CHAPTER 6

The Attempted Breakthrough
by Army Group Fabeck.

Following the early bitter fighting which had not led to the desired breakthrough, the situation around Ypres was reviewed. It was still considered that success on this northern flank would be decisive if it unleashed German formations to fall on the Allied flank thus exposed. Within days it was evident that the offensive operations of Fourth Army under Duke Albrecht of Württemberg were beginning to stall, so a decision was made to concentrate a new ‘Army Group Fabeck’ from the forces of XV Corps and II Bavarian Corps, together with 26th Infantry Division and the newly raised 6th Bavarian Reserve Division. The command element was based on Headquarters XIII Corps from Württemberg, with General der Infanterie von Fabeck in command and Oberstleutnant von Loßberg as chief of staff. Orders for the reorganisation arrived on 28 October, direct from Army Supreme Command. The so-called, and somewhat confusingly titled, ‘Army Group’, was to come under the command of the Sixth Army of Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria. This large mass of troops was to be moved rapidly into position and was to launch a fresh assault in a northwesterly direction from a line of departure drawn between Deûlémont and Wervik. The clear objective was to thrust along the general axis Ypres-Poperinge, breaking the British line once and for all. Up until this point, as described earlier, the sector between the Sixth Army, preoccupied with the battles for Arras, La Bassée and Armentières and Fourth Army was held more or less loosely by cavalry formations. The new arrangement was designed to transform German strength in this key area and it was popular with the cavalry, who were not relishing having to fight in the dismounted role and increasingly against the odds. On the eve of the battle, the general in command of all the cavalry south of Ypres wrote to his wife, describing what was about to happen.

General der Kavallerie Georg von der Marwitz Senior Cavalry Commander 2 ¹

“I believe that I can write to you about the forthcoming operations, because they begin early tomorrow morning [30 October 1914]. From the Menen – Ypres road, the enemy position bends away sharply southwest and west. From there to Messines my divisions are dug in facing the enemy. The total length of the frontage is about sixteen kilometres. The regiments have held on to these positions for about eight days now, whilst their horses have been held south of the Lys. Now today comes relief. Two and a half corps under Fabeck are to launch an assault on Ypres via Wervik and Comines. Our men are going to be relieved in the line at about midnight then march back six to eight kilometres to the horses. Instead of them the infantry will be manning the trenches and then tomorrow and, after an absolutely crazy bombardment on the enemy positions, everyone is going to attack with as much surprise as possible.

“If the attack is successful, the enemy line will be pierced and their situation as far as the sea will be untenable. By the time my letter reaches you, you may already have read about a successful battle. It could well be decisive for the northern theatre of operations. I pray to God that he may grant our troops success! The assault may overrun the forward enemy positions with ease then the follow up thrust may develop extraordinary power and send them all packing. On the other hand it could easily stall in front of the front line and then again there may be other positions in rear of the first ones, so that the attack will have to be phased. Based on these thoughts, you should be able to determine from reports of Supreme Army Headquarters how things turned out at Ypres on 30 October.”

For the formations involved in the new offensive, there was no time to lose. Whilst the new headquarters was being set up in Linselles, Fabeck and Loßberg rushed around on 28 October, making contact with the various headquarters involved and acquainting themselves with the situation on the Fourth Army front and forward of the cavalry. One particular concern was the quantity of heavy artillery available to the Army Group, as was the extreme shortage of ammunition. By this stage of the war, artillery units further south around Arras and on the Somme were being restricted to two or three shells per gun per day, but even these extreme measures did not free up significant quantities of ammunition for use elsewhere and the lack was to be felt keenly later. In the short term, the only additional units which could be made available were: elements of 1st Battalion Guards Foot Artillery and 1st Battalion Foot Artillery Regiment 4 with heavy field howitzers. There were also some heavy howitzers from II Bavarian Corps and 1st Battalion Foot Artillery Regiment 14, heavy howitzers from half of 1st Battalion Foot Artillery Regiment 19, together with one 300 mm howitzer battery from 26th Infantry Division. The four heavy howitzer batteries of 2nd Battalion Bavarian Reserve Foot Artillery Regiment 3 were held back in reserve initially.²

Most of the cavalry and associated jäger battalions operating on the new front were subordinated to one or other of the formations of Army Group Fabeck and incorporated into the altered plans which, because of the urgency of the situation, were issued as early as the evening of 28 October. In broad outline, XV Corps was to attack on the right flank, with its most northerly units advancing just to the south of the Menen – Ypres road and its left flank units along the Comines -Ypres canal where its heavy artillery was also to be placed. On the southern flank, with its left hand formation anchored on Garde Dieu, II Bavarian Corps was to form the Schwerpunkt [point of main effort] of the attack. On the extreme left, 26th Infantry Division was to assault with its southern flank on the Douvebeek to the west of Warneton. Cooperating with the planned assault, elements of HKK [Senior Cavalry Commander] 1, supported by three battalions of XIX Corps, was to attack St Yvon and Ploegsteert Wood. From this, it can be seen that the primary aim was to force a decisive breakthrough to the south of Ypres. Whether this attempt would achieve more than the thrusts to the north of that place had done remained to be seen.

Eyewitness Locations Chapter 6

Clearly all concerned were determined to give of their best to secure the new objective, but the preparation time was severely truncated and the troops who were to carry out the attack had to overcome a number of severe difficulties. The principal negative factor was that all the troops concerned had to spend more or less the whole of 29 October moving into position and, which was worse, the leading elements followed this by lengthy, exhausting, approach marches in pitch darkness during the night 29/30 October, in order to be on their start lines at the appointed hour. As the time for the attack approached, Fabeck was faced with the unpalatable fact that his infantry was already very tired and had had absolutely no opportunity to reconnoitre the ground over which it was meant to advance. Not only that, it was quite clear, even without detailed staff checks, that the artillery resources were inadequate to meet the demands of the forthcoming task.

Fabeck despatched a request for a delay of twenty four hours in order to meet some of these concerns, but Supreme Army Command dismissed the request, insisting instead that the attack went in on 30 October as planned and with the support of Fourth and Sixth Armies on either flank. The chief of staff of Army Group Fabeck later noted some of these difficulties and concerns.

Oberstleutnant Fritz von Loßberg, Headquarters Army Group Fabeck ³

“We were convinced that the assault of Army Group Fabeck was going to bump up against stiff resistance because the time delay on this previously planned attack to the south of Ypres (the orders for which had only just been given), had provided the enemy time to move up reinforcements. Having strengthened their front along the lower Ijzer by flooding, they were then able to move the formations thus released south to counter Army Group Fabeck and the left flank of Fourth Army. [In addition] with the exception of 6th Bavarian Reserve Division, almost all the units of Army Group Fabeck had been severely reduced in strength as a result of previous battles and, above all, from the very first days of the battle, there was a serious lack of artillery ammunition, which became worse and worse with the onset of offensive operations, thus making reduction of stubbornly defended woods and strongly-built villages increasingly difficult.”

No matter what the reservations within the chain of command were, every effort had to be made to fulfil the overall aim of this new offensive. XV Corps, advancing with 30th Infantry Division right and 39th Infantry Division left, had the overall mission of taking over its frontage from the cavalry and launching an attack between the Menen – Ypres road and the Ijzer – Lys canal and breaking through to Ypres and beyond. On the eve of the attack, the corps commander issued a special order of the day, which included this exhortation to the troops:

‘Tomorrow, in conjunction with Bavarian II Corps and 26th Infantry Division, we are to attack the British around Zandvoorde and to the east of that place and then push on to Ypres. This breakthrough is of decisive importance for the outcome of the war. Therefore we shall and must be victorious! His Majesty the Kaiser trusts that each will try his utmost to do his duty. We shall make sure that we justify this trust. Brave and undaunted we are going to attack the British, Indians, Canadians,⁴ Moroccans and all such rabble. The enemy is becoming worn out and recently, whenever we have gone for them energetically, they have surrendered in large numbers. So let us go forward with God for our Kaiser and our beloved German Fatherland!’⁵

For its part, II Bavarian Army Corps extracted its mission and tasks from the Army Group Fabeck directive and issued its orders during the afternoon of 29 October. Whilst not downplaying the significance of the thrust just south of the Menen – Ypres road, it underlines that the main effort had been shifted to the south for the time being.⁶

“1. General von Fabeck intends to deploy the Bavarian II Army Corps to break through the enemy positions along the line of the canal. To our right XV Corps will also go on the offensive and 26th Infantry Division will attack to our left. Strong forces echeloned in depth behind the inner flanks of these neighbouring formations are in place to prevent Bavarian II Army Corps from being vulnerable to outflanking manoeuvres after it has broken through. A general reserve will be formed from 6th Bavarian Reserve Division and one heavy howitzer battalion.

“2. The Schwerpunkt [point of main effort] of the attack is placed on the inner flank of the two divisions and is directed at the village and chateau of Hollebeke. So, once the canal has been crossed, permanent contact is to be maintained between the two divisions. Having gained the heights northwest of Basseville and the Rozebeek sector, the next strong points to the rear are to be assaulted immediately and preferably with fresh troops.

“3. The attack will begin at daybreak 30 October when, without further order, the artillery is to range in. As soon as this is complete and the artillery is ready to start its bombardment, the infantry is to begin immediately to advance so as to force the enemy to man its positions. The artillery is to bring down effective fire against the occupied positions. Harassing fire simply squanders ammunition and is forbidden. Every effort is to be made to profit from the flanking effect of interdivisional cross fire. Artillery operating from the 4th Division sector is to superimpose its fire on the Zandvoorde area.

“4. A field gun battery is to be allocated in direct support of each of the infantry regiments in the front line. When this happens they are removed from the command of their parent artillery formations.

“5. By 6.00 pm 29 October at the latest, Commander 4 Field Artillery Brigade (less his staff) is to report to the Corps command post in Comines and act as artillery adviser until further notice. Placed at his disposal are Oberstleutnant Gramich and Hauptmann Lehmann from Corps Headquarters, one orderly officer from each of 3 Field Artillery Brigade and Foot Artillery Regiment Gartmeyer and six despatch riders from the cavalry of each division.”

Apart from the picture this paints of the main threads of the plan, the order is interesting in other ways. It includes, for example, an order to the corps signals detachment to connect the divisional headquarters by telephone line to corps headquarters, suggesting that that was not standard practice.⁷ Furthermore, the fact that an artillery adviser and staff had to be improvised at the beginning of a major offensive shows how the German army was wrestling to come to terms with the need to centralise control of artillery fire on the modern battlefield and to move away from the wasteful dispersal of assets. The attempt to correct these problems and the reservations expressed by Loßberg chime with a widespread feeling that all was not well with the way the German army was organised and deployed to meet the needs and demands of the offensive battle. The desperate straits in which the Fourth Army found itself repeatedly can be laid firmly at the door of inexperience and inadequate training and equipment. The problems experienced by the formations of the other German armies were in some ways more worrying, because they seemed to suggest that pre-war doctrine and development had been wanting and that there had been gaps and deficiencies in the area of all-arms cooperation and training.

In an attempt to correct the more glaring manifestations of these difficulties, the Chief of Staff Sixth Army, Generalmajor Konrad Krafft von Dellmensingen, issued a strongly worded directive, based on instructions from Supreme Army Headquarters, on the eve of the offensive by Army Group Fabeck. Because it deals with matters of fundamental importance to the entire German army, it is worth considering at length.⁸

“During recent days, several promising opportunities have been wasted because entire corps have allowed themselves to be held up by vastly inferior forces. This situation can be traced back to the fact that attacks are not being pressed home with the utter disregard for danger that each attack which aims at a decisive result demands. Naturally it must be recognised that the high officer losses have seriously damaged the offensive power of the army. However, if as a consequence we frequently conduct half-hearted attacks, the enemy will soon lose respect for us. We shall spare the blood of our infantry if we confine ourselves to attacks which are essential and make sure that they are strongly supported by all available artillery and other technical resources. If, however, a decisive attack is ordered, then every commander, including those at high levels, is personally⁹ to ensure, including by example, that he is so engaged that the attack will be conducted with the utmost power. Superior officers are also to appear at the front sufficiently frequently to bring their personalities to bear on the troops.

“Valuable advantages are often not being exploited properly because, in the case of formations advancing alongside one another, instead of driving forward ruthlessly within their boundaries, troops are pausing to allow their neighbours to catch up, or halting as soon as they come under enfilade fire from neighbouring sectors. From receipt of this [directive] there is an explicit ban on delaying or halting if the planned advance is delayed or disrupted on neighbouring fronts, or to see what effect the outflanking manoeuvre might have. Even if neighbouring attacks are held up, that is no excuse for failing to act.

“It is a fundamental principle of the French artillery to bring down flanking fire and it cannot be avoided when adjacent formations are advancing simultaneously. The troops must arrange for their own protective measures. It must also be the unvarying case that neighbours may never be left in trouble. Individual units and formations have often suffered heavy casualties because their neighbours delayed far too long before coming to their assistance, or believed wrongly, after reports from the other troops, that they were occupying places which were actually in enemy hands. It is essential, therefore, that reports and information concerning lines reached or points captured are absolutely reliable. If a formation is unable to reach a particular piece of terrain, or cannot do so in time; if it believes that the situation has changed, or that it cannot reach the designated place for reasons unknown to its superior level of command, it is to make the fact known to all relevant places, without fail.

“An extremely threatening squandering of artillery ammunition, far beyond even the most pessimistic estimates, has occurred. This has been caused because many units and formations have constantly engaged inadequately reconnoitred enemy positions with wide-ranging, harassing fire; either that or attempts have been made by bombarding enemy positions for days or hours at a time to eliminate them in that manner, instead of the infantry through daring direct action, forcing a weaker enemy to occupy [and attempt to defend] their positions. For the future it is essential that the troops draw the lesson that careful husbandry of artillery ammunition is of decisive importance; that simply bringing fire down will never have an effect and, furthermore, that fire may only be directed against clearly identified targets and only for strictly limited tactical purposes. As a result, the artillery may not meet every request by the infantry for fire support and may only respond to the senior commander. The infantry must always cooperate with the artillery in the attack; the artillery must never try to attack alone.

“It is very regrettable to note that up to now there has been a constant lack of liaison between neighbouring formations. This is another reason for the undesirable situations described [earlier]. The despatch of liaison officers is only useful when they are furnished with ample means to pass on information. In future, commanders will be held personally responsible for failures of this type.

“Every effort is to be made by all commanders to designate reserves or make them available once again [after redeployment]. Every individual man is to be pressed into service to this end.

“Troops not involved in attacks must spend their time thoroughly reinforcing their positions and developing them with all means available, so that they are strong enough to enable a minimal garrison to beat off all enemy attacks. Reserves are to be used constantly to reinforce. Even when battles are drawn out, it is essential to arrange for troops in the front line to be relieved, so that they can rest and regain their ability to strike. The men are never to be left with nothing to do. Every opportunity is to be taken to re-impose discipline through the use of drill.

“Commanders at all levels who fail to meet the requirements outlined above will be summarily dismissed. No special consideration will be given to any individual, not even if previously he has been thoroughly worthy. The names of all individuals who are not completely fit for their posts are to be passed immediately to Supreme Army Headquarters through official channels. Belief in a favourable outcome must always be maintained at a high level. Every individual must be made to realise what is at stake. Patience will certainly be required. It will be a long time before a final decision is achieved but, if every single individual is absolutely determined to see it through to the end, then all enemy efforts will be for nothing and final victory will be assured.”

On the right of XV Corps, 39th Infantry Division divided its frontage into three main sectors. Attacking on a narrow front, Infantry Regiment 132 on the right aimed to capture the rather elaborate farm complex 700 metres east of Zandvoorde. To the left, 82 Infantry Brigade, less one battalion, was allocated the centre and western parts of Zandvoorde, whilst the centre of the divisional sector was the responsibility of a composite force of jäger battalions from HKK [Senior Cavalry Commander] 2 under the command of Major Petersen, commanding officer Jäger Battalion 10. Shortly after first gunner light on 30 October (i.e. the time when targets could be made out at battle ranges by ground observers), a group of designated batteries fired three rolling salvoes as a signal that the preliminary bombardment of the enemy trenches was to begin.¹⁰ For once this was a substantial, if short, bombardment, with a significant contribution from concentrated heavy artillery. Precisely one hour later the general advance began, with 2nd Battalion Infantry Regiment 132 maintaining contact with 30th Infantry Division on its right. As an example of how concentrated the assault was, Oberst Kreyenberg attacked with his 1st and 2nd Battalions in line, each of them on a frontage of only 350 metres.

Despite being in position on the start line in good time, visibility was so poor that it was 8.00 am before the guns opened fire and 9.00 am before the two battalions, each reinforced by an engineer platoon to deal with obstacles and a machine gun platoon, launched their attacks with two companies forward.¹¹ The advance was far from easy. The battlefield was fundamentally flat, offering good fields of fire, though it was punctuated by folds in the ground, hedgerows and copses and criss-crossed by numerous drainage ditches. It was also dotted with farm houses and agricultural buildings of all kinds. The advance was subject to heavy flanking fire almost from the start and artillery defensive fire increased in strength constantly. Nevertheless good progress was made and 3rd Battalion, in reserve, closed up behind 2nd Battalion with the regimental band in attendance. By 11.00 am the attackers had penetrated the British positions on part of the 1st Battalion front but, on the extreme right, were stalled by the moat surrounding Zandvoorde Chateau and the bitter defence offered by the 1st Battalion Royal Welch Fusiliers. Nevertheless, at the cost of heavy casualties during virtually hand to hand fighting, the chateau, too, was swiftly taken and, with it, the primary divisional objective for the day.

2nd Battalion endured a far harder morning of fighting, dense thickets and woodland making it difficult to maintain direction and cohesion during the assault. However, once the chateau fell, much better progress was made, partly because units of the British 7th Cavalry Brigade lacked the dismounted strength fully to counter a determined and concentrated infantry attack. In order to encourage the troops to greater efforts, Oberst Kreyenberg ordered the regimental drummers to blow the appropriate calls and beat the drums for the assault. He then followed this by directing the regimental band to play stirring music in support of the attack.¹² Despite the intervention of 3rd Battalion and all the other encouragement, bitter and inconclusive fighting continued for several hours, leaving the men of Infantry Regiment 132 in a dangerously exposed position between Zandvoorde Chateau and Chapelle d’Epines. Finally, an immense effort was made to get a section of 2nd Battery Field Artillery Regiment 66 forward into positions where the enemy positions could be engaged at short range over open sights. Re-launched, the attack was driven home, but at heavy cost, especially amongst the company offices, several of whom fell at the head of their men as they strove to encourage them. Eventually the objectives were all carried and numerous prisoners from the Royal Welch Fusiliers and South Staffordshire Regiment were captured.

Whilst all this was occurring, at 2.30 pm, 39th Infantry Division ordered a continuation of the attack towards Zillebeke. This was to have involved Infantry Regiment 132 in a further advance to a point 800 metres beyond Zandvoorde, but the attack never got going. The day had been too costly in casualties, too hard fought in view of all the British counter-attacks and the men were completely exhausted by the effort. Despite vigorous action by Generalleutnant von Kathen and the remainder of the chain of command, it proved to be impossible to disentangle jumbled sub units so as to attack with any chance of success so, finally, the divisional reserves were stood down and the remaining troops were ordered to dig in where they were.

Also participating in the attack on 30 October was Infantry Regiment 136 of 30th Infantry Division. It had moved into position the previous night, taking up station between Infantry Regiment 99 on its right and one of the formations of 39th Infantry Division on its left. Three companies from each regiment were located forward in the front line as the artillery preparation began at 8.15 am. More or less exactly one hour later, the order to launch the attack arrived at the forward brigade headquarters and slowly, but surely, profiting from good artillery support, the attack began to make progress; Infantry Regiment 136 capturing several small positions and a series of farm buildings as it advanced approximately 600 metres. Already casualties were mounting due to the obstinate defence being put up by the British defenders and Major Borck, commanding officer 2nd Battalion Infantry Regiment 136, was killed at the head of his troops, as were Leutnants Schumann and Brinkmann.¹³ By about midday Infantry Regiment 136 has pushed forward as far as Chapelle d’Epines, located about one and a half kilometres south southwest of Nieuwe Kruiseke, but Infantry Regiment 99, which had suffered heavy casualties due to flanking fire from Geluveld, had made little progress and the whole attack in this sector threatened to stall. Ordered to push on at all costs, Infantry Regiment 99 continued to press in the direction of Geluveld then, towards 4.00 pm, Headquarters 30th Division ordered that the line Zandvoorde – Geluveld was to be secured that day

This was easier said than done, with the British infantry continuing to resist fiercely, in some cases from well constructed strong points, based around farm buildings and field fortifications. After hard fighting, Infantry Regiment 136 seized this line but, because flanking units had been less successful, two of its companies had to withdraw from the furthest point reached, in order to re-establish the link with the units to its north and south. A member of the machine gun company, who was involved in the thick of the action that day, later described the manner in which it had unfolded.

Schütze Meister Machine Gun Company Infantry Regiment 136 ¹⁴ 1.

“On the morning of 30 October 1914 there was to be an attack right across the front. That morning the storm broke punctually. The first trench was taken with few casualties and we captured between 600 and 700 prisoners. We then pressed on. As we advanced in bounds, we saw a white flag being waved above the enemy trench, so we stood up and advanced on the enemy. However, it was a trick. Just as we approached to within one hundred metres, we were engaged from there with rifle and machine gun fire. As though an order had been given, we all hit the ground and then we continued forward in rushes, but there were heavy casualties. The second trench was captured and we laid about us with rifle butts. Because the infantry was so tied up, Vizefeldwebel Mehlbräuer pushed on ahead with his platoon. We arrived at a farm which offered cover and he directed that the guns were to be placed in firing positions. He then went on ahead alone out of the farm, probably with the intention of placing a machine gun up on the hill, but the hill was occupied by the enemy. Vizefeldwebel Mehlbräuer did not get very far before we saw him hit and collapse. At that Unteroffizier Berning, who had assumed command of the platoon, gave orders that the guns were to go into action.”

After what was a day of hard fighting and painfully high casualties throughout 30th Infantry Division, the following night and morning was described by one member of the same regiment.

Unteroffizier Knauth 6th Company Infantry Regiment 136 ¹⁵ 1.

“That night there was strange, eerie silence. Hardly a single shot was heard and not a word was spoken aloud. A farmhouse to our front was burning and lighting up the trees behind in a marvellous manner. It was not possible to distinguish flames, smoke and sparks, just the glow of the fire, sometimes brighter, sometimes fainter, which showed that a blaze was still burning there behind the walls. There was no crackling to be heard or falling beams to be seen, it was all rather like a theatrical backcloth, with one pointed gable end standing up like a church spire above the remaining blackened walls with their empty window sockets. As dawn broke the flames died out and only a few sad remains of walls stuck up into the sky.

“Emerging like a shadowy figure out of the darkness our company feldwebel appeared and whispered to me, ‘One volunteer per section is to go forward on listening duty!’ Slowly and silently the thin file of men wrapped in their greatcoats disappeared. Within seconds, they had been swallowed by the darkness of the night. Gradually the clouds cleared and the stars emerged. For a great many of us this was the very last time that they would ever be able to look up at the endless starry heaven in all its beauty. At 6.00 am, still under the protection of darkness, a figure came up to our company feldwebel. They spoke together for a short time, then the figure disappeared once more. This was followed by a lively discussion amongst the platoon commanders down in the dugout. Soon all was quiet once more. A short while later my platoon commmander arrived.

“Has the attack been ordered?’ I asked. ‘Yes. The artillery opens up at 7.00 am to prepare the enemy positions for the assault’. That meant a stay of execution of another hour. Gradually it became light and I looked at my watch. Five minutes to go; then, passed on from mouth to mouth came the order, ‘Fix bayonets! Make ready!’ With a metallic clattering noise the bayonets were fixed. Would I be thrusting with my bayonet once more or not? If I did it would certainly be streaked with blood. A strange feeling came over me. It was not fear; that emerges only when we feel ourselves to be defenceless. But today we would be setting off calmly and sure of victory. If anyone was to fall, he would be falling in battle as a brave soldier, happily carrying out his duty to his Fatherland; as a victor, for not a man doubted that our operation would bring victorious success.

“At exactly 7.00 am there was a dreadful rushing, roaring and groaning sound in the air, just as though all hell had broken loose Our artillery had opened fire. To our front the ground dropped away to the road, then rose gently once more. Our artillery engaged the area on the far side of the road. Wherever the eye could see, smoke and pillars of earth were being thrown up by exploding shells with, between them, the small yellow clouds showing where shrapnel had burst. A road in the distance lined with poplars was brought under heavy fire and very soon a dozen snapped off tree trunks were lying in the road. Only a few hundred metres to our front rounds from a complete heavy battery were landing. It was a gruesomely fine sight. Our 210 mm howitzers were firing rapidly and all the smaller calibre guns, down to the lightest field guns, were contributing to the concert.

“There was almost no sound from the British artillery. On one occasion something whistled over our heads and impacted about two metres away in the soft ground, but the shell did not explode. Rapid small arms fire was then aimed at the British. Now and then the odd individual could be seen, but the enemy also fired back vigorously. One man leapt up out of the trench to take an order to the supporting platoon, but hardly had he broken cover than he gave a shout and fell, groaning terribly. A bullet had hit him in the abdomen. At the risk of their own lives, two men of the supporting platoon dragged him to safety. Shells whistled past, unpleasantly close to our heads then we saw German infantry emerge from the wood to our left and begin to advance. It could not be long before it was our turn. Our comrades down below us did not seem to be under fire, then one suddenly fell, followed by another. They began to run forward and another one went down. The remainder disappeared behind the house that had been burning the previous night. A battalion runner appeared. ‘6th Company: attack!’ he shouted, then disappeared once more. All of a sudden another runner appeared and bawled, ‘2nd Battalion: attack!’ At that our company commander shouted. ‘Right, with God’s help, let’s go!’ Reserve Leutnant Knapmann was the first to plunge into the hail of bullets. Followed by my section, I climbed out of the trench as fast as possible and we ran as fast as we could after our Leutnant.

“At first it appeared as though the British had been taken completely by surprise by our attack but no sooner had the other companies appeared than their bullets were whistling most unpleasantly around our ears. We ran as far as the road, but our way on the other side was blocked by a hedge. I ran up to it but, unfortunately, a few strands of wire ran through its twigs. Our company had now taken up a firing line with its front at ninety degrees to the road. To our right neighbouring troops had closed up to the thick hedge, which surrounded the farm to the right of the road. The British there seemed to be firing especially accurately, judging by the fall of shot, which was right in amongst the line.

“Offizierstellvertreter Räbisch ordered, ‘6th Company! On your feet! Double march!’ We took cover again just in front of the house. During the dash forward Räbisch had been grazed on the thigh by a bullet, but he took no notice. Drawing his sword and taking his pistol in his right hand, he entered the house to see if any of the enemy had hidden themselves there. Hardly had Räbisch entered the second room than he gave a groan and collapsed, with blood oozing out from beneath his helmet. Because I could see that simultaneously spurts of chalk were being thrown out of the wall on our side, I assumed that Räbisch had been hit by a German bullet but, by chance I looked out of the window and saw where the shot had come from. Barely one hundred metres behind the house there was an enemy trench, in which the British were running up and down in some excitement.

“In order to be able to maintain the link to 7th Company more easily, Leutnant Knapmann, I and a few other men rushed over the road into the ruins of the second house. The situation here was more or less the same as the other side, but this time there were no window openings in the direction of the enemy. At this point our howitzers opened fire on the trench to our front in order to help us get forward. We watched with uncontrolled joy as we saw how accurately our artillery was landing shells, this time directly on the trench. Not even the toughest British skulls could withstand that for long. Four times in succession there was a roaring sound just over us, so low that we feared the shells would collapse our gable end, but then there were four dreadful explosions one hundred metres to our front, so strong that they made the earth shake and caused the weakened wall above us to rock. Yellow earth and grey smoke rose up from four points along the enemy trench. Then, finally, it got too much for the British. They took to their heels and ran backwards as fast as their legs could carry them.

“Nobody gave an order on our side, but almost everyone rushed out of our houses, shouting Hurra! It would in fact have been better had we stayed where we were and simply fired from there, because our shells were still landing in the enemy trench. But who could show such control at a time like that? Then, suddenly, I received an awful blow to the left shoulder, causing me to cry out as I was thrown forwards. I was gasping for breath, my heart was beating fit to burst, my fingers clawed at the grass, my teeth ground together and my right foot came up against a metal object, which I saw later was my bayonet which was lying behind me. I realised that I had been shot in the back by a bullet which had exited through my chest and I thought that my last hour had come. Soon things improved a little. I could breathe once more and my heart rate steadied. I shouted to the man next to me to take my knapsack off. The rear of it was already soaked in blood. Extraordinary to relate, my next thought was, ‘Well, you will be spending Christmas at home’.

To the south, II Bavarian Corps had been making rather better, if slow, progress on 30 October. 4th Bavarian Division, commanded by Generalleutnant Graf von Montgelas, successfully stormed and captured Hollebeke at about 4.30 pm after a renewed assault had been arranged at 3.00 pm. Further to the south, 3rd Bavarian Division, under Generalleutnant Ritter von Breitkopf, assisted by 26th Infantry Division from Württemberg (which established itself a mere 1,200 metres from Wijtschate), pushed on west of Wambeke to within two kilometres of the crest of the Messines Ridge. According to German sources, however, there was also very hard fighting by elements of both 3rd and 4th Bavarian Infantry Divisions for Hollebeke Chateau and its adjoining parkland. Whilst Bavarian Infantry Regiment 9, with Infantry Regiment 172 on its right, was thrusting forward to the heights west of Zandvoorde, Bavarian Infantry Regiment 5 was heavily involved in the fight for the area around the chateau.¹⁶

Even with the direct fire support of two gun batteries, Bavarian Infantry Regiment 5, having first assaulted with two of its battalions in line, found that by midday it had to deploy all its own reserves and call on the support of battalion of Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment 5 and a company of Bavarian Jäger Battalion 2 that afternoon, before it was able to enter the grounds of the chateau and take prisoner a captain and two other members of the King’s Dragoon Guards.¹⁷ For its part, Bavarian Infantry Regiment 17 noted that it had to deal with several machine gun nests in succession by means of minor platoon and company tactics and the sending forward of reserves repeatedly until, by the time Hollebeke Chateau was finally taken and secured by 6 Bavarian Infantry Brigade, it was past 10.00 pm and long after darkness had fallen.¹⁸

Reserve Leutnant Hermann Kohl Bavarian Infantry Regiment 17¹⁹ 2.

“The German assault flooded northwest towards Hollebeke. Blow after blow was struck, but enemy machine guns fired mercilessly and tore holes in the ranks. Were we up against the same sort of fanatical opponents we had met at Maricourt?²⁰Here they clung on like glue to their ground and refused to yield one single square metre voluntarily. Charge followed charge as the companies crashed in. Bronzed Indian troops lay there, cut down in rows. They were Herculean men, with complete contempt for death, who took not a single step backwards! They preferred to die where they were! Only over their shattered skulls could the sacred charger of Mars advance to victory! Their fearful wrath as they faced death was matched only by the anger burning in the hearts of the German ranks.

“Towards 4.00 pm Wibel’s Battalion [Major Moritz Wibel, commanding officer 2nd Battalion] had pushed the attack to within three hundred metres of Hollebeke, Haasy’s Battalion [Major Wilhelm von Haasy, commanding officer 3rd Battalion] had crossed the canal and was advancing on the final objective of the day. It was tough, bitter, fighting. The potential of every building, right up to its rafters, was cunningly exploited for its defensive possibilities, the dense woods served as one long endless barrier to progress. Fire blazed down from the treetops, serving its deadly veto on the Bavarians storming forward . . . It was fighting at its hardest and only the good Lord knew to whom the evening would belong.

“The German guns roared, hurling their smashing steel with religious fervour, like a raging storm . . . but one battery fired using incorrect sight settings and hit the rear of Haasy’s Battalion badly. With dull thuds German shells came down amongst our own ranks. The commander gave the sign and the trumpeters blew ‘Halt!’ The battle was paused as runners raced back to the battery position but then, fifteen minutes later, a new performance took centre stage. There was an overture of the loudest fortissimo and the battle entered its final phase. The enemy line crumbled and, at 4.30 pm Hollebeke, that blood-soaked bulwark, was in German hands.

“This success was a spur to further action. That evening, despite being worn out by the battles of the day, the Bavarian 17th, in conjunction with the neighbouring troops, stormed the grounds of Hollebeke Chateau. The German Hurra! came like a shot out of the distance, echoed off the walls of the chateau and shook the occupants out of their carefree existence. In a tearing hurry, the enemy staff vacated the chateau, abandoning a freshly laid table, complete with silver cutlery and every delicacy. It must have been painful for that Great Nation to leave such sumptuous food to the barbarians, but the Germans were to have no problem dealing with it.”²¹

In summary, the first day of the offensive produced mixed and largely disappointing results for Army Group Fabeck. On the XV Corps front, Zandvoorde fell during the morning, followed a little later by its heavily fortified chateau, but the inability of XXVII Reserve Corps to the north to capture Geluveld meant that progress on its right flank was minimal. In an attempt to reinvigorate his attack, its commander, General der Infanterie von Deimling, requested the subordination of the heavy weapons of 2nd Battalion Mörser [i.e. heavy howitzer] Regiment 3, which was located at Comines. However, Fabeck’s intention remained to force a breakthrough on the narrow frontage of II Bavarian Corps, so he allocated only one battery to XV Corps, whilst the Bavarians received the support of three of the available batteries. In a further attempt to unlock the right flank, XV Corps then redirected several battalions towards Geluveld, but it made no difference; that village continued to resist stubbornly in the face of a series of attacks which went in repeatedly throughout the remainder of the day.

On the extreme left flank of Army Group Fabeck, the 26th Infantry Division from Württemberg, commanded by Generalleutnant Wilhelm Herzog [Duke] von Urach, had a hard, and not especially successful, day. In this area the terrain was extremely unfavourable for an assault, posing particular problems for the guns of Field Artillery Regiments 29 and 65 which supported it. The difficulties were particularly acute for the direct support guns, which 26th Infantry Division was already routinely allocating to its leading regiments during offensive operations. An unnamed diarist from Field Artillery Regiment 29 underlined the challenges in his entry for 31 October.²² 3.

“One section [of guns] had to be advanced even further so as to provide intimate support to the infantry. If the reconnaissance itself was very problematic, the move of the guns into position demanded an even more amazing performance by the gunners. They had to wade knee deep in the mud, whilst the guns themselves sank in up to their axles – and all this was achieved under constant artillery and small arms fire. The daring troop was hindered especially by the fire of some machine guns but, finally, Reserve Vizewachtmeister Engländer succeeded in locating these troublemakers and a few well directed shells silenced them. However, in order to be able to engage the main enemy trenches, it was necessary to change positions again.

“[Everyone] set to work with a will. Making use of long tow ropes, the guns were hauled through deep boggy ground, over churned up tracks and deep, sharp sided, trenches. The section was now a mere three hundred metres from the enemy. Right and left the infantry were poised to launch the assault. Two men worked the guns. Everyone else slithered backwards and forwards under heavy rifle and machine gun fire fetching ammunition and the guns were fired at the fastest rate possible. The enemy did not hold out for long. To shouts of Hurra! the infantry advanced and captured the enemy position.”

This clearly refers to a forward British position and not Messines itself, which did not fall until later. The regiments of 26th Infantry Division, after their brief foray to Menen and Geluwe, had been involved in a three day battle near Fromelles and had then had to march all the way forward via Quesnoy and Warneton into positions some two kilometres short of Messines. They arrived there during the early evening of 29 October and relieved the weak forces of 6th Cavalry Division. Worn down by the fighting and extremely tired from their previous exertions, the entire formation was in urgent need of rest, but there was no time for that and not even enough for appropriate reconnaissance and preparation. The whole affair was extremely rushed and, to make matters worse, the objective was very challenging. The main enemy line of defence in this sector was established some 1,000 metres east of Messines, where a low, flat topped ridge ran away northeast towards Wambeke. From the crest there were excellent fields of fire and the flat open terrain offered the attackers nothing much in the way of cover or concealment, except for a few ditches and the hedges and fences which surrounded the houses and gardens of the many isolated farmsteads. To the rear the small town of Messines stood out, dominant and threatening.

During the early morning of 30 October, the divisional artillery began to bombard the British positions and Messines itself, provoking an immediate response from the British guns near the town and west of Wambeke. Nevertheless, making use of the cover provided by the fire, the regiments attempted to get forward. Infantry Regiment 122 made straight for Wambeke, whilst Infantry Regiment 125 thrust towards Messines. It was over-ambitious. Its 1st Battalion advancing on Blauwepoorthoek came under withering fire, both from the front and the right flank, halting it and forcing its right flank company to pull back. 2nd Battalion Infantry Regiment 125 was equally thwarted trying to close in on Messines, when it came under effective fire from the direction of Wijtschate. Every effort was made to suppress the defences in Messines, but the light field guns were not effective against the thick walls of the buildings so, until the heavy artillery could be brought to bear and range in correctly (which did not happen immediately), there was little more that the infantry could achieve.

At 2.50 pm, Major Sproesser, commanding officer 2nd Battalion, reported, ‘My impression is that the attack is still not sufficiently prepared. Enemy rifle and machine gun fire from the area northwest of Les Quatre Rois is still coming down with undiminished force.’²³ Luckily that was about the time that Infantry Regiment 122 managed to get forward and an opportunity presented itself to renew the main assault. However, as an illustration of how slow the passage of information and orders could be, the regimental commander Infantry Regiment 125 ordered a resumption of the assault on Messines on his own initiative, but a 51 Infantry Brigade order to the same effect did not even arrive at the Infantry Regiment 125 command post until 5.55 pm. By then the second attempt had also run into the sand; Major Sproesser, reporting again at 5.00 pm, ‘Under fire from infantry and artillery to the front and machine guns in the right flank, 2nd Battalion Infantry Regiment 125 cannot get forward’.²⁴

As Loßberg had feared, Allied resistance had been stronger on 30 October than expected and, in any case, in country which offered numerous advantages to the defence it was a relatively easy matter for small groups of men to impose delay on the advancing formations. The possession of Hollebeke Chateau was of the first importance. It enabled General Ritter von Martini to give orders to II Bavarian Corps to continue to drive northwest, but to switch its focus to the crucial Messines – Wijschate ridge and to plan on introducing the uncommitted regiments of 6th Bavarian Reserve Division (Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiments 17 and 21) into the line between 26th Infantry Division and 3rd Bavarian Infantry Division and drive on hard and exclusively to Wijtschate.²⁵

In the meantime, in order to provide the best possible support, top priority was given to the move forward of heavy artillery, in order to support an all-out assault on Messines the following day. Perhaps as a reflection of the limited progress made, however, a mere three hundred British prisoners of war had been captured. They were drawn mainly from the British 4th and 7th Divisions, though some cavalrymen were also captured and there were reports that the bodies of Indian troops had been discovered north of Messines. As a result, it was felt that the attack had gone in primarily against weakly held British outpost positions; only Messines, Wijtschate and Geluveld seemed to be held in significant strength.

There were also German air reconnaissance reports that day, indicating that strong reinforcements were being readied between Ypres and Poperinge and that there was a great deal of rail traffic forward from Dunkirk in the direction of Hazebrouck. This was a source of concern to the German chain of command, especially in view of the fact that progress on 30 October had not conformed to expectations. There was an urgent need to maintain the pressure on the defence and so, as darkness fell on a confused situation on the 26th Infantry Division front, attempts were made to use reinforcements to carry out patrols, to establish contact with neighbouring units and to decide, on the basis of a closer inspection of the ground, what might be possible the following day. All the work was overturned, however, when, at midnight, 51 Infantry Brigade issued orders for a night attack on Messines to start at 2.45 am.

After a scramble to be ready on time, this attack was launched against the British garrison, comprising the dismounted elements of the 1st Cavalry Brigade, reinforced by the 9th Lancers of 2nd Cavalry Brigade and two companies of the Indian 57th Rifles. Enjoying for once the fire support of heavy howitzers, the attack gained a certain amount of ground, after some initial ebbing and flowing, though it was only after several hours of hard fighting that news filtered back that 1st and 3rd Battalions Infantry Regiment 125 had succeeded in entering Messines and were consolidating there. At around midday there was a further concentrated effort to clear right through the whole town, but that was still not complete when the regimental commander arrived late that afternoon to take personal charge; this, despite the fact that barricade after barricade had already been stormed with support from point blank range by individual guns of Field Artillery Regiment 29. The British Official History²⁶ stated that prior to the first assault, some Germans had been, ‘disguised by wearing turbans’ as they approached forward trenches manned by men of the Inniskillings, the implication being that surprise was gained unfairly. Given the presence of Indian troops awaiting relief, a case of mistaken identity in the dark seems to have been a much more likely explanation.²⁷

Despite the relative weakness of the British garrison, the fighting both north and south of Messines and within the village itself took its toll on the attackers. By the afternoon, Grenadier Regiment 119 and Infantry Regiment 125 had already been heavily engaged for almost ten hours and needed reinforcement. This was far from easy to arrange. Infantry Regiment 121 had lost very heavily during the battles near Fromelles a few days earlier. Its 11th Company, for example, was reduced to three junior NCOs and thirty men.²⁸ Nominally in divisional reserve, it despatched its 9th Company to Grenadier Regiment 119, followed shortly by 5th and 8th Companies, then amalgamated 10th and 11th Companies and placed them under command of Infantry Regiment 125. The commander of the combined company later described their experiences in this hard fought battle.

Leutnant Schröder 10th Company Infantry Regiment 121²⁹ 4.

“The little town of Messines stood out on the hill to our front like an old fortress on a mountain top. Of course it had no battlements or towers set into its walls but, nevertheless, torrents of fire from concealed trenches and loopholes poured down on the daring attackers who were attempting to storm the heights. Despite this, our neighbouring regiment had succeeded in closing right up to the edge of town from where, out of hastily dug holes, they were conducting a costly fire fight. It was essential to capture the broad sweep of terrain in front of the dominant town, but a frontal attack would have been difficult to carry out and a flanking attack promised greater success.

“10th Company, which was dug in on the flank in the second line was ordered by 51 Infantry Brigade at about midday on 31 October to move over to the right and to take the town in the flank by means of a swift charge. This was a serious mission, because the British had prepared every house for defence. Moving individually or in small groups, the riflemen sprang up out of their trenches and made their way in bounds forward and to the right. This was carried out amidst rapid rifle and machine gun fire and the whole area was also under shrapnel fire. Rushing forward, creeping and crawling in cover behind hedges and garden fences, the riflemen reached the cover of a small hollow.

“Many, including the company commander (who was wounded), had already been hit, but it was essential to press on. To the front of the left flank platoon a small ditch ran directly towards a tile works, which was strongly defended. Everybody piled into the ditch, the platoon commander leading and soon they were about sixty metres from the tile works. A quick order was given and the platoon dashed forward as one at the double, shouting Hurra! and entered the yard. The British left in great haste and the building was swiftly prepared for defence.

“The other platoons, advancing in a similar manner, had pushed up against the northern exit to the town and stormed the first of the houses in the face of lacerating fire, which tore holes in their ranks. Messages were sent back requesting reinforcements and ammunition but, instead, the British counter-attacked. The aim was to drive out these people who had forced their way in, threatening their flank and rear, but they did not make much progress and they were sent back home, with bloody heads. Darkness fell, supports came up and, with them, two guns. Assisted by some of our men these were quickly brought into action out on the street. They fired at occupied houses and street barricades with great effect, but the British artillery, unconcerned about their men in the town, brought down heavy fire. This cost us casualties during the night, including the battery commander, who was killed.³⁰ However, the British dared not attack. Messines had been taken, admittedly with heavy losses, thanks to the energetic flanking attack of the 10th Company.”

Whilst the battles of the Messines – Wijtschate ridge had been raging on 31 October, there was equally heavy fighting further to the north in the XV Corps sector, which was later summarised by the commander of the troops deployed closest to the Ypres – Menen road.

Generalleutnant von Altrock Commander 60 Infantry Brigade ³¹

“On the orders of 30th Infantry Division, Oberstleutnant von Oldershausen and Infantry Regiment 105, supported by their right hand neighbouring formation, were to capture Geluveld. General von Altrock was to support this attack by means of one of his own launched by Infantry Regiment 99 and one battalion of Infantry Regiment 136 to the west of the Wervik – Geluveld road. On the morning of 31 October, preliminary artillery fire came down on Geluveld. The staff of 60 Infantry Brigade moved to occupy a small house to the west of Oude Kruiseke, whilst the four battalions (three from Infantry Regiment 99 and one from Infantry Regiment 136) were deployed against Geluveld.

“The assault was launched against Geluveld and, a short time later, came a report that the commander of Infantry Regiment 99 [Oberstleutnant Nollau], who was in overall command, had been seriously wounded. At that, General von Altrock and his staff went forward through heavy harassing fire as far as the southern edge of Geluveld where the regimental commander lay severely wounded and where Major Rock [Commanding Officer 3rd Battalion] of Infantry Regiment 99 had been killed. There were severe casualties on both sides, but Geluveld had been captured. That same night General von Altrock went in search of a command post for the following day, but everywhere had been shot to pieces. They were surrounded by all the grimness of the battlefield; everywhere lay wounded soldiers, British as well as German, together with dying cattle who let out bellows of pain. The howl of shells passing overhead, coupled with the crack of small arms fire, provided the aural backdrop. Large numbers of stragglers and shirkers were rounded up.

“It was difficult on 1 November to determine the positions of the battalions because of all the small arms fire that was flying about. General von Altrock selected a small building, Granat-Haüschen [Shell Cottage], situated just west of Geluveld as a brigade command post. It was located close behind the infantry firing line and protected by a fold in the ground. Here throughout this and the following days, we were under constant heavy artillery fire. The roof was pierced constantly by shrapnel balls and it kept raining tiles.”

This was the second consecutive day of heavy fighting for Infantry Regiment 99. Having attempted the previous evening to press forward by means of a night attack at 10.00 pm, already by 5.00 am on 31 October the regiment was thrusting forward once more in the direction of Windmühlehöhe [Windmill Hill], southeast of Geluveld, but the leading elements suffered such heavy losses that they were forced into cover and to attempt to dig themselves in. As it became light, however, the hill began to be bombarded systematically and 2nd Company was ordered to capture it, whilst the remainder of 1st Battalion moved to cover the gap with Infantry Regiment 136. Moving from cover to cover in bounds and despite further painful casualties, by 1.00 pm the men of 2nd Company were ready to begin the final attack, which was timed to coincide with the assault of the Saxon Infantry Regiment 105 against Geluveld village itself.

The intensity of the battle may be judged from the fact that it was almost impossible to pass verbal orders from man to man for the attack. Nevertheless the assault was pressed home promptly and valiantly. Three officers were killed and a further ten wounded in quick succession and casualties amongst the other ranks rose alarmingly but, by 2.30 pm, and following a determined charge led by Reserve Oberleutnant Walter which led to the capture of 200 prisoners and a machine gun, the hill was taken and held.³² The regiment later felt that but for the intervention of the French and the fact that casualties amongst the junior leadership had been so high, rapid progress could have been made. Given the weight of flanking fire coming from the direction of Polygon Wood this was probably overoptimistic, especially because resistance from this same direction continued to hinder German operations for some days to come. However, after the frustrations of the previous day, 31 October was day marked by slight, but measur able, progress towards the elusive goal of Ypres.

One gun commander from 2nd Platoon, Machine Company Infantry Regiment 105, later left a very atmospheric account of the events of the day.³³ 5.

“We were called forward during the night 30/31 October 1914, with the mission of pushing as far forward towards the strong British positions to the right (north) of the Menen – Geluveld road as possible, there to dig in. Our machine gun platoon was commanded by Offizierstellvertreter Tuchscherer, who failed to return from a forward reconnaissance right at the start of our operation. Unteroffizier Gläser, an extraordinarily energetic NCO and one of the first members of our regiment to be awarded the Iron Cross Second Class met the same fate, having been fatally wounded by an enemy bullet.³⁴ At that, command of the platoon was assumed by the Einjährig-Unteroffizier and Gun Commander Schaarschmidt, who went on to work his way forward with his two guns to within about sixty metres of the British trenches located forward of Geluveld, which was in flames. There he dug in for the remainder of the night, together with a few infantry sections.

“As dawn broke there was a brief artillery bombardment to the south of the road, where the majority of the regiment was located, then the assault of Infantry Regiment 105 was launched. However it was repulsed repeatedly with heavy losses, due to the tough resistance put up by the elite troops to our front. During all of this, increasingly heavy British artillery fire began to come down, but rather than causing damage to our trenches on the right of the road, it seemed to be directed more towards our rear positions. Our rifle and machine gun fire against the trenches opposite us appeared to be more effective because, all of a sudden and quite unexpectedly, we spotted movement there. Initially believing that there was going to be an attack, we opened fire, but the British began waving handkerchiefs and reversed rifles then climbed out of the trench and came towards us with their hands up. There were about fifty of them and they were quickly led to the rear. Given the unclear situation there could be no thought of occupying the trench for the time being and we contented ourselves by searching it quickly.

“A further patrol under Gun Commander Blechschmidt which clambered up the high road embankment, established that our assault trenches were exactly opposite the densely occupied enemy trenches on the far side of the road. Coming to a swift decision we lugged our one remaining machine gun – the other one had been shot up during the battle – up onto the embankment and brought it into action! The field of fire we had from up there was amazing, as was the surprise suffered by the British when we brought our well-aimed fire down along the line of the enemy trench. However we did not remain undisturbed. We were spotted from Geluveld and came under accurate small arms fire from there and from another position almost in our rear. One after the other we fell victim to the fire, until only Blechschmidt and Unteroffizier Schaarschmidt were left operating a half-damaged gun . . .

“Nevertheless when our regiment renewed its attack our fire held the British trench in check and it was soon overrun by the 105th, followed closely by the much disputed village of Geluveld. The following day Blechschmidt and Schaarschmidt were promoted by Oberst Freiherr von Oldershausen and were awarded the Iron Cross Second Class, followed a short time later by the Military St Heinrich’s medal in silver.”

Unsurprising to relate, by the afternoon of 31 October, the scene to the south of Geluveld was one of great confusion. Despite the fact that some progress had been made, on this critical day it was essential that the German line was pushed forward to the maximum extent possible and so maintain the pressure on the British defence. There was a feeling within the German chain of command, not without some justification, that it was close to cracking, so it was time for every possible expedient to be attempted.

Oberleutnant Krazer and Kanonier Lobeck 3rd Battery Field Artillery Regiment 51 ³⁵ 6.

“The infantry could not get forward. Deimling decided to push a battery forward and create some space. The Veldhoek heights had to be captured. The General spoke direct to the commander of the 1st Battalion and his battery commanders while standing on the observation wagon of 3rd Battery Field Artillery Regiment 51. He explained the situation and demanded the services of a battery which he wished to deploy in front of the infantry; the intention being to prevent the enemy counter-attack which was being prepared. Lots were drawn and it fell to 3rd Battery. The commander of 3rd Battery, Hauptmann Kirchner, thanked the general for the mission. A small hollow provided cover for the move forward, then it was a matter of galloping onto the hill, with the observation wagon in the lead.

“Following up, Number 1 gun came to a halt in the midst of a hail of fire, perhaps only two hundred metres in front of the astonished British troops. The courageous gunners dragged out two shell baskets and brought the unharnessed gun into action. The gunlayer, Braun, aimed independently at the trench to his front and, without waiting for orders, sent the first shell flying towards the enemy. He was on target from the very first shell, which made bringing up the other five guns easier. Unfortunately the great weight of fire brought down by the British at such short range meant that there were considerable casualties amongst both men and horses. Losses mounted rapidly. The brave Braun received a bullet through the throat but, gradually, the British fire reduced in intensity as they were pinned down in their trenches.

“The ammunition was exhausted about 3.00 pm. Scattered and isolated, the battery was caught close up to the enemy and could only have defended itself with revolvers. Not until evening could Vizefeldwebel Doubs lead the teams forward at least as far as the protective dip slope and there unload. The infantry also got forward at this time – Infantry Regiment 105 – and dug in between and about twenty five metres in front of the guns. When the Saxons saw our ammunition crisis they rushed down to the ammunition stacks and, together with the gunners, had soon transferred all the ammunition forward. On the left flank of the battery was a small hut and there, in amongst wounded British soldiers, we set up an observation post. That night we also buried our dead near this hut.

“The following day brought the fruits of the efforts of the battery. A short fire programme came down on the trenches which were very close, there were shouts of Hurra! from the courageous 105th, the bayonets flashed then we gunners were able to watch what was a only a brief infantry battle from very close range. Soon two or three companies of British soldiers surrendered. It was an unforgettable sight when we both joined in shouts of Hurra. The infantry were standing on the parapets of the captured trenches and we by our guns. Then the Tommies marched back past us and were able to see at first hand the battery which had closed right up on them . . . For us it was a sad move back to Geluwe then near to Menen. When the battery dismounted we could see all the gaps in the ranks. Instead of five men, there were only three and sometimes as few as two per gun. Hauptmann Kirchner was also wounded. During our march back through Menen we saw the Corps Commander. When the battery was reported to him, he was amazed that we were still there. Visibly relieved he said, “I thought that the British had got you. I thank you all.”

During the early months of the war in particular, it was frequent practice for families who had received detailed letters from their relatives or friends serving at the front to pass them on to local newspapers for publication. In the wake of the battles at the end of October, the family of member of Infantry Regiment 105 allowed the use of one such by the Leipziger Volkszeitung. It was deemed to be of such general interest that it was later republished by the Freiburger Zeitung some weeks later. An extract, though somewhat highly coloured, nevertheless conveys the close quarter, confused and intense nature of the low level infantry battle along the Menen road vividly. It reads: 6.

“ . . . After a march of several days duration, we heard the thunder of the guns on 31 October . . . What we experienced that day was a more appalling scene of war than it is possible for the normal mortal to comprehend . . . There was an eerie silence then suddenly a Hauptmann from the 99th on our left shouted across, ‘Prepare to attack! The assault begins at 1.00 pm!’ We shook our heads in disbelief, because thus far, anybody raising his head above the edge of the sunken road would have had it shot off. However, we made ready and waited patiently.

“At 12.45 pm the same Hauptmann suddenly shouted, ‘Rapid fire!’ We looked up and there, one hundred to one hundred and fifty metres away, the clay-yellow forms of the British, wearing caps of the same colour, were pulling back to the village behind them. We gave them all we had. The Hauptmann himself fired and I could hardly load fast enough . . . Suddenly came the call ‘Stop!’ Our comrades off to the right had followed up towards the enemy trenches and there was chance that we might have hit them. At this point the drums beat for the attack, the trumpets blew and, from thousands of throats, came shouts of Hurra! Hurra! We rushed forward like a wild storm, despite the weight of our knapsacks, with bayonets fixed and hunted the British out of their trenches, where they had made themselves extremely comfortable.

“Their trenches were well constructed and equipped. To eat and drink there was corned beef, ham, chocolate, brandy and wine and there were ample quantities of cigars and cigarettes. Most of them were located behind hedgerows and hawthorn bushes. They had excellent overhead cover and featured tables, chairs, woollen blankets and mattresses. They fired at us from these trenches until we were a mere thirty metres away, then they emerged with their hands up and ran towards us to surrender. Despite their raised hands a great many were nevertheless shot down, some of us could not stop ourselves. We took several hundred prisoners . . . the British were better infantrymen than the French. Some had sixteen years’ service and most of them eight . . .

“My nerves were on edge and my heart was beating so loud I could hear it, but I stormed on, one amongst a wild horde rushing forward. The enemy was firing from every building. By now the sections included men from all the different regiments and they were attacking every trench and every building. Together with five other men, I overran three British supply wagons. Two men were attempting to guard them. Despite our charge, they would not yield, so we shot them down. We had a quick look in the wagons and found that they contained ammunition, rations and mail – most of which had been posted in London on 22 October . . . ’³⁶

Away to the south, where the battle for Messines was proving to be a tough examination for the battle-hardened Württembergers of 26th Infantry Division, the attempts by the men of 6th Bavarian Reserve Division (who were as raw as the ill fated troops of Fourth Army operating up to the north), to establish a foothold in Wijtschate, proved initially to be a failure. During the afternoon of 31 October, orders reached Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment 21 to move forward to the Wambeke area east of the Warneton – Oosttaverne road, to come under command of 12 Bavarian Reserve Brigade and to prepare to launch a night attack against Wijtschate. This would have been a challenge for any active army formation; to give such an order to men, who had only begun even platoon level training a mere five weeks previously, was distinctly ambitious, especially because they were being required to advance across totally unreconnoitred ground to attack an enemy of unknown size.

The situation was equally difficult for the inexperienced gunners of Bavarian Reserve Field Artillery Regiment 6, who had been supporting the advance into the west of Hollebeke, but now had to switch their attention to Wijtschate. One of the gunners later described one abortive action in his diary.

Kriegsfreiwilliger Schuster Bavarian Reserve Field Artillery Regiment 6³⁷ 7.

“About 5.00 pm on the evening of 31 October, we arrived in Houthem, which was ablaze. Only with difficulty could we get the horses to move forward in amongst all the smoke and flames of the burning houses. The battle had also left its mark outside the village, where medical orderlies were busy tending to the wounded and gathering together the fallen. The fields and ditches were littered with abandoned equipment and shell baskets. Darkness was already falling when the battery went into position in a field surrounded by hedges not far from Kaleute. The gunners then set to, to dig in the guns and ammunition wagons. As far as the falling light permitted, the ground out to the front was observed. In the west this was crowned by a low hill feature. Upon it were situated Wijtschate, with Messines on fire to the south.

“By now it was dark, so the flash of guns firing, the explosions of enemy shells and the sight of burning farms in all directions made a striking, if sad, impression. We did manage to grab a quick meal from the insulated containers; it was the first warm food of the day. It was about 9.00 pm when we opened fire on Wijtschate. The moment when the order ‘Fire!’ was given was an unforgettable occasion. It was not until midnight that the loud sound of battle began to die away. Wijtschate was a sea of flames and the church tower first tilted and then collapsed. It was now All Saints’ Day. For many this religious holiday was also to be their last day! We were manning our guns at 2.00 am when we were ordered to change positions forward.

“In near silence the teams arrived and we moved along a field track at a walk. Because it was narrow and the infantry were also marching forward along it, we had to halt frequently. Finally we arrived at Oosttaverne and three guns of the battery went into position at its western exit. [Our] fourth gun, commanded by Offizierstellvertreter Jaenisch, was sent forward, together with an ammunition wagon, along the road to Wijtschate, so as to accompany the forward troops of Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment 17. The gun soon bore off to the left along a track that petered out and we were reduced to carrying on cross country until we unharnessed behind a hedge. The gun was run forward to a point about one hundred metres from a lone house and ammunition was moved forward. The team remained in cover behind the hedge.

“All around it was relatively quiet, though now and again we heard rifle or machine gun fire. We were in an odd sort of position, because we had no contact with the infantry. We aimed at Wijtschate and opened fire. We had barely fired one shell than a hail of small arms fire came from the right. Some flew overhead, the rest rattled against the gun shield. We threw ourselves to the ground and took up our carbines, ready to shoot. The shots came from Rondel Wood about one hundred and fifty metres away. There was enemy in the wood and we had passed through our own lines in the darkness. The first thing, therefore, was to withdraw our gun so that we should not be caught out. Under a torrent of fire which fortunately passed overhead, we hauled the gun and as much ammunition as possible back behind the hedge, but we had to leave the ammunition wagon where it was. We remained behind the hedge, ready to fire to cover the withdrawal of the gun then, when we thought that it was back in safety, we pulled back ourselves, moving in bounds until we were safely back with the battery. The wagon was recovered the following day.”

At 10.00 pm the order to attack Wijtschate was also given to Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment 17. On receipt it disengaged from the wooded area to the west of Hollebeke and sidestepped to the left to be in position on the start line at 1.00 am about three hundred metres short of the first enemy positions. To have achieved this was no mean feat for inexperienced troops. Linking with Infantry Regiment 122 on the left, the attack jumped off at 2.00 am but, hardly surprisingly, there were problems immediately. The ground was littered with obstacles, most of them natural: ditches, thick hedges and wire. Direction and cohesion was lost repeatedly, so it was probably only due to the fact that the British defence was weak, that the advance reached the ridge and carried on into Wijtschate. Here, in addition to the difficulty of fighting in a built up area, once again the wearing of forage caps by the regiments of 6th Bavarian Reserve Division caused another near disaster.

In the gloom of the early morning, troops of Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment 21 advancing from the east, mistook the leading elements for British troops and, according to that regiment, ‘a battle with many casualties broke out until it was ended with considerable difficulty by the intervention of individual officers’.³⁸ This entirely avoidable setback provides yet another proof that on the battlefield a high price was being paid for rushing these troops into action. The furthest point of the advance was probably achieved by men of Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment 17, who pressed on to the eastern edge of the village by about 3.30 am. They were in the process of reorganising, an extremely difficult operation in view of the general inexperience of the troops, when Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment 21, which had encountered great difficulty in closing up on the town in the dark, launched its attack in error.

Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment 17 noted later, ‘Towards 5.00 am, elements of Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment 21 launched an attack on Wijtschate from the east near Torreken Farm. Despite the waving of flags and unfurling the regimental colour; notwithstanding the giving of German signals and the singing of Die Wacht am Rhein, it was impossible to correct the error. Our sister regiment charged in amongst us and wrecked the carefully created order. Only gradually did the officers restore order.’³⁹ Unfortunately vigorous local British counter action, coupled with an increase in flanking fire and shelling, both from British as well as German batteries, then convinced the commander of Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment 17, Oberst Großmann, that the place could not be held without additional reinforcements. These were not forthcoming so, at 9.00 am, he gave the order for withdrawal. Arriving back at their rallying point near Wambeke, the roll was called and it was discovered that Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment 17 had suffered thirty percent casualties and there were subsequent accusations that some of the men were suffering wounds caused by Dum Dum bullets.⁴⁰

A member of one of the leading companies later described his experience in a letter home, written on 2 November from a field hospital. The timings he described are somewhat awry and he does not mention the unfortunate clash with Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment 21, but he does convey the impression of the confusion experienced by men going into battle for the first time.

Kriegsfreiwilliger Ludwig Engstler 4th Company Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment 17⁴¹ 8.

“Do not be shocked, in two days’ time I shall be back in action. I have a bayonet wound in my right thigh. I have headed this letter ‘All Souls’ Day’ [2 November]. My God, the words ‘All Souls’ conceal a tremendous amount. Let me explain it to you. During the evening of 31 October the Oberst said to us, ‘Comrades. It all begins today! His Majesty the Kaiser himself has ordered that the town of Wijtschate is to be stormed and held. Both the Kaiser and the Crown Prince [Rupprecht] will be observing the battle. Act like brave Bavarians!’⁴² We moved forward joyfully; it was still night when were arrived at our place of battle. The guns were already making a tremendous racket. Everywhere the shells groaned their way to the horizon. The German artillery was the stronger and did not grant the enemy any sort of breathing space. We shook out and launched into battle.

“At that everything opened up on us: guns, machine guns and rifle fire. Our ranks began to thin, as here and there our comrades fell. However the unholy howling and rushing sounds of the shells did not throw us off balance. Forwards! Not a step backwards! It was 12 o’clock midnight. ‘Fix bayonets!’ We closed our ranks in tightly and went forward like a wall of flashes. Every gap which appeared in the wall was rapidly filled. With shouts of Hurra! we pushed on into the town. From all sides a raging rate of fire was poured at us from within the houses. We set fire to them and the flames blazed upwards, illuminating a grim scene. The streets were full of dead and wounded men: dark skinned Indians, together with British, French and Belgians, all lying alongside rows of our courageous Bavarians. We drove the British out of the town, which now belonged to us. The British, however, summoned reinforcements and pushed forward. We came under fire from the entrances to cellars and every other nook and cranny.

“There were too few of us. There were no officers in sight and we just had to pull back. Once more we advanced and once more we retreated. It was a saddened platoon which turned its back on this place of death. ‘Are you still alive?’ asked one of the few who remained. It seemed to me that I had been granted new life; something which was permitted to very few. I cried with anger when I saw all the misery around me. A man ran past me. I glanced at him and saw that it was Jordan Mattias. Deeply moved, we shook hands in silence. On All Saints Day [1 November] there was a regimental roll call. More than half the regiment was missing. The other regiments who had also fought on this day suffered equally dreadful losses. Today is All Souls Day, when the living remember the dead. However, we are proud that we were present during a great battle, which worked out in our favour [sic.] and which the Kaiser and the Crown Prince witnessed. Within two to three days nothing more will be heard about the British troops but this [for us] was less a baptism of fire and more a baptism in blood.

“How did I come to be wounded? We were in the town and pursuing the enemy when, suddenly, I felt something sharp and metallic pierce my thigh. I threw my leg forward quickly, so that it did not penetrate far, then I went back to my opponent. It was a wounded British soldier, who was aiming his rifle at me. His instrument of death flew into the mire and I despatched him to Hell with one thrust. Then we pushed on. It was not until after the roll call that I had my wound dressed and I have now been in hospital for nearly two days. I shall then be out just in time to take part in the decisive battle. May God protect me as he has thus far.

“What did I experience during the battle? I was relieved that it had finally got going. The never ending marching was not at all to my liking. The first time shrapnel burst over us, we all ducked down low, but we soon got used to it. I was very lucky during the assault. Men were falling to my front, my right and my left, but I remained on my feet. I gave up all hope of surviving and, in this fatalistic mood, did not seek cover, but moved around upright. I shall have to stitch up two holes in my clothes caused by these damned British soldiers. In the town we came up against a mixed group of twenty British and Indian troops. There were about twelve of us and we opened fire at once.

“The Hauptmann was stationed at the entrance to the village and called for volunteers to go and collect the wounded and bring them into the shelter of the undamaged buildings. I volunteered for this rather risky task. We carried about two dozen into two houses and made them comfortable. All of a sudden there was firing on all sides. Some of our comrades raced by and shouted to us, ‘The British are coming!’ We had to pull back. We took the slightly wounded men with us, but we had to leave the others behind. We could not stay there; we realised that it was pointless to stay and be killed, so off we went! I took the arm of my Leutnant and supported him, but suddenly he was shot through the temples and fell dead, so I went and joined the others. A word about the battle in general. It was one of the largest to date. The British were attacked all along the front and suffered similar casualties to us. They were hemmed in a horseshoe – like position and could not get away. You will be able to read more about it in the papers. Most of our officers have fallen.”

In fact, as has been noted, this assault failed because it was conducted by troops who were barely trained, over unknown ground and in the dark. There was a major clash between friendly forces and numerous instances of ill directed German artillery fire. It is possible that regular troops with time for preparation would have done better but they, too, would have had problems because the formations to the north were unable to get forward out of the Oosttaverne woods, leaving Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment 17 to attempt to cover its open right flank in addition to getting forward. As it was, this failure cost that regiment over thirty per cent casualties, including the following officers, who were all killed in action: Major Hermann Helmes, commanding officer 2nd Battalion, Hauptmann Georg Danner and Landwehr Oberleutnant Theodor Harster, commanders of 3rd and 6th Companies respectively, together with Leutnants Georg Fillweber, Anton Halder, Michael Sacherl and Rudolf Schuster. Within the next two weeks, especially on 4 November, the regiment lost a further twelve officers killed in action, so Engstler’s assertion was certainly true by the time the regiment was withdrawn from this disastrous first battle.⁴³

This engagement had one other amazing feature. On 12 November the Corps Commander, General der Infanterie Karl Ritter von Martini, signed off a letter to Headquarters Sixth Army about the conduct of one of the soldiers under his command.⁴⁴

“I wish to draw your attention to the following extraordinary action:

During the night 31 October/1 November 3rd Company Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment 17 became split up during bitter house to house fighting in Wijtschate. Only a few men reached the edge of the village with the company commander and all but one were killed in the [subsequent] fire fight. The only survivor was Infanterist Johann Zott, whose knapsack was holed by shell splinters. Zott disguised himself in the coat and cap of a dead British soldier, who was lying next to him. He then ran to a position behind the line of British riflemen and went up to where the ammunition wagons and field kitchens were located. He remained there for several hours, drank some coffee with the British soldiers, busied himself around an ammunition wagon and fed the horses.

“As dawn approached, Zott feared that he would be unmasked, so he mounted the saddle horse, drove the wagon forward to the British firing line and emptied the ammunition. It came in useful that Zott, a former seaman, knew a number of English expressions and swear words. Whilst the British soldiers were occupied with the ammunition, Zott mounted suddenly and galloped off past the trenches in the direction of the German lines, under heavy fire from both sides. Luckily he found cover in a small hollow. Here he was able to swap his British clothing for German, because there were dead and wounded German soldiers in the hollow. Once he had loaded a wounded officer and three wounded soldiers on his wagon, he drove on towards the German position. Towards evening he arrived at Headquarters II Bavarian Army Corps with his wagon and three wounded men – the officer had died on the journey. I have awarded the man, who is a kriegsfreiwilliger from Augsburg, the Iron Cross Second Class.” ⁴⁵

Naturally the inability to take and hold Wijtschate was not regarded as the final word on the subject. From the war diary of 6th Bavarian Reserve Division, it can be seen that the importance of the place was such that, a full two hours before the withdrawal of Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment 17, a decision had been made to move fresh troops forward for a renewal of the attack.⁴⁶

“7.00 am. Enemy in Wijtschate once more. From 12 [Bavarian] Reserve Brigade [Bavarian] Reserve Infantry Regiment 17 is 500 metres east of the built up area; [Bavarian] Reserve Infantry Regiment 21 is on the adjoining hill to the south. In order to speed up the capture of the enemy strong point Wijtschate, another two battalions of [Bavarian] Reserve Infantry Regiment 8 have been released from Corps reserve and have been placed at our disposal. Admittedly this is because it was thought a breakthrough in this area might have been possible. The allocation was, however, urgently needed because [Bavarian] Reserve Infantry Regiment 17 needed a break, so Commander 12 [Bavarian] Reserve Brigade has received fresh troops.”

The adjutant of Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment 8, who was later to achieve fame as the man who led the recapture of the Schwaben Redoubt near Thiepval on 1 July 1916, takes up the story:

Oberleutnant Herbert Wurmb Adjutant Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment 8 ⁴⁷ 8.

“It was on All Saints’ Day 1914, a beautiful Sunday in autumn, that troops of 6th Bavarian Reserve Division captured Wijtschate but, due to several unfortunate circumstances, the village had to be completely evacuated once more. However, the divisional commander, [General der Kavallerie] Freiherr von Speidel, did not regard the battle as lost. [Bavarian] Reserve Infantry Regiment 20 and our regiment, less 2nd Battalion . . . was given the mission of renewing the attack at 2.00 pm. The regimental commander, Oberst Hartmann, and I, as regimental adjutant, were despatched in advance to Groenelinde, where we were met by the commander of 12 Reserve Brigade, General[major] Kiefhaber. He issued orders for the assault on Wijtschate. The 1st Battalion (Hauptmann Oskar Prager) and 3rd Battalion (Major Bezzel) advanced as far as Oosttaverne, where they halted, because it was not known whether we or the enemy were occupying Wijtschate. From here 3rd Battalion pushed forward patrols towards Wijtschate.

“The artillery preparation of the attack was provided by the heavy artillery of 6th Bavarian Reserve Division (Reserve Foot Artillery Battalion 6) and 3rd Division. The light field howitzers of Bavarian Reserve Field Artillery Regiment 6 were also involved, but the field guns were distributed as infantry support batteries amongst the two brigades of 6th Bavarian Reserve Division and located in the front line. In accordance with the mission, the 3rd Battalion, together with Reserve Infantry Regiment 17 was to assault and capture Wijtschate. To the northeast of Wijtschate, it was to link up with Bavarian Infantry Regiment 23 at the Rondellwald, whilst its left flank was to move along the line of the Oostaverne – Wijtschate road, maintaining contact with Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment 21. 1st Battalion was to follow up echeloned to the right.

“The attack began at 1.45 pm. Zeitler’s battery kept up a constant fire on Wijtschate, lifting only when 3rd Battalion began to advance, in the face of very heavy small arms fire from Rondellwald. There was a gap of about two kilo-metres with the 3rd Division until that evening, when a battalion from that division had closed it. As a result Major Bezzel requested the Regiment to deploy 1st Battalion in his support. At that a platoon of 2nd Company was sent forward and established that the southern edge of this wood was free of enemy forces and pushed on further to the western edge. Initially this did make much of a difference to 3rd Battalion but, at 2.30 pm, a further attempt was made by the entire company to clear the wood. Meanwhile Reserve Infantry Regiment 17 was withdrawn completely from the firing line, having suffered insupportable casualties.

“About 2.00 pm the 3rd Battalion was occupying reasonable cover in a hollow some 800 metres west of Wijtschate. Enemy shelling was having no effect. Grehn’s patrol from 10th Company, reported, ‘Southern sector of Wijtschate is free of enemy, but there are strong groups of enemy in the northern part.’ Towards 3.00 pm Major Bezzel ordered an attack on Wijtschate. In order to reduce the risk of casualties, the men were ordered to spread out and to advance individually as far as a fold in the ground a few hundred metres from the eastern edge of Wijtschate and to form up there. Reserve Leutnant Graser, commanding 10th Company, received a head wound and was replaced by Reserve Leutnant Schaurer. Major Bezzel hurried forward with his adjutant, Oberleutnant Bärmann (Infantry Regiment 4) and 10th Company to the track running from Oosttaverne – Wijtschate, passing racks of drying tobacco and under extremely heavy flanking fire.

“There was a short breather in the hollow from where it was possible to observe troops, apparently from Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment 21, advancing and then digging in at the southern end of Wijtschate. Once more Major Bezzel repeated his orders for the assault on the village and directed that there be no halt until the western edge was reached. Rushing out in front himself and not far from the houses began he came under fire from a rough brushwood shelter and suddenly felt a heavy blow on the thigh – wounded! He made his way back into the first house he came across, which happened to be on fire, made it his command post and his wound was tended by Infanterist Pfirsching of 10th Company . . . Leutnants Böck (11th) and Mantel (officer commanding 12th) were also wounded and Offizierstellvertreter Hacker, a platoon commander in 9th Company, was killed.⁴⁸

“The adjutant 3rd Battalion [Oberleutnant Heinrich Bärmann] observed the progress of the battle from the roof of the command post. 9th Company had formed a front facing the enemy in the Rondellwald whilst, to the left 10th Company appeared to have deployed. Then, once 2nd and 4th Companies had opened fire just before 4.00 pm on the groups of houses and pockets of resistance from the western edge of the Rondellwald, 3rd Battalion (primarily 9th and 10th Companies) supported by 3rd Company, which advanced to the south of Rondellwald in contact with 3rd Battalion, pressed the attack against the eastern edge of the village and succeeded in capturing a line of enemy trenches by about 5.30 pm. Two light enemy machine guns, which the 3rd Battalion captured and which were placed that evening in a house east of the village, were unfortunately moved to the rear the following day by Bavarian Infantry Regiment 22.

“There was an unfortunate occurrence at 5.20 pm when our own artillery brought fire down once more in the village. Our 10th Company, which had already pressed on into the village, received heavy casualties as a result. Despite every effort by the commanding officer of 3rd Battalion: waving with artillery flags, towels and coats, the artillery continued to fire and to damage 10th Company, such that it had to withdraw. Once the small arms fire from the flank had slackened, Major Bezzel, supported by Infanterist Pfirsching and leaning on his sword, hobbled back to Oosttaverne, whence he was transported back to the homeland. Oberleutnant Bärmann assumed command of 3rd Battalion that evening. He and Leutnant Fritsching, officer commanding 9th Company were the only officers of the battalion still on their feet. Bärmann amalgamated the 9th and 11th Companies into one, Feldwebel Eberling commanded the 10th and Feldwebel Mayer the 12th . . .

“During the night the troops dug in, together with the grenade launcher teams. In accordance with divisional orders the village perimeter was to be held at all costs. Many of the wounded were evacuated, but it was a difficult operation. The shadows darkened and night fell, heavy and serious, on the bloody Sunday that was All Saints’ Day 1914, the weapons fell silent and the fallen took their rest.”

The War Diary of 6th Bavarian Reserve Division noted, ‘At 5.30 pm, as a result of enemy numerical superiority and flanking artillery fire from the north, the village had to be evacuated yet again. Weak elements hung on there, but the remainder had to pull back some 150 metres to the east. The falling of night precluded a further attempt at an assault. Order: The positions achieved are to be held in readiness for a continuation of the attack tomorrow.’⁴⁹ All day on 2 November further attempts were taken to storm and hold Wijtschate. The British cavalry, which had been defending it up until then, was finally relieved by French troops, who seem to have wasted little time in withdrawing from the village and leaving it to be occupied by Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment 8. Because the entire sector had proved so tough a nut for the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division to tackle unaided, as an emergency measure, 3rd Infantry Division was rushed to the area and the Pomeranian Grenadier Regiments 2 and 9 force marched forward to take over the main responsibility from the largely fought-out Bavarians. Surprising to note, their arrival was not greeted universally with enthusiasm. By now it had become a point of principle to the Bavarians to capture and hold the place themselves and Grenadier Regiment 9 makes the point firmly that, ‘On two separate occasions the order to 5 Infantry Brigade to attack was withdrawn, because the Bavarians wanted to storm Wijtschate alone.’⁵⁰

In view of the need to force a decision to the east of Ypres Army Group Fabeck ordered a full scale attack all along its front. In the northern sector, so as to wring every last vestige of effort from his exhausted troops, the commander XV Corps issued a special Order of the Day that showed that every expedient was to be exploited to this end:

“Headquarters XV Corps	Wervik, 3 November 1914
	Corps Order!

During the past three days the Corps has captured approximately forty officers and 2,000 British other ranks.

It is clear that the British surrender if they are subject to energetic attack.

I direct, therefore, that the attacks are to be pressed home with bugle calls and with the regimental bands playing.

Regimental musicians who play during assaults will be awarded Iron Crosses.⁵¹

Signed: von Deimling” ⁵²

Meanwhile, down at Wijtschate, 3 November began badly. A French local counterattack was launched against the north of the town and Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment 8 was pushed back in the northwest quarter. This time, the support of Grenadier Regiment 9 was urgently sought at about 2.00 pm to help restore the situation, whilst Grenadier Regiment 2 was launched forward as part of a more general attack in the direction of Spanbroekmolen on the far side of the ridge between Messines and Wijtschate.

Unteroffizier Schadow 2nd Company Grenadier Regiment 2 ⁵³ 9.

“Assault! What that word means to a soldier! To our front was a wide expanse of terrain. Wherever the eye could see shells and shrapnel rounds were exploding. First there would be a small cloud in the sky then it would expand. Suddenly there would be a roar and a rush of air, as though an autumn wind was blowing through the twigs. Over there a shell was landing in an isolated house. There was a dull but heavy crash and hundreds of tiles flew through the air. Where the house had once stood there was just a thick black cloud, enveloping red flames which shot skywards. So it was that something which a man had built by the sweat of his brow was flattened in an instant. The rafters still stuck up steeply, but they were being burnt higher and higher by the flames and it was not long until the whole place was one great inferno. Then there was a thunderous crash and only the blackened walls remained to bear witness that people had once lived here.

“In the meantime we stayed in cover and thought once more about our own homes. Of course we knew that our thoughts could not dwell on that for long. Soon we should have to act and an iron sense of duty meant that we had to suppress all our humanity. The minutes ticked by with desperate slowness; time seemed to stretch out. We lay there completely still, looking so peaceful that it was hard to believe that all these men with their serious eyes would soon appear to be utterly transformed. Soon they would stretch their limbs and stand up, the light of battle in their eyes and their trusty weapons gripped tightly, ready to launch themselves wildly into battle. Above and around us raged the artillery battle. The earth seemed ready to burst as each side tried to out do the other’s firepower.

“Everywhere where the shells landed they spread death and destruction, producing one glowing crater after another. The grim reaper moved amongst both friend and foe, young and old and claimed a rich harvest. The fire grew ever heavier, the sky was lit up as though by a sea of flames. It was as though the air was being split by hundreds of bolts of lightning – just a few moments now! – ‘Fix bayonets!’ That wrenched us out of our reverie. Already to our front the trumpets were sounding and the drums beating. Shouts of ‘On your feet! Forwards!’ rang in our ears. Off in front raced our first platoon, with Hauptmann v Waldow in the lead. With shells bursting in amongst them, they advanced in short bounds. It looked as though they had all disappeared off the face of the earth, as if they were all dead, but repeatedly the grey wave pushed on, pausing frequently to go to ground.

“They finally set foot in the first abandoned line of trenches and were followed up by the Second Platoon and then the Third, though not all our comrades made it as far as the trench. But this was, in any case, no place to linger: press on was the watchword. We launched forward and all hell broke loose once more. Throwing ourselves down, we pressed our faces into the ground and gasped for breath. Then it was time for another bound. Shells crashed down on our ranks; here and there a comrade fell with Hurra! still on his lips. Forward, ever forward, we stormed at a breathless pace. Swift commands passed from mouth to mouth, but sometimes they could not be heard; the crash of the shells drowned everything else out. Rifle bullets whistled past us, punctuating the monotonous clatter of the machine guns. Out front our standard bearer (Hornack) went down passing, with the last of his strength, the unfurled colour to a comrade rushing forward to take it up.

“Finally we could go no further and we leapt down into the enemy trenches. Tired out we lay around or sat in an old position – played out men with restless eyes, staring around us, taking no note at all of shells or shrapnel – tired, just so tired! Evening fell. It went darker and darker then the moon rose and the artillery fire died away. Then stooped figures began moving over the bloody ground; the Samaritans of the battlefield. Here they would close the eyes of the dying, there they would offer a water bottle to a wounded man, who would take long draughts from it. ‘Thank you, comrade!’ We hunched down deeper into our coats and huddled together, but our tired bodies were shrieking for rest. We might have wanted to turn our thoughts to our homes once more but we were too tired, simply too tired. Now and again someone stirred, sighed deeply then slept on towards the morning which would bring further difficult tasks.”

The situation in Wijtschate restored, Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment 8 resumed responsibility for the forward positions and Grenadier Regiment 9 took advantage of the fact, allowing its forward troops to gather in the cellars of the town and rest overnight. Elsewhere the line barely moved that day but although it was becoming clear that Army Group Fabeck was going to enjoy no further success and that the arrival of the French in force on its front simply reduced the chances further, nevertheless, the battles continued over the next few days. On 4 November, for example, there was an early resumption of the attack by formations of 3rd Infantry Division south of Wijtschate. Because of heavy fire from a flank, it made little progress and finally stalled some two hundred metres short of Hill 75. At 11.30 am 3rd Battalion Grenadier Regiment 2 received orders to move forward and it arrived in the forward positions by

2.00 pm. The attack, supported by the divisional artillery reinforced by the Howitzer Battery of Field Artillery Regiment 38, was due to be renewed at 4.00 pm, but this start time had to be postponed for a further one and a half hours. When the attack was finally launched, several members of the regiment left detailed descriptions of the way the attack unfolded.

Leutnant von Kleist 8th Company Grenadier Regiment 2 ⁵⁴ 9.

“We officers wished each other luck, drank a last schnaps and smoked a final cigarette then, punctually at 5.00 pm, the trumpeters blew, ‘Fix bayonets!’ and a crazy rate of fire was opened. However, because visibility was so poor, nobody could really tell what they were firing at. Five minutes later the order to attack was given and the wild hunt was on. The first objective was a farmstead. What did we care about the artillery? What did it matter who was firing at the farmstead: ours, or the enemy’s? The [enemy] had certainly spotted our advance, countering it with a hail of lead and iron. It was complete hell, but we pressed forward and had soon taken the first farmstead. However, shells were coming down accurately and men fell as though they had been mown down. I indicated the second target with my sword, but my arm fell as though it had been paralysed. I put away my sword and pistol and carried on. There was a hedge twenty metres to my front – but what was that? I stumbled on and threw myself down by the hedge. My foot had also been hit and I stayed lying where I was.”

Kriegsfreiwilliger von Geibler 8th Company Grenadier Regiment 2 ⁵⁵ 9.

“It was midday. We were still under cover in the trench. Finally – about 4.00 pm – a runner arrived from Leutnant von Kleist. ‘The platoon is to prepare to move. Move forward to the trench which is currently under fire, then go half right towards a farm – a watermill – and assemble there! The other platoons will be following up!’ At long last the relief of an end to all the waiting, to having to lie still. Now it was up and at the enemy! I can still see them in my mind’s eye, all my mates, moving on past the 3rd Battalion and shouting wisecracks and jokes at them, like acquaintances from an exercise as they lay at readiness lining the edge of a sunken road. The move continued. At one point contact was lost between two sections, but this was restored and first the platoon, then the whole company, arrived at the farm. Leutnant von Kleist lay together with Hauptmann von Mutius in a large hole in the ground which had once been a clamp for sugar beet.

“I ran over to him and reported all present. He gave out his orders then I heard Hauptmann von Mutius shout over to the trumpeter: ‘Blow, Fix bayonets! and put the wind up that lot over there!’ At that the trumpeters took up the call which ran along from the right, echoing back quietly amongst the noise of the firing. There was great enthusiasm, almost jubilation, amongst us as bayonets flew out of their scabbards, then it was, ‘On your feet, forwards!’ and we advanced on the enemy. Initially my platoon advanced half right through a hollow, then straight on and through a hedge – but where was the enemy? They had pulled back. Nevertheless we [received] fire from the front and from the flanks and salvoes of shells fell around and amongst us. We lay there for a short while and then dashed further on.

“To our right was a platoon from another company. I was just about to order another bound forward when shrapnel burst overhead, throwing me to one side. I felt dizzy and faint, but pulled myself together and shouted at the man next to me that I was wounded and that the next most senior Unteroffizier was to assume command. It was not until late in to the night that the wounded were all brought in to the dressing station at Bas-Warneton and there I met up with some comrades from the company. All the platoon commanders of 8th Company had been hit, as had the company commander, Leutnant von Kleist, who took his sword in his left hand after he had been hit and continued to charge forwards until he was wounded again.”

Hauptmann von Keßler 1st Battalion Grenadier Regiment 2 ⁵⁶ 9.

“Despite an heroic advance, ground was only gained slowly. Murderous rifle and machine gun fire mowed down complete rows of our courageous [men]. In the end all elements of the regiment were merged together. When, at long last, the order to dig in arrived the regiment was located to the west of Wijtschate. Its right flank rested on a narrow gauge railway opposite a park, its left on Spanbroekmolen and its centre pushed forward. The losses within the battalions were very severe, with almost all the officers killed or wounded. The last men of 1st Company were commanded by Vizefeldwebel Langner and the 3rd by Sergeant Gebhardt. Elements of 2nd and 4th Companies assembled by the field kitchens under the command of Vizefeldwebel Preuß of 2nd Company. Other parts were mixed in with the other battalions. The standard bearer, Gefreiter Gutzmer, was seriously wounded and Grenadier Köhler of 2nd Company took over the colour.”

It is clear from Keßler’s statement that the law of diminishing returns was applying in this area – which did not prevent a continuation of the attacks for several more days, with Grenadier Regiment 9 being pressed into service and Infantry Regiment 42 from 6 November. However, there were no more substantive gains and the lines finally solidified into the shape they would retain during the coming months. It was a similar story further north, where painful progress continued to be made along the line of the Ypres – Menen road. More or less the final distinctive act by the forces of Army Group Fabeck occurred on 8 November. Infantry Regiment 136, commanded by Major von Trott was very near the end of its tether after several days of fighting and very heavy casualties, amounting by this stage to eleven officers, thirteen offizierstellvertreters and 829 other ranks. As a result it was forced to reorganise into two battalions.⁵⁷ About this time the regiment received a draft, comprising mainly kriegsfreiwillige, drawn from the ranks of the students of Göttingen University. One of those involved later wrote a detailed account of his experience.

Offizierstellvertreter Böttcher Infantry Regiment 136 ⁵⁸ 6.

“We set out during the evening of Monday 2 November 1914. Six companies of kriegsfreiwillige and Ersatz Reservists, some of whom had travelled with me from Infantry Regiment 82 in Göttingen, had been brought together at Strasbourg. Commanded by Hauptmann Nelle, who had already been awarded the Iron Cross First and Second Class, they had carried out tactical exercises and some shooting. Now, after about twelve weeks of training, they were to be sent to reinforce XV Corps, which had suffered severe losses. Having detrained in Lille and spent the night in a school near the memorial to Joan of Arc, they marched via Wervik, where there was another overnight halt, as far as Amerika [two and a half kilometres north of Wervik]. Here the reinforcements were finally allocated to companies. During the evening of 5 November orders arrived to move forward to the positions of Infantry Regiment 136; that is to say to the trenches.

“Under the cover of darkness we set off guided by an Unteroffizier who knew the area and who had been sent back by the regiment. All we knew was that it was in the direction of Ypres. The main road to Ypres was teeming with arms and services of every kind, as well as field kitchens, ammunition columns etc. Every now and then a shell impacted somewhere nearby. Had the enemy fired more, the situation on that broad road would have been terrible, packed as it was in the darkness. We marched almost as far as Geluveld and then turned off to the left along a track where the mud was almost up to our calves and we had to be careful that we did not stumble into a shell hole and drown. Picking our way carefully through the darkness we passed fields, ditches, meadows and other obstacles, until we reached a small copse where we paused.

“An Offizierstellvertreter of the troops already in position was ordered to spread the newly arrived reinforcements around some of the trenches of the second line. In the darkness of the wood that was no easy task and each of us was happy if we managed to avoid deep holes. I was put in charge of one detachment and was told to deploy them in a particular trench that was already partly full of water. However, bullets whistling past now and then ensured that the men had soon disappeared into the depths. My young soldier-students wanted to know, naturally, where and how far away the enemy were, what the situation was and what role was intended for us. All I knew was that we were in the second line. Our guns were located a short distance behind us. Every time they fired the ground trembled and in response a ‘blessing’ was sent howling towards us from over there. It was certainly a thorough grounding in warlike operations for us.

“About midday on 6 November we were assembled on a narrow path in the wood then, together with experienced men, were sent to the various rifle companies. Our company, the 4th, was directed to a position on a wooded forward slope. To our front a clearing opened up. The British were supposed to be located on the far side of it. The troops to our left were more or less level with us but, to our right, the battalion was rather more to the rear. A British attack was expected that evening and soon the first shots rang out. Platoon Commander Kulawik was first to spot the danger and shouted, ‘Half right, 300 – 400 metres, British troops in the scrub by the clearing! Rapid fire!’ Someone shouted back to Leutnant Schott, ‘We are under heavy enfilade fire!’ We barely had time to take cover in the positions we had prepared and to bring our rifles into our shoulders. After we had been pinned down in this murderous flanking fire for several minutes, a call came, ‘About turn, take cover in the thicker wood to the rear!’

“At that everyone flooded to the rear, bent over and pushing through the scrub for about two hundred metres, in order to be able to man a front facing the enemy, who were attacking from the right. We thought it terrible that our first experience of battle was to turn our backs on the enemy. However, the weight of British fire increased. An absolute hail of fire whistled over our heads, striking left and right of us. To add to our enjoyment we came under heavy shrapnel fire as well. Suddenly, however, both the shrapnel and small arms fire died away. Some way off I heard Hauptmann Nelle order an assault. Immediately there were repeated shouts of Hurra! and heavy small arms fire broke out, the sound gradually dying away as it became more distant. Night fighting in woods is always a grisly business, especially when it begins with an enemy ambush. The British had to evacuate the high wood, but our casualties were also heavy. Hauptmann Nelle, leading from the front, was wounded in the shoulder right at the start and a great many of the volunteers were killed.

“We occupied the holes and trenches that the British had evacuated but, unfortunately, we could do nothing for the wounded, because a renewed attack was expected at any moment. Here we passed four days and four nights, at times experiencing Hell on earth. The shell and shrapnel fire which lashed us and felled the trees around us was dreadful. It was particularly bad that there were no medical orderlies with us and first aid had to be administered by platoon and section commanders, whilst the evacuation of the severely wounded had to be carried out by the infantrymen themselves. This could only be done at night, because anybody showing himself by day was immediately fired on. This was the time when Unteroffizier Heß, who carried out the duties of company feldwebel here forward, was killed whilst observing. He was the only regular Unteroffizier in the entire company. Offizierstellvertreter Kulawik was so severely wounded in the head that he died whilst he was being evacuated. My faithful batman, Schweineberg, was also slightly wounded.

“Our artillery managed to land several direct hits in the British trenches, forcing them to pull back into the reserve trenches in rear. Naturally we exploited this opportunity to fire on those retreating. Schweineberg, joining in, was just about to fire when, a British soldier swung round in a standing position suddenly and shot at him. He immediately felt a burning sensation in his head, but luckily the bullet had only creased him. This accuracy shown by the long service British soldiers with colonial experience who were deployed opposite the company, verged on the miraculous. On the morning of the fourth day we heard that we were to be relieved that evening at 8.00 pm. However, the closer we drew to that hour, the more critical the situation became. Intense artillery fire began to come down on and around us and crash followed crash, as shells impacted very close by, causing the earth to tremble and walls to crumble. Splinters and bullets flew in all directions and the machine gun, which was laid along the line of the communication trench, began to play its music with fresh intensity. Minute after minute dragged by, each seeming like an eternity. But we were in luck. The thunder of the enemy artillery did not last long. Betrayed by their muzzle flashes, our guns began to fire back accurately and so increasingly gagged the enemy. Finally our relief took place at about midnight.”

On 6 November, while the battles were still in full swing around Wijtschate and Veldhoek, the Kaiser decided to inspire his troops with news of the defeat inflicted on Rear Admiral Cradock’s squadron at the Battle of Coronel by Vizeadmiral Graf von Spee. This was the first British naval defeat since the war of 1812 and, in a personal message he wrote:

“Our armoured squadron commanded by Spee has defeated a squadron of British cruisers in battle.

– Armoured cruiser Monmouth sunk

– Armoured cruiser Good Hope seriously damaged [sic.]

– Light cruiser Glasgoy [sic. Glasgow] escaped, but damaged.

A cheer for our lads in blue. Inform all the troops and have them give three cheers for the navy.

Wilhelm. ⁵⁹

It is impossible to say if the men struggling for control of the Messines Ridge or fighting their way through the thick woods south of the Ypres-Menen road were particularly heartened by the message or even if they ever heard about it. Having entered Valparaiso on 3 November to a rapturous reception, Admiral Spee, in accepting a bouquet of flowers, said, ‘These will do nicely for my grave’. He knew that despite the tactical victory, with half his ammunition gone, his fate was sealed. Having raced south with the battlecruisers Invincible and Inflexible, Vice Admiral Sturdee destroyed all but one of his ships at the Battle of the Falkland Islands on 8 December 1914. Spee lost his life and so did his sons, together with over 2,000 German sailors. Needless to say, that event was not followed by a call for cheers.

Long before that event, any thought of cheers had completely died away amongst all the formations engaged in the north. At Supreme Army Headquarters, efforts were still being made as late as 10 November to introduce fresh troops in the hope of forcing a decision around Ypres but, at Headquarters Army Group Fabeck, both the commander and chief of staff were convinced by the end of 3 November that all hope had gone, that the chance of operational success had slipped away, never to be retrieved. That day XV Corps did take Veldhoek, but II Bavarian Army Corps, in the Schwerpunkt, it will be remembered, made hardly any progress and was under extreme pressure from British counter-attacks against 6th Bavarian Reserve Division. Effectively the entire day passed, marked only by disputes for particular geographical features. The artillery ammunition had almost run out, forcing the infantry to carry the main load of the battle and suffering accordingly.

Oberstleutnant Fritz von Loßberg, Headquarters Army Group Fabeck ⁶⁰

“The events of 3 November demonstrated to all levels of command, up as far as Supreme Army Headquarters, that there was no way of forcing an operational success in Flanders. The necessary battle reserves and, above all, sufficient stocks of ammunition to press on with offensive operations, were simply not available. In Flanders Supreme Army Headquarters had let slip the final opportunity to gain a victory through the timely deployment of reserves released from elsewhere and the use of all the ammunition which could have been made available. This would probably have been possible had every releasable corps been made available simultaneously with Fourth Army. [These should have been] assembled on the right flank of the army, deeply echeloned and provided with sufficient ammunition, in order to smash with overwhelming force into what were then in Flanders only weak enemy forces between Diksmuide and Armentières.

“As ever, however, after the Battle of the Marne, Supreme Army Headquarters, through its slow decision making and division of the resources of the armies in the west which wore them down, always trailed behind the enemy command processes in Flanders. This made it possible for the enemy to match force with force in battle. The consequence was that the entire German Western Front was more or less condemned to positional warfare. Up to 3 November, tardy decision making by Supreme Army Headquarters led to the succession of frontal attacks by Fourth Army which cost it 49,000 men killed in action or wounded and 13,000 missing. The Sixth Army suffered about 27,000 casualties, of whom 17,250 were caused to Army Group Fabeck alone between 30 October and 3 November.

“The final reserves of ammunition were expended. The battleworthiness of the German Army of the West was considerably weakened. For the time being the German army had no capability to conduct major operations. It was absolutely essential, therefore, to break off offensive operations in the west, to adopt a defensive posture and to go at once to the aid of the Eastern Front, threatened by the weakening of the Austrians. This decision was completely obvious, but still Supreme Army Headquarters could not bring itself to take it, preferring instead to cling on to the idea of attacks in the west; this despite the weakened state of most of the German formations and the lack of ammunition, which all recent experience had shown might perhaps produce the odd tactical success, but had no hope of achieving anything at the operational level.”

Stalemate it might have been, but at least from the attackers’ point of view it was stalemate with the German army in possession of dominating positions all along the Messines Ridge. There it was to remain until it was blown off it on 7 June 1917, in a position to observe every move the British army made forward of Ypres and, as a result, able to cause it monumental casualties over a two and half year period. Post war in Germany it became overshadowed and forgotten in the wake of all the popular attention devoted to the tragedy of Langemark, but in Bavaria there was continuing pride in what had been achieved at such sacrificial cost, as these words from the pen of one of the divisional padres at the time makes clear.

Feldgeistlicher Oskar Daumiller 6th Bavarian Reserve Division⁶¹

“From the Bavarian perspective, the ‘Spirit of Langemark’ is the ‘Spirit of Wijtschate’ – its hallmarks were an unparalleled disregard of the risk of death; love of and faithfulness to People, King and Fatherland; to Kaiser and Empire, in the most noble and pure sense of the words of the oath sworn on the Colours. We stood together as one for our parents, wives and children; for hearth and home. Our innermost conviction was, ‘Germany must live, even if we have to die’.⁶² We were the physical embodiment of that rousing call to battle!”

Notes

1. Tschischwitz General von der Marwitz p 58.

2. Lossberg Meine Tätigkeit im Weltkriege p 94.

3. ibid. p 95.

4. This is a strange remark. The first Canadian troops did not arrive at Ypres until January 1915.

5. Glück History Infantry Regiment 126 p 67.

6. Kriegsarchiv München 3. Inf. Div. Bd 6 Generalkommando II. Bayer. A.K. Korpsbefehl 29.10.1914.

7. This order is all the more strange, bearing in mind, for example, that General US Grant in his 1864 campaign during the American Civil War would be automatically linked by telegraph to his subordinate headquarters each evening within a very short time of the end of each day’s march. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that insufficient attention had been paid before the war to the requirement to exploit every modern means of communication to facilitate command and control of the field army.

8. Kriegsarchiv München Gen-Kdo (wk) II AK Bd 6 A.O.K. 6.Armee Weisung an die Armee von 30.10.1914.

9. All underlined words are points of original emphasis.

10. Steur History Infantry Regiment 132 p 84.

11. The fog may have been thicker elsewhere along the attack frontage. Bavarian Infantry Regiment 18 reported that their artillery did not finish firing until 9.30 am and then for some reason there was a thirty minute gap before the 3rd Bavarian Infantry Division began to advance. See Ritter History Bavarian Infantry Regiment 18 p 63.

12. Steur op. cit. p 86.

13. Of the three, only Leutnant Wolfgang Schumann has a known grave. He is buried in the German cemetery at Menen Block F Grave 1605.

14. Joermann-Düsseldorf History Infantry Regiment 136 pp 116–117.

15. ibid. pp 117–119.

16. Etzel History Bavarian Infantry Regiment 9 p 44.

17. Weniger History Bavarian Infantry Regiment 5 p 32.

18. Riegel History Bavarian Infantry Regiment 17 pp 23–24.

19. Kohl Mit Hurra in den Tod! pp 53–54.

20. This is a reference to one of the places on the Somme where the German attacks stalled at the end of September 1914.

21. This account contains a certain amount of poetic licence. The BOH (p 291) describes a ‘wheel back of 3rd Cavalry Brigade 2nd Cavalry Division near Hollebeke’ that afternoon and states that a squadron of the Royals departed the area of the chateau, ‘forced to retire’ but in good order at the time the German mid afternoon attack was launched. Even if there was no British staff there to be driven out of Hollebeke Chateau – and the BOH maintains that it was empty at the time the Bavarians arrived – it is entirely feasible, indeed extremely likely, that the British cavalry had being making full use of the facilities it offered.

22. Gerok History Field Artillery Regiment 29 pp 14–15.

23. Stühmke History Infantry Regiment 125 p 42.

24. ibid p 43.

25. The actual situation within 6th Bavarian Reserve Division was quite complicated. Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment 16 was still engaged to the north against Geluveld, Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment 17, which, together with Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment 8, of 5th Bavarian Reserve Brigade, 4th Bavarian Infantry Division, had been in Corps reserve, initially received orders at 10.00 am 31 October to move under command of 3rd Bavarian Infantry Division in the Wambeke area, where it fought for several hours that day under the command of Generalmajor Danner’s 5th Bavarian Infantry Brigade. (See Großmann History Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment 17 pp 12- 13) It was not until 10.00 pm that orders to link up with Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment 21 for the attack on Wijtschate were issued.

26. BOH p 305

27. Peculiar assertions like this are dotted throughout the early volumes of the BOH. There is no mention of any such unlikely event in any of the German accounts, which are quick to describe the successful use of subterfuge on the occasions when it was employed, or indeed to mention British examples. Großmann (History Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment 17 p 13), for example, relates an instance of a British officer galloping towards them in the early hours of 1 November near Wijtschate, shouting in German, ‘Don’t shoot. I am a German!’ Not that this did him any good; both he and his horse were shot dead.

28. Brandenstein History Infantry Regiment 121 p 18

29. ibid. pp 19–20

30. This refers to the death of Hauptmann Heuß of Field Artillery Regiment 65, the last man on his feet that night capable of serving a gun, who fell while firing a howitzer that had been brought into action on the main street through Messines. See Gemmingen History Infantry Regiment 119 p 61.

31. Bossert History Infantry Regiment 143 pp 159 – 160.

32. Petri History Infantry Regiment 99 p 27.

33. Glowgowski History Infantry Regiment 105 pp 30–32.

34. Unteroffizier Alfred Gläser is buried in the German cemetery at Menen Block 1 Grave 1019.

35. Wagner History Field Artillery Regiment 51 pp 82–83.

36. Freiburger Zeitung 15 January 1915.

37. Beckh History Bavarian Reserve Field Artillery Regiment 6 pp 26–27.

38. Braun History Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment 21 p 13.

39. Großmann History Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment 17 p 14.

40. ibid. p 15. There were constant accusations on both sides that illegal ammunition was being used. In fact such use is likely to have been rare. Fighting in amongst buildings would have caused many ricochets and wounds inflicted in that way could easily give the impression that ammunition had been tampered with.

41. Dellmensingen Das Bayernbuch vom Weltkriege II Band pp 127–128.

42. This is an interesting proof that sometimes exhortations and messages from the highest levels could permeate to the lowest rapidly. The previous evening General von Fabeck had signed off a message to the troops, which read: ‘His Majesty the Kaiser has arrived at Headquarters Group Fabeck. [He] is highly delighted with the progress so far and expects further victorious advances all along the line.’ Kriegsarchiv München Gen-Kdo II AK Bd 6 An II. A.K. u. 6. b.R.D. In fact the Kaiser is unlikely to have been ‘highly delighted’ with progress. Nobody else in the chain of command was, but this was not the occasion to say so.

43. Großmann op. cit. pp 12–15 & 111. Because this sector of the battlefield remained in German hands, the bodies of all these officers were recovered. Danner, Hanster, Halder, Schuster and Sacherl all lie in the Kamaradengrab at the German cemetery at Langemark, whilst Major Hermann Helmes and Leutnant Georg Fillweber are buried in the German cemetery at Menen in Block A Grave 379 and Block G Grave 2155 respectively.

44. Kriegsarchiv München HS 1972 General Kommando II. B. Armeekorps Nr 1560 3.11.1914 Betreff: Besondere Taten.

45. This was clearly an immediate operational award. News of it appeared as the first item in the Bavarian II Army Corps Routine Order on 2 November 1914. See Kriegsarchiv München 6. Reserve. Division. Bd 87

46. Wurmb History Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment 8 p 44.

47. Dellmensingen op. cit. pp 128–130.

48. Offizierstellvertreter Max Hacker is buried in the German cemetery at Langemark Block B Grave 13118.

49. Wurmb op. cit. p 46.

50. Hansch History Grenadier Regiment 9 p 100.

51. It would be nice to think that the offer was still open three days later, because the temporary commander of Infantry Regiment 171 of 39th Infantry Division (following the necessity for Oberst Freiherr von Imhoff to report sick and be evacuated on 3 November) ordered the 3rd Battalion to dig a trench ‘with all speed’ during the night of 5 November hard up behind the regimental start line, so that the regimental band could take cover and play during the renewed attack through the swampy woods towards the distant (and unattainable) objective of Zillebeke on 6 November. This was done and the men advanced to the stirring strains of Preußens Gloria. Bravery medals were won that day, but it is not recorded if the regimental band or its bandmaster were honoured. See Kaiser History Infantry Regiment 171 pp 87–88.

52. Bossert History Infantry Regiment 143 p 170.

53. Gottberg History Grenadier Regiment 2 pp 80–82.

54. ibid. pp 82–83.

55. ibid. pp 83–84.

56. ibid. p 84.

57. It is interesting to note that of the original complement of officers who marched out to war three months earlier, only five still remained with the regiment and three of those had already been wounded once. Joermann-Düsseldorf History Infantry Regiment 136 p 125.

58. Joermann-Düsseldorf op. cit. pp 125–126.

59. Kriegsarchiv München Gen-Kdo II AK Bd 6 An II A.K. u. 6.b.R.D. In fact Good Hope, like Monmouth, sank with all hands, making a combined loss of 1,600 men. To be fair, the ultimate sinking of Good Hope was not witnessed by anybody. The message as taken down contains a real howler. It must have been passed over a bad telephone line, or been received by a slow witted operator. It begins ‘Unser Panzergeschwader Unterspree . . . ’, which translates as, ‘Our armoured squadron ‘Lower Spree’ . . . (i.e. the squadron was apparently named after the river which flows through Berlin). What it should have stated was, ‘Unser Panzergeschwader unter Spee . . . ’, i.e. ‘Our armoured squadron, commanded by Spee . . . ’ This just goes to show that no army has a monopoly on mistakes.

60. Lossberg op. cit. pp 99–100.

61. Kriegsarchiv München HS 1360 Geschichte des RIR 20 Seiten 105–106: Beilage III

62. The quotation is taken from the poem Soldatenabschied [The Soldier’s Farewell] by Heinrich Lersch (1889 – 1936), whose war poetry had an enormous popular following in Germany – fully comparable with that of Rudyard Kipling in the United Kingdom. Unfortunately for Lersch, his work, which was founded on simple patriotism and the experience of the front line soldier, was pressed into service between the wars by the Nazis and tainted for all time as a result.