IN MARCH 2020, most Americans were told by their state governments that it was necessary to “shelter in place,” which is really another term for “house arrest.” Selective closure of businesses followed. Local and state governments established varying criteria for which businesses could remain open and which would close. Businesses labeled as “essential” included supermarkets and grocery stores, big box stores, drug stores, convenience and discount stores, healthcare facilities, daycare centers, hardware stores, gas stations, auto repair shops, banks, post offices, shipping offices and companies, vet clinics, pet stores, educational institutions to facilitate distance learning, transportation, and businesses that could justify staying open because they were required to facilitate other essential businesses – computer and office supply stores for example. Restaurants could continue to operate if they only offered food for take-out and delivery.
Everything else was closed – theaters, gyms, salons, museums, sporting events, concert venues, and so on. The determination of which businesses were considered “essential” versus “non-essential” was fairly capricious since many of the “essential” businesses like big box stores sold the same products as those deemed “non-essential.” In “COVIDLAND” it was ok to purchase shoes at Walmart, but not at a smaller independent shoe store. It was ok to purchase decorative items at Target but not at a boutique. It was ok to purchase clothing at Meijer but not at a smaller shop. Tobacco stores, cannabis dispensaries, and pawn shops were essential, yet many businesses that families had spent 25 or more years building were not.
The reason for the lockdown was to slow or stop the spread of COVID-19 and preserve hospital capacity, since it was predicted that millions of Americans would contract COVID, millions would require hospitalization and two million people would die. Americans were told preserving hospital capacity was the goal. While many people were against the lockdowns (we were, and for the record our families had income from businesses deemed “essential”), most were willing to give the government the benefit of the doubt for two weeks.
The problem was that the lockdowns did not end in two weeks, and instead continued for months. At the time this book was being finished (August 2020), few places in the U.S. were completely “open,” and some states were going backwards and locking down again. Most states had re-opened some businesses with limitations, but entire industries, like theatre and the arts and sports events had not returned. Many businesses could only operate with severe restrictions such as the number of people allowed inside at one time, or in the case of restaurants, using only 25%-40% of seating capacity.
In addition to house arrest and business closures, social distancing, masks, incessant hand washing, and other practices were mandated too. Was there evidence to support these measures?
The Origin of Lockdowns: A High School Project
The only thing more shocking than placing hundreds of millions of people on house arrest is the fact that the origin of the idea was a class project completed by a 14-year-old in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Laura Glass created a computer simulation of a bird flu pandemic in a virtual town of 10,000 people as part of an Intel International Science and Engineering Fair. She computed how family members, co-workers, students, and people in social situations interact, and determined that the average teenager was in close contact with about 140 people daily, which was the most of any group. She reported that high school students had the greatest potential to spread disease. She hypothesized that adults bring diseases into communities, and infect children, after which a disease spreads through schools.
In one of Laura’s simulations about half of the population of 10,000 becomes infected but by closing the schools the number was reduced to 500.1
A foundational paper was written by Laura, her father and two others called “Targeted Social Distancing Designs for Pandemic Influenza (2006).”2 The paper concluded, “Implementation of social distancing strategies is challenging. They likely must be imposed for the duration of the local epidemic and possibly until a strain-specific vaccine is developed and distributed. If compliance with the strategy is high over this period, an epidemic within a community can be averted. However, if neighboring communities do not also use these interventions, infected neighbors will continue to introduce influenza and prolong the local epidemic, albeit at a depressed level more easily accommodated by healthcare systems.”
Robert J. Glass, Laura’s father, had no medical training, and no expertise in immunology or epidemiology. And Laura was a high school student. So how in the world did their hypothesis become the basis for a series of decisions that brought the economy to a halt, resulted in the highest unemployment rates in the history of the U.S., disrupted education for tens of millions of children, and as yet uncalculated harm to millions of people and even death for some?
This is a long story that goes back to 2006 when President George W. Bush asked experts to submit potential plans for addressing a flu epidemic, should one occur. The avian flu had circulated in 2006 and was not declared a pandemic. Although it had caused government agencies to become concerned about planning for a pandemic should one occur. Two government doctors, Dr. Richard Hatchett and Dr. Carter Mecher were aware of this paper and proposed what we refer to today as “shelter at home” and lockdown as potential strategies.
At the time, the idea was not considered to be practical. Dr. D.A. Henderson, who had led the international effort to eradicate smallpox, thought it was a terrible idea. In a paper he authored with an infectious disease expert, an epidemiologist, and another physician, he wrote that a lockdown would “result in significant disruption of the social functioning of communities and result in possibly serious economic problems.”3
The text of the article is worth reading (emphasis ours):
There are no historical observations or scientific studies that support the confinement by quarantine of groups of possibly infected people for extended periods in order to slow the spread of influenza. … It is difficult to identify circumstances in the past half-century when large-scale quarantine has been effectively used in the control of any disease. The negative consequences of large-scale quarantine are so extreme (forced confinement of sick people with the well; complete restriction of movement of large populations; difficulty in getting critical supplies, medicines, and food to people inside the quarantine zone) that this mitigation measure should be eliminated from serious consideration…
Home quarantine also raises ethical questions. Implementation of home quarantine could result in healthy uninfected people being placed at risk of infection from sick household members. Practices to reduce the chance of transmission (hand-washing, maintaining a distance of 3 feet from infected people) could be recommended, but a policy imposing home quarantine would preclude, for example, sending healthy children to stay with relatives when a family member becomes ill. Such a policy would also be particularly hard on and dangerous to people living in close quarters, where the risk of infection would be heightened….
Travel restrictions, such as closing airports and screening travelers at borders have historically been ineffective. The World Health Organization Writing Group concluded that “screening and quarantining entering travelers at international borders did not substantially delay virus introduction in past pandemics . . . and will likely be even less effective in the modern era.”… It is reasonable to assume that the economic costs of shutting down air or train travel would be very high, and the societal costs involved in interrupting all air or train travel would be extreme…
During seasonal influenza epidemics, public events with an expected large attendance have sometimes been cancelled or postponed, the rationale being to decrease the number of contacts with those who might be contagious. There are, however, no certain indications that these actions have had any definitive effect on the severity or duration of an epidemic. Were consideration to be given to doing this on a more extensive scale and for an extended period, questions immediately arise as to how many such events would be affected. There are many social gatherings that involve close contacts among people, and this prohibition might include church services, athletic events, perhaps all meetings of more than 100 people. It might mean closing theaters, restaurants, malls, large stores, and bars. Implementing such measures would have seriously disruptive consequences…
Schools are often closed for 1–2 weeks early in the development of seasonal community outbreaks of influenza primarily because of high absentee rates, especially in elementary schools, and because of illness among teachers. This would seem reasonable on practical grounds. However, to close schools for longer periods is not only impracticable but carries the possibility of a serious adverse outcome….
Thus, cancelling or postponing large meetings would not be likely to have any significant effect on the development of the epidemic. While local concerns may result in the closure of particular events for logical reasons, a policy directing communitywide closure of public events seems inadvisable.
Quarantine. As experience shows, there is no basis for recommending quarantine either of groups or individuals. The problems in implementing such measures are formidable, and secondary effects of absenteeism and community disruption as well as possible adverse consequences, such as loss of public trust in government and stigmatization of quarantined people and groups, are likely to be considerable….
The conclusion: Experience has shown that communities faced with epidemics or other adverse events respond best and with the least anxiety when the normal social functioning of the community is least disrupted. Strong political and public health leadership to provide reassurance and to ensure that needed medical care services are provided are critical elements. If either is seen to be less than optimal, a manageable epidemic could move toward catastrophe.
In other words, two doctors, an epidemiologist, and an infectious disease expert warned that a lockdown was not only inadvisable but would have a catastrophic effect on the population.
A 2007 report from the Centers of Disease Control highlighted serious consequences if a lockdown was implemented. The report included the results of a survey conducted by Harvard University to determine the willingness of adults to agree to community mitigation in the event of a pandemic, and the expected consequences. Almost 75% reported that they would be willing to “curtail various activities” of daily life for a month. Over 94% said they would stay at home and away from other people for 7-10 days if they had the flu. They were not asked about longer periods of confinement.
When asked about financial difficulties associated with missed work, 74% reported that they could miss 7-10 days of work without financial problems, but 25% said even this amount of time would cause a problem. Most, or 57%, reported that they would experience severe financial hardship if they missed work for one month, and 76% thought that three months away from work would be financially disastrous.
The CDC report noted other consequences to be considered, including that millions of children who relied on school meals might not have adequate food. The report advised that planning and implementation of pandemic mitigation would require participation from all segments of society.4
Fauci, state health directors, and governors repeated over and over again the importance of “following the science,” and “listening to the experts.” It became apparent early on that no one was listening to any credible experts and there was no scientific basis for any of the decisions that were made.
ENDNOTES
1. Virtual city used to study flu pandemic. UPI May 9 2006 https://medicalxpress.com/news/2006-05-virtual-city-flu-pandemic.html
2. Glass RJ, Glass LM, Beyeler WE, Min HJ. “Targeted Social Distancing Designs for Pandemic Influenza.” Emerg Infect Dis 2006 Nov;12(11):1671-1681
3. Inglesby T, Nuzzo JB, O’Toole T, Henderson DA. “Disease Mitigation Measures in the Control of Pandemic Influenza.” Biosecur Bioterror 2006 Nov;4(4):366-375
4. Interim Pre-pandemic Planning Guidance: Community Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Mitigation in the United States – Early, Targeted, Layered Use of Nonpharmaceutical Interventions. Canters for Disease Control and Prevention. https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/pdf/community_mitigation-sm.pdf