From Narcissism
to Ego Psychology
to Self Psychology
PAUL H. ORNSTEIN
By the mid-1960s clinical practice in psychoanalysis had once more forced the issue of narcissism to center stage. This first happened in 1914, when, after several smaller but significant steps, Freud was compelled to introduce narcissism as a broader concept. In so doing he revised his libido theory —then the conceptual foundation of psychoanalysis—and prepared for major clinical and theoretical changes ahead, which gave this work its pivotal importance.
Both the original introduction of the concept and its more recent reemer-gence shook the foundations of psychoanalytic theory and practice, apparently for similar reasons. The new theories, Freud’s own and later Kohut’s, threatened the existing central conflict theory of psychoanalysis (Ornstein, 1983; Wallerstein, 1983). Narcissism thus became embroiled in heated controversy, both historically and more recently. No wonder Gay characterized the 1914 essay as “subversive” of Freud’s own previous theories (Gay, 1988, 338). Subversive it was. According to a careful and incisive study of the literature of that period (1914-22) by May-Tolzmann (1988), it was for this very reason that most analysts of the time reacted to it negatively, with bewilderment and confusion. Few could embrace even some elements enthusiastically, and most disregarded it, not knowing how to integrate these new ideas within the existing conflict theory. We also leam from Jones (1955, 302-06) that he and some of the others around Freud found the essay “disturbing.” Jones’s explanation is worth recounting: “It gave a disagreeable jolt to the theory of instincts on which psychoanalysis had hitherto worked. The observations on which the new conception of narcissism was founded were so unmistakable and easily confirmed that we had to accept it unreservedly, but it was at once plain that something would have to be done about the theory to which we were accustomed” (1955, 303; italics added).
Something was indeed done about the theory a few years later: further revisions were made to the libido theory (Freud, 1915, 1920, 1923), followed by a drastic reformulation of the basic model of psychoanalysis (Freud, 1923, 1926). Few would challenge the assessment today that it was a revolutionary move on Freud’s part to replace the topographic model of the mind with the tripartite structural model, to exchange the paradigm of id psychology with the new paradigm of ego psychology—which led also to a marked shift in psychoanalytic technique. These changes were foreshadowed in the new theory of narcissism. Our current interest in it is heightened by the fact that we can now discover in it the nuclei not only of ego psychology (in which it culminated) but also of object-relations theory and self psychology.
Thus there can be no question that the ideas expressed by Freud in “On Narcissism” were fundamental for the subsequent development of psychoanalysis. It is necessary for our present purpose to examine Freud’s essay in order to assess his 1914 and later ideas on narcissism in relation to their historical impact on the evolution of psychoanalysis and their current theoretical position in our field (Bing et al., 1959; Pulver, 1970; Moore, 1975). This will also permit us to put Kohut’s contributions into their proper perspective.
Rereading “On Narcissism,” registering retrospectively the transitional nature of its propositions, and following their subsequent fate should enable us to use psychoanalytic theories more freely as discardable tools of observation. A rereading provides all of us with a corrective emotional experience.
Before turning to the specific lessons of this essay, we should cast a quick glance at the circumstances under which it was written. Freud had reacted strongly to the recent defections of Adler (1911) and Jung (1913) and responded to their respective challenges in the two essays he worked on simultaneously in 1914, the paper on the history of the psychoanalytic movement and the paper on narcissism. In “On Narcissism” his response is considered more “objective” and more “scientific,” albeit at times he gives the appearance of being bent on demolishing his opponents’ arguments, giving them no recognition for the legitimate questions they have raised. Freud was at pains to repudiate Jung’s assertion that the libido theory failed to account for certain psychotic phenomena in the Schreber case (Freud, 1911). But—as Jones saw it—at this point Freud “was hard put to it to demonstrate one side of the conflict, to define any non-narcissistic components of the ego. His scientific career received an apparent check” (1955, 303). So, for Freud, this was a serious matter, and it is understandable that in striking back he mobilized all his emotional and intellectual capacities. In the second paper, “On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement.” he attacks his opponents more openly and is, according to his own description, “fuming with rage.”
These circumstances undoubtedly contributed to both the form and the content of the essay on narcissism. Nevertheless, it would be misleading to focus unduly on the precipitating events and see this essay primarily as a defensive effort on Freud’s part. After all, some of the themes he now wove into a grand design of the theory of narcissism had already preoccupied him for some time and had slowly emerged from within, albeit frequently stimulated by external pressures. It is this emergence from within, the inner logic of the evolution of psychoanalysis, that we are interested in pursuing. In doing so, we shall discover that “On Narcissism” is rightly considered one of Freud’s most important works. Although it stands at the transitional point between id psychology and ego psychology—and hence will soon be eclipsed by newer ideas—nevertheless it contains all those elements of Freud’s thinking that propelled him toward his momentous paradigmatic change within a decade or so (Freud, 1923, 1926).
KEY ELEMENTS IN FREUD’S THEORY OF NARCISSISM: THE ROAD TO EGO PSYCHOLOGY
A proper entry into this complex and multilayered work for a brief historical and conceptual exploration demands that we place ourselves into the framework of the psychoanalysis of the time. Freud himself makes it easy for us to know where psychoanalysis stood in 1914. In order to distance himself from Adler as well as from Jung, Freud carefully delineated the field, to show that his opponents worked outside it (Freud, 1914a).
The theory of psychoanalysis, he said, was based on the clinical “facts” of transference and resistance. These were then accounted for with the theories of repression, the unconscious, and infantile sexuality. These facts and ideas determined the analyst’s clinical focus. In his explorations the analyst searched for the patient’s unconscious, infantile sexual wishes and fantasies (the manifestations of the sexual instincts), which were in conflict with his self-preservative needs (manifestations of the ego-instincts, which instigate their repression). It was the conflict that characterized the core activities of the analyst. So important and central was this theory of conflict that analysis was often referred to as a “conflict psychology par excellence” and this epoch in psychoanalysis as one of “id psychology.”
Nevertheless, all along, Freud also concerned himself with the other side of the conflict: the ego (of ego-instincts), repression, censorship, the secondary process, and so on. He began to form the conviction that it was the development not only of the libido but also of the ego that contributed to the formation of neurotic as well as psychotic disturbances.
This was the psychoanalysis around 1914 into which the concept of narcissism was introduced. The theory evolved slowly over time, with several notable developments en route prior to 1914. All of them have been referred to by Strachey, Jones, and many others, so a brief mention here will suffice.
The Observational Referents and Pre-1914 Threads of the Concept of Narcissism
The term “narcissism” had been around since the turn of the century, inspired by the Greek myth of Narcissus. It referred, narrowly, to a perverse form of self-love, in which a person’s own body was his love object. Freud first enlarged on this narrow conception in connection with Sadger’s view on narcissistic object choice in some forms of homosexuality (Nunberg and Fedem, 1967, 303-14). Freud remarked that “this [narcissism] is not an isolated phenomenon but a necessary developmental stage in the transition from auto-erotism to object-love. Being enamoured of oneself (of one’s own genitals) is an indispensable stage of development” (312).
Freud then elaborated further on the issue of narcissistic object choice in some homosexual patients (Freud, 1009 [2nd edition of Freud, 1905], 1910) and made two additional contributions to narcissism. The first observation was in relation to the analysis of Schreber’s paranoia (Freud, 1911); the second in relation to the analysis of animism and magic in Totem and Taboo (Freud, 1913).
In the 1911 paper, in attempting to understand the role of a repressed homosexual wish in paranoia, Freud made use of the concept of narcissism as he had recently enunciated it in his paper on Leonardo (Freud, 1910). He spelled out here, more clearly, what happened in this developmental stage between autoerotism and object-love: “There comes a time in the development of the individual at which he unifies his sexual instincts (which have hitherto been engaged in auto-erotic activities) in order to obtain a love-object; and he begins by taking himself, his own body, as his love-object, and only subsequently proceeds from this to the choice of some person other than himself as his object” (1911, 60-61). “This half-way phase,” says Freud cautiously, “may perhaps be indispensable normally; but it appears that many people linger unusually long in this condition, and that many of its features are carried over by them into the later stages of their development. What is of chief importance in the subject’s self thus chosen as a love-object may already be the genitals” (612). His psychoeconomic concept of the distribution of the libido (sending it out to invest objects and withdrawing it to reinvest the ego) enables Freud to interpret Schreber’s “megalomania” as well as his withdrawal from the outside world, which culminates in the end-of-the-world delusion. In megalomania the withdrawal of the libido from objects is reinvested in the ego (secondary narcissism), and this investment is added to the original, infantile, “omnipotence of thought” (primary narcissism). The withdrawal of libido from objects leads to the endopsychic perception of the collapse of the patient’s inner world, represented in the externalized end-of-the-world delusion.
Freud’s second additional contribution to narcissism is found in Totem and Taboo (1913). Here the idea of the omnipotence of thought (the ideational component of primary narcissism) attains a larger role, since it opens the way for Freud to interpret the dynamic mechanism operative in animism and magic.
The Observational Referents and Main Constituents of the 1914 Theory of Narcissism
Perhaps the most impressive aspect of the theory woven together from these threads is its grand design: the large variety of clinical and theoretical issues that Freud brought under the umbrella of the widened concept of narcissism. With this expanded theory the explanatory power of narcissism increased considerably. No wonder we are able to trace most later significant concepts in psychoanalysis to this pivotal work.
1. Extreme or severe forms of narcissism. Freud begins his synthesis by focusing on the clinically observable pathological forms: autoerotism and perversion; schizophrenic megalomania and withdrawal from the external world (end-of-the-world delusion).
2. Milder and more widespread forms of narcissism. He then immediately introduces the idea that individual, milder features of extreme narcissistic attitudes are also observable in other clinical contexts—for example, in homosexual patients, whose object choice is narcissistic in nature. Freud remarks here that the more severe as well as the milder forms of narcissism constitute one of the limits of their susceptibility to analytic influence.
3. Ubiquitously present, normal forms of narcissism. The recognition of severe and mild forms of narcissism in various neurotic conditions led Freud to assume that narcissism “might claim a place in the regular course of human sexual development” (1914b, 73). Freud’s basic definition of narcissism now emerges: he considers it to be fundamentally “not a perversion [that is, pathology], but the libidinal complement to the egoism of the instinct of self-preservation” (73-74), hence a part of normal development.
Freud buttresses these ideas by elaborating on what he had already said regarding schizophrenic megalomania and delusions. He adds his observations on the mental life of children and primitive peoples (whose behavior is governed by their belief in the “omnipotence of thought”) as well as observations on people in love, which support his concept of the normal developmental significance of narcissism. His famous amoeba image (75) depicts his (psychoeconomic) notion about the distribution of the libido: the more is invested in the ego, the less becomes available for the cathexis of objects, and vice versa. He adds organic disease, hypochondria, and the erotic life of men and women to the observational data already referred to and sheds light on them from the vantage point of the distribution of the libido.
Hand in hand with this expansion of the libido theory went the expansion of his still rudimentary ego psychology; the two are inevitably intertwined in their development to a considerable extent. They influence each other: any change in the libido distribution appears to change the ego, and vice versa. Freud had already portrayed the ego as secondary process, as censor, as instigator of repression, resistance, reality testing; now he clearly saw it as the seat of the ego instincts, the reservoir of the libido, as well as the agency of its distribution.
But Freud went much further than this. Having thus far established the main observational and theoretical points of his new and encompassing theory of narcissism, he immediately put its explanatory power to further tests with unexpected, heuristically significant, and far-reaching results. As the high point of this essay, he introduced the ego-ideal (and in conjunction with it defined sublimation and idealization); further elaborated on the origin and development of conscience (and in conjunction with it explained the delusion of being watched, as well as its normal equivalents: self-observation, self-criticism, and “endopsychic research”—Freud’s phrase for introspection); specified the ego (more precisely the self-regard of the ego) as the instigator of repression; considered the consequences of repression for the distribution of the libido; and finally discussed in detail the sources and functions of self-regard—all of which derive from narcissism and are accounted for in this new theory.
In the process of identifying the many vicissitudes of infantile (primary) narcissism, Freud wonders about the ultimate fate of ego-libido in normal adults. Could it be, he asks, that all of it becomes transformed into object-libido? That is not the case. He proceeds to describe how and under what circumstances this new agency, the ego-ideal, becomes set up within the ego. It develops in response to that internal watchman we call conscience, which itself arose in response to parental criticism and the criticism of a whole host of others, including society at large. In response to these criticisms and because of his own awakening critical judgment, the growing child can no longer retain the image of his actual ego as perfect. He seeks to recover this lost perfection in his ego-ideal; this absorbs and binds a considerable amount of his narcissistic and homosexual libido—which is thus turned back onto his ego, enriching it once more. Henceforth his satisfactions will come from living up to this ideal. The agency of “conscience” will measure the distance between the actual ego and the ego-ideal and will see to it that living up to the ego-ideal will afford the needed satisfaction.
The satisfaction will come from heightened self-regard (self-respect, self-esteem). This self-regard depends on the “size of the ego” and comes from various sources. It is in part primary (the residue of infantile narcissism); another part originates from omnipotence corroborated by experience (fulfillment of the ego-ideal); and the third part derives from satisfaction in love (the successful deployment of object-libido).
Having surveyed the 1914 essay in its broadest outlines, let us reflect for a moment on Freud’s key propositions before we turn to the question of what happened to them in the years that followed.
Freud considered narcissism as the libidinal complement to the egoism of the instinct of self-preservation—lodged in the ego as its reservoir. As part of normal development narcissism is a stage between autoerotism and object-love, hence, an aspect of the libido theory. On that account it is governed by the “law” of the distribution of the libido from a fixed amount in its reservoir. This means the more that is invested in objects, the less remains in the ego, and vice versa. Here “self-love” is in opposition to “object-love.” There are additional aspects to narcissism, however, that were of great importance to Freud. “Narcissistic object choice” and the “omnipotence of thoughts” cannot easily be fitted into the libido theory (especially its psychoeconomic aspects), although Freud used both of these as evidence for his theory of narcissism. In their narcissistic object choice, people “plainly seek themselves as love objects,” says Freud. But the four different variations of those “love objects” indicate not the seeking of libidinal gratifications but the enhancement, strengthening, and completion of the self. In the omnipotence of their thoughts people have the aspect of their narcissism, which is the nidus of their ego development. (Ferenczi’s developmental theory of the ego belongs here.) In this instance, too, it is hard to imagine the central relevance of the libido distribution. (Ferenczi did not place his theory of the development of the sense of reality into the libido theory.) Then there is one more significant component of narcissism, the aspect that is part of the formation of the ego-ideal, which is only partially understood from the vantage point of the libido theory. In what follows we should examine the fate of these ideas.
All in all it appears (retrospectively) that the single-axis theory of narcissism was already too narrow at its inception and could not easily accommodate these two apparently different trends of narcissism (see May-Tolzmann, 1988). Many of the complications of both theory and technique that appeared later seem to be related to these very issues.
THE FATE OF FREUD’S KEY IDEAS ON NARCISSISM IN HIS SUBSEQUENT WRITINGS
1. The centerpiece of the concept of narcissism, its psychoeconomic aspect, and the fact that it placed the core psychic conflict between the sexual instincts, on the one hand, and the ego-instincts, on the other, were already a significant departure from earlier formations, where the sexual instinct was opposed by the ego. Freud continued to reassess his libido theory (1915, 1917, but especially 1920 and 1923). One of the results of this reassessment was that after 1914 he located the aggressive drive within the ego instincts. With the introduction of the tripartite model of the mind, a further and perhaps even more drastic revision became necessary. Freud now considered that there were two kinds of basic drives, the sexual and the aggressive. The self-preservative drives were now subsumed under self-preservative ego-interests (and no longer considered drives), in the context of the new organization of the ego.
2. In this new ego psychology—which became the leading paradigm of psychoanalysis—the conflict was once more clearly formulated as between the drives (sexuality and aggression) and the controlling structures of the ego. The drives were organized in the “id,” which was now seen as the original reservoir of the libido, replacing the ego in this respect. The ego obtained its narcissistic cathexis only secondarily, as it was withdrawn from object cathexes. There was a special agency within the new ego, the “superego”—the ultimate heir to the ego-ideal—which exerted its influence on the drives via the ego’s defensive operations.
3. The concept of the ego-ideal went through a number of changes between 1914 and 1923, when it was essentially replaced by the superego in Freud’s own writings. The development of the ego-ideal also involved “identifications,” later to be called “narcissistic identifications” (Freud, 1917). Hence, this was (along with related mechanisms such as “projection” and “introjection”) a point of departure not only for the concept of the superego but also, even more broadly, for object-relations theory in general. In other words, through these concepts Freud also laid the groundwork for an object-relations theory. But because object relations were seen as so tightly connected to the libido in most formulations, object-relations theory never emerged as a separate, full-fledged paradigm in Freud’s own work. The same applies to self psychology, although it is less easy to pinpoint its precursors because Freud used das Ich (as ego) interchangeably with das Selbst (one’s own person, the self). But as he began to give the ego (as an agency of the mind) a more precise definition as a system, this interchangeability—as Strachey traces it carefully—no longer worked well; it became confusing. Yet the self never attained a metapsychologic position in Freud’s writings. The need for such a psychoanalytic conception of the self is evident in “On Narcissism,” and Strachey does, indeed, slip up (deliberately) on a couple of occasions and translates das Ich: “The ego ideal also became a more clearly recognized bridge to the external world, to society, just as its successor, the superego, has become. But for a psychoanalytic understanding of group formation and group disintegration the superego appears to be no substitute for the ego ideal” (Freud, 1921).
After this cursory glance at where his ideas on narcissism led Freud, we may now step outside of his own frame of reference and look at his key concepts from the vantage point of a few selected later contributors who redirected our thinking on these subjects, without necessarily altering Freud’s basic paradigm of ego psychology, and only (implicitly or explicitly, as the case may be) modifying (or in practice actually abandoning) his libido theory.
THE FATE OF THE CONCEPT OF NARCISSISM IN THE POST-FREUDIAN LITERATURE
The first major advance beyond Freud’s definition of narcissism was undoubtedly Hartmann’s “small” step of redefining it “as the libidinal cathexis not of the ego but of the self” (Hartmann, 1950, 85; 1956, 433). With this Hartmann accorded the self a significant position in psychoanalytic theory, albeit still only as a content of the tripartite mental apparatus. He also corrected the interchangeable use of the terms “ego,” “self,” and “one’s own person.” This change was necessary to bring the concept of narcissism into the structural framework and to place it within the tripartite model. It was also necessary because, in relation to narcissism, we are dealing with two very different issues in the different usages of das Ich: one in which we refer to functions and cathexes of the ego (as distinct from cathexes of different parts of the personality) and one in which we refer to the opposition of the cathexis of one’s own person (self) to that of other persons (objects). Hartmann retained Freud’s 1914 and 1923 psychoeconomic notion of the distribution of the libido and added to it aggression (without fully integrating it with the concept of narcissism). With the changes he did introduce, he opened the way for others to pursue further refinements of many psychoanalytic concepts. Important among these are the various efforts to establish a psychology of the self side by side with the well-established psychology of objects (for example, Jacobson, 1954, 1964; Lichtenstein, 1965). Kemberg dealt most extensively and penetratingly with narcissism from the standpoint of the dual-drive theory and ego psychology (1975 and later writings).
Among the many examples of the consequences of Hartmann’s conceptual separation of self from ego is the successful reclaiming and redefinition of the ego-ideal and the definition of the ideal self (Sandler, Holder, and Meers, 1963). Freud’s new concept of the superego did not fully cover the functions assigned to the ego-ideal in its various interim formulations; and a certain ambiguity remained in Freud’s own writings regarding the relationship between the two. Sandler and his colleagues did delineate Freud’s changing definition of the ego ideal between 1914 and 1923 and were able to expand the concept and make it clinically relevant.
Another fundamental corrective effort involves the psychoeconomic principle of the distribution of the libido (Joffe and Sandler, 1968). As we have seen, Freud was able to use this idea to explain a large variety of psychotic, neurotic, and normal phenomena, at the same time demonstrating the encompassing usefulness of his newly revised libido theory. But this view was essentially quantitative, and what is needed in clinical psychoanalysis is a qualitative approach. It is here that Joffe and Sandler showed us the limitations of the concept of libido distribution with the aid of brief, but highly evocative clinical vignettes (1968, 57-58). They redirected our search for the understanding of narcissistic disturbances to ego-states or affect-states:
The states which are important in any consideration of narcissism are not only determined by the state of the drives nor can they be more than partially understood in terms of the hypothetical distribution of energic cathexes… . The clinical understanding of narcissism and its disorders should be explicitly oriented towards a conceptualization in terms of a metapsychology of affects, attitudes, values and the ideational contents associated with these, from the standpoint of both present function and genetic development. (63)
Their idea of focusing on affect-states, rather than on drive discharge (without neglecting the latter) and its economics, is a major shift in psychoanalysis. This shift appears to narrow the applicability of the libido theory in general and in narcissistic disturbances in particular.
Since this is such a crucial shift, let us look at the review by Joffe and Sandler of the relevant literature (1968, 60-62), which points in the same direction. They noted that Freud himself, in his definition of narcissism, referred to it as the libidinal complement to egoism and that Freud’s “descriptions in this connection always involved statements referring to attitudes of what later came to be called the ego” (59). Jacobson also takes the view that attempts to link such concepts as affects, values, self-esteem, and self-devaluation to quantities of energy make for extreme complication (1954, 1964). Fenichel spoke of “narcissistic needs” and “narcissistic supplies” without linking them to quantities of energy (1945, 40-41). He also defined self-esteem and self-love as connected with infantile omnipotent feelings. rather than drive-related experiences (39). Finally A. Reich’s focus on ego-states, ego-attitudes, and defensive formations and their mode of regulation also indicates that these are paramount in narcissistic disturbances (1960).
Joffe and Sandler proceeded to formulate the nature of narcissistic pathology in terms of its underlying painful affect and the patient’s symptomatology and behavior as efforts to deal with it (1968, 65). One of the many advantages of their proposition is that affects and attitudes not only capture the quality of subjective experiences but also become available to the empathic observer for use in the interpretive process.
We should take a quick look at one of their clinical images in transition to Kohut’s self psychology: “we may assess a child who has problems over exhibitionism from the point of view of neurotic conflict over the discharge of exhibitionistic drive impulses.” In this assessment, they say. “we also include the consideration of the function of exhibitionism in connection with the maintenance by the child of a particular type of object-relationship, and its function as a possible technique for gaining admiration and praise in order to do away with underlying feelings of unworthiness, inadequacy and guilt” (56).
We would have to raise the following questions: Could these two views of the psychopathology of that particular child be held simultaneously? Are they complementary or antithetical? If complementary, which should be interpreted first? Does the sequence matter? If antithetical, how would we decide which view is the relevant one in this case? We will leave these questions unanswered for the moment and return to them after we have surveyed Kohut’s contributions to the issue of narcissism and self psychology.
In addition to these specific questions, however (which may be viewed as reflecting the core clinical problems in our field in connection with the issues of narcissism), we should add some observations about what we were left with in the mid-1960s to all that had already been contributed to the topic of narcissism since 1914.
The theoretical advances are easier to recognize and appreciate. They are substantial, even if still confusing (Moore, 1975). But what about the clinical issues? It is here that we run into more difficulties and sharper controversies. To put it in a nutshell: the idea of narcissism as basically normal has been stated clearly from 1914 on. But its replacement within the single-axis (autoerotism, narcissism, object-love) theory of the development of the libido (Ornstein, 1974) caused it to be viewed as something pathological to be overcome, in spite of repeated claims to the contrary. Remnants of narcissism within the ego were fixations to be loosened and transformed into object-love. A part of the original narcissism was “saved” in the structure of the ego-ideal. Self-esteem (now linked to the function of the ego-ideal) as a carrier of normal narcissism did not come fully into its own in the treatment process. This is because in analysis the focus largely remained on the conflicts emanating from the sexual and aggressive drives and the superego-inspired defenses of the ego, even when embedded in an object-relations theory. And here is another aspect of the definition that stood in the way of clinical therapeutic progress: narcissism—that is, the “narcissistic attitude” of patients (as it was conceived)—seriously limited the extent to which the patient could be influenced through psychoanalysis.
These particular handicaps (built into the theory of narcissism) retarded further progress both in theory and in practice for some time. This was inevitable, as I see it, because essentially all new formulations retained the single-axis theory of narcissism, thereby continuing to view narcissistic manifestations primarily as defenses and resistances (Ornstein, 1974). Joffe and Sandler (1968), however, show that they are hovering over a significant advance. In the way they present their ideas regarding their patient’s exhibitionism, they are implicitly searching for a second line of development, because they do not necessarily consider the narcissistic issues in their example as defensive against the primary drive-related conflicts. Although this is significant, in the end it does not lead them to the step of breaking with the single-axis theory.
Where in all this are the transferences? Considering them as central guiding principles to diagnosis ultimately breaks the logjam.
KEY ELEMENTS IN KOHUT’S THEORY OF NARCISSISM: THE ROAD TO SELF PSYCHOLOGY
Kohut linked his own work to one of Freud’s statements: “The disturbances to which a child’s original narcissism is exposed, the reactions with which he seeks to protect himself from them and the paths into which he is forced in doing so—these are the themes which I propose to leave on one side, as an important field of work which still awaits exploration” (Freud, 1914b, 92). Kohut’s writings detail these explorations extensively (1966, 1968, 1971).
But Kohut did not begin by sorting out the theory of narcissism, although he found Hartmann’s definition helpful and considered narcissism (at first) to be the libidinal investment of the body-mind-self. Rather, he began his work with the psychoanalytic exploration of patients with narcissistic personality disturbances and gave detailed descriptions of their transference. It was from the study of the working-through process of these (then called narcissistic) transferences that Kohut derived his basic clinical and meta-psychologic concepts. A thumbnail sketch of these transferences should serve as a background for the ensuing reflections on some of the concepts that constituted the building blocks of his theory of the self.
What Kohut found in the analyses of his patients was that their expectations. needs, demands, and fantasies clustered around two main issues (to which he later added a third). First, the patients expressed their need for someone to serve as an echo, and for affirmation, approval, admiration, and the bolstering of their self-esteem. The analyst mattered only to the extent that he could or could not be experienced by the patient as available to perform these needed functions. This “mirror transference,” once established, effected an improvement in the patients functioning—as if the analyst served as the necessary “psychic glue.” Whenever the patient was disappointed in his expectations, as was inevitable, the disruptions in the transference were reflected either in the return of disturbed functioning or in outright fragmentation. Therefore the analytic efforts had to be focused on the immediate precipitating cause of the disruption (commonly related to some form of “unempathic” response by the analyst). Thus the reconstructions of the intra-analytic precipitants (and with it, often, the genetic precursors for the patient’s vulnerability and proneness to fragmentation) would restore the cohesiveness of the transference.
The second cluster of experiences, which Kohut called an “idealizing transference,” is expressed in the need of some patients to attach themselves to the analyst by putting him on a pedestal and experiencing him as all-knowing, all-powerful, and perfect so that they might partake of that greatness and perfection. These expectations and needs, when experienced as having been met, also lend the patient a modicum of cohesiveness and vitality as well as inner calm. But here, too, disappointments are inevitable, and once the patient’s proneness to fragmentation is traumatically touched on, narcissistic rage ensues, and the other well-known consequences of a disrupted idealizing transference may follow. And here, too, the analyst’s response has to be given in the form of reconstructive interpretations.
The details of these transference experiences and their working through, their felicitous or unfavorable outcome, permitted Kohut to reconstruct the infantile and childhood traumas that left the psyche with insufficient structure or with excessive defensive structures—those characteristic manifestations of “narcissistic pathology” that he observed and described in depth. Kohut postulated that the two transferences, briefly sketched above, arose in relation to the infantile “grandiose self” (mobilizing a mirror transference) and the “idealized parent imago” (mobilizing an idealizing transference). In this respect Kohut’s theory of transference as arising on the basis of repressed and/or disavowed infantile needs and wishes was not different from Freud’s postulation of the Oedipus complex as the basis for the transference neurosis. The clinical and theoretical equivalence of these three infantile structures is of significance because now patients with narcissistic personality disorders could also be considered analyzable. That is, not only their defensive narcissism but also (and more important) their narcissistic defects or deficits (expressions of fixations on one or another, or both of these archaic narcissistic constellations) could now be the central focus of their analyses. The assumption of two separate lines of development for narcissism and object-love was Kohut’s first theoretical innovation. It was based on the observation that the working through of these transferences led to the transformation of archaic narcissism to more mature forms, without the mobilization of an oedipal transference neurosis. Thus he opted for separating out the narcissistic attitudes and ego-states from classical libido theory (while retaining the idea of the libidinal nature of narcissism).
The clinical and technical implications of this highly unpopular change were of fundamental importance. The analyst was no longer to expect (and subtly push) the patient to give up a narcissistic position in favor of object-love. He had to conduct the analysis in such a climate and in such a manner as to facilitate the transformation of archaic to more mature forms of narcissism. In the mirror transference this meant the attainment of a more stable self-esteem regulation; an increased capacity for the pursuit of one’s goals and purposes; and an increased ability to enjoy the functions of one’s body and mind. In the idealizing transference this transformation meant the acquisition of self-soothing, self-calming, self-controlling, and drive-channeling capacities, based on the finning up of the matrix of the ego and on “transmuting internalization” of values and ideals.
We should point here to a few of the most significant differences among Freud, most of the post-Freudian literature, and Kohut’s formulations. The first issue concerns the quality of the libido. (We should remember here that when Kohut speaks of libido, he means “abstractions referring to the psychological meaning of the essential experience” [1971,39; italics added].) For Kohut the target or direction (whether toward the object or the self) of the libidinal investment was not the determining factor of the quality of the libido. He assumed two different qualities to begin with, the narcissistic and object-libido. In this manner he emphasized the qualitative (affective) aspects of human experience. By recognizing narcissistic (later self-object) transference, he could demonstrate that “the other” could be invested with narcissistic libido—that is, could be experienced as part of the patient’s self. For Kohut object-instinctual libido could occasionally invest the self—for example, during objective self-assessment or in incipient schizophrenia. This qualitative differentiation is important since for Freud the object was either invested with libido or not, which led to a variety of inaccurate clinical observations. For instance, having one or two friends might mean intense object cathexis, and an abundance of them might still mean a narcissistic one.
Kohut considered narcissism per se as the normal “fuel” for structure building. Pathology in this context is not a pathology of narcissism but a pathology of the structures of the self (deficiencies, defects, or defensive structures), owing to inadequate narcissistic cathexis, not to excessive amounts or pathological forms of narcissism.
It was from careful clinical observations (richly detailed in all of Kohut’s writings) that the assumption of two “separate lines of development for narcissism and object love,” the “selfobject transferences,” the developmental concept of the selfobject, and structure building through “transmuting internalizations” were derived.
The revision of clinical theory and metapsychology had to lead to a revision of developmental theory. In this connection Kohut could answer Freud’s question regarding “the disturbances to which a child’s original narcissism is exposed” by reconstructing the development of the “grandiose self” and the “omnipotent, idealized object,” both of which are archaic structures that attempt to deal with the normally arising early disturbances to primary narcissism. The archaic idealizations will later be transformed into the narcissistic dimension of the superego, ensuring the power of its values and ideals—a different way of conceiving what Freud called the ego-ideal. In describing the developmental and clinical vicissitudes of these archaic structures, Kohut offered a new view of health and illness in which self-esteem regulation plays a dominant role.
Kohut did not disregard the drives (only drive theory, which is another matter) but saw them in a different light and integrated them within his self psychology. He still considered the duality of libido and aggression a good way to group important inner experiences. The “mirroring” and “idealizing” needs of infancy and childhood, however, appeared to him to be the primary emotional nutrients of psychological development. Freud assumed the inevitability of opposition between sexual and aggressive drives, on the one hand, and the ego’s defensive operations (at the behest of the superego), on the other, as primary: the conflict is built into the mental apparatus. Kohut, however, assumed on the basis of his clinical experiences that infants are born preadapted to elicit what they need from their empathic selfobject environment. The selfobject’s responses are never perfect; conflicts will always arise. But more important, severe and prolonged selfobject failures will lead to the incomplete or malformed structuralization of the psyche. Here is a crucial (albeit still controversial) difference; the primacy of conflict versus the primacy of deficit and secondary conflict are at the center of contemporary polemics.
From this position it was only a very small step, but a momentous one. to leave narcissism behind and speak about the development of the self from the self-selfobject matrix, without reference to a libido theory. From this vantage point the vicissitudes of the development of the grandiose self, which led at its end point to the pole of self-assertive aggression, and the development of the idealized parent imago, which led to the pole of ideals and values, suggested to Kohut the image of the two poles of the self: the bipolar self. Placed at the center of the psychological universe, the bipolar self could now be seen as a superordinate structure, whose study gave Kohut the impetus to revamp psychoanalysis, just as Freud’s new image of the ego in 1923 gave him the impetus to revamp the psychoanalysis of his time.
We should now, in closing, respond to the questions we asked regarding Joffe and Sandler’s clinical image of the exhibitionistic child from a self psychological perspective. Faced with exactly the same dilemma, we would be guided by the predominant, sustained transference. This would help us decide whether it was the neurotic conflict over the exhibitionistic wishes that was primary or the need for admiration and praise, whether we were witnessing essentially an oedipal transference (or a regression from it) or a mirror transference. Only the transference context could guide us here. In the case of the mirror transference “drive discharge” would be secondary, in the service of narcissistic needs—for example, the attempt “to do away with underlying feelings of unworthiness, inadequacy, and guilt,” as Joffe and Sandler put it, or shame, from a self psychological vantage point. If we are dealing with a mirror transference, interpretations that are focused on drive discharge as if it were primary would make matters worse clinically. In that sense the two views would be antithetical. Drive discharge as a failed effort at restoring self-esteem (when understood from the vantage point of the self) would be very much to the point. This is what Joffe and Sandler mean, I believe, when they speak of this child’s maintenance of a particular type of object relationship as well as his technique for gaining admiration and praise.
These are questions that require further empirical study for clearer and more reliable answers. An ongoing exploration of the transferences is crucial, but we also need a clinical epistemology to make possible comparative assessments of the approaches dictated by ego psychology, object-relations theory, and self psychology. At present we do not have such an epistemology (Omstein, 1987).
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