7

An Insoluble Dilemma:
Economic Assistance
and the Kolchak Government

The year 1919 was pivotal to the Wilson administration’s reconstruction program for Siberia. In February the United States reached a tenuous inter-Allied agreement for supervision of the Trans-Siberian railway system, which was placed under the operational control of John Stevens. This agreement required the Allies to cooperate with Stevens and to furnish a modest financial contribution that would cover emergency expenses. In practice, the competing interests of the participating powers severely limited the effectiveness of the agreement.

Beyond this inter-Allied agreement, the Wilson administration also contemplated a strictly American plan for facilitating general economic reconstruction in Siberia, which would be financed by an unprecedented foreign assistance program. Throughout the first half of 1919, the American mission at Paris worked under the assumption that the administration could obtain a large appropriation from Congress for Russian assistance, after Wilson had successfully negotiated a peace treaty and a League of Nations structure with the Allies. However, the president’s political fortunes declined at home as the peace treaty encountered stiff opposition in the Senate. As Wilson’s domestic political prestige eroded, any chance of obtaining a congressional appropriation for Russian assistance disappeared.

Finally, the rapid deterioration of conditions in Siberia overwhelmed the assistance program in its early stages. The reactionary policies of the Kolchak regime intensified social and economic instability in Siberia and worked against American reconstruction initiatives. As if the Omsk government’s corruption and incompetence were not enough to overcome, Japan purposely exacerbated these conditions by its support for the bandit Cossack leaders and by the persistent efforts of its military to monopolize the Chinese Eastern Railway.

The negotiations over inter-Allied control for the Trans-Siberian railway system began in September 1918. It quickly became apparent to Roland Morris, the American negotiator and ambassador to Japan, that British acquiescence encouraged Japanese intransigence in the negotiations over control of the Trans-Siberian railways. A week before Morris and Japanese representatives concluded a tentative agreement for operation of the railroads, Britain notified the State Department that it would take a neutral position in the negotiations between the United States and Japan. Rather than support the State Department’s plan, which would place Stevens in charge of the railways, Britain declared that it “would prefer that the United States and Japanese governments should arrange the question of actual control, since they are primarily interested, and His Majesty’s Government will fall in with any agreement that may ultimately be reached by these two Governments.”¹ This statement gave a clear message to Japan’s General Staff that the American plan would receive no backing from the Allies.

Following these diplomatic exchanges, the Japanese government announced that it would not accept Stevens’s undivided control over the Trans-Siberian system. In early November, Foreign Minister Viscount Yasuya Uchida suggested that the plan could be amended to the General Staff’s satisfaction if a Japanese engineer shared the director-generalship with Stevens. Uchida rationalized this alternative on grounds that joint management would smooth relations between Stevens’s personnel and Japan’s military. But the motives of the General Staff were less benign. It really intended to effect a division of the railway system. The General Staff wanted jurisdiction over all the railways east of Irkutsk, giving it complete control over all access into Siberia’s interior. Therefore, while Stevens would have authority over all railroads west of Irkutsk, the effectiveness of his efforts would be completely dependent on Japan’s administration of the connecting lines to the east.

Not surprisingly, Stevens found Uchida’s compromise completely unacceptable. While Stevens was prepared to include a Japanese engineer on his staff, an equal division of authority between them would undermine his status as representative of the Russian people. Moreover, since the large number of Japanese troops were the real authority in northern Manchuria, the Japanese engineer would inevitably become the dominant figure, while Stevens would be forced to share responsibility for actions he did not approve.

Morris believed Britain’s neutrality had emboldened Japan to make such a counterproposal. Uchida’s remarks regarding the lack of interest Britain and France had exhibited in the negotiations over the railroad led Morris to conclude that “I am sure that this belief has given the General Staff added confidence.”²

But the political maneuvers Britain engineered in Siberia during early November 1918 altered the stakes involved in the railroad issue. The coup of November 18, 1918, which installed Admiral Aleksandr Kolchak as leader of the Siberian government at Omsk, took place with British support. A regional Siberian government under British influence served Britain’s objectives of weakening the Russian Empire and of building its sphere of influence in the regions surrounding Russia proper.

Kolchak’s coup caused friction with Japan, which was attempting to tighten its grip over the area east of Lake Baikal. Japan had been using the Cossack troops of G. M. Semenov to favor its own commerce in northern Manchuria and the Russian Far East at the expense of the other powers. Hence, Kolchak’s regime aroused deep suspicion on the part of the Japanese because he constituted a rival for their clients, such as Semenov. Furthermore, Japan’s representatives in Siberia were concerned that Kolchak’s government would grant exclusive economic privileges to Britain.³

Kolchak’s emergence had provocative implications in light of the bitter relations he had with the Japanese military and the Cossacks. In May 1918, Kolchak had been made administrator of military affairs for the Chinese Eastern Railway by Dmitri Khorvat in a reorganization of the company’s board of directors. Japan had supported this initiative in an attempt to transform Khorvat’s administration into a shadow government under its influence. But Kolchak had upset these designs when he opposed Japan’s intervention in the Russian Far East. He quickly severed all relations with the Japanese military mission because of its support for Semenov. At the end of June, Khorvat, with Japan’s backing, removed Kolchak from the position he had held for only five weeks. Kolchak immediately turned to his Russian allies and the British in order to challenge the Japanese clients.⁴

On the eve of Kolchak’s coup, Britain suddenly began to take an interest in the operation of the Siberian railways. To ensure the viability of Kolchak’s regime in central Siberia, Britain had to secure his supply line eastward along the Trans-Siberian railway system. From Tokyo, Ambassador Morris reported on November 8 the concern of British ambassador Sir William C. Greene that Japan’s support for the Cossacks’ banditry east of Lake Baikal “would lead to the disintegration of Siberia.” Morris used this opportunity to impress upon Ambassador Greene the advantages of the American plan, since Stevens’s personnel represented the “centralizing force in Siberia.” At the time, Morris believed he had convinced the British ambassador of the merits of the American plan, and Greene expressed his intention to abandon the neutral position he had been taking.⁵

While the British government was concerned about Japans objectives in the Russian Far East, it had its own plans for operating the Trans-Siberian railway system. By December, in contrast to the American proposal for operation of the Siberian railways, British engineer Col. Archibald Jack suggested that L. A. Ustrugov be given administrative control of the railways. Ustrugov had been appointed manager of the Trans-Siberian system by the czarist government, and, accordingly, Kolchak’s Omsk government made him minister of communications. Morris believed the head of Britain’s military mission to Russia, the arch-conservative Gen. Alfred Knox, and the high commissioner Sir Charles Eliot had influenced Jack’s position, because, until recently, Jack had “zealously” supported the American plan. In Morris’s view, these officials had been obstructing American proposals for economic assistance since the summer and had “consistently advocated military and financial support to the promoting of a central Siberian Government.”⁶

Necessity forced the Omsk officials to accept Stevens’s control of the railroad in mid-December. They surmised that Stevens’s prestige might offer the Omsk regime its biggest advantage in its struggle to transport military supplies for western Siberia past the Japanese and Cossack forces who blocked railroad transportation east of Lake Baikal. Pressure from Stevens virtually ensured that Omsk officials would see things his way, for he threatened to cancel orders for desperately needed lubricating oils unless the Omsk regime accepted his terms for managing the railway system.⁷

By the end of December, after prolonged negotiations with Japan, Morris reached a settlement that he believed would give Stevens sufficient operational control. In the final agreement, the Allies permitted Stevens to become president of a Technical Board, a position in which he would be authorized to administer the technical operation of the railway subject to the general supervision of an Inter-Allied Railway Committee composed of representatives from the Allies and the United States. In this capacity, Stevens could issue instructions to the Russian managers regarding technical matters, and he could appoint assistants and inspectors who would serve under the board’s jurisdiction.

Yet the agreement qualified Stevens’s power in some important respects. It also established a Military Transportation Board that would coordinate military transportation under the instructions of the appropriate Allied military authorities. The effectiveness of Stevens’s authority would always be contingent on the degree of cooperation he received from the various Allied military officials, because the agreement specifically placed the railroads under the protection of the Allied military forces. When he assigned experts to any of the stations, Stevens would be required to take into account the “interests” of the Allied powers who were in charge of those stations. Moreover, the agreement also stipulated that the Russian managers or directors would remain at the head of the different sections of the railroad and they would continue to exercise the powers conferred on them by existing Russian law.

Stevens was still not entirely satisfied with the extent of his powers as president of the Technical Board or with his formal subordination to the Inter-Allied Railway Committee. Nevertheless, Morris convinced the State Department and the American mission to the Paris Peace Conference that the agreement granted Stevens the necessary authority to manage the Siberian railways without jeopardizing the cooperation of the Russian officials and the Allies. Stevens would later admit that the inter-Allied Committee had been devised to function as a “cloak” for his Technical Board.⁸ In mid-February 1919, Britain, France, the United States, and Japan officially approved the Inter-Allied Railway Agreement.

Following the inauguration of the inter-Allied agreement, problems immediately arose for Stevens that would foreshadow the trials of the next three years. China balked at the railroad plan, arguing that it was entitled to assume control over the Chinese Eastern Railway because of the collapse of the Russian administration. The United States countered China’s claims to the Chinese Eastern Railway by declaring that the inter-Allied agreement was designed to preserve all existing treaty rights, Russian rights representing the primary claim in this case. Chinese officials grudgingly acquiesced in the inter-Allied agreement, but they would attempt to assert Chinese control over the line as soon as the opportunity presented itself. Chinese claims on the line were particularly problematic for the United States, since officials like Minister of Communications Tsao Ju Lin were under Japanese influence. Therefore, while America wanted China’s participation in the railroad administration, China could never be allowed to assume control over the Chinese Eastern Railway lest its corrupt and incompetent officials become tools of Japanese ambitions.⁹

An even more serious dispute arose between Stevens and Japan’s representatives over supervision of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Stevens informed the Japanese that he planned to give Japanese experts supervision of the Amur Railroad and the Changchun-Harbin section of the Chinese Eastern. He distributed the Railway Service Corps across the main line of the Chinese Eastern and Trans-Siberian railways, where they would introduce a unified system of train dispatching. In keeping with the provisions of the inter-Allied agreement, Stevens intended to attach Japanese experts to the corps so they could learn American methods and thereby assume supervision over some divisions of the line. Stevens had no objection to delegating supervisory authority to Japanese operators as long as they functioned in harmony with Open Door principles. Needless to say, Japanese representatives who wanted sole supervision over a substantial portion of the Chinese Eastern Railway remained “greatly dissatisfied” with Stevens’s plans.

Despite these difficulties, the United States was anxious to get the railroad plan under way. Yet, emergency funds were needed immediately just to begin operations. These funds were required to pay arrears of wages to employees, to pay wages and salaries in the near future, and to purchase equipment. Ambassador Morris suggested that Stevens’s position would be strengthened if America made such a temporary advance. While the State Department agreed that it would probably be necessary for the Russian Bureau to make an initial advance to Stevens, it nevertheless believed that it would be a mistake for the United States to unilaterally finance the Siberian railways. Instead, the Inter-Allied Railway Committee should determine what financing was necessary and each nation should then contribute its quota to the general pool. A future Russian government would be obligated to repay these loans to the Allies.¹⁰

From Paris, Lansing and McCormick agreed with the State Department that a comprehensive inter-Allied financial plan, equally distributed among the Allies, should be adopted for the Siberian railways. In the meantime, McCormick recommended that the Russian Bureau make a temporary advance of $1 million to Stevens.¹¹

On January 24, the State Department warned the American mission that Congress would not look favorably on any plan that required further appropriations for Russia. Congressional Republicans were expected to attack every aspect of the administration’s Russian policy, which was quite vulnerable after the cessation of hostilities.¹² For instance, the Russian Bureau had already begun to draw fire from the House of Representatives. In mid-January, Iowa representative James W. Good questioned the legality of the $5 million appropriation the administration gave the Russian Bureau, without congressional approval, from the $100 million fund for National Security and Defense. Good especially criticized the bureau’s open-ended certificate of incorporation, which gave it the power to engage in a practically unlimited range of economic activities in Russia, which, he emphasized, could conceivably involve billions of dollars.¹³

As a result of the opposition the administration encountered from Congress in obtaining the $100 million Food Bill for Europe, the State Department frankly doubted its chances of receiving the large appropriation that would be necessary to undertake the railway plan.

In spite of the State Department’s recommendations, Wilson and his advisers were determined to convince Congress that assistance for the Siberian railways was a vital national interest. On January 31 the American mission sent lengthy instructions to acting Secretary of State Frank Polk that demonstrate the significance it attached to establishing the Open Door in Siberia. Polk was authorized to hold a confidential meeting with congressional leaders at which he would explain the president’s objectives in Siberia. He was instructed to emphasize the “strategic importance” of the Trans-Siberian railway as a communication link between Russia and the United States. The line facilitated American economic assistance to Siberia “where the people are relatively friendly and resistant to Bolshevik influence.”¹⁴

Above all, the mission earnestly counseled Polk to impress Congress with the importance of the administration’s hard-fought Inter-Allied Railway Agreement. He was instructed to review in detail with Congress the administration’s struggle to prevent Japan’s monopolization of the Chinese Eastern Railway subsequent to the intervention of the previous summer. The unwarranted size of the Allied military intervention in the Russian Far East was a consequence of Japan’s desire to seize the railroad. Therefore, in the mission’s view the successful conclusion of the railroad agreement “can properly be described as a very important and constructive achievement which may be of inestimable value to the people of Russia and to the United States as well as the world in general, provided they are followed through, thereby giving practical effect to the principle of the Open Door.” But to put this plan into effect Congress would have to appropriate funds for the United States’s share. If Congress favored the plan, the emergency advance to Stevens could immediately be arranged through the Russian Bureau.¹⁵

The State Department responded to this instruction with a very discouraging assessment of the political climate in Congress toward the Russian question. At a cabinet meeting on February 4, the opinion was unanimous that Congress could not be approached at that time for any further foreign appropriations—particularly for Russia. Polk was convinced that, in light of the difficult fight for the $100 million Food Bill for Europe, the administration’s vague proposals for assisting the Siberian railroads would receive no consideration. Since even supporters of the Food Bill had complained about the lack of information provided them on that issue, it would be hopeless for the State Department to present a case for assistance to the Siberian railroads when it could supply no estimates.¹⁶

The State Department’s difficulty was compounded by the apparent inability of the administration to define its Russian policy to the satisfaction of the public and Congress. The United States’s program of economic assistance for Siberia was implicitly designed to undermine bolshevism. Yet, as a matter of policy, the president wanted to avoid taking a public position toward that regime. In early January when Wilson was attempting to arrange the Prinkipo Conference for the purpose of reconciling the different Russian factions, he commented to Lansing, “I still see no great advantage to be derived from words and public statements in the matter of Bolshevism.” Wilson then expressed an integral assumption of his world-view when he concluded with conviction that “the real thing with which to stop Bolshevism is food.”¹⁷

Accordingly, the Wilson administration’s policy toward Siberia during 1919 was to assist the reconstruction of Russia’s civil society, rather than intervene in the chaotic political environment born of war and revolution. Wilson’s enduring faith in the efficacy of liberal capitalism led him to conclude that bolshevism was a symptom of social and economic malaise and should be treated as such. For Wilson, an American policy designed upon liberal principles would perform the greatest service to the Russian people. American assistance to the Siberian railroads was intended to achieve such liberal ends by restoring the necessary preconditions whereby the Russian people themselves could reconstruct their society.

Wilson’s liberal historicism also informed his decision not to declare an overtly anti-Bolshevik policy, because he understood that intervention only exacerbated the radical phase of a revolutionary cycle. As N. Gordon Levin has argued, this assumption motivated Wilson’s attempt to convene the Prinkipo Conference in January 1919. Wilson’s gambit was based on the recognition that fear of foreign intervention created popular support for bolshevism. Moreover, by pressing for a negotiated settlement rather than a military solution, which would work on behalf of Russia’s reactionaries, Wilson hoped to limit the Allies’ influence over Russia’s political evolution. In other words, Wilson’s effort to sponsor negotiations between the Russian political factions was an attempt to undercut the Bolsheviks’ moral influence without aiding reaction. Therefore, Wilson’s unsuccessful pursuit of a non-interventionist settlement in early 1919 was calculated to promote a liberal world order conducive to American national interests.¹⁸

Mounting congressional opposition to the American involvement in Russia by early 1919 would create serious complications for any new policy initiatives the Wilson administration would propose for Siberia. Wilson’s refusal to declare a position toward the Bolshevik regime left the administration vulnerable to domestic political attack because of the presence of American troops in north Russia and Siberia. The United States originally sent troops to Archangel as part of the Allied effort to bolster anti-German groups. After the Armistice, these troops became involved in the civil war against Bolshevik forces who were attempting to overthrow the Provisional Government of Nikolai V. Chaikovskii, which remained in control around Archangel. In response to the public outcry over American deaths at Archangel, congressional Republicans, led by Hiram Johnson, demanded the immediate withdrawal of American troops from north Russia. Public outcry over these casualties was particularly vehement because the administration gave no explanation for their presence in north Russia after the Armistice. On February 15, the administration narrowly defeated a Senate vote sponsored by Johnson that called for the withdrawal of American troops from Archangel; Vice President Thomas R. Marshall cast the tie-breaking vote.

Unfortunately, while the north Russian expedition had become irrelevant to American policy, the controversy it had engendered now jeopardized the Siberian program because American troops were required on the Trans-Siberian Railroad. The mere presence of American troops placed some restraint on the depredations Japan’s military and the Cossacks were committing against person and property. Yet, the administration could not take this matter publicly to Congress without aggravating relations with Japan. Polk concluded that “any attempt to commit Congress to a definite policy on the Siberian railroad, which is only part of the whole Russian problem, would be hopeless until some definite information could be given them on the whole subject.” Vice President Marshall believed that if the Russian question were thrown into Congress at that time, it would probably jeopardize all appropriation bills.¹⁹

Congressional objections against the appropriation of funds for the Siberian railroads reflected the lack of precedent for extended foreign assistance commitments not connected directly to national defense. The unease with which Congress was responding to the new global responsibilities the administration was thrusting upon it can be perceived in Polk’s assessment of congressional sentiment. Based on the advice he had received, Polk was convinced that it would be hopeless to approach Congress with any proposal to finance the Siberian railways at that time “in its present mood when it is badly frightened over the amount of money we are spending and when it is so completely at sea as to what should be done in Russia.” In view of this discouraging assessment, Polk recommended to the American mission on February 4 that the compromise agreement for management of the Siberian railways be formally accepted by the United States “and then take our chance later on [of] our being able to get Congress to assume the responsibility.” Then, if Congress refused to accept a carefully worked plan that required a definite amount of funding, the administration could place the onus of responsibility on it.²⁰

Meanwhile, War Trade Board officials were considering a method whereby the Russian Bureau’s anomalous status could be resolved to the benefit of the administration’s reconstruction program for Siberia. Conditions in Siberia had brought the bureau’s commercial activities to a standstill. Furthermore, the bureau’s trading function had become redundant because private trade could now supply goods far in excess of what could be distributed in Siberia in view of the lack of shipping and the disruption of the Trans-Siberian system. Under these circumstances, War Trade Board officials were particularly hesitant to maintain stringent regulations on private trade and to place a government agency in competition with the private sector, if only nominally.²¹

Beyond these domestic considerations, the United States could not effectively regulate Allied commerce—which may have been the determining factor. If War Trade Board regulation of American trade with Siberia were maintained, Allied commerce would have an advantage. British and Japanese traders would be inclined to purchase American goods for resale in Siberia at significantly higher prices, which would tend to harm the credibility of American trade.²²

In view of these developments, near the end of February, the War Trade Board suggested to Vance McCormick at Paris that the Russian Bureau’s capital be reduced to $1 million and the balance of $4 million be returned to the president’s fund. This fund would constitute a more appropriate source from which Stevens could be advanced the emergency fund of $1 million.²³

Far from abandoning the objective of supplying the Siberian cooperative societies, the War Trade Board was contemplating an alternative means of financing commercial assistance. On February 17, William R. Stanert of the War Trade Board informed Basil Miles that the Russian Bureau was discontinuing its efforts to finance the Siberian cooperatives on credit. Instead, the War Department would assume this task by selling army surplus to the cooperatives on credit.²⁴

These financial maneuvers were almost certainly motivated by the immediate need to create a fund from which Stevens could draw. Since no hope existed for obtaining a congressional appropriation for Stevens, the War Trade Board may have been anticipating a situation in which the Russian Bureau’s capital was the only fund available to finance the American share of the Inter-Allied Railway Agreement. As a by-product of these moves, the politically controversial capital fund of the Russian Bureau quietly passed out of existence. Conversely, the sale of War Department surplus on credit presented little political risk, since this arrangement would require no new appropriations and because these types of goods would be a less conspicuous form of competition with the private sector. In this reformulated version of the reconstruction endeavor, the Russian Bureau’s infrastructure of marketing agents would continue to mediate exchanges with the Siberian cooperatives; now they would be agents of the War Department.

In March, the administration’s Russian policy was overtaken by a financial crisis that demonstrated the foresight of the War Trade Board’s measures. On March 15, Stevens informed the State Department that the Inter-Allied Railway Committee would immediately need an emergency Allied credit of at least $20 million.²⁵ Stevens based this figure on an estimate of the minimum necessary financial assistance the Trans-Siberian system would require from foreign sources in the short term.

Sir Charles Eliot, the British representative on the Inter-Allied Railway Committee, immediately contested Stevens’s financial policy by introducing a counterproposal from the British War Office. This plan called for the Allies to undertake the complete financing of the Trans-Siberian railway, including the collection of its revenues. Any deficits resulting from this arrangement would be equally shared between the governments represented on the Inter-Allied Railway Committee, while any profit accruing from Allied control over the railroad system would be returned to the Russian administration. A financial sub-committee consisting of representatives from Britain, France, Japan, the United States, and the Russian administration would supervise the expenditure of the Allied funds.

Stevens’s Technical Board immediately lodged serious objections to the British proposal. It argued that in conformity with the Allies’ declared policy of nonintervention with Russia’s internal affairs foreign financing should be restricted to the acquisition of foreign supplies, to the expenses of Allied supervision, and to emergency needs. If the Allies did not confine their financial commitment within these parameters, it would be impossible to fix limits on the habitual internal deficits of the Russian railroads.

The Technical Board emphasized that the Allies would undermine the financial independence of the Trans-Siberian system if they assumed complete responsibility for its financing. For instance, the board pointed out that in 1919 the Trans-Baikal, Tomsk, and Omsk sections of the railroad would run operating deficits of about 500 million rubles. The Amur line needed 300 million rubles for its completion and another 50 million for its annual operating deficit. Beyond these huge liabilities, the cost of rehabilitating the railroad system west of Omsk could not even be estimated, though it would run into enormous sums.

Yet, the British proposal had even more troubling political implications. While the Allies would assume responsibility for the total deficit, the plan had no provision for strengthening the Technical Board’s administrative control over the railroad system. Indeed, this financial guarantee would actually remove any incentive for the profligate Russian administration to implement efficient practices. Under these circumstances, the Russian administration could easily become perpetually dependent upon foreign financing, jeopardizing Russian sovereignty over the system.²⁶

On April 4, the Russian Chairman of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee, L. A. Ustrugov, presented a variation on the British plan. In his proposal, an Allied banking group or consortium rather than the Allied governments would finance the Trans-Siberian railway system. Russia would participate in this consortium as owner of the railway system. If deficits resulted from this arrangement, they would be charged to Russia but without interest!²⁷

Charles H. Smith, the American representative on the Inter-Allied Railway Committee, sponsored the Technical Board’s proposal for temporary financing of the Trans-Siberian railway system during the committee’s discussions on the issue. On April 8 Smith persuaded his colleagues to adopt the temporary procedure on grounds that the Technical Board’s plan would meet the “urgent and immediate” needs of the railway system. He insisted that Ustrugov’s proposal be shelved because it would require extensive study both by the committee and the various Allied governments.²⁸

Even this minimum estimate of the railroads’ financial requirements must have caught the State Department off guard because the War Trade Board was only then formally releasing the $1 million emergency fund to Stevens. The War Trade Board’s instruction to Stevens stated that no additional funds would be forthcoming from any department of the U.S. government. Instead, it expected that until congressional appropriations were obtained Stevens could draw upon payments made to the Russian Bureau from its sales of goods to the Siberian cooperatives. In other words, it was thought that in the short run Stevens could tap into the bureau’s revolving fund.²⁹

An equally pressing financial crisis followed directly on the heels of Stevens’s request for emergency funds. On March 21 the State Department informed the American mission that the Russian embassy was nearly bankrupt. At that time, it had cash assets of $8 million and materials worth $25 million, which consisted of railway equipment, boots, and shoes. However, the embassy’s debt to the U.S. government and to private American creditors, principally the National City Bank, totaled almost $73 million. These obligations were scheduled to come due between April and July 1919. Most of this debt consisted of National City Bank loans from 1916 of $11 million and $50 million, which would mature on May 1 and July 10, respectively.

If the United States and the National City Bank collected these debts when due, not only would the Russian embassy be bankrupt, but its material assets would have to be attached and sold to help pay this debt. In view of this impending crisis, the State Department inquired of the American mission whether Wilson wanted Russian cash and material assets protected and whether he wanted the Russian embassy maintained in the United States. If Wilson approved the measure, the State Department would have to intervene to protect the Russian embassy’s cash assets from private creditors until about July 1920. Wilson would also have to approve the postponement of interest collections on Russian obligations held by the Treasury Department.³⁰

At the heart of this gloomy financial picture lay the vital question of financing the Siberian railways. On March 28, in a cable prepared by Basil Miles, the State Department stressed to the mission at Paris that Russian reconstruction depended on rehabilitating the Trans-Siberian railway system, which urgently required the $20 million fund. Miles emphasized:

This question of finance strikes at the root of our whole undertaking in Siberia. The Department has believed the only solution of the Russian problem to be an attempt to restore normal conditions of economic life. The railway plan is the only sound attempt thus far launched. If it collapse[s] through mere failure of financial support, as seems not unlikely, the result will be disastrous. The effect would spread beyond the limits of Siberia. Moreover, by natural force of circumstances the result would lead to Japanese intervention on a scale which would eclipse all further efforts by other powers, including ourselves.³¹

The State Department identified three possible sources of American financing for the railroad: a congressional appropriation, a private loan through the China Consortium banking group, or recognition of the Omsk government in order to formally extend it a loan for restoration of the railways. Furthermore, the State Department also requested the mission’s views on the long-term question of devising a permanent plan for financing the Siberian railways.³²

This crucial question of finding a means to finance the Siberian railways was the most important factor in the administration’s debate over recognition of Kolchak’s regime. Conservative internationalists at the State Department were undoubtedly more predisposed than Wilson to recognize Kolchak as a defender of “order” against bolshevism. Yet, as Miles demonstrated, conservative American officials were also primarily interested in rehabilitating the Trans-Siberian as requisite for initiating Siberian reconstruction. To illustrate this point, when the Japanese military continued to cause problems following the inauguration of the Inter-Allied Railway Agreement, Miles drafted a State Department message instructing Ambassador Morris to

make clear to Japan that in our opinion the situation has changed since we cooperated in sending troops to assist [the] Czechs. The adoption of [the] railway plan marks this change. Our efforts should now be directed to restore the railways. This is an economic and peaceable undertaking which calls for military activities only for policing and for protection in cases of actual necessity. In the opinion of this Government our two military forces should now be employed exclusively in assisting the inter-Allied committee and the boards subordinated to it under the plan proposed by Japan. Such an interpretation modifies our previous understanding and presents a new phase of assistance in which we can achieve success best by emphasizing the purely economic and practical character of our purpose.³³

During the spring of 1919 Miles’s attention had become so focused on the Russian and Siberian railroad question that one State Department insider remarked that it had become “his chief hobby.”³⁴ Hence, the State Department’s readiness to urge recognition of Kolchak in the spring of 1919 should be attributed primarily to its concern over the critical state of the Russian embassy’s finances and to its appreciation of the increasingly uncooperative drift of the Republican Congress.

Wilson’s instinctive reservations against recognition of Kolchak’s government could only have been strengthened by the views of Roland A. Morris, the American ambassador to Japan, who was assigned to observe Siberian conditions. Morris, whose judgment Wilson particularly trusted, added his commentary to the recommendations of Ernest Harris, the American consul general at Omsk, who favored an immediate de facto recognition of Kolchak. In mid-April Morris counseled against even a de facto recognition of the Kolchak government because he had serious doubts about its chances for survival. While Morris agreed with Harris that “encouragement and friendliness” should be extended to Kolchak, he felt this should continue only so long as the “attitude” of his government warranted American support.

But in contrast to the staunch anti-Bolshevik Harris, Morris did not agree that financial assistance should be given to Kolchak. Instead, he emphasized that a direct Allied loan to the Trans-Siberian Railroad was essential. Morris’s views, which were communicated to the American mission near the end of April, were consistent with the position Wilson would adopt toward Siberia.³⁵ Wilson would also consider the question of financing the railroad as a matter of overriding importance and separate from the question of Kolchak’s recognition. The differences that existed between Wilson and the conservative State Department officials over America’s official position toward Omsk should not obscure the fact that Wilsonians and administration conservatives were both searching for a method to finance the all-important railroad.

However, in its preoccupation with the unprecedented tasks of peacemaking in the spring of 1919, the American mission at Paris was slow to appreciate the magnitude of the financial crisis facing the Siberian railways. The mission affirmed Wilson’s desire to maintain the Russian embassy and to protect its cash and material assets, provided they could be utilized in Russia. Yet, Wilson insisted that these Russian assets could only be furnished to the Trans-Siberian railways on terms that did not imply recognition of the Omsk regime. On these conditions, Wilson directed the State Department to lend its good offices for the conservation of Russian assets. But the mission underestimated the seriousness of the Russian embassy’s financial condition, and it misunderstood the needs of the Siberian railroads. The mission believed $6 million would be sufficient to pay the embassy’s maturing interest payments and its expenses for the next year. Moreover, it mistakenly believed the embassy’s $25 million of supplies could be used to furnish all of the $20 million emergency fund for the Siberian railways. To the extent that these supplies were not suitable for the Siberian railways, the mission believed they could simply be sold and the proceeds utilized.³⁶

In suggesting this arrangement, the American delegation hoped to obviate dangers they perceived in the proposed plan for inter-Allied governmental financing of the railways. By supplying the railway’s needs entirely from the embassy’s own assets, the mission now hoped to postpone inter-Allied financing until a permanent plan for operation of the railways could be devised. This plan would solve a number of problems American policy faced in Siberia: it would facilitate the constructive use of Russian assets in America while avoiding the “political implications” associated with recognition; it would defer Japanese financial and political participation in the management of the Siberian railways; it would delay the need for American financial participation at a time when it would be difficult to obtain; and finally, this plan would tend “to preserve the integrity and independence of the Trans-Siberian for the benefit of such Russian Government as ultimately may be recognized.” The mission even broached the possibility of using this arrangement to establish American trusteeship, in equity, over the railways. In exchange for the $20 million advance, which, after all, could only be preserved for Russia through the good offices of the U.S. government, the mission thought it would be desirable to receive the securities, or obligations, of the railroad. These securities would eventually be delivered to a Russian government or used in connection with the settlement of Russian loans held in the United States.³⁷

These ambitions were quickly dashed by the bleak figures reported by the State Department. The $6 million in cash assets that the Russian embassy reported to its credit as of March 1, would be reduced to about $1 million by May because of shipping costs and payments made on old contracts. Payments for these purposes would further reduce this amount in May. Meanwhile, the Russian embassy scrambled to obtain an extension on the due date of the National City Bank loan of $11 million, which required additional interest payments. Stop-gaps would not suffice beyond mid-July when additional large interest payments to the bank would come due, bankrupting the Russian embassy. The Treasury Department’s willingness to defer collection of past and present due interest on the governmental loans would therefore be of little help. Finally, the State Department took pains to emphasize to the mission that the Inter-Allied Railway Committee urgently needed $4 million in cash and that the railway supplies, which constituted assets of the Russian embassy, were not suited to Stevens’s needs.³⁸

By early May, the American mission had finally come to grips with the seriousness of the Russian financial situation. On May 5 the mission informed the State Department of the approach it wanted to take for dealing with Russia’s critical financial situation. It believed the problem had to be resolved as two distinct issues: financing the Trans-Siberian Railroad, and protection for Russian assets in the United States in a manner that would ensure the most beneficial use for all concerned interests. First, the mission impressed upon the State Department that it should obtain a “substantial” appropriation from Congress for the Siberian railways at the “earliest possible occasion.” Similar to its detailed cable of January 31, the mission expected the State Department to emphasize the critical economic role of the Trans-Siberian railway system. In the meantime, the mission approved the transfer of the Russian Bureau’s funds for Stevens’s use. Reciprocally, Secretary of War Baker had agreed to the War Trade Board’s plan of furnishing the cooperatives $3.5 million in credits directly from the War Department for the purchase of army supplies. This arrangement freed the Russian Bureau’s remaining $4 million to serve as the American share of the $20 million cash fund. In addition, because China had difficulty in providing its share of the emergency fund for the railways, the mission hoped that the War Trade Board’s assets could also cover its share.³⁹

These arrangements were completed in mid-June, but not without opposition from House Republicans who, noting the administration’s desire to follow up this emergency arrangement with a more comprehensive financial plan for the Trans-Siberian railways, accused the president of drawing Congress into an open-ended commitment to this vast system.⁴⁰ Frank Polk cautioned the mission that congressional Republicans would make a political issue out of the transfer of Russian Bureau funds to the Siberian railways, although he agreed it was an urgent matter.⁴¹ While aware of these dangers, Vance McCormick nevertheless urged Clarence Woolley to transfer the Russian Bureau funds; the mission strongly believed “the financing of the railways seems so constructive and important an undertaking that it should be proceeded with irrespective of the possibility of political attack.”⁴²

The mission also favored conservation of Russia’s material assets for use in Russia on grounds that this would serve the best interests of both Russia and the American creditors. Accordingly, the mission approved the department’s recommendation that the Treasury defer collection of past due and present interest on government debt and that its good offices be used to postpone the maturity of private debt, provided arrangements could be made for the interest. Even then, there would be considerable doubt the embassy could meet the interest payments on this private debt.⁴³

In May, when Wilson could devote more attention to the Russian question, the views of Roland Morris and Aleksandr Kerensky reinforced his predisposition against recognition of Kolchak. On May 4 Kerensky gave his views to an unidentified member of the American delegation at Paris. Kerensky expressed confidence that the Bolsheviks would be overthrown in a few months. However, he feared a more repressive government could succeed the Bolsheviks because Britain and France were supporting reactionary elements around Kolchak. To counteract these reactionary tendencies, he recommended that America and the Allies require Kolchak to respect basic democratic principles as the condition for recognition of his regime as the Provisional Government of Russia. Kolchak should be willing to meet the following conditions: the restoration of civil liberties for zemstvo and municipal organizations, the reorganization of his cabinet as a coalition, a promise to convene a Constituent Assembly as soon as possible, and guarantees for peasant land holdings and the rights of workers.⁴⁴

In a reply to inquiries from the mission, Morris confirmed Kerensky’s opinions about Kolchak’s regime. He recommended that recognition be postponed until Kolchak’s government defined its policies and ceased its reactionary behavior.⁴⁵ Following this report, Wilson instructed the State Department to send Morris on a fact-finding mission to Omsk. The State Department indicated to Morris that the president would rely on his recommendations in formulating the American position toward Omsk.⁴⁶

By May 20, Wilson was prepared to adopt Kerensky’s demands, including the establishment of regional democratic assemblies, as the conditions under which further support could be extended to Kolchak. However, he remained unwilling to recognize Kolchak’s as an all-Russian government.⁴⁷ Kerensky’s conditions were embodied in an inter-Allied dispatch of the Council of Four to Kolchak on May 26, 1919. Vance McCormick and Secretary Lansing were encouraged about the prospects that this initiative would result in recognition of the Omsk government. Furthermore, since the U.S. government had postponed the collection of interest payments owed the Treasury, they now hoped the financial collapse of the Russian embassy could be averted until the administration enacted a general assistance program on the basis of Ambassador Morris’s reports. Thus, the recommendations of Morris would play a critical role in determining whether the administration would undertake more extensive diplomatic and financial commitments toward the Omsk government.⁴⁸

Although Kolchak responded only in general terms to the Council’s dispatch of May 26, the Allied leaders nevertheless declared his statement satisfactory and the basis on which he could be given further support. By this time, Wilson’s doubts about the Omsk government must have increased as first reports of Kolchak’s military reverses began to reach Paris. In any case, near the end of June, Wilson made it abundantly clear to the State Department that the council’s reply to Kolchak did not imply recognition but only assistance to the extent that each nation’s legislation permitted. This meant that Wilson’s continued unwillingness to recognize Kolchak disqualified the Omsk government from generous Liberty loans; supplies could be furnished to his government to the extent that it could pay a certain amount directly in cash.⁴⁹ However, political considerations motivated the State Department to support arms shipments to Kolchak. In March Polk reminded the American mission that following the introduction of American troops into Siberia, the State Department considered it appropriate to support the Russian embassy’s efforts to ship rifles to the Russian forces. More important, he added, “in our efforts to aid the Czecho-Slovak armies it seemed proper to cooperate in measures to strengthen the Russians who were acting with them.” In view of these political considerations, when Kolchak assured the Allies that he would support democratic reforms in his June message, Wilson could not deny him military support against the Bolshevik’s conventional military forces, particularly after the United States had given the Czechs $7 million the previous summer. Wilson had to accommodate Kolchak because the American economic assistance program would require cooperation from the Omsk government. If the United States proved unwilling to furnish any military supplies to the Omsk regime at this point, it would relinquish what political influence it had with that regime to the other powers.⁵⁰

Thus, by the end of June, Wilson had demarcated clear limits on the extent to which his administration would support the Omsk government. In contrast, he remained committed to obtaining a substantial appropriation for the Trans-Siberian railway system, which he considered an entirely separate and overriding issue from the recognition of the Omsk government. On June 23 Wilson and McCormick discussed the central importance of the railroad to America’s Far Eastern policy. McCormick emphasized to Wilson “the difficulty of furnishing money unless you could recognize some governmental obligation, particularly in Siberia for railroad development.” Wilson agreed that the issue was urgent, but, instead of recognizing Kolchak, he told McCormick that he planned “telling Congress the whole story and said he would appeal for funds upon his return, as he also recognized the opportunity of a great constructive program in aiding Russia through [the] Siberian road and keeping [an] open door by preventing Japan from creating [a] sphere of influence and monopoly [in] Siberia, which will also jeopardize Chinese interests.”⁵¹ Like the State Department, Wilson recognized that the Siberian railroad system played a pivotal role in Far Eastern questions, since the fate of Manchuria hinged on preventing Japan from controlling the Chinese Eastern Railway.

As they began to consider plans for a comprehensive reconstruction program in Siberia, it is important to note that Wilson and the American mission intended that the operation be financed and managed by the United States alone. In a memorandum to Wilson dated June 21, Herbert Hoover, director of general relief for the Supreme Economic Council, recommended that the United States serve as an “economic mandatory” for the Russian Empire. Hoover emphasized that this endeavor could not be organized on an inter-Allied basis because of the “conflicting financial and trade interests” involved. When Hoover discussed his statement with the president and Vance McCormick on June 23, Wilson concurred with “Hoover’s statement that Russia could not rehabilitate itself without economic aid, which should be given without political interference; that it was impossible for an inter-Allied body to give such aid without getting mixed up in politics to some extent.” McCormick also agreed with this assessment.⁵²

The opposition of the Wilson administration to a comprehensive inter-Allied loan for the Siberian railway system reflected a well-founded mistrust of the Allies’ motives. After the Technical Board rejected the British War Office proposal, which called for the Allies to assume complete financial responsibility for the Siberian railways, Britain gradually withdrew its promise to contribute its share of the $20 million emergency fund. Britain was evidently dissatisfied with the Technical Board’s decision not to place restrictions on the expenditure of the emergency fund in any one country—since three-fourths of the foreign purchases would necessarily have to come from America. In late May the British representative on the Inter-Allied Railway Committee informed Charles Smith that Britain would be willing to contribute its $4 million share, but he then suggested that for the remaining subscription “each country might advance money only for whatever materials [were] bought therein.”⁵³ But through August, only the United States placed its $4 million subscription with the Inter-Allied Railway Committee; China managed to put up five hundred thousand dollars. Then, in mid-August 1919, Britain abruptly reneged on its promise to contribute its share. Smith learned from a Foreign Office representative that Britain “felt that she had already advanced her share in bacon and locomotives and did not care to do more at present.”⁵⁴

In light of this action, it would seem that Britain’s original desire to have the Allies take over the complete financing of the Siberian railways was motivated by the desire to obtain preferential commercial arrangements with its client, the Omsk government. Britain probably entertained hopes that a large financial commitment to the Trans-Siberian railways could be tied to the purchase of British railway materials. This objective was undermined when Stevens forced the adoption of the limited American proposal for emergency Allied financing, which placed no restrictions on where the funds could be spent. When it became apparent in late summer that the Omsk government would most likely collapse and that there would be no prospect for commercial gain, Britain decided to withhold its contribution entirely.

Wilson’s ambitious plans for an American loan to the Siberian railways were communicated to Morris by the State Department on July 11. Placing special emphasis on restoring the railway system, the department instructed Morris to estimate the financial requirements for “a comprehensive plan for economic reconstruction in Siberia and ultimately for European Russia.”⁵⁵

Eleven days later, on July 22, in response to a Senate resolution from June 27 that inquired about the presence of American troops in Siberia, Wilson sent a message to the Senate explaining his Siberian policy. After an extensive review of the Siberian intervention, Wilson emphasized that American troops should continue to protect the railroad from “partisan bands,” a clear reference to the Japanese-supported Cossacks. Wilson stressed to the Senate that Russia’s participation in the war had been of incalculable value to the Allied cause, and that Russia now desperately needed economic assistance to prevent the spread of further chaos and to begin the process of reconstruction. He maintained that the United States bore a heavy obligation to protect the Trans-Siberian system, since it was not only the main transportation artery for Siberia but also the only means of access to European Russia.⁵⁶

Ambassador Morris arrived at Vladivostok on July 10 and began to travel west in accordance with his instructions to evaluate the Omsk government. On his approach to Omsk, Morris discovered to his surprise that the Kolchak regime completely lacked popular support and was backed only by “a small discredited group of reactionaries, Monarchists and former military officials.” Moreover, the Czecho-Slovak troops were becoming restless with their situation; their discontent was fueled in no small measure by their disillusionment with Kolchak’s regime. They would have to be repatriated to their homeland after November. All Allied representatives and moderate Russians with whom Morris conferred believed the Czechs’ withdrawal would bring about an uprising against Kolchak.

Without even making a thorough evaluation of conditions in central Siberia, Morris immediately identified five major reasons why Kolchak failed to win popular support for his government: popular distrust for the Cossack leaders of Eastern Siberia who ostensibly represented him; the inability of the Russian military and civil officials to in any way amend their reactionary views or practices; the government’s failure to implement constructive economic and financial measures, while it condoned rampant speculation and corruption by its officials; the resentment by the peasantry against an extremely harsh system of conscription; and the suppression of all local self-government in the urban areas. This report was repeated to the American mission at Paris.⁵⁷

After discussing the situation with Admiral Kolchak, Morris and the pro-American foreign minister, John Sukin, agreed that certain of the Omsk government’s policies had to be addressed: the supervision of the railway, which principally involved enforcement of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee’s operational authority and protection of the line, for which the Czechs had been responsible; credits for military supplies and commercial assistance; Red Cross relief; the German-Austrian prisoners; and a bill of rights.

Morris elaborated on the latter point, which underscored the basic dilemma confronting the attempts of the administration to undertake a reconstruction program in cooperation with the Omsk government. Morris suggested to the State Department that it would be necessary for Kolchak to issue a carefully prepared statement in which he promised to guarantee certain fundamental individual rights. He believed “much of the discontent with the present Government, the demoralization and panic, is in my judgment due to the utter insecurity of person and property.” The reconstruction process could never commence while “all over Siberia there is an orgy of arrest without charges, of execution without even the pretense of trial, and of confiscation without color of authority.” In conclusion, Morris expressed to the department his view that the United States should not invest great hope in the Omsk government.⁵⁸

None of the problems Morris observed during his fact-finding mission to Omsk could be resolved independently of the transportation question. The success of the Wilson administration’s assistance program for Siberia hinged on Stevens’s ability to reconcile the region’s pressing commercial transportation needs with the Omsk government’s military program. To facilitate cooperation with the Russian and Allied military forces, the Technical Board conceded priority to military transportation, although railway materials received precedence over everything else. Stevens’s principal challenge lay in overhauling the existing system of car distribution, which had contributed to the disruption of railway operations. Since the March Revolution of 1917, the Trans-Siberian Railway had operated under a complicated system whereby the authority to distribute cars was divided among the military, the commercial transportation committees, and the local transportation officials. Both the military and civilian transportation committees were authorized to distribute cars by issuing instructions to the local railway officials whose responsibilities were limited to the movement of trains and maintenance of the line.⁵⁹ As long as wartime conditions existed military transportation received priority over civilian traffic. By the spring of 1919, the competing demands of the various committees and the combined burden of Russian and Allied military forces had brought about the complete disruption of railway operations.

In May the Technical Board tried to reduce military interference with railway operations by requiring the Military Transportation Board to place all orders through the central railway administration. This central authority would then issue instructions to the local railway officials regarding military requirements. By routing all military requests through the Central Transportation committee, Stevens hoped to insulate the local line authorities from military pressure and encourage them to assume more responsibility for the railroad’s operations. Stevens planned to exercise the Technical Board’s supervision over this whole process by assigning Maj. F. B. Parker as general superintendent to the Central committee, and by attaching the Russian Railway Service Corps to the local Russian line administrations—George Emerson as chief inspector would coordinate their work.⁶⁰

Beyond facilitating better coordination between the Russian bureaucracies, Stevens also attempted to use Emerson’s corps to decentralize Russian railroad operations. Since Stevens did not believe that lasting improvements in transportation efficiency could be achieved without limiting bureaucratic interference with the local railway administrations, he assigned Emerson’s approximately 150 technical and operating specialists the task of introducing the dispatching system across the Trans-Siberian from Vladivostok to Omsk. Under this system dispatchers who were distributed across the line expedited train movement on the basis of detailed reports regarding traffic conditions received by telegraph or telephone. If successfully introduced, this decentralized system would effectively shift operational control from the Ministry of Communications to the parallel network of Russian dispatchers. Benjamin O. Johnson, Stevens’s Omsk district inspector, would later make the point that the dispatching system “to all intents and purposes ran along parallel to the Russian organization.”⁶¹ As one American inspector noted, “when the Russian Chief Dispatchers are installed they will serve as a buffer between outsiders and the dispatchers.”⁶²

Emerson’s inspectors immediately discovered they would receive no cooperation from the Russian military authorities. At major terminals, particularly Vladivostok and Harbin, military station commandants ignored the inspectors and demanded transportation directly from the local railway officials. Problems with the Russian military command were compounded by the arbitrary behavior of the Japanese military and their Cossack clients who routinely commandeered transportation in open defiance of Allied regulations.

Throughout June, Minister of Ways and Communications Ustrugov refused to authorize the Allied Resolution from May 27, which required the Military Board to transmit all requests for transportation through the civilian transportation officials under the supervision of Emerson’s inspectors. Ustrugov’s silence undermined the inspectors authority; their instructions were conveniently ignored by Russian railway officials because they inevitably conflicted with the myriad Russian laws and regulations governing railroad operations. In July Emerson repeatedly met with Ustrugov, urging the minister to endorse the resolution. Ustrugov demurred, claiming the government could not enforce the inter-Allied agreement because it could not control the Japanese or Semenov.

But Ustrugov’s ministry also hindered the Technical Board’s work in the case of purely technical issues that were not subject to the arbitrary whims of the military officials. The minister gave only equivocal support to the inspectors endeavors to expedite repair and maintenance procedures. Ustrugov and his bureaucracy were suspicious of the Technical Board’s efforts to decentralize control over technical matters for the same reason they opposed the dispatching system. The extensive rules and laws regulating technical matters helped perpetuate the power of the ministry’s bureaucracy. Reviewing the failure of the inter-Allied Agreement in December 1919, Johnson commented that “the Department of Ways of Communications including all the heads of railway service, constituted under Mr. Ustrugoff the most weighty political element in Siberia.” Johnson added that “Mr. Ustrugoff’s declaration to his organization, ‘Save Russian Railways for Russians,’ sounded patriotic enough, but back of it, was as we all know, the fight by Ustrugoff to maintain the old railway regime of Russians, with all that went with it in authority and Power.”⁶³ Faced with the open hostility of the Russian and Japanese military officials, and the passive resistance of the Russian railway officials, the Technical Board would only achieve limited success, except on the Chinese Eastern Railway where officials, such as Chief Engineer D. P. Kazakevitch, cooperated with the inspectors.

But the Omsk government’s complete disregard for social reconstruction is best illustrated by its unwillingness to stabilize its currency. Since it had come to power in the fall of 1918, the Omsk government had resorted to the printing press to pay its administrative and military costs. This reliance on monetary inflation to pay its expenses created a powerful incentive for its czarist civil and military officials to engage in widespread graft and speculation. Currency stabilization was crucial to the reconstruction process, because the collapse of the ruble made it difficult to pay railroad workers wages and hindered cooperative associations and the Trans-Siberian railway from concluding credit arrangements with foreign suppliers. Accordingly, shortly after its formation, the Technical Board decided that its first task had to be the stabilization of Siberia’s currency. At the request of the Technical Board, the Inter-Allied Railway Committee enlisted the services of a British financial expert who drafted a monetary plan in cooperation with Allied and Russian bankers.⁶⁴

On May 5, Smith cabled the committee’s unanimous recommendation to Washington. This plan consisted of two phases, the first of which addressed the creation of a stable currency and the second of which devised a method whereby credits could be extended to the Omsk government and other institutions in Siberia. Initially, the committee’s plan required the Omsk government to replace all of its currency notes and bonds with the American Bank Note Company’s issue of 500 million rubles, which had originally been printed for the Kerensky government. As Charles Smith, the American representative, emphasized, this technically well-printed currency would inspire confidence on the part of the population, in contrast to the Omsk government’s poorly printed and easily counterfeited currency. Small denominations were particularly needed, since their absence contributed to higher prices. The committee believed substitution of the new currency for the old should take place at par. While these new notes would be legal tender, there should be no promise for their redemption in gold, since this obligation could only be assumed by an all-Russian government. This reservation could be clearly stated by a surcharge stamped on each bill. To ensure an adequate supply of currency the committee recommended that existing Kerensky notes should continue to circulate. It should only represent legal tender on the basis of its daily market rate with the new American Bank Note Company currency. Finally, the Omsk government would need to publish a monthly statement on the quantity of new notes in circulation. This provision, together with the replacement of all Siberian currencies by the necessarily finite quantity and high quality American Bank Note Company’s issue, demonstrated the committee’s intention to control the regime’s currency emissions.

In the plan’s second phase, the committee suggested that the Allies provide a gold credit to the Omsk government and other reliable institutions for the purchase of necessary foreign supplies. This foreign credit would be required to bolster the new ruble’s stability, which could then be used exclusively for circulation in Siberia. Otherwise, if this new ruble were used in foreign exchange, it would quickly depreciate because of Siberia’s unfavorable balance of trade.

For these financial measures to succeed, however, the committee stressed that it must also supervise Siberia’s imports to ensure that Western commercial assistance would be used exclusively for the restoration of normal economic conditions. Accordingly, it recommended that one financial expert from each Allied power be assigned “to aid the Omsk Government properly in carrying out its part of the program.” These experts would give the committee extensive oversight of the Omsk government’s financial activities since they “should be allowed to make regular reports to and consult with the Inter-Allied Committee which shall be granted the privilege of discussing all financial questions with the government before any final decision is made on any question which the Allies may be interested.”⁶⁵

In particular, the committee hoped to exercise control over the government and private institutions, such as the cooperatives, in order to limit their use of foreign exchange to “actual needs.” As an alternative to the experts, the committee suggested that this supervisory function “might be delegated to the government bank, or else an Allied bank.” Existing organizations, like the Russian Bureau, should continue to function in order to assist both the export of raw materials from Vladivostok and the purchase of imports. These regulatory powers would give the Inter-Allied Railway Committee capabilities similar to those envisioned for the proposed inter-Allied bank the previous fall when the United States supported the Russian embassy’s plan for a temporary ruble scheme. From a broader perspective, the committee’s functions resembled those of the international banking consortium, which supervised foreign loans for China; moreover, it should also be viewed as a forerunner of the Marshall Plan.⁶⁶

While the Inter-Allied Railway Committee prepared these financial recommendations, the United States renewed its efforts to provide the Siberian cooperatives with commercial assistance. It would now be even more difficult for the administration to furnish Siberia with commercial credit because the precipitous decline of the ruble created increasing chaos within the Siberian economy. Although War Trade Board export regulations with Siberia had been lifted after the Armistice, the administration still intended that the Russian Bureau personnel supervise commercial assistance with Siberia.

In March 1919, the State Department informed August Heid that the Union of Siberian Creamery Associations and the Union of Siberian Cooperative Unions (Zakupsbyt) had applied for credits to purchase army surplus from the War Department on credit, the method that had been proposed by the War Trade Board in February. Similar to the concerns that preoccupied the War Trade Board in the fall of 1918, the State Department wanted assurance on the following points: Were these organizations really active? Could assisting them disrupt political stability? What suggestions could the Russian Bureau offer for supervising these arrangements? Did the bureau think any other organizations should be included in the plan?⁶⁷

Heid responded with a generally favorable assessment of the Union of Siberian Creamery Associations. While Heid could not determine the politics of its officers, he believed the peasant membership of the Creamery Association made it a desirable recipient of American assistance because they “generally stand for equitable land distribution and improved educational facilities, freedom of the press and religion, and general enactment of laws to assist improvement of social and civic conditions.” Nevertheless, Heid did recommend that credits be given to the Creamery Association on the basis of a fixed profit to contain part of the overhead salary expense that resulted from the organization’s large number of highly paid officers.⁶⁸

By the end of April, the War Trade Board officials in Washington and Heid had established the terms upon which the War Department surplus could be sold. Patterned on negotiations with the Siberian Creamery Association, the general regulations were consistent with the administration’s policy that only the most pressing needs of the population be met first and that all necessary steps be taken to prevent speculation or favoritism by the cooperatives. The Russian Bureau would attempt to supervise the association’s purchases at each stage of the process: it would regulate the sale price on the basis of a profit not to exceed 10 percent; and it would require that the association only sell goods to actual consumers, including nonmembers, and not to middlemen for resale. American agents would have to supervise distribution, and the bureau would be furnished detailed lists of requested commodities and their specifications in order to help it determine priorities.⁶⁹

These conditions formed the basis for three identical $5 million contracts the War Department concluded with the Central Union, the Siberian Creamery Association, and the Zakupsbyt in late June 1919. At this time, the War Department announced that it would furnish as much as $25 million worth of supplies to approved cooperative societies.⁷⁰ These negotiations had taken on even greater urgency in light of the cooperatives worsening financial condition due to the deterioration of railroad transportation, the collapse of the ruble, and the lack of Russian exports. War Trade Board planners hoped that if the Russian Bureau could establish reasonably effective supervision over the distribution of necessities and “if enough are sent into Siberia prices will be regulated automatically.”⁷¹

By late September, Heid informed Washington that these commercial arrangements could not be carried out because “the entire machinery of commerce is wrecked.” Without doubt, Japan bore a great deal of responsibility for creating these conditions. Its support for the Cossack leaders was largely responsible for obstructing railway traffic between Vladivostok and Irkutsk. The shortsightedness, incompetence, and corruption of the Omsk government caused a great deal of instability in its own right and certainly did nothing to mitigate the region’s problems. In resignation Heid explained: “There is no prospect of early rehabilitation, on the contrary the large issues of new Siberian currency to meet expenses of military railroads and general government budget accelerate and increase devaluation. Credits are impossible, the Cooperatives can not safely accept rubles in payment for commodities.”⁷²

Any chance for promoting social and economic reconstruction in Siberia rested on the willingness of the Omsk government to implement the Inter-Allied Railway Committee’s financial recommendations. Instead, the regime sacrificed the welfare of the Siberian population to its single-minded quest for a military victory over the Bolsheviks. Not only did the government subject the population to brutal acts of repression in its pursuit of a military solution, but its economic practices exacerbated instability and hardship. On May 28 Ernest Harris, the American consul general at Omsk, reported news that contradicted the Inter-Allied Railway Committee’s financial recommendations. In a conference with Foreign Minister Sukin and Finance Minister I. A. Mikhailov, Harris learned that the Omsk government no longer believed a pressing need existed for the rubles printed by the American Bank Note Company. The Omsk government officials explained that while the notes had been needed six months ago, the government had now practically completed preparations for the printing of “a very much larger sum than had been ordered in America.” Supposedly, Omsk might be interested in using the American notes as an all-Russian currency in the future after a constituent assembly decided to establish a permanent currency.⁷³ This announcement, coming on the heels of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee’s recommendations, indicates the Omsk government probably balked at the committee’s financial recommendations.

Charles Smith, the American representative to the Inter-Allied Railway Committee, attributed the railroads’ financial difficulties largely to the government’s unwillingness to stabilize its currency. He asserted that, two months after the committee’s proposal had been submitted to the Omsk government, the memorandum “had hardly been read.”⁷⁴

The Omsk government’s overissuance of currency had particularly deleterious effects on the Chinese Eastern Railway. Within the Chinese Eastern Railway zone, Omsk government currency depreciated sharply because the railroad was the only major outlet for the currency.⁷⁵ In late July, workers on the Chinese Eastern, who could no longer buy anything with the virtually worthless Omsk currency, initiated a general strike, which paralyzed the line. Because Russian railway workers along the Chinese Eastern purchased their necessities from Chinese merchants who refused to accept Omsk currency and because Chinese workers preferred Chinese currency, the Chinese representative on the Inter-Allied Railway Committee proposed that the railroad adopt the Chinese silver dollar. The Russian administration and the non-Chinese members of the committee flatly rejected this suggestion because it would result in the displacement of the ruble from this international corridor and because it would effectively dissolve Russian authority over the line. In early August, the Technical Board temporarily alleviated the problem when it used $550,000 in gold from the committee’s funds to purchase Romanov rubles, which enabled it to meet the July payroll.⁷⁶ Smith told Washington at the time of this payroll crisis that this precarious financial situation existed because of the refusal of the Omsk government to follow the committee’s May 5 recommendations.⁷⁷

Smith related that the Omsk government’s monetary practices were no more responsible in areas that lay under its direct control. When workers on the Tomsk Railroad threatened to strike because the government had not paid them for an extended period, Omsk cabled the dubious reassurance to the Technical Board that it would soon meet the payroll because the government printing press had been repaired and the necessary sums could simply be run off!⁷⁸

In July the Omsk regime’s military fortunes began to decline rapidly as the Bolshevik forces advanced through the Urals, capturing Chelyabinsk and Ekaterinburg. These setbacks gave Stevens’s Technical Board an opportunity to demand reforms from the Omsk regime as a precondition for additional financial support. In mid-July Ambassador Morris agreed to personally discuss the Technical Board’s problems with Kolchak. Morris also reassured Stevens confidentially that the U.S. government would only consider aid requests from the Omsk regime if Kolchak’s officials cooperated with the Technical Board.⁷⁹

Shortly after this, Emerson appealed directly to the Allied diplomatic corps when Ustrugov ignored a Technical Board resolution that limited transportation privileges for military commanders. Emerson’s protest prodded the Allied representatives at Omsk to inform Kolchak’s council ministers that the Allied credit to assist the railroad (to which, of course, only the United States and China had actually contributed!) would be withdrawn unless the Omsk regime enforced the railway agreement.⁸⁰ This ultimatum induced the Omsk regime to concede the Inter-Allied Railway Committee’s principal demands: it suspended the laws governing technical standards, and it ordered military authorities to observe the Technical Board’s procedures for obtaining transportation.⁸¹

As a prerequisite for additional credits, the Allied diplomatic corps also urged the Omsk officials to enact a series of financial reforms. On July 30, Ambassador Morris participated in a meeting with Allied representatives and Russian officials during which Finance Minister Mikhailov outlined steps his government would take in order to receive foreign credits. It is likely that the pro-American officials, Foreign Minister Sukin and Vladimir Novitskii, who had served as the financial delegate to the Russian embassy in Washington, were instrumental in formulating this program since Mikhailov knew little about finance himself.⁸²

The ministry’s program addressed three main problems: the reform of monetary circulation, the resumption of payment on Russia’s foreign debt, and measures to be taken for the acquisition of foreign credits. As a precondition for further foreign support, the government would undertake monetary reform to ensure the severance of its currency from that used by the Bolsheviks, and it would attempt to unify its monetary tokens by exchanging all existing currencies in the areas under its control for new Russian State Bank notes produced by the American Bank Note Company. The government would also strive to improve the technical quality of the currency it printed in small denominations to prevent counterfeiting. After the completion of these reforms, the emission of currency would be subject to public control.

Next, the ministry recognized that the Kolchak government’s willingness to resume interest payments on the nation’s foreign debt would be a condition for any significant amount of assistance from the Allies, let alone recognition. It therefore proposed to issue an interest-bearing script as reassurance to French, British, and American private creditors of the Omsk government’s intention to cover unpaid interest. After attempting to satisfy the Allied representatives on these two issues, Mikhailov hoped the Allies would agree to grant the Omsk regime substantial Allied credits for war matériels, railway supplies, and for general economic assistance.⁸³

For Ambassador Morris, however, the question of embarking on a large-scale foreign assistance program for the Omsk government remained problematic. His evaluation of the regime in early August exhibited a great deal of ambivalence. This was a result of the difficulty he had in resolving the administration’s desire to assist reconstruction in Siberia with his recognition that the presently constituted Omsk government was fatally flawed.⁸⁴

On August 4, Morris reported to the State Department his belief that the government had “moderately liberal and progressive” intentions, but that it was ill-equipped for the task of governing the region. Morris considered Kolchak personally honest and patriotic but completely lacking in administrative ability or an appreciation of the social, political, and economic problems that confronted his government. Likewise, he thought the civilian Council of Ministers was a committed, politically moderate body but inexperienced and inefficient. While the military would obviously continue to pose great difficulties for the civilian officials, Morris nevertheless expressed confidence that if the government survived, it would honor its promise to convene a constituent assembly. In Morris’s view, administrative shortcomings largely resulted from the failure of the government to represent the truly organic institutions in the region, such as the zemstvos and municipalities, which left it with little effective authority. This weakness gave the reactionary and corrupt military officials a free hand to engage in ruthless and indiscriminate acts of repression against the civilian population.

Morris captured the essence of the dilemma American policy faced in Siberia when he attempted to summarize the strengths of the Kolchak regime, for he could not really find any. He concluded that “however helpless this Government has proved, no alternative is offered around which those opposed to Bolshevikism might rally. The choice which confronts every moderate in Siberia is between Kolchak and Bolshevikism.”⁸⁵

Morris continued to wrestle with the issue over the next several days as he prepared his recommendations. Without endorsing any further support for Kolchak’s government, he frankly informed the State Department that the existing government could not withstand bolshevism. No amount of assistance could save the government unless fundamental changes in the personnel and the methods of government were enacted. Still, he clung to the idea that with perseverance and patience the Allies could shape the Omsk government into a bulwark against bolshevism. This would necessarily be a long and difficult task, and, in the meantime, the government would have to survive its present crisis.

On August 11, Morris recommended that the Allies essentially assume trusteeship over all facets of the Omsk government in order to make it worthy of further foreign assistance. Morris’s recommendations covered three broad categories: the amount of credits needed by Kolchak and the civilian population, assistance for the operation of the railroad system, and the need for extensive Allied supervision over all assistance furnished to Omsk.

First, Morris thought that if the government survived its present military crisis during the next months, it should be accorded formal recognition as the Provisional Government of Russia in order to facilitate the substantial assistance that would be required. This assistance included: $90 million for military supplies; $70 million for commercial assistance; $20 million for the Inter-Allied Railway Committee, plus an additional $15 million to cover its expenses and salaries—credits totaling nearly $200 million. The second recommendation urged steps that would be necessary to maintain communications between Vladivostok and Omsk. This would require a continuation of the inter-Allied agreement, an addition of 40,000 troops to replace the departing Czechs, and the $20 million credit that the other powers had been slow to furnish.

In his third point, Morris stipulated that these recommendations were contingent upon the establishment of an extensive network of Allied supervisors who must ensure that the credits were efficiently used and the supplies distributed honestly. An Allied military supply committee should be authorized to appoint at least three hundred military inspectors to supervise the delivery of military supplies. Likewise, a committee of commercial experts should establish a corps of Allied inspectors who would oversee the distribution of goods consigned to selected Siberian firms and organizations. Fourth, Morris believed the United States should appoint a diplomatic representative “at the seat of the Kolchak government” who would be assisted by experts in commercial affairs, finance, labor relations, and agriculture. In other words, this representative would occupy an advisory status within the Omsk government similar to the position John Stevens held with the Trans-Siberian railway system.⁸⁶ These conditions were tantamount to Herbert Hoover’s recommendations to Wilson in June that the United States must establish an “economic mandatory” over Siberia.

Political realities at home made it impossible for the Wilson administration to consider a commitment of this size to the Omsk government. On August 25 the State Department informed Morris that the question of recognizing the Omsk regime had become moot, because the United States could not furnish the support Morris thought necessary. Public opinion and the mood in Congress would not support any further commitment of American troops to Russia. Furthermore, no credits could be extended to Kolchak for military supplies or for commercial assistance without authorization from Congress. Any action by Congress depended on whether Wilson presented an assistance program then being prepared by Vance McCormick on the basis of Morris’s reports. This endeavor had to be put on hold until the administration obtained ratification of the peace treaty—itself a hopeless battle that would drag on long after conditions in Siberia had deteriorated beyond help.

But even if the Wilson administration had been able to act on Morris’s recommendations, Omsk lacked the capacity and willingness to accept the American ambassador’s stringent terms for assistance. Indeed, Morris’s visit to Omsk in August only caused new tensions between the United States and Kolchak’s regime, as the desperate Russian officials alleged that the ambassador had agreed to recommend new credits unconditionally. Foreign Minister Sukin actually told Emerson that Morris had agreed to support a suspension of the railway agreement until the U.S. government recognized the Omsk regime, granted it financial assistance, and replaced the Czecho-Slovaks with American troops. Sukin rationalized that these steps would give Kolchak the prestige necessary to assert authority over the factions working against his regime; then it would be possible for the government to enforce the railway agreement.⁸⁷

Meanwhile, Emerson’s inspectors had become thoroughly disillusioned by pervasive Russian opposition to the rationalized repair procedures and the dispatching system. It should have come as no surprise to Stevens that the Russian civil and military authorities would stubbornly resist his efforts to undercut their authority by introducing American personnel and operating methods. To this extent, Stevens and his advisory personnel must share some of the blame for problems they encountered with Russian officialdom, for the Americans undoubtedly offended Russian sensibilities in their efforts to drastically overhaul Russian railroad practices. As a case in point, Benjamin Johnson believed the Technical Board had made a mistake in attempting to circumvent the transportation bureaucracy. During his tenure as chief inspector of the Omsk district, Johnson achieved better results by attaching the Russian dispatchers to the office of the Russian division chief of transportation. Merging the dispatching network into the existing bureaucracy encouraged Russian officials to cooperate with the American innovations by giving them a stake in the new system while it enabled the inspectors to supervise operations more effectively.⁸⁸

Regardless of any tactical mistakes Stevens may have made in implementing the railroad agreement, these errors were ultimately overshadowed by the inhospitable political environment the Great Power rivalry fostered for all American initiatives in Siberia. British and Japanese support for their military clients in Siberia only strengthened the reactionary elements who opposed the American assistance program. For instance, the independent-minded British consul at Vladivostok, W. O’Reilly, believed his government’s policy had been too accommodating to the Omsk regime. O’Reilly thought that British High Commissioner Sir Charles Eliot had been “too much taken up with the idea of pleasing the Omsk Government at all costs, regardless of their real interests, and also of our position in the eyes of the population generally, who are the permanent factor in the situation.” In contrast, O’Reilly believed American policy had been unfairly criticized by Omsk officials because “Washington would not let them [the American troops] go beyond railway guarding” and because the Americans “did not agree with old regime[s] bullying of the population.”⁸⁹

As Kolchak’s position grew more critical in the fall, State Department experts vigorously lobbied Wilson and Lansing for a de facto recogniton of the Omsk regime. Basil Miles, probably the main advocate of recognition, considered this action necessary in order to prevent Russia from being absorbed into the economic orbit of Germany or Japan. Miles reiterated the principal concern of American policymakers when he emphasized that “to my mind we must get appropriations from Congress for a general plan to assist in economic re-construction in Russia.”⁹⁰ Near the end of September before resigning from the State Department, Miles pleaded with his superiors to furnish Kolchak’s regime additional support, warning that if the United States did not do something for Russia “the alternative is to let others act who are willing to do so—which would leave Siberia to the Japs.”⁹¹

Following Wilson’s stroke in late September, Secretary Lansing, who temporarily assumed authority for policy decisions, expressed the hopelessness of the Russian situation. Whereas Miles’s passion for Russia had undoubtedly begun to cloud his judgment of the Omsk regime, Lansing had to face the inescapable fact that “responsible government” could never be based on the “corrupt and incompetent, and to a large extent reactionary” civil and political officials who surrounded Kolchak. This regime, Lansing emphasized, had managed to alienate the Siberian population in less than a year, particularly the zemstvos and cooperatives “which being democratic in principle are best representative of the popular will.” Lansing anticipated that the Czechoslovak’s evacuation would force Kolchak to withdraw his government to Irkutsk, where he might be compelled to seek Japanese assistance.⁹²

When Kolchak’s collapse became imminent in late November, the State Department explained to Morris why the administration must continue to support the regime’s survival, albeit in a reorganized form. American officials were essentially concerned that if Kolchak was replaced, a pro-Japanese government could quite possibly succeed him. Recently, a visiting Japanese publicity agent from the Japanese Parliament had suggested to Smith at Vladivostok that Kolchak would soon fall and that Japan and America should sponsor Russian self-government through the zemstvos and cooperatives. While on the face of it the State Department welcomed these sentiments as perhaps representing a new departure in Japanese policy, it nevertheless feared it could just as well be “a disingenuous attempt to obtain [our] support for the elimination of Kolchak.” Therefore, “in the interest of securing as orderly a succession of government as possible,” the United States favored a reorganization of the Omsk government along democratic lines—which Kolchak had pledged to the Council of Four in June—”rather than a complete break with the past.” While the presently constituted Omsk government itself stood in the way of reconstruction, the Wilson administration did not want to risk its succession by a regime oriented toward Japan.⁹³

The position of the Omsk regime grew critical in October when White resistance collapsed along the Tobol River, leaving Omsk defenseless before the Red Army. Meanwhile, growing uncertainies over the fate of the peace treaty threatened any further initiatives the administration might have wanted to undertake in Russia. But these grave setbacks did not weaken the State Department’s resolve to assist economic reconstruction in Siberia. On the contrary, during November Dewitt C. Poole, the new Russian division chief, prepared a lengthy report urging the U.S. government to underwrite a large-scale reconstruction progam for Siberia. Secretary Lansing submitted this report to Wilson on December 4.

Poole predicated his recommendations on the conviction that the Russian market, “comprising one-seventh of the land surface of the globe,” would have to be integrated into the global economy in order to maintain stable international growth in the postwar period. Accordingly, regardless of the enormous difficulties this unprecedented program would encounter, Poole justified such a commitment as an alternative to leaving the Russian Empire under the control of “adventurous revolutionaries” or a “renascent imperialism which would conspire once more to establish itself in forcible control of the world’s affairs.”⁹⁴

To meet the emergency conditions in Siberia, Poole recommended that an expanded Russian Bureau be incorporated with a capital of $100 million. While continuing to lend directly to cooperatives, zemstvos, and municipalities, this agency would also assume functions similar to the War Finance Corporation by insuring exports and imports to Russia. Although American policymakers favored the return of economic activity to private channels, Poole’s recommendations illustrate how the Wilson administration believed that exceptions to this principle should be made in cases where widespread social and economic instability on the continent could only be alleviated by substantial governmental intervention. A major portion of the bureau’s funds would be used to assist the Trans-Siberian railway, which would continue to play the pivotal role in the region’s reconstruction.⁹⁵

Events at home and in Siberia had already squelched any potential program of this scope; Poole’s ambitous recommendations would never even reach Congress. This does not, however, lessen the importance of his views, for they were consistent with Wilson’s position in June. Equally important, Poole’s report enables us to reach broader conclusions regarding the nature of American intervention in Russia during the Revolution and civil war. His recommendations were founded on the widely shared American belief that the Bolsheviks and “bolshevism” were distinct phenomena. In contrast to the small, but dedicated Bolshevik party, which relentlessly pursued its revolutionary goals, Poole defined bolshevism as “a popular state of mind growing out of the war and past abuses.” After identifying social grievances as the cause of revolution, Poole reiterated that American policy had been guided by the principle that bolshevism “is obviously not to be conquered by force. It is pre-eminently an economic and moral phenomena against which economic and moral remedies alone will prevail.” He considered military measures to be useful only as a “practical necessity, in certain contingencies”; beyond limited purposes, military operations only produced more hardship for the population, thereby fueling social protest and strengthening the Bolsheviks.⁹⁶

While Poole’s distinction between the “Bolsheviks” and “bolshevism” is obviously an oversimplification, it nevertheless demonstrates a recognition that the Bolsheviks’ success at mobilizing popular support had little to do with their ideological program. Most of the Siberian peasantry lacked any coherent political consciousness; between 1918 and 1920 they simply supported whichever side appeared to offer relief from oppression and material hardship.⁹⁷

Near the end of 1919, the State Department abruptly informed Japan that the United States would withdraw its troops from Siberia, an act that called into question the continuation of the inter-Allied agreement for supervision of the Trans-Siberian railways. Nevertheless, by the spring of 1920, the United States reaffirmed its commitment to maintaining the Open Door on the Chinese Eastern Railway as a link between Siberia and the world market. But in much the same way that the aims of its Siberian policy had been compromised, American efforts to establish an international trusteeship over this line would become hopelessly entangled in the even more complex web of Great Power rivalry in China.