of the Army of the Tennessee from the right to the extreme left of the combined armies, began June 9th.
Marching from Sand Town, by the rear to the left, on the 9th of July, the Sixteenth Corps bivouacked, at ten o’clock at night, near Marietta, continued on, at three o’clock, in the dark of the morning, and that second day had crossed the Chattahoochee, spanned it with a foot-bridge, seven hundred feet long, covered it with a long tête-du-pont, and intrenched on the Atlanta side. The march was thirty-one miles, the heat was intense, yet the men were uncomplaining and ardent, and for nearly three days more they worked in reliefs of one thousand in the mud and water until we completed, July 13th, at Roswell, Georgia, a double-track trestle-bridge, fourteen feet high and seven hundred and ten feet long. The material used was standing timber and some cotton-mills; over this bridge the entire Army of the Tennessee, with trains and artillery, passed.
On the 17th the command moved toward Decatur, cutting a new road so as not to infringe upon the Seventeenth and Twenty-third corps, which took the old roads; keeping its communication with those corps, the Sixteenth advanced behind its pioneers, preceded by the Ninth Illinois mounted infantry, which skirmished with the enemy at Nancy’s Creek, and drove them across; and here, one of my scouts, who had left Atlanta that morning, brought the first intelligence of Hood’s having superseded Johnston, which was at once sent to Generals Sherman and McPherson. Decatur was occupied July 19th, after a heavy skirmish and artillery-fighting, and Colonel Sprague, with Second Brigade of Fourth Division, was placed there to relieve General Garrard’s cavalry division and guard the trains. As we approached Atlanta the converging corps forced the Sixteenth Corps out of line, and a series of transfers began. On the 21st of July General Fuller, with First Brigade, Fourth Division, was put in reserve to the Seventeenth Army Corps, and United States Regular Battery F, of the Fourth Division, was put in front line of General Giles A. Smith’s division of the Seventeenth Corps. My second division, under General Sweeny, moved forward three quarters of a mile beyond its old position, to a range of hills, the enemy contesting this advance very sharply, and intrenched there. At four o’clock the next morning General Sweeny reported to me that the enemy had disappeared from his front; whereupon I ordered him to push forward a heavy skirmish-line. He soon found the enemy in force, in works surrounding Atlanta. The Second Division being displaced by the contraction of the lines, and the Fifteenth and Twenty-third Corps closing upon each other, General McPherson ordered me to move to the left of the army, and place Fuller’s first brigade on the left of the new position to be assumed by the Seventeenth Corps, and hold the rest of the command in reserve on the extreme left. Before this was done, I rode with General McPherson from his headquarters to the front on the direct Decatur and Atlanta road. It was quite early in the morning, the day of the battle of Atlanta. The sudden evacuation of the enemy was surprising to both of us, and gave General McPherson serious concern. He requested me to return immediately to my command, and get the troops upon the ground they were to occupy, and first to examine that ground myself, and choose a position on the left of the Seventeenth Corps, and also to feel toward the wagon-road running from Atlanta south. I started at once. There was a cross-road leading to the left from the Atlanta road, in the rear of the Fifteenth, and passing through the left of the Seventeenth Army Corps, by which I gave orders for the Sixteenth Corps to march, while I went forward rapidly with my engineers and a part of my staff to select the new position. I rode out beyond the Seventeenth Corps, far in the advance, and within easy musket-range of the works of Atlanta, passing the pioneers of the Seventeenth Corps intrenching the new line. The stillness was oppressive, and, I thought, almost ominous. I could plainly see the enemy’s troops working on their fortifications, on the south side of Atlanta, and they allowed myself and staff to approach within easy musket-range, not firing upon us until we turned about to return, after having picked out the ground for the corps. As we retired, the enemy opened on us briskly with musket and artillery. I at once sent word to General Fuller to send out working-parties to intrench his line on the new position, and for the Second Division to move to the rear of the Seventeenth Army Corps and bivouac.
While passing through the Seventeenth Army Corps, I left an order for Murray’s Second United States Battery to join its command, and also met General Giles A. Smith, commanding the left division of the Seventeenth Army Corps, who told me that the Seventeenth Corps would not move into their new position until night. Immediately on receiving this information I sent General Sweeny orders to halt and bivouac his division (the Second) where he then was, viz., about three-fourths of a mile in the rear of the Fifteenth Army Corps (General Logan’s), and on the right and rear of the Seventeenth (General Blair’s). At noon I reached General Fuller’s headquarters, in the rear of the Seventeenth Corps, and almost directly on an extension of the line of Sweeny’s division, which had halted upon receiving my order, and was resting by the road-side. While at Fuller’s headquarters I heard straggling shots fired to the east and to the left of General Sweeny’s division, which warned me, and I ordered General Fuller to put his command immediately in position, and spoke to him of the gap that existed of about one-quarter of a mile between him and General Giles A. Smith, and of the exposed condition of the left flank of our army. I called his attention to the position of the ammunition-train of the army on the right of Fuller and in the rear of General Smith, where they were very much exposed; but I had scarcely given General Fuller his orders, when the report came in that the enemy was in force in our rear, and developing far behind General Sweeny. I sent a staff-officer to General Sweeny on the minute, with orders to immediately close on Fuller, and to form to repel an attack. General Sweeny anticipated the order, and had already sent forward skirmishers in the direction of the enemy’s fire, and he developed the enemy in large force. The Second Division had just got into position when Hood’s army appeared in force, advancing in three columns. I waited until the enemy was fully developed, then dispatched a staff-officer to General Giles A. Smith, telling him that the enemy was attacking in his rear, that he must refuse his left and join with Fuller. My staff-officer came back with the information that General Smith would comply with the request. Smith had not then been attacked, and the enemy was all developed beyond my right in the timber, covering Fuller’s right flank, with their skirmish-line extending around to the left of Sweeny. I observed no movement of General Smith, and became very anxious for the safety of that flank. I sent another staff-officer to General Smith, giving him fully the position of the enemy, and telling him that a very large force was upon our rear. General Smith was by this time apprised of the fact of the enemy’s intentions, from the general attack which had been made along my whole line. It afterward was made plain to me by General Smith why he hesitated to comply with my first request. He was in the act of refusing his left, when General McPherson sent him orders to hold his ground, and that reënforcements would be sent to him, or his left protected. General McPherson had evidently sent this order before arriving on the ground, without knowing the position of the enemy as fully as I did. I received no orders from General McPherson during the battle. In moving out of the timber into the open field in my front, now the rear of the army, one of the enemy’s columns of attack (the centre column) struck a mill-pond, or some other obstruction, just on the edge of an open field, and became entangled, retarding its progress and exposing the flank of the other column. I saw that something had confused the enemy, and immediately ordered Colonel Mersey’s brigade to charge the advance column on the exposed flank, and also sent orders to Fuller to instantly charge the enemy in his front, and to take advantage of their embarrassment. Both commands moved promptly, and fell upon the enemy and drove them back across the field, and I have no doubt saved my command. While this attack was progressing, not hearing from the staff-officer I sent to General Giles A. Smith, and seeing that the enemy was passing to my right in the rear, and far down the line of the Seventeenth Army Corps, I sent another staff-officer to that flank who must have passed up the road a short time before General McPherson, for he found General Giles A. Smith hotly engaged and unable to move. Fortunately, two batteries that were in line were in the centre of Sweeny’s division, on a knoll naturally strong and commanding, and giving a sweeping fire across an open field, covering both the right and left of Sweeny’s division; this knoll being the apex of the formation of Sweeny, the road bent to the west at that point, and Sweeny followed the direction of the road, forming his line right where his men were resting. These two batteries fired very effectively upon the enemy’s advance forces, pouring into them canister at short range. The fire was so destructive and Mersey’s charge so furious that the enemy very soon gave way on their front and fell back to the timber. General Fuller advanced rapidly across the field, driving the enemy before him, developed them in the gap between General Smith and his right, and drawing a rapid fire on his right flank, from the body of the enemy that had poured around the left of the Seventeenth Corps, he promptly changed front with a portion of his division, and, under a galling fire, moved on the enemy in the timber, clearing that point. The Sixty-fourth Illinois Infantry pushed in between the main column of the enemy and their advance in the timber, and captured their skirmish-line, the same that had killed General McPherson a few minutes before, and were then in possession of his papers and effects, including his orders, which we obtained. The fighting in General Fuller’s front was very severe, and the ground contested inch by inch, his artillery doing very effective service. Finally, the enemy fell back along Fuller’s whole line, and I swung my right in order to bring it into line with the brigade that McPherson had ordered up to General Giles A. Smith’s aid, which had been forced to take position to the right, and somewhat in rear of Fuller’s advance. The Seventeenth Army Corps reformed its left at right angles with the original line, and joined this brigade. This brought the enemy well to our front, and there we kept them the rest of the day. Major-General McPherson arrived on the ground during the attack on me, stood near the ammunition-train on right of my line, watching the result of my counter-charge upon the enemy. As soon as the tide turned in my favor, he followed a road through the timber leading from Fuller’s right before his advance to the left of the Seventeenth Army Corps, still unaware of the advance of the enemy into the gap between Fuller’s right and the Seventeenth Corps. About half an hour after my first repulse of the enemy I received a report that General McPherson was wounded, and it was about 3 P.M. before I was aware he was dead. About 4 P.M. General Logan called in person for aid to drive back the enemy on the Decatur and Atlanta road, where he had made a sortie and gained a temporary advantage, breaking through General Morgan L. Smith’s division of the Fifteenth Army Corps. I sent the Second Brigade of the Second Division under Colonel Mersey, accompanied by Captain Jonas of my staff. Mersey’s brigade immediately went into line and moved down the main road, participating in the charge with General Wood’s division of the Fifteenth Army Corps, retook the works and batteries that had been lost, Colonel Mersey receiving a wound in his leg, having his horse killed under him. General Morgan L. Smith, who witnessed Colonel Mersey’s attack, sent by Captain Jonas a very complimentary message as to Colonel Mersey’s charge and its success. When General Logan called for Mersey’s brigade, he told me that if the enemy again attacked me and I needed help to call upon General J. D. Cox, of the Twenty-third Corps. At 5 P.M. the enemy made a demonstration on my extreme left, and I requested General Cox to send me a brigade, which he promptly did. The enemy, however, only opened with artillery. Again Mersey’s brigade was called into action about midnight, when General Logan ordered two regiments from it to occupy the hill that had been hotly contested in line of the Seventeenth Army Corps and relieve the troops of that command. Mersey’s troops promptly executed the request, crawling in on their hands and knees, finding the enemy in the ditches on the outside, and driving them out. The time of Colonel Mersey’s brigade had expired; they were exempt from participating in this battle had they chosen to avail themselves of this right, and were awaiting transportation North. They fought successfully on different parts of the field, suffering heavy loss in killed and wounded. General Sprague, who was at Decatur holding that town, covering the trains of the Army of the Tennessee with three regiments of his brigade and six guns of the Chicago Board of Trade Battery and one section of the Eighth Michigan Artillery, was attacked by the enemy in overwhelming numbers. Two divisions of Wheeler’s cavalry, dismounted, charged upon Sprague from three different directions. General Sprague concentrated his command, and, after a doubtful and determined contest, held the enemy in check and gained a position north of the town, which he was able to keep. In their charge the enemy twice got possession of Sprague’s artillery, but were immediately driven from it. General Sprague, by his good generalship and hard fighting, saved the trains of the Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth Army Corps at Decatur and en route from Roswell to the army. The trains on the march were guarded by the Ninth Illinois Infantry and the Forty-third Ohio Infantry, which regiments, upon their arrival at Decatur, went promptly into the action. The Sixteenth Army Corps, at the time of Hood’s attack, was in the rear of the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps, stretched out upon a common wagon-road. Three brigades disposed in single line, numbering about forty-five hundred men, and not in line with the other corps, had met the attack of the rebel army, staggered it at the first onset, and driven it back with great slaughter, leaving the dead and wounded of the enemy in our hands. Any failure on the part of the Sixteenth Corps to check the enemy’s advance when he was already in our rear and certain of success, would have been disastrous to the whole Army of the Tennessee. The fortunate topography of the ground, the intelligence of the commanders, and the alacrity and bravery of the troops, enabled us to take advantage of the confusion created in the enemy’s ranks in finding this corps prepared for the attack, and to rout the enemy.
The disparity of forces can be seen from the fact that in the charge made by the two brigades under Fuller and Mersey they took three hundred and fifty-one prisoners, representing forty-nine different regiments, eight brigades, and three divisions. These two brigades brought back eight battle-flags from the enemy.
After the fight, four hundred and twenty-two of the enemy’s dead were buried in my front, and large numbers of the wounded were cared for in my hospitals.
The Sixteenth Army Corps suffered terribly in the battle of Atlanta. Their loss in killed and wounded was eight hundred and fifty-four out of fifty-four hundred men engaged, and nearly every field-officer of my command was killed or wounded.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
G. M. DODGE.
COUNCIL BLUFFS, IOWA, November 30, 1875.
TECUMSEH, ALABAMA, February 22, 1876.
Mrs. General W. T. SHERMAN.
MY DEAR MADAM: I have read with great interest General Sherman’s “Memoirs,” and some of the criticisms made upon it, and venture to give my testimony in regard to some of the disputed points falling within my personal knowledge, as of interest possibly to some of my comrades in arms, if not to the general public and history.
The March to the Sea.
On the 5th of May, 1864, I reported to General Sherman at Ringgold, Georgia, for duty as inspector-general on his staff. The general, with his map before him, explained the general course of his proposed campaign against General Johnston, ending with the capture of Atlanta. I remember that he had his coat and hat off, and his slippers on. When he had done his explanations, he began walking the floor of the room, smoking a cigar. I said to him that when he got to Atlanta he would be four hundred and fifty miles from his real base of supplies, with one railroad as his only means of transportation, and every mile of that liable to be broken by the enemy, and that it would absorb the whole of his army to hold Atlanta and protect the road, and asked him what he proposed after the capture of Atlanta. Stopping short in his walk, and snapping the ashes off his cigar in a quick, nervous way, he replied in two words—“Salt water.” I did not comprehend his meaning, but after a little further examination of the map I asked him if he meant Savannah or Charleston, and he said, “Yes.”
Again, soon after the capture of Atlanta, he called Colonel Beckwith, his chief commissary, and myself into his room in Judge Lyon’s house in Atlanta, and, locking the door, laid his map on the floor, and indicated his proposed march to Savannah. Colonel Beckwith’s first question naturally was, “How about supplies?” The general replied that there were one million of people in Georgia, and that where they could live his army would not starve.
Snake-Creek Gap.
Before and during the movements against General Johnston, at Rocky Face, General Sherman explained to me and others of his staff that the demonstrations on Johnston’s front and right were feints to cover and hide the real movement of attack by General McPherson through Snake-Creek Gap. In speaking of the danger that Johnston might fall on McPherson with his whole force, and crush him before help could be got to him, he said that the twenty-three thousand muskets of the Army of the Tennessee could not “be run over by anybody in a hurry,” and that the moment Johnston let go of Rocky Face, Thomas and Schofield would be on his rear, and thus place him between two fires, when ruin would be sure.
On the night of May 9th, as we were at supper at the brick house, by the spring near Tunnel Hill Station, a letter was brought to the general. Reading it, he instantly left the table, and bade me follow him. When we had got a little way from the house, he stopped short, and, with a vehement gesture of his right hand clinched, said: “I have got Joe Johnston dead. This letter is from McPherson. At one o’clock to-day he was within one and a half mile of the railroad. He must be on it now. I want to go over and see ‘Tom’ ”—meaning General Thomas. On his way he said that Johnston would be compelled to abandon the railroad and most of his artillery and trains, and retreat to the east through the mountains (Pigeon Mountains, I think they were called); that we would follow the railroad, and beat Johnston to Atlanta.
Arriving at General Thomas’s headquarters, we found him at supper, and General Sherman repeated to him the same expressions he used to me. General Thomas was also greatly pleased, and my recollection is that he said he thought Johnston would fortify and defend the gap. Sherman and Thomas agreed that Johnston must now let go Rocky Face, and that Thomas and Schofield must push him hard in the morning to crush him and prevent his crushing McPherson. This understanding had, we returned to our headquarters, General Sherman being in high spirits.
Late that night word came from McPherson that he had failed to seize the railroad, and had fallen back to the mouth of the gap and fortified. I think that all the members of the staff will remember how disappointed and excited the general was on receipt of this news, and how cross he was the next day, and that we all thought he might relieve McPherson of his command, though the general gave no intimation of such intent—to me, at least. We simply inferred it from McPherson’s failure to execute the work expected of him.
I was present when General Sherman and McPherson first met after this, and well remember that General Sherman’s manner toward McPherson was one of sadness rather than anger, and that his first remark was, “Well, Mac, you have missed the great opportunity of your life.” General Adkins and Colonel Hickenlooper, both of whom were in good position to know the truth, express, I think, the general judgment of the Army of the Tennessee—that if certain other division commanders had been in the lead, the railroad would have been seized and held, and Johnston ruined.
That the failure to do this was by far the most grievous disappointment which General Sherman met with during the Atlanta campaign, will, I think, be admitted by all who participated in it, and were familiar with its history.
The Battle of the 22d of July, or “Atlanta.”
Perhaps I cannot better state my knowledge of this battle than by quoting some remarks made by me in the Ohio Senate in 1866, when the facts were all fresh in my memory, and repeated in the United States Senate May 4, 1870. Though not all exactly pertinent to the points in issue about the battle of Atlanta, I will copy the whole of these remarks, as affording the conclusive proof of my high regard and admiration for all three of these true men and great soldiers—Sherman, Thomas, and McPherson—and how incapable I am of seeking to lessen in the slightest degree their well-earned fame. Grant, Sherman, Thomas, McPherson, and Sheridan, are names that will be illustrious throughout the world while the history of our late great war is preserved.
The joint resolution appropriating condemned cannon for the use of the McPherson Monument Association having been taken up, Senator Warner said:
“I claim the indulgence of the Senate for a few minutes.
“Mr. President, I speak on this resolution with feelings of unusual interest, growing out of the remarkable character of the man whom it is intended to honor, and of my long association during the late war with him. I first met him just after we had fought so successfully the battle of Fort Donelson, when he was a lieutenant-colonel on the staff of General Grant; and from that time until the hour of his death I was in the same army, campaigns, and battles, with him. During the ever-memorable and brilliant Atlanta campaign, it was my honor to serve as an inspector-general on the staff of General Sherman, and, as such, was brought much in contact with General McPherson, and had large opportunities of learning his character and services, and the regard in which he was held by the army and by his military peers and superiors. That esteem was in some respects peculiar. General Sherman had, above all others, the supreme confidence of the entire army in his military skill and bold energy, and none stood higher for personal patriotism, purity, and integrity—an integrity of Roman firmness, rigidity, and self-denial. These qualities are well shown in his refusal to accept, in the beginning of the Atlanta campaign, a commission as major-general in the regular army, on the ground that the Government had already sufficiently rewarded and honored him for his services, and that it should be held up as a prize for the most meritorious service during the campaigns then about to be begun, of Atlanta and the Wilderness.
“General Thomas, in his Washingtonian greatness, solidity, and purity, had universal respect and confidence throughout the army. General Schofield, though less widely known than either Sherman or Thomas, yet had the entire confidence and perfect respect of his own army, and of all who were competent to judge him, as a soldier of skill and courage, and as a pure patriot and just man. But McPherson, added to the utmost confidence in his military skill and personal courage, had such noble beauty of form and countenance, such winning gentleness of expression and manner; his face, which in repose had an expression of almost womanly sweetness, would so light up and blaze with fiercest courage and daring in the moment of battle, that in danger he was worshiped as a hero; in quiet regarded in tenderest love as a man—it seemed as though the love of the beautiful one whom he worshiped, but whom the Fates in blind cruelty decreed he might never wed, so lighted the noble soul which God gave him, as to illuminate his face, and make gentle and true and winning his life, his own love attracting to him the love of all other men.
“And then the circumstances of his life and death were so touching and tragic! At two o’clock of the morning of the memorable 22d of July, 1864, when General Sherman’s army was laying close siege to Atlanta, I was called by him and ordered to go to McPherson, some six miles distant on our left, and inform him that the enemy had evacuated his works in front of our centre, and with directions for him to pursue, by certain roads, in case the enemy had abandoned his whole line and Atlanta. I found him at daylight in bed. Waking him up, he gave instantly the necessary orders for a reconnaissance to ascertain the movements of the enemy. We ate breakfast together, mounted our horses, rode to the front, and found the enemy had only retired about a mile to an inner and shorter line. We rode to his skirmish-line and outside of it, and a mile in front of the line on which the great battle was fought later in the day, passing twice over the spot on which he fell a few hours later. Very near this spot we met General G. M. Dodge, and then General McPherson gave him the order to halt his two divisions of the Sixteenth Corps, which were then marching by the flank in a direction at right angles to our line, the head of the column being less than a mile from our extreme left. Neither McPherson nor Dodge nor General Frank P. Blair, who was with us, then comprehended the mighty and happy influence which this order, given only to await the intrenching by working parties of the extended and advanced line on our left, which Dodge was to occupy, was to have on the day’s battle, whose stillness was even then upon us. One may well regard it as providential. No one then knew or thought that Hood had, during the night before, contracted his line so as to be able to spare Hardee with a corps of ten to fifteen thousand men, to make by a night march of fifteen miles a circuit round our left to attack us in flank and rear, and who was then, just out of our sight, forming his troops for the attack. We left the field on our left and rode rapidly to the centre to General Sherman, at the Howard House, an abandoned private dwelling near the centre of our line, and within easy reach of the enemy’s rifles. On our way we halted for a few moments at the tent of Major-General Frank P. Blair. While there, Blair’s surgeon reported that rebel cavalry had been seen near the hospital of the Seventeenth Corps, which held our left. It was also reported to McPherson that rebel cavalry had been seen near his headquarters, located in the rear of our left, on Decatur road. The necessary orders were given by McPherson and Blair to guard against dashes of bands of cavalry, but no importance was attached by any one to the fact of their appearance, as it was so common, though, in fact, it was the first pattering of the great storm of battle which was soon to burst upon the two armies, and prostrate in wounds and death ten thousand brave men. A few moments after dismounting at General Sherman’s headquarters, the sharp, rattling fire of musketry was heard in the direction of our left rear. Sherman and McPherson listened to it attentively for a few moments, both detecting in it the decisive sound of coming battle, when McPherson quickly mounted his horse and rode rapidly toward it. In less than two hours his dead body was laid at Sherman’s feet on the porch of the Howard House. In riding from the right of General Dodge’s line through the interval that separated it from the left of Leggett’s division of the Seventeenth Corps by a blind road through the woods, attended only by an orderly, his staff having all been sent away with orders for the conduct of the battle, he was halted by a squad of rebel infantry and ordered to surrender. Raising his hat as if in token of surrender, he essayed to rein his horse quickly away and plunge into the woods and escape. The rebels, instantly detecting his purpose, fired a volley, and the brave and chivalrous McPherson fell to rise no more.
“I can never forget the touching scene at the Howard House as his body lay there, still and beautiful in death. McPherson was betrothed to a girl of rare beauty and worth in Baltimore, and had the promise of a leave of absence in the spring of 1864 to go to Baltimore and be married. The exigencies of the military service, in connection with the grand movements of the Atlanta and Wilderness campaigns, which General Grant directed should be begun simultaneously, compelled General Sherman to the painful necessity of denying this leave. He wrote a kind and touching letter to the girl, taking the whole responsibility, and begging her to consider that General McPherson had no option but obedience or soldierly dishonor, and promising him leave the earliest time the service would allow. As we looked on his face, pale and cold in death, even the remembrance of his virtues, and his value to the army and to the country, was hushed in the thought of the deep love which, but a few hours before, had lent such light to his eyes and such geniality to his manners, and of the irreparable sorrow soon to come to one from whom death had so cruelly snatched her beautiful hero. Sherman slowly paced the floor, frequently stopping short to receive reports of the progress of the fight, or to give orders for its conduct, or to gaze into the lifeless face of his beloved captain, the tears meanwhile rapidly coursing down his war-worn face.
“Mr. President, the tears shed on the battle-field over his dead body by his great chief Tecumseh and his brave men would have made his most fitting monument, had the skill of other than a divine artist been equal to the task of gathering them in the form in which they fell, and of giving them the perpetuity as they had the radiance of diamonds, of fashioning them into ‘a form of beauty,’ sparkling in God’s light, while time shall last, the story of his virtues. But earth caught them, mingled with the blood of those who shed them, and her flowers, nourished by them, will be Nature’s sympathetic testimony to his kindred beauty of form and soul.
“The high military renown of General McPherson, together with the possession by him of those gentle qualities which won for him the sobriquet of ‘the beloved McPherson,’ so peculiarly distinguished him as to warrant us in making this contribution, to aid in raising a monument which shall tell to all future ages of his services and fame.”
On my way to General McPherson’s headquarters, on the morning of the 22d of July, I passed General Logan’s quarters at daylight, and seeing him in front of his tent, told him my errand, and my recollection is that he at once proceeded to reconnoitre his front, without waiting for orders from General McPherson, which were sent by a staff-officer on my arrival at General McPherson’s, perhaps a mile distant and to the left rear.
When news came of General McPherson’s death, and of the partial turning of our left, General Sherman said to me, “Warner, you have been over all this ground to-day; go quickly and see how matters stand, and report to me.” I went and saw Generals Dodge, Blair, and Leggett. Blair’s left had been turned, but he had reformed it refused from Leggett’s Hill, and had made connection, or nearly so, with Dodge’s divisions, and the three stood firm and were confident of holding their positions, which they did, and repulsed the enemy with great slaughter. General Blair said to me, on my asking him of the condition of matters, “We have had a d——d hard fight, but we whipped them, and can do it again if they come back at us.”
As I returned I had to ride, in order to pass a fence, up the main wagon-road alongside the railroad from Atlanta to Decatur to within one or two hundred yards of our main line on our centre, when it crossed the wagon and rail roads near the brick house. The enemy were just attacking our centre with great energy, and their artillery enfiladed the road up which I was riding—three solid shots or shells striking in the road in front of me and ricochetting over me, in going a distance of half a mile. Just as I passed nearest our line, the enemy issued from the railroad-cut in the rear of our line and captured a part of it belonging to General Morgan L. Smith’s division, and not to General Wood’s, as General Kilpatrick erroneously states. General Wood’s line was nowhere broken, nor seriously attacked, as I remember. The splendid fighting of his division was done later in aiding General Smith’s division to recover the lost part of their line.
Reaching General Sherman a few minutes later at the Howard House, I informed him of the condition of affairs on the left, as stated by Generals Blair, Dodge, and Leggett, and as seen by myself, and said to him that Leggett’s Hill was the key of our entire left from the railroad, and that it would be held—that, in fact, the enemy were already repulsed and beaten on that part of the field.
General C. R. Wood had just reported the breaking of our line to his left, but General Sherman was incredulous, and sent him back to be sure. I confirmed the report, and presently General Wood returned and again confirmed it. Then it was that General Wood’s troops were formed en échelon and advanced in such splendid style to the left to the attack of the enemy’s left flank, swinging to the right up to the breastworks as the enemy were driven from the opposite side by the enfilading fire of Wood, aided by Schofield’s guns on the hill in front of the Howard House trained on the enemy’s flank. I directed the fire of one of these guns, by watching with my glass where the shots struck and hinting accordingly to the officer sighting the gun. To understand all this it must be borne in mind that the guns were on a high hill, Wood’s troops in a deep hollow, and the enemy on the face of the hill opposite—the line of breastworks crossing the hollow at right angles. All this was done by the orders and under the eye of General Sherman.
The result was that our entire line was speedily recovered, and the day closed with the enemy completely foiled of his object, and everywhere repulsed and beaten with great loss.
The next morning General Sherman, soon followed by General Logan, rode along our entire line to the left of the Howard House, and both were received with the wildest enthusiasm by the troops which had done such severe and splendid fighting the day before.
The sight of the great number of Confederate dead in front of our lines was appalling, and never to be forgotten by those who saw it.
As showing General Sherman’s estimate of General McPherson, I will say that, as we rode to our quarters from the battle-field late that night, General Sherman said: “The army and the country have sustained a great loss by the death of McPherson. I had expected him to finish the war. Grant and I are likely to be killed, or set aside after some failure to meet popular expectation, and McPherson would have come into chief command at the right time to end the war. He had no enemies.”
Successor to McPherson.
General Sherman talked to me freely about this matter at the time, and the considerations that seemed to influence him were that General Howard was a soldier of education and training, with a larger experience than General Logan, and therefore better fitted for such high command; but he seemed to regret that these reasons compelled him to prefer General Howard to so brave and daring a soldier as General Logan.
Removal of the People of Atlanta.
The following letter, the original of which is in my possession, throws some light on this matter, in regard to which General Sherman was so sharply censured at the South. The fact is, that not more than half the people of Atlanta obeyed the order, and no force was used to compel obedience. I was detailed by the general to attend to the delivery of the people to General Hood at Rough and Ready, where he sent Colonel Clare, of his staff, to receive them. The inhabitants had choice of transportation by rail or wagons—Colonel Le Duc, of General Geary’s command, having control of all the transportation of the army for the purpose, and sending as many wagons to each house as were asked for. I had a train of cars standing on the track in Atlanta every day from 8 A.M. to 3 P.M., and the people were allowed to put on what they chose. The only limit to amount of goods to be taken was Hood’s ability to transport from Rough and Ready. This letter Colonel Clare handed to me sealed and addressed to myself, when we parted, with request that I would not open it until I reached Atlanta. It illustrates his generous nature.
“ROUGH AND READY, GEORGIA,
September 21, 1864.
“COLONEL: Our official connection is about to cease. You will permit me to bear testimony to the uniform courtesy you have shown on all occasions to me and my people; and the promptness with which you have corrected all irregularities arising in our intercourse.
“Hoping, sir, to be able at some future time to reciprocate your courtesy and in many instances your positive kindness,
“I am, with respect, your obedient servant,
“W. CLARE, Major and Assistant Inspector-General, General Hood’s Staff.
“Colonel WARNER, Inspector-General, Major-General Sherman’s Staff.”
General Thomas.
General Sherman has been censured for not doing General Thomas justice in his “Memoirs,” and particularly for speaking of him as “slow.” That General Sherman is rapid and bold, and that Thomas was slow and cautious, in thought and action, in word and deed, in constitutional habit of mind, certainly no sane and honest man acquainted with each will deny.
This is certainly as well known as that General Grant was quicker and bolder than McClellan, and Sheridan than Buell. Which was the better general, on the whole, is a question not here in dispute.
On the 5th of May, 1864, General Thomas came to General Sherman’s headquarters at Ringgold, Georgia. I did not then know him, but asked General Sherman if that were not General Thomas. He said, “Yes,” and I then asked him if there was any truth in the rumor that Thomas felt aggrieved at having him (Sherman) put in command over him. He replied: “No, not a bit! It don’t make much difference which of us commands. I would obey ‘Tom’s’ orders tomorrow as cheerfully as he obeys mine to-day, but I think I can give an army a little more impetus than ‘Tom’ can.” Here was the whole truth and difference in a nut-shell.
Their consultations were frequent, frank, and free, and I never saw any sign of bad feeling between them. After the battle of Nashville, General Thomas complained to me, as I understood he did to others, that injustice was done him in sending General Logan to relieve him of command; that those who gave and allowed the order did not and could not know the facts of his position, and that results had justified and vindicated him.
After the war he complained to me of the treatment of President Grant. I well remember his grand old figure, as he leaned on the little marble pedestal that used to stand in the vestibule of Willard’s Hotel, in Washington, at the Fourteenth Street entrance, and said sadly: “I think that I have done the country some service, and something toward the success of the Republican party, and the only thing I have asked of this Administration was the appointment of my old commissary, Paul, as postmaster at Nashville, and that was refused, as the place was needed for some politician. I shall never ask for anything more.”
WILLARD WARNER,
Late Brigadier-General of Volunteers,
and late United States Senator of Alabama.
Official account of the people sent south, their numbers and luggage, under Special Field Order No. 67, issued by Major-General W. T. Sherman, Atlanta, Georgia, September 4, 1864.
Respectfully submitted:
(Signed)
WILLIAM G. LE DUC,
Lieutenant-Colonel and Chief Quartermaster Twentieth Army Corps.
Statement showing the organizations actually participating in the movement on Atlanta, Georgia, under General W. T. Sherman, in May, 1864.
ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND.
MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS.
Fourth Army Corps.—Major-General O. O. HOWARD, commanding.
FIRST DIVISION.
Major-General D. S. STANLEY.
First Brigade.
Brigadier-General
Charles Cruft.
1st Kentucky Infantry.
2d Kentucky Infantry.
90th Ohio Infantry.
101st Ohio Infantry.
31st Indiana Infantry.
81st Indiana Infantry.
21st Illinois Infantry.
38th Illinois Infantry.
Second Brigade.
Brig. General
W. C. Whitaker.
96th Illinois Infantry.
115th Illinois Infantry.
35th Indiana Infantry.
84th Indiana Infantry.
40th Ohio Infantry.
51st Ohio Infantry.
99th Ohio Infantry.
21st Kentucky Infantry.
Third Brigade.
Colonel William Grose.
59th Illinois Infantry.
75th Illinois Infantry.
80th Illinois Infantry.
84th Illinois Infantry.
9th Indiana Infantry.
30th Indiana Infantry.
36th Indiana Infantry.
77th Pennsylvania Infantry.
Artillery.
5th Indiana Battery Light Artillery; Independent Battery B, Pennsylvania Light Artillery.
SECOND DIVISION.
Major-General JOHN NEWTON.
First Brigade.
Brigadier-General
N. Kimball.
2d Missouri Infantry.
15th Missouri Infantry.
24th Wisconsin Infantry.
36th Illinois Infantry.
44th Illinois Infantry.
73d Illinois Infantry.
74th Illinois Infantry.
88th Illinois Infantry.
Second Brigade.
Brig.-General
G. D. Wagner.
40th Indiana Infantry.
57th Indiana Infantry.
26th Ohio Infantry.
97th Ohio Infantry.
100th Illinois Infantry.
28th Kentucky Infantry.
Third Brigade.
Brig.-General
C. G. Harker.
3d Kentucky Infantry.
64th Ohio Infantry.
65th Ohio Infantry.
125th Ohio Infantry.
22d Illinois Infantry.
27th Illinois Infantry.
42d Illinois Infantry.
51st Illinois Infantry.
79th Illinois Infantry.
Artillery.
M, 1st Illinois Light Artillery; A, Ohio Light Artillery.
THIRD DIVISION.
Brigadier-General T. J. WOOD.
First Brigade.
Colonel W. H.
Gibson
8th Kansas Infantry.
15th Wisconsin Infantry.
15th Ohio Infantry.
49th Ohio Infantry.
32d Indiana Infantry.
25th Illinois Infantry.
35th Illinois Infantry.
89th Illinois Infantry.
Second Brigade.
Brig.-General
W. B. Hazen.
1st Ohio Infantry.
6th Ohio Infantry.
41st Ohio Infantry.
93d Ohio Infantry.
124th Ohio Infantry.
5th Kentucky Infantry.
6th Kentucky Infantry.
23d Kentucky Infantry.
6th Indiana Infantry.
Third Brigade.
Colonel Fred Knefler.
9th Kentucky Infantry.
17th Kentucky Infantry.
13th Ohio Infantry.
19th Ohio Infantry.
59th Ohio Infantry.
79th Indiana Infantry.
86th Indiana Infantry.
Artillery.
6th Battery Ohio Light Artillery; Bridge’s Battery, Illinois Light Artillery.
Fourteenth Army Corps.—Major-General JOHN M. PALMER, commanding.
FIRST DIVISION.
Brigadier-General R. W. JOHNSON.
First Brigade.
Brigadier-General
W. P. Carlin.
21st Wisconsin Infantry.
10th Wisconsin Infantry.
33d Ohio Infantry.
94th Ohio Infantry.
2d Ohio Infantry.
42d Indiana Infantry.
88th Indiana Infantry.
104th Illinois Infantry.
15th Kentucky Infantry.
Second Brigade
Brigadier-General
J. H. King.
1st Bat. 15th U.S. Infantry.
2d Bat. 15th U.S. Infantry.
1st Bat. 16th U.S. Infantry.
2d Bat. 16th U.S. Infantry.
1st Bat. 18th U.S. Infantry.
2d Bat. 18th U.S. Infantry.
1st Bat. 19th U.S. Infantry.
69th Ohio Infantry.
11th Michigan Infantry.
Third Brigade.
Colonel B. F.
Scribner.
78th Pennsylvania Infant’y.
79th Pennsylvania Infant’y.
21st Ohio Infantry.
74th Ohio Infantry.
37th Indiana Infantry.
1st Wisconsin Infantry.
38th Indiana Infantry.
Artillery.
C, 1st Illinois Light Artillery; I, 1st Ohio Light Artillery.
SECOND DIVISION.
Brigadier-General J. C. DAVIS.
First Brigade.
Brigadier-General
J. D. Morgan.
10th Illinois Infantry.
16th Illinois Infantry.
60th Illinois Infantry.
10th Michigan Infantry.
14th Michigan Infantry.
Second Brigade.
Colonel J. G.
Mitchell.
121st Ohio Infantry.
113th Ohio Infantry.
98th Ohio Infantry.
108th Ohio Infantry.
3d Ohio Infantry.
78th Illinois Infantry.
34th Illinois Infantry.
Third Brigade.
Colonel Daniel
McCook.
52d Ohio Infantry.
85th Illinois Infantry.
86th Illinois Infantry.
110th Illinois Infantry.
125th Illinois Infantry.
22d Indiana Infantry.
Artillery.
I, 2d Illinois Light Artillery; 5th Wisconsin Battery.
THIRD DIVISION.
Brigadier-General ABSALOM BAIRD.
First Brigade.
Brigadier-General
J. B. Turchin.
11th Ohio Infantry.
17th Ohio Infantry.
31st Ohio Infantry.
89th Ohio Infantry.
92d Ohio Infantry.
82d Indiana Infantry.
19th Illinois Infantry.
24th Illinois Infantry.
Second Brigade.
Colonel R. Van Derveer.
35th Ohio Infantry.
2d Minnesota Infantry.
9th Ohio Infantry.
87th Indiana Infantry.
105th Ohio Infantry.
101st Indiana Infantry.
75th Indiana Infantry.
Third Brigade.
Colonel George R Este.
4th Kentucky Infantry.
10th Kentucky Infantry.
18th Kentucky Infantry.
10th Indiana Infantry.
74th Indiana Infantry.
14th Ohio Infantry.
38th Ohio Infantry.
Artillery.
7th Indiana Battery; 19th Indiana Battery.
Twentieth Army Corps.—Major-General JOSEPH HOOKER, commanding.
Escort. K, 15th Illinois Cavalry.
FIRST DIVISION.
Brigadier-General A. S. WILLIAMS.
First Brigade.
Brigadier-General
J. F. Knipe.
123d New York Infantry.
3d Maryland Infantry (det.).
141st New York Infantry.
5th Connecticut Infantry.
46th Pennsylvania Infantry.
Second Brigade.
Brigadier-General
T. H. Ruger.
2d Massachusetts Infantry.
3d Wisconsin Infantry.
107th New York Infantry.
150th New York Infantry.
27th Indiana Infantry.
13th New Jersey Infantry.
Third Brigade.
Colonel
J. S. Robinson.
82d Ohio Infantry.
61st Ohio Infantry.
143d New York Infantry.
45th New York Infantry.
82d Illinois Infantry.
101st Illinois Infantry.
Artillery.
I and M, 1st New York Light Artillery.
SECOND DIVISION.
Brigadier-General JOHN W. GEARY.
First Brigade.
Colonel Charles Candy.
5th Ohio Infantry.
7th Ohio Infantry.
29th Ohio Infantry.
66th Ohio Infantry.
28th Pennsylvania Infantry.
147th Pennsylvania Infan’y.
Second Brigade.
Colonel J. F. Lockman.
73d Pennsylvania Infantry.
109th Pennsylva. Infantry.
33d New Jersey Infantry.
119th New York Infantry.
134th New York Infantry.
154th New York Infantry.
Third Brigade.
Colonel David Ireland.
60th New York Infantry.
78th New York Infantry.
102d New York Infantry.
137th New York Infantry.
149th New York Infantry.
29th Pennsylvania Infant’y.
111th Pennsylvania Infan’y.
Artillery.
13th New York Battery—Independent; E, Pennsylvania Light Artillery.
THIRD DIVISION.
Major-General DANIEL BUTTERFIELD.
First Brigade.
Brigadier-General
W. T. Ward.
70th Indiana Infantry.
102d Illinois Infantry.
105th Illinois Infantry.
129th Illinois Infantry.
79th Ohio Infantry.
Second Brigade.
Colonel John Coburn.
33d Indiana Infantry.
85th Indiana Infantry.
19th Michigan Infantr.
22d Wisconsin Infantry.
Third Brigade.
Colonel James Wood, Jr.
136th New York Infantry.
33d Massachusetts Infan’y.
55th Ohio Infantry.
73d Ohio Infantry.
26th Wisconsin Infantry.
20th Connecticut Infantry.
Artillery.
C, 1st Ohio Light Artillery; I, 1st Michigan Light Artillery.
Cavalry Corps.—Brigadier-General W. L. ELLIOTT.
FIRST DIVISION.
Colonel E. M. McCook.
First Brigade.
Colonel Joseph B. Dorr.
2d Michigan Cavalry.
8th Iowa Cavalry.
1st East Tennessee Cavalry.
Second Brigade.
Colonel O. H. La Grange.
1st Wisconsin Cavalry.
2d Indiana Cavalry.
4th Indiana Cavalry.
18th Indiana Battery.
SECOND DIVISION.
Brigadier-General KENNER GARRARD.
First Brigade.
Colonel R. H. G.
Minty.
4th U.S. Cavalry.
4th Michigan Cavalry.
7th Pennsylvania Cavalry.
Second Brigade.
Colonel Eli Long.
1st Ohio Cavalry.
3d Ohio Cavalry.
4th Ohio Cavalry.
Third Brigade.
Colonel John T. Wilder.
17th Indiana Mounted Infantry.
72d Indiana Mounted Infantry.
98th Illinois Mounted Infantry.
123 Illinois Mounted Infantry.
Chicago Board of Trade Battery.
THIRD DIVISION.
Brigadier-General JUDSON KILPATRICK.
First Brigade.
5th Iowa Cavalry.
3d Indiana Cavalry.
9th Pennsylvania Cavalry.
Second Brigade.
Colonel Charles C.
Smith.
10th Ohio Cavalry.
2d Kentucky Cavalry.
8th Indiana Cavalry.
Third Brigade.
Colonel E. H. Murray.
92d Illinois M’nted Infantry.
3d Kentucky Cavalry.
5th Kentucky Cavalry.
Artillery.
10th Wisconsin Battery.
Reserve Brigade.
Colonel H. Le Favour.
9th Michigan Infantry.
22d Michigan Infantry.
Pioneer Brigade.
Colonel George P. Buell.
58th Indiana Infantry.
Pontoon Battalion.
Unassigned Artillery.
11th Indiana Battery.
ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE.
MAJOR-GENERAL JAMES B. MCPHERSON.
Fifteenth Army Corps.—Major-General JOHN A. LOGAN, commanding.
FIRST DIVISION.
Brigadier-General P. J. OSTERHAUS.
First Brigade.
Brigadier-General
C. R. Woods.
76th Ohio Infantry.
26th Iowa Infantry.
30th Iowa Infantry.
27th Missouri Infantry.
Second Brigade.
Colonel J. A. Williamson.
4th Iowa Infantry.
9th Iowa Infantry.
25th Iowa Infantry.
31st Iowa Infantry.
Third Brigade.
Colonel H. Wangelin.
3d Missouri Infantry.
12th Missouri Infantry.
17th Missouri Infantry.
29th Missouri Infantry.
31st Missouri Infantry.
32d Missouri Infantry.
Artillery.
F, 2d Missouri Light Artillery; 4th Ohio Battery.
SECOND DIVISION.
Brigadier-General MORGAN L. SMITH.
First Brigade.
Brigadier-General
Giles A. Smith.
6th Missouri Infantry.
8th Missouri Infantry.
55th Illinois Infantry.
111th Illinois Infantry.
127th Illinois Infantry.
57th Ohio Infantry.
Second Brigade.
Brigadier-General
J. A. J. Lightburn.
30th Ohio Infantry.
37th Ohio Infantry.
47th Ohio Infantry.
53d Ohio Infantry.
54th Ohio Infantry.
83d Indiana Infantry.
4th West Virginia Infantry.
Artillery.
A, B, and H, 1st Illinois Light Artillery.
FOURTH DIVISION.
Brigadier-General WILLIAM HARROW.
First Brigade.
Colonel R. Williams.
12th Indiana Infantry.
100th Indiana Infantry.
26th Illinois Infantry.
90th Illinois Infantry.
Second Brigade.
Brig.-General
John M. Corse.
46th Ohio Infantry.
6th Iowa Infantry.
40th Illinois Infantry.
103d Illinois Infantry.
97th Indiana Infantry.
Third Brigade.
Colonel John M. Oliver.
15th Michigan Infantry.
70th Ohio Infantry.
48th Illinois Infantry.
99th Indiana Infantry.
Artillery.
1st Iowa Battery; F, 1st Illinois Light Artillery.
Sixteenth Army Corps (Left Wing).—Brigadier-General G. M. DODGE, commanding.
SECOND DIVISION.
Brigadier-General T. W. SWEENY.
First Brigade.
Colonel E. W. Rice.
2d Iowa Infantry.
7th Iowa Infantry.
52d Illinois Infantry.
66th Indiana Infantry.
Second Brigade.
Colonel Augustus Mersy.
9th Illinois Infantry.
12th Illinois Infantry.
66th Illinois Infantry.
81st Ohio Infantry.
Third Brigade.
Colonel M. M. Bane.
7th Illinois Infantry.
50th Illinois Infantry.
57th Illinois Infantry.
39th Iowa Infantry.
Artillery.
H, 1st Missouri Light Artillery; B, 1st Michigan Light Artillery.
FOURTH DIVISION.
Brigadier-General JAMES C. VEATCH.
First Brigade.
Brigadier-General
J. W. Fuller.
18th Missouri Infantry.
27th Ohio Infantry.
39th Ohio Infantry.
64th Illinois Infantry.
Second Brigade.
Colonel John W. Sprague.
25th Wisconsin Infantry.
35th New Jersey Infantry.
43d Ohio Infantry.
63d Ohio Infantry.
Cavalry.
1st Alabama Cavalry.
Artillery.
14th Ohio Battery; C, 1st Michigan, and F, 2d U.S. Artillery.
*Seventeenth Army Corps.—Major-General F. P. BLAIR, Jr., commanding.
THIRD DIVISION.
Brigadier-General M. D. LEGGETT.
First Brigade.
Brigadier-General
M. F. Force.
20th Illinois Infrantry.
30th Illinois Infrantry.
31st Illinois Infrantry.
45th Illinois Infrantry.
16th Wisconsin Infrantry.
Second Brigade.
Colonel R. K. Scott.
20th Ohio Infrantry.
32d Ohio Infrantry.
68th Ohio Infrantry.
78th Ohio Infrantry.
Third Brigade.
Colonel A. G. Molloy.
17th Wisconsin Infrantry.
Det’s.
14th Wisconsin Infrantry.
81st Illinois Infrantry.
95th Illinois Infrantry.
Artillery.
D, 1st Illinois; H, 1st Michigan and 3d Ohio Battery.
*Joined in June, 1864.
FOURTH DIVISION.
Brigadier-General W. Q. GRESHAM.
First Brigade.
Colonel W. S. Sanderson.
3d Iowa Infantry.
12th Wisconsin Infantry.
23d Indiana Infantry.
32d Illinois Infantry.
53d Indiana Infantry.
Second Brigade.
Colonel J. C. Rogers.
14th Illinois Infantry.
15th Illinois Infantry.
41st Illinois Infantry.
53d Illinois Infantry.
33d Wisconsin Infantry.
Third Brigade.
Colonel William Hall,
11th Iowa Infantry.
13th Iowa Infantry.
15th Iowa Infantry.
16th Iowa Infantry.
Cavalry.
G, 11th Illinois Cavalry.
Artillery.
10th and 15th Ohio Batteries; 1st Minnesota Battery;
C, 1st Missouri, and F, 2d Illinois Batteries.
Army of the Ohio (Twenty-third Army Corps).—Major-General J. M. SCHOFIELD, commanding.
FIRST DIVISION.
Brigadier-General A. R HOVEY.
First Brigade.
Colonel Richard Baxter.
120th Indiana Infantry.
124th Indiana Infantry.
128th Indiana Infantry.
Second Brigade.
Colonel J. C. McQuiston.
123d Indiana Infantry.
129th Indiana Infantry.
130th Indiana Infantry.
Artillery.
23d and 24th Indiana Batteries.
SECOND DIVISION.
Brigadier-General M. S. HASCALL.
First Brigade.
Brigadier-General N. C. McLean
25th Michigan Infantry.
80th Indiana Infantry.
13th Kentucky Infantry.
3d Tennessee Infantry.
6th Tennessee Infantry.
Second Brigade.
Colonel John A. Bond.
23d Michigan Infantry.
111th Ohio Infantry.
107th Illinois Infantry.
118th Ohio Infantry.
Artillery.
19th Ohio Battery, and F, 1st Michigan Light Artillery.
THIRD DIVISION.
Brigadier-General J. D. COX.
First Brigade.
Colonel J. W. Reilly,
100th Ohio Infantry.
104th Ohio Infantry.
112th Illinois Infantry.
16th Kentucky Infantry.
8th Tennessee Infantry.
Second Brigade.
Brigadier-General M. D. Manson.
65th Indiana Infantry.
63d Indiana Infantry.
24th Kentucky Infantry.
5th Tennessee Infantry.
103d Ohio Infantry.
Artillery.
D, 1st Ohio and 15th Indiana Battery.
CAVALRY DIVISION.
Major-General GEORGE STONEMAN.
First Brigade.
Colonel C. D. Pannabaker.
1st Kentucky Cavalry.
11th Kentucky Cavalry.
8th Michigan Cavalry.
6th Indiana Cavalry.
12th Kentucky Cavalry.
16th Illinois Cavalry.
Second Brigade.
Colonel Israel Garrard.
7th Ohio Cavalry.
9th Michigan Cavalry.
5th Indiana Cavalry.
16th Kentucky Cavalry.