Life on a warship was a combination of hard work, conformity, and, in wartime, occasional moments of terror and exhilaration. Cruiser crews were fairly small, and sailors were often assigned to the same ship for many years, making the crew a tight-knit organization. Unlike battleships, where spit and polish seemed to be more important at times than the business of practicing to fight, cruisers spent a great deal of time at sea and their capabilities were honed to a fine edge.
The primary purpose of a cruiser was to act as a gun platform. Gunnery thus became the focus of much of the crew’s daily activities. A retired naval officer described the routine of a 5-inch/25 gun crew as thus:
The pointer elevated the gun either by matching signals sent from the director, or by eye. The trainer trained the gun in azimuth by the same method. The fuze setter set a timing mechanism on his “fuze pots,” in accordance with the director order, or the order of the gun captain … A third loader would strip the protecting wires from the rim of the can [containing the shell] and tilt the can so the ammunition could be handled by the second loader. This man than placed the [shell] nose-down in one of the three fuze pots, which set the mechanical/powder fuze. The first loader would reach over, pick up a shell from the fuze pot, and place it on a tray under the chamber of the gun. The gun captain would shove a lever, and the shell would be rammed home by compressed air. Automatically, the breech would close … the gun would fire, recoil, and eject the empty cartridge. The first loader would start the action all over again by placing another shell on the tray. This was an amazingly fast and efficient method. We could load and fire twenty or more shells a minute over a sustained period. The enlisted men were drilled for interminable hours into teams of near-inhuman perfection.
One of the 5-inch/25 gun crews aboard Astoria in early 1942. Note the crew still wearing the vintage World War I-style helmets. The 5-inch gun was a dual-purpose weapon capable of engaging both surface and air targets. (US Naval Historical Center)
A cruiser’s crew was organized into eight departments, each performing one of the primary functions of the ship. These included gunnery, navigation, communications, engineering, repair, medical, supply, and aviation. Each department could have several different divisions to address each of the specialized duties required of each department. All members of the ship’s company were assigned a General Quarters station that was to be occupied during battle. In addition, most crewmen were also assigned watches to be performed in addition to their regular duties. Sleep was a precious commodity, especially during wartime in combat areas when the entire crew could be at General Quarters for extended periods.
Going into the Pacific War, the US Navy possessed a large number of competent officers proficient in both technical and operational matters. Years of training had given them a shared sense of aggression and, as events during the war would demonstrate, the ability to adapt quickly to change. Officers were mostly graduates of the Naval Academy located in Annapolis, Maryland. However during the interwar years there were still officers remaining from the expansion during World War I, and, beginning in 1925, the Navy took officers into service through the Reserve Officer Training Course. Going into the Pacific War, all major commands (like that of the commanding officer of a cruiser) were held by Annapolis graduates. But not until 1933 was Annapolis accredited as offering an equivalent education to a civilian university. Attendance at the school was an arduous four years that stressed development of leadership skills at the expense of academic training.
Norman Scott had the fortune of being the first US Navy officer to beat the Japanese in a surface battle during the Pacific War. He won his victory at a time when America was short of naval heroes, thus magnifying his fame and reputation.
He was born in Indianapolis, Indiana and was admitted to the Naval Academy in 1907. After graduation, Ensign Scott served in the battleship Idaho and then on destroyers. In December 1917 he was the executive officer of a destroyer that was sunk by German submarine attack; Scott was commended for his performance in the incident. For the remainder of the war he served in the US, including as an aide to President Wilson.
After the war he commanded a division of Eagle Boats, and during the early 1920s Scott returned to destroyers, followed by duty aboard the battleship New York. From 1924 to 1930 he was assigned to the staff of Commander, Battle Fleet and served as an instructor at the Naval Academy. In the early 1930s, he commanded two destroyers, followed by a stint at the Navy Department and attendance at the Senior Course at the Naval War College. As a commander, he served as executive officer aboard the cruiser Cincinnati and later as a member of the US Naval Mission to Brazil in 1937–39. Following promotion to the rank of captain, he was commanding officer of the heavy cruiser Pensacola until shortly after Pearl Harbor.
Captain Scott was assigned to the staff of Admiral King during the first months of 1942. After promotion to rear admiral in May, he was granted his wish of being posted to a combat command in the Pacific. Scott commanded a surface task group for the first three months of the Guadalcanal campaign, but always seemed to miss out on the action. As Commander Task Group 62.4 (the most eastern group of the transport screen) during the Battle of Savo Island, he saw no action. He commanded the screen of the carrier Wasp at the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, but a poorly timed refueling forced Wasp to miss the battle. Finally, on the night of October 11–12, Scott’s chance would come. With a force of four cruisers and five destroyers, he entered the waters north of Guadalcanal to contest the Imperial Navy’s total control of the night waters around the island. The result was a victory, though inconclusive, for the US Navy. For a loss of a single destroyer, Scott’s force sank a heavy cruiser and a destroyer and did much to raise American morale. Scott’s performance at the Battle of Cape Esperance was far from perfect, but he made fewer mistakes than his Japanese adversary and he demonstrated that the Imperial Navy could be beaten, even at night. He made every possible effort to prepare his force for action and gave them a clear battle plan. Most of all, he was aggressive, taking the battle to the Japanese in a way that they did not expect.
Norman Scott, shown here as a captain. (US Naval Historical Center)
In November, command of the US Navy’s surface task group operating off Guadalcanal was given to Rear Admiral Daniel Callaghan. Despite the fact that Scott had been serving six months at sea and had the success at Cape Esperance behind him, Vice-Admiral Turner chose to give command to the newcomer Callaghan because, most likely, he was 15 days senior to Scott as a rear admiral. Seniority meant everything in the US Navy. As deputy commander to Callaghan during the night action known as the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal on November 13, Rear Admiral Norman Scott was killed in action when his flagship, the light cruiser Atlanta, was struck by gunfire and a torpedo. For his actions in the October and November battles, Scott was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor. The citation of the award read as follows:
For extraordinary heroism and conspicuous intrepidity above and beyond the call of duty during action against enemy Japanese forces off Savo Island on the night of 11–12 October and again on the night of 12–13 November 1942. In the earlier action, intercepting a Japanese Task Force intent upon storming our island positions and landing reinforcements at Guadalcanal, Rear Adm. Scott, with courageous skill and superb coordination of the units under his command, destroyed 8 hostile vessels and put the others to flight. Again challenged, a month later, by the return of a stubborn and persistent foe, he led his force into a desperate battle against tremendous odds, directing close-range operations against the invading enemy until he himself was killed in the furious bombardment by their superior firepower. On each of these occasions his dauntless initiative, inspiring leadership and judicious foresight in a crisis of grave responsibility contributed decisively to the rout of a powerful invasion fleet and to the consequent frustration of a formidable Japanese offensive. He gallantly gave his life in the service of his country.
When an officer graduated as an ensign, his first tour was spent as a surface warfare officer. It was during this tour that the young officer had to learn every aspect of how to operate and fight his ship. This was a prerequisite to other career alternatives like submarine duty or aviation. Competition remained part of an officer’s life and for each rank he had to undergo a selection process. Promotion boards would review his record and decide if he was suitable for promotion. Those judged unfit for promotion were dismissed from the Navy or forced to retire. Especially promising officers would endeavor to attend the Naval War College located in Newport, Rhode Island. In the interwar years, not only was this a center of innovation in the US Navy, but it was a virtual prerequisite for promotion to flag rank. Here students studied tactical and strategic problems, often using war gaming. Cruiser doctrine was largely developed here.
The level of training and education of the US Navy’s sailors going into the war was quite high. It is worth noting that conscription into the Navy did not begin until December 1942 – thus all cruiser crews going into the war were composed of volunteers, many of whom had served considerable periods of time on the same ship.
A sailor was drawn into service in the US Navy for many of the same reasons as were his officers. Naval service held the promise of travel and adventure, and, during the Great Depression, guaranteed food, accommodation, and a regular paycheck. During the 1930s many well-educated men (those possessing a high-school degree) were drawn to the Navy as few opportunities existed elsewhere. Upon enlisting, basic training consisted of 12 weeks. At this point the apprentice seaman was sent to his first ship, where he was expected to learn a trade and become rated in a particular skill. Before the war, about half the crew would be comprised of sailors who were “striking” for a rate. Once he had learned a skill, and had demonstrated other traits such as reliability and leadership, he could be advanced to seaman and later petty officer. Long-serving sailors who had demonstrated exceptional technical skills and leadership were selected to be chief petty officers, who were instrumental in the smooth running of the ship. Enlisted personnel were advanced through exams using instruction books published by the Bureau of Navigation.
The wardroom of Augusta pictured in 1937. Of the crew of more than 600 on a Northampton-class cruiser, only some 40 were commissioned officers. (US Naval Historical Center)
Conditions aboard ship were hard, but by no means brutal. Enlisted men ate in their own areas, separate from the officers and the chief petty officers who each had their own mess areas. By the late 1930s cafeteria-style berthing had replaced the old-style mess, where sailors would take food from a central galley to their mess area. Berthing areas were always crowded and sailors slept in pipe rack bunks. However, during the war, as crew sizes grew with the addition of more men required to service the growing numbers of antiaircraft guns or electronics, conditions on board cruisers became much more cramped. When added to the rigors of prolonged duty in tropical areas (like Guadalcanal), conditions were barely tolerable.
While American crews practiced seriously for war, the crews of Imperial Navy cruisers took combat training to another level. Part of the Imperial Navy’s ethos was that numerical inferiority had to be compensated for with superior personnel training and readiness. This could be accomplished only through constant and rigorous exercising. In the 1920s the Combined Fleet’s commander ordered the fleet to engage in night combat exercises “more heroic than under actual battle conditions.” The seriousness of his intent was revealed in August 1927 when, during a night torpedo exercise, four ships collided at high speed resulting in the loss of one destroyer with 104 casualties, another destroyer heavily damaged with 29 more casualties, and serious damage to two cruisers. Training was often conducted in northern waters in severe weather and sea conditions, and the pace was relentless; there was no such thing as a weekend in the pre-war Imperial Navy and shore leave was reduced to two or three successive days each month.
The Imperial Navy’s training year began on December 1 and focused on single-ship and squadron-level training through April. This progressed into training with the entire Combined Fleet in May, reaching a climax in October. As far as possible, combat conditions were replicated during training. The rigor of these exercises was such that Japanese officers often described it as tougher than actual combat. Added to peacetime exercises was the advantage of exposing ships to actual combat conditions off the Chinese coast after 1937.
The chief petty officers of Tuscaloosa pictured with President Roosevelt in 1940. Chief petty officers were the most senior enlisted personnel in the crew and were instrumental in maintaining discipline and training new crew members. (US Naval Historical Center)
Mikawa was destined to become one of the Imperial Navy’s more controversial command figures of the Pacific War. Born in Hiroshima Prefecture in 1888, he graduated from the Eta Jima in 1910 third in his class of 149. He was identified early on as an officer of great potential, as evidenced by his posting to the Naval Staff College in 1916 and his extensive overseas assignments.
Like most Imperial Navy officers, much of his time was spent at sea. As a midshipman he spent time on four different ships before attending the Naval Torpedo and Gunnery Schools in 1913–14. His first assignment as a young officer was aboard the cruiser Aso and he later served aboard a destroyer and a transport during World War I. After attending the Versailles Peace Treaty Conference as a member of the Japanese delegation, Lieutenant Mikawa returned to the fleet, where he held the position of chief navigator aboard several ships including the battleship Haruna; for the remainder of his career he was considered a specialist in navigation. His sea tours were followed by a period of duty as an instructor at the Naval Torpedo School, and as a new commander he was part of the Japanese delegation to the London Naval Conference. This was followed by a period as the naval attaché in Paris. Promoted to captain in 1930, he returned to Japan to assume administrative and training duties.
As a captain he served as commanding officer on several ships in the mid-1930s, including the cruisers Aoba and Chokai, and the battleship Kirishima. In December 1936 he gained flag rank.
Vice-Admiral Mikawa Gun’ichi. (US Naval Historical Center)
As a rear admiral he continued to be given important posts as Chief of Staff of the Second Fleet and on the Navy General Staff and at Imperial General Headquarters. This was followed by command of cruiser and battleship squadrons before he was promoted to vice-admiral in November 1940.
When war came he was commander of Battleship Division 3 (the Kongo-class units) and, leading the First Section of his squadron, was assigned as the commander of the screen of the First Air Fleet (the Imperial Navy’s carrier force). He continued to command battleships during the Indian Ocean operation in April 1942 and during the Battle of Midway as part of the Midway Occupation Force.
In July 1942, he was given command of the new 8th Fleet, also known as the Outer Seas Force. The lack of concern shown by the Naval General Staff about guarding its new conquest in the south Pacific was shown by the lack of forces assigned to Mikawa. He did have the Chokai as his flagship, but the rest of his command included Japan’s four oldest heavy cruisers, three old light cruisers, and eight destroyers that were equally outdated.
Mikawa reached Truk on July 25 en route to his new command. In discussion with the staff of the Combined Fleet before arriving in Truk, and after talking to officials there, he quickly discovered that nobody considered the Americans posed a serious threat to the Solomons. On July 30 he arrived at Rabaul to assume his new post; a week later he was in combat facing the first American offensive of the war.
In his first encounter with the US Navy he gave the Americans a severe beating at the Battle of Savo Island. He continued in command of the 8th Fleet throughout the campaign, personally leading the cruiser bombardment of Henderson Field on the night of November 13–14. He was also the primary organizer of the “Tokyo Express” that was the only means of getting troops and supplies to the island in the face of American air superiority. In April 1943 he was relieved as commander of the 8th Fleet.
Following his relief, Mikawa was assigned to duties in Japan. In September 1943 he was given a rear area post as commander of the Second Southern Expeditionary Fleet in the Philippines; he assumed command of the Southwestern Area Fleet in the Philippines from June to October 1944. After the disastrous Battle of Leyte Gulf he was again relieved, and returned to Japan, concluding his active duty service in May 1945. He lived until February 1981.
Mikawa is described as intelligent and soft-spoken. It is also obvious that he was very aggressive, as demonstrated by his audacity during the Guadalcanal campaign. His career had exposed him early and often to the classic precepts of Imperial Navy education, first and foremost that naval power comes from the defeat of the enemy’s battle fleet. As discussed later in this book, this may have been the primary factor why he failed to turn his tactical victory at Savo Island into a strategic victory by attacking the American transports off Guadalcanal whatever the cost. This lack of flexibility was also a characteristic of the Imperial Navy’s officer corps, even its best officers, as Mikawa clearly was. It is significant that his failure to attack the transports was not seen as a fatal blunder by the Japanese at the time. Mikawa continued to act as 8th Fleet commander and performed well in that capacity. Even after the shake-up following the defeat at Guadalcanal, he continued to hold important commands. On balance, it is fair to say that Mikawa epitomized the best and the worst traits of the Imperial Navy’s officer corps.
All considered, the Imperial Navy entered the Pacific War as an extremely confident and competent force. Training in night combat was particularly well honed. For the first part of the war, the performance of the Imperial Navy’s surface combatants confirmed the Navy’s faith in its pre-war training. Of Guadalcanal, it is hard not to come to the conclusion that Japanese cruiser crews were better trained than their counterparts in the US Navy. This was only accomplished by the rigorous and incessant pace of peacetime training.
One of the Imperial Navy’s strongest characteristics was the quality of its enlisted crew personnel. In 1942 the Imperial Navy comprised 34,769 officers and 394,599 enlisted members. Prior to the war, the enlisted force was about one-third volunteer and the remainder conscript. Of course, the Japanese preferred the former as they served longer and thus were more likely to fully absorb the increasingly complex business of manning a modern warship. After the war began, this shifted to a 50-50 mix of volunteers and conscripts. Generally the enlisted crew and the officers served well together. However life aboard a Japanese cruiser was not easy. In addition to the high operational tempo even during peacetime, lower-ranking enlisted personnel were often subjected to physical abuse by petty officers or even officers. There were no creature comforts aboard a cruiser, or any other Imperial Navy warship, as habitability was a very low design priority.
Aoba pictured with the carrier Kaga in the background. After the modernization of the Furutaka class, the principal differences between the Furutaka class and the Aoba class were the thicker second stacks on the Aobas and the different catapult placement, with Aoba’s being further aft. (Yamato Museum)
The Imperial Navy’s well-trained, disciplined, and motivated enlisted force was combined with an excellent officer corps. Almost all Japanese naval officers entered service through the Naval Academy located on the island of Eta Jima near Hiroshima. Entrance into the academy was extremely competitive. For example, in 1937 more than 7,100 applicants contended for 240 places. Eta Jima stressed fitness and toughness. Life was spartan and new midshipmen were subjected to brutal beatings at the hands of upperclassmen, setting the tone for service in a navy where beatings were all too commonplace. The quality of instruction at Eta Jima was generally good, but newly minted ensigns left the academy with a generally inflexible mindset.
The Imperial Navy’s manning strategy was built around creating a small, highly trained cadre of career officers and men. During the initial period of war, this strategy proved successful. However under the strain of war, when the Japanese were attempting to expand the fleet and replace losses, it was clearly insufficient. The high caliber of Japan’s cruiser crews, nor of the entire Navy, could not be maintained.