CHAPTER 8

Afghanistan: Yet Again a Grave Geopolitical Risk?

Nasim Zehra

Few foresaw major geopolitical upheavals like the Arab Spring and the euro zone crisis. Now there is a risk that in scanning the horizon for new signs of turmoil, policy makers may overlook familiar hot spots with the potential to again provoke high-intensity seismic activity. Afghanistan offers a crucial case in point. This country has faced considerable turmoil over the past four decades. There was the war that followed the 1979 Soviet invasion, the emergence of the Taliban government and of al-Qaeda, the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and the U.S.-led invasion of the country. We may now be on the verge of another Afghan crisis.

As the U.S.- and NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops end their ten-plus-year occupation of the country by 2014, there are growing doubts whether the Afghan National Security Forces are ready to inherit the task of securing the country and its government. If not, Afghanistan will return to anarchy and again become a fertile base for militants and terrorists to threaten South and Central Asia—and perhaps beyond. If the Western powers, China, Russia, and Afghanistan’s other neighbors agree on anything, it is that Afghanistan must not again become a base for militants. At a time of opportunity for broader and deeper regional development, the need to build on that consensus is clear.

HOW WE GOT HERE

After the September 11 attacks, U.S. and ISAF forces took control of Afghanistan to destroy all terrorist training and support facilities as well as the groups they identified as the principal source of terrorism, al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The United States then sought to transform a terrorist sanctuary into a constitutional democracy. Yet, following a decade of mixed results, and with an engagement-fatigued NATO community, a Europe under severe financial pressure, the growing unpopularity of the war in the United States, and the failure to secure an outright military victory or even to isolate insurgents from mainstream Afghan society, the foreign forces have committed themselves to exit.

Despite the drawdown, NATO members have pledged to “continue to support Afghanistan on its path towards self-reliance in security, improved governance and economic and social development.”¹² Conferences in Bonn, Kabul, and Tokyo have produced similar commitments. Yet, success will depend mainly on the Afghans themselves—and, in particular, on the transition to a security environment managed by Afghan forces. Here, there are six primary challenges.

First, there is the Afghan internal security architecture. The Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police must accept full responsibility for the country’s security. Washington can provide a large share of the financing, and has already promised to fund the Afghan National Army until 2030, but there is skepticism that Afghanistan can make up the difference to sustain a force of a half million troops. Of course, the true cost of developing and maintaining this force can only be measured against the strength of the Afghan insurgency. The staying power of Taliban militants depends mainly on Pakistan’s support for major militant groups like the Haqqani network, Hizb-e-Islami, and others. The root cause of Afghanistan’s troubles is found in Afghanistan, but Pakistan continues to play a crucial role in determining how they develop.

Second, the future of the insurgency and state of the transition are both directly influenced by progress in Afghanistan’s political reconciliation process. The near complete defeat and destruction of al-Qaeda has created a consensus in favor of a negotiated settlement with the Taliban as the surest path to Afghan stability. The Taliban, in turn, has demonstrated a willingness in 2011 and 2012 to negotiate with both Kabul and Washington. Despite promising early signs, little progress has been made, in part because fear of election-year domestic political fallout in the United States has limited the United States’ willingness to directly engage Taliban leaders. Afghan president Hamid Karzai has also begun a discreet dialogue with Taliban negotiators, though with few immediate prospects for success, and with influential tribal leaders and representatives of key ethnic groups. Officials from Saudi Arabia and Qatar have acted as intermediaries in the broader reconciliation process.

Third, the nature and extent of the continuing U.S. military presence will be a crucial factor in establishing long-term domestic stability. The Karzai government knows it needs a substantial number of U.S. troops for long-term security, and a loya jirga (grand council), representing a broad cross-section of Afghan society, voted by secret ballot to authorize a strategic agreement with the United States under which American combat troops could stay in Afghanistan after 2014. By signing such a Strategic Partnership Agreement with Afghanistan, Washington has signaled Afghan citizens, insurgents, and the country’s neighbors that it will maintain an “enduring presence” in the country. Though the vast majority of U.S. troops will leave Afghanistan by 2014, an estimated forty thousand U.S. troops—including trainers, advisers, and special forces backed by airpower—will be based in Afghanistan across six military bases. U.S. forces, especially the special forces, CIA ground operations, and drones, will assist the Afghan army in counterinsurgency operations, and the evolving situation in Iran provides another incentive to stay. The CIA carries out surveillance missions over Iran from the U.S.-controlled Shindand Air Base, which is located less than seventy-five miles from the Iranian border. Under the partnership agreement, the United States is also committed to providing annual financial support of approximately $2.7 billion, primarily for Afghan security forces, until 2024.

Yet, dozens of ISAF soldiers have been killed in 2011 and 2012, not only by improvised explosive devices (IEDs) but by members of the Afghan army, prompting several ISAF member countries, including France and New Zealand, to withdraw troops ahead of schedule. The U.S. Defense Department acknowledges nearly 2,100 U.S. casualties in Afghanistan, and the possibility of an earlier-than-scheduled withdrawal following an unexpected surge in attacks cannot be ruled out.

Fourth, no one can predict the economic impact on Afghanistan of the withdrawal of foreign forces. This is a country where, according to the World Bank, 97 percent of gross domestic product comes from foreign money. The presence of foreign forces, nongovernmental organizations, and so-called Provincial Reconstruction Teams has created thousands of local jobs. Foreign spending has generated an enormous economic stimulus. According to the Congressional Research Service, recent U.S. annual spending in Afghanistan has amounted to $110–$120 billion. Faced with political pressure for less government spending at home, that total is expected to fall to about $2.7 billion after 2014, and the World Bank forecasts a $7 billion shortfall in Afghanistan’s annual budget beginning that year. At a conference in Tokyo in July 2012, the United States, Germany, Japan, Britain, and other donors pledged to provide Afghanistan’s government with $16 billion in civilian aid over four years, but that won’t be enough to fully close the gap, and massive levels of corruption are likely to aggravate the problem.

Fifth, Afghanistan and Pakistan share a 1,500-mile border and, as noted, Pakistan will play a primary role in Afghanistan’s internal stability. The Pakistani military leadership fears that cooperation, actual or potential, between the governments of Afghanistan to the west and India to the east will leave Pakistan encircled by hostile forces. That is why Pakistan, which is now home to 2.5 million Afghan refugees, is also home to the Afghan Taliban leadership; its major fighting force, the Haqqani network; and various other insurgent groups. Pakistan controls Afghanistan’s most important trade route, the ancient Grand Trunk Road—the main and only overland trade route between Kabul and Delhi. Pakistan’s policies toward Afghanistan—as well as toward the militants based in and operating from Pakistan’s tribal areas bordering Afghanistan—contribute to both the insurgency and the counterinsurgency effort. Washington and Kabul complain that Pakistan has not done enough to target the Afghan Taliban fighters operating from its territory or to persuade the group’s leaders to become part of Afghanistan’s process of political reconciliation.

But cross-border militancy cuts both ways, and Pakistan faces terrorist risks from insurgents and militants operating inside Afghanistan. In 2012, Pakistan’s security forces faced a spike in the number of well-coordinated attacks from Pakistan’s own Taliban, which frequently struck from (and retreated to) Afghan territory. As militant attacks on Pakistani targets and sectarian violence have increased, Pakistan’s government has become more aggressive in fighting back in border regions, and talks between Kabul and Islamabad on a possible Strategic Partnership Agreement are under way. Pakistan’s relations with India are improving as well. If these trends continue, Pakistan could emerge as part of the Afghan solution, instead of simply exacerbating the problem.

Finally, as Afghanistan is forced to reduce its dependence on Western donors, its regional relationships will become much more significant. If Pakistan, India, and Iran feed the problems of insurgency, militancy, corruption, and competition for money and influence among tribal leaders, infusions of Western aid will be of little help. Afghanistan’s security environment includes immediate neighbors and distant neighbors. Rising China, resurgent Russia, changing India, oil-rich Saudi Arabia, aggressive Iran, ore-rich Central Asian states, and increasingly assertive Turkey will each play a role in Afghanistan’s future. For all these countries, a stable Afghanistan offers a bulwark against extremism.

This helps explain why the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which includes China, Russia, and several Central Asian governments, has granted Afghanistan observer status. The South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which includes India and Pakistan, has given Afghanistan full membership. India’s 2011 Strategic Partnership Agreement with Afghanistan and Turkey’s active diplomatic bid to promote Afghan political reconciliation could also make a difference. Regional initiatives aimed at developing a consensus approach on Afghanistan have included trilateral summit meetings between Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

In addition, some of Afghanistan’s neighbors have taken steps to weave the country more deeply into the region’s web of trade. Pakistan will concede to Afghanistan and India a transit trade facility, which is indispensable to enhanced regional trade and economic cooperation, leading gradually to potential restoration of a modern Silk Road. Tighter trade and other commercial ties among India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan will give each government greater incentive to fight militancy and bolster security stability.

The interplay between these six factors will determine whether Afghanistan can finally become a stable and prosperous country.

CONCLUSION

All this said, the United States’ role remains central to the future security of Afghanistan. For Washington, minimum levels of security will depend on an Afghan army that can eventually secure Afghan territory and a political process that prevents the Taliban from becoming the controlling political partner in any future government. Washington will remain focused in years to come on helping Kabul achieve these objectives—and seems set to avoid the near total withdrawal of U.S. influence we saw during the 1990s. Yet, Washington’s financial pressures, likely defense cuts, and other priorities will limit the depth of engagement after 2014—and could make it difficult for Washington or cash-strapped Europeans to follow through on financial promises to Kabul, particularly if corruption continues at its current level. An Afghanistan that depends on foreign donors for another generation is not one that is likely to enjoy an extended period of peace. There will be no Marshall Plan for Afghanistan, and the sort of extensive U.S. economic and security-related investment seen in Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea seems unlikely, particularly given Afghanistan’s state of development. Hence, a NATO/ISAF-dependent security plan is neither politically nor financially viable.

The worst-case scenario in Afghanistan would be an acute financial shock to the Afghan economy, the collapse of the Afghan army, a slide into anarchy, the eruption of civil war, a sudden and unplanned exit of all troops, a move by Pakistan to play favorites among emerging leaders inside the country, and enhanced competition for influence on the part of Pakistan and India that undermines bilateral relations between these two nuclear-armed powers.

To avoid this outcome, Washington must focus its political, diplomatic, and financial resources on doing what it can to ensure that Afghanistan can build and sustain extensive regional trade ties, a plan that can enhance security and stimulate sustainable local growth. This is Afghanistan’s—and the world’s—best insurance against a return of the Taliban and of Islamic militants. This is yet another reason why the United States cannot afford to give up on ties with Pakistan and needs Islamabad’s help in both targeting militants in lawless regions and promoting regional reconciliation, reconstruction, and commerce. Yet, it is also a reason why Washington should allow Russia and even Iran to play a role in the process. In particular, Afghan cooperation with Iran on construction of pipelines to transport oil and gas across the region can be crucial to regional economic integration.

The problem of Afghanistan’s reconstruction and its future is thus a global problem with a regional solution. It is a project in the interest of every government.