It is now the moment to scrutinize what considerations there were on the part of Germany, following the successful campaign in the West for the continuation of the war. First of all Hitler addressed the well-known offer of peace to Britain, rejected on Churchill’s instigation. It is once more the place to quote here: ‘difficile est satiram non scribere’! What is written about it must surely appear as satire to anybody who is not familiar with this fascinating material.
In the conditions of a peace treaty Hitler had approached the British as far as it could possibly be done. The visionary in him was still hoping for an understanding with Britain. Only at the last minute had he agreed with Father’s proposals to come to an agreement with the Russians, but he had basically not completely abandoned hope that the British would be brought to see reason by this move and that an arrangement could be reached with them. At that time Hitler would still have gone to great lengths to come to such an arrangement. I gathered from what was said by my parents that there was a possible eventuality for the re-establishment of Poland to a certain extent.
The offer of peace to Britain in his speech to the Reichstag of July 1940 was without any doubt sincerely meant, particularly as at the same time the precise conditions for it were transmitted to Lord Lothian, the British ambassador in Washington, as described in detail by the historian Stefan Scheil.328 Lothian found the German conditions ‘more than satisfactory’, but nobody in London took any notice. Once again Britain had been given the chance to maintain her independence and her world supremacy intact. Churchill bears the responsibility for this opportunity having been missed. The end of their world supremacy was thus rung in.329 The picture formed in the meantime of Churchill and the English policy in regard to the German Reich was published in a long article in The Times in 1993 by a clear-thinking and unprejudiced observer, the historian and at one time Defence Minister in Margaret Thatcher’s Cabinet, Alan Clark. It is most illuminating to peruse his thoughts.330
Following Clark’s depiction of the tensions in the Conservative Party which could have erupted as a result of the defeat looming in France in 1940, but which, however, Churchill dealt with harshly and in a manner that was far from objective, he continues:
‘The defeat of Hitler was his [Churchill’s] raison d’être. It was this which had brought him, stage by stage, against all prediction, the whole way from the political wilderness to the premiership …
‘There were several occasions when a rational leader could have got, first reasonable, then excellent, terms from Germany. Hitler actually offered peace in July 1940 before the Battle of Britain started. After the RAF victory the German terms were still available, now weighted more in Britain’s favour. In spring 1941, following the total defeat of the Italians in Africa, Britain had recovered its military poise and not yet paid over all its gold reserves to America. Hitler wanted to secure his flank before he turned to Russia. Hess, his deputy, flew uninvited to Britain with terms. Churchill, who saw the domestic dangers [for his policy], would not talk to him, and repressed (in conspiracy with the whole establishment) the documents.
‘This was the real watershed, because if Britain had made peace in April 1941 the fleet and the Spitfires could have been moved to Singapore. The Japanese would never have attacked and the Far Eastern empire would have endured. But Churchill did not attach as much importance to this as to defeating Hitler; and he realised that total defeat was only possible if the United States entered the war. Only the Japanese could cause this to happen. Why deter them?
‘Churchill’s abasement of Britain before the United States has its origins in the same obsession. The West Indian bases were handed over; the closed markets for British exports were to be dismantled, the entire portfolio of (largely private) holdings in America was liquidated. “A very nice little list,” was Roosevelt’s comment when the British ambassador offered it. “You guys aren’t broke yet.” …
‘Anyone in the Tory party who realised what was happening was horrified. Even Beaverbrook and Bracken, … were uneasy, and complained to him [Winston Churchill] …
‘The war went on far too long, and when Britain emerged the country was bust. Nothing remained of assets overseas. Without immense and punitive borrowings … we would have starved … The Empire was terminally damaged. The Commonwealth countries had seen their trust betrayed and their soldiers wasted.’
Not much need be added to this article in the renowned Times. It was composed by a prominent member of the party that Churchill also belonged to. As a historian and Defence Minister in Margaret Thatcher’s Cabinet, Clark can certainly not be accused of treating British interests lightly or of being over-friendly to Germany. To stay with the satire: Churchill sacrificed the Empire in order to annihilate Germany as a power factor. Hitler for his part admired that Empire and would have done everything to preserve it if a reasonable arrangement between Germany and the British Empire had been achievable.
I have already recounted Father’s State Secretary Weizsäcker’s whispering propaganda campaign that he spread both in Germany and abroad, saying that Father was falsely instructing and advising Hitler that Britain would not fight for her interests. Father knew of these rumours, without being able to locate their source. Already in 1941 (26 November) he had taken up his position, in a talk to European state leaders convened in Berlin: he had dwelt therein also on British policy toward the Reich. Having described the attempts to find an understanding on common ground on the part of Germany, he elucidated:
‘Whoever rejects such uniquely favourable offers has decided on war! That was our conviction. I shall be pleased to allow the judgement to the future whether the know-all English propagandists are right to say afterwards that while ignorant of and misrepresenting the British character I had briefed the Führer to believe that England would never fight. However, the future will also have to pass judgement on something else, much more important, to wit whether or not the British statesmen of the day conducted a wise policy. I for my part believe it has already done so.’
With regard to the British Empire, these words may be said to be prophetic. Further on in the talk he said:
‘In continuing the war, England will lose one position after another and her world supremacy will forcibly instead become an ever increasing dependence.’
In his discussions with Hitler on the subject of the English policy, Father had every so often stressed that ‘we [cannot] force the British to do what’s best for them’. After seizure of the documents of the Polish Foreign Ministry, it was known in Germany what an active role Roosevelt had played in preventing a German-Polish settlement. No illusions were harboured as to the political objectives of the American President. Under these circumstances Father regarded a good relationship with the Soviet Union as a cornerstone of German policy. There was naturally a certain dependence of Germany on supplies from the Soviet Union of raw materials and foodstuffs. The German side was often in default of the counter-supplies, but that was ever and again dealt with. However, German dependence on the Soviet Union did not go half as far as Britain’s on the Unites States. The picture is remarkable. Both European opponents were respectively supported by one of the great powers outside of Europe (‘flank powers’, as Oswald Spengler called them), namely the USA and the Soviet Union. Whilst Britain threw herself completely into the arms of the United States and proceeded in the conflict as a second-rate power, Germany tried to protect her independence, or to attain it, and also foundered.
But to revert to the situation of the Reich following the successfully conducted Western campaign: Hitler had achieved a strong Central European position. The Reich’s situation was considerably improved in comparison to the start of the war. On analyzing the position of Germany after the campaign, beginning from the north, the first thing to be noticed is that in the occupation of Norway the British had just been beaten to it, despite the substantial superiority of the British Navy. Ore supplies from the Swedish Kiruna district via the Norwegian harbour of Narvik were first of all secured. It should also be noted that after lengthy preparations the British had landed almost at the same time at Andalsnes and Namsos, of which Hitler was informed in time. What has become part of history that was valid in Germany at that time as an alleged German ‘invasion’ of Norway turns out on closer inspection to be a defensive step against British strategies.
In the east, the hazardous borders drawn by the Versailles Treaty were disposed of, and the same went for the security risk of the remnants of the Czech state. German influence in the Balkans had strengthened in a normal way, despite the situation that arose from Italy’s advance into Greece and the unclear situation that resulted from those unfortunate military operations, which called for a revision. It is unnecessary to point out that the Italian incursion had taken place without the accord of the German leadership, and was regarded with utmost displeasure by Hitler and by Father.
In the area of the Mediterranean, when Italy finally came in on the German side it signified on the one hand an extension of the operative possibilities in the fight against England, although it was also, regarding Italy’s military inefficiency, a not inconsiderable liability. Following the victory in the West, it appeared that the entry of Spain into the war on the side of the Axis powers was but a matter of time and negotiation. The Reich’s operational potential in the Mediterranean region would be decisively extended thereby. The occupation of the entire Atlantic coast from Spain to Holland offered Germany options such as a landing in England, a U-boat war waged from a much broader base than in the First World War and an effective war from the air against the British Isles.
This Central European position was made secure by the treaties with the Soviet Union, although it was clear to the Germans that the border demarcation between the so-called ‘spheres of interest’ certainly did not have to be the last word in German-Russian relations. The swift progression of the Russians, even during the Western campaign, was a clear indication that on the part of Stalin the development of the conflict between the two Western powers had been seen somewhat differently. A certain exertion of pressure from Russia was perceptible; at least, Hitler said he felt it. The Russians had demanded Bessarabia from Romania, which had been lost in the First World War, by ultimatum, and South Bukovina was occupied. Both regions fell into the Russian ‘sphere of influence’, according to the Moscow Treaty. However, Russia also occupied and annexed North Bukovina – formerly Austrian territory – which did not. On the other hand, the connection to Soviet Russia for the supply of raw materials for the German army had worked very well.
Hitler had attained the German position of strength in Central Europe he strove for and considered a necessity, albeit it did not coincide with his original conception of it being in concord with both Western European powers. It was also not achieved without a war. Indeed he had, in the eleventh hour and after much hesitation, performed a radical about-face turn by joining with his declared enemy, the Soviet Union, so as to keep his back free in order to solve the problem of the Corridor, while still nurturing the hope of achieving a peaceful settlement with Poland.
Both of Britain’s current ‘mainland rapiers’ – or should France and Poland be designated as the European ‘rapiers’ of the United States? – had been disabled. In the case of the latter, it can safely be said that she had been sacrificed. For the German side, four options now stood open.
Closest at hand, but without doubt the most difficult and riskiest, was a direct attack on the British Isles. The planning of a landing in Britain was code-named ‘Seelöwe’ (Sealion).
The second option was to drive the British away from the Mediterranean. The British Empire’s main artery would in this way be blocked and at the same time Europe’s ‘soft underbelly’ would be protected.
The third alternative was entrenchment in Europe, possibly with the establishment there of a political New Order331 and the organization of armament with the aid of the broadened potential offered by the occupied areas and a simultaneous U-boat warfare.
As for the fourth option, to bring down the Soviet Union, it has to be mentioned even though it will be demonstrated that at first there was no thought of taking such a decision. If Hitler did in fact, as is postulated, give an order in the summer of 1940 for drawing up a plan for a campaign against Russia, it may have been as a precaution under the impact of the Russian westward drive. It has already been said that the occupation of North Bukovina did not correspond to what had been agreed between Germany and Russia. It is nonetheless a truism that irrespective of that, all general staffs have to make theoretical plans for every eventuality, without thus in any way influencing the country’s policies or even being able to define them. The political points of view are always decisive.
•The first option – Operation Seelöwe, the invasion of the British Isles – was tackled immediately after ending of the Western campaign. It was revenge for having let a major part of the BEF get away from Dunkirk. An indispensable precondition for the undertaking of Operation Seelöwe to succeed was, however, to win air supremacy over the Channel. This could not be done.
•For the second option, to drive the British out of the Mediterranean an important prerequisite was the elimination of Gibraltar.
•The third option, the build-up of the German position with simultaneous U-boat warfare against the British Isles, would doubtless have afforded the States the time to advance in their armaments efforts. This option would be helped through maintaining amicable relations with the Soviet Union. But it was upon this that Hitler felt he could not rely, at latest following Molotov’s visit to Berlin in November 1940.
•As we know, Hitler had recently, after lengthy hesitation, decided to attack the last – as he saw it – ‘mainland rapier’ of Britain, the Soviet Union, so as to fight to secure the back of the Reich once and for all. It must be expressly noted that this decision was taken only when it became clear that the premise for Operation Seelöwe, namely air supremacy over the Channel, was not feasible and that a decisive strike against the British Empire in the Mediterranean could not be effected. To this end, the removal of Gibraltar would have been indispensable, which, because of Franco’s refusal to join the Reich in this objective, could not be realized.
On investigating the course of the Second World War objectively from the German point of view, the acknowledgement keeps coming to the fore that the pre-emptive war on Soviet Russia – pre-emptive is here to be taken in its broadest sense – represented for Germany the most decisive unfavourable turning point. This brings up the question of what motivated Hitler consciously to initiate a war on two fronts? Had it not been he who had reproached the Imperial Government of Germany for not having avoided a war on two fronts in the First World War? Hitler himself had repeated this in his most recent dictations:332
‘I had always maintained that we ought at all costs to avoid waging war on two fronts, and you may rest assured that I pondered long and anxiously over Napoleon and his experiences in Russia.’
Nevertheless, he goes on to say that there was a whole list of reasons that rendered the attack on Russia unavoidable: Soviet blackmail, indispensable raw materials, ideological antithesis and Soviet preparations for an offensive. Already, this sounds rather like a ‘rationalization’ for the decision.
The most plausible support of theories for the reasons of motivation for weighty decisions are first of all the ‘given facts’. Yet of course ‘facts’ too are open to interpretation when one considers their historical catalysts. It will therefore be necessary to examine whether the diverse theories propounded correspond or contradict. Contemporary historical research offers a variegated bunch of explanations and motives for Hitler’s decision to attack the Soviet Union. They are partly in contradiction. It cannot be up to me to give a full overview of the current scholarship on Hitler’s motives for the Russian war. I shall deal briefly with the generally maintained theories and thereafter give what I see as the facts that for me derive principally from what I learned personally from my parents or from the documents at my disposal. I shall finally say a little about my experience as a ‘minor troop officer’ in the vastness of Russia.
If one ignores the slanderous postulations of propaganda – which are admittedly constantly broadcast by German historians themselves – such as war-lust, power-trip, megalomania and so on, we have to tackle the following questions that arise as to Hitler’s motives for the pre-emptive strike against the Soviet Union, and examine them as to their plausibility.
We will begin with the long-known and celebrated argument that Hitler had wished to realize the gaining of the necessary – in his opinion – ‘Lebensraum’ (space to live) for the German people, a thesis he had stated in his book Mein Kampf. The ‘Lebensraum’ theory is probably the most widespread and most generally believed as the grounds for Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union. It is true he does expound this issue vehemently in the book he wrote in 1928. He speaks of a ‘land policy’ in contrast to a ‘commercial and colonial policy’, championing the opinion that the German Reich should seek its required ‘Lebensraum’ ‘in the East’ – that is, at the expense of Russia.
At first sight, and seen superficially, the arguments in his book and the war on Russia seem to correspond. Certain aspects of the German policy of occupation seem additionally to underline the ‘Lebensraum’ thesis. Himmler’s romantic image of a military frontier deep within Russia that would be secured by ‘soldier peasants’ was only one of its facets. The elimination of the Auswärtiges Amt commanded by Hitler in relation to all questions relevant to Russia is also in line with this. When Father wanted to hand the buildings of the Soviet Embassy in Berlin over to a protective power, Hitler refused and disposed of them to Rosenberg’s Ostministerium (Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories).
There are, nevertheless, serious doubts about the ‘Lebensraum’ thesis. Firstly, as to Hitler’s book itself, it may not contradict the ‘Lebensraum’ thesis that he himself told my father that it had been a bad mistake to write the foreign policy chapters of the book himself.333 It does, however, address the point of time at which Hitler wrote it, as well as its contents, against the postulation that in 1941 he wished to realize the principles of foreign policy he had externalized in 1925. Hitler wrote Mein Kampf when he was a prisoner in the Festung Landsberg fort after his failed attempted coup of 1923. His party had been prohibited and his political prospects were uncertain. There is no doubt the book was meant to prepare his return to the political scene, or he would not have writen it. The man was 35 years old at the time. He could not really count on the chance to influence German policies in the foreseeable future, so he would not therefore have given much consideration to what he wrote. He wanted above all to have himself stand out and acquire supporters from amongst the national-minded Germans.
Quite irrespective of this, it is always overlooked – or not taken into consideration – that for his ‘Eastern or Land policy’ Hitler claimed a perfectly clear precondition, namely an alliance with England. But in 1941 this particular precondition did not exist, indeed to the contrary. England was at war with the Reich, and was also – after the defeat in France – not prepared to initiate peace talks. England was as implacable as ever toward Germany and was enjoying massive support from the USA. She moreover endeavoured to achieve a rapprochement with the Soviet Union.
It is furthermore not considered that at the time when Hitler was committing his concept of a possible ‘Ostpolitik’ to paper in the Festung Landsberg, the Soviet Union did not constitute a power factor. Weakened by the revolution and the previous war, internally ripped by civil war and the recent defeat by Poland, the Soviet Union did not yet represent the power that was later to turn into a massive threat to Europe. In 1941, however, this position had been reached. The Soviet Union was a highly armed state, strictly organized, with an expressly aggressive political ideology, led by a man – one may think what one wishes about him morally – who held the vast country firmly in hand and had made it clear by his earlier actions that he was at any time prepared to exert influence on world policy.
Although in 1940 Hitler had after all managed to achieve a halfway consolidated position for the Reich through the successful outcome of the campaign in the West, it cannot nevertheless be overlooked that it was emerging increasingly that the United States would become the Reich’s real opponents. Churchill was basically naught but Roosevelt’s agent, actually waging the war on his behalf, since, due to broad swathes of American public opinion that were against participation in the European war, Roosevelt had at least to seem reluctant. That to a certain extent the German war budget was undoubtedly dependent on Soviet supplies was furthermore a point of weakness for the Germans. Taking all these factors into account, Hitler was in no way in a situation – without having secured his rear – to launch an attack against, in the truest sense of the word, a giant country in order to gain ‘Lebensraum’.
There must consequently have been other reasons for his fateful decision. Hitler’s arguments were frequently ambivalent, geared to address his interlocutor so as to make an impression, in order to motivate or to obtain something. He stated after the campaign in the West that he was ‘saturated’ and that it would require time – centuries – for the acquisition of land in the East to be digested.
The theory of a deliberately planned acquisition of ‘Lebensraum’334 moreover does not fit in with the partial demobilization of the German army after the Western campaign. I remember how, at lunch in the summer of 1940, Father, beaming, said: ‘The Führer has already ordered the suspension of armament production in many sectors.’ The reason this little scene is so memorable for me is that I realized, rather disappointed, that for me there would be no opportunity to gain the Iron Cross First Class. A 19-year-old youth does tend to have his own ‘war goals’, irrespective of the fact that I did not want to be unworthy compared with the foregoing three generations of my family, who wore or had worn that medal.
Father’s statement was exactly aligned with instructions that went out to the army after the Western campaign. Fromm, the commander of the reserve army, signed the relevant directives on 20 June 1940, wherein it is succinctly stated that: ‘The reserve army will be disbanded at the earliest moment.’ On 25 June 1940, on the order from Hitler from 7 June, Keitel commanded the beginning of demobilization to the extent permitted by warfare and ‘the securing of occupied territories’. This order says as to materiel equipment: ‘Capacities, means of production, raw material and workforces instituted heretofore for fitting out of the Wehrmacht and no longer required in future, are, by the Defence Industry and Armaments Office, with the accord of the supreme authorities of the Reich in charge, to be reinstated in their peacetime destinations.’335
In July and August 1940, seventeen infantry divisions were disbanded and a further eighteen sent on leave.336 The reduction of the strength of the army to 120 divisions was ordered, with a reinforcement of the tank divisions. However, monthly tank production was determined to an output of only 213, which meant that the ‘rebuilding’ of the army – to the augmented numbers of the tank division – was attained only in 1944. In accordance, ‘medium-term planning’ signified no land warfare in view.337 This partial demobilization of the German army following the Western campaign is unequivocal proof that at that time Hitler was not considering a war against the Soviet Union, and thus also had no intention of gaining ‘Lebensraum’.