MUSTAFA KABHA
In his speech at the Zionist Congress on October 20, 2015, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that
Hitler had planned to expel the Jews from Germany, but he was affected by the words of Mufti Haj Amin al-Husayni. Al-Husayni had a major role in devising the “Final Solution.”…At the time Hitler had not intended to eliminate the Jews, rather only to deport them. The mufti said to him: “If you deport them, they will come here.” Hitler asked him: “What should I do with them?” He answered: “Burn them.”1
Netanyahu’s words aroused a major uproar and generated quite a few condemnations, both within the political system and in various academic circles in Israel. Yitzhak Hertzog, head of the opposition in the Knesset (Israel’s parliament), referred to Netanyahu’s assertions as follows: “Even the son of a historian should maintain historical accuracy.” He added: “This is a dangerous historical distortion and I demand that Netanyahu correct it immediately, as it minimizes the Holocaust, Nazism, and the role of the villainous oppressor Adolf Hitler in the terrible disaster perpetrated against our people in the Holocaust. It plays into the hands of Holocaust deniers and turns them against the Palestinians.” In the academic sphere, Moshe Zimmermann, of the Hebrew University’s Department of History, said that “Netanyahu’s allegation is untrue. Hitler is probably turning in his grave, as he certainly thought that it was he who had conceived the ‘Final Solution’ rather than the mufti.” According to Zimmermann, although a meeting between Hitler and the mufti of Jerusalem indeed took place in Berlin, research provides no support for the suggestion that the Jewish extermination was first proposed at this meeting. “If perceptions of the mufti and of the Palestinians are as insinuated by Netanyahu, they have political implications as well as implications for any political settlement.”
These strong words of Netanyahu have no precedent in the claims voiced by representatives of the Zionist narrative and establishment about the mufti and the Palestinian national movement with regard to their alleged contribution to the Holocaust and the “Final Solution.” But they continue a trend that has been evident for many years, namely the leveling of allegations about the Palestinian national movement in general and its collaboration with Nazi Germany and the Axis powers during World War II in particular.2 Meanwhile, the contribution of the Palestinians to the war efforts of the Allied forces have been disregarded.3 Also ignored are the Palestinian voices raised at the height of the German occupation of Europe against fascism as a concept and a doctrine and against Nazi Germany and its colonial aspirations in the Arab East.4
In the introduction to one of his important papers, Israel Gershoni linked the accusations aimed at Muslims and Arabs with regard to demonstrations of sympathy for fascism and Nazism with the “Islamophobia” prevalent at present in academic and pseudoacademic circles around the world. Gershoni stated:
The term “Islamofascism” has developed and taken root only recently. It is part of a terminology that has been integrated into the academic and pseudo-academic discourse, which defines and explains contemporary global Islamic jihadism. In real time, in the 1930s and during the Second World War, 1933–1945, this term was totally alien to Muslim intellectuals in Egypt and in the Arab Middle East. Islam and fascism or Islam and Nazism were perceived as diametrically opposed terms. For most Arab intellectuals and publicists, who represent what is commonly referred to as Islamic thought or were spokesmen of Islamic movements, it was inconceivable to conjoin these two vastly different doctrines and ways of life. Any attempt to harmonize Islam and fascism, not to speak of the very term Islamofascism or fascist Islam, would have been anathema.5
It has become fashionable to recognize Mufti Amin al-Husayni’s close collaboration with Mussolini and Hitler and allegations concerning the Palestinian national movement’s purported wall-to-wall support of fascism as characteristic of the entire Palestinian movement. Most researchers disregard the variations between factions within the movement, and they ignore in particular the significant transitions experienced over time by advocates of fascism and Nazism. A close reading of Palestinian newspapers during the period 1933–1945 indicates the complex and dynamic attitude of the Palestinian public toward fascism and Nazism, which was contingent to a great degree on the evolution of Palestinian national identity in particular and Arab identity in general.
The views and approaches displayed by Palestinian leaders, journalists, and writers concerning German and Italian fascism do not point to the all-inclusive support alleged by many scholars. The latter commonly claim that the leaders and stewards of the Palestinian national movement—their disagreements and factions notwithstanding—were uniformly supportive of Germany and Italy, mainly due to their hatred and animosity toward Britain and in accordance with the concept “my enemy’s enemy is my friend.” These scholars draw their conclusions from comments made by Palestinian leaders, particularly Mufti Amin al-Husayni, who gambled on the Axis powers and their victory in World War II and spent the war with Mussolini and Hitler, as did other colonized leaders such as Subash Chandra Bose, of India.
The Palestinian Community during World War II—The General Atmosphere
When the revolt of 1936–1939 was finally repressed, Palestinian antagonism toward the British did not dissipate. The authorities’ maltreatment of Palestinian civilians—collective sanctions that included the destruction of homes, damage to crops, and food and possessions, as well as arrest, torture, and abuse—remains engraved in their memory over sixty years later. Recently, I interviewed some Palestinians who lived during this period and they angrily displayed scars or deformities inflicted upon them at detention centers during the revolt. It is not surprising that during World War II not many Palestinians hastened to stand by Britain, especially given that in the war’s initial stages Britain seemed helpless in response to the massive German attacks. However, the mufti’s actions notwithstanding, the Palestinians cannot be said to have uniformly supported the Axis powers. Most opinion shapers writing for the Palestinian press mitigated and toned down any demonstrations of support for Germany and Italy. The failure of the Iraqi coup d’état and Germany’s unwillingness to support the rebels reduced all interest in other concurrent German achievements.6
In a document composed in October 1941 by an informant working for the Arab division of the Jewish Agency, the atmosphere among the Palestinian public was described as follows:
It may be confidently assumed that recent events—beginning with the suppression of the Iraqi coup, the occupation of Syria, the Russian-German war, and ending with the invasion of Iran—have brought about a certain change among the Arab masses, as they have seen that: (A) In Iraq the coup initiated by the Germans has been suppressed; (B) The Vichy government, a German ally, has been forced to withdraw from Syria and Lebanon in favor of the English; (C) Russia had the courage to lash out against such a mighty force and to fight back; (D) Iran, a large Muslim country previously under German control, was forced by circumstances to open its gates to two oppressive forces; (E) The elimination of all signs of war [sic]. All these, as stated, had a certain effect on the local atmosphere among the Arabs. As a result: (A) Former threats against the Jewish settlement have disappeared; (B) Cooperation between the authorities and the masses, and even—significantly—the leaders, has intensified; (C) The extremists have cooled off, since most of the population would not comply with them as long as England was accumulating victories in the East.7
Supporting Allied Efforts
In spite of the hard feelings remaining from the suppressed revolt, and despite the harsh economic situation, many Palestinians responded to the call to mobilize in favor of Britain’s war effort. When the war broke out, a group of second-line Palestinian leaders—in the absence of first-line leaders—met with High Commissioner Harold MacMichael. The leaders expressed their support for Britain and even appealed to the Palestinian public in the press to support Britain and forego all internecine disputes.8 Palestinian Arabs contributed to the British war effort on two levels: (a) recruitment of service-age youngsters for active service and (b) recruitment of skilled men to work in army camps, unload wares at the harbors, supply fruit and vegetables, and build roads. There are no precise data on the numbers of Palestinian recruits, but estimates indicate there were between nine thousand and seventeen thousand.9 Some of the recruits were familiar with the British training regime from their previous role in the Peace Bands established by the British during the revolt. Prior experience expedited integration in the armed forces, while other recruits were sometimes found unfit for combat and employed as drivers, guards, and other noncombatant personnel. Palestinian recruits formed three operational units. The major unit was Commando 51, which took part in the fighting in France, North Africa, Ethiopia, and Crete. Historian Bayan Nuwayhid al-Hout concludes that “Palestinian Arabs contributed to the war effort comparatively less than the Jews. However, considering their political and psychological circumstances the assistance they provided may even be said to have exceeded their capacity.”10
Britain’s reinforced might in Palestine and neighboring countries had a positive effect on the local economy. Residents of towns and villages in the vicinity of army camps enjoyed an improved standard of living, as related by Nimr Murqus in his memoirs:
A new source of livelihood was now available to many younger and older men from our village, employed in construction of a camp adjacent to the village. The English opened construction workshops for building military camps and preparing basic facilities for the forces stationed in the country. There was a demand for workers and guards. Our village supplied a growing number of workers and many of them could now afford to eat meat practically every week. My father’s butchery became a good source of livelihood for my family. It no longer required understandings concerning the need to consolidate Arab efforts and reconcile their disagreements.11
Hence, the historical circumstances were much more intricate than mere propaganda, and thus the purpose of the current chapter is to explore and present the decisive attitude demonstrated by one of the Palestinian communist activists and intellectuals against the Nazi doctrine and against anyone who supported it, even if this was Joseph Stalin, the venerated leader of the Soviet Union, global center of contemporary communism, with which this Palestinian activist was ideologically affiliated.
Najati Sidqi (1905–1978) was one of the most influential Palestinian intellectuals between the two world wars. He left his mark on many cultural and philosophical spheres, particularly political philosophy and literature.12 Najati was one of the first Palestinian intellectuals to join the Communist Party, established in 1919 by Jews from the left-wing faction of Poalei Zion Smol (Left Poalei Zion). Throughout his membership in the party he occupied a series of influential positions and assignments, but, notably, he did not always adhere to the party’s mainstream and quite often remained in opposition.13 While active in the party he stressed ideas of universalism and social justice and expressed a great longing for art, literature, and analysis of history and historical processes. In the crucial junctions encountered by humanity and global communism in the years between the world wars, he showed an affinity for humanism and human values, which put him at risk of a severe conflict with the apparatus of the Communist Party. His membership in the party was indeed consequently put on hold several times, culminating in his eventual expulsion. The height of his conflict with the party apparatus revolved around his strict objection to the agreements and understandings reached between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany (known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact) on the eve of World War II and during its initial stages. In Sidqi’s opinion, Nazism was a complete contradiction of his values as a communist, Arab, and Muslim. He even published in the newspaper al-Marahil al-Musawwara (the Illustrated Stages of Life) a series of articles in which he explained why the Arab and Muslim nations must object to Nazism. This series was published in 1940 as a book entitled The Islamic Traditions and the Nazi Principles: Can They Agree? In the introduction to the book he stressed the complete contrast between the values of the Islamic religion and the fundamental principles of the Nazi doctrine. His excellent knowledge of languages (in addition to Arabic he was well versed in both written and spoken English, French, and Russian, and he was proficient in Turkish and Spanish) helped him reach better understanding as well as attain profound levels in his writing and analyses of historical processes and events.14
Sidqi was born in Jerusalem in May 1905. His grandfather was a senior Ottoman military commander and his father, Baker Sidqi, taught Turkish at the al-Ma’muniyya School in Jerusalem and was an aficionado of art and classical music. He was also the first to bring to Palestine a phonograph, which he used to play classical records. Sidqi’s mother, Nazira Murad, also loved music, art, and literature and was a well-known socialite in contemporary Jerusalem. He graduated from al-Salhiyya Elementary School and continued his studies in Jerusalem at al-Ma’muniyya and al-Rashidiyya.15
At the age of fourteen (in 1919) he and his father volunteered in the Hashemite army in World War I under the command of Faysal bin al-Husayn and was called to the Hejaz to take part in the war against the Wahabis, a war that ended with the defeat of the Hashemites and their ultimate expulsion from the Hejaz in 1924. In these five years the family moved between the cities of Ta’if, Jeddah, and Mecca, then moved from Mecca to Cairo and Damascus and back to Jerusalem. It may be assumed that during this period Sidqi became well acquainted with the geopolitical reality of the Arab East as well as with the diverse population groups living in the Middle East and, finally, with the rules of play outlined by the great powers and colonial forces operating there.16
When he returned to Jerusalem in 1924 he was appointed a clerk at the Department of Posts and Telegraphs. While beginning his work there he met a group of young Jewish employees who belonged to the Palestine Communist Party (PKP), and it did not take long for him to become persuaded by the communist philosophy and to join the party. When a decision was made to send a delegation of students to Moscow to study at the Communist University of the Toilers of the East (KUTV), established for students from the Asiatic republics of the Soviet Union and countries under colonial rule, Sidqi was one of those chosen. He studied at the university for nearly four years and earned a Bachelor’s degree in social sciences and political economics. He also wrote a master’s thesis on “The Arab National Movement from the Young Turks Revolt to the Era of the National Bloc.” In this period he wrote journalistic articles in several newspapers in different languages under one of two aliases: “Mustafa Sa῾du” or the shorter “Sa῾du.” He also expanded his knowledge of and proficiency in Russian literature and world literature and developed a strong relationship with the progressive Turkish poet Nâzim Hikmet.17
Upon his return to Palestine, the national struggle reached a higher pitch, and in the fall of that year clashes broke out in the vicinity of the holy places in Jerusalem. Sidqi was in charge of the underground activities of the PKP. In 1931 the party decided to send him, together with his friend Mahmoud al-Atrash al-Mughrabi and another, Jewish representative, to the international conference of trade unions in Moscow. When he returned, he was arrested by the British and detained for two years. One year after his release, he was put once again under administrative arrest for a short period and then under house arrest for one year.18
One of the issues that occupied Sidqi from the time of his return from Moscow until his arrest and departure from the country was the Arabization of the Palestine Communist Party, meaning the need to let Arabs (who were at the time a minority among the party members) rise within the party apparatus and assume prominent roles. The instructions for implementing this process came from the Comintern in Moscow, but according to Sidqi they were not accepted by the Jewish leaders of the party, who feigned compliance but acted to the contrary.19 Sidqi tried to explain the objection of the Jewish members to this process: “The issue of Arabization was neither easy nor comfortable; the Jewish communist elements were very restrained on this matter because they were convinced that the Jewish communist is more aware of communism than the Arab communist, and that in their opinion the Arab communist cannot withstand the pressure and may break down and endanger his comrades.”20
Sidqi’s comrade Mahmoud al-Atrash al-Mughrabi held the same opinions as Sidqi on the issue of Arabization. He wrote in his memoirs:
During our work among the members of the popular party base, we sensed that the opposition to the Arabization plan came not from members of the party’s cells, as stated by several members of the higher leadership, [but] rather from among the leaders, most of whom belonged to the intellectual petite bourgeoisie and were unable to shed the Zionist chauvinist national influence that affected their conceptions. But nonetheless some of them, headed by Yosef Berger (Barzilay) recognized the new plan on one hand and utilized all available means to prevent its implementation on the other.”21
As a result of his disagreements with the leadership of the party and his harassment by the British, who kept a close watch on him, Sidqi was asked to leave the country and travelled to Paris, where he published the newspaper al-Sharq al-῾Arabi (The Arab East) under the alias “Mustafa al-῾Umari.” This newspaper was distributed in Arab countries through an underground network. It appeared from 1933 to 1939, when it was closed by special order of the French prime minister Pierre Laval.22
From France Sidqi moved to Moscow, from where he was subsequently sent to Tashkent as an emissary of the Comintern. There the fissures in his relationship with the Comintern first emerged, in association with Soviet attempts to solve national issues that arose in the Muslim regions of the Soviet Union.
The impulses that gave rise to his efforts to Arabize the PKP and to his accusations against his party comrades and against the higher ranks of world communism remained with him in his journey to participate in the Spanish Civil War and later in his strong stand against the Stalin-Hitler pact on the eve of World War II, which eventually led to his expulsion from the party (more on this later in this chapter).
In 1940 Sidqi returned to Jerusalem, and a short time later he began working at the Near East Broadcasting Station,23 where he remained until 1948. When the station moved its operations to Cyprus he moved with it and worked there until 1950. From there he moved to Beirut, where he lived until 1976. He spent the last three years of his life in Athens, where he died in November 1979.24
Najati Sidqi was a true intellectual. Aside from his political and party activity, he was also involved, as mentioned above, in journalism and other literary endeavors. (He published five collections of short stories, of which the best known is the story “Al-ahwat al-hazinat” [The sad sisters], in which he relates the Palestinian historical narrative through the story of several sycamore trees that remained in southeastern Jaffa, on the road to Lydda and Ramla.)25 He wrote two books about Chekhov and Pushkin and also arranged for the publication of world literature translated into Arabic, including collections of Chinese and Spanish literature.26
Sidqi’s Active Role in the Spanish Civil War Against General Franco’s Fascist Forces
Najati Sidqi, who was asked by the Comintern in Moscow to travel to Spain in 1936 and take part in the propaganda effort aimed at Moroccan soldiers from among the rebels (for this purpose he was asked to operate under a Moroccan alias, “Mustafa Bin Jala”), dedicated one chapter of his memoirs to this these events and described the Moroccan soldiers, their background, and the circumstances in which they were recruited into the rebel corps. In one passage Sidqi describes the attitude of the Spanish public to the Moroccan fighters:
I arrived in beautiful, magnificent Barcelona, with its great cultural tradition, the capital of Catalonia. I suddenly encountered soldiers of the militia [of the government forces]. Their leader approached me, thinking I was Spanish, and addressed me in Spanish: “Why don’t you join our ranks?” I smiled, answering in Spanish with the passion of the young: “I am an Arab volunteer, I have come to defend liberty in Madrid, to defend Damascus in Guadalajara, Jerusalem in Cordoba and Baghdad in Toledo and Cairo in Zaragoza and Tatwan in Burgos.” His face reflected astonishment and joy and he answered me in poor French: “Are you indeed Arab? Are you a ‘Moro’, i.e., Moroccan? It is impossible, Moroccans are standing by the fascist hooligans, they attack our cities, loot our homes, and assault our women.” Then I said to him: “These Moroccans who follow the leadership of the fascist generals offend Arabism and Islam with their conduct, they represent only themselves, they have been misled by Spanish military men and a handful of Moroccan leaders who have sold their souls to the devil, such as “Abd al-Khaliq al-Turaysi.”27
Sidqi also testifies in his book that the views he expressed were shared by millions in the Arab and Islamic world who shied away from fascism and Nazism and hoped for the victory of democratic and socialist forces in Spain.28
Another of Sidqi’s topics is the Palestinian volunteers who teamed up with Spanish government forces. This issue received no coverage in the Palestinian press of the period, perhaps due to ignorance or as a result of a reluctance to speak of Palestinian support for “heretic” or “atheist” forces. The number of volunteers is unknown, but aside from Sidqi himself, Mahmoud al-Atrash al-Mughrabi (one of the first Palestinian Arabs to join the PKP) is mentioned along with two other Palestinians, both of whom were among those killed in the war: ‛Ali ‛Abd al-Khaliq and Fawzi al-Nabulsi.
Attention from historians to the involvement of Arab (including Palestinian Arab) volunteers in Spain has been similarly sparse. Only two scholars have treated the subject extensively. The first is the Syrian ‛Abdallah Hanna29 and the second is the Moroccan ‛Abd al-Latif Bin Salam.30 Neither scholar finds clear grounds for the press’s disregard (with the exception of coverage by communist newspapers and bulletins) for Arab volunteers who fought beside Spanish government forces in international brigades.31
Confrontation with the party apparatus
Once the Nazi-Soviet pact was signed in August 1939, Sidqi decided to express his objection to the agreement in public, despite the position of the party apparatus and the Comintern in Moscow. He wrote in his memoirs about his choosing this course of action:
I saw that I was obliged at this stage to define and specify my political approach, unrelated to that of any other person or agent. In my opinion, the non-aggression pact arrived at by Hitler and Stalin on August 21, 1939, was a false agreement, and its only purpose was to buy time. I challenged the pact, although my comrades praised it and thought that it was a decisive step in the rapprochement efforts between world communism and the German national-socialist regime.32
The rift between Sidqi and his party deepened when he published a series of articles against Nazism in the newspaper al-Marahil al-Musawwara . This was despite an explicit request by the party leadership in Syria that he terminate the series. He did not make do with publishing the series in the press but collected the articles in a book published by Dar al-Kashaf in 1940 in Beirut. Sidqi explains his motivation for writing the book in the introduction:
It was not the world war that brought me to a state of hostility and disgust towards Nazism, my objection to Hitler began much earlier, in 1933, when the Führer took over a region that was once a place of pilgrimage, a “Ka῾abah,” for lovers of freedom and science. Ever since then I saw the Nazi regime as a gang of bullies who recognized the weak points of the German Republic and hit it on the head, causing it to collapse, and then broke into the great libraries and ripped out the wealth of human philosophy and set fire to it, as a first indication of the human conflagration we are now witnessing. They established hundreds of internment camps and turned them into pens for human beings, where they abused them in many terrible ways.33
In order to reject accusations that he was engaged in propaganda on behalf of one of the belligerent parties, he wrote:
I did not write this book in Arabic on anyone’s behalf. I did it as a service to the East and to strengthen the spiritual and material relationship between all Muslims and the two superior nations: the British and the French. This so that the global and national mission of this book would reach millions of Muslims and people of the East, as a beacon that will outline a path for these people in the harsh times that the world is going through at present.34
Scholar Salim Tamari was not convinced of Sidqi’s explanations concerning his efforts against the party apparatus nor of his real motivation for publishing the book. He suggested that the book was published as propaganda intended to recruit the traditional Muslim classes against the Nazi doctrine.35 Sidqi’s explanations were indeed incomplete and sometimes vague, but Tamari did not manage to prove his accusations against the author’s intentions and personal motivations, which followed a consistent ideological route throughout his political and literary career, i.e., a sense of belonging in his life to three important circles of identity: the Palestinian, the pan-Arab, and the pan-Islamic. He did his very best to connect these three circles to his inner circle, a sense of belonging to the free, universal world. We see his efforts at forming this connection in more than one place in the book and through his repeated emphasis that there should be an ideological war between Nazism and its allies and the rest of the world. In a section titled “The Ideological War,” for instance, he writes:
The ideological war continues the war of destruction and extermination, it is an influential weapon used by the belligerent parties to justify the cause for which they took up arms. It is also an effective tool utilized by both sides in pursuit of the support of the world’s nations and peoples. But what a difference between the ideological cause defended by the English, French, Polish, Czech, Norwegian, Danish, Dutch, and Belgian nations—and the doctrine defended by Hitler and the German colonialists. The former encompasses an aspiration to liberty and to granting natural independence to the nations, while the later encompasses an aspiration to restrict liberties and destroy the independence of nations using methods unheard of in history. And while we, the sons of the East, have not yet joined Europe in the intense heat of war, we must take part in the ideological war against the enemy who spares no efforts to destroy our morale, using the radio as a weapon and mysterious preachers to spread its ideas. While the propaganda of the German radio should be countered by the radio stations of the Allies and their press, the preachers are harder to handle and they require many means and efforts.36
Moreover, Sidqi does not deny that his book was to the liking of those responsible for Allied propaganda. He describes this dynamic as follows:
Immediately upon publication of the article series, ͑Azmi al-Nashashibi, press attaché at the British Embassy in Beirut, called me and said: Your study serves the Allied cause and helps keep the Nazi danger away from the Arab countries, in addition to defending liberty and democracy. Would you agree to have it translated it into English and published as a book? I said that I have no objection.37
Publication of the book caused an uproar among members of the Communist Party in Syria and Lebanon. The responses were harsh and eventually led to Sidqi’s expulsion from the party’s ranks. He says of this turn of events:
My objection to Nazism angered my comrades in the party. They perceived my use of Islamic texts to contradict Nazism as a deviation from the party’s agenda. They decided to expel me from the party and posted their decision in the party’s underground bulletin. The party’s policy in World War II was the beginning of the tragedy that befell the party and its members and leaders, since the Mandate government saw them as enemies of the Allies and of international democracy. The Mandate government closed down the newspaper Sawt al-Sha῾ b, “The Voice of the People,” harassed the editors, and forced them into hiding. Those arrested were imprisoned in the al-Miyya wamiyya detention center in Sidon. They did not realize their big mistake until very late, i.e., after the Nazi forces invaded the Soviet Union in 1941. Then they announced that they were willing to join the French army in defense of liberty and democracy.38
(Notably, the nonaggression pact signed by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union in 1939 left the entire socialist and communist world in shock and divided parties and movements around the world.)
Sidqi’s book consists of fourteen chapters, and its main thesis is that the tradition and heritage of Islam are clearly and consistently at odds with the Nazi doctrine and the courses of action taken by the Nazi regime in Germany. The book takes a propagandist approach, based on many quotes from the Qur’an and Sunnah (where Islam’s tolerant and pluralistic attitudes are stressed) as well as Western data and reports that emphasize the “bad winds” coming from Berlin and the capitals of its allies. In a chapter entitled “Why Should the Muslim Object to Nazism?” he writes:
Nazism is a danger not only to the European nations and to European democracy. It is a terrible danger that also threatens the kingdoms of Islam and the spirit and foundations of the Muslim faith, as any Muslim raised on true faith in the holy Qur’an and the Sunnah centering on the Hadith of Prophet Muhammad, and anyone familiar with the Islamic history from the beginning of Islam, can only strive to be the most bitter enemy of the destructive Nazi doctrine and its barbaric regimes, as it acts against people’s thoughts, wishes, and aspirations. The principles of Islam urge the believers forward and do not cause them to regress, rather urge them to join the communities of humanity in forming an overall civilization endeavoring to generate joy and happiness and to revive people’s sense of general human fraternity, rather than backsliding together with anarchist communities characterized by a morbid faith, deficient thought processes, and a shaky social structure, such as the communities “devised and formulated” by Adolf Hitler and his gang.39
Najati Sidqi strongly emphasized the ethical dimension and presented his interpretation of traditional Islamic values in detail, while attempting to portray them as advanced, progressive values compatible with those of the Western world. This was probably the main factor contributing to the split between Najati and the hardcore activists of the Communist Party. A similar claim was made by Salim Tamari, who attributes the split to Sidqi’s disagreements with the Secretary General of the Syrian Communist Party, Khaled Bikdash (of Kurdish descent) and with Georges Marchais, Secretary General of the French Communist Party, with regard to the Islamic doctrine and the pan-Arab doctrine. These two men accused Sidqi of excessive enthusiasm for these ideas.40
Furthermore, under the title “There is No Racism in Islam,” Sidqi presented Nazism’s race theory by portraying and analyzing the philosophy of Alfred Rosenberg as reflected in his book The Myth of the Twentieth Century, in which he claimed that the history of the nations in general and of the German people in particular must be rewritten in terms of the constant battle between the races. On this theory of Rosenberg’s, Sidqi wrote: “The Nazi doctrine is a new ‘religion’ with its own principles, rituals, and courses of action. It also has a philosophy that can make a person who respects his humanity scorn himself and develop a sense of inferiority.”41 He goes on to present Rosenberg’s theory in detail as well as Hitler’s explanations and understanding of this theory.42 He contrasted these theories with the Islamic doctrine, using many quotes from the Qur’an and Hadith that emphasize the complete rejection of all forms of racism and the human fraternity of the “community of believers.”43
In a chapter entitled “Islam is a Revolution and Nazism is a Reactionary Movement,” Sidqi summarizes the essential difference between Islam and Nazism: “Islam is the national and social revolution that elevated the Arabs from the adversities of ignorance and backwardness and introduced them to new horizons of progress and development, while Nazism is a reaction and revolt directed at the free regime constructed by the German people under the Weimar Constitution of 1918.”44
Sidqi also tries to identify the differences in the historical circumstances of the emergence of Islam among the Arab people and the emergence of Nazism in Germany: “Islam was an essential historical necessity in the history of the Arab nation and the Islamic peoples, and Nazism is a disability forced on Germany, motivated by the trampling of the weak and their rights in Germany and elsewhere.”45
In Sidqi’s opinion, Nazism embodies a pagan spirit, and for this reason it rejects the monotheistic religions as
the religions, notwithstanding their differences and disagreements, [that] include a series of courtesies and ethics that Nazism cannot accept or live with. The religions preach compassion, love, fraternity, and object to killing, theft, lies, and aggression. For this reason, the Nazis contended that the Christian faith is a Jewish idea imported from the Mediterranean basin and that it is not compatible with the mentality of the Northern Germans.46
Sidqi also made sure to portray the Germans as a colonial force that strives to take control of extensive parts of the Islamic world and says that they were a major player in the colonial activities of the “Eastern Question” that motivated the European powers to operate in the east, mainly in the territory of the Ottoman Empire. He ascribed to the Germans an extensive plan to solve the “Eastern Question” in a way that would serve their colonial aspirations. He provided the following details:
In the previous war (World War I) the Germans used all possible means to ensure that they would solve the Eastern Question to their benefit, i.e., gain a victory over the Allies and remove them from their colonies and establish a broad German empire under the slogan “Germany above all.” One of these means was by forcing the Young Turks and Shaykh al-Islam in Istanbul to declare a Jihad, while calling upon believers from all over the Muslim world to join them.47
He also makes a point of stating that Palestine was one of the Germans’ most important centers of colonial interest, perceived as a significant springboard for taking over the Arab East, and he contends that for this purpose they founded dozens of colonies in Palestine: in Sharona, Melabes (Petah Tikva), Jerusalem, Haifa, and Jaffa. In Jerusalem they established the al-Tur building, considered the largest structure in the Near East, and turned it into a German colonial intelligence center, leading to its bombardment in several lethal sorties by British planes in 1917.48 Najati Sidqi’s attitude toward British colonialism was ambivalent. He saw Britain as a headstrong colonialist force that the Palestinians and Arabs must contend with in order to achieve independence, although he did not deny the possibility of dialogue with Britain and its allies. But he also assigned this struggle secondary importance behind the need to make every effort to repel fascism and Nazism, with no room for discussion.
In this context, it is notable that Sidqi, like many native inhabitants of the Middle East, objected to British colonialism, although in a unique fashion. This issue is not within the purview of the current chapter; therefore it will suffice to say that he identified the British as a factor that prevented the Palestinians from realizing their national aspirations, and he noted their support for the Jewish National Home plan that gradually achieved substance under the British Mandate in Palestine. In his opinion, the commitment to the Jewish National Home plan and its realization was more impactful than any other British initiative during their Mandate in Palestine.
Further on and throughout the entire book, Sidqi reviews one by one the intelligence centers established by the Germans all over the Muslim world, which in his opinion prove that German colonialism is of the worst and most sophisticated brand of colonialism.49 For this reason, he concludes by saying:
All Muslims and inhabitants of the East support the idea of democracy in theory and in practice, not because they pander to the Allies or are afraid of them, as described by Hitler’s spies, but because the democratic issue is an essential issue for them, since the liberty of the nations in a collaborative framework of national fraternity is the model to which we aspire and for which we have been struggling for so many years. All Muslims who are committed to the foundations of universal Islam will not hesitate for one moment to fulfill their historical commitment to act against the convoy of subordination and paganism that is flooding the earth.50
Conclusion
The voice of Najati Sidqi is an important, brave, and bold voice that he did not hesitate to use when the Nazi forces and their allies proceeded to occupy many regions of the world in repeated waves. His voice joined those of other intellectuals in the Arab and Muslim world51 (including Egyptian intellectual and author Abbas Mahmoud al-͑Aqqad, for example52), although these thinkers for some reason did not make themselves heard at the time. Ever since then, voices denigrating Palestinians, Arabs, and Muslims for supporting the Nazis have chosen to completely disregard the Sidqi’s contributions. His voice went unnoticed by them, just as they did not notice the participation of nearly nine thousand Palestinians in the Allied war effort during World War II, dozens of whom were killed in battle.53
These voices are worthy of renewed emphasis and publicity in times of repeated slander and generalizations about the allegedly sympathetic attitudes in Muslim and Arab communities around the world toward Nazism and fascism.
Like the large majority of Palestinian national activists, Najati Sidqi objected to both the British mandate and to Zionist activities, including the Jewish National Home plan. Like many of his colleagues in the leftist-communist wing of the political landscape, he objected to Nazism in part because it had the effect of accelerating Jewish migration from Europe to Palestine, bringing the dispute over the country to greater intensity.
In an article entitled “Fascism and Us,” the communist Lebanese author Ra’if Khoury wrote: “The oppression of the Jews by fascism and Hitlerism serves the interests of the Zionist movement. This movement has a stake in the oppression of Jews in all countries, as this enables it to pose as a solution and a response to their predicaments. This also provides it with a moral-human excuse that it can present to the world in order to inundate Palestine with waves of Jewish immigrants.”54
In the same breath, Khoury criticized those Palestinian voices that applauded the fate of the Jews in Europe, calling them “stupid voices.”55 Khoury rejected the propagandist attempt to market fascism and Nazism as forces that object to the old European (British and French) colonialism. He said that these two movements espouse and believe in colonialism in its strictest and most brutal form. Furthermore, “the sullen attitude of the fascists towards the old colonialism should in no way be interpreted as acceptance of us. Indeed, fascism looks askew at others only because the others prevent them from dividing the rest of the world and its treasures. This includes us: the Arabs, the Africans, the Indians, and the Chinese.”56
Najati Sidqi was among those Arab communists who migrated from the Palestinian Communist Party to the National Liberation League amid assertions that Jewish members of the party were motivated by nationalist-Zionist chauvinism. The National Liberation League, despite its adamant position against Zionism and the concept of the Jewish National Home, stressed its objection to the brutal repression of the Jews under Nazi rule even before the horrendous dimensions of the Holocaust were uncovered. At the same time, it called for a democratic solution in Palestine that would protect the rights of both Jewish and Arab residents of the country.57
NOTES
2. On the war of narratives surrounding the involvement or lack of involvement of Arabs in the Holocaust, see Gilbert Achcar, The Arabs and the Holocaust, The Arab-Israeli War of Narratives, trans. G. M. Goshgarian (New York: Metropolitan, 2010).
3. For more information on this, see Mustafa Kabha, The Palestinian People: Seeking Sovereignty and State (Boulder, CO: Rienner, 2014), 31–32.
4. For more information about these voices, see Mustafa Kabha, “The Palestinian National Movement and Its Attitude toward the Fascist and Nazi Movements, 1925–1945,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 37, no. 3 (2011): 437–450.
5. Israel Gershoni, “Why the Muslims Must Fight against Nazi Germany: Muḥammad Najātī Ṣidqī’s Plea,” Die Welt des Islams 52, no. 3/4 (2012): 471.
6. Kabha, The Palestinian People, 29–32.
7. Archives of Haganah, 105/197.
8. Bayan Nuwayhid al-Hout, Al-Qiyadat wa al-Mu’ssat al-Siyasiyya Fi Falastin, 1917–1948 (Acre: Dar al-Aswar, 1984), 432.
9. For the latter estimate, see Palestinian Research Centre, file no. L/111, Document 4, cited by al-Hout, Al-Qiyadat, 432. Even the lower estimate indicates significant activity, particularly if we note that during the revolt of 1936–1939, the general command succeeded in recruiting only fifteen thousand fighters. See Palestinian Research Centre, Document 4, cited by al-Hout, Al-Qiyadat, 432.
10. al-Hout, Al-Qiyadat, 434.
11. Nimr Murqus, Aqwa Min al-Nisyan (Kufr Yaseef: Dar Raya, 1999), 56.
12. On Sidqi’s contribution to literature, see Ibrahim Abu Hashash, Najati Sidqi (1905–1979), Hayatuhu Wa’adabuhu. Al-Mawasasa al-Filastiniyya al-Akadimiyya Lilshu’uan al-Dawliyyah (Jerusalem: al-Jamʿiyya al-Filastiniyya al-Akadimiyya, 1990), 15–49.
13. On the conflicts within the party in this period, see Shmuel Dotan, Adumim, Hamiflaga Haqomunistit Be’eretz Yisra’el [Reds: The Communist Party in Eretz Israel] (Kfar Saba: Shevna Hasofer, 1991).
14. On this subject, see Gershoni, “Why the Muslims Must Fight,” 471–472.
15. Yaʿqub al-͑Uwdat, Min ‘A͑lam al-Fakr waal-Adab fi Filastin, 3rd ed. (Jerusalem: Maktabat al-Aqsa, 1992), 351–352.
17. On the time he spent in Moscow, see Najati Sidqi, Muzakkirat Najati Sidqi, Hikayat Ishtrakiyya (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-Dirasat al-Filastiniyya, 2002), 21–65.
18. For more information about the period of his arrest, see Sidqi, 92–103.
21. Maher al-Sharif, ed., Tariq al-Kifah fi Filastin waal-Mashraq al-͑Arabi, Muzakkirat al-Ka’id al-Shuyu͑I Mahmoud al-Atrash al-Mughribi (1903–1939) (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-Dirasat al-Filastiniyya, 2015), 148–149.
22. Sidqi, Muzakkirat Najati Sidqi, 14.
23. The Near East Broadcasting Station was established by the British in 1943. It was operated at first from Jenin and then from Jaffa. During the war of 1948 it was transferred to Cyprus and continued broadcasting there until 1956. Some of its prominent employees were Najati Sidqi, Rashad Bibi, Sabri al-Sharif, Halim al-Rumi, and Ghanem al-Dajani. At its height, it had nearly seventy employees.
24. Sidqi, Muzakkirat Najati Sidqi, 15.
25. For more information, see Abu Hashash, Najati Sidqi, 15–22.
26. A list of all his writings is provided by al-͑Uwdat, Min ‘A͑lam al-Fakr, 352–353.
27. Sidqi, Muzakkirat Najati Sidqi, 127.
29. ‛Abdallah Hanna, Al-Haraka al-Munahida Lil Fashiyya fi Surya wa Lubnan (Beirut: Dar al-Farabi, 1975).
30. Abdellatif Bensalem, “Los Voluntarios Arabes en las Brigadas Internacionales (España, 1936–1939),” Revista International de Sociologia 36 (1988).
31. For more information, see Mustafa Kabha, “The Spanish Civil War as Reflected in Contemporary Palestinian Press,” in Arab Responses to Fascism and Nazism: Attraction and Repulsion, ed. Israel Gershoni (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2014), 127–141.
32. Sidqi, Muzakkirat Najati Sidqi, 165.
33. Najati Sidqi, Al-Taqalid al-Islamiyya wa al-mabadi’ al-Naziyya, Hal Tatafaqan? (Beirut: Dar al-Kashaf, 1940), 5.
34. Sidqi, Al-Taqalid al-Islamiyya, 6.
35. Salim Tamari, “Najati Sadqi (1905–79): The Enigmatic Jerusalem Bolshevik,” Journal of Palestine Studies 32, no. 2 (Winter 2003): 92.
36. Sidqi, Al-Taqalid, 7.
37. Sidqi, Muzakkirat Najati Sidqi, 166.
38. Sidqi, Muzakkirat Najati Sidqi, 167.
39. Sidqi, Al-Taqalid, 10.
40. On this subject, see Tamari, “Najati Sadqi,” 92.
41. Sidqi, Al-Taqalid, 31.
51. On this subject, see two important works of Israel Gershoni: Gershoni, Alma Vesatan: Mitzrayim Vehanatzizem 1935–1940 [Damsel and devil: Egypt and Nazism, 1935–1940], 2 vols. (Tel Aviv: Resling, 2012); and Gershoni, Arab Responses.
52. Abbas Mahmoud al-͑Aqqad, Hitler fi al-Mizan (Cairo: al-Maktaba al-ʿAsriyya, 1940).
53. For information about this, see Kabha, The Palestinian People, 31–32.
54. Ra’if Khoury, “Nahnu wa-al-Fashistiyya” [in Arabic], al-Tali’ah, December, 1936, 838–845.
57. Office of the National Liberation League of Palestine, “The Palestinian Problem and the Route to Its Solution” [in Arabic] (report sent to the British prime minister on October 10, 1945), 8–9. Cited by Maher al-Sharif, “Al-Shuyu’iyyun al-’Arab wa-al Nidal Did al-Fashiyya wa-al-Naziyya,” http://www.aljabha.org/index.asp?i=68266.