Savo Island was the worst US Navy defeat ever suffered at sea.
Four heavy cruisers were lost (one Australian), and a fifth damaged. Two destroyers were also damaged. Personnel losses were also heavy, with 1,077 sailors killed and 700 wounded.
In return, Mikawa’s losses were light. Chokai suffered three hits that killed 34 and wounded 48. Aoba suffered extensive topside damage but was able to withdraw at high speed. Kinugasa had one killed and one wounded from two hits. Tenryu took a single 5-inch hit and had 23 killed and 21 wounded. The largest loss to the Japanese was suffered after the battle on August 10 when American submarine S-44 sank Kako (71 dead and 15 wounded) on her way to Kavieng.
Savo Island was the epitome of the Imperial Navy’s night-fighting skills. Pre-war night-fighting doctrine had proven sound in the crucible of war. Superior night optics and highly trained lookouts provided the Japanese with first detection upon which the cruisers immediately launched torpedoes. The role of the cruiser floatplanes was key, as they designated and illuminated targets. Illumination from the cruisers was also crucial, as was the clarity with which targets were designated and engaged and the accuracy of 8-inch gunfire. Despite the central role the Imperial Navy had placed on its Type 93 super-weapon, it is important to note that at Savo Island cruiser gunfire crippled the American cruisers with torpedoes only finishing off the wounded ships.
American command and control problems and faulty deployments had as much to do with the disaster at Savo as did superior Japanese doctrine. Turner’s decision to use only two destroyers to guard the western approached to Savo Island was faulty, as was the decision to deploy them so close to the cruiser forces. The patrol areas of the two ships could take them as far as 20 miles apart, easily big enough for an enemy force to slip through. The Allied cruisers would have been better kept together under a single commander to react as required against an incoming threat. The potential game-changer of superior American technology in the form of radar was wasted when the best radar in the entire Allied force, the SG radar aboard the new cruiser San Juan, was placed in the area least likely to be engaged.
Chicago was lucky to survive Savo. She is shown here the day after the battle with damage evident to her bow. She was not as fortunate several months later during the Battle of Rennell Island. She was sunk during the battle on January 29, 1943, by six aircraft torpedoes. (US Naval Historical Center)
Allied command problems overshadowed the brilliance of the Japanese performance. Neither Crutchley nor Turner made an attempt to brief his force ahead of time and neither issued a battle plan. With no common doctrine to fall back on, and with a force that had never trained together, the predictable result was chaos. Crutchley’s unannounced removal from the Southern Force was compounded by the fact he left nobody else clearly in charge. The choice of a commander for the Northern Force, the captain of Vincennes, was another decision with disastrous consequences. This officer had never met Crutchley and, as already mentioned, did not know his commander’s plan or intent. In any event, as a cruiser captain he would have had his hands full with fighting his own ship, much less as the commander of a group of three cruisers.
American command problems began at the top, with the commander of the Amphibious Force, Kelly Turner. He was guilty of using his available intelligence to attempt to discern Japanese intentions without considering Japanese capabilities. He failed to guard against the most dangerous enemy course of action, launching a night-surface attack on his dispersed invasion force. In the event, this was the exact intention of the aggressive Japanese. For the Americans, the only saving grace in the entire battle was that the Japanese had not pressed their advantage and destroyed the transport fleet. Such an action would have probably spelled the end of the hurried attempt to invade Guadalcanal and would have had a strategic impact. Destruction of the American transports would have been worth the sacrifice of Mikawa’s entire force.
Rear Admiral Kelly Turner and Major General Alexander Vandergrift confer during the battle for Guadalcanal. Despite being responsible for the disaster at Savo Island, Turner escaped personal blame and went on to have an outstanding record for the remainder of the war. (US Naval Historical Center)
With the element of surprise in their favor at Savo, the well-trained crews of the Imperial Navy’s heavy cruisers were unbeatable. However, when the element of surprise passed to the Americans, the Japanese were far from invincible, even at night. The outcome of the Battle of Cape Esperance was therefore quite different. Undoubtedly the battle was an American victory, but not the major success that Scott claimed in his after-action report.
Japanese losses in the battle included the sinking of Furutaka with 258 of her crew killed and the destruction of the destroyer Fubuki with about 78 killed (the remainder of her crew, 111 men, was taken prisoner). The cruiser Aoba suffered heavy damage, but since the integrity of her hull was not compromised, she was able to retire from the battle with 79 dead and undergo repairs in Japan. She returned to action in January 1943. The Japanese also suffered minor damage to Kinugasa and Hatsuyuki. As the Imperial Navy was unable to place blame on Goto, his chief of staff was immediately relieved.
The Americans clearly came off better, but the cost of victory was not negligible. The destroyer Duncan was pummeled by both sides and sank with the cost of 48 killed and 35 wounded. Boise suffered severe damage with 107 killed and 29 wounded; the cruiser was lucky to survive the fight. Less severe damage to Salt Lake City still required six months to repair. She lost five dead and 19 wounded. Damage to the destroyer Farenholt (also by “friendly” fire) also required a trip to the US for repairs. Personnel losses totaled three dead and 40 wounded.
The reasons for the American victory were easy to find and bear a striking resemblance to the key factors behind the Japanese victory just weeks earlier at Savo. The main determinant was surprise. Aside from Japanese carelessness, the reason for this was American use of radar. The US Navy was still learning to incorporate this new technology into its tactics, but Cape Esperance clearly showed the potential of this key technology, which had the potential to completely upset the Japanese calculus of how night battles should be fought. The Americans could take comfort in the prowess of their gunnery, especially the fast-firing 6-inchers aboard the two light cruisers. The victory had shown that the Imperial Navy was not invincible in a night battle and Scott should be given much of the credit. His tactics, while simple, were well suited to his command. An unfortunate side effect was the temptation by subsequent American task-force commanders to use tactics similar to Scott’s with less than desirable results. But what was lost in the overall disasterous performance of Goto’s force at Cape Esperance was the continued excellence of individual Japanese ships, as exhibited by the superb gunnery of Kinugasa. Fortunately for the Americans, the Long Lance torpedo did not make itself felt during the battle.
Boise shown on trials in 1938. The ship was fortunate to survive damage suffered at the Battle of Cape Esperance, but went on to give distinguished service in the Mediterranean and the Pacific. (US Naval Historical Center)
Cape Esperance showed that the Imperial Navy could also be guilty of a lack of battle readiness. Despite signs that an American force was in the area, when the Americans opened fire not one Japanese ship was ready for action. This was solely due to Goto’s irresponsibility in assuming no American challenge was possible. Even after his lookouts identified their contacts as American, Goto refused to shake his inertia. The only saving grace for the Imperial Navy was the performance of Kinugasa and the fact that it did successfully conduct the reinforcement portion of the battle.
| Cruisers sunk | Destroyers sunk | Personnel killed or captured | |
| US | 4 (1 Australian) | 1 | 1,240 |
| IJN | 1 | 1 | 584 |
Damage to the Number 3 turret of Boise suffered during the Battle of Cape Esperance. This view was taken at Philadelphia Navy Yard in November 1942 as Boise began repairs from the damage suffered in the battle. (US Naval Historical Center)
After the first two major surface battles of the Guadalcanal campaign, losses for each side were as shown on the table on p73.
While it is always precarious to draw conclusions from two battles so shaped by command difficulties and surprise, several trends were evident. The pre-war Japanese energy spent on developing night-combat tactics and equipment proved well spent in the early part of the Guadalcanal campaign. In general, Japanese cruiser doctrine and weaponry, and their night-fighting skill, proved superior during the first part of Pacific War. The Japanese decision to retain torpedoes aboard their cruisers was proven correct. Another crucial element of the early Japanese successes was the better-trained crews of their cruisers and destroyers.
Nevertheless, even if Japanese night-fighting skills were greater, this conferred the Imperial Navy with only a tactical edge and did not translate to decisive victory. The Japanese emphasis on quality was appropriate for a short, decisive war, but the six-month struggle for Guadalcanal showed that the Japanese were facing a protracted battle of attrition that they could not win. The US Navy made up for its lack of night-fighting skills with a collective instilled sense of aggression. This ensured that unless the Japanese fought a perfect battle, such as at Savo Island, every clash would exact a toll from the Japanese ensuring the eventual demise of the Imperial Navy. Increasingly, the successful integration of technology overcame the Japanese night-fighting skills and by late 1943 the US Navy could claim superiority in this area.
When comparing the designs of the cruisers themselves, the Imperial Navy consistently demonstrated that it could produce superior ships. This superiority began with the Furutaka class and lasted up until 1943 when the US Navy introduced the Baltimore class. The epitome of Imperial Navy cruiser design was the Takao class. Japanese cruisers gained a reputation as tough opponents in the early part of the war, which they maintained throughout the conflict. However their designs, even with the extra margins provided by exceeding treaty limitations, did have shortcomings. They possessed much less range and were noted for stability problems. Their increased weight also made them vulnerable to battle damage as most of their main belts were submerged.
As the war progressed, the true weakness of the Imperial Navy’s cruisers was exposed. Increasingly Japanese cruisers were vulnerable to air attack. Despite a growing number of antiaircraft weapons fitted throughout the war, of the 16 heavy cruisers sunk during the war, ten were lost solely or primarily to air attack. In comparison, only two were sunk by US or Royal Navy surface forces and another four by submarine attack.
US Navy Treaty cruisers proved supremely versatile ships. While not truly outstanding in any one single capacity, they proved successful in every role they were assigned, including surface combat, carrier escort, and shore bombardment. Despite concerns about their ability to absorb damage, many Treaty cruisers survived fearful damage from Japanese torpedoes and the majority survived the war. During the Guadalcanal campaign, they ultimately proved up to the challenge and played an important part in the American victory.