If God wanted us to vote, He would have given us candidates.
—Jay Leno
MICHAEL DUKAKIS STOOD AT THE PODIUM ON A SWELTERING Atlanta night in 1988 to accept the Democratic Party’s nomination for President of the United States. The overflow crowd stood shoulder to shoulder on the convention floor, gasping for what little cool air blew from the overworked industrial air-conditioning. Thousands more were in the streets, denied access to the convention center by the Atlanta Fire Department. A beaming Dukakis, dressed in a blue pinstriped suit, looked cool and very presidential—at least to Democrats.
“This campaign is about competence, not ideology,” the former Massachusetts governor said, attempting to draw on his successful tenure as governor and broaden it into a national campaign message. It was widely accepted, even by Republicans in Massachusetts, that Dukakis had revitalized his state’s economy from one dependent on outdated heavy manufacturing to the leading high-tech economy in the Northeast. Dukakis was also credited with turning the huge budget deficits he had inherited into real surpluses by the time he left. The press dubbed it “the Massachusetts Miracle.”
Democrats saw the “competence not ideology” message as a solid defense against the predictable Republican attack on “tax-and-spend liberals” while the media—looking to keep the latest scandal story alive—saw it as an attack on the Reagan/Bush mismanagement of the Iran-Contra mess. Both would be disappointed when Dukakis squandered a double-digit lead in the polls following the convention and suffered a near-landslide loss to George H. W. Bush in November.
The Dukakis implosion is widely blamed on any or all of the following: a poor campaign operation, the infamous Willie Horton ad, an ill-advised photo of Dukakis in an army tank, and a less than forceful response during a debate to a hypothetical question about whether the rape of his wife might alter his opposition to the death penalty. Amid this, Dukakis’s message about competence, not ideology, took a pounding from the critics.
The message ultimately failed because Dukakis tried to sell the right product at the wrong time. A message of competence over ideology was a good product, but by 1988 polarization was growing into an even stronger political force than in the previous two national elections when Ronald Reagan was the Republican candidate.
After the last two years of the Reagan administration, burdened by the Iran-Contra debacle, Republicans wanted to avoid a competence test. They much preferred to make the fight about ideology, hence the Bush campaign’s mantra that Dukakis was a “card-carrying member of the ACLU.” Twenty years ago, ideology mattered. Politics forced most Americans to take sides.
As the Chinese calendar names years after an animal (year of the rat, snake, dog), so 1988 was the year of polarization, when the concept of divide and conquer took hold of our national political life and would not let go. The Christian Coalition emerged as a political movement. The labor movement was in decline. Liberals were trying to define a new post-FDR identity. The Cold War was thawing and with it the one enemy (the USSR) that had united Democrats and Republicans on national security. The movie Wall Street highlighted the lifestyles of the nouveaux riches; crack and crime was ravaging inner cities, terrifying the mostly white suburbs (as well it should have, for their turn was coming soon). Nineteen eighty-eight was the year of labels: liberal/conservative, big government/small government, free markets/government regulations, left/right.
There was little room for middle ground, let alone common ground. It was a time when expanding the party’s voter base with polarizing rhetoric was the hot new strategy for winning elections, while competing for voters in the middle was a zero-sum game. After twenty years of worsening storms, followed by a brief lull at mid-decade, America looked at the new political landscape and saw the powerful front of polarization overtaking them. No wonder ideology trumped Dukakis’s message of competence.
Why spend time on a losing twenty-year-old message? Because that message, in the hands of a good candidate, running with a companion message of common ground, is exactly the right message for 2008. The victor in that campaign will be the candidate who causes the public to see him or her as the most competent and the least ideological.
American politics has come full circle in the twenty years between 1988 and 2008. Competence and results are “in,” while polarization appears headed back to the political fringes. In today’s political environment, voters want less cross fire and more cease-fire; fewer arguments and greater results. A modern candidate would be nuts to call his opponent a “card-carrying member of the ACLU,” or to use another version of LBJ’s “Daisy” ad. Trying to replicate a winning message from a different time is no guarantee of success, while ignoring good messages from losing campaigns can be missed opportunities.
A good campaign plan (and accompanying message) should reflect the political tone of the times. Campaign plans are not timeless, nor are they available in political science textbooks. A good plan should begin with a set of assumptions about current voter attitudes on domestic and national security issues, the state of the nation, voters’ personal and financial security, the degree of confidence in the future, and their assessment of how much change is necessary in leadership and governance to address the challenges facing the country.
All these have been factors in past presidential campaigns, and will be in one form or another in future ones. However, it is the degree of importance voters attach to these issues in the current political climate, and which candidate’s style and approach to governing best suits that climate, that will guide persuadable voters. (Note: “Persuadable voters” are self-identified weak partisans or independents who, unlike partisan Republicans or Democrats, enter an election year undecided or “leaning” toward a candidate.)
A candidate’s character is the one factor that is timeless and vital to voters. But character is more than virtue and honesty (although if voters sense a deficit in either it can be a deal breaker). Personality, style, comportment, and manner also figure into the equation. Jimmy Carter’s seriousness and virtue suited the post-Watergate environment, just as Ronald Reagan’s optimism was viewed as an asset after the grim decade of the 1970s. John Kennedy’s character was ideal for a country eager to move on to a new generation of leaders, just as the bigger-than-life characters of Lincoln and Roosevelt were so vital in times of crisis.
The results of the 2006 election and recent polling provide a good snapshot of voters’ attitudes as we approach the 2008 election:
National security issues are dominated by the war in Iraq. A strong majority wants the United States out of a war they perceive as unwinnable. Voters also understand the pitfalls of withdrawal and will expect presidential candidates to be specific about their plans to accomplish a pullout safely, while leaving Iraq with at least a chance to avoid a bloodbath and survive as a country (and therefore some comfort that our soldiers did not die in vain). They are tired of the right screaming “cut and run,” and just as fatigued with the left saying our soldiers died for no reason other than a Bush/Cheney secret plan to control Iraqi oil.
The public doesn’t think leaving Iraq ends the war on terror. They will want to know a candidate’s plan to continue that war after Iraq. That had better include a plan that no longer leaves voters with the impression that the United States is going it alone. The right-wing polarizing mantra, “we have to fight them over there so we don’t have to fight them over here,” is no longer going to cut it. No more grounded in reality is the left-wing polarizers’ claim that only a tiny percentage of Muslims wants to terrorize the West, and we should be tolerant of every new mosque and Islamic charity being created in America (at a rate that should alarm more of us).
President Bush’s call for democracy around the world in his second inaugural address was moving and idealistic. Voters are wary, however, of using U.S. forces in attempts to install democracies abroad. That is especially the case in countries with no history of democracy and with political, religious, and economic systems foreign to our own. They don’t believe we have the resources to police the world. Iraq has forced many foreign policy idealists to become realists.
Domestically, the economy is a major concern. That’s a surprise given the low unemployment and inflation of recent years, but that good news is countered by stagnant wages. According to the Congressional Budget Office, the average middle-income worker has actually lost purchasing power over the previous decade. The polarizers in the business community, who seem to be quite content with soaring CEO salaries, are not going to get away with the old “that’s the free market, and if you don’t like it, you’re a socialist.” Nor will liberal polarizers convince voters that the United States must stop all trade with countries that don’t have strong environmental or labor laws.
The growing cost of health care, combined with concerns about Social Security and Medicare solvency, is dampening voter optimism, especially among baby boomers. The old partisan Democratic polarizing line that we can’t touch the “third rail of American politics” (Social Security and Medicare) is becoming tiresome; nor will an updated version of “Harry and Louise” (from the TV commercial in the early nineties that helped sink the Clintons’ health care reform plan) kill health care reform. That scam was played out by the polarizers fifteen years ago, effectively paralyzing the debate. Unfortunately, the situation has gone from bad to worse.
The voters’ view on the state of the nation is best explained by the much-tested question, “Is the country headed in the right or wrong direction?” The available data was unanimous in mid-2007 that most voters by a substantial margin see the country headed in the wrong direction.
On political leadership, President Bush’s average job-performance numbers are over 60 percent negative to 30 percent positive. Although the Iraq war certainly impacts the president’s approval numbers, the government’s failure to respond effectively in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina still haunts the Bush administration. The Democratic Congress, although still viewed more favorably than the Republican Congress that preceded it, has lost all of its post-2006 election glow.
Finally, among the so-called social issues (at the heart of polarization and the red state/blue state, “culture war” divide), neither abortion, gun control, gay rights, church/state separation, stem-cell research, nor flag burning reaches double digits in polls measuring issues about which voters are concerned. A few, like flag burning, rate less than 1 percent. The lack of concern over the big culture issues is a mighty blow to the polarizers and the fund-raisers who have successfully picked the pockets of polarized voters in the “culture war” for twenty-five years. If they can’t fuel the fires of the culture war, how are they going to perpetuate the red state/blue state divide they have come to depend on to justify their existence?
The evidence, taken together, points to competence, not ideology, as the foundation for a successful campaign in 2008. To succeed, a candidate must be seen as a competent leader, rather than a partisan ideologue. A leader capable of forging bipartisan consensus at home and meaningful diplomatic relations around the world. That is a compelling portrait for a general-election presidential candidate. But how does a candidate emerge from either party in a nominating process still heavily influenced by partisan ideologues?
There are indications that the nominating process in 2008 will not be as dominated by polarizers as in past elections. The number of voters who declare themselves “strong Democrat” or “strong Republican” is giving way to an increase in “weak Democrats” and “weak Republicans.” Although self-identified “strong Democrats” and “strong Republicans” will still account for a substantial percentage of primary and caucus voters, their percentages are shrinking. Presidential polls survey only voters who say they are “certain” or “almost certain” to vote in primaries or caucuses. More “weak Democrats” and “weak Republicans” are indicating to pollsters that they intend to participate in larger numbers in 2008. If so, the polarizers’ domination in the nominating process is no longer absolute.
There is another factor in 2008 that will help more pragmatic, less ideological candidates to emerge from both party’s nominating process. The absence of clear front-runners and no incumbent president seeking reelection makes the race for the White House in 2008 very unpredictable.
The stakes are high for both parties. The Democrats have been shut out of the Oval Office for the last eight years (and twenty of the last twenty-eight). In that time George Bush has filled two Supreme Court seats and hundreds of other federal judgeships. The Democrats can ill afford to see the courts move further to the right.
For the Republicans, it could be argued that the stakes are even higher. If history is a guide, it is unlikely that Republicans will regain the House or Senate. Following the second term of an unpopular president (even popular presidents in most cases) his party usually loses seats in Congress. Republicans are terrified that they may once again be a minority in Congress and shut out of the White House.
With so much at stake and the outcome so uncertain, primary voters (even very partisan primary voters) are likely to be less dogmatic, and more inclined to support the most electable candidate. By definition, the most electable candidate is likely to be the less ideological candidate.
Casting a vote for president is serious business. On average, more than twice the number of voters will turn out in a presidential year than in a midterm election. In the 2006 midterm, approximately 41 million people cast ballots, just one-third of the 126 million who voted in 2004. Large turnouts in presidential races diminish the impact of polarized voters by drawing more moderates and independents who are less aligned with a party or ideology. We expect, given that so many remain angry about politics and politicians, that turnout in 2008 will be higher than in 2004—bad news for polarizers, good news for “the rest of us.”
The Republican presidential campaign of former New York City mayor Rudy Giuliani provides more evidence of the declining importance of the so-called culture issues. Giuliani is pro-choice. As mayor, he enforced strict gun-control laws and favored equal benefits for gay couples. At the height of the polarization era such a record would have automatically disqualified Giuliani for the Republican nomination. In 2006 many pundits predicted that the Giuliani record, when it sank in with GOP primary voters, would do just that.
Nevertheless, within weeks of announcing his White House bid in early 2007, Giuliani became the GOP front-runner. By May 2007, despite broad dissemination of his record (mostly by his GOP rivals), Giuliani had lost some support, but remained the front-runner. There was unanimous agreement among political observers that the mayor’s performance in the aftermath of 9/11 is driving his candidacy. The competence shown by “America’s Mayor” (a moniker attached to Giuliani within days of 9/11) was trumping ideology, even among GOP primary voters.
This is not to suggest any less commitment to cultural issues among Republican activists. The strong Evangelical Christian base is not enamored of any of the three GOP front-runners (as of summer 2007), who include, in addition to Giuliani, Senator John McCain and former Massachusetts governor Mitt Romney. Unless efforts to recruit a credible “values” candidate are successful (Senator Sam Brownback, former Arkansas governor Mike Huckabee, and former Virginia governor Jim Gilmore are way back in the pack), it looks as if the GOP choice may be limited to these three, or to former Tennessee senator Fred Thompson, who declared his candidacy in July. That once would have been considered “early.” Not in this election cycle.
MOST OF THE POST 2006 ELECTION ANALYSIS FOCUSED ON THE voters’ rejection of hyperpartisan politics, and fueled much of the early rush to embrace “common ground” by leaders in both parties. However, as the battles in Congress over Iraq and the Democrats’ pursuit of missteps by the Bush administration escalated in 2007, many pundits began revising their initial analysis. In their insatiable need to appear “current,” pundits are now suggesting that Congress and the president did not get the voters’ message; or (and this is the “current” analysis) that maybe the election results were all about Iraq and had nothing to do with polarization.
This assessment has, of course, been embraced by the polarizers (and also by some political leaders), but it is foolish and shortsighted. Of course the Iraq war (like any controversial armed conflict) is leading to strong partisan feelings, but the fallout from it is obscuring two important realities. First, since the new Congress convened, there has been more cooperation between the parties on several fronts unrelated to the war. And second, the hyperpartisanship surrounding the war is increasing the voters’ desire to move past polarization and begin to find consensus and common ground on the war, as well as other concerns.
The question is which candidate will read the signs correctly and ride the voter wave against polarization. There are not many politicians with the foresight to grasp the antipolarization sentiment. Very few of them believe that a common ground message will get them elected, despite evidence that polarization has cost votes, and is a dangerous strategy.
Politicians will concede that some losses in 2006 could be attributed to polarization. However, they are not yet willing to accept that the resulting victories were a response to calls for common ground. “What about Joseph Lieberman?” Critics argue that Lieberman’s contest was unique. They argue that (1) he lost the primary because of his position on the Iraq war, and (2) he ran statewide as an independent in a state that has a history of electing independents. Moreover, they believe that Lieberman’s campaign against polarizing liberals attracted Republicans as well as independents. Therefore, his success had nothing to do with a call for common ground. In effect, they believe that polarization beat polarization!
It’s always difficult to change the conventional wisdom in the campaign business about what works and what doesn’t. Candidates are generally afraid of an untested strategy or message. This kind of thinking is why most of the high-profile campaign contracts are distributed among a few well-known political consultants. Candidates fight over the hottest campaign talent, chasing the ones who have been involved in successful (and preferably high-profile) campaigns.
Political consultants are a surprisingly cautious breed. They tend to use the same formulas that have worked for them since they entered the political game. They should look at the previous election for clues to voters’ thinking and adjust their game plans accordingly. Instead, they are like old football coaches who use the same plays every season, despite having a new team with different skills going against different opponents. At least in football the dimensions of the playing field don’t change. That is not so in politics, where voters’ attitudes can alter the playing field.
We believe the 2008 election will usher in a new era in American politics that will reward competence and reject ideology. The people have already provided the clues. If a person woke up from a thirty-year coma in 2006, he would not have missed the following: (1) the voters were very angry, (2) much of that anger was directed at polarization and gridlock in Washington, and (3) the biggest issue was a war that was going badly, while all the politicians could do was fight among themselves and question one another’s patriotism.
Despite our criticism of Karl Rove’s base strategy, it worked for him in 2002 and in 2004. He decided that polarization was necessary to turn out the Republican base in both elections. Voters bought it. But polarizing elections lead to polarizing government, because politicians, who run as polarizers, govern as polarizers. Polarization does not have an on/off switch. In 2006 Rove and company continued to embrace the strategy that had been successful for them in previous campaigns. This time the voters altered the playing field, making Rove’s base strategy inoperable.
Political polls generally include a question that measures the degree to which voters feel estranged from their government. The nonpartisan Pew Research Center presented the following yes/no statement to 2,017 adults in the aftermath of the 2006 election: “Most elected officials care what people like me think.” Only 34 percent of the respondents agreed with the statement. That answer explained a lot about voter anger in 2006.
Voters concluded that politicians had become blind to the realities of their everyday lives. They didn’t see politicians listening to people like them. Rather, they saw politicians interested in retaining power. People heard a political debate lost in a flurry of insults and sound bites. They saw the big picture, while politicians focused on the small scenes. In 2006 voters went to the polls to give their answer to the question of whose interests politicians were looking out for. Clearly, they decided, it wasn’t theirs. We believe voters will bring this same skeptical attitude into the 2008 presidential election. The winning candidate will be the one who best understands the voters’ mood.
Presidential nominations and general-election campaigns often turn on one or two moments that convince people that a candidate is on their wavelength. In 1980, Ronald Reagan caught the public’s mood with one line: “Are you better off now than you were four years ago?” That changed the campaign’s focus from concerns about Reagan’s brand of conservatism and lack of experience to Jimmy Carter’s failures. Carter lost because voters concluded that they were worse off than they had been four years earlier. Despite their doubts about Reagan, they thought he understood how they felt.
Reagan found one of the most important formulas to success in politics: he minimized both his weakness (lack of experience) and Carter’s strength (incumbency). He maximized his strength (relating to voters) with the sense that he understood their problems, and in doing so maximized Carter’s weakness (that he was contributing to their problems). In the process, Reagan accomplished the most important thing a politician can hope to achieve…he exceeded expectations.
There lies the key to a common ground victory in 2008. In the next chapter, we will tell you how a common ground campaign can maximize the strength of a consensus message and the weakness of polarization. It will require departures from conventional campaign methods and rhetoric, and it will require a candidate with the substance and courage to challenge polarization and force it back to the fringes of politics where it belongs.
Political observers call 1980 a “hinge” year in American politics, an election year when voters closed the door on a difficult period in our history and moved on. In that year, after nearly two decades of discord and pessimism driven by years of war and racial and cultural divisions, they were looking for something different. Certainly they wanted a change in policies, but they also wanted change in the current political environment that was dividing the country. We think 2008 has all the ingredients to be another hinge year.