When I was a boy I was told anybody could become president; I’m beginning to believe it.
—Clarence Darrow
“I’M NOT A LAWYER, I AM NOT A MEMBER OF CONGRESS, AND I’VE never served in Washington,” said Jimmy Carter as he traveled across the country from 1974 until 1976 seeking the presidency. It was a long march for the peanut farmer, turned governor of Georgia, turned candidate for president. But a long march was perfectly suited to a Carter candidacy.
Carter was served well by not being a product of the Washington political crowd. Vietnam and Watergate, combined with a general feeling that the federal government was not the omnipotent force it once was, had soured voters on establishment candidates. Being a Washington outsider was now “in.”
The anti-Washington themes Carter and Reagan used in 1976 would be embraced by many other candidates for president and Congress in years to follow. It is fair to suggest that both contributed to the polarization that would explode a decade later. The core of the polarizers’ message today inevitably begins with the evils of the Washington political establishment, which is a variation on the Carter/Reagan message. The irony, of course, is that the polarizers have become the political establishment in Washington.
Carter’s message was perfect for the times. He was a former naval submarine officer; a small-town farmer from tiny Plains, Georgia; a Sunday school teacher; and the first openly born-again Christian to run for president, with a record without a hint of scandal, all of which reinforced his campaign theme, “I will never lie to the American people.” This appealed strongly to conservatives and moderates who had been appalled by the Watergate scandal and the seemingly endless erosion of bedrock family values.
Carter’s election gave Democrats a false sense of optimism that their old base was being restored. The election was close, with Ford closing the gap in the final weeks, much as Humphrey had done against Nixon in 1968. The electoral map in 1976 resembled 1960. It appeared that Kevin Phillips’s prophecy of an emerging Republican majority of presidential electors had been short-lived. In fact, it had only been delayed. That Carter won (in part because of Watergate) is true, but it is also true that his style suited the times.
Despite having large Democratic margins in the House and Senate, Carter and the Congress never got on the same page. The president’s plans to reorganize and streamline the federal government met fierce resistance on Capitol Hill, especially among liberal special-interest groups that depended on government to fund their pet programs. Liberal activists increased their number to defend their agenda. This growing body of liberal activists (during a Democratic presidency) would provide recruits for the coming polarization wars with conservative Republicans.
Something else happened on Carter’s watch that would feed polarization. Congress, especially the House, began to change the structure of its committees. Important committees, including Ways and Means and Appropriations, established subcommittees with new chairmen. New subcommittees meant more staffers and congressional hearings, which meant more lobbyists and special-interest groups would descend on Washington. The new subcommittees also meant new power centers that would help raise campaign funds.
On foreign policy, Carter had some successes, but these were overwhelmed by far too many political setbacks. He succeeded in ratifying a controversial Panama Canal Treaty and in bringing American pressure on some nations guilty of human rights abuses, but neither was politically popular. The OPEC countries drove up oil prices, keeping Americans in long gas lines, while Carter’s energy program was crippled by special interests, leaving consumers with virtually no relief. To his credit, Carter was the only president to forge a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, but that accomplishment was soon overshadowed by the seizure of the American embassy in Iran by Islamic terrorists.
The embassy takeover, coupled with the Panama Canal Treaty, an unexpected Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and opposition to Carter’s human rights policies, underscored a growing perception that the Democrats were weak on national security issues. Conservative Republicans pounded the message home, while conservative think tanks made the case for the Democrats’ appeasement of America’s enemies. The result would be a significant step toward the polarization of foreign policy between the two parties.
The last thing Carter needed was a fight for the Democratic nomination, but he got one from the liberal wing of his party in the candidacy of Massachusetts senator Edward Kennedy. Kennedy ran a hapless campaign that only served to highlight the Democrats’ far-left wing and undermine moderate Democrats. But the Carter/Kennedy contest went all the way to the Democratic convention in New York. Carter prevailed, but he entered the fall campaign weakened by the economy, hostages, and a divided party.
Ronald Reagan easily won the GOP nomination, and in the process put a new and endearing face on the conservative movement. Despite efforts by Democrats to demonize Reagan, his genial personality and optimism won over a majority of voters. What looked like a close election turned into a blowout. The emerging Republican majority was back on track.
This was the first “wave election” since FDR ran in 1932. (Some argue 1952 was a “wave election” when the Republicans took the White House and Congress. However, it only lasted two years.) One ingredient of a “wave election” is a sense that the politicians currently in control in Washington have ceased to understand the needs and desires of the average voter. They usually occur when one party has been in control of the White House and Congress, as was the case in 1980. One-party control that can’t produce results garners very little sympathy from the voters. If you can’t make progress when you control everything, when can you? As we shall see, a similar fate would confront presidents whose party controlled both houses of Congress in 1994 and 2006.
The years 1976 to 1980 became a significant benchmark in the growth of polarization. Both Carter and Ford faced intraparty challenges by candidates on the extreme left and right. Party unity and discipline had given way to ideological division. In both cases, the challenge to Ford in 1976 by Reagan and to Carter in 1980 by Kennedy weakened each president and contributed to his defeat in the general election.
In the end, both parties became dominated by their political extremes, as moderates became increasingly irrelevant. With the demise of moderates came the erosion of bipartisanship, especially in foreign policy. An unwritten rule accepted by both parties had been that “partisan politics end at the water’s edge.” No more.