Few contemporary political figures have aroused as much controversy as Yasser Arafat. For almost a month before his death, the world witnessed an agonizing re-examination of his life without being able to agree on his place in history.
In personal terms he had manifested signs of incoherence for more than two years. There were suggestions that his mind was vacant and, politically, his leadership of the Palestinians had been in doubt since the failure of the Camp David negotiations between him and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak during the last two months of the Clinton administration. After that he was no longer acceptable in international forums. As a result many Palestinians felt disenchanted with his leadership.
In four decades Arafat went from being a nationalist revolutionary to freedom fighter, to statesman, to Nobel Peace Prize winner, to president of the Palestinian Authority and eventually to being a discredited political leader committed to antiquated methods who was no more than a caricature of his old self. Towards the very end he was reduced to nothing more than an incapacitated petty dictator living on past achievements.
Arafat’s decline began with the Oslo agreement of 1993. Accepting the terms of the vague agreement produced a disaster. According to Palestinian lawyers who were invited to proffer an opinion on Oslo before the final draft was signed, Arafat rejected their opinion that agreements between strong and weak parties favour the strong. To the lawyers, Oslo was the equivalent of a Palestinian surrender.
The perception of this was made worse by the fact that Arafat negotiated Oslo secretly and accepted it to safeguard his leadership position. The official Palestinian delegation negotiating openly in Washington had turned down better Israeli offers. But he feared that allowing the delegation to sign a peace agreement would marginalize him and produce a transfer of power from the PLO, then in exile in Tunisia, to the indigenous population of the West Bank and Gaza, from where all the official delegates came.
Oslo was a trap and Arafat walked into it willingly. No other Palestinian would have signed an agreement which left the problems of the boundaries, water, refugees and Jerusalem to later except the man everybody called Mr Palestine. Arafat thought that he could turn the agreement into something acceptable to his people. He misjudged the accusative nature of the Israeli state and the attitude of Israeli politicians towards the Palestinians.
The subsidiary agreements which followed Oslo, the Taba and Cairo agreements in 1994, exposed the weakness in the Palestinian position and the determination of the Israelis to follow their onesided interpretation. Under Yitzhak Rabin, until he was assassinated in November 1995, the Israelis refused to budge on anything worthwhile. At this point an Arafat attempt to secure the backing of the Arab league for abrogating Oslo was turned down. Not having been consulted on the agreement itself, the Arab governments refused to be involved.
The election which followed Rabin’s death produced a victory for militant Likud and aggressive and uncompromising Benjamin Netanyahu. This sealed the fate of Oslo. Netanyahu was totally distrustful of Arafat and scoffed at his interpretations of the agreement. He made no secret of his non-acceptance of many of its articles and determination to undermine its application, especially the parts concerning the expansion of the Israeli settlements in the occupied territories.
It wasn’t only that, contrary to Arafat’s many statements lamenting the death of Rabin and blaming the deadlock in implementing Oslo on the right-wing elements in Israel, neither Labour nor Likud was willing to grant Arafat what he had promised the Palestinian people. In addition to expanding the settlements, the issue of Jerusalem and a Palestinian presence in it was not part of Israeli thinking. The Israelis insisted that Jerusalem was exclusively theirs, ‘the eternal capital of Israel’, and not a subject for negotiation. Refusing to be honest with his people, Arafat continued to perpetuate the illusion of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital.
In fact the smallest issue between the two sides took a long time to overcome. Delay after delay eroded whatever faith either side had in the peace process. Meanwhile, ignoring both the spirit and letter of Oslo, the United Nations and appeals by Washington, the Israelis continued to expand settlements, indulged in what they called a ‘thickening’ process and eventually, blatantly created new ones from scratch. The deadline for concluding Oslo, May 1999, became a mirage. None of the basic issues separating the two sides were being addressed.
Arafat had returned to Gaza in August 1994, kissed Palestinian soil and raised his fingers in a victory sign. By 1999 the victory sign had produced nothing for his people except a 50 per cent decline in their per capita income. Counting on his lack of interest in anything but the confrontation with Israel, Arafat’s immediate entourage, a collection of feckless PLO loyalists who had lost the confidence of many Palestinians, continued to pursue their personal interests. Arafat’s mismanagement and total neglect of internal issues which mattered to his people went further. He paid little attention to the elected Legislation Counsel, dismissed members of the judiciary who disobeyed him, rid his administration of talented people who thought for themselves and moved forward unabashed. His performance in two areas – what he got from Israel in return for accepting Oslo and the nature of his governance – were total failures.
When his persistent attribution of the failure to implement Oslo to Rabin’s death became stale, he resorted to drama and committed himself to accepting the United States as the sole arbiter of the impasse. It was another strategic mistake which would cost him dearly. Not only is the United States an ally of Israel but the Palestinian people knew that, resented Arafat’s move and rejected America’s role as a fair arbiter. What he did was considered a second act of ‘surrender’. When Arafat would not relent, the Palestinians turned to the radical Islamic movements Hamas and Islamic Jihad for solace. The level of violence against Israeli targets, including civilian ones, increased.
The only real opportunity for a way out of the deadlock came in May 1999, when, miraculously, former Israeli chief of staff Ehud Barak led the Labour party to victory. Barak’s election to prime minister reflected an Israeli disenchantment with the stalemate. During the election campaign, Barak committed himself to expediting the peace process and reaching ‘a full and final agreement’ to end the Arab–Israeli conflict. The pressure on Arafat made him accept the concept of full and final settlement readily. Promising as it sounded, this was a recipe for disaster for both men. There were too many issues to overcome.
Packaging all the outstanding issues in one bundle was akin to wanting to climb the highest mountain in a single leap. Why Barak and Arafat didn’t opt for a step-by-step approach cannot be explained except in terms of cynical politics, an attempt to please the home crowd. Nor did Clinton advise them otherwise for he too was after a full and final settlement in the last months of his presidency.
Despite a news blackout, optimism filled the air. News leaks spoke of an agreement being reached for the Israelis to return 95 per cent of the West Bank and Gaza land seized in 1967 to the Palestinian Authority. More dramatic was the news of an Israeli concession on Jerusalem, of Barak’s acceptance of a Palestinian presence in the city. Meeting followed meeting, all at Camp David in the United States, and all the news filtering out told of a personal amity between Arafat and Barak, an atmosphere full of promise and hope.
But whatever it was the two sides agreed on failed to materialize. There was nothing to give the talk enough momentum to solve the other issue. After months of pretence, in September 1999 both sides shocked the world and announced their failure to reach agreement on land and Jerusalem. They decided to suspend the talks on these vital elements and address the refugee problem. It was a foolish move. The refugee problem was and remains the hardest to resolve.
The negotiations were conducted against a background of deterioration in the human rights situation in the areas under the Palestinian Authority. Combined with unchecked corruption in the ranks of Arafat’s loyalists it diminished his standing among his people at a critical time. Lack of progress in the talks completed the picture; Arafat had nothing to offer the Palestinians. Late in 2000, Arafat issued a familiar call to arms. He asked his people to rise against the Israeli usurper. That the Palestinian had reason to rise and start a second intifada was undoubtedly true. But Arafat’s timing and appreciation of the strength of his position were totally wrong. The second, or Al Aqsa, intifada, was to become the fourth strategic mistake of Arafat’s leadership.
In 1968, the Arab countries relinquished much of their responsibility towards the Palestinians by ceding leadership of the confrontation with Israel to Arafat and the PLO. It was a criminal conspiracy of silence based on the unsound premise that the Palestinians were capable of defeating Israel on the battlefield. Arafat hid behind his dark glasses, made threatening speeches but had no military plan.
Oslo was the consequence of the failure to defeat or dislocate Israel. Initially greeted with enthusiasm, the agreement eventually lived up to the lawyers’ predictions and became a case of total surrender. The Israelis realized that Arafat’s position was weak and expanded their claims on Palestinian land and integrity. In response, Arafat tried to saddle Israel’s principle backer with the results of his own failure. He declared that America was behind Israel’s intransigence and expected the Palestinian people to sympathize with his inability to stand up to the only super power in the world.
By mid-2000, elections in Israel and the United States produced Ariel Sharon and George W. Bush. Neither was likely to bow to Arafat’s improvised intifada. But his belated realisation of this and attempt to reverse direction to stop the uprising was a failure. Palestinian frustration with his lack of success, constant change in direction and the stubborn positions of Israel and the United States had already become impossible to contain. For the first time ever, Arafat’s primacy started being challenged and there were young firebrands, such as Marwan Barghouti, who were willing replace ‘the old man’. Suddenly the once undisputed leader was neither here nor there.
With both Bush and Sharon refusing to deal with him, he tried to placate them through a typical Arafat one-step-forward-two-steps-backward routine. He ordered his security apparatus to undertake a crack– down on the Islamic movements Hamas and Islamic Jihad. The Palestinian Authority was transformed into a police state; thousands of people were imprisoned, dozens tortured and no less than twenty-four died while in police custody. Even human rights activists were attacked in broad daylight. The local Arabic press was muffled.
But these moves were considered as half-hearted by Bush and Sharon who demanded a crack-down by Arafat on his own more militant followers, the popular Barghouti included. Arafat, unable to accommodate them, responded by freeing the Islamists. He played right into the hands of Bush and Sharon. At the end of 2000, catching him while on a trip to the West Bank away from Gaza headquarters, the Israelis ordered their forces to surround him in Ramallah and confined him and a small number of assistants to a compound of five buildings.
With the Bush administration totally committed to inaction, the Sharon government followed Arafat’s confinement with a policy of massive retaliation. Town after Palestinian town came under unrestrained Israeli attack the moment a single townsman was suspected of a single act of resistance against the Israeli occupation. And most towns suffered curfews that lasted days at a time. In the city of Jenin, there were more than three hundred casualties in one week. With the Arabs preoccupied with America’s invasion of Afghanistan and impending attack on Iraq, and with the Bush administration determined to ignore Arafat and label Israeli prime minister Sharon ‘a man of peace’, it became apparent that only the removal of the Palestinian leader would alter the fortunes of his people.
Amazingly and despite defection from the ranks of the Palestinian leadership from some of his closest friends, Arafat refused to bow to outside demands. Even many of the Palestinian leaders who helped elevate him to his leadership position, Abu Mazen and Abu ’Ala began thinking that his removal would serve Palestinian interest. Still, with Arafat largely popular with the rank and file of the Palestinian people, he prevailed over his old comrades and maintained his position.
However, the Palestinian problem stopped being a conflict with Israel and became an internal struggle for the leadership of the Palestinians. Obeying their own ambitions, other Palestinians joined Abu Mazen and Abu ’Ala and openly advocated the removal of Arafat. This incredible situation was to last for nearly three years. There were no efforts by outside powers or the Arab countries to restore him to his rightful position or restart negotiations. But then in October 2004, visibly unwell and looking like a shadow of his former self but still unabashedly raising his fingers in the V for victory sign, Arafat emerged from the cramped, unhygienic compound as a man clearly in need of medical attention. He was frail and unable to walk without assistance. At the end of October, he was moved from Ramallah to a military hospital in Paris as a guest of the French government. All quarrels with his old comrades came to an end and his estranged wife re-emerged to be at his side for the first time in four years.
There was much speculation and confusion and to date the world has not been told the nature of the disease which finally brought Yasser Arafat’s life to an end in the early hours of 11 November 2004. But even his most steadfast enemies found it difficult to criticize a man who in failure was referred to as Mr Palestine or Our Father.
Palestinians throughout the world became one in their grief. The Israelis refused to grant him his only recorded wish to be buried in Jerusalem. The press began speculating about what would happen to his real or imaginary fortune. President Bush callously declared that Arafat’s departure represented a new opportunity for peace.
Only time will determine Arafat’s place in history. His failures as a warrior, peacemaker, and head of the Palestinian state, which are there for all to see, reduced his stature. But his symbolic importance to most of the eight million people who call themselves Palestinians remains a source of wonder to his critics, this writer included. Now, as for the past forty years, he was the finest expression of what Palestine meant to them. When hundreds of thousands of them hailed his coffin when it arrived in Ramallah earlier today, many of them weeping openly, the well-known Palestinian spokesperson Hanan Ashrawi described the scene as ‘vintage Arafat; he would have liked it’.
Said K. Aburish,
Nice, 12 November 2004