8 | Investigation

IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE RCMP robot confirmed the four Mounties were deceased, Inspector Bob Williams from Edmonton’s “K” Division (Alberta) Major Crimes Unit came in with his “Initial Response Team.” They locked down the crime scene and secured the entire property in preparation for the investigation of the multiple murders.

Williams, fifty-seven, who was originally from Saskatchewan, was uniquely qualified to lead the Mayerthorpe investigation. He had thirty-seven years with the RCMP, during which he had served as a senior supervisor dealing with homicides, serious criminal investigations, and several high-profile cases across Canada. He also had been the commander of an ERT unit and had experience as a polygraph examiner. In 1999, Williams had taken charge of “K” Division Major Crimes North, a unit that covers the northern section of Alberta from Millet (just south of Le Duc) to the border of the Northwest Territories.

Inspector Bob Williams. (RCMP)

At 10:35 a.m. on March 3, he was called to Chief Superintendent Rod Knecht’s office at Edmonton Headquarters. Knecht told him that something significant was occurring at Mayerthorpe. “We’re not exactly sure what it is just yet. But it sounds serious . . . we might have an officer down. I want you to go out there and take over as site commander.”

Anticipating a worst-case scenario, Williams immediately put together a team of eight Major Crime investigators and instructed them to proceed to Mayerthorpe with dispatch.

His eight team members included:

•Sergeant Terry Kohlhauser, forty, who had seventeen years’ experience, seven of them with “K” Division Major Crimes. Williams knew that Kohlhauser’s dedication and determination would make a great contribution to a thorough investigation.

•Constable Valerie Lahaie, a twelve-year veteran of the RCMP, an experienced file coordinator who was assigned to manage, sort, and prioritize the vast quantity of materials that would be sent in by the field investigators

•Sergeant Dennis Travanut, forty-seven, with twenty-eight years’ experience in Alberta and selected as a highly motivated and tenacious investigator

•Corporal Kevin Quail, forty, an experienced major crime investigator, assigned the role as the crime scene coordinator

•Corporal Ron Campbell, forty-seven, a focused and meticulous homicide investigator who had served all of his twenty-eight-year career in Alberta

•Sergeant Jerry Dunn, a seasoned veteran who had spent thirty-two years with the Force. His expertise was in the area of crime scene and autopsy investigations. He would oversee the autopsies of the four deceased members.

•Constable Garry Lotoski, forty-four, an experienced member of the Edmonton Homicide Unit. One of his primary responsibilities at Mayerthorpe was to serve as the exhibit person at the crime scene.

•Constable Jason Reeve, thirty-three, who had served nineteen years with the RCMP in a variety of assignments. He would assist with the interviewing and interrogation.

That same morning of March 3, Deputy Commissioner Gary Leoppky, the acting commissioner of the day, called from Ottawa and spoke to the “K” Division commanding officer, Assistant Commissioner Bill Sweeney.

They were both concerned that the situation at Roszko’s farm looked ominous. Leoppky wanted to make sure if a major investigation should be required, the RCMP would be ready to proceed in a precise and politically correct manner.

Because of public perception, they agreed there would be a strong need for independent oversight of the Mayerthorpe investigation, one that presented a clear understanding that “K” Division was not examining the incident on its own. To satisfy this requirement, the man they chose to bring in was Chief Superintendent Al MacIntyre, an experienced homicide investigator who was in charge of the Major Crimes Section of “E” Division (British Columbia).

MacIntyre, who was fifty-three years old and originally from Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario, had twenty-four years’ experience in homicide. In 1983, he helped convict two brutal thrill killers in Alberta. He had also led the homicide task force that solved the murders of the nine strikebreakers at the Giant Gold Mine in Yellow-knife in 1992. MacIntyre had been alerted to the Mayerthorpe situation since its onset and was stunned when he learned that the four young members had been murdered at the farm site.

Chief Superintendent Al MacIntyre. (RCMP)

At 12:20 p.m. on March 3, MacIntyre received a phone call from Deputy Commissioner Gary Leoppky, who asked him to be the lead investigator in the Mayerthorpe case. Leoppky tasked him to pull a team together immediately and bring it to Alberta to lead the investigation. MacIntyre accepted the assignment and advised Leoppky that he and his team would be at the crime scene by the following morning.

About half an hour before that, Inspector Bob Williams, driving alone from Edmonton, had arrived at the Mayerthorpe Detachment office. As he was parking his car beside the building, Superintendent Brian McLeod and his Edmonton ERT members began arriving, car after car, in the parking lot. Shortly after that, Superintendent Brian Simpson and his Red Deer ERT crew started to pull in. Within minutes about twenty-five heavily armed ERT members in their camouflage uniforms were mustering in the parking lot.

The first thing Williams did was to acquire an office for himself in the detachment. From there, he immediately connected with the Division’s Emergency Operating Centre, with which he stayed in contact throughout the day.

Williams says, “We still didn’t know precisely what was happening out at Roszko’s farm, but I remember thinking things weren’t looking very good.”

When the robot went in and determined the worst, ERT commander Brian McLeod phoned Williams with the bad news. “We have four members down and one suspect down.”

Williams says, “That was close to three p.m. And at that point I knew my Major Crimes Unit would be responsible for a principal role in the homicide investigation.

“And with the sheer size of the operation . . . the number of investigators that would ultimately be involved in the case, I knew the Mayerthorpe Detachment building would not suffice as a command centre.

“When I first drove into town, I had noticed the Royal Canadian Legion building across from the detachment. Now, I thought that would be a facility that could serve us very well.”

Williams remembers, “The people in charge of the Legion were most willing to accommodate us. They were more than supportive. They let us use the entire main floor of the building.”

To secure the crime scene and start processing evidence, Williams named Sgt. Jerry Dunn as supervisor of the investigation. Corporal Kevin Quail and Cst. Garry Lotoski were given the responsibility of gathering evidence exhibits, logging and tagging them, and storing them.

The next thing Inspector Williams did was to establish his command triangle. He would be at the top of the triangle, Inspector James Hardy would be at the second point and serve as the primary investigator, and Constable Valerie Lahaie would assume the third point as file coordinator.

Both the second and third points of the triangle were immense jobs.

Hardy would coordinate and supervise every aspect of the investigation. He would be responsible for the speed, flow, and direction of the process, deciding what was to be done, the order in which things were to be done, and who would do them.

Lahaie was responsible for managing the administrative aspect of the investigation. This entailed all the electronic files and all the paperwork generated by the investigation. Every task and each bit of information had to be logged and filed including evidence exhibits, interviews, interrogations, autopsy results, forensic reports, items for disclosure, media releases, etc.

“I knew this was going to be a massive file,” Williams says, “and I needed the best possible people in those two positions. Both Inspector Hardy and Constable Lahaie had extensive experience and both of them were extremely capable in their respective areas. Lahaie was well-trained. She was meticulous with paperwork and with the gathering and retrieval of electronic information.”

Williams remembers, “I knew the investigation was going to be a big job . . . an enormous undertaking . . . but we had the very best people in place and we were given tremendous support. Anything we needed, we got.”

Throughout that first day, the technical specialists from the “Informatics” Branch were busy installing multiple phone lines and setting up a myriad of computer stations and their requisite power connections.

That evening, Al MacIntyre and his selected crew from “E” Division caught a Westjet flight to Edmonton. His special team was comprised of six members, each of them amply experienced and extremely capable.

Inspector Don Adam, in his early fifties, was known for his criminal investigative ability and his comfort in the interview and interrogation room. He was also a no-nonsense, industrious police manager who was good at keeping other investigators focused and on task.

Staff Sergeant Brenden Fitzpatrick, in his early forties, was a smart, energetic policeman held in high regard for being a tenacious, hard-working criminal investigator.

Sergeant Bruce Hulan, in his early fifties, was a well-known, well-liked, seasoned criminal investigator with a reputation for being thoughtful, thorough, and dogged in his determination.

Corporals Paul McCarl and Matt Toews were young, aggressive homicide investigators who were tireless workers noted for doing the heavy lifting and hard digging on any case assigned to them.

Sarah Russell was a gifted young civilian member who would share her expertise with Alberta’s Constable Lahaie, who was in charge of all electronic data entry, retrieval, and analysis. Sarah had a special skill. Using the RCMP software called “E & R” (evidence and reporting), she had developed a unique ability of being able to convert the evidence of a major crime into a logical format.

The Vancouver team spent the night at an Edmonton hotel; at 6:30 a.m. the next morning, they arrived in Mayerthorpe and reported to the command post in the Legion hall.

Their first meeting that morning was with the police unit that assesses police needs for a particular project. This unit has the authority and the means to rapidly provide essential equipment and resources for the special investigators. These would include such items as police cars, cell phones, laptops, desktop computers, and all other necessary office equipment.

At 8:00 a.m., MacIntyre met with Inspector Bob Williams, and together they united the “K” Division and “E” Division members into working partnerships. This included the command triangle, where MacIntyre and Williams would share command, although MacIntyre, with his higher rank and assigned responsibility, was considered to be in charge.

With their responsibilities clearly defined, each of the investigators staked out a small working area on the long banquet tables that were set up around the Legion hall. The hall itself, as well as a few other small rooms in the building that would be used for interviews, was secured and declared off limits to anyone except authorized police personnel. The RCMP had determined that no member from either the Mayerthorpe or Whitecourt Detachments would be allowed to work on the investigation in any capacity.

Over the course of the investigation, over 200 officers worked in the Legion hall, coming and going as they performed their various assignments and duties.

Al MacIntyre says, “The guidelines I stressed to all of them were pretty straightforward. They had to do it right. They needed to be thorough and careful. There was no sense in rushing.

“There was to be no such thing as an informal statement. They were to get everything on tape . . . on video or digital or audio. And the evidence they collected needed to be clearly articulated . . . clearly unambiguous. It wasn’t about what evidence looks like today but what it would be like two or three years down the road . . . when we went to court. The evidence needed to be seized and articulated; the record needed to be clear.”

Many of the working members were selected for their special skill sets and had been sent to Mayerthorpe by their various detachments. Some members had asked for permission to leave their home detachments to serve in Mayerthorpe. Others took their holidays and volunteered to serve their time in the Legion hall. Seven members from Calgary were taking an interviewing course in Edmonton. All of them volunteered to come in and help the investigation in Mayerthorpe. Other members came from all over Alberta. Some came from as far away as Nova Scotia or from the proximity of British Columbia. Forensic Identification Specialists were dispatched from Edmonton, Winnipeg, Regina, and Halifax. A forensic firearms team drove in from the Regina Crime Lab to investigate all aspects of the involvement of firearms in the Mayerthorpe crime.

For the next two weeks, the Mounties would use an arsenal of investigative techniques: interrogation, interviews, physical and electronic surveillance, searches, forensic identification, and analysis.

After several briefing meetings on that Friday morning of March 4, Al MacIntyre, Don Adam, and Bob Williams drove out to Roszko’s farm. The crime scene was securely contained. A perimeter had been established where the police checked all vehicles coming near the farm. There was absolutely no access to the property from any unauthorized person.

After MacIntyre, Adam, and Williams presented their credentials, they were admitted and received a thorough briefing on the crime scene and the crime itself. Personnel on site familiarized them with all aspects of Roszko’s inner compound, his buildings, and the lie of the land on his property.

Elsewhere, the RCMP had set up checkpoints on several roads near Roszko’s farm where they stopped cars and asked the drivers and their passengers whether or not they had seen or heard anything regarding the incident.

The crime scene was a busy place. Searches continued unabated. Using infrared and other scanning equipment, police persevered with their attempts to recover evidence. They employed ground radar to determine if there were any signs of disturbance to the land. This was done to see if anything had been buried in the earth or uncovered from it. Techs from Ident (Forensic Identification Section) and the Explosives Disposal Unit swept the farm with metal detectors and sifted dirt inside the Quonset hut looking for shell casings. Oil drums, water casks, and other paraphernalia were removed from inside the Quonset. All of it was examined and stored for future reference. Backhoes were brought in, just in case any digging had to be done.

That evening, back at the command centre, Sgt. Jerry Dunn phoned Al MacIntyre at 6:40 p.m. He had spent the day at the Edmonton Medical Examiner’s Facility as a witness to the autopsies of the four murdered Mounties.

MacIntyre recalls, “He described the devastating injuries the .308 calibre bullets had caused. I could hear the sheer upset in his voice as he explained their types of injuries. It was obvious there was clearly no chance of survival for any of them . . . absolutely no chance.

“That was very upsetting to me. The killer was obviously so violently angry. The number of shots he fired was so over the top. I could imagine the hell the members went through . . . the time they had for terror . . . waiting . . . as they went down, one after another. It was very distressing for me to think about that.”

Day after day, with MacIntyre and Williams in the lead, the investigative process went on. There were digital photograph screenings, forensic analysis reports, applications for search warrants, development of flow charts, constant overviews, and briefings.

At the outset of the case, one of the first procedures that the police had employed was to apply for five different search warrants.

The first was for Roszko’s cell phone records. These indicated that prior to the time of the murders, Roszko had made phone calls to his mother, his sister, his aunt, and to Kal Tire in Barrhead. He had also made several calls to phone numbers that were eventually traced to a man named Shawn Hennessey.

This same Shawn Hennessey was a person who was suspected to be selling marijuana grown on Roszko’s farm.

Another of the search warrants addressed the .300 Winchester Magnum rifle and the ammunition for it that was found beside Roszko’s body. In short order, the RCMP traced the Winchester hunting rifle to John Hennessey, the grandfather of Shawn Hennessey.

Shawn Hennessey immediately became a person of interest to the police.

When Shawn heard the news of the police massacre late in the afternoon of March 3, he was afraid. “I was absolutely terrified of the involvement I had,” he says, “and I didn’t know what was going to come out of it.”

He says that he decided to “lie low.”

His primary concern was that the Winchester rifle he had given to Roszko was registered in his grandfather’s name. John Hennessey, his grandfather, had given the rifle to Shawn two years previously when he thought the government planned to eliminate the gun registry requirements.

Shawn and his mother, Sandy, discussed the fact that the rifle was registered to John and that the police would undoubtedly check that out by seeking out the grandfather and questioning him.

Shawn contacted his grandfather and told him that James Roszko had taken the Winchester from Shawn’s home the night before the murders and definitely had it on him when he attacked the police. After that conversation, John Hennessey says it was his idea to tell the police that his rifle had been stolen from the back of his welding truck in October 2004. Shawn and his mother and dad agreed that they all would stick to this “story.” In so doing, the Hennessey family had all agreed to perpetrate an orchestrated cover-up concerning the Winchester rifle.

On Sunday, March 6, four days after the murders, the RCMP came to John Hennessey’s house and asked him about the Winchester rifle. As planned, the old man lied to them. He said he usually kept his rifle behind the seat of his welding truck but he hadn’t seen it since October 2004. It was his belief that the rifle had been stolen from his truck.

When a writer from the Globe and Mail interviewed John and asked him how it was that Roszko had possession of John’s rifle, John told them, “I don’t know how he got it.”

Shawn told the Globe and Mail that he had known Mr. Roszko as a customer at Kal Tire for the previous four years. He said he had visited the property once but he rejected allegations in one of the police search warrants that he was selling marijuana for Mr. Roszko.

This was the first in a series of lies and misrepresentations that Shawn would tell the police and the media.

He said he felt ill when he first heard of the murders and denied any suggestions that he played a role in the killings. “I’ve never been in a situation like this before,” he said. “I’ve never been accused of such huge things. This is absolutely beyond me.”

Yet all throughout the RCMP investigation Shawn Hennessey did not act like he was innocent. Neither did Cheeseman. They lied about where they’d been and what they’d done. They denied assisting Roszko in any way.

Over the duration of many months, the police questioned Shawn Hennessey approximately fifteen times. Sergeant Terry Kohlhauser conducted many of those interviews. Some of the sessions took place at Hennessey’s residence; a few occurred at Kal Tire where Shawn worked. One lengthy formal interview took place at the Barrhead Detachment office. Some of Kohlhauser’s conversations with Hennessey were informal interviews where the two men stood around and talked to each other.

In all of these interviews, Shawn provided basically the same information each time and refused to admit any involvement in the murders. He constantly lied about his involvement with Roszko on the night before the massacre.

In one affidavit, an officer who interviewed him wrote: “Shawn Hennessey said he knew James Roszko for approximately three to four years. He said he went to Roszko’s farm and put a stereo in his Camaro for Roszko during the summer of 2004 and the next time he attended the property he looked at a car his wife wanted to purchase. The third time, he did some yardwork for Roszko.”

As for the events leading up to the murders, it was Hennessey’s contention that when Roszko came by his place, he insisted that Roszko could not park his truck there. He said Roszko left. He denied having any knowledge of how the rifle ended up at Roszko’s place.

But the police weren’t buying his denials.

Another police observation read: “Hennessey is a person to which Roszko would turn for assistance.”

As time went on, Shawn became more and more testy with the media. When a reporter phoned him, Shawn angrily replied, “I don’t want to speak to you people.”

To another newsman’s question he answered, “That’s none of your business.”

The police interviewed Shawn’s mother and Dennis Cheeseman several times as well. Each and every time, they admitted nothing and maintained the family’s concocted “story” with regard to the Winchester rifle.

Hennessey’s boss at Kal Tire, Steve Hunter, told the media that he thought Shawn was smeared by the simple fact he knew James Roszko. He told Michelle Collins, a writer for the Edmonton Journal, “There’s no story with Shawn. It’s been almost a year now, and if the police had anything on him, they would have charged him . . . Shawn didn’t take his [Roszko’s] truck or help him in any way.”

Hunter told the Barrhead Leader that if Hennessey were guilty of anything, it was his being stupid about with whom he chose to associate. With regard to Shawn’s being involved in Roszko’s marijuana grow-op, in the Leader story Hunter said that Shawn worked at Kal Tire sixty hours a week. This made it almost impossible for him to have any extensive dealings with Roszko.

However, other information contained in one of the RCMP search warrants reveals that the police believed that Shawn Hennessey was involved in a marijuana cultivation and trafficking operation with James Roszko. According to the documents, James Roszko’s mother stated to investigators that she believed James grew the marijuana and Shawn Hennessey sold it.

Hennessey steadfastly denied such an allegation to the police.

As the RCMP investigation continued, the residents of Mayerthorpe and surrounding area showed their appreciation for the police by bringing food and goodies to the Legion.

“The local residents were very considerate,” says Al MacIntyre. “They brought in casseroles, cakes, cookies, and all kinds of fruits and snacks. I was extremely impressed with their kindness.”

The townspeople also started asking a lot of their own questions.

Ever since Roszko’s truck had been found at his aunt’s place in Sangudo, the public had been wondering how Roszko managed to travel the 38.5 kms from his aunt’s place back to his farm. There was widespread speculation that Roszko had an accomplice.

Rev. Arnold Lotholz said, “Even from the get-go, there was always a nagging question about who helped Roszko get away from the site and get back.”

Mayor Schalm commented, “Once the smoke cleared, everybody knew that somebody had given Roszko a ride.”

One Mayerthorpe resident told the Canadian Press that Mr. Roszko likely didn’t get back to his Rochfort Bridge-area farm on his own. “It’s something that everyone is wondering. How did he get back to the farm and do the things he did?

Randy Schroeder, Mayerthorpe’s fire chief asked, “How did Roszko get back on the property and why would he do that? Normal criminals flee the scene, they don’t return to it. What was he protecting? There wasn’t anything there that would have put him away for life. Why would he come back and ambush these guys?”

Other people kept wondering how Roszko did it. How did he manage to ambush and cut down four armed police officers?

Cliff Walde, a retired RCMP sergeant, knew Roszko’s property. He said, “It wouldn’t have been difficult for someone to sneak back undetected to Roszko’s property in the dark. Considering the size of the farm, the back roads in the area, and the cover provided by the nearby brush and rolling hills.

“If you had thirty officers it wouldn’t have made any difference . . . you could have still snuck back onto the property. You got to remember you’re out in the country. There’s no street lights.”

Besides the questions there were a lot of rumours, second-guessing, and untruths flying around. Some people claimed that the four Mounties died during two separate time periods. Others thought that the four members were shot outside the Quonset and then dragged back inside by Mr. Roszko.

One man stated, “I don’t believe for one second Roszko was inside the hut when he opened fire. It doesn’t make any sense. Roszko practised shooting all around his property and he wouldn’t take a position in a building where he could be trapped.

“Roszko managed to kill or severely wound all four officers during his opening salvo. He probably started taking them into the Quonset hut so arriving members wouldn’t see them.”

There were rumours about crosses being on the farm that marked the graves of other dead people buried on Roszko’s property.

Media coverage insinuated that the police were “pleading” and “desperate” for information and further suggested that a possible accomplice might be scaring witnesses from coming forward.

Some residents said that charges had already been laid against someone who had aided and abetted James Roszko with the murders.

All of these rumours were unfounded and ranged from being untrue to being absurd.

The media began featuring stories that asked questions about RCMP training and preparation. One published story asked if the RCMP chain of command had adequately prepared the young Mounties to deal with a dangerous subject like Roszko.

Even a former RCMP superintendent, Clyde Kitteringham, who had a thirty-nine-year career with the Force, was quoted in Time magazine and the Toronto Star about what he considers a crucial lack of protection for the officers who were killed.

“Based on my many, many years of experience in both rural Alberta and elsewhere as an operational police officer,” said Kitteringham, “this was a failure. It was negligent supervision, quite frankly, and I haven’t heard anyone tell me different.”

Kitteringham said supervisors clearly erred by leaving junior members overnight to keep watch. He said the officers were exposed to an ambush because no one kept tabs on where Roszko was throughout the night, allowing him to sneak back onto the farm without the officers’ knowledge.

Corporal Wayne Oakes, the Media Relations Officer for “K” Division, responded to Kitteringham’s assessment: “The superintendent does not have all the facts or the points about this investigation. If we sent more people in there, we would have had more people to bury. The armchair quarterbacking is unbelievable. It’s inappropriate for any of us to sit back and say anything.”

Bill Helland, a retired RCMP staff sergeant from London, Ontario, who had spent much of his career reviewing and assessing operational plans and risk assessments, took exception to Kitteringham and a few other retired members of the Force “who professed to have much more information than anyone else.”

Responding to them in the press, he quoted Lucia Benaquisto, a McGill University sociologist, who maintained that the blame game is not always sensible. “It appears to be a way that people look for answers, but too often it’s a form of posturing by politicians and public figures to make it look like they are doing something.”

Helland questioned why these blame-game people were not prepared to wait until at least a preliminary investigation was complete. “The finger pointing, hand-wringing, and haunting hypothetical ‘what ifs’ from those who had little first-hand knowledge of what really happened bothered me.

“Are they helpful . . . hardly. Do they represent the vast majority of police officers . . . certainly not. Will they be involved in searching for answers . . . probably not, as they are irrelevant to the investigation. Will they be unhappy if, in the final analysis, their prejudgements are not upheld . . . probably.”

Retired Staff Sergeant Carl MacLeod, who had thirty-two years with the RCMP and had commanded the Joint Forces Unit in Hamilton, stated that the overnight deployment of two members at Roszko’s Quonset was correct and proper.

MacLeod told the author, “Police forces react and prepare for the most part on intelligence information received on an individual from a variety of sources. For example, if information on Roszko had been to the effect that he had killed or had the potential to kill, then you can be assured that the RCMP involved at the Quonset hut would have been on high alert until the search had been completed or Roszko had been tracked down and arrested.”

He emphasized, “This was definitely not a high-alert situation. It would have been different if Roszko had served time for murder or was a suspected killer or even a serious threat to police.

“But that was not the case.

“When a bad guy runs, he runs. He doesn’t return.

“You’re there. You’re seizing his stuff. He’s in trouble. Why would he come back?”

MacLeod says the police deal with situations like this every day across Canada. “Occurrences like this are so common, it’s off the chart.

“Do any of the bad guys come back?” he asks. “I don’t think so. We have to get a warrant for their arrest and go out and look for them.”

He continues, “Anyone can be a Monday morning second-guesser. But the facts did not indicate they should have done anything other than what they did. The guys in charge out there wouldn’t be thinking he’d return. That would not even be a consideration for them.”

An editorial in the Edmonton Journal seems to have hit the nail on the head.

“As eager as Albertans may be to understand and draw conclusions, we must wait — patiently and confidently — for them [the police] to complete their reconstruction and analysis of events.

“There is already too much uninformed second-guessing of decisions made by the four officers last Wednesday night and Thursday morning. RCMP spokesman Wayne Oakes is rightly frustrated by the ‘armchair quarterbacking’ of the investigation. ‘How these people outside the process are able to offer expert opinion baffles me,’ he told reporters Monday.”

There was also a lot of discussion about why a violent person like Roszko, with such a criminal record, was not in jail. People were asking whether or not the justice system had failed in Roszko’s case and had contributed to the four officers’ deaths.

An Alberta government report released in the fall of 2005 summarized James Roszko’s run-ins with the law and concluded that the ambush and murder of the Mounties was not preventable. The report noted that Roszko had been flagged as a possible dangerous offender in 1995, but police couldn’t apply the distinction because he didn’t meet the required criteria, even with his serious record that included forty-four charges and fourteen convictions.

Senior Crown prosecutor Gordon Wong, who wrote the report, told the media, “At no time did Roszko meet the criteria to be considered for a dangerous offender.”

Wong said one more conviction for sexual assault would have brought Roszko to a level where he could have been considered for a dangerous offender distinction, which would have resulted in longer prison terms for further offences. “What you need to get a designation is a series of convictions,” he said. “You need that to apply for dangerous offender designation. He simply did not have the subsequent convictions.”

Kim Connell, a former commander of the Mayerthorpe Detachment who still lives in the town, said that the Alberta report was a whitewash. “The justice system let us down and that’s why four members are dead. That’s it!” He added that the provincial government issued the report “to cover their asses.”

Gordon Wong denied that, saying, “I’m not interested in covering up anything.”

Some people even began to complain about the expense of the investigation.

An RCMP press release supplied some answers to questions with regard to its cost. “This investigation involved the murder of four police officers and the death of one civilian. While we must be accountable for our financial expenditures we must also be accountable for the actions we take and the actions that are not approved. Given the size, nature and scope of this investigation, the cost is comparable to other large-scale operations. The purpose of conducting an investigation is to investigate. Only when this process is complete are they truly in a position to possibly know and understand all the circumstances.”

On Wednesday, March 16, Superintendent Marty Cheliak, the officer in charge of the Western Alberta District, invited members of the slain Mounties’ families to come out to a private meeting in the Quonset hut on Roszko’s farm. With him, representing the RCMP, were Superintendent Brian McLeod and Rev. Bob Harper, “K” Division’s full-time chaplain.

This type of information meeting is standard procedure in all homicide cases. Although this meeting was difficult for the RCMP representatives to conduct, they realized that many of the family members had questions about how their loved ones had been killed.

Prior to the actual meeting — outside the Quonset hut — the families met with all of the members of the Mayerthorpe Detachment search team. The families were introduced, then chatted with the members and thanked them for their efforts. After an appropriate amount of time, the Mayerthorpe contingent left and the families were invited to go inside the Quonset.

Using all the information at his disposal, Brian McLeod walked the group through the significant steps of the violent incident. Occasionally, either he or Marty Cheliak answered questions from the family members.

One of the things McLeod revealed was that forensic analysis indicated Roszko had been hiding inside the Quonset hut behind a large white plastic vat that was situated close to the human door in the southeast corner of the building. That’s where he fired from initially. Then he apparently got off other shots while moving around inside the Quonset.

Cheliak remembers, “At one point, Don Schiemann said out loud, ‘Evil is residing here. This is an evil place.’”

The most chilling moments in McLeod’s presentation came when he pointed out the various places where the families’ murdered loved ones had fallen.

Marty Cheliak says, “When Brian pointed out the spot where Peter Schiemann had lay murdered, Peter’s entire family — Don, Beth, Michael, and Julia — went to that spot and stood there.

“That was a very powerful moment. They stood there absorbing their feelings at the spot where Peter had been killed.”

After the Schiemanns did this, the various other family members followed suit — going to the spot where their loved ones had fallen.

Chief Superintendent Marty Cheliak. (RCMP)

Then they had a solemn candlelight service where everyone held a lighted candle in the darkness of the hut while Bob Harper offered a prayer for the fallen four.

After the meeting ended, the entire group went to the restaurant in Rochfort Bridge for coffee. The general feeling among the family members was that the meeting, although painful at times, was needed. Many of their terrible questions had been answered. They appreciated all the inside information they had received.

The next day, March 17, Inspector Bob Williams locked the gate on Roszko’s laneway and instructed Staff Sergeant Gary Radford to return all the keys to Warren and Stephanie Fifield. The property was now back under their control. The RCMP had completed their physical examination of the crime scene in two weeks.

Chief Superintendent MacIntyre stayed on at the command post continuously until March 16, when he went home for the long weekend. He came back on March 21 and officially left Mayerthorpe a week after that.

From then on, Bob Williams was officially in charge of the investigation.

A federal Human Resources and Skills Development Canada (HRSDC) investigation and an RCMP internal investigation into the police officers’ actions of March 2 and 3, 2005, were completed at a later date. Both these reports stated that there was no way that the RCMP could have anticipated the slayings of the four RCMP officers.

The report compiled by the Human Resources (HRSDC) department concluded that the “immensely tragic event was the direct result of an unprecedented, premeditated act of murder.”

The RCMP’S internal report stated: “This was a premeditated act of murder. Roszko’s behaviour was unprecedented and unanticipated.

“There was nothing available to the police at the time which would have suggested that Roszko had intent to plan and execute a deadly assault on officers.”

Both reports agreed that this was a most unique case. Never before had a criminal fled the scene and then surreptitiously returned with the determined intent of killing police officers.

The lying and lack of co-operation by Shawn Hennessey and his family initially slowed the RCMP investigation, but in the end, the police got their break from the second man who had travelled with Roszko on the night of the ambush and murders.

A year after the murders, on March 17, 2006 — and during subsequent meetings — Dennis Cheeseman spoke to his boss at Sepallo Foods, Brad McNish, and confessed some vital information to him regarding the Roszko case. McNish, a former Calgary police sergeant, took this information directly to the RCMP.

McNish told Sgt. Terry Kohlhauser that he had held a meeting with his staff where they expressed concerns about some of the employees at Sepallo Foods working there while under the influence of drugs. After the meeting, Dennis Cheeseman approached McNish privately and revealed that there were times that he had come to work having smoked marijuana. As they talked, Cheeseman gradually became more and more distraught. Gradually he began to purge himself of some of the deep, dark secrets about his involvement in the Roszko incident.

Over the course of several meetings, Cheeseman told McNish that he had not been honest with the police. He said he knew more about the case than he was prepared to share with them. His main concern was that he hadn’t told the police the truth and he was having difficulty dealing with the Mounties’ murders.

Even at that, he lied to McNish.

Dennis tried to deflect the guilt away from his brother-in-law, Shawn Hennessey. Dennis said that Roszko had approached him a few days before the murders and told him he needed a rifle. Cheeseman said he took him to John Hennessey’s place and gave him the Winchester and some ammunition from the back of John’s truck.

Cheeseman also revealed to McNish that Shawn Hennessey was involved in Roszko’s marijuana grow-op. He said that on Wednesday, the day before the murders, Shawn knew the Mounties were searching Roszko’s Quonset hut. Because of his connection with Roszko, Shawn was concerned that he would be implicated in charges related to the illegal grow-op.

Cheeseman told McNish that later that same day, Roszko came to Shawn’s house and said he was going to kill some of the RCMP who were searching through his Quonset. Cheeseman admitted that he and Shawn followed Roszko to a farm where Roszko dropped off his truck. Then they drove him back to his farm. As they were driving, Cheeseman claimed that Roszko ranted about killing RCMP officers at his farm. He said, “They’ve made a mess of my life. They’ve got me and I’m going to get them.” Roszko also told them he was going to burn down the Quonset hut because of the marijuana plants and the stolen goods that were in it.

While Cheeseman revealed all this information to Brad McNish, he refused to go to the police and tell it to them.

Nevertheless, his confession to McNish was the break the Mounties had been looking for. They now believed they had sufficient evidence to convict Dennis Cheeseman with aiding and abetting Roszko in the Mountie murders.

However, Cheeseman’s confession would not suffice to convict Shawn Hennessey. In Shawn’s case, Cheeseman’s revelations would be considered hearsay and inadmissible. Therefore, after an extended conference among the RCMP investigators, a decision was made to deploy undercover operators to obtain more evidence from both Dennis Cheeseman and Shawn Hennessey.

An undercover operational plan or “sting” named Project Kourage was approved on March 21, 2006, and went into action a few days later.

In recent years, undercover operations have become a significant factor in the realm of police investigations. The RCMP has approximately 1,500 of its members qualified as trained undercover operators. At any given point in time, about 600 of them are engaged in undercover operations. About five percent of these operatives are female.

All those qualified as undercover operators with the RCMP across Canada are listed in a central registry in Ottawa. In each member’s dossier, there are photos and up-to-date information regarding the operator’s location, rank, responsibilities, education, interests, hobbies, areas of expertise, personality traits, languages spoken, etc.

When an undercover operation is required, the lead investigator in a case submits a request through the Division Undercover Coordinator for suitable undercover operators based on the specific needs of an investigation. The Coordinator then offers the assignment to chosen personnel in consultation with the various members’ detachment commanders.

Undercover work is voluntary; therefore, members selected for a particular operation have the right to refuse. If they do accept the undercover assignment, they are still required to maintain their ongoing responsibilities at their present posting.

The first element of the Mayerthorpe sting was initiated when the RCMP sent an undercover operator² to Barrhead to befriend Shawn Hennessey. The new man in town posed as a welder and demonstrated to Shawn his interest in snowmobiling and quadding, two activities that Hennessey really enjoyed.

Shawn was leery of the operator, suspecting he might be an undercover cop. But despite his suspicions, Hennessey continued to associate with him and invited him to go snowmobiling and quadding.

Even when the new man’s girlfriend came to join him, Shawn and his wife, Christine, remained cautious. Nevertheless, the Hennesseys did continue to associate with the new couple.

The second phase of the “sting,” which ran parallel to and in conjunction with the first, focused on Dennis Cheeseman.

In October 2006, a female undercover operator managed to develop car trouble outside of Sepallo foods. As Dennis was leaving work, he stopped to help her. Actually, her car had been rigged with a kill switch that would disable the motor at just the right time.

Dennis tried his best to start the car, but he couldn’t get it going. He gave the operator a ride to a nearby restaurant, where, during a brief conversation, the women revealed she had just broken up with her abusive boyfriend.

Cheeseman volunteered to keep an eye on her disabled vehicle until she could have it removed from the Sepallo parking lot.

Their meeting ended with their exchanging phone numbers.

In the weeks that followed, the female operator made numerous phone calls to Cheeseman in relation to her broken-down vehicle.

Early in the undercover operation, the Mounties wanted to set up listening devices in the Cheeseman and Hennessey residences. To get Dennis out of the house, the female operator invited him to her annual Christmas party. Dennis accepted her offer, and he, in turn, invited her to his Christmas party.

While they were at the operator’s party — and the Hennesseys were away from the house, too — the bugs were installed in the home. The operator’s Christmas party was an elaborate hoax. Everyone at the party was a Mountie — even Santa Claus, who made a late-night surprise visit to hand out a few gifts.

Cheeseman was a willing participant in these events that helped develop their relationship. Ultimately, he became smitten with the woman and came to think of her as his girlfriend. To cool the situation, the operation handlers introduced a reason for her to get away for a while. The story they devised was that her beloved grandfather was dying and the operator needed to leave to be with her family in Manitoba. But even while she was gone, she stayed in touch with Cheeseman.

The entire RCMP undercover operation was designed to ensure that a suitable distance was maintained between the female operator and Cheeseman. By design, they made sure that there was no opportunity for an intimate relationship between them. Including the Christmas party in December 2006, the female operator and Cheeseman saw each other only on five occasions. All of these meetings were in public places, and at three of these meetings, there were other undercover operators present. The remainder of their relationship was conducted on the phone.

It was at the staged Christmas party that the female operator introduced Cheeseman to “an old school friend.” He was also an undercover operator.

After Cheeseman had been introduced to the female operator’s old school friend, the RCMP effected a scenario whereby she was supposedly beaten and robbed by her abusive ex-boyfriend. A makeup artist distorted her appearance to make her look as if she had been badly beaten.

The operator’s old school friend suggested to Dennis that he was going to deal with the ex-boyfriend. Cheeseman offered to go along. Although Dennis was told he did not have to get involved, he insisted that he go to help get back the money the boyfriend had stolen from the female operator.

On February 24, 2007, they tracked the ex-boyfriend to a hotel south of Calgary. While Dennis searched the room for money, the old school friend took the ex-boyfriend, who was also an undercover operative, into the bathroom and pretended to beat him up. Dennis could hear the banging and screaming as the boyfriend faked being hammered.

Having accomplished their mission, Dennis and the male operator left the hotel as real buddies. Not long after that, the operator offered Dennis employment, purported to be illegal, which Cheeseman readily accepted.

Although Cheeseman did not see the female operator again, they did communicate by text messages on a few occasions.

Shawn and Christine Hennessey watched Dennis and the new woman’s relationship grow with mixed emotions. On one hand, they were happy for shy and reticent Dennis, who never seemed to have much luck with women. On the other hand, they were concerned that she might be an undercover cop who was plying Dennis with her attention for her own purposes.

Meanwhile, the male operator revealed to Cheeseman that he was a member of a criminal gang. Very soon after they met, he offered Dennis the choice of either participating or not in a simulated crime where the operator’s gang was going to steal a mini-loader from a guy who owed them money.

Dennis made the choice to involve himself. During the heist, he used bolt cutters to sever a chain that secured the trailer and the mini-loader. He also hooked up the trailer as the undercover operator watched.

After the loader escapade, other assignments followed.

Dennis was invited to participate in a caper that involved the gang members’ stealing a boat. He chose to be actively involved. Then he willingly took part in the theft of a truck full of cigarettes.

The biggest deal he was involved in was helping to unload crates of automatic weapons from a private plane that landed at the small airport in Edson, Alberta. Dennis assisted in transporting the weapons to an Edmonton warehouse and acted as security during the sale of the guns.

Dennis was paid for everything he did that involved a staged crime. They gave him $500 to unload the illegal gun shipment. They passed him $300 for participating while they stole equipment from people who owed the gang money. He got $700 for participating in the cigarette heist.

On every occasion that Dennis got together with the gang, they told him he didn’t have to take part in any of the criminal activity. But they stressed that their gang operated under a strict code of honesty and trust. They expected every gang member to be completely honest with each other.

To this end, Cheeseman disclosed to five undercover operators on four separate occasions that he had been involved with the murder of four RCMP members at Mayerthorpe. The leader of the gang, “Mr. Big,” was aware of Cheeseman’s involvement in the Mayerthorpe murders and invited Dennis to attend a meeting with him to clarify the details of his participation in that crime. During their meeting, the leader of the gang congratulated Dennis for his good work. He said that gang members had told him that Dennis had a bright future with their organization.

Then Mr. Big told him the gang had connections with a major satellite company in the United States. He advised Dennis that this company constantly took detailed photos of the prairies. And if any pictures existed that would show Cheeseman driving James Roszko back to his farm on the night of the killings, the gang might be able to make the photos disappear.

It was then that Cheeseman disclosed the details of his involvement in the Mayerthorpe shootings.

On the drive home from this Kelowna meeting, Cheeseman reiterated his involvement with the Roszko incident to one of the high-ranking gang members. Dennis gave this undercover operator a lot of the details about what had happened that night when he and Shawn drove Roszko back to his farm.

Dennis told the man that when he saw the lights of the police cars at Roszko’s property, he said he and Hennessey were sure Roszko was going to kill the police.

Dennis said, “Obviously we knew he was going back to kill RCMP officers. He said he was pretty much going to go and take care of business. He was pretty much going to burn the Quonset hut, burn down the trailer, and then just leave.”

In May and June of 2007, Mr. Big pushed Cheeseman to recruit Shawn Hennessey to join the criminal gang. But Shawn resisted. He told Dennis that he had a young family and he didn’t want to jeopardize his life with them by getting involved with criminal activity that could land him in jail.

Dennis Cheeseman continued to work with the criminal organization. He actually took a lead role overseeing undercover operators in a series of extortion-based scenarios.

Meanwhile, the undercover operators in Barrhead continued to socialize with Shawn and Christine on a regular basis. As they became friendlier, Shawn disclosed a version of his involvement in the Mayerthorpe shootings. The version he offered minimized his involvement to something less than criminal.

But on July 6, 2006, Mr. Big confronted Cheeseman and told him that his involvement in the Roszko case was bringing a lot of police heat down on the criminal organization. He proposed — almost insisted — that a meeting with Cheeseman and Hennessey be set up to discuss their mutual problem with the RCMP investigation.

Cheeseman was able to induce Shawn to join him at a meeting with the big boss at the Barrhead airport. And this was the reason why: In April and May of 2007, the gang had offered Shawn employment with the promise of a big payday. He turned this down. But this time, the incentive to get him to meet with the big boss was based on the fact that the RCMP investigation was closing in on Shawn. And Hennessey was aware, through Cheeseman, that Mr. Big could potentially make evidence disappear.

So Shawn Hennessey agreed to attend the meeting.

Because Shawn was concerned about being taped on a recording device, he didn’t want to get into Mr. Big’s car. Consequently, their entire meeting took place outside the vehicle.

As they walked along the runway, Shawn admitted to driving Roszko back to his farm.

Shawn told him that the Winchester rifle was to be used as a “scapegoat,” by which he meant that Roszko would use the rifle if the Mounties caught him or had him under fire.

He also told Mr. Big that he had known Roszko for ten years. He said he had worked for four years with Roszko on his grow-op and auto chop shop. He claimed the money was good and he believed that he was the only person that Roszko trusted.

Shawn also advised him that in the two and a half years since the murders had occurred, he had never told anyone what had happened with him and Roszko. He said he hoped Mr. Big could be trusted.

The undercover operator, as Mr. Big, recorded every word that Shawn said.

Mr. Big told Hennessey that Cheeseman had admitted Shawn’s involvement in the Roszko affair to him.

Shawn replied, “Which then brings another guy that knows that . . . which brings me a step closer to fucking years [in prison].”

Shawn told Mr. Big that all he knew was that Roszko was going to burn down the Quonset, which housed the marijuana plants and the chop shop. As for the Winchester rifle, he said, “He told me I had to give it to him. He didn’t give me an option. He told me he had no intentions of using it. None.”

Shawn also admonished himself for getting Dennis involved in the Roszko ride. He admitted that Dennis had nothing to do with the marijuana operation. He said to Mr. Big, “Why I ever went out and asked Dennis to come with me, I don’t know. I do now know. Comfort!”

After the airport meeting, Shawn went back to Barrhead with Dennis and then he returned to work.

The next day, Hennessey had a second meeting with Mr. Big.

When Mr. Big asked Shawn if he believed Cheeseman’s statement that it was Roszko’s intention to kill police that night, Hennessey responded, “Yes.”

Mr. Big said to Hennessey that it only made sense that with his guns and with his socks over his feet, it was clear that Roszko intended to “whack” the police.

Hennessey appeared to agree with that, saying, “Yeah.”

That admission was what the police were looking for.

That same day — Saturday, July 7, 2006 — Dennis Cheeseman was arrested in the Edmonton suburb of Sherwood Park. He was charged with four counts of capital murder as a party to the offences committed by James Roszko. He was jailed in the Edmonton Remand Centre.

When Shawn Hennessey heard about Dennis’s arrest, he knew he would be next.

On Sunday, July 8, he and his wife were visiting at her cousin’s house in Barrhead. When Shawn went out to get something from his car, he was swarmed and taken down by the Edmonton ERT. Christine saw this and ran out to help him. She, too, was taken down by the emergency unit.

Shawn says, “There were rifles everywhere. They had my wife face down on the driveway, dragging her through the dirt.”

Like Dennis, Shawn was charged with four counts of capital murder and incarcerated in the Edmonton Remand Centre.

After the arrests, RCMP Deputy Commissioner Bill Sweeney held a news conference at Edmonton Headquarters. He opened by saying, “Today we have been able to provide Canadians with the first significant update on the Mayerthorpe investigation.”

Regarding the two accused, he said, “They were in the same community as James Roszko and were associates over an extended period of time.”

He added, “It’s not necessarily that they committed the crime directly, but they were somehow involved in facilitating the crime.”

When Sweeney announced the charges against Hennessey and Cheeseman, Peter Schiemann’s sister Julia whispered to him, “Thank you.”

Anthony Gordon’s mother was also in attendance and wiped a tear from her eye as the arrests were announced.

The families of the four dead officers had been contacted about the developments in the case a few days before the arrests went down.

Barry Hennessey, Shawn’s father, told a reporter for the Grande Prairie Herald–Tribune that he just couldn’t believe his boy could be involved in such a crime. “It’s a huge loss to all of us. It’s worse than a death. Everybody loved him. He didn’t do nothing, as far as I’m concerned. I’m just a lost parent right now.”

The RCMP investigation had taken twenty-eight months, using over 200 officers for various periods of time. The cost of the investigation was calculated to be in excess of two million dollars.

There was criticism of the RCMP investigation.

Some said it was far too costly. The police say that every investigation into multiple murder is expensive.

Others claimed that since Roszko, the killer, was dead, such a widespread investigation was unnecessary. The law says if there were persons who enabled Roszko to commit his heinous crime, they deserve to be punished.

Christine Hennessey said the police were just looking to blame someone and they settled for Shawn and Dennis.

The RCMP say they didn’t want to blame just anyone. They wanted to determine whether or not someone had helped Roszko commit these multiple murders. And when they uncovered enough evidence to support a conviction in this regard, they closed in and made their arrests.

Some insist the Mounties tried longer and harder in this case than they would have if it had been civilians who were murdered. The RCMP disagree. They say that to solve this case, their investigators did nothing different from the normal operating procedure than they would have done on any major case investigation.

The author believes that the RCMP investigators would have worked equally hard to solve any major crime of this calibre. But surely the fact that their comrades were murdered would have given them an added incentive to do their very best work.