I have enjoyed peaches and apricots more since I have known that they were first cultivated in China in the early days of Han Dynasty; that Chinese hostages held by the great King Kaniska introduced them to India, whence they spread to Persia, reaching the Roman Empire in the first century of our era; that the word “apricot” is derived from the same Latin source as the word “precocious,” because the apricot ripens early; and that the A at the beginning was added by mistake, owing to a false etymology. All this makes the fruit taste much sweeter.
—BERTRAND RUSSELL
The second way to taste conceives of taste as knowledge and awareness of culture. In this perceptual experience, taste operates as the conscious fabric of a person’s biographical and cultural identity, a progressive acquisition. Here taste is “dressed,” controlled, and dedicated to appreciation as the capacity of understanding over time. Calling this experience “taste” does not connote the predominance of a hedonic impulse but that of reason, reflection, and balance. There are many ramifications along this mode of access to taste because, unlike the experience of naked pleasure, which tends to lack the capacity to reflect and is therefore less articulated, it develops on many different levels of awareness—from the novice’s curiosity to the most sophisticated
connoisseur’s expertise—and it provides many consequent options. The curious person, the enthusiast, the
gourmet but also health fanatics and vegetarians fall into this category because they all express a gustatory appreciation from
qualitative and
esteeming criteria that arrange an aesthetic judgment. If naked pleasure is basically the realm of unreflected and often
tacit desire, dressed taste is the land of
explicit, conceptualized, and often verbosely expressed knowledge. Please note that I am not proposing again here a dichotomy that I aimed to deconstruct before (desire/knowledge, nature/culture, and the like)! Instead, I propose to observe different modes of experiencing food from the perceiver’s perspective, as I have previously noted,
from inside the perception. To give examples that have already been discussed, wine in this case will not be appreciated simply
as “wine” or alcohol, or chocolate
as a generic sweet or sugar bearer. Rather, particular wines or chocolates will convey constitutive values of appreciation through taste. Gustatory perception is consciously oriented toward such an exploration in order to obtain pleasure intensified by knowledge and culture or modeled on it in a sort of intellectual enjoyment. However, expertise is not always necessary for dressed taste: its domain is not only about recognition and awareness of one’s identity but also just as much about the approximation to otherness and exoticism. A plate of
tortellini or
arancini can be appreciated because of the memories they stir, fried grasshoppers can be appreciated because they are exotic, Sauternes can be appreciated because of its nobility and its production method. Connection to the past, open-mindedness, and broadening cultural perspectives are all ways in which the subject, armed with projects, horizons of expectation, and particular interpretative schemes, approaches the object on a scale that ranges from primary, basic curiosity to the most sophisticated connoisseurship.
My experience as a teacher and wine taster, an activity I have practiced for several years at a professional level, has taught me a good deal about the development of learning and cultivating taste. Using my personal background, I will now start to sketch some lines that can be useful for understanding a number of basic processes regarding the access to food via dressed taste. My skills were clearly formed through practice (tasting many different wines, building an archive for the recognition of some recurring features, and making comparisons as a habit), study (reading books and journals, keeping up to date on new products, and so on), and trips to vineyards, wineries, and meetings with producers and winemakers at their places and at fairs and events. During this apprenticeship, I was “promoted” to taster and educator of the tastes of others. The quotation marks are there because there is no “school of taste,” there is no institution certifying that someone has “good taste” for wine or food, just as there is no school that guarantees a degree in good criticism or—to look at the issue from the side not of judging, but rather of making—no school one can graduate from as a good writer. This impossibility is most revealing; neither the fields of taste and criticism nor the fields of creating artworks or artifacts are subject to general and abstractly computable certifications. There are of course schools of tasting and sensory training, as well as those of literary criticism, journalism, and creative writing, but they provide the basic tools for understanding the backbone of the functioning of these activities. Success—becoming a
good critic, a
good taster, or a
good artist—is an entirely different story. That is up to individual talent, to a personal process and development of something that is recognized
as good. Such evaluation is made ex post by the same communities of affiliation—the critics, the tasters, the artists—and by the public, the general audience (Shapin 2012).
As a wine-tasting teacher, I have taught many courses for both beginners and advanced students who in vivo helped me to understand the difference between the expression of individual naked and immediate pleasure and qualitative evaluation. Educating taste aims first at teaching words, a grammar, and a syntax of quality that express a reasoned appreciation of what is ingested and assimilated (Smith 2007). This process develops through various stages. At the first step, the beginner acquires the tools for building a value-oriented reference system. But how does this acquisition occur? Instead of “acquisition”—a word that underlies the idea of gathering knowledge as it was “already given”—it would be more correct to speak of interaction, active correspondence, and negotiation (Ingold 2013). In fact, masters are the authorities that teach a system of values. They provide examples and, thanks to their persuasive and seductive ability (
seduce comes from the Latin
se ducere, “to lead a person toward oneself”), convince the novices of the “truth” of the system proposed. The language of taste here is under construction. Let me give a personal example: Many years ago, I wanted to verify a particular fact about this process. In an introductory wine-tasting class, I proposed to focus on quality in wine through concepts and perceptions expressed by words like
flavor and
acidity. Was it a neutral gesture? Clearly not, because from those features I stressed a certain idea of quality based on values like drinkability, elegance, lightness. I recommended a whole language of wine, which depended on that initial move and convinced others through
gestures,
postures, and
facial expressions that a quality wine had to have exactly those characteristics.
Before finishing my direct evidence, let me offer an important clarification. Around the middle of the twentieth century, the distinction between so called nonaesthetic properties and aesthetic properties (or qualities) was introduced into aesthetics to explain how qualitative values are established in works of art. In short, the nonaesthetic properties correspond to the characteristics that define an object or work of art in physicochemical and quantitative terms. These properties are easily discernible and measurable: color, shape, weight, volume, and composition. Aesthetic properties, on the other hand, are those attributions that involve a very problematic area, namely, that domain of qualitative perception called
aesthetic perception where properties such as harmony, finesse, elegance, appeal, and balance are taken into consideration (Sibley 2007). Now the problem is to discover whether there is some kind of a relationship between the aesthetic and the nonaesthetic properties. If so, what is it? Without entering into the merit of the many possible answers offered by scholars, I would only like to point out that the question applies perfectly to our case as well. In the tasting course, in fact, I wanted to convince the students that flavor and acidity—nonaesthetic properties, subject to measurement and quantitative analysis—were
closely linked to certain aesthetic properties such as drinkability, lightness, and elegance. Now that this has been made clear, and keeping it in mind, I can conclude my story. In another introductory course with a different group of novices, I proposed focusing on quality in wine through completely different concepts and perceptions, expressed by nonaesthetic properties such as alcohol content, fruitiness, and sweetness. I then connected these properties to the
same aesthetic properties of the previous course: drinkability, elegance, and appeal. In both courses, I obviously justified my value system, not only by way of seductive and rhetorical strategies, but also with reasonable arguments taken from wine production. With an audience of beginners, in two “experimental” courses, I obtained the same outcome—a good measure of pleasure and new wine enthusiasts—by constructing two diverse and in a certain way opposite paradigms of taste as value and qualitative appraisal.
My little experiment is not supposed to suggest a skeptical conception of taste. I do not intend to argue that taste is just a matter of private preferences in the line of “de gustibus non est disputandum.” This
motto refers to taste as naked and immediate pleasure, to instances where impulses encounter flavors, that terrain where the gustatory perception exhibits our
uniqueness, our unwavering signature. Taste cannot be
discussed here, it can only be reported. This is a good thing, as we argued in the first chapter; there are aesthetic encounters that need to be seen in this light. From a different angle, however, taste is the chosen topic of discussion, a true “social negotiating table.” We are also social and often sociable beings. For this reason, dressed taste is what is most debated and demands criteria, values, and judgment. It requires knowledge and culture, shared through socially coded patterns of behavior and a corresponding grammar. The example of the wine-tasting courses helps us understand how
aesthetic knowledge concerning aesthetic properties comes about through negotiation, a comparison of perspectives that does not have a
causal foundation, but instead contingent motivations and hence historical, anthropological, and social ones. Harmony and elegance, beauty and finesse, personality and character are
not caused by a wine’s physicochemical components; rather, they depend on them in a different way. They are perceived by virtue of specific training that produces an ability to perceive the second degree, diverse from standard perception, which is therefore defined as taste. Taste is the mark of aesthetic perception (Levinson 2005). Aesthetic perception, however, is not a definitive and fixed stage. It changes and develops in accordance with the historical significance of the values it captures, but also with respect to every single experience and environment in which it occurs. If the first gustatory aesthetic relationship we have analyzed in terms of naked pleasure corresponds to the vital impulse and delight, in the transition toward cognitive and cultural stages aesthetic appreciation becomes even more specialized and articulated.
The historicity of gustatory aesthetic perception affects both individuals—tastes change, and they change because experiences, perspectives, and more generally the values attributed to objects change—and society as a whole. The values associated with wine substantiate this well. My personal experiment showed two different systems at play, one typical of the 1990s, according to which wine had to be structured, dense, soft, and fruity, the other, which is currently popular, according to which wine has to be crispy, light, fresh, and mineral. Those novices and unwitting victims of my basic tests, who continued to broaden their knowledge and developed a greater tasting capacity, might have begun to harbor certain doubts about the paradigm imparted by me in retrospect. Maybe someone has transformed their initial curiosity into true expertise, and in this process their perceptual amelioration, their ability for discernment and judgment, has increased. With those former students, I can no longer draw up grids of value to my liking, but instead I would have to face them and negotiate as between peers.
If education and training play a crucial role in the constitution of adult gustatory perception and are the way toward dressed taste, it is furthermore impossible to ignore the basic conditionings that structure our perception, an involuntary legacy that cannot be done away with. Explicit projects and conscious purposes to establish one’s style and identity are one thing; the background of individual biographies, memories and social environment in which one has grown up and been raised are another (Auvrey and Spence 2007; Burnham and Skilleås 2012). In the example above, the project that the beginners chose by enrolling in the wine course was to learn a perceptual ability and the appropriate language skills to describe a sensory perception and its subsequent qualitative assessment. This is normally what people attending a wine-tasting class expect, but since I happened to be their teacher, I gave them something more to learn, aesthetic perception. In fact, I have been arguing that taste perception comprises two different levels, sensory perception and aesthetic perception. This assumption needs to be discussed since it is controversial.
According to a certain view—shared, for example, by some sensory chemists and analysts who are more in tune with the “hard” sciences and statistics than with philosophy and the humanities (Noble 2006)—the only possible and “objective” gustatory perception is standard perception. This perception, as we said above, refers only to nonaesthetic properties such as the levels of acidity and tannins as well as the presence of certain aromas rather than others. In this context, training taste would mean learning to perceive, recognize, and appreciate standard characteristics, similarly to what occurs when a child learns to recognize colors and shapes of objects and the letters of the alphabet. In this conception, beyond standard perception, taste “non est disputandum.” The defenders of such a position claim it is the only reasonable way to discuss and to share judgments about food and wine. On the contrary, they argue that adjectives such as
harmonious,
elegant, and
vibrant would express only individual preferences. Words such as
balance,
finesse,
power, or
grace would not denote anything real and would only correspond to pure personal idiosyncrasies, exempt from any reference to the tasted object. It is easy to refute this concept. First, it works with the subject/object paradigm that we already put into question, replacing it with the relational and ecological paradigm. According to the latter, taste perception is a complex skill, aimed at different purposes and projects. In this framework, recognizing quality is recognizing values rather than mere facts, as the former paradigm would affirm. In other words, we are freer. It is entirely legitimate, and for some purposes even useful, to enhance the sensory practice of flavor and aroma recognition by training taste and smell aesthetically, as these senses are generally underestimated and therefore not used to the fullest of their capacities. But—and this is the second point—this does not imply that standard gustatory perception (flavors “as such,” aromas “as such”) is neutral and not itself biased. It’s just another game, as has been argued also by historians and social scientists (Perullo 2012b; Shapin 2011). Third, sensory perception does not cover everything that taste allows one to do: it is perfectly possible to distinguish between two wines with a similar sensory profile but dissimilar final qualities, different values. Think of the different prices of two wines belonging to two adjacent but diverse vineyards that cannot be explained just by sensory features. If the price differential is warranted, it calls for other arguments, both perceptual—standard and aesthetic—perceptual and nonperceptual. These arguments compose the domain of aesthetic. Aesthetic sensibility is the capacity to ecologically correspond to the intertwining of facts and values; it does not pertain to the complexity of the reasons that temporarily and historically justify certain value orientations. Learning about quality and cultivating taste, therefore, means facing our inescapable relationship with food, making it an integral part of our experiences. It also means consciously exercising one’s perceptive ability in the direction of the complexity of embodied knowledge, leaving the environment around us to interact with our psychophysical system.
Experiencing food while traveling is one of the most deliberate, appreciated, and popular ways of approaching the culture of new and unusual places. Wine and food tourism is on the rise, in particular with regard to the aesthetics of traditions and their territories. The encounter with “other” food in contexts differing from the usual ones is also an extremely rich topos, from Montaigne to Stevenson, from Twain to Chatwin. The travel writer John Foster Fraser describes the discovery of a fish in Burma in his book
Round the World on a Wheel (1989), which narrates a bicycle trip that lasted over two years: “We investigated how the food was prepared. First of all the fish were caught and laid in the sun for three days to dry. The fish being then dead, though moving, were pounded in plenty of salt. Then they were put into a jar, and when the mouth was opened people five miles away knew all about it.
Nga-pee, I soon saw, was a delicacy that could only be appreciated by cultured palates. The taste is original; it is salt, rather like rancid butter flavoured with Limburger cheese, garlic, and paraffin oil. The odor is more interesting than the taste. It is more conspicuous” (265). This passage makes clear how taste can serve as an
active probe for the discovery of the world, in direct experience as well as in academic research: much of
cultural studies today is about food as a marker for multicultural complexity (Counihan and Van Esterik 1997).
In a well-known story originally published 1982 with the title
Sapore Sapere (Taste Knowledge) (which in 1986 was changed to
Under the Jaguar Sun), Italo Calvino described some itineraries of taste as knowledge and culture in great depth. In the Italian edition, the story opens with a long epigraph from Niccolò Tommaseo’s
Dizionario dei sinonimi,
1 which provides further clarification about the original meaning of taste. This is what the Italian linguist wrote in his famous work published in 1830: “
Tasting, in general, exercising the sense of taste, receiving its impression, even without a deliberate will or without thought. The sampling becomes more determined in order to taste and to know what one is tasting; or at least it denotes that from the first impression comes a reflected sentiment, an idea, the beginning of an experience. Therefore, to the Latins,
sapio in translation meant feeling correctly; and therefore the sense of the Italian
sapere [to know], which in itself stands for the right doctrine and for the prevailing of knowledge over science” (Calvino 1988, 23). Tommaseo distinguished between a direct impression, before any intention and reflection, and a reflective exploration, aimed at recognition and intellectual appreciation. Then he referred to the etymology of the Italian verb
sapere (to know), from the Latin
sapio (originally “to have taste” and, by extension, “to know”). Tasting, therefore, means correctly perceiving a substance’s immediate taste, but also its subsequent recognition following an investigation. According to Tommaseo, taste is a double ability, related to the same double nature and meaning of the
sense. This word in fact denotes both the immediate sensation (the instant “epidermal” sensation) and good sense (“to have good sense”), something that helps us choose and orient ourselves. A few decades before Tommaseo, the French gastronome Jean Anthelme Brillat-Savarin had already offered a similar and even more precise definition of taste. According to him, taste is a combination of three elements corresponding to three consecutive steps:
direct sensation (the immediate introduction of a food item into the mouth, with the activation of all receptors responsible for the recognition of chemical stimuli),
complete sensation (the first and the subsequent perception, obtained by the mastication and oxygenation of the food in the mouth, which allows capturing the aromatic and tactile nuances), and
reflective sensation (the final appreciation and the act of judgment after the ingestion of the food item—a process that can take a long time, if it is true that we are sometimes undecided in evaluating whether we really enjoyed something or not) (Brillat-Savarin 2009). Taste in Calvino’s story is a complex system that presupposes these articulations.
Under the Jaguar Sun tells the story of a couple, the writer and his partner Olivia, on vacation in Oaxaca, Mexico, the city of chocolate. Europe’s interest in this product, which was initially used as a drink and brought to Spain by the church (Schivelbusch 1992), began here in the sixteenth century. Chocolate, the ambivalent food par excellence, symbol of pleasure and sin, so much so that it appears everywhere in literature and cinema, is not the key player of this story, however. Instead, the story revolves around different foods, seeing taste as a complex device for exploration and as an internal travel compass through Mexico. Here, taste is mostly dressed and related to cultural forces, an adult version of the relationships one bears to oneself and to others. The anthropological trip through food in
Under the Jaguar Sun leads to reflections and new elaborations on identity and the redefinition of relational strategies. During their travels, the two main characters try many traditional dishes and come to recognize the signs of a highly developed culture: “Olivia remarked that such dishes involved hours and hours of work and, even before that, a long series of experiments and adjustments . . . imagining entire lives devoted to the search for new blends of ingredients, new variations in the measurements, to alert and patient mixing, the handing down of intricate, precise lore” (Calvino 1988, 6). This approach leads to food through an explicit interest in its social and anthropological meanings that precede or follow the act of ingestion and assimilation. The transmission of the art of preparation and the patient alchemy in the transformations, as well as the conflict between the Spanish and the American Indian civilizations and the regional differences in edible material and vocabulary, are all elements that come before or after the perceptual experience. The experience is constituted by an approach
toward taste, by anticipating it along horizons of expectation and information, the acquisition of historical and anthropological data, and their explicit intellectual elaboration afterward. The trip Olivia and her husband made is a cultural project that lives the experiences of taste as aesthetic experiences. It reflects an attitude toward food that differs highly from naked pleasure as it was discussed in the first chapter. Naked pleasure was, above all, an aesthetic relationship stemming from a “simple” sensory stimulation taken in its relative “narrowness” in an environment. Dressed taste, on the other hand, emphasizes the constructive and
poietic role of the aesthetic relation. This difference in attitudes does not denote any hierarchy but, pragmatically, different relevant contexts of experience and appropriate narrative processes.
In the following passage, Calvino defines such an aesthetic program with words that are often quoted: “The true journey, as the introjections of an “outside” different from our normal one, implies a complete change of nutrition, a digesting of the visited country—its fauna and flora and its culture (not only the different culinary practices and condiments but the different implements used to grind the flour or stir the pot)—making it pass between the lips and down the esophagus. This is the only kind of travel that has a meaning nowadays, when everything visible you can see on television without rising from your easy chair. (And you mustn’t rebut that the same result can be achieved by visiting the exotic restaurants of our big cities; they so counterfeit the reality of the cuisine they claim to follow that, as far as our deriving real knowledge is concerned, they are the equivalent not of an actual locality, but of a scene reconstructed and shot in a studio.)” (1988, 12). Calvino’s aesthetic perspective sees in the journey the most radical search for experiential authenticity, and therefore it redefines the hierarchy of the senses as in Nothomb’s novels. Instead of a bare perception, however, here we find a semiotics of culture: tasting, the “only kind of travel that has a meaning nowadays,” means assimilating “between the lips and down the esophagus,” ingesting and physically consuming the object, and this perceptual process can be neither substituted nor replaced, in contrast to what may well happen in visual perception. Taste is the embodied experience that permits the most appropriate knowledge of the other, the perceptual ability that allows a true contact with things, exactly because it does not only touch the matter, but merges with it. Taste establishes a carnal twine between perceiver and perceived. If in the Platonic-Hegelian tradition this mixture expresses the epistemic limit of the so-called minor sense, Calvino instead adopts an alternative paradigm. According to a minority in Western thought, taste guarantees an even higher level of truthfulness: “it informs us in a perfect way concerning the nature of things” because “the entire substance of the tasted object comes into contact with the tongue and penetrates it directly,” as an anonymous medieval commentator claimed (“Summa de saporibus” 1991, 231).
Calvino provides a radical meaning to the access to food through dressed taste. In the words of the anthropologist David Le Breton, taste here is the
taste of the world because it is
knowledge of the world (Le Breton 2006). It is a knowledge that fuses sharing and bonds, but also lacerations and conflicts. If, with naked pleasure and prereflective enjoyment, sharing, struggles, or guilt feelings occur with respect to infantile behavior or to regression in adulthood, in Calvino’s story the context is different. We are faced with a rational conflict between cultivated human beings in whom dressed taste acts as an amplifier or mirror of the discomforts that lie outside the planned management of existence. The perceptual difference between the narrator and his partner surfaces, for instance, in a pragmatics of taste: “Olivia more sensitive to perceptive nuances and endowed with a more analytical memory, where every recollection remained distinct and unmistakable; I tending more to define experiences verbally and conceptually, to mark the ideal line of journey within ourselves contemporaneously with our geographical journey” (Calvino 1988, 11). While Olivia cultivates a gustatory knowledge geared toward intense perceptual attention and tacit memory, the narrator for his part tries to translate the living experience into words and concepts. This difference harks back to the hierarchy between men and women with respect to the kitchen. The domain of taste, of smells, of the body, of practical gestures is a woman’s assigned social prerogative; the domain of theory, of conceptualized language, and of ideal design is a man’s. Far from being an obsolete prejudice, this still holds true today. Think of the distinction between so-called traditional and creative cuisine, commonly seen as a sharp distinction between the mechanical execution of coded recipes and creative inventive design, and now consider the predominant gender associated with each. There is a French word that expresses this axiology, that is,
chef. The chef, according to the definition by the French historian Revel, “is a man capable of inventing that which hasn’t already been eaten at home” (Baugé 2012). The chef is therefore a
chief, that is, primarily a head, a mind. The space of the chef is outside of the house, the space of the woman cook is at home.
Women should stay in the kitchen: this thought expresses the ideology of a precise social structure that involves all aspects of human life (Cooper 1998). The autonomous space of women is carved out within the domestic walls and, above all, expresses itself in cooking and in other tasks that are done in the absence of men, who go out to work, produce, create, and fill public roles. The mouth symbolizes this hierarchical prejudice well, at the same time denoting its ambivalence. It is the opening through which food enters and words exit, a
medium of the physical and the mental together, and it differently serves sensitive, perceptual, and intellectual needs.
Through taste, Olivia emphasizes haptic and tacit perception; the narrator, on the other hand, emphasizes verbal and conceptual perception, exploring the object and then putting it back at a distance. Olivia lives taste as a harmoniously twofold instrument, “pleasure that knows, knowledge that enjoys,” as defined by the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben (2015). Knowledge and culture do not weaken but rather enhance pleasure. Instead, for the narrator taste is a problem. He recognizes its potential, but he lives it within a dramatically dualistic frame—tacit, haptic pleasure on the one hand, explicit, theoretical knowledge on the other—whose only solution is a complete translation of taste into conceptual language. Calvino’s story therefore provides a good example for dressed taste to be expressed in different manners.
Let’s return to the gender issue. The conflict between male and female is repeatedly evoked in Calvino’s story, but more generally it can easy be established that, in the Western tradition, the neglect of gustatory perception has always accompanied emotional, erotic, and sexual problems. From the condemnation of physical pleasure and its excess by the more radical versions of the Christian tradition—where gluttony and sex are united by the same interdict—to the opposite glorification of gluttony as a mark of Eros/Thanatos recounted by so much literature and so many films (think of La grande bouffe), taste always has a gender connotation, both in physical and in psychic characterizations. Taste as a psychic glue is an interesting variation on the theme for understanding some of the prevailing attitudes in the experience of food: cooking can be a vehicle to seduce, to call back those who are gone, to be forgiven, but it can be also a survival strategy. Olivia and the narrator leave for their trip to Mexico during a marriage crisis, and food is the medium chosen for their attempt to reestablish a true sensual relationship. It is not difficult to bring fiction back to real life. At times, the development of the dominance of gustatory experiences in couples is the supplement to, or substitute for, the sensual decline in long-term relationships. This finding is not irrelevant to our theme. We have to know how to frame taste experience in this context with the possibility of an alternative or supplementary performance. This allows us to understand these gustatory attitudes and not condemn them.
In the first chapter, I discussed the fundamental relationship between pleasure and images. The image is the sensory form of every living action, and therefore also of taste perception. A specific triangulation emerged from that mode of access: perceiver and perceived were connected through a medium that intensified, clarified, or let pleasure express itself as “naked.” Taste as dressed and codified knowledge has an equally stringent relationship with images, although expressed differently. Just think of the education of taste, of recipe books, or of the endless articulations of the expression “taste is culture” in the mass media (websites, blogs, and television). Gustatory perception is the direct experience of food, therefore a strategy that boosts the aesthetic relationship by drawing on one’s embodied capacity and expanding it, but, as with pleasure, the triangulation with images and representations is unavoidable.
In Calvino’s story, the relationship between taste perception and visual representation is explicitly advocated. Even though it only points in one direction, thirty years after its first publication, it still contains many useful insights and deserves to be discussed. The savory, aromatic, and haptic experience is seen as a viable and concrete alternative to the static nature of the visual image as it is commonly misunderstood and lived in ordinary experience. Calvino compared the “real” journey to the visited country, as physical ingestion through taste, to the technological and reproducible image-simulacrum of television. However, the issue is not as simple as it seems, and it is the author himself who reminds us of this in another passage of Under the Jaguar Sun: “I concentrated on devouring, with every meatball, the whole fragrance of Olivia—through voluptuous mastication, a vampire extraction of vital juices. But I realized that in a relationship that should have been among three terms—me, meatball, Olivia—a fourth term had intruded, assuming a dominant role: the name of the meatballs. It was the name ‘gorditas pellizcadas con manteca’ that I was especially savoring and assimilating and possessing” (27). This passage clarifies that the image is not reducible to its bloodless stasis. The bond between taste and language refers here to the acoustic image of the name “gorditas pellizcadas con manteca,” but its power holds also with respect to visual perception.
In television and cinema, and especially with the explosion of the web over the last decade, we have become witnesses, on the one hand, to a proliferation of food- and taste-related content, conveyed by the visual image, and, on the other, to its progressive virtualization. Food has become a commanding and almost overpowering presence in communication as an expression of the most diverse meanings. And this fact is accompanied by its symmetrical counterpart, the growing interest in visual cuisine and cooks corresponds to the decrease in active cooking. It is as though what Heidegger said about the destiny of modern metaphysics were true for gastronomy too. To paraphrase “The Age of the World Picture” (Heidegger 2002), I would say that today we live in the age of the
Food Picture, of food reduced to image and simulacrum. Thus, every day we experience the risk—as was already exposed by Roland Barthes (Barthes 1997)—that the gustatory haptic experience in vivo could move to the visual field and be replaced by it. We live in a paradox; while pictures, news, and even food objects proliferate, we are losing our grip on real things, we are losing experiential and life awareness. With respect to taste, this process derived also from what Walter Benjamin named—referring to works of art—reproducibility. According to Benjamin, art has lost its “aura,” its uniqueness, its
hic et nunc (Benjamin 2008) as a result of advanced reproduction technologies. Benjamin’s thought developed from a reflection on the “new arts” of that time, photography and film. Similarly, one may argue that the experience of taste has lost the uniqueness of its unrepeatable experience as a result of being reproduced in increasingly sophisticated ways in photos, videos, and movies. However, it is undeniable that there is a fundamental difference between gustatory and (mere) visual perception of taste, due to the material incorporation and assimilation of food. How do things really stand here? The relationship between the experience of eating and its narration through images cannot consist in either a reduction or an adaption of the former to the latter. Instead, we should speak of a translation, even more precisely of an active correspondence between two ontologically different yet intertwined levels. Nothing is more different than eating as compared to watching others eat or contemplate dishes, but since taste is a multisensory perception, sight is a very important influence. That said, it is also undeniable that in everyday life the risk of a virtualization of taste exists and produces different bad practices, such as criticizing and condemning cuisine and chefs using “hearsay” and things “seen,” especially online, as well as the power of marketing trends, which produces a trivialized uniformity in judgment and appreciation.
A positive dialogue between taste experience and visual experience does not ignore the necessity of a pictorial dimension of gustatory perception, from naked pleasure to dressed taste. Along these lines, gustatory imagery was compared to theater, as a scene comprising many heterogeneous elements such as muscle movements, gestures, facial expressions, and words. It is very telling that some authors have compared this need with a prosthesis that weakens the importance of taste with respect to sight and hearing, those autonomously symbolic and expressive senses (Leroi-Gourhan 1964–65). But now, on the contrary, also from recent cognitive and psychological research, we can see this as an asset: taste always confronts us with a complex multisensory field, so much so that other scholars have even tried to establish correspondences between the gustatory and the visual qualities of a dish.
The representational need of taste can be understood both as a mental induction to taste and as its condition of access. For instance, a name or a word may produce—or bypass—the taste of food (the name of the meatballs in Calvino’s story) because words have to do with the mouth. Words and writing condense taste and image into the imaginary, of course without reducing the real meatball to its sound or its description. Taste perception always signals a surplus of the signifier (food “in itself,” while we assimilate it in the concrete relationship) with respect to the signified (its expression and its expressibility). But words and, even more, visual representations have great power. They induce and arouse revulsion and prevent access to certain experiences, as demonstrated by many experiments regarding the conditioning of perception (Taylor 2004; Gueguen 2010). Each verbal or figurative sign refers to a specific horizon of gustatory expectation that activates channels of attention. Chefs are clearly well aware of this, and they sometimes devote much time to the multisensory construction of their dishes, with particular attention not only to appearance, but also to names.
Real gustatory experiences possess a regenerative potential for human existence, having to do with a cultivation of the awareness of one’s body and sensitivity. Taste as embodied knowledge can be an effective critical instance for a renewal of deeper experiential modalities. Exploration via dressed taste and the development of specific codes of expression is a thrilling way to access aesthetic experience according to Calvino’s
Under the Jaguar Sun. But, simultaneously, taste can be an ally of the superficial leveling of a vilified feeling devoid of meaning, as the increasing power of media shows us every day. During the same period of Calvino’s story, the philosopher Michel Serres issued a warning in his essay “The Five Senses”: “The victory of reason: the only taste an apricot has is the taste of the word ‘apricot’ passing over the lips” (Serres 2008, 233). Taking the approach of taste as knowledge and culture should promote critical and wise attitudes, but that, unfortunately, is not always the case.
Through naked pleasure, the experience of taste molded a perception characterized by ungovernability and passive abandonment. Dressed taste sketches a different way to experience taste, apparently more reasonable and balanced. Culture accompanies and empowers pleasure, returning it to shareability and public language. However, these two approaches are not alternatives. They represent different experiences, different accentuation preferences, which in many cases are even intertwined. In the first mode of access to food, we have shown how, in certain circumstances, naked pleasure touches upon the adult territories of knowledge. Similarly, we must emphasize that, in certain contexts, dressed taste looms close to the borders of impulses not controllable by nature. With a culture’s own perceptual devices, some experiences that are directed toward food find themselves hostage to the unexpected powers stemming from areas of our being that are not subject to rational will. In other words, the perception of taste does not have a linear and irreversible evolution; it is distinguished, instead, by reversibility and circularity, which can take different characterizations. For example, the philosopher Jacques Derrida, in certain analyses based on the
Critique of the Power of Judgment by Kant, identified
vomit as the limit of digestion, the extreme expression of external matter that cannot be assimilated by our psychophysical system (and that is not necessarily disgusting: we often vomit what we ate with great pleasure) (Derrida, 1981).
In
Under the Jaguar Sun, the blind spot and the limit of resistance to the domain of gustatory reason are presented under the disturbing guise of anthropophagy and cannibalism, which Olivia introduces during a discussion of sacrificial cuisine with their local guide. The taste for human flesh explicitly emerges at the end of the story; it goes beyond the field of cultural anthropology and establishes itself as the telos of the gustatory experience, taking on a metaphorical and universal meaning: “Under the thatched arbor of a restaurant on a riverbank, where Olivia had waited for me, our teeth began to move slowly, with equal rhythm, and our eyes stared into each other’s with the intensity of serpents’—serpents concentrated in the ecstasy of swallowing each other in turn, as we were aware, in our turn, of being swallowed by the serpent that digests us all, assimilated ceaselessly in the process of ingestion and digestion, in the universal cannibalism that leaves its imprint on every amorous relationship and erases the lines between our bodies and
sopa de frijoles,
huacinango a la veracruzana, and
enchiladas” (Calvino 1988, 29). As some scholars point out, following a Hegelian perspective, “universal cannibalism” corresponds to a similar structure of understanding. Understanding (the other) is assimilating, ingesting, and metabolizing (the Latin
comprehendo refers to the act of grasping, of taking something with your hands and holding it). Here, the vital metabolic process turns into a metaphor of the human as such, to the extent that living means being in society, and every social relationship is a process of recognition of the other, but also at the same time of his or her assimilation. Again, what is here at play is not unrelated to the question of gender. Take the sexual act, for example: the man, unlike the woman, makes love by possessing and being taken in (Derrida 1992). Literature also features many examples of disgust and repulsion—a notion and experience in which philosophers are perhaps much more interested than in taste. To take a famous example, in chapter 64 of Melville’s
Moby Dick, the second mate Stubb shares his dinner of whale-steak freshly cut from the animal just caught with a plethora of sharks that finish off the carcass in the water. The description of the scene conveys a sense of horror and disgust, but it is also a reflection on the life cycle and on the relationship between eating and being eaten (Korsmeyer 1999).
In Calvino’s poetics, the gustatory experience often plays an exemplary and metaphorical role. From
Mr. Palomar to
Cosmicomics, food and flavors appear regarding questions of Eros, of the role of the human being in the universe, and of social and historical relationships. In one of his most famous novels,
The Baron in the Trees, the story of Cosimo, who decided to live in trees, follows from an act of rejection of some food due to its taste. Cosimo’s protest becomes totally political. The narrator, Cosimo’s brother, describes the family atmosphere by way of the family meals. The tension between the father and children, in particular Battista, Cosimo’s sister, emerges here: “So it can be seen why our family board brought out all the antagonisms, the incompatibilities, between us, and all our follies and hypocrisies too; and why it was there that Cosimo’s rebellion came to a head” (Calvino 1977, 6). Cosimo rebels against his sister because he is disgusted by the strange dishes she prepares—
crostini of rat liver pate, grasshopper legs, roasted pig tails, “horrible dishes”—and, in particular, by snails. The conflict turns into a war of taste involving identity-related paths and experiences, a whole framework of relations that cannot be reduced to the pure, naked pleasure of the palate but rather refers back to the family meal, to the meal as a communal and conflicting moment. The anthropology of food has given much thought to the relationship between “good to eat” and “good to think”: Lévi-Strauss’s famous thesis argued that what communities like to eat is what is (considered as) good to think in a moral sense. In Lévi-Strauss’s paradigm, food aesthetics follows from food ethics. This was overturned by Marvin Harris in a more materialistic sense. What communities find ethically good in food habits is what they
must eat for geographic, economic, and historical reasons. According to the general movement of this essay, again it is not necessary to choose between one of the two options. Gustatory taste grows in the intertwining of ethics and aesthetics, and it operates each time on different levels according to the environmental experience. The gustatory multisensory perceptual system contains ethical and economic instances, as well as physiological and aesthetic ones. As we have shown, taste is an
ecological perception: it consists of an amalgam of heterogeneous forces—from chemical stimuli to highest cognitive levels—that at times also express conflicting values. This is why taste experiences are many and varied, and for this reason, we sometimes taste with a passive, abandoned attitude, sometimes by way of firmly established cultural codes and patterns, and most of the time playing on both accesses according to different scales and intensities. In the ecological and pragmatic perspective of the aesthetic relationship, one must understand that the perceptual approaches to taste are different and respond to different criteria of distinction, different desires, different projects and goals.
Under the Jaguar Sun crosses the territory of taste on hot and spicy flavors. That is to say, adult flavors, the bitterness of cocoa and coffee, the spiciness of chili. The intellectual appreciation of taste usually comes into play when the food involved is difficult (think of “high cuisine” dishes), strange, or exotic. Exoticism concerns our discussion, because it is the approach to the other that is in question, the interplay with different styles and cultures, as well as with different stages in one’s life: wine, tea, coffee, and high cuisine express the adult appreciation for mediated taste. These foods are social markers; they mark the entry into certain groups. Think of the first glass of red wine, with its acidity and tannins, and how the process of appreciation develops here. The fact that training and education are involved in this category of foods seems intuitive. Why should we have to learn the taste of childhood on which we built our first relationships with others? This would seem useless and bizarre, but this is not always so. On the one hand, owing to different circumstances, some people are estranged from their own childhood tastes, and it is also due to this fact that in postindustrial Western societies a new educational question regarding taste is thriving, which is not geared toward the exotic, but rather toward the local and the familiar and goes by the name of “tradition.” From time to time, celebrity chefs create “childish” dishes, which explicitly evoke gustatory dimensions “surpassed” in individual growth. On the other hand, globalization has changed the dynamic between the exotic and the local. It can happen that the foreign becomes more familiar than the formerly familiar ones, and that the boundaries of the known and the unknown are modified. These remarks show that relying on the notion of “culture” in general is not enough, when taste experiences are at play. A specific perspective and an appropriate narrative are needed to understand time and again what kind of relationship is involved between the perceiver, the food perceived, and the environment. Taste is a multimodal device, embedded, relational, flexible, and
potentially skilled at sorting out very different and even opposite situations.
Walter Benjamin believed architecture to be an emblematic case of an art that has a collective and routine use. The appropriate experience of architecture—precisely because it responds to practical uses and because its original function is not visual contemplation but rather dwelling interaction—amounts to a perception that he defined as “distracted.” The question posed by Benjamin was part of a major aesthetic debate regarding the nature of a work of art. In the wake of Benjamin, we can address in our context the following similar question. Do food experts and critics, with their analytical dissections of gustatory processes, incarnate the most appropriate way to live taste perception? From an evolutionary point of view, the first and primary function of food has been to feed and to feed well. In parallel, the first and primary function of taste has been to escape harmful and toxic foods, and then to make us feel good and give us pleasure. An aesthetics of taste should start then from this fact: all edible matter, even the most refined, is picked, bred, or made to be eaten. And all food, even that of the most refined gastronomic quality, retains its nutritional and energy-providing function. Why then should we assume that the cultivation of gustatory perception aimed at appreciating taste stems from the removal of this very basic but essential fact in favor of a mere analysis of flavor? I believe this approach depends on the preponderance of the visual and contemplative paradigm of aesthetics, according to which the true appreciation of food and drink must pass through an analytical exploration made by our sensory/perceptual apparatus. The haptic process of tasting is then considered as if it were observed by an eye. However, this approach surreptitiously presupposes what it sets out to prove, namely, that to appreciate food requires analyzing it in discrete terms, dissecting the object of appreciation into separate moments like the color, the odor, the taste. I do not reject the legitimacy of food being appreciated
also in reflective and analytical ways, as I suggest that taste perception is molded in many different environmental experiences that take many different forms. I am merely asserting that this is not the
only possible approach or the only way to appreciate it. We can appreciate food
aesthetically also taking a different way, just considering its physical and psychological effects and its transformation into energy for life. This implies accepting a different conception of aesthetics, based on material contact, assimilation, and metabolism. To wholly understand the aesthetics of taste, it is necessary to go beyond the privilege of vision and the formal perspective that supports it. We should value instead the vital and metabolic aspects, as well as transformation and change, because taste always leaves a trace, even if you cannot see it.
Adult, thoughtful, and cultural gustative appreciation passes through different stages. Historical and anthropological curiosity is usually the first stage. Bertrand Russell was not particularly interested in food, but he was a curious and certainly very intelligent person. He once made a very interesting observation: “I have enjoyed peaches and apricots more since I have known that they were first cultivated in China in the early days of Han Dynasty; that Chinese hostages held by the great King Kaniska introduced them to India, whence they spread to Persia, reaching the Roman Empire in the first century of our era; that the word “apricot” is derived from the same Latin source as the word “precocious,” because the apricot ripens early; and that the A at the beginning was added by mistake, owing to a false etymology. All this makes the fruit taste much sweeter” (2004, 25). The passage clearly shows that taste can be directly stimulated by cultural factors such as historical knowledge and extrasensory elements, which may affect the moment of perception itself. The degree of conditioning varies with the tasting subject. It is no coincidence that a “simple” curious person can point out the link between information received and perceived gustative pleasure (“much sweeter”). Just prior to the quoted passage, Russell writes that “curious learning not only makes unpleasant things less unpleasant, but also makes pleasant things more pleasant.” Extrasensory information that does not refer to the intrinsic characteristics of the foodstuff and that is intended rather to arouse interest and attraction, creating a sort of “aura” of uniqueness around the object, is what many marketing strategies and also many contextualized everyday experiences offer.
If one evening, in a fit of generosity, I were to offer a special bottle of wine to some friends who are everything but “foodies,” I would not offer it “blindly” without saying a word (unless I wanted to perform another experiment about the universal and absolute perception of good). But neither would I describe its particular aesthetic and nonaesthetic gustative properties, for they would not understand them, lacking the vocabulary provided by expertise. I could tell them something about the wine’s historical and cultural importance, its myth, and also its market price. In this way, I would capture their attention and create a horizon of expectation and perceptive curiosity that could lead to their drinking with appreciative awareness and not in a mechanical and ignorant fashion. This would not be enough to create awareness, but it would be a suggestion, a signal for a path to be walked. Were I to offer the same wine to connoisseurs, I would not say those things because they could be taken for granted. More importantly, because of the nascent established relationship between the guests, the wine, and myself, it will develop further from gustatory perception as such, and then possibly turn to extrasensory data ex post. Here, too, I am not describing a straightforward and imposed process. Not all curious people become experts and not all experts become experts by following the same training and process. There are wine experts who have acquired their experience exclusively via sensory training, without any historical, anthropological, or geographical knowledge. Do they enjoy less? It depends on the occasions. In order to enjoy and appreciate food, knowledge as the voluntary
accumulation of information and culture is not
always necessary, but relational aesthetic sensitivity is. Of course, culture
can help in developing a more accurate and critical perception, but again this is not always the case since cultural organization can also be subject to the same standardizations as production processes. In this light, criticism is important, but at the same time, we should not forget that the main purpose of food—to nourish well and to arouse pleasure—suggests taking the issue of criticism lightly.
The highest social mark of distinction for the cultivation of taste is expertise. The food expert is someone skilled in some particular product, like wine or beer, or in the gastronomic experience in general such as fine dining. Wine experts are traditionally more common in Western society, but there are also experts in spirits, cheese, cured meat, and chocolate. In Eastern society, tea ceremony expertise is very well known. Being an expert regarding products is different from being an expert on taste in general terms. The latter case presupposes a developed sensitivity, not solely geared to the object but to many different features: styles, traditions, contextual goals. In other words, being a gastronome does not mean being an expert on every single ingredient tasted; it means being experienced in how the final combination, the dishes, their sequence, the whole menu, and the overall experience, comes to be. A restaurant serving traditional Tuscan fare, for example, will have certain standards of reference, with respect to the ingredients, the recipes, their elaboration, and maybe even the atmosphere. The expert should be able to interpret and evaluate these factors along with many others, offering consistent and reasonable grounds for her assessments. The learning process of a gastronome is an interesting experience because, unlike what one might think, it does not involve only the sensory training during food intake.
Undoubtedly, it is necessary to train one’s senses in order to perceive what nonexperts do not perceive. As David Hume already asserted in the middle of the eighteenth century in his well-known essay “Of the Standard of Taste”: “A good palate is not tried by strong flavors, but by a mixture of small ingredients, where we are still sensible of each part, notwithstanding its minuteness and its confusion with the rest” (Hume 1909–14, §17). However, the attention needed for good gustative perception is only part of the path that leads to expertise. One must focus on the surroundings of taste, what precedes it, what constitutes it, and what follows. John Dewey stated this well: “Even the pleasures of the palate are different in quality to an epicure than in one who merely ‘likes’ his food as he eats it. The different is not of mere intensity. The epicure is conscious of much more than the taste of the food. Rather there enter into the taste, as directly experienced, qualities that depend upon reference to its source and its manner of production in connection with criteria of excellence. As production must absorb into itself qualities of the product as perceived and be regulated by them, so, on the other side, seeing, hearing, tasting, become esthetic when relation to a distinct manner of activity qualifies what is perceived” (1980, 50–51). In this mode of experience, taste should function as an antenna designed to capture meanings and values of different orders: aesthetic, ethical, economic, political, and social. The taste expert, both the enthusiast/connoisseur and the professional critic, should therefore be an example of equilibrium, openness, vision, and sensitivity, as suggested again by Hume: “Strong sense, united to delicate sentiment, improved by practice, perfected by comparison, and cleared of all prejudice, can alone entitle critics to this valuable character; and the joint verdict of such, wherever they are to be found, is the true standard of taste and beauty” (1909–14, §23).
Often, however, reality shows us a very different approach to expertise. An extreme characterization of the risk of compulsiveness that leads to a dramatic disease is depicted in Paul Torday’s novel
The Irresistible Inheritance of Wilberforce, in which the main character, Wilberforce, develops a slowly increasing curiosity about wine driven by conscious existential unhappiness, a successful but unrewarding career, and almost no affective relationships. The passion for wine grants him access to a new, emotionally active, and fascinating social life. Wilberforce now begins to invest the time he had so far spent anonymously on his career affectively and emotionally, but along the way he falls prey to his love. Wine becomes an all-encompassing investment and, through the lens of a more refined expertise, a compulsive obsession. He becomes fanatical about great Bordeaux wines and consumes more and more until he turns into an alcoholic. The story of Wilberforce is the story of a man who discovers unprecedented experiences that shed unexpected meaning on new passions by living the taste experience as knowledge and as pleasure to its fullest. However, he loses the balance necessary for their “positive” incorporation and dies. In a very significant point of the novel, the weak boundaries of pleasure, knowledge, and pathology within one and the same experience become clear. Wilberforce has tried tackling his addiction in a center for alcohol abuse. Upon returning home, he reflects, “Meanwhile, it had been a very long time since I had drunk a glass of wine. With, I admit, trembling hands, I found the last bottle of Chateau Carbonnieux and opened it. An alcoholic,
which I am not and never have been, would not have sat and let it breathe for half an hour, and let it come up towards room temperature. He would not have poured it lovingly into the large bowl of a tasting glass, to ensure the bouquet could develop properly. Nor would he have checked the glass first for any mustiness. . . . An alcoholic would not have rolled the purple liquid gently around in the glass, to capture the aroma of the wine, and then taken a single sip, allowing the complex chemicals of the wine to release themselves upon his tongue. He would not have made the effort to
characterize the tastes from the wine in the approved wine taster’s vocabulary: sweet black cherries, toasty oak in the background” (Torday 2008, 71–72, my emphasis). Wilberforce excuses his addiction, denying both its seriousness and its real name, “alcoholism,” by referring to the cultural dominance of the field and his absolute expertise. An analogous defensive strategy is found frequently in real life among gastronomes, both enthusiasts and experts, though in less serious cases than those of poor Wilberforce. It is as though the “drawbacks of the trade” were enough to ennoble a practice, to redeem it from the “lowliness” of instincts and toxins.
There are other, less explicit, and more subtle types of addiction and compulsive behavior. Some experts and critics are victims of a true obsessive-compulsive disorder regarding the food they should be appreciating and evaluating in a levelheaded fashion. If classic iconography portrays the fat gastronome in the act of smelling or tasting, his nose deep in a glass of wine or close to a piece of meat or cheese, today we can witness new forms of foodism modeled on different tools—computers, digital cameras, smartphones—that sometimes complement and enhance the body’s perceptual apparatus according to a consistent evolutionary process, and at other times tend to replace it instead. Recording data and archiving images in some cases appear to stand for the living perceptual experience, as if what really mattered were documenting the fact that “I’ve had that experience” rather than enjoying and critically reflecting on the experience itself. Just as naked pleasure risks becoming autistic and infantile if it does not develop and evolve, surviving in the appropriate contextual circumstances, dressed taste can degenerate into a narcissistic discourse in spite of any true relational perception. An expert may lose the value of the intellectual pleasure of tasting (this is the sense of appreciation through knowledge) because he focuses on the
analytical observation of food and its components. Wittgenstein once expressed this aesthetic misunderstanding, arguing that anybody who read the description of a monument or sculpture instead of
looking at it would lack the perceptual experience of why that object was created. The object is read regardless of its interaction with the perceiver; the perceiver acts as a neutral medium of presumed pure knowledge. This may lead to a recognition of taste, as it were, made of already known elements, as it was handed over to codes that are already known and assimilated, eliminating any possible new cognition and any surprise effect. In this situation, one perceives in a dulled fashion, hurriedly and distractedly, and maybe even accepts the fashion of the moment. If, in the experience of naked pleasure, the risk was canceling any real otherness as well as the very self that constitutes itself through it by way of an enjoyment that unilaterally abandoned itself to the object, the risk of dressed taste is instead an “epistemological abuse,” a cognitive obsession where the otherness of the matter paradoxically almost disappears.
In some cases, the degeneration described above becomes an exercise in power, both in professional criticism and in everyday taste experiences, when the gastronome flaunts his haughty ways in his small playground. A few years ago, this figure was masterfully described by the authors of
Ratatouille, the well-known Disney movie starring the rat chef Remy. One of the main characters of the story is the much-feared food critic Anton Ego. In a famous scene, he critically reflects on his work: “In many ways, the work of a critic is easy. We risk very little, yet enjoy a position over those who offer up their work and their selves to our judgment. We thrive on negative criticism, which is fun to write and to read. But the bitter truth we critics must face is that, in the grand scheme of things, the average piece of junk is more meaningful than our criticism designating it so. But there are times when a critic truly risks something, and that is in the discovery and defense of the new.” This remark provides many suggestions. Anton Ego is consumed by his ego: narcissism and loneliness lead to compulsive, excessive, and pedantic behavior. This compulsion is expressed in different ways. It may concern the boundless need for information on the genealogy of food,
orthorexia (the excessive preoccupation with avoiding food perceived to be unhealthy), or the paroxysm of analytical recognition of the elements that make up a dish or a wine—ingredients, cooking methods, spices, flavors, or textures. Again, I am not denying the importance of higher sensory skills, developed through specific and long training. On some occasions, it is important to grasp all the elements to complete an assessment and enrich appreciation. But qualitative assessment normally passes through a total
synthetic appreciation, and only afterward can it be broken down into discrete data, for an ex post understanding of the appreciated item and experience. A comparison with music may be helpful here: the appreciation of a piece of music lies in listening, not in reading the score. Of course, this can be most useful for certain purposes, but it should not trump the open act of listening. In this light, at the end of the film, Anton Ego repents and embraces a more open and “amateur” perspective on taste perception, one that can also be supported by convincing philosophical, psychological, and sociological arguments. The same position can also be found in another literary food critic, Monsieur Arthens, one of the main characters of Muriel Barbery’s
Gourmet Rhapsody whom we have already met in the first chapter. At the end of his life, Arthens, by now bedridden, asks his grandson to grant him one culinary wish: some cream puffs. Not the best ones in town, but the supermarket cream puffs he loved to eat on his way to school. The great and refined critic’s last perception is reconciled with the pure and vulgar pleasure of the beginning: “In the almost mystical union between my tongue and these supermarket chouquettes, with their industrial batter and their treacly sugar, I attained God. Since then, I have lost him, sacrificed him to the glorious desires which were not mine” (Barbery 2000, 155). The attitudes of Ego at the end of
Ratatouille and of Arthens on his deathbed well express that flexible and multimodular perception that taste permits when properly heard and cultivated.
The basic function of food does not conflict with the cultivation of taste, if by “cultivating taste” we do not only reductively mean a social mark of distinction and hierarchy, but instead a tool of social understanding, self-care, and listening to others. Beyond gastronomy, one of the general and classic problems of criticism concerns the connection between expert judgment and public acceptance of it, the connection between the critic’s seemingly designated task—promoting and communicating “good” taste on the basis of “standard” and valuable parameters—and what the public actually likes, something that tastes “good.” A few years ago, an American advertising campaign for a brand of canned tuna summarized this conflict very effectively: “Star-Kist doesn’t want tunas with good taste. They want tunas that taste good” (Iggers 2007, 95). This highlights the reversal of the hierarchy of values in mass society; what really matters is what most people like, not what a few claim to be better. The gap between expertise and ignorance has been increasingly hidden and maybe even erased today, when every cultural, aesthetic, and artistic expression, from the most highbrow and exclusive events to the most ordinary and vulgar ones, can attain “pop” fruition thanks to the enhancing powers of technological devices. Gastronomy is one of the most evident examples of such phenomenon in contemporary society, so much so that many people wonder if the figure of the iconic food critic personified by Anton Ego and Monsieur Arthens still plays a decisive role. In fact, pop food culture is highly involved in the discussion about digital democracy. On the web, many attempts at “grassroots” criticism canceling any representation or authority of good taste are made with sites and servers collecting feedback on products and services and then compiling charts and statistics. However, this trend reveals another facet of the prejudice according to which quality is quantity and numbers that correspond to the sum of all individual preferences. Disregarding the mediation of authority, dressed taste loses the characteristics of a socially constituted and negotiated value among those who became experts through training and learning, and instead becomes a battleground for blind, anonymous, and purely numerical forces. According to our proposal of taste as a flexible experience, the two instances—effectively educated, sanctioned expertise and criticism on one side, and the vulgarization of taste judgments and values on the other—are not mutually exclusive; rather, they need to interact and intertwine. One would have to be blind not to observe that food critics today cannot take Anton Ego as their example. At the same time, it would also be very superficial to take the lawless processes of the democratization and popularization of taste as the arrival points of a democratic and self-generating transparency. The processes leading to the assignment of values are never neutral and objective in the naive sense of the term, since the notion of emotional and aesthetic “value” is an inherently social notion (Shapin 2012).
A remarkable approach to taste as culture is the ethical appreciation of taste. So far we have seen ethics “percolate” from the uniqueness of the gustatory experience. This approach reverses the perspective where evaluation and judgment grow and develop
before perceptual encounter. There are many clear examples such as religious dietary laws, whose regimens govern abstinence or moderation according to their purity or to the calendar. However, there are also many, at least apparently, nonreligious ethics that subscribe to the idea that aesthetics is anchored in ethics. Duty lays the foundations for pleasure, such as in vegetarians and vegan models, fair trade, associations that promote food culture, and, more generally, critical gastronomy based on the idea of environmental sustainability (Petrini 2007; Pollan 2006, 2008). A political conviction and an epistemic conviction are the foundation for the ethical appreciation of taste. The latter evaluates aesthetic pleasure and appreciation as secondary or, in its more radical versions, subordinate to the sense of duty as “acting rightly” on the basis of a subscription to the idea—whether informed or not, it hardly matters—that ethics is the first philosophy. This approach sees food as a powerful tool for political change, so good taste must correspond to
fair (Lemke 2008)
One of the best examples of the ethical appreciation of taste is proposed by the American essayist Wendell Berry. In an essay titled “The Pleasures of Eating,” he writes, “The pleasure of eating should be an extensive pleasure, not that of the mere gourmet. . . . I mentioned earlier the politics, esthetics, and ethics of food. But to speak of the pleasure of eating is to go beyond those categories. Eating with the fullest pleasure—pleasure, that is, that does not depend on ignorance—is perhaps the profoundest enactment of our connection with the world” (Berry 1990, 151–52). This is an explicit manifesto: pleasure refers to a broader sentiment, governed by knowledge and ethical reasoning. Gustatory appreciation for food requires a primary sensitivity that can be found in the deeper understanding of our “connection with the world” and that allows the “pleasure of eating” to become “an extensive pleasure” that is not reducible to palatal appreciation while ingesting food. According to this model, education and taste training are primarily oriented not toward gustatory perception but toward an overall educational project that one might define as “sustainable sensoriality” or the desire to direct perceptive values toward an ethical appropriateness. In other words, to have good taste, one must have good rational beliefs. One must understand that taste is formed through conditioning and interests, as a result of which we risk being manipulated and food is likely to be considered a mere commodity. It is a matter not only of contextualizing perceptual experience, but of overloading taste with elements that seem distant and unrelated to gastronomy “in the strict sense.” Gastronomy thus changes its traditional characteristics; it both shrinks (less importance is given to taste perception and expertise itself) and grows as an atmospheric mark almost without limits, becoming the expression of a general modus vivendi. This approach is not entirely new; in fact, it goes as far back as the vegetarian regimens of Greek philosophers such as Pythagoras and Plutarch, to the choice of organic or biodynamic production methods, and to certain trends in contemporary culinary research that are increasingly carving out the link between creation and ethical responsibility. Let’s take vegetarianism as an example. The choice to not eat meat may stem from animal-rights ethics (animal suffering), from environmental ethics (the energy-related and ecological costs of factory farming), from a religious precept, or from questions of health. In all these cases, taste aligns itself with a prior conviction, with a preliminary orientation.
We could, however, ask in what sense preliminary ethical choices really translate into the gustatory appreciation of food. In other words, does ethically and morally “good” food
always taste better (Perullo 2014)? And will this ethical approach be able to orient the grammar of taste definitively? I believe there is no simple answer. Ethical appreciation of food is an interesting and complex attitude, but it is not without problems. First, it may risk forgetting the chronological priority in the evolutionary development of our relationship with food. We are not born adults and childhood is a crucial time in our lives. Strictly separating ethics and aesthetics, as some references sometimes seem to suggest, seems to promote an accidental paradox; sometimes sustainable taste becomes the updated version of modern day “good taste,” a correct and comfortable trend, widely followed for purely fashion reasons. Consider, for example, the risk of a degeneration that affects the notions of “natural” and “organic,” ever more subject to violent semantic and commercial fraud as sedatives for commercial ends used to gain consumer trust and confidence. I am keen on organic and biodynamic food and wine; I find them interesting and often fulfilling. The problem is that sometimes they are an alibi for not increasing one’s perceptual awareness and mindful ability to practice environmental tasting. There is also a further problem. The main psychological factor in consumer food choice is pleasure, not ethics (Glanz et al. 1998). Therefore, an optimizing strategy that disregards food’s impulsive and hedonic dimension might turn out not to be very effective. Better to pursue a more versatile and lay gustatory model that can hold together the hedonic and the ethical motive, gustative desirability and its moral appropriateness. And moreover, in everyday life don’t we often see the very advocates of regulative food ethics let themselves go and indulge in naked pleasure, in their own idiosyncrasies and biographies, suspending and putting aside ethical beliefs and cultural motivations even if only for the moment?
A variant of ethical appreciation deserves to be very briefly considered. It is a vast, almost pervasive topic, but here I want to suggest only a connection with our theme. There is one way to approach taste as culture primarily or exclusively oriented to the nutritional and dietary aspects of food. For very long time, food, taste, and diet were very strictly bound together; with modern times, they drifted apart. Today’s meaning of diet is different and much more limited than the original. Etymologically the word
diet—from the ancient Greek
diaita—meant way of life, matters related to daily activities such as physical exercise, sleep, sexual activity and, of course, alimentation. Food played a great role in diet, so much so that “dietetics” then came to indicate that branch of medicine that deals with food. It was based on the principles of
Hippocratic-Galenic medicine, grounded in the four elements (earth, water, air, and fire) corresponding to as many qualities (dry, wet, cold, and hot), humors (black bile, yellow bile, phlegm, and blood), and temperaments or characters (melancholic, choleric, phlegmatic, and sanguine). Ancient and medieval dietetics claim that every food has at least one corresponding quality. Eating well means measuring and mixing the various food qualities in order to obtain an equilibrium of moods and temperaments (Flandrin and Montanari 1999). The taste for food corresponded in large part to this interpretative model of reality, and historical documents attest to the close link between taste as pleasure and as health. Taste was in fact mainly the result of dietary reasoning, and it was only in the early modern period that the “liberation of the gourmet,” as the French historian Jean-Louis Flandrin called it, was born with a new paradigm of taste based on the palatal perception of single elements of food, regardless of its effects on the body and mind. In the nineteenth century, gastronomy by and large freed itself from dietetics as health, but in the meantime, dietetics has taken on completely different characteristics, because medical science has changed since Hippocrates and Galen. If back then the main proof of the link between taste and diet was based on the
perception of foodstuffs, because the elements of reality and the qualities—wet, cold, dry, hot—were perceivable qualities, modern science is instead grounded in (trust in the existence of) components of invisible reality: atoms, electrons, cells, and molecules, which are not detectable by the human eye. The same can be said of vitamins, amino acids, minerals, and the lipids and proteins that make up food, but it is exactly on these components that modern nutritional science, as well as the specific branch of dietetics, relies.
In recent years, however, that modern dualistic paradigm has failed once again. Many chefs work with great consideration for
healthiness,
lightness, and
balance in terms of nutrients (calorie count) and food quality (freshness, seasonality) that make up their dishes and menus. Yet regarding the most common experiences with food, the attention to the link between nutrition and taste exploded: food literature contains a virtually limitless number of titles on diets. On the one hand, of course they guarantee important sales figures, but on the other side today the word
diet encompasses all that goes under the name of
wellness. In this perspective, eating well and eating the good mean
healthy eating. It could also be argued that
diet sometimes becomes a stand-in for faith and other apodictic postulates: health is truth, a recipe for prêt-a-porter happiness, though the common approach of accepting as “healthy” everything that is offered by nutritional science can itself be called into question (Shapin 2007). The connection between food and health is envisaged in different ways with varying intensity, which one must be able to distinguish, ranging from an attitude of simple “common sense” in accordance with popularized scientific knowledge to compulsive and obsessive attitudes such as orthorexia. The formula of the popular “Mediterranean diet” is well known (for example, eat carbohydrates for lunch and protein in the evening, plenty of fruit and vegetables, and few sweets and drink little alcohol). Less common is the habit of alternating between gluttony and health (alternating periods of disregard for nutritional balance and weight control, and very strict periods of almost complete abstinence from “dangerous” foods), and there is also the belief that a food is only good
because it does good. Of course, there is also an approach to food that redirects all attention to its nutrients, with an utter indifference to its taste. But this attitude goes beyond the scope of this chapter and will be treated in the next.