Notes
Chapter 1: Introduction
1. This very general definition of “social movements” will be elaborated upon in this chapter and in chapter 2.
2. See Martin Meredith, The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence (London: Free Press, 2006) and John Reader, Africa: A Biography of the Continent (London: Penguin, 1998).
3. E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (London: Penguin, 1991), 11–12.
4. Charles van Onselen, Chibaro: African Mine Labour in Southern Rhodesia, 1900–1933 (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1980); Shula Marks and Richard Rathbone, eds., Industrialisation and Social Change in South Africa: African Class Formation, Culture, and Consciousness, 1870–1930 (Harlow: Longman, 1982). More recently, some excellent work has followed a similar trajectory. See George Nzongola-Ntalaja,The Congo: From Leopold to Kabila: A People’s History (London: Zed Books, 2002).
5. See, for example, Peter Waterman, Division and Unity amongst Nigerian Workers: Lagos Port Unionism, 1940s–60s, (The Hague: Institute of Social Studies, 1982); Michael Burawoy, A Comparison of Strikes among Zambian Workers in a Clothing Factory and the Mining Industry (Lusaka: University of Zambia, 1974).
6. In Zimbabwe, an excellent example of history from below is Brian Raftopoulos and Ian Phimister, eds., Keep on Knocking: A History of the Labour Movement in Zimbabwe, 1900–1997 (Harare: Baobab Books: 1997).
7. David Renton, David Seddon, and Leo Zeilig, The Congo: Plunder and Resistance (London: Zed Books, 2007).
8. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (London: Penguin, 1964), 58.
9. Chris Harman, “The Rise of Capitalism,” International Socialism Journal 2:102 (2004), 82, available at http://www.isj.org.uk/?id=21.
10. Ibid., 80.
11. Ibid., 82.
12. Otherwise we would all, presumably, choose much more favorable circumstances!
13. This, of course, implies a further importance to the struggles in periphery capitalist societies. As relatively “weak” links in the global hierarchy, it is perhaps in these areas that the chains of capitalist society can be the first to be prized apart. See Leon Trotsky, The History of the Russian Revolution (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2008).
14. Harman, “Rise of Capitalism,” 81.
15. We will see the same kind of argument about the pro-democracy movements of the 1990s—that their unity was achieved on a “negative” basis as different sectors desired the removal of the dictatorships but differed in their “positive” social goals.
16. John Bomba, interview by Leo Zeilig, May 23, 2003.
17. Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, available at http:// www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/ch01.htm.
18. Thompson, Making of the English Working Class, 8.
19. Asse Lilombo, interview with the authors, Kinshasa, November 20, 2006.
20. Peter Dwyer and David Seddon, “The New Wave? A Global Perspective on Popular Protest,” paper presented at the 8th International Conference on Alternative Futures and Popular Protest, April 2–4 2002, Manchester Metropolitan University, Manchester, UK.
Chapter 2: Social Movements and the Working Class in Africa
1. Inspiration for many ideas in this chapter came from the work of Colin Barker. While we have been influenced by his writing on social movements and Marxism for more than two decades, it is his recent elaboration of the “social movement in general” that informs our work here: “Class Struggle and Social Movement—An Effort at Untangling,” conference paper presented at Alternative Futures and Popular Protests, Manchester Metropolitan University, March 29–31, 2010, as well as Barker’s brilliant critique of recent writings on revolutions, “Looking in the Wrong Direction? Reflection on Revolutionary Possibility in the 21st Century,” unpublished working paper. See also Colin Barker, Alan Johnson, and Michael Lavalette, eds., Leadership and Social Movements (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001).
2. See Charles Tilly, “Social Movements as Historically Specific Clusters of Political Performances,” Berkeley Journal of Sociology 38 (1994), 1–30. Social movements occupied a space outside the state for most of the nineteenth century. However, in the last decades of the century, this began to change as capitalist states incorporated “movements” of contestation. Suffrage was widened, trade unionism legalized, and social-democratic parties born. A new phenomenon developed in the shape of semi-permanent movement organizations embodied in left-wing political parties, trade union structures, and cooperatives.
3. For a basic statement of this proposition, see Marx and Engels, Communist Manifesto.
4. See Friedrich Engels,“The Revolt in India 1858,” in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Collected Works, vol.15 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1986), 607–11.
5. Aijaz Ahmad, In Theory (London: Verso, 1991), 229.
6. Barker, “Class Struggle and Social Movement,” 28.
7. Jeff Goodwin, No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945–1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 44.
8. Dan Georgakas and Marvin Surkin, Detroit, I Do Mind Dying: A Study in Urban Revolution (New York: South End Press, 1998).
9. Thompson, Making of the English Working Class, 8.
10. Barker, “Class Struggle and Social Movement,” 27–30.
11. Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movements: Social Movement, Collective Action and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
12. This is no more than Thomas Paine’s statement during the French Revolution that in humanity there is a “mass of sense laying in a dormant state, and which, unless something excites it to action . . . all that extent of capacity . . . never fails to appear in revolutions.” See “The Rights of Man,” available from the University of Virginia at http://xroads.virginia.edu/~hyper2/CDFinal/Paine/contents.html.
13. These are not abstract statements. This vision illuminated the popular democracies and workers’ councils in the revolutionary movements in Germany (1918–23), Spain (1936), and Budapest (1956), but also in peripheral capitalist countries such as Senegal (1968) and Iran (1979), for example.
14. Thomas Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa, (London: Frederick Muller, 1956), 25.
15. Frederick Cooper, “The Dialectics of Decolonization: Nationalism and Labor Movements in Post-War French Africa,” in Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, eds., Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 406. Cited in Joseph Mtisi, Munyaradzi Nyakudya, and Teresa Barnes, “War in Rhodesia, 1965–1980,” in Brian Raftopoulos and Alois Mlambo, eds., Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from the Pre-Colonial Period to 2008 (Harare: Weaver Press, 2009), 150–51.
16. Lilombo, interview, November 20, 2006.
17. Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite (London: Panaf, 1985), 166–67.
18. For a good introductory overview of the origin and initial consequences of this policy, see Duncan Hallas, The Comintern (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2007).
19. For a classic statement of the labor aristocracy in Africa, see Giovanni Arrighi and John Saul, “Socialism and Economic Development in Tropical Africa,” Journal of Modern African Studies vol. 6, no. 2 (1968), 141–69. For a number of effective challenges to such arguments, see Richard Sandbrook and Robin Cohen, eds., The Development of an African Working Class (London: Longman, 1976). Joan Davies cites at least one African labor leader who believed revolutionary socialist change was possible at this time: African Trade Unions (New York: Penguin, 1966), 143–47.
20. Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (London: Penguin Books, 1963).
21. Ibid., 174.
22. Basil Davidson, Africa in Modern History: The Search for a New Society (London: Pelican, 1977).
23. Amílcar Cabral, Revolution in Guinea (London: Stage 1, 1969), 83.
24. Ibid., 87.
25. Amílcar Cabral, Return to the Source: Selected Speeches of Amílcar Cabral (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973), 83–84.
26. See Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument (Oxford: James Currey, 1999).
27. Jill Natrass, The South African Economy: Its Growth And Change (Oxford University Press, 1988), 27.
28. Miles Larmer, Mineworkers in Zambia (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2007), 149–50.
29. Patrick Bond and Mzwanele Mayekiso,“Toward the Integration of Urban Social Movements at the World Scale,” Journal of World Systems Research 2:2 (1996), 1–11.
30. James Petras and Denis Engbarth,“Third World Industrialization and Trade Union Struggles,” in Roger Southall, ed., Trade Unions and the New Industrialization of the Third World (London: Zed Books, 1988). John Saul was also doubtful about the progressive nature of these movements; see John Saul and Colin Leys, “Sub-Saharan Africa in Global Capitalism,” Monthly Review 51:3, (1999).
31. Patrick Chabal, “Political Transitions and Civil Society in Africa,” in Nuno Vidal and Patrick Chabal, eds., Southern Africa: Civil Society, Politics and Donor Strategies (Luanda: Media XXI & Firmamento, 2009).
32. Ousseina Alidou, George Caffentzis, and Silvia Federici, eds., A Thousand Flowers. Social Struggles against Structural Adjustment in African Universities (New York: Africa World Press, 2000).
33. John A. Wiseman, The New Struggle for Democracy in Africa (Aldershot: Avebury, 1996), 49.
34. David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (London: Oxford University Press, 2005).
35. Gareth Dale, “A Short Autumn of Utopia: The East German Revolution of 1989,” International Socialism Journal 124 (2009).
36. Joseph Iranola Akinlaja, the former general secretary of the National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers in Nigeria, explained in 2002 that the collapse of the Soviet Union “weakened our belief in Marxist resistance in Africa.” Personal communication, February 2002.
37. But much happened in the 1990s, including the Zapatista uprisings in 1994, the struggles of social movements in South America, and the slow revival of radical left politics in France after the “winter of discontent” in 1995.
38. For an early example, see Emma Bircham and John Charlton, eds., Anti-Capitalism: A Guide to the Movement (London: Bookmarks, 2001).
39. See Achille Mbembe, On the Postcolony (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Jean-François Bayart, The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly (London: Longman, 1993).
40. See Richard Werbner, “Multiple Identities, Plural Arenas,” in Richard Werbner and Terence Ranger, eds., Postcolonial Identities in Africa (London: Zed Books, 1996), and James Manor, ed., Rethinking Third World Politics (London: Longman, 1991).
41. Manor, Rethinking Third World Politics, 2.
42. Eboe Hutchful, “Eastern Europe: Consequences for Africa,”Review of African Political Economy vol. 18, no. 50 (1991), 51–59.
43. Graham Harrison, Issues in the Contemporary Politics of Sub-Saharan Africa: The Dynamics of Struggle and Resistance (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 107. Two important studies are illustrative of these trends. One edited collection, Werbner and Ranger, Postcolonial Identities in Africa, and Manor, Rethinking Third World Politics. These texts look at specific examples within states, concentrating on detailed case studies to avoid large-scale categorization. This, they argue, allows the researcher to delve into the localized complexity of social formations. The emphasis is on anthropological and cultural enquiry that brings out the symbolic and linguistic significance in a social practice.
44. “Afropessismism” was a fashionable term in the 1990s, and in academic circles became attached to the work of Jean-François Bayart. It was linked to the general pessimism, as we have seen, that followed the collapse of the Berlin Wall.
45. Bayart,The State in Africa, 57–58.
46. Achille Mbembe, interview by Christian Höller, “Africa in Motion,” Springerin, 2001, available at http://www.springerin.at/dyn/heft_text.php ?textid=1195&lang=en.
47. Achille Mbembe, “Power and Obscenity in the Post-Colonial Period: The Case of Cameroon,” in Manor, ed., Rethinking Third World Politics, 171. It is an unfortunate fact for Mbembe that as he was describing the “performance” of people in Cameroon involved in perpetuating their own oppression, there was a popular upheaval that almost bought the government down.
48. Pascal Bianchini, “Le Mouvement Étudiant Sénégalais: Un Essai d’Interprétation (The Student Movement in Senegal: An Interpretive Essay)” in M.C. Diop, La Société Sénégalaise entre le Local et le Global (Senegalese Society between the Local and the Global) (Paris: Karthala, 2002).
49. Harrison, Issues, 109–10.
50. Piet Konings, “University Students’ Revolt, Ethnic Militia, and Violence during Political Liberalization in Cameroon,” African Studies Review 45:2 (2002), 179–204.
51. Hal Draper, Karl Marx’s Theory of Revolution: The Politics of Social Classes (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977), 38.
52. Karl Marx, “First Draft of the Civil War in France,” in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Collected Works, vol. 22 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986), 495.
53. Leo Zeilig and Claire Ceruti, “Slums, Resistance and the African Working Class,” International Socialism Journal 117 (2007), available at http://www.isj .org.uk/index.php4?id=398&issue=117.
54. Leo Zeilig and David Seddon, “Class and Protest in Africa: New Waves,” Review of African Political Economy 32:103 (2005), 12.
55. Therefore we refuse to dissolve the working class into the amorphous “multitude” described in most academic accounts of sub-Saharan Africa. The working class on the continent, together with other popular forces, has both agency and organization. See Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire (London: Hamish Hamilton, 2005).
56. Thompson, Making of the English Working Class, 9.
57. Mike Davis, Planet of Slums (London: Verso, 2006), 7.
58. Ibid., 201.
59. The heterogeneity of classes has never been the reason for their political decay—rather, a factor of their real condition. As Lenin argued in 1920: “Capitalism would not be capitalism if the ‘pure’ proletariat were not surrounded by a large number of exceedingly motley types intermediate between the proletarian and the semi-proletarian (who earns his livelihood in part by the sale of his labor power), between the semi-proletarian and the small peasant (and petty artisan, handicraft worker, and small master in general), between the small peasant and the middle peasant, and so on, and if the proletariat itself were not divided . . . according to territorial origin, trade, sometimes according to religion, and so on.” Vladimir Lenin, “Left Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder,” (1920) in Selected Works (Progress Press: London 1969), available at http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/ 1920/lwc/.
60. For an example of this research, see Zeilig and Ceruti, “Slums, Resistance and the African Working Class.”
61. Karl Marx, Capital vol. 1, emphasis added, available at http://www.marxists.org/ archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch28.htm.
62. Leo Zeilig, “Tony Cliff and Deflected Permanent Revolution in Africa,” International Socialism Journal 126 (2010), available at http://www.isj.org .uk/?id=641.
Chapter 3: An Epoch of Uprisings
1. Ruth First, The Barrel of a Gun: Political Power in Africa and the Coup d’État (London: Allen Lane, 1970), 57–58.
2. Davidson, Africa in Modern History, 284.
3. Dwyer and Seddon, “The New Wave?”
4. Michael Bratton and Nicholas van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 5.
5. Mbembe, “Power and Obscenity in the Post-Colonial Period,”166–82.
6. Quoted in Isaac Deutscher, Stalin: A Political Biography (London: Penguin Books, 1966), 328.
7. For an overview of some of the working-class-led movements, see Leo Zeilig, ed., Class Struggle and Resistance in Africa (Chicago: Haymarket, 2009).
8. The best summary of labor organization and political change during this period is Frederick Cooper, Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
9. Ibid., 408–52.
10. Leo Zeilig and David Seddon, “Marxism, Class and Resistance in Africa,” in Zeilig, ed., Class Struggle and Resistance in Africa, 14–28.
11. For example, Julius Nyerere’s “Ujamaa” socialism: see Julius Nyerere, Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1968).
12. For an example of these ideas, see Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite.
13. For Nigeria, see Robin Cohen, Labour and Politics in Nigeria, 1945–71 (Heinemann: London, 1974). For Zambia, see Larmer, Mineworkers in Zambia.
14. Fanon, Wretched of the Earth.
15. Shula Marks, “Southern and Central Africa, 1886–1910,” in Roland Oliver and G.N. Sanderson, eds., The Cambridge History of Africa: Volume 6, 1870 to 1905 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 431.
16. George Shepperson, Independent African: John Chilembwe and the Origins, Setting and Significance of the Native Rising of 1915 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1987).
17. Robert I. Rotberg, The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa: The Making of Malawi and Zambia, 1873–1964, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966), 67–72.
18. Adrian Hastings, A History of African Christianity, 1950–1975 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 101.
19. On Aladura, see J.D.Y. Peel, Aladura: A Religious Movement among the Yoruba (London: Oxford University Press, 1968).
20. David M. Gordon, “A Community of Suffering: Narratives of War and Exile in the Zambian Lumpa Church,” in Derek Peterson and Giacomo Macola, eds., Recasting the Past: History Writing and Political Work in Modern Africa (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2009), 191–211.
21. Jeff Haynes, Religion and Politics in Africa (London and New Jersey: Zed Books, 1996), 79.
22. Quoted in Hastings, History of African Christianity, 185.
23. Haynes, Religion and Politics in Africa, 112.
24. Quotes in Hastings, History of African Christianity, 150.
25. Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, African Women: a Modern History (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 166–67.
26. Ifi Amadiume, Re-Inventing Africa: Matriarchy, Religion, and Culture (London: Zed Books, 1997), 168–69.
27. Ibid, 170–73.
28. Susan Geiger, TANU Women: Gender and Culture in the Making of Tanganyikan Nationalism (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1997).
29. Coquery-Vidrovitch, African Women, 181.
30. Geiger, TANU Women, 165–67.
31. D.A. Low and J.M. Lonsdale, “Introduction: Towards the New Order, 1945–1963,” in D.A. Low and Alison Smith, eds., History of East Africa, vol. 3 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), 12.
32. John Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 440–41.
33. Quoted in ibid., 443.
34. Quoted in ibid., 502.
35. Henrietta Moore and Megan Vaughan, Cutting Down Trees: Gender, Nutrition and Agricultural Change in the Northern Province of Zambia, 1890–1990 (Portsmouth, NH, Heinemann, 1994), 132–36.
36. Terence Ranger, Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe, (London: James Currey, 1985), 300–14.
37. Norma Kriger, Zimbabwe’s Guerrilla War: Peasant Voices (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
38. Moore and Vaughan, Cutting Down Trees, 138.
39. James Scott, Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), 223–61.
40. Merle L. Bowen, The State against the Peasantry: Rural Struggles in Colonial and Postcolonial Mozambique (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2000), 2.
41. Harrison, Issues in the Contemporary Politics of Sub-Saharan Africa, 46.
42. Tony Cliff, Marxism at the Millennium (London: Bookmarks, 2000), 48.
43. Mahmood Mamdani, “The Intelligentsia, the State and Social Movements in Africa,” in Mamadou Diouf and Mahmood Mamdani, eds., Academic Freedom in Africa (Dakar: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, 1995), 253–55.
44. Silvia Federici, “The New Student Movement,” in Ousseina Alidou, George Caffentzis, and Silvia Federici, eds., A Thousand Flowers: Social Struggles against Structural Adjustment in African Universities (New York: Africa World Press, 2000), 90.
45. M.E. Chambrier Rahandi, “Introduction,” in Charles Diané, La FEANF et les Grandes Heures du Mouvement Syndical Étudiant Noir (Paris: Chaka, 1990), 16. Interestingly, FEANF stood at the summit of approximately fourteen African student organizations in France from 1947 to 1956.
46. It is hard to exaggerate the role played by Nkrumah as an exemplary radical nationalist and model to a generation of African students in the 1950s. Diané writes that for students active in FEANF, “Nkrumah is an older brother, a precursor and a sort of mirror to the new class of engaged intellectuals.” Ibid., 29.
47. Panaf, Patrice Lumumba (London: Panaf, 1973), 196.
48. This was the opinion of many African socialists, but also of those who had no socialist inclinations. So Lumumba stated in 1956, “Let poor Belgium keep its ideological squabbles. The Congo needs something other than petty wranglings. Let us all unite, Catholics, Liberals, Socialist, Christians, Protestants, Atheists, to achieve real peace in this country. . . . Our country has much greater need of ‘builders’ than of squabblers, pamphleteers and purveyors of communist slogans.” Cited in Leo Zeilig, Patrice Lumumba: Africa’s Lost Leader (London: Haus Publishing, 2008), 81–82.
49. Robert Biel, The New Imperialism: Crisis and Contradictions in North/South Relations (London: Zed Books, 2000), 91.
50. Kofi Buenor Hadjor, Nkrumah and Ghana (London: Kegan Paul, 1988), 23.
51. Phil Marfleet, “Globalisation and the Third World,” International Socialism Journal, 2, 81 (1998), available at http://pubs.socialistreviewindex.org.uk/ isj81/marfleet.htm.
52. Abdelkader Zghal, “The ‘Bread Riot’ and the Crisis of the One-Party System in Tunisia,” in Mahmood Mamdani and Ernest Wamba-dia-Wamba, eds., African Studies in Social Movements and Democracy (Dakar: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, 1995), 99–129.
53. Times of Zambia, April 4, 1987, cited in Larmer, Mineworkers in Zambia, 52.
54. Christopher, Colcough, The Labour Market & Economic Stabilisation in Zambia,World Bank Country Economics Department WPS 222 (Washington: World Bank, 1989), vol. 1, available at http://go.worldbank.org/4HOIL5ANJ0.
55. See also Munyaradzi Gwisai, Revolutionaries, Resistance and Crisis in Zimbabwe: Anti-Neoliberal Struggles in Periphery Capitalism (Harare: International Socialist Organization, 2002).
56. Zeilig and Seddon, “Marxism, Class and Resistance in Africa.”
57. Jeremiah Dibua,“Students and the Struggle against Authoritarianism in University Governance in Nigeria,” in Paul Tiyambe Zeleza and Adebayo Olukoshi, eds., African Universities in the Twenty-First Century, vol. 2 (Dakar: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, 2004), 473.
58. Federici, “The New Student Movement,” 88.
59. This useful phrase was coined by Thandika Mkandawire: “Crisis Management and the Making of ‘Choiceless Democracies’ in Africa,” in Richard Joseph, ed., The State, Conflict and Democracy in Africa (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999), 119–36.
60. Bratton and van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa, 5.
61. Theodore Trefon, Saskia Van Hoyweghen and Stefaan Smis, “State Failure in the Congo: Perceptions and Realities,” Review of African Political Economy, vol.29 no. 93/94 (September–December 2002), 379–88.
62. M. Ngalamlume Nkongolo, Le Campus Martyr (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2000), 96–98.
63. Blaine Harden, Africa: Dispatches from a Fragile Continent (London: Harper Collins, 1993), 53.
64. Renton, Seddon, and Zeilig, Congo.
65. Zeilig and Seddon, “Marxism, Class and Resistance in Africa,” 48.
66. John A. Wiseman, The New Struggle for Democracy in Africa (Aldershot: Avebury, 1996), 49.
67. Quoted in D. Throup, “‘Render unto Caesar the Things that Are Caesar’s’: The Politics of Church-State Conflict in Kenya, 1978–1990,” in Holger Bernt Hansen and Michael Twaddle, eds., Religion and Politics in East Africa: The Period Since Independence (London: James Currey, 1995),143–76.
68. Ibid, 143.
69. Norbert Tengende, “Workers, Students and the Struggles for Democracy: State-Civil Society Relations in Zimbabwe,” Ph.D. dissertation, Roskilde University, Denmark (1994), 389–92.
70. Gwisai, Revolutionaries, Resistance and Crisis.
71. Tengende, “Workers, Students and the Struggles for Democracy,” 427.
72. Arthur Mutambara, interview by the authors, Harare, July 7, 2003.
73. Ludo Martens, Kabila et la Révolution Congolais: Panafricanisme ou Néocolonialisme? vol.1 (Brussels: EPO, 2002),115.
74. Thomas Hodgkin, “The Revolutionary Tradition in Islam,” Race and Class vol. 21, no. 3 (1980), 221–30.
75. Harrison, Issues in the Contemporary Politics of Sub-Saharan Africa, 100.
76. John Saul and Colin Leys, “Sub-Saharan Africa in Global Capitalism,” Monthly Review vol. 51, no. 3 (1999), 25, available at http://monthlyreview.org/1999/ 07/01/sub-saharan-africa-in-global-capitalism.
77. Ibid.
78. John Saul, “Africa: The Next Liberation Struggle,”Review of African Political Economy vol. 30, no. 96 (2003), 187–202.
79. Saul and Leys, “Sub-Saharan Africa in Global Capitalism,” 26.
Chapter 4: Cracks in the Monolith
1. Events since 1994 have resulted in a wide range of books on the social changes underway. Those not familiar with the country will find the following of use. On the initial years after 1994: Patrick Bond, The Elite Transition: From Apartheid to Neoliberalism in South Africa, 2nd ed. (Scottsville, South Africa: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2000) and Hein Marais, South Africa: Limits To Change: The Political Economy of Transition (London: Zed Books, 1999). On the changes to the ANC, see William Mervin Gumede, Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC (London, Zed Books, 2007); for the rise of the new social movements, see Richard Ballard, Adam Habib, and Imraan Valodia, eds., Voices of Protest: Social Movements in Post-Apartheid South Africa (Pietermaritzburg, South Africa: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2006); and for the labor movement, see Sakhela Buhlungu, ed., Trade Unions and Democracy (Pretoria:Human Sciences Research Council Press, 2006). The best single overview is Hein Marais, South Africa Pushed to the Limit: The Political Economy of Change (London: Zed Books, 2011).
2. During apartheid (1948–1994), people were divided into four racial classifications, in descending order of population: Africans, Coloureds, Whites, and Indians. “Africans” are indigenous people whose ancestors’ presence in the region predated the arrival of European settlers. “Coloured” legally referred to persons of “mixed blood,” often, but not always, meaning white and African. “Indian” refers to people descended from South Asians, and “White” to descendants of European settlers. Political activists rejected this classification as racist. The term “Black” has progressive political connotations and is an all-inclusive term referring to all South Africans who are not “white.” We will use this term, although, at times, it will be necessary to use terms such as “African.”
3. See chapter 2. The text of the Bill of Rights is available at http://www.info .gov.za/documents/constitution/1996/96cons2.htm (accessed May 30, 2010).
4. Ibid.
5. Moeletsi Mbeki, “The curse of South Africa,” New Statesman, January 17, 2008, available at http://www.newstatesman.com/world-affairs/2008/01/south-africa -anc-zuma (accessed May 30, 2010).
6. Constituted on May 9, 1990, the Alliance is headed by the ruling ANC and includes the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP—formerly known as the Communist Party).
7. Sher Verick, Unravelling the Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on the South African Labor Market, International Labor Office, Economic and Labor Market Analysis Department, Employment Sector (Geneva: ILO, 2010), available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_emp/documents/publication /wcms_122402.pdf (accessed May 30, 2010). In South Africa, two unemployment rates are widely used: a narrow rate that includes only those who have actively searched for a job in the last fourteen days and a broad definition that includes individuals who say that they want a job but who have not actively searched for work in the last fourteen days. This figure is based on the broad definition.
8. Approximately 19 percent of adults between ages fifteen and forty-nine are infected, with prevalence rates of up to 40 percent among women aged twenty-five to twenty-nine. South African National AIDS Council, HIV and AIDS and STI National Strategic Plan 2007–2011 (Pretoria: SANAC, 2007), available at http://www.info.gov.za/otherdocs/2007/aidsplan2007/ (accessed May 30, 2010).
9. Donwald Pressly, “Study finds SA now falls below Brazil,” Business Report, September 28, 2009. The Gini coefficient is the most commonly used measure of inequality and measures equality across society. The higher the value on a range of zero to one, the more unequal a society is. If income is shared equally (perfect equality), the Gini coefficient would be zero.
10. Murray Leibbrandt, Ingrid Woolard, Arden Finn, and Jonathan Argent, “Trends in South African Income Distribution and Poverty since the Fall of Apartheid,” OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers, No. 101, OECD Publishing, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2010, 18.
11. Seven South Africa rand equals approximately one US dollar.
12. Leibbrandt et al., “Trends in South African Income Distribution,”14–20, 26.
13. William Gumede, in William Gumede and Leslie Dikeni, eds., The Poverty of Ideas: South African Democracy and the Retreat of Intellectuals (Auckland Park, South Africa: Jacana Media, 2009), 3.
14. Political analyst Susan Booysen, quoted in Michael Georgy, “S. Africa Riots Press Zuma to Live Up to Promises,” Reuters, July 24, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLO185274 (accessed May 30, 2010).
15. For example, one union activist estimated that in the 1980s there were up to 150 union meetings taking place on any one night across the country. See Steven Friedman, Building Tomorrow Today: African Workers in Trade Unions, 1970–1984 (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1987).
16. The non-party political sections of which are now commonly referred to as “civil society.”
17. A popular ANC slogan from the 1994 elections that is still commonly referred to in government and among social movements.
18. This is a process of industrialization whereby a large part of imports are substituted by domestic production. The theorization of ISI, an already existing practice in many developed and developing countries, by development economists such as Raul Prebisch carried enormous intellectual currency. South Africa, together with countries such as India and Brazil, embarked on a state capitalist directed industrialization program very similar to ISI.
19. Marais, Limits To Change.
20. Between 1965 and 1973, the average growth rates for sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia, and Latin America were 3 percent, 5.4 percent, and 4.1 percent respectively. For the OECD countries, it was 3.5 percent. See World Bank, World Development Report (Washington, D.C.: Oxford University Press,1990) and William Beinart and Saul Dubow, eds., Segregation and Apartheid in Twentieth Century South Africa (London: Routledge, 1995), 165.
21. Police shot sixty-nine African protestors dead and wounded 227 at Sharpeveille, triggering nineteen days of mass nationwide strikes and protests. The killings were condemned internationally and domestically by white South African business leaders and media. This prompted organizations like the ANC to reject previous methods based on pacifism and turn to armed struggle.
22. The Freedom Charter was created by leaders of the Congress Alliance to unite and mobilize people. It was ambiguous enough to appeal to people on the basis of social class, ethnicity, and nation; the three constituencies repeatedly drew upon under the rubric of a national identity by the ANC as the liberation struggle developed.
23. Monetarism was a global response to the inability of Keynesian economics to explain or cure the seemingly contradictory problems of rising unemployment and inflation (“stagflation”) as a result of the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1972 and the oil shocks of 1973. Many of its ideas and policies formed the basis of what today is known as neoliberalism.
24. Gramsci notes: “A crisis occurs, sometimes lasting for decades. This exceptional duration means that incurable structural contradictions have revealed themselves (reached maturity), and that despite this, the political forces that are struggling to conserve and defend the existing structure itself are making every effort to cure them, within certain limits, and to overcome them . . . and it is upon this terrain that the forces of opposition organize.” Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, eds. and trans.(London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1998), 178.
25. Between 1969 and 1977, the number of skilled jobs grew by 30 percent and the proportion of jobs filled by Africans went from 9.3 percent to 23.2 percent. See Helene Perold and Dawn Butler, eds., The Right To Learn (Johannesburg: Sached Trust/Ravan Press 1986).
26. Anthony W. Marx, Lessons of Struggle: South African Internal Opposition, 1960–1990 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
27. In Soweto on June 16, fifteen thousand schoolchildren gathered to protest a government announcement that half of all classes must be taught in Afrikaans. Police opened fire and shot dead unarmed children. Anger at the killings sparked protests in other townships; six days later, 130 people had been officially recorded as dead. The single best coverage and analysis of the events surrounding Soweto and its political consequences can be found in Baruch Hirson, Year of Fire, Year of Ash: The Soweto Revolt: Roots of a Revolution? (London; Zed, 1979).
28. The Soweto uprisings boosted the exiled wing of the social movements as approximately six thousand people went into exile and joined the ANC between 1975 and 1980. As the best equipped and organized in exile, with funding and support from Moscow through its ties with the SACP, the ANC attracted many of those who fled the country. The ANC population in exile went from one thousand to nine thousand, with the average age dropping from thirty-five in 1975 to twenty-eight in 1976. See Stephen Davis quoted in ibid., 93. Inspired by the rebellions and flushed with external recruits, but not centrally involved and thus worried about being marginalized, the exiled and imprisoned ANC leadership made moves to set up structures, recruit, and circulate propaganda more purposefully inside the country. See Dale McKinley, The ANC and the Liberation Struggle (London: Pluto, 1997), 48.
29. See Alex Callinicos, Southern Africa After Zimbabwe (London: Pluto Press, 1981), 119 and Merle Lipton, Capitalism and Apartheid: South Africa 1910–1986 (Aldershot: Gower/Maurice Temple Smith, 1985), 381–82.
30. For example, in Katlehong, near Germiston, the number of shacks increased from three thousand in 1979 to forty-four thousand by 1983. See Beinart and Dubow, Segregation and Apartheid, 239.
31. The ANC related to its mass support base by setting up the UDF, through which they could internally popularize their politics. The UDF played an important role in the ANC’s turn to “people’s war” and its declared intention to make the country “ungovernable.” For a detailed but uncritical account of the UDF, see Jeremy Seekings, The UDF: A History of the United Democratic Front in South Africa, 1983–1991 (Cape Town: David Phillip, 2000).
32. Popo Molefe, former general secretary of the UDF and former premier of North West province, now executive chairman of Lereko Investments, quoted in Seekings, UDF, 17.
33. Quoted in Marx, Lessons of Struggle,134.
34. Replicated by communist parties elsewhere in the Third World, this theory argued that “capitalism was not the enemy in such countries,” more “local interests and the US imperialism that supported them,” and the way forward was “a broad popular or national front in which ‘national’ bourgeoisie or petty-bourgeoisie were allies.” See Eric J. Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914–1991 (London: Abacus, 1995), 436. Detaching racial oppression from its material roots in capitalist exploitation, it also implies that a “normal” capitalist society was hidden under “apartheid capitalism.” Politically and organizationally, this meant relegating the struggle for socialism to that of the “national democratic revolution” through building a national alliance of social groups.
35. See Seekings, UDF, 321. After meeting the ANC leadership in exile in 1986, the COSATU leadership agreed that the question of the NDR could not be “resolved without the full participation of the ANC, which is regarded by the majority of the people of South Africa as the overall leader and genuine representative.” Quoted in Robert Fine and Dennis Davis, Beyond Apartheid: Labour and Liberation in South Africa (London: Pluto Press, 1991), 265. Practically the majority of COSATU’s first national executive committee, elected at its founding congress, were ANC members or supporters. See Jeremy Baskin, Striking Back: A History of COSATU (London: Verso, 1991). 1
36. McKinley, ANC and the Liberation Struggle, 33.
37. See also Martin Legassick, “Myth and Reality in the Struggle against Apartheid,” Journal of Southern African Studies, vol. 24, no. 2 (June 1998), and references therein. Mandela notes that a letter read out by his daughter at a rally in February 1985 signaled a willingness to negotiate. Nelson Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela (London: Abacus, 1996), 623. Such duplicity echoes Frantz Fanon, who warned against nationalist leaders making “a show of force” while seeking conciliatory means.
38. More details about the period from 1984 to1986 can be found in Baskin, Striking Back; Marx, Lessons of Struggle; McKinley, ANC and the Liberation Struggle; and Seekings, UDF.
39. See the South African Labour Bulletin, May 6, 1985, 74–100.
40. Gerald Kraak, Breaking the Chains: Labour in South Africa in the 1970s and 1980s (London: Pluto Press, 1993), 236.
41. See Beinart and Dubow, Segregation and Apartheid, 246.
42. This united the independent union, FOSATU, with those unions with much closer ties to the ANC; this majority argued that COSATU should be aligned with the ANC. This represented a weakening of the independent left in the labor and liberation movement; in 1987, the National Union of Mineworkers of South Africa, a stronghold of the independent left, adopted the Freedom Charter.
43. Beinart and Dubow, Segregation and Apartheid, 246–47.
44. “If the emergency had not been introduced the economy would have been finished. There was no way we could have continued to do business while people were burning down schools and murdering one another.” Donald Mason, former president of the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut, quoted in Baskin, Striking Back,137.
45. Kraak, Breaking the Chains,129, table 6.1.
46. Seekings, UDF, 3.
47. Kraak, Breaking the Chains,129.
48. Ibid., 245–46.
49. Martin J. Murray, The Revolution Deferred: The Painful Birth of Post-Apartheid South Africa (London: Verso, 1994), 142.
50. Ibid., 169. Today this area comes under the provinces of Gauteng, Limpopo, Mpumalanga, and the North West province.
51. Financial Times, December 28, 1989.
52. Mac Maharaja (now presidential spokesperson), quoted in Heribert Adam, Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, and Kogila Moodley, Comrades in Business: Post-Liberation Politics in South Africa (Cape Town: Tafleberg, 1998), 69.
53. Fine and Davis, Beyond Apartheid, and Callinicos, Southern Africa After Zimbabwe, suggest this. In July 1990, when the SACP announced its leadership, it included former leading FOSATU activists and critics of the ANC-SACP Moses Mayekiso and John Gomomo. Other leading activists soon followed.
54. Quoted in Baskin, Striking Back, 420–21.
55. Mandela, Long Walk, 724.
56. Star, June 30, 1993.
57. African National Congress, The Reconstruction and Development Programme (Johannesburg: Umanyano Publications, 1994), 5.
58. Star, March 4, 1994.
59. Financial Times, May 7, 1994.
60. Financial Times, May 2, 1995.
61. Quoted in Adam et al, Comrades in Business,151.
62. Sunday Times, June 16, 1996.
63. At the time, official unemployment was approximately 30 percent and the economy had to grow by between 8 and 10 percent per annum to accommodate new entrants into the labor market, according to then-labor minister Tito Mboweni. Quoted in Financial Times, May 2, 1995.
64. Economist, October 12, 1996.
65. See Jonathan Michie, “South Africa’s Transition: The Policy Agenda,” in Jonathan Michie and Vishnu Padayachee, eds.,The Political Economy of South Africa’s Transition (London: Dryden Press, 1997), 50 and Oupa Lehulere, “The Political Significance of GEAR,” Debate, no. 3 (1997), 74.
66. Business Day, March 1, 2000.
67. See, for example, South African Labour Bulletin, vol. 22, no. 3 (June 1998), 94.
68. See the “Declaration on Gear” in Shopsteward, October/November 1997, 20 and 40.
69. Bond, Elite Transition, 193–94.
70. Business Report, September 9, 1998, and Business Day, March 29, 2000.
71. Citizen, September 8, 1999.
72. For more on TAC, see Steven Friedmanin Ballard et al.,Voices of Protest.
73. The Star, July 9, 1999. A much-heralded success at election time was the electrification of three hundred thousand new households each year between 1994 and 1996. Others estimate that at some point or other since 1994, a total of ten million people have been disconnected from water and electricity and two million evicted from their homes because they could not afford their municipal bills. See David McDonald, “The Bell Tolls for Thee,” and David McDonald and Laila Smith, “Privatizing Cape Town,” Municipal Services project paper, 2002.
74. In this election, four million fewer people voted than in 1994. The Democratic Party emerged with 9.58 percent of the vote, up from 1994—a “recycled” white vote from the NP, now the New National Party (NNP), which got 6.87 percent and later merged with the ANC. See Tom Lodge, Consolidating Democracy: South Africa’s Second Popular Election (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1999), available at http://tinyurl.com/ct69myp.
75. At an ANC Women’s League election rally, attended by one of us in Gugulethu Township near Cape Town, May 1999.
76. Quoted in Edward Cottle, “ANC Elections Manifesto is a Decoy,” South African Labour Bulletin, vol. 23, no. 4 (August 1999), 80.
77. Business Day, May 11, 1999.
78. Business Day, March 1, 2000.
79. In South Africa the term “social movements” has taken on a particular narrow meaning as opposed to to how the term is more widely understood. Here it refers to a group of mainly community-based organizations that are largely independent and, to varying degrees, critical of the policies and practices of the ANC government and the ANC-led Alliance.
80. For an extensive discussion of the origins, characteristics, and history of these groups, see the specific chapters in Ballard et al.,Voices of Protest.
81. For an overview of the role of civil society at these events see Ashwin Desai and Peter Dwyer, “Civil society, the United Nations and WCAR” and “The World $ummit on $ustainable Development,” in Patrick Bond and Ashwin Desai, eds., Foreign Policy Bottom Up: South African Civil Society and the Globalisation of Popular Solidarity (Durban: University of KwaZulu-Natal Centre for Civil Society, 2008), available at http://tinyurl.com/c4fz9vf (accessed April 27, 2012).
82. The SMI was a split from the broader Civil Society Indaba set up to facilitate participation in parallel events of the World Summit on Sustainable Development. In the process, differences emerged with organizations such as COSATU over the role of those groups critical of the government.
83. Labour Research Service, Labour Research Service Annual Report 2004-2005, available at http://www.lrs.org.za/docs/Annual_Report2004-5.pdf (accessed May 30, 2011).
84. Business Day, February 26,2004.
85. Financial Mail, May 28, 2004, 20.
86. This Day, June 4, 2004.
87. For more on the ABM, see its website: www.abm.co.za.
88. The fractious and fragmented nature of post-apartheid social movements is evidenced by the divisions between ABM and other groups in the SMI. An example was their disruption, along with the AEC, of the SMI national meeting in Durban in December 2006.
89. This is what one social movement activist initially argued. See Ashwin Desai, We are the Poors: Community Struggles in Post-Apartheid South Africa (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2002), 124, and Dale McKinley and Prishani Naidoo, “New Social Movements in South Africa,” Development Update, vol. 5, no. 2 (2004), 14–15.
90. Interestingly, this was also the year of the first serious reflective critique of the social movements by one of its key activists. See Ashwin Desai, “Vans, Autos, Kombis and the Drivers of Social Movements,” Centre for Civil Society, University of KwaZulu-Natal, paper presented at the Harold Wolpe Memorial Lecture Series, July 28, 2006, International Convention Centre, Durban, available at http://ccs.ukzn.ac.za/files/dn072006desai_paper.pdf (accessed May 30, 2011).
91. This is argued by social movement activist Oupa Lehulere in “The New Social Movements, COSATU, and the ‘New UDF,’” in Khanya, No. 11 (December 2005), available at http://amadlandawonye.wikispaces.com/file/view/New+ social+movements%2C+COSATU+and+New+UDF%2C+Oupa+Lehulere.pdf (accessed May 30, 2011).
92. See the talk by a key SMI organizer: Mondli Hlatshwayo, “The Genesis of the Social Movements Indaba,” lecture delivered at UKZN Centre for Civil Society, November 22, 2007, available at http://tinyurl.com/bue3vno (accessed May 30, 2011).
93. It is all the more tragic that such a respected militant as Oupa Lehulere should reduce this to COSATU getting involved in “internal squabbles with the ruling class” (ibid.).
94. Clearly many social movements are in a very serious malaise and have yet to recover from what Lehulere called “a lull, a temporary retreat” in 2005. A recent example of this was evident at the protest held at the COP17 United Nations Climate Change conference in Durban in December 2011. Ten years after WCAR, the coming-out party of the social movements, only five thousand people marched.
95. Desai, We Are the Poors, 49.
Chapter 5: Social Movements after the Transition
1. For example, Larry Diamond, “Towards Democratic Consolidation,” Journal of Democracy, vol. 5, no. 3 (1994), 4–17; John W. Harbeson, Donald Rothchild, and Naomi Chazan, eds., Civil Society and the State in Africa (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994).
2. The term is commonly associated with Bayart, The State in Africa.
3. Interview, Fr. Joe Komakoma, secretary general, Zambia Episcopal Conference, Lusaka, April 5, 2006.
4. Harri Englund, Prisoners of Freedom: Human Rights and the African Poor (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006).
5. Interview, Undule Mwakasungule, Centre for Human Rights and Rehabilitation, Lilongwe, June 8, 2006.
6. Harri Englund, ed.,“Introduction,” in A Democracy of Chameleons: Politics and Culture in the New Malawi (Uppsala, Sweden: Nordic Africa Institute, 2002), 12.
7. Interview, Lucy Muyoyeta, chairperson of Women for Change, chief executive of NGO Coordinating Committee, Lusaka, April 6, 2006.
8. David M.C. Bartlett, “Civil Society and Democracy: A Zambian Case Study,” Journal of Southern African Studies, vol. 26, no. 3 (2000), 429–46.
9. Miles Larmer, Mineworkers in Zambia: Labor and Political Change in Post-Colonial Africa, 1964—1991 (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007), 172.
10. Interview, Jack Jones Zulu, Jubilee Zambia, Lusaka, April 4, 2006.
11. Muyoyeta interview.
12. Interview, Elijah Rubvuta, executive director of Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP), Lusaka, April 6, 2006.
13. Englund, Prisoners of Freedom, 74.
14. Interview, Peter Ngulube Chinoko, coordinator, Catholic Commission for Justice, Development, and Peace—Lilongwe Diocese, Lilongwe, June 5, 2006.
15. Interview, Desmond Kaunda, director, Malawi Human Rights and Rehabilitation Centre, Lilongwe, June 8, 2006.
16. Ibid.
17. Mwakasungule interview.
18. Interview, Andrew Mushi, advocacy officer, Tanzania Association of NGOs (TANGO), Dar es Salaam, August 29, 2005.
19. Lise Rakner, Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia, 1991–2001 (Uppsala, Sweden: Nordic Africa Institute, 2003); Miles Larmer, “Reaction and Resistance to Neo-Liberalism in Zambia,” Review of African Political Economy vol. 32, no. 103 (2005), 29–45.
20. Larmer, “Reaction and Resistance,” 39.
21. Englund, Prisoners of Freedom, 126–27.
22. Ibid., 127.
23. Rubvuta interview.
24. Muyoyeta interview.
25. Interview, Limbani Nsapato, coordinator, Civil Society Coalition for Quality Basic Education, Lilongwe, June 9, 2006.
26. Kaunda interview.
27. Interview, John Njunga, national coordinator, Malawi Health Equity Network, Lilongwe, June 9, 2006.
28. Interview, Mabvuto Bamusi, director, Malawi Economic Justice Network, Lilongwe, June 7, 2006.
29. Interview, Deus Kibamba, Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP), Dar es Salaam, August 29, 2005.
30. Interview, Rev. Japhet Ndhlovu, Council of Churches (CCZ) and executive director of Oasis Forum, Lusaka, April 7, 2006.
31. Mwakasungule interview.
32. Chinoko interview.
33. Englund, Prisoners of Freedom, 197–98; Kaunda interview.
34. Mwakasungule interview.
35. Chinoko interview.
36. Englund, Prisoners of Freedom, 43.
37. Interview, Rev. Malawo Matyola, Zambia Council for Social Development, Lusaka, April 5, 2006.
38. Interview, Fr. Peter Henriot, Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection, Lusaka, April 10, 2006.
39. Ndhlovu interview.
40. Rakner, Political and Economic Liberalisation, 78–79.
41. Central Statistical Office, “Formal Sector Employment Trends in Zambia, 1985–2005,” (Lusaka: Central Statistical Office, 2006).
42. Central Statistical Office, Zambia Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) EdData Survey, (Lusaka: Central Statistical Office, 2002).
43. Central Statistics Office, “National Trends in Poverty, 1991—2004,” (Lusaka: Central Statistical Office, 2005).We should note at this point that progress (or lack of progress) in democratization is not just a function of the interaction of the state and social movements, but is also affected by the performance of the economy.
44. Blessings Chinsinga, “The Politics of Poverty Alleviation in Malawi: A Critical Review,” in Harri Englund, ed., A Democracy of Chameleons: Politics and Culture in the New Malawi (Uppsala, Sweden: Nordic Africa Institute, 2002), 25–42, 26.
45. Inter-African Network for Human Rights & Development (AFRONET), Citizens for a Better Environment, and Rights and Accountability in Development (RAID), “Zambia: Deregulation and The Denial of Human Rights,” Submission to the OECD Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Lusaka, Kitwe, Oxford: March 2000).
46. Interview, Joyce Nonde, president, Federation of Free Trade Unions of Zambia (FFTUZ), Lusaka, March 13, 2003.
47. Sunday Post, January 25, 2003.
48. The Post, December 19, 2002.
49. World Bank Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility, quoted in Corporate Europe Observatory report, “Case Study on Malawi,” May 2007, available at http://www.corporateeurope.org/water-justice/content/2007/11/ ppiaf-case-study-malawi (accessed February 11, 2010).
50. Interview, Olivia Kunje, vice–general secretary, Water Employees Trade Union of Malawi (WETUM), Lilongwe, June 8, 2006.
51. Corporate Europe Observatory report, “Case Study on Malawi.”
52. Interview, Joyce Nonde, president, Federation of Free Trade Unions of Zambia (FFTUZ), Lusaka, March 28, 2006.
53. Interview, Joyce Nonde, president, Federation of Free Trade Unions of Zambia (FFTUZ), Lusaka, May 11, 2008.
54. Miles Larmer and Alastair Fraser, “Of Cabbages and King Cobra: Populist Politics and Zambia’s 2006 Elections,”African Affairs, vol. 106, no. 425 (2007), 611–37, 627–29.
55. Alastair Fraser and John Lungu, For Whom the Windfalls? Winners and Losers in the Privatization of Zambia’s Copper Mines (Lusaka: CSTNZ, 2006).
56. All PRSPs are available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/prsp.aspx.
57. Jeremy Gould, ed., The New Conditionality: The Politics of Poverty Reduction Strategies (London: Zed Books, 2005).
58. Chinoko interview.
59. Interview, Besinati Mpepo, executive director, Civil Society for Poverty Reduction, Lusaka, April 3, 2006.
60. Bamusi interview.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. Mpepo interview.
64. Mushi interview.
65. Ibid.
66. Interview, Peter Sinkamba, executive director, Citizens for a Better Environment, Kitwe, May 27, 2008.
67. African Forum and Network on Debt and Development (AFRODAD), “The Impact of Economic Reform Programs on Social Services: The Case of Malawi” (Harare: AFRODAD, 2007), available at http://www.afrodad.org/ downloads/Malawi%20FTA.pdf (accessed January 28, 2010).
68. Zulu interview.
69. Interview, Victor Mhoni, coordinator, Civil Society Agriculture Network (CSANet), Lilongwe, June 7, 2006.
70. Ibid.
71. The full CRC report is available at http://www.ncczambia.org/media/final _report_of_the_constitution_review_commission.pdf.
72. Episcopal Conference of Malawi, “Choose Life: Preparing for 2009 Elections During Lent: Sunday Reflections and Guiding Principles from our Bishops,” Lilongwe, 2009, available at http://www.fides.org/eng/documents/LENT _english_2009.pdf (accessed November 29, 2009).
73. Matyola interview.
74. Joint interview, Oscar Tembo (program officer) and Theresa Chewe (administrator), Southern Africa Centre for Constructive Resolution of Disputes (SACCORD), Lusaka, March 28, 2006.
75. Ndhlovu interview.
76. Komakoma interview.
77. Muyoyeta interview.
78. Komakoma interview.
79. Mushi interview.
80. Kibamba interview.
81. Chinoko interview.
82. Bamusi interview.
83. Ibid.
84. Kaunda interview.
85. Mwakasungule interview.
86. Chinoko interview.
87. Englund, Prisoners of Freedom, 195.
Chapter 6: Frustrated Transitions
1. See Renton, Zeilig, and Seddon, Congo.
2. Cited in Martins, Kabila, 115.
3. Harden, Africa, 54.
4. Stephen Riley and Trevor Parfitt, “Economic Adjustment and Democratization in Africa” in John Walton and David Seddon, eds., Free Markets and Food Riots: The Politics of Global Adjustment (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 136.
5. Trefon,Van Hoyweghen, and Smis, “State Failure in the Congo,” 381.
6. Nkongolo, Campus Martyr, 182.
7. Nzongola-Ntalaja, Congo, 155–56.
8. Walton and Seddon, eds., Free Markets and Food Rights, 163.
9. Nzongola-Ntalaja, Congo,188.
10. Martins, Kabila, 78.
11. Nzongola-Ntalaja, Congo, 190.
12. Martins gives a good description of the demonstration and the risks that were involved. Martins, Kabila, 83–84.
13. An important collection of eyewitness accounts from the demonstration published two years later provides a unique insight into the nature of the popular struggles that were sweeping the Congo. Philippe de Dorlodot, Marche d’Espoir: Kinshasa 16 Février 1992 Non-violence pour la Démocratie au Zaire (Paris: l’Harmattan, 1994).
14. Ibid., 25–26.
15. Ibid., 28.
16. Ibid., 30.
17. Gauthier de Villers and J. Omasombo Tshonda, “When Kinois Take to the Street,” in Theodore Trefon, ed., Reinventing Order in the Congo (London: Zed Books, 2004), 144.
18. Riley and Parfitt,“Economic Adjustment and Democratization in Africa,” 165.
19. Nzongola-Ntalaja, Congo, 195.
20. Ibid., 197.
21. Gauthier de Villers and J. Omasombo Tshonda, “An Intransitive Transition,” Review of African Political Economy vol. 93, vol. 4 (2002), 403.
22. Martins, Kabila, 83.
23. Cited in ibid., 115.
24. Cited in ibid., 115.
25. United Nations Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources (New York: UNSC, May 2002), 19.
26. The international community raised $450 million to hold the elections. Problematic as this funding maybe, it is some achievement that in a country devastated by war, twenty-five million Congolese were encouraged to vote in fifty thousand polling stations. In general, the elections were held without major incident. Francois Manga-Agoa, ed., Republique Democratique du Congo ( Paris: l’Harmattan, 2008).
27. George Ngonzola-Ntalaja, “DRC’s Potential: Lighting the Continent from Cape to Cairo,” Pambazuka, July 21, 2006, available at http://www.pambazuka .org/en/category/features/35486.
28. For a recent account of a massacre in Makombo in the Haute Uele district of the Congo, see Human Rights Watch,“Trail of Death: LRA Atrocities in the Northeastern DRC,” March 2010, available at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/ 2010/03/29/trail-death (accessed April 30, 2012).
29. Amnesty International, “End Persecution of Human Rights Defenders in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” press release, February 17, 2010, available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/report/democratic-republic -congo-must-end-persecution-human-rights-defenders-201 (accessed April 30, 2012).
30. Ibid.
31. Joseph Tanyanyiwa, “Country report at the ITGLWU’s 10th World Congress,” speech delivered in Frankfurt, Germany, December 2–4, 2009.
32. Interview, Joseph Tanyanyiwa, general secretary, NUCIZ, Harare, March 20, 2010.
33. Interview, Brian Kagoro, civil society activist, Harare, June 23, 2003.
34. Leo Zeilig, “Crisis in Zimbabwe,” International Socialism Journal 94 (2002).
35. Interview, Job Sikhala, MDC MP, July 30, 2003.
36. Financial Gazette (Zimbabwe), March 12, 1999.
37. Elinor Sisulu, Pascal Richards, and Steve Kibble “Where To for Zimbabwean Churches and Civil Society?,” in Vidal and Chabal, eds., Southern Africa, 243.
38. Though there has been no recent audit of civil society organizations in Zimbabwe, a study in 2006 reported an impressive array of diverse organizations with a national spread of members and affiliate groups. As a snapshot of the Zimbabwean political scene it remains important today. “Despite a shrinking membership, the trade unions also retain a national infrastructure [including] a network of 21 offices with 45 full-time officers. . . . The National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) network [consists] of approximately 480 formal and informal committees. . . . The Bulawayo Agenda is made up of 36 active civil society organizations in Bulawayo. . . . The Zimbabwe Civic Education Trust (Zimcet), with its infrastructure of five regional offices, has established 57 peace committees across the country.” The research concludes that “Zimbabwe retains a wealth of community-based organizations [with] more than 50,000 members in 50 districts.” Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Exploring Transitional Justice Options in Contemporary Zimbabwe (Harare: Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 2006), available at http://www.hrforumzim.org/reports/special-reports/exploring-transitional-justice-options-in-contemporary-zimbabwe/ (accessed April 30, 2012).
39. Rejoice Shumba, “Social Identities in the National Youth Service of Zimbabwe,” MA dissertation, University of Johannesburg, 2006.
40. Munyaradzi Gwisai, Revolutionaries, Resistance and Crisis in Zimbabwe (Harare: International Socialist Organisation, 2002), 32.
41. For an overview, see Leo Zeilig,“Zimbabwe: Imperialism, Hypocrisy and Fake Nationalism,” in International Socialism 119 (2008), available at http://www .isj.org.uk/index.php4?id=458&issue=119.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Bomba interview.
45. Interview, Tella Barangwe, March 21, 2010.
46. Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Exploring Transitional Justice Options.
47. Sisulu, Richards, and Kibble, “Where to for Zimbabwean Churches and Civil Society?,” 246–47.
48. Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Exploring Transitional Justice Options.
49. Interview, Tinashe Chisaira, March 19, 2010.
50. Ibid.
51. Interview, Mike Sambo, March 12, 2012.
52. Interview, Tafadzwa Choto, March 13, 2010.
53. Chisaira interview.
54. Interview, Munyaradzi Gwisai, March 20, 2010.
55. Patrick Bond, “Vultures Circle Zimbabwe,” Counterpunch, April 5–7, 2008, available at www.counterpunch.org/bond04052008.html (accessed April 30, 2012).
56. Tanyanyiwa interview.
57. See Brian Raftopoulos’s conclusion on the recent period in Zimbabwean history in Brian Raftopoulos and Alois Mlambo, eds., Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from the Pre-Colonial Period to 2008 (Harare: Weaver Press, 2009).
58. Sisulu, Richards, and Kibble,“Where to for Zimbabwean Churches and Civil Society?,” 255.
59. Interview, Alex Langwenya, SWAYOCO, Mbabane, February 25, 2006.
60. Interview, Vincent Dlamini, Mbabane, February 25, 2006.
61. Interview, Joyce Vilikati, Women’s Resource Centre, Manzini, Swaziland, February 24, 2006.
62. Interview, Mario Masuku, PUDEMO, Manzini, February 27, 2006.
63. Interview, Musa Hlophe, Coalition of Concerned Civil Society Organisations, Manzini, Swaziland, February 28, 2006.
64. Ibid.
65. Masuku interview.
66. Ibid.
67. Discussions with Socio-Economic Justice Foundation (SEJF), Simunye, Swaziland, February 27, 2006.
68. Langwenya interview.
69. SEJF discussions.
70. Ibid.
71. Hlophe interview.
72. Ibid.
73. International Monetary Fund, Kingdom of Swaziland Article IV Consultation—Staff Report (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 2006), available at http://www.imf .org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2006/cr06106.pdf (accessed April 30, 2012). See also Government Gazette vol. XLIV, no. 8 (February 6, 2006); interview, Quinto Dlamini, Swaziland National Association of Civil Servants, Manzini, Swaziland, February 28, 2006.
74. Vincent Dlamini interview.
75. Langwenya interview.
76. Ibid.
77. Masuku interview.
78. SEJF discussions.
79. Vincent Dlamini interview; SEJF discussions.
Chapter 7: Social Forums and the World Social Forum in Africa
1. Donatella Della Porta and Sidney Tarrow, Transnational Protest and Social Activism (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 1–21.
2. David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 15.
3. William F. Fisher and Thomas Ponniah, eds., Another World is Possible: Popular Alternatives to Globalization at the World Social Forum (London: Zed Books, 2003); Boaventura de Sousa Santos, The Rise of the Global Left: The World Social Forum and Beyond (London: Zed Books, 2006).
4. A useful summary of these arguments is provided by Focus on the Global South, “Focus on Trade No. 136” (Bangkok: Focus on the Global South, 2008), available at http://www.focusweb.org/node/1327 (accessed November 20, 2009).
5. Fisher and Ponniah, Another World is Possible, 3.
6. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, “Foreword,” in Fisher and Ponniah, Another World is Possible, xvi–xix.
7. Hilary Wainright, “The Forum as Jazz,” in Jai Sen, Anita Anand, Arturo Escobar, and Peter Waterman, eds., The World Social Forum: Challenging Empires (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 2004), xviii–xix.
8. Alex Callinicos and Chris Nineham, “At an Impasse?: Anti-Capitalism and the Social Forums Today,” International Socialism 115 (2007), 69–110.
9. Peter Waterman, “The Secret of Fire,” in Sen et al., The World Social Forum, 148–60.
10. Ibid., 153.
11. Michael Albert, ‘“The WSF: Where to Now?,’” in ibid., 323–28.
12. African Social Forum 2003 Addis Ababa Consensus, “Another Africa is Possible!” (Addis Ababa: ASF, 2003), available at http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/ d0000167/P163_ASF_consensus.pdf (accessed December 12, 2006).
13. Thomas Deve, “Africa in Search of a Deeper Dialogue beyond Addis and Bamako: Reflections on Africa and the Mumbai 2004 World Social Forum” (2004), available at http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000699/WSF_Deve.pdf (accessed March 12, 2006).
14. EPAs are the European Union’s aid-trade partnership agreements. Replacing the Lomé and Cotonou Agreements, they effectively impose free-trade policies on African (and Caribbean and Pacific) countries, opening their domestic markets to greater access for highly subsidized European agricultural producers and further undermining local producers.
15. Amanda Alexander and Mandisa Mbali, “Have the Slaves Left the Master’s House? A Report on the Africa Social Forum,” Journal of Asian and African Studies vol. 39, no. 5 (2005), 407–16.
16. Callinicos and Nineham, “At an Impasse?,” 72.
17. Marie-Emmanuelle Pommerolle and Joanna Siméant, “African Voices and Activists at the WSF in Nairobi: The Uncertain Ways of Transnational African Activism,” paper presented to the Africa-Europe Group for Interdisciplinary Studies (AEGIS) European Conference on African Studies, Leiden, Netherlands, July 11–14, 2007. See also Marie-Emmanuelle Pommerolle and Joanna Siméant, Un Autre Monde à Nairobi: Le Forum Social Mondial 2007, Entre Extraversions et Causes Africaines (Paris: Karthala, 2008).
18. Quoted in Terra Viva, World Social Forum newspaper, January 24 and 25, 2007.
19. Quoted in Daily Nation (Nairobi), January 25, 2007.
20. Interview, Peter Ngulube Chinoko, coordinator, Catholic Commission for Justice, Development, and Peace, Lilongwe Diocese, Nairobi, January 23, 2007.
21. Ibid.
22. Interview, Mutawaya Sitali, Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection Zambia, Nairobi, January 22, 2007.
23. Interview, Humphrey Sikapizye, Zambia Council for Social Development, Nairobi, January 23, 2007.
24. Ibid.
25. Interview, Tshumba Nkosi, Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, Nairobi, January 23, 2007.
26. Interview, Lucia Matibenga, vice president, Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions, Nairobi, January 24, 2007.
27. Discussion with Swazi activists, Nairobi, January 22–24, 2007.
28. For a powerful argument regarding the continued relevance of the nation-state, see Linda Weiss, The Myth of the Powerless State: Governing the Economy in a Global Era (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998).
29. Interviews with Mabvuto Bamusi, director, Malawi Economic Justice Network, Lilongwe, June 7, 2006, and Andrew Mushi, advocacy officer, Tanzania Association of NGOs, Dar es Salaam, August 29, 2005.
Chapter 8: Conclusion
1. See, for example, the recent special issue of Review of African Political Economy 125 (September 2010), on “Social Movements and Struggles in Africa,” available at http://www.roape.org/125/ (accessed May 2, 2012).
2. For an exemplary study of such inequalities and power relationships, see Nadine Beckmann and Janet Bujra, “The ‘Politics of the Queue’: PLHA Politicisation and AIDS Activism in Tanzania,” paper presented at the University of Leeds conference Democratization in Africa: Retrospective and Future Prospects, December 4–5, 2009.
3. Alex Callinicos, “Ukraine: is the Future Orange?” Socialist Worker (UK), December 11, 2004.
4. Chris Harman,“Are You Being Served?,” Socialist Review 286 (2004).
5. Kagoro interview.
6. Interview, Cherif Ba, Université Cheikh Anta Diop, Dakar, February 12, 2004.
7. Colin Barker,“Robert Michels and the ‘Cruel Game’” in Barker, Johnson, and Lavalette, eds., Leadership and Social Movements, 42.
8. Gwisai, Revolutionaries, Resistance and Crisis in Zimbabwe, 27.
9. See Leo Zeilig,“Tony Cliff: Deflected Revolution in Africa,” International Socialism Journal 126 (2010), available at http://www.isj.org.uk/?id=641 (accessed May 2, 2012).
10. See Ben Fine and Dimitris Milonakis, From Economics Imperialism to Freakonomics: The Shifting Boundaries Between Economics and Other Social Sciences (London: Routledge, 2009).
11. David Harvey, “Organising for the Anti-Capitalist Transition,” speech delivered at the World Social Forum, Porto Alegre, Brazil, January 26, 2010, available at http://davidharvey.org/2009/12/organizing-for-the-anti-capitalist -transition/ (accessed May 2, 2012).
12. For example, the UK’s previous prime minister, Gordon Brown, boasted before the financial crash that he had ended, singlehandedly, capitalism’s tendency to boom and bust: Deborah Summers, “No Return to Boom and Bust; What Brown Said When He Was Chancellor,” Guardian, September 11, 2008, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2008/sep/11/gordonbrown .economy (accessed April 30, 2012).
13. Afrique 21,“2007–2009 Crise Alimentaire: Révoltes et Résistances” in Afriques 213 (Spring 2010), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/29323136/Afriques -21-n%C2%B03-6-pages (accessed May 2, 2012); Makama Bawa Oumarou and Bénédicte Maccatory, “Des Mobilisations à Caractère Socio-économique mais aussi Politique,” paper presented at Lutters dans les Afriques conference, Université Paris I Panthéon, January 22–23, 2010.
14. See, for example, John Saul, “African Studies in Canada,” speech delivered at the Annual Conference of the Canadian Association of African Studies, Ottawa, May 5–7, 2010.