Convincing evidence of Hitler’s stance at this time is provided by an examination of the Situation Conferences of the Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy to Hitler, which have been preserved in their entirety and are available in book form with commentary. The study of these protocols, in the context of the demobilization measures undertaken, gives a clearly recognizable profile of Hitler’s plans for engaging in further warfare. After the Minutes of the Situation Conferences dated 21 May 1940 – that is during the Western campaign – to Raeder’s question, Hitler declares himself for long-term planning of U-boat warfare. He elaborates: ‘following the conclusion of the main operations in France, to shift the focus of emphasis [of armament] to the U-boat and Ju-88 Programme.’338
On 4 June, Raeder notes:
‘Führer shows his objective: after defeat of France, reduction of the army, dismissal of all the older skilled workers. Focus of emphasis on air force and navy.’339
It is noteworthy in this context that the existing armaments capacities were not to be extended. These insuperable facts, and the documents, are proof that the claim that Hitler had a stage-by-stage plan to conquer Russia for ‘Lebensraum’ is unsustainable.340 Hitler had no plan at all, unless the objective of gaining a position as unassailable as possible for the Reich in Central Europe may be designates a ‘plan’. It is precisely in regard to this objective, which – it must be said again – he wanted to attain by peaceful means, that he would have had to prepare a clear plan and coordination of the Reich’s material capacity. This he neglected to do.
On 6 September 1940, a discussion between Hitler, Raeder and Jodl took place. It is minuted in detail and is substantiated by a memo from the Maritime Warfare Command on ‘warfare against England in case of cancellation of Operation Seelöwe’. The decisive passage of this protocol, composed and signed by Raeder, is given here (in English by the translator) word for word by reason of its significance:
‘Considerations of the Maritime Warfare Command about further possibilities of warfare against England next to or in place of Operation Seelöwe:
‘Decisive strategic significance for the German-Italian warfare in the Mediterranean region: GIBRALTAR – SUEZ CANAL.
‘Elimination of England from the Mediterranean – determining significant domination in the Mediterranean area for emplacement of Central Powers in South-Eastern Europe, Asia Minor, Arabia, Egypt and in the African area. Securing of unlimited raw materials sources – disposition of fresh strategically more favourable base of operations for further action against the British Empire – decisive difficulties for British supplies traffic from the South Atlantic through neutralization of Gibraltar.
‘Preparations for these actions, that do not have the character of an “intermediary action” but of a MAIN ACTION AGAINST ENGLAND must ensue immediately so as to be implemented BEFORE AN INTERVENTION by the U.S.A. Führer gives the order.’341
The Maritime Warfare Command’s memorandum, which convincingly presents the significance of domination in the Mediterranean for the ‘Central Powers’ – as attested to by a handwritten note on the document – was read aloud by Raeder.
In the protocol of the 6 September Situation Conference, ‘The S Problem’ is mentioned for the first time (S = Soviet Union). However, the decisive passage is, as minuted by Raeder, that Hitler orders preparations for the taking of Gibraltar as a main action. It must be judged improbable that Hitler should have wished to conduct both actions – Gibraltar/Mediterranean and Soviet Union – simultaneously, added to which it followed that the reduction of the army by thirty-five divisions, as it is expressly stated that he agreed, meant that Seelöwe and the ‘S Problem’ could not be tackled at the same time. Preparations for war with the Soviet Union on the part of the General Staff did not, above all by consideration of the army’s partial demobilization, signify that at this point in time Hitler had made the decision to attack the Soviet Union.342 In the Situation Report of 14 September 1940, from a discussion between Hitler and Raeder about air raids on London that are not thought of as terror measures, Raeder says:
‘Air raids on London are to be continued, with extension once more of the assault areas with targets significant for the war and of vital importance for the capital. Terror attacks are expressly held in abeyance as a last resort.’343
This last resort of pressure was to be utilized only as retaliation for English attacks of that sort, as was noted by Raeder. On 4 November 1940,344 a discussion took place between the chief of the ‘Maritime Warfare Command’ (Operations department), Rear Admiral Fricke, and the chief of the Wehrmacht’s High Command, General Alfred Jodl. In the minutes of the discussion, under Point 4 it is stated, word for word:
‘GIBRALTAR: Führer is decided to proceed to possession of Gibraltar as soon as possible. Franco appears to be ready soon to enter the war on the side of Germany – the army (Gen. Staff) has already made preparations for the expedition of the troop units required. Führer has ordered: Immediate initiation of expedition of a reconnaissance troop of a force of some 50 officers to Spain. Immediate deployment of troops for the Gibraltar-operation at the French-Spanish border. Spain will be summoned to provide a road for German troop movements.’345
This is followed by further detailed stipulations for the advance on Gibraltar and the consequences arising from it. It is further to be noted that in the protocol of the discussion, Jodl’s allusion is retained to the fact that on Hitler’s instruction the preparations for an Ostfall as well as for a ‘Spring Seelöwe Operation’ were to proceed. This proves the fact that the Ostfall, meaning the Russian war, presented only one of several possibilities of how the war was to be further conducted, and therewith given no priority.
If from Raeder’s Situation Conferences it is taken into account to what extent the preparations for Seelöwe availed themselves of the capacity in materiel and personnel of the German war economy, it will readily be recognized that in the preparations for the invasion it was not a case of mere camouflage. Hitler wanted to keep all possibilities open in the fight against the British Empire. Moreover, on 3 December 1940346 after a Situation Conference to Hitler, in the protocol Raeder notes verbatim:
‘Further steps against England must have the objective of relieving Italy and the cleaning out of the Mediterranean:
a)Removal of Gibraltar, which would mean a great loss of prestige for England; at the same time, taking control of the Western Mediterranean; then, if still necessary, an advance in the Eastern Mediterranean. Führer agrees.’
It is also to be noted that at the conference between Jodl and Admiral Fricke on 4 November, the need for an offensive on the part of Germany with Italy against Greece was spoken of. In the minutes of the session it is explicitly stated:
‘Neutrality of Russia expected. In the coming days, discussions with Molotov on the questions arising from this.’
The notes unequivocally show the primacy for Hitler of waging war against England. Another order from the Führer on 20 December 1940 demands that henceforth all personnel measures are to be subordinated to the navy and air force as a precondition for the war against England, disregarding the army’s requirements. Hitler was still following the plan to take Gibraltar, although talks with Franco in Hendaye had not been satisfactory. It was only on 27 December that Hitler allowed it to be seen that at the time he no longer believed in Spain entering the war on Germany’s side. After the decisive deterioration of the Italian position in the Mediterranean had been ascertained – Hitler speaks of a ‘total deficiency of leadership’ in Italy – renewed mention is made of the significance of Gibraltar in the war effort against England:
‘CONCLUSION THEREFROM: possession of Gibraltar of great importance for Germany’s further warfare. MILITARY DEMAND FOR A SWIFT IMPLEMENTATION OF “FELIX” [code name for the Gibraltar undertaking] IS MAINTAINED. Answer from the Führer: exactly the same view regarding significance of occupation of Gibraltar. At present however Franco not ready as he cannot make the decision and still allows himself to be held up by England’s promises of supplies … Führer tries once more via Foreign Minister to gain influence on Franco through Spanish ambassador.’347
Hitler did not insist on a Russian campaign but on political cooperation with the USSR, as Stefan Scheil stresses, quoting him:
‘If England wants to continue the war, it will be attempted to rope in everything politically against England: Spain, Italy, Russia.’348
The establishment of the ‘Continental block’ suggested by Father was the leitmotif of German policy in the second half of 1940. I could now again more closely follow the efforts made, having been ordered to the War Academy in Braunschweig. Our training time in Braunschweig extended from May 1940 to March 1941. I was enabled through this to visit my parents in Berlin on various occasions—it took only two hours by express train. We were given leave over Christmas and the New Year. I was thus able to keep abreast of political developments. I remember Mother’s descriptions of the relations with Spain very well. Hitler’s meeting with Franco at Hendaye on the French-Spanish border had not gone well from the German angle. In his memoirs, Father describes how Hitler sprang up excitedly during the discussion with Franco and Serrano Súñer – the Spanish Interior Minister and Franco’s brother-in-law, later to be Foreign Minister – when Serrano Súñer ‘cut in to Hitler’s conversation with Franco somewhat awkwardly’.
During my visits to Berlin Mother recounted that the Spanish position being confronted was a riddle. The preliminary talks with Serrano Súñer had been very promising and the trip to Hendaye had actually been undertaken in order to conclude a pact with Franco, which was to set the seal on the ‘Axis’. The pact had, however, not subsequently been concluded, due to Franco’s demands. He had required supplies to an extent and under specifications that could not be provided from the German side. What or who had brought about this change of mind in Franco? Father would never learn the answer to the riddle of why Franco changed his mind in 1940; he was executed before the reason was revealed in 1948 (see below).
On 16 April 1940, even before the Western campaign, Serrano Súñer had officially declared to the German ambassador in Madrid that Franco and he placed their entire confidence in a German victory, as a guarantee for an ‘in itself already self-evident alliance’ with Germany. Therein the hope of driving the British out of Gibraltar played a particular role. The acquisition of Tangier was also hoped for.349 On 12 June 1940, Spain abandoned the order given by Franco on 5 September 1939 for ‘maintenance of the strictest neutrality’ and declared herself as ‘not engaging in warfare’. On 14 June Tangier was occupied by Spanish troops under the slogans ‘Long live Spanish Tangier’ and ‘Gibraltar for Spain’. In December 1940 Franco suddenly made the final decision not to enter the war on the side of the Axis, after having declared in July 1940 in a public speech that:
‘Two million soldiers are ready to create a nation, to weld an empire together: the dominance over Gibraltar and the extension in Africa remain Spain’s duty and mission!’350
Plans of this sort were naturally to be pursued and realized only by being on the side of the Axis powers.
There was in Berlin in the five years preceding the war an English correspondent by the name of Ian Colvin, of the London paper the News Chronicle. I have already said that Britons working abroad or who have foreign connections were in those days frequently employed by the Secret Service, if not actually full-time, albeit of course secretly. This was the case in Colvin’s instance. He was probably relatively high-ranking, for he was heard by Churchill personally when the latter was already prime minister. Churchill mentions him in his memoirs as ‘deeply in German affairs and making contacts of a secret nature with the German Generals’.
After the war Colvin wrote up biographical material on Admiral Canaris. He entitled one book Master Spy and in it presents Canaris as the English master spy. The sub-title is ‘The incredible Story of Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, who, while Hitler’s Chief of Intelligence, was a secret ally of the British.’ Colvin gives a detailed account of the Admiral’s activities and those of his deputy, Oster, to the extent of ongoing transmission of military secrets to the enemy during the war. What is of interest here is the role Canaris played in German-Spanish relations and to what extent he influenced the Spanish policy against the Reich. Colvin recounts that an item of news from Canaris reached Serrano Súñer in Rome, brought by Josef Müller (code name ‘Ochsensepp’).351 It said:
‘The Admiral [Canaris] asks you to tell Franco to hold Spain out of this game at all costs. It may seem to you now that our position is the stronger. It is in reality desperate, and we have little hope of winning this war. Franco may be assured that Hitler will not use the force of arms to enter Spain.’352
In his memoirs, Serrano Súñer did not describe in detail Spain’s initial declaration of readiness to enter the war on the side of the Axis powers and its subsequent retraction. He did, however, make Canaris responsible for the ‘confusion’ that in those days reigned in Berlin in regard to all questions relating to Spain, and calls him a ‘singular and disquieting personality’. He describes the role played by Canaris as follows:
‘Admiral Canaris, Chief of the German Secret Intelligence Service, played a very peculiar role in these affairs. He frequently travelled to Spain and conducted significant and highly secret discussion with us of which the Foreign Ministry had no inkling.’353
According to Colvin, in the negotiations with the Germans, Serrano Súñer will have demanded ten 38-cm guns, which he knew from information could not be supplied by Germany. Jodl will have told Franco in Madrid about the German plan for acquisition of Gibraltar on 11 December, wherein it was stipulated, as wished by Spain, that Spanish forces would take part in the operation. It was then, however, proposed to Hitler to entrust Canaris with the task, due to his good connections with Spain.354 In his memoirs, Serrano Súñer ponders the possible consequences of an entry of Spain into the war at that moment:
‘It is more than probable that such a decision by Spain at that moment signified the end of the war. At that time the United States were unable to act. Roosevelt himself, who was much more realistic than many people there thought, would then have altogether altered his foreign policy, because it was not in vain that isolationism ruled the sentiments of the overwhelming majority of the American people.’355
Churchill was best able to know and judge what Spain’s neutrality signified for Britain and the Axis powers, writing in his memoirs:
‘Spain held the key to all British enterprises in the Mediterranean, and never in the darkest hours did she turn the lock against us.’356
It is tempting at first sight to rate Colvin’s account as a journalist’s spy thriller, had he not been legitimized by Churchill himself as an important agent of the British Secret Service. Confirmation, however, of the activities of the British ‘master spy’ – as Colvin calls him – Canaris comes from a much more competent source. In the so-called ‘Wilhelmstrasse Trial’ at Nuremberg, in which Weizsäcker too was accused in the course of the latter’s questioning, he admitted the following (excerpt from the official court records):
Military tribunal No. IV, Case XI
Nuremberg, Germany, 9 June 1948
1:30 – 4:45 pm Session
Page 7989 of the German protocol
The accused, Weizsäcker, is in the witness stand:
Q:How were you placed toward the plan of attack against Gibraltar tabled at this time?
A:In any case in such a way that a reconciliation with France could not be envisaged at the same time as an attack on Gibraltar. This Gibraltar plan was after all meant now to embroil Spain too in the maelstrom. One could think either of winning over Spain as partner in war or to make a decent peace with France; the two could however not go together.
Q:For this reason you therefore did not adhere to the plan?
A:That was the reason why I did not adhere, but not the only one.
Q:You had other reasons?
A:I had in fact nothing but reasons against it: military, financial and moral too. Militarily we would not have the superior strength to defend the extended coast of Spain even in the least effectively. We would have had just the same fate as Napoleon’s in his Spanish campaign. Financially, we were totally incapable of making sure of Spain’s even merely modest claims, which we knew, for ensuring the country’s sustenance. And Spain would have served no purpose for us but as ballast, not to speak of the moral responsibility for a country just emerging from civil war.
Q:Did the Spanish government itself then want the war?
A:I was unable myself to ascertain the will of the Spanish government to enter the war at that time, albeit I too had the opportunity to speak to the Spanish Foreign Minister once. However, so as to make sure, I resorted at that time again to an extravagant method of action with Canaris. For, in order to incite the Spaniards to war, Hitler sent Admiral Canaris to Spain, as it was known that he had good connections there. And Canaris and I agreed that he would instead tell the Spaniards the plain truth and make the certain disaster clear to them to which they would come, inevitably and inexorably.
Q:Is it your view that Canaris’ advice contributed to keeping Spain out of the war?
A:That I do not know. But I have heard that ‘Yes!’ What is more, I will say ‘the advice he gave was certainly right’.
Certification
I, Attorney Alfred Seidl, certify the accordance of the excerpt above from the Minutes of the session of the military tribunal No. IV, Case XI, on 9 June 1948, signed, Dr. Alfred Seidl.357
Weizsäcker’s statements during the ‘Wihelmstrasse Trial’ confirm those of the Secret Service agent Colvin. Colvin’s book came out only in 1951; when giving his testimony in Nuremberg, Weizsäcker therefore did not know it.
It emerges with the greatest clarity from the available papers and documents that the anti-Russian component was ever more strongly forthcoming in Hitler’s considerations as the hope faded of being able to induce Britain to conclude a peace. One of the preconditions for it would have been the blocking of the Straits of Gibraltar, which, again, without the cooperation of Spain, or at least her positive tolerance, was not feasible. However, no responsible statesman will tie the fate of his country to an ally whose highest executives and officers conspired behind his back to counter the policies of their government. As things stood, therefore, Franco acted absolutely sensibly when he finally withdrew from the German courtship for him to join in the war on the side of the Axis powers.
What role was played by Spain in Hitler’s considerations regarding the continuation of the war also emerges from a diary entry by Hewel, the liaison between Hitler and his Foreign Minister. Under the date of 14 February 1941, Hewel notes: ‘Telegram from Rome regarding Mussolini-Franco meeting. Negative, as expected.’
The discussion between Mussolini and Franco was yet another attempt to sound out Franco’s intentions so as to ascertain whether there was still a chance of bringing him over to join the Axis. That would have still enabled undertaking Operation Felix, the acquisition of Gibraltar. Under the dates of 29 and 30 May, Hewel makes another note regarding Spain: ‘“F” [Führer]: “… Gibraltar is not on today any more.”’ Although by this time it was too late, Hitler continued to preoccupy himself with the option of taking Gibraltar. His verbal outbreaks against Spain recorded by Hewel clearly give the impression that as far as he was concerned he gave the ‘Mediterranean option’ priority over a strike against the Soviet Union.358
Raeder had repeatedly presented the potential that the acquisition of Gibraltar meant for the German war effort in the diverse Situation Conferences to Hitler, and had obtained Hitler’s complete agreement. The possibility of blocking the Straits of Gibraltar would have solved the question of supplies for a subsequent operation against the Suez Canal. A landing operation against the Spanish coasts, as Weizsäcker exaggerated in his interrogation in Nuremberg, would have had no chance against an intact German force that was not tied up in Russia and had the support of Spanish armed forces. Weizsäcker’s statement to the contrary shows a thin justification of his ‘extravagant’ actions – as he called them – behind the back of his government.
The domination of the Mediterranean by the Axis would have become a grave threat to the British Empire and might have incited the British to give in, since Hitler would have been broadly accommodating to them. The position of the Axis powers would have in any case been considerably reinforced, not least from the angle of operational potential that had arisen from the matter of the Near-Eastern oil wells. It thus came only to a weak movement of uprising in Iraq that could not be sufficiently supported by the Axis and petered out.
If on the threshold of 1941 the question arose once more for Hitler as to how to pursue the war, then the altered situation in Spain signified the decisive turning-point in his plans. Father always wracked his brains as to the reasons that could have caused Spain’s joining the Axis to fall through. He could not conceive that the conspiracy around his own State Secretary, that together with Canaris had spawned the fateful outcome, was what finally drove Hitler to the decision to attack the Soviet Union. Delegate Dr Paul Schmidt (A.A. Press and Information Dpt) remembers a little scene in Hitler’s special train following the failed talks with Franco in Hendaye. Hitler had abruptly demanded ‘maps of Russia’ from Keitel and Jodl, and had intensive consultation with them in the train.
A word more as to the significance of historic sources. Next to memoirs and factual reports, contemporary sources of written material, that will have in any case been accessible to all the participants, are of the greatest importance. Next to the Minutes of the Situation Conferences that both Navy Commandersin-Chief, Raeder and later Dönitz, presented to Hitler, it is Walter Hewel’s diary for 1941, already quoted from, to which we have access. The diary is therefore of the utmost value, as it was kept only occasionally and with entries of verbatim references, meaning that they were clearly quite spontaneously handwritten and have no apparent recognizable bias.
The Minutes of the Situation Conferences were filed among the official documents of the Maritime Warfare Command. They were thus at any moment also at the disposal of Hitler and others taking part in the meetings. This restricted any possible ‘bias’ of the Minutes. Naturally, they were composed from the point of view of the Navy, but it is the personal misgivings of Raeder about Hitler – already mentioned – that render the statements very valuable, above all in places where Raeder – as in the case of Gibraltar – repeatedly notes Hitler’s agreement.
Both sources repeatedly point out how Hitler’s train of thought turns only on the war with Britain. Whether he is referring to the ‘Felix’ undertaking, i.e. Gibraltar, or ‘S’ (‘Barbarossa’) from the turn of the year 1940/41, his considerations are ever running on how to get England prepared to make peace.
How little the decision on war with the Soviet Union was determined from the ‘Lebensraum’ perspective is once more evidenced by a Note of Raeder’s about a report to Hitler of 26 September 1940 that took place tête à tête.359 To begin with, Raeder asks Hitler if he may ‘tell him his own perception of the conduct of the warfare – also going beyond his own competency’. After he described the Mediterranean ‘as centre of the [British] general position’, mentioning the strong positions of the English in the Eastern Mediterranean, he requests that the ‘Mediterranean issue be cleared up by mid-winter’. According to Raeder, this means that:
‘“GIBRALTAR” must be taken … SUEZ CANAL must be taken; doubtful that the Italians on their own alone will manage it; therefore support by German troops necessary. From Suez, an advance through Palestine, Syria as far as Turkey necessary. If we get that far, Turkey is in our power. The Russia problem then takes on another aspect. Russia is basically afraid of Germany. Query, whether then an advance on R. from the north will still be necessary. Dardanelles question.’
There follows more from Raeder on the Italian position in East Africa, strong emphasis on the significance of North-West Africa for the German and Italian conduct of the war, and a warning about a United States-supported advance of England against Dakar, with de Gaulle’s backing. Raeder then tells of Hitler’s attitude to these statements:
‘Führer basically agrees with train of thought. Following conclusion of the alliance with Japan he will immediately undertake consultation with the Duce and poss. also with Franco …
‘England-U.S.A. have to be thrown out of North-West Africa. If Spain came along, Canaries, poss. also Azores and Cape Verde first to be secured by Luftwaffe.
‘An action through Syria would also depend on stance of France, but should be quite feasible. Italy was OPPOSED to the surrender of the Dardanelles to Russia. He would however try to incite the Russians to advance energetically against the south – Persia, India – to reach an outlet to the ocean from there, that is more important to Russia than the positions in the Baltic Sea.
‘The Führer too is of the opinion that Russia greatly fears the German power; he believes that Russia, e.g. Finland, would not attack this year.’
Raeder’s remarks are more unequivocal proof of two observations:
•All Hitler’s strategic considerations come from the standpoint of forcing England to make peace and/or to bring the Reich to so strong a position that the British Government would realize that a conclusion of peace with the Reich under acceptable conditions was preferable to continuing the war.
•The relations to the Soviet Union are seen exclusively under politico-strategic criteria, and once more above all from the point of view of the British ‘mainland rapier’, that is of the Continental power that could be allied with the British against Germany.
The extent of Hitler’s accord with Raeder’s concepts in their discussions is interesting. All statements and, above all, all orders given by Hitler until the end of December 1940 unequivocally demonstrate the priority of warfare against England and his preparedness – according to Raeder – to transfer the focus of operations to the Mediterranean. The reduction of the army, the withdrawal of which was effected in October, is plausible if it is taken into account that both Hitler and Raeder, as well as the army high command, had previously hesitated whether Seelöwe should actually be set in motion. Possibly decisive for this was that aerial domination was still not yet achieved, at least not in the planned invasion areas, and the undoubted inferiority of the German Kriegsmarine to the Royal Navy. The remobilization of the army was imperative for realization of the ambitious plans for North Africa and the Near East, as discussed by Hitler and Raeder on 26 September, which would have to include operations in North-West Africa, to say nothing of an operational reserve in order eventually to enable prevention of a landing of English-American forces on the French-Spanish-Portuguese coast.
Hitler was of the opinion that all three options were open to him: Seelöwe, Felix (Gibraltar) and Barbarossa. He was reluctant about Seelöwe because of the lack of air superiority, and the Felix option had been taken from him by the German conspiracy – which he did not yet know. He consequently charged Franco with wrongful submission to England. Thus his cogitations concentrated ever more on a pre-emptive strike against the Soviet Union.
There is no doubt at all that the actions of the conspirators Weizsäcker and Canaris against Hitler’s plans to concentrate completely on warfare against England in the Mediterranean and North Africa do not justify Hitler’s ‘risky game’; the war on Russia, as will be seen, cannot be characterized differently. Canaris and Weizsäcker will, however, be reproached by history for having forced Hitler’s hand through their ‘extravagant’ (as Weizsäcker called them) interference with the Spanish leadership in such a direction and in consequence having their share of responsibility for the ensuing disaster. Keitel confirms this in his estate of written material. He could not have known of Weizsäcker’s testimony, for by that time he had already been executed.360