In the literature of World War II, much has been written about the reliance of Germany upon the great petroleum center at Ploesti, Romania. Far too little has been written to underscore the fact that Balikpapan, on the eastern shore of Borneo, would become the Ploesti of the Japanese Empire. Balikpapan was the keystone of Japanese strategy in Southeast Asia, and to the future of the Japanese war machine. By the opening days of January 1942, this keystone was within easy reach.
The Japanese conquest of the British protectorates of northern Borneo had been initiated and completed within the final two weeks of December 1941, but this left the unfinished business of Dutch Borneo. It was especially within this area, on the island’s east side, that great petrochemical production and refining operations helped to make the Dutch East Indies the world’s fourth largest oil producer.
That story began with the discovery of petroleum as a fuel and lubricant for the industrial revolution in the nineteenth century, and the worldwide quest by industrialized countries to find and possess it. This led to the realization, late in the nineteenth century, of the value of the oil seeping out of the ground in Borneo, and in turn, to the creation in 1890 by Jean Baptiste August Kessler and Henri Deterding of an oil company. With an official charter from King William III of the Netherlands, this little company on a distant tropical shore earned itself a distinguished name as the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company (Koninklijke Nederlandsche Petroleum Maatschappij).
As noted in Chapter 11, this firm merged in 1907 with the Shell Transport and Trading Company Limited of the United Kingdom to become Royal Dutch Shell, which went on to become – and to remain to this day – one of the half dozen largest oil companies in the world.
Though Shell had become the dominant player in Dutch Borneo, as well as the British-controlled north, it was by no means the only oil company present. As a small footnote to the petroleum story on the island on the eve of the war, it should be mentioned that one of the active independent producers was the Borneo Petroleum Company, founded in 1929 as a joint Dutch–Japanese venture. By 1941, however, the Dutch were minority players, with controlling interests held by the Japan Petroleum Company and Mitsui Bussan Kaisha, a steamship transportation company that was part of the Mitsui family zaibatsu, or conglomerate.
By 1941, the oil industry on the east coast of Dutch Borneo, including both drilling and refining, was centered at two locations. First was Tarakan Island, in the Sesajap River Delta about 250 sea miles south of Sandakan in British North Borneo. Second was Balikpapan, across the equator and about 400 sea miles south of Tarakan. At the time, Balikpapan City had a population of about 30,000, with Tarakan City being about one third this size.
The Japanese battle plan called for Tarakan Island to be invaded on January 10, with Balikpapan assaulted soon after. In preparation, the Japanese flew a number of reconnaissance missions, and had begun flying bombing missions on Christmas Day.
Leading the attack would be the Sakaguchi Detachment, drawn from the IJA 56th Infantry Group of the 56th Division, commanded by Major General Shizuo Sakaguchi, based on the 146th Infantry Regiment, and reinforced by artillery, armored, and engineer units drawn from the division. Whereas the northern Borneo attack had launched from Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam, the Sakaguchi Detachment sailed from Davao in the Philippines, which they had captured in December as a base of operations for the Dutch Borneo assault.
Also involved in the Dutch Borneo operations was the 2nd Kure Special Naval Landing Force, a battalion-sized contingent of IJN ground troops under Lieutenant Commander Masanari Siga. The inclusion of “Kure” in the designation identified the unit’s base as Kure Naval Base. Landing force units were identified by the name of their parent base. In addition to Kure, other Special Naval Landing Forces originated at Maizuru, Sasebo, and Yokosuka.
Used more often in the Dutch East Indies than elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the Special Naval Landing Forces were a naval infantry force roughly equivalent to the US Marine Corps. At the beginning of the war, they were an elite force, but as time progressed, their ranks were filled mainly with poorly trained and poorly disciplined troops brought in randomly from other units.
Tactically, Borneo presented the Japanese with a significantly different terrain situation than they were encountering in Malaya. Both consisted almost entirely of dense, essentially impenetrable and largely uninhabited jungle. However, in Malaya the British had constructed both a highway and a rail system. These were confined to narrow corridors, but they ran from one end to the other without interruption. In Borneo, there were no roads connecting the major cities. All long-distance transportation was by sea. For the invader, there was no opportunity to use tanks, motor vehicles, or that stellar conveyance of the Malay campaign, bicycles. Each of the objectives would require a separate amphibious assault.
However, the defenses in place to fend off these attacks were inadequate at best. As with the British in northern Borneo, the Dutch had left the east side of the island only lightly defended, planning to depend on a scorched earth policy to deny their petroleum resources to the Japanese.
The Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger, KNIL) maintained its 6th Infantry Battalion at Balikpapan, and its 7th Infantry Battalion at Tarakan. These units were each supported by two field artillery batteries, and the ports were defended by coastal artillery batteries, each of which consisted of a pair of 120mm guns and four 75mm guns. The Dutch commanders at the two locations were Lieutenant Colonel Cornelius van den Hoogenband at Balikpapan, and Lieutenant Colonel Simon de Waal at Tarakan.
Bandjarmasin, the Dutch administrative capital for its part of Borneo, located near the southern tip of Borneo along a marshy coastline 210 miles south of Balikpapan, was effectively undefended. Lieutenant Colonel Henry Halkema commanded a contingent of about 500 troops and no artillery, which were all that were assigned to protect a city of around 70,000 people. Like Tarakan and Balikpapan, Bandjarmasin was also a center of petroleum activities, but of less significance than the other two.
Overhead, the mainstay of Netherlands Naval Aviation (Marine Luchtvaartdienst, MLD) were Dornier Do 24 flying boats, while the Military Aviation of the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (Militaire Luchtvaart van het Koninklijk Nederlands-Indisch Leger, ML-KNIL) was equipped with American-built aircraft, such as Glenn Martin bombers, as well as Curtis Hawk and the Brewster Buffalo single-seat fighters of the type that had proven so inadequate in Malaya.
Most ML-KNIL bases were on Java, but the service had forward-deployed Martin bombers and Buffalo fighters to Balikpapan. However, they were pulled back to Samarinda in northwest Borneo, or to Java and Sumatra in January. Aside from the submarines of its Divisie Onderseeboten III, and a small number of support vessels, the Royal Netherlands Navy had also withdrawn from eastern Borneo.
Meanwhile, the 16 transport vessels carrying the IJA’s Sakaguchi Detachment and the Special Naval Landing Force were escorted by the cruiser Naka, 11 destroyers, three No.31-class patrol ships (converted from Momi-class destroyers), two seaplane tenders, and a bevy of minesweepers and patrol boats under the command of Rear Admiral Shoji Nishimura.
Seaplane tenders were a usual part of IJN invasion fleets because they were an efficient means of providing air support for observation and strike missions in lieu of aircraft carriers or dependence upon land-based airpower operating from distant bases.
As the invasion fleet arrived off the coast of Tarakan at sunset on January 10, the setting sun glowed red through the towers of smoke which boiled upward from the burning oil rigs. The Dutch had already torched the oil fields.
The assault went forward that night as planned, with the assault troops using the fires to navigate through the smoke and darkness. The first of two waves of IJA troops, commanded by Colonel Kyohei Yamamoto, reached the island around midnight, albeit not at their assigned location, with the IJN landing force coming ashore shortly thereafter.
Tarakan is a large island, comprising 177 square miles, much of it jungle or marshland. The swampy terrain, combined with the smoke and fires, not to mention the darkness, was a recipe for confusion. The attackers encountered pockets of resistance from KNIL troops, mainly ethnic Indonesians, and were compelled to beat off one determined counterattack. Nevertheless, with their superior numbers and superior firepower, Yamamoto’s troops were able to battle their way through to the vicinity of the main oilfield by noon on January 11. The IJN landing forces, meanwhile, ran into tough going in the jungle and did not occupy the Tarakan airfield until the following morning. During their advance on the airfield, they were hit by a small number of ML-KNIL bombers flying from Samarinda.
Realizing that his position was untenable, and knowing that his command had essentially been sacrificed to delay the Japanese, Lieutenant Colonel de Waal conveyed an offer to surrender. Yamamoto accepted and advised General Sakaguchi. However, because of the general confusion that then prevailed, and lack of adequate communications, not all of the KNIL forces got the message.
The second wave, or left wing, of the IJA 146th Infantry landed on Tarakan at 3:00 pm on the afternoon of December 11. Their objective was to capture the coastal artillery battery, which was manned by troops who were not yet aware of de Waal’s surrender. While they were making their way through deep jungle to reach the guns which dominated the entrance to the harbor at Tarakan City, it was the turn of the IJN not to get the message.
At some point on January 12, a notice, preserved in US Army records, was transmitted to the ships of the invasion fleet which read “Although the enemy has offered to surrender, it is feared that the coastal battery located at the south end of the island is not aware of this and it would be dangerous to proceed to the Tarakan pier, therefore hold up your sailing.”
Failing to heed the warning, two minesweepers made for the waters off Tarakan City, entered within range of the coastal guns, came under fire and were sunk. There was much rejoicing in the gun batteries, but deep embarrassment for de Waal, who had already surrendered. He agreed to obtain a surrender of the battery to avoid further bloodshed, but when the artillerymen came down to give themselves up, the Japanese tied them up and threw them into the bay. It is estimated by the Allies that 219 men were drowned.
General Shizuo Sakaguchi came ashore on Tarakan at midday on January 12 to supervise the mopping up operations and to accept de Waal’s formal surrender. He remained for 48 hours before embarking with most of his detachment for the next objective, Balikpapan.
He also met with the man who had been the local manager for Borneo Petroleum. He cut a deal by which the Japanese would hire him to supervise the repairs to the badly damaged facilities on Tarakan which he had previously helped to sabotage on behalf of the Dutch colonial authorities. For Sakaguchi, it was an expedient transaction, because the Borneo Petroleum people knew their way around and could get the job done more quickly than Japanese engineers.
The bargaining that had ensued gave the Japanese general an idea. If he could convince the Dutch to surrender Balikpapan intact, the Japanese could be on line with their own production without a lengthy period of reconstruction. It was a long shot, and it delayed his operational timetable, but apparently Sakaguchi felt that it was worth a try.
On January 16, two Dutch and three Japanese officers departed from Tarakan aboard the commandeered Dutch motor vessel Parsifal. Four days later, a Dutch Do 24 seaplane spotted the boat at sea, landed, and took the passengers aboard. Having been flown to Balikpapan, they presented Sakaguchi’s proposal to Lieutenant Colonel van den Hoogenband, the garrison commander.
Despite the threat that any damage done in Balikpapan would result in the execution of all the Dutch troops captured if the Japanese attacked, van den Hoogenband rejected the ultimatum out of hand. Indeed, he had already ordered the limited demolition of facilities in the port area on January 18. Destruction of wells and other facilities farther inland was not, however, part of this order. Perhaps he still imagined that the Japanese would be somehow defeated and the oil fields should be preserved.
When the three Japanese officers returned to Tarakan on January 23 with the Dutch refusal, Sakaguchi had already initiated a Plan B, and was en route to Balikpapan. As it was obvious to the Dutch at Balikpapan that the Japanese were coming, Sakaguchi understood that the sort of tactical surprise that he had enjoyed at Tarakan on January 10 had been lost. However, an opportunity arose by which he thought he might achieve a modest element of surprise for part of his operation, specifically the capture of Balikpapan’s substantial airfield. The idea was to use his main attack as a diversion to draw attention away from a covert operation against the airfield.
During the debriefing of ethnic Indonesian KNIL troops captured at Tarakan, some were turned up who appeared to be sympathetic to the propaganda message of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Using two of these men who had lived at Balikpapan as guides, Sakaguchi sent a small surprise attack contingent via canoe to infiltrate the heavily wooded coastline, travel up a jungle river, and capture the Balikpapan airfield. They departed on January 20.
Though spotted at sea by Dutch aircraft, the canoes successfully eluded detection as they made their way inland. Meanwhile, there had been no element of surprise for the convoy. Detected by Dutch reconnaissance aircraft on January 22 as they entered the Makassar Strait separating Borneo from Celebes, they were attacked by nine Martin bombers, escorted by 20 Buffaloes, the following day. One transport ship was sunk, and another was damaged.
Beneath the sea, the Dutch submarine K XVIII, part of Divisie Onderseeboten III, which had successfully attacked the Japanese invasion fleet off northern Borneo a month before, was quietly in pursuit. As the convoy approached Balikpapan on January 23, the submarine struck, sinking a Japanese ship. Initially it was believed to have been a destroyer, but subsequent comparisons to Japanese records show the lost ship to have been a transport.
The convoy, which reached the waters off Balikpapan later that day, began landing the invasion troops after nightfall, as was the typical Japanese practice for amphibious operations. By around 9:30 pm, most of the force was ashore, having overcome light opposition. Meanwhile, van den Hoogenband had ordered a withdrawal of his forces from Balikpapan City, but they ran into the Japanese surprise attack contingent coming the other way. Having captured the airfield, they were coming into the city to link up with the main landing force. Caught in a vise, most of the Dutch troops were compelled to surrender. Though the battle for Balikpapan City would continue for another two days, the airport had been secured, and operations were proceeding according to plan.
Offshore, though, it was another matter, for the submarine K XVIII continued to stalk the Japanese convoy. As the clock ticked toward midnight, its torpedoes struck, sinking another of the transports. In the small hours of January 24, another Dutch torpedo hit one of the three Japanese patrol ships, damaging it beyond repair.
At this point, Admiral Nishimura angrily ordered the destroyers escorting his transports to hunt and kill the escaping submarine, thus drawing them away from the troop ships. Perhaps the last thing on his mind was a surface attack against his flotilla, but this is exactly what he got.
Upon news of the imminent Japanese assault on Balikpapan, four Clemson-class USN destroyers of Destroyer Division 59, along with the cruisers USS Marblehead and USS Boise, had earlier been dispatched by the newly formed (January 7) American–British–Dutch–Australian Command (ABDA) to intercept the Japanese. The cruisers had to drop out of the pursuit, but the destroyers, under the command of Commander Paul Hopkins Talbot, continued north toward Balikpapan.
The USS John D. Ford, USS Parrott, USS Paul Jones, and USS Pope arrived at around 2:45 am to see the Japanese ships silhouetted against the fires burning ashore. With the Japanese destroyers on their submarine chase, the transports were protected mainly by the two surviving No.31-class patrol ships. Built as destroyers two decades earlier, they had been converted as landing craft carriers for the IJN landing forces, and had had much of their armament, including their torpedo tubes, removed.
The four American destroyers attacked, sailing directly into the formation of Japanese ships, and pounding them for several hours, using both torpedoes and their 4-inch guns. The Americans sank another of the patrol ships, along with four of the troop ships, and damaged two more transports. The toll might have been higher, but the USN was still working out bugs in its Mark 15 torpedoes, which had a tendency to run too deep. With no effective counterfire, the four destroyers escaped with minimal damage.
For the USN, it was the first major surface action of World War II, and the first since the Spanish American War nearly half a century earlier. For the IJN, it marked the climax of 48 hours of the most serious losses to date in the Southeast Asia campaign. However, had the destroyers arrived eight hours earlier, before the invasion troops disembarked from the transports, things would have been much worse for the Sakaguchi Detachment.
With the Allied naval elements having withdrawn, and the mopping up concluded on January 26, quiet descended once again upon Balikpapan. The only sounds of war were those of a few crackling fires amid the petroleum infrastructure near the docks, and gunshots near the old fortress of Klandasan, as around 80 Dutch prisoners were executed.
Sakaguchi had now achieved the goals of his assignment in Borneo. He had crushed the minimal Dutch military force that had stood up to him, and had seized the two great petroleum centers, with the largest, at Balikpapan, in much better shape than Tarakan.
For General Shizuo Sakaguchi, the conquest of Balikpapan on January 26 left only Bandjarmasin at the south end of Borneo, which was important because it was the seat of Dutch power and the only major population center on Borneo that was not yet under Japanese control. The area around Bandjarmasin was strategically important to the Japanese because of the well-constructed airfields, such as those at Martapura and Kotawaringin, which would be important bases for Japanese bombers patrolling and controlling the waterways to the south as operations were undertaken across the rest of the Dutch East Indies.
For this next step, Japanese tactics changed significantly. Largely because Japanese naval power was being assembled for operations in Java and Sumatra, and because the Sakaguchi Detachment had lost most of its transport ships to enemy action, the next step would not be an amphibious operation. Rather, it would be a pincer movement that depended mainly on an overland march across the southern tip of Borneo.
Rather than embarking most of his entire force, as he had done after Tarakan, Sakaguchi established his permanent 56th Infantry Group headquarters at Balikpapan, and sent just one battalion to capture Bandjarmasin. On January 27, a reinforced infantry company under Captain Yoshibumi Okamoto left Balikpapan aboard small boats, intending to follow the coastline all the way to Bandjarmasin.
Four days later, the 3rd Battalion of the 146th Infantry Regiment, commanded by Colonel Kyohei Yamamoto, was landed at Adang Bay, about 100 miles south of Balikpapan. They marched due west carrying nine days’ worth of field rations and bicycles, which proved useless on the jungle trails and were discarded. The mountainous terrain proved to be a far greater obstacle than the handful of KNIL troops which they encountered, and many of the Japanese soldiers came down with malaria or other tropical diseases. Nevertheless, the fact that they made it at all was a triumph, and the fact that they made it in fighting form earned acclaim for Yamamoto from those higher up the command hierarchy.
By the end of the first week in February, Okamoto’s contingent had come ashore south of Bandjarmasin, and the two prongs of the pincer were closing in on the city. On February 10, the airfield at Martapura was captured, and the Japanese marched without opposition into Bandjarmasin. Most of the Europeans who had been living there had been evacuated to Java earlier in the month. Colonel Halkema, meanwhile, had abandoned the city with his last 75 troops, and had retreated into central Borneo, where he was ordered to undertake the impossible task of defending the airfield at Kotawaringin.
Meanwhile, a number of civilians and KNIL personnel had separated from their units and had managed to escape from southern Borneo in small boats. Some of them managed to reach Java, where the residents were still more in denial, rather than fear, of a possible Japanese invasion of the colony’s most populous island.
The IJA, which had soundly defeated a superior British force in Malaya, had now secured Dutch Borneo in the space of just 30 days without a significant land battle. With the latter victory – counterintuitively underreported in the global media of 1942, and largely overlooked in the history books – Japan had secured the petroleum that would fuel its triumphant war machine indefinitely.