On 9 April 1940, German troops began landing in Norway. In the Trondheimfjord, the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper shelled the coastal defences, and by the end of the day Trondheim was in German hands. The same was true of Narvik, Bergen, Stavanger and Oslo. Although the fighting would continue until early June, the outcome was never really in doubt. Norway fell and became an occupied country. However, the cost had been high. The Kriegsmarine had played its part in the operation, but of the 22 destroyers, cruisers and battlecruisers involved, three cruisers and ten destroyers had been lost, and two battlecruisers damaged. Grand Admiral Raeder said that having Norway was worth the loss of half of his battle fleet, as it gave his fleet a base outside the confined waters of the North Sea.
The Tirpitz, pictured in Kiel by a British PRU flight in September 1941 as she lies alongside the quay, at the entrance to the naval shipyard’s inner basin. She was based there intermittently during her sea trials and ‘working up’ exercises, where she attracted the attention of RAF bombers.
This would become of crucial importance following the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. For the moment though Norway remained relatively unimportant, as German naval efforts were concentrated on the development of naval bases on the French Atlantic coast and the launching of commerce raids into the North Atlantic. During this phase of the war the Tirpitz was still being fitted out in Wilhelmshaven. After that she was undergoing her sea trials. So, she missed out on Operation Berlin, the first of the Kriegsmarine’s surface operations in the North Atlantic, which took place in early 1941. This successful sortie by the battlecruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau was followed in May 1941 by Operation Rheinübung, an operation involving Tirpitz’s sister ship Bismarck and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen.
On 27 May Bismarck was cornered and sunk by warships of the British Home Fleet. For the crew of Tirpitz, the only consolation was that the armoured citadel of their sister ship was proof against the British shells, although her superstructure and turrets were comprehensively damaged and she became little more than a floating wreck. The German crew had actually begun to scuttle their own ship to prevent her falling into enemy hands, when she was struck by torpedoes launched from a British cruiser. One or more of them hastened the end of the battleship by demolishing her stern. The sinking of her sister ship meant that Tirpitz was now the Kriegsmarine’s only fully fledged battleship.
The bombing raids against her began in the summer of 1940, just after the Fall of France, while she was still being fitted out in Wilhelmshaven. Most of these raids, though, were aimed at the port itself rather than the ship, and she emerged unscathed. In early March 1941 she passed through the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal to Kiel, which would serve as her base while she conducted sea trials. PRU flights monitored her progress, and a small raid using twin-engine Whitley bombers was launched against her, but this was thwarted by bad weather. She also emerged unscathed from a larger raid in June. Any further chance to damage Tirpitz in Kiel evaporated when the battleship finally set off to war.
The invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 changed the whole strategic picture in Europe. The Western Allies were put under intense diplomatic pressure to help the Soviet Union. So, in August, as German tanks drove on Moscow, a small convoy was despatched. The Dervish Convoy consisted of six merchant ships, which assembled in Iceland before heading east to Archangel in northern Russia, which it reached on 31 August. Dervish was the ad hoc forerunner of the Arctic Convoys, a maritime lifeline between Britain and the Soviet Union which was of the utmost strategic importance. A total of 78 Arctic Convoys would make the dangerous journey to northern Russia and back, battling the elements as much as the Germans. By necessity, this convoy route ran close to the Norwegian coast. From August on, therefore, Norway was once more an area of considerable strategic importance.
By the start of January 1942 Tirpitz had completed her crew training, and was ready for active service. On 13 January the ship transited the Kiel Canal and emerged from its western end that evening. Signals claiming she was returning to Wilhelmshaven were merely a ruse. Instead she took on fuel, stores and replacement equipment, and headed north. The British were unaware of this activity until the morning of 17 January, and so they lost track of the German battleship. By then the Tirpitz had arrived at her new berth near Trondheim. It was not until 23 January that she was spotted by a PRU flight. Tirpitz was 16 miles north-west of Trondheim, moored in the Faettenfjord. It was a near-perfect spot. The small finger-shaped fjord was just 300 yards wide where the Tirpitz was moored, with high ground on two sides. Attacking her there was going to be extremely difficult.
Captain Karl Topp (1895–1981) commanded the Tirpitz for two years, from her commissioning in February 1941 until February 1943, when he was promoted, and given an administrative command in Berlin. Known affectionately as ‘Charlie’ by his crew, he was regarded as one of the finest seamen in the Kriegsmarine, and one of its most competent captains.
Prime Minister Winston Churchill considered the bombing of the Tirpitz of major importance, writing that ‘No other target is comparable to it.’ The Fleet Air Arm quickly ruled out the feasibility of an attack using torpedoes, while its dive bombers were too small to carry a decent payload. So it was up to Bomber Command. It was decided to carry out a night attack at the end of the month, when there was sufficient moonlight to see the target. This mission would be codenamed Operation Oiled. On 28 January, 27 heavy bombers set off for RAF Lossiemouth, an air base in the north-east of Scotland. These comprised 16 Stirlings from 15 and 149 Squadrons, and 11 Halifaxes from 10 and 76 Squadrons.
The trip north was eventful – one Stirling was forced down by ‘friendly fire’ from a coastal convoy, and another crashed on landing. Then, on 30 January, 16 bombers took off from Lossiemouth, bound for the Faettenfjord. Of these, seven were Stirlings and nine were Halifaxes. Maintenance or engine problems had accounted for a third of the bomber force before the raid began.
It was a little over 600 miles to the target, and the aircraft would take three-and-a-half hours to reach the fjord. They were expected to reach the target area around 0600hrs on 31 January. If they couldn’t identify the target they had no fuel reserves to linger in the area, hoping for a gap in the clouds.
The bombers carried a mixture of 2,000lb HC and AP ordnance, and 500lb SAP bombs. Each Stirling carried six of the larger bombs, while the Halifaxes were loaded with a mixture of the two. During the flight, all four Halifaxes of 4 Squadron turned back due to lack of fuel. When the remainder reached the Trondheimsfjord they found that low cloud at 1,500ft obscured the target. As the 2,000lb AP bombs had to be released at 8,000ft, it proved impossible to bomb the target with any accuracy. Only one bomber actually dropped its payload, after aiming at the epicentre of flak rising up through the clouds.
Tirpitz in the Faettenfjord in January 1942, with tugs and other support craft in attendance. Tarpaulins obscure the shape of her forward guns, while the crew have set small fir trees around her forecastle, to augment her rudimentary camouflage.
Shortly before 0600hrs the Germans spotted six bombers flying over the Trondheimsfjord, but after that they saw nothing else. However, they heard the planes, and the flak batteries opened up on them, firing blindly into the cloud. None were hit, and the frustrated bomber crews set a course for home. One Halifax crashed on the return leg, and another crashed on landing, as if to underline the futility of the mission.
The mission might have been a failure, but it highlighted a problem. The mission had failed due to poor meteorological information on the target area. In future, Bomber Command would try to liaise with the Norwegian resistance to obtain better local information before sending their bombers to the target. One hare-brained scheme, of sending Beaufort light bombers of 217 Squadron in a one-way ‘suicide mission’, was suggested, then quietly dropped. Meanwhile, the PRU flights would continue, and Bomber Command waited for another suitable opportunity.
At first the Tirpitz seemed intent to stay in her lair, as camouflage nets were rigged, and fir trees were cut and tied to the forecastle, to add to the effect. Then, on 17 February, Tirpitz removed her camouflage, raised steam and moved out into the Trondheimsfjord, to conduct gunnery exercises. On 23 February the armoured cruiser Admiral Scheer and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen appeared off the Trondheimsfjord, escorted by destroyers of the 5th Destroyer Flotilla. The Kriegsmarine was assembling a major surface battle group, centred on the Tirpitz, which now flew the flag of Vice Admiral Otto Ciliax.
Not everything was going the German way – Prinz Eugen was torpedoed by the British submarine Triton as she entered the fjord, and was damaged sufficiently to necessitate a return to Germany for repairs. However, that still left Ciliax with a powerful force. His biggest worry, though, was fuel. Essentially, he didn’t have enough oil to undertake a full-scale sortie. So, when reports reached him that another Arctic Convoy was at sea, Ciliax decided to sail without the Admiral Scheer.
At noon on 6 March Tirpitz and three destroyers left the Trondheimsfjord, and headed north. Ciliax knew that Convoy PQ-12 was on its way to Murmansk, and a return convoy, QP-8, was heading to Britain. He expected Admiral Tovey’s Home Fleet to be at sea to cover the two convoys, but he had no clear idea what its strength was, or where it might be.
In 1941, Vice Admiral Otto Ciliax (1891–1964) became the Kriegsmarine’s Befehlshaber der Schlachtschiffe (Commander, Battleships), and in February 1942 he led the ‘Channel Dash’. The following month he embarked in Tirpitz, and she served as his flagship during Operation Sportpalast. He later became the commander-in-chief of all naval forces in Norway.
Ciliax planned to intercept the convoys somewhere between Jan Mayen Island and Bear Island. PQ-12 was being tracked by German reconnaissance planes, heading north-east past Jan Mayen Island, so Ciliax put himself across its path. He hoped to encounter QP-8 too, but although Arado spotter planes were sent up from Tirpitz the Allied convoy was hidden by thick fog. The same fog also hindered the Luftwaffe, who lost contact with PQ-12. Ciliax was operating in the dark. So too was Admiral Tovey. He now knew Tirpitz was at sea, and with a force of two battleships, a battlecruiser and the aircraft carrier Victorious he had the power to sink her if she could be brought to battle. However, he had to find her first. By 1600hrs on 7 March, Tirpitz was roughly between PQ-12 and the Home Fleet, with the convoy 60 miles to the east of her, and the Home Fleet 80 miles to the west.
On the morning of 9 March, Tirpitz and an accompanying destroyer were spotted off the Lofoten Islands by search aircraft operating from the fleet carrier Victorious. Here the wing of the reconnaissance Albacore can be seen, as the pilot dips the wings to allow the observer to take a clear photograph of the enemy battleship.
It was a frustrating time for both commanders. At 1600hrs that afternoon, the German destroyer Friedrich Ihn came upon the Russian freighter Izhora, a straggler from QP-8. She was sunk by gunfire. That, though, told Ciliax that he had missed the homebound convoy. So at 1045hrs on 8 March he decided to spend the day cruising towards the west, in an attempt to catch up with QP-8. Tirpitz cruised on her own, as the previous evening Ciliax had ordered his destroyers to put into Narvik to refuel. Finally, at 2025hrs that evening he turned southwards and headed home towards Trondheim. Tovey learned of this through Ultra signal intercepts, and he realized that his only chance of intercepting Tirpitz now was by crippling her in an air strike. That would allow the Home Fleet to overhaul her. Interestingly, it was a similar situation to that which had faced him the previous year, when he was pursuing Bismarck. It was now up to the air crews of HMS Victorious.
Throughout that night (8/9 March), Ciliax and Tovey headed south and south-west respectively, with the British hoping to be in a position to launch an air strike against Tirpitz shortly after dawn. By that time she would be to the west of the Lofoten Islands, where Ciliax planned to rendezvous with his destroyers. Also, if necessary Tirpitz could put in to Narvik. Victorious had 18 Albacores embarked, from 817 and 832 Squadrons. The intention was to fly off six of these at dawn to search for the German battleship, while the remaining 12 would form the strike force, led by Lieutenant Commander Lucas, commander of 832 Squadron. The weather had improved slightly during the night, and the fog lifted. Visibility was now good, and the cloud base was 4,000ft.
At 0640hrs on 9 March, the search aircraft were flown off, fanning out to the south-east, flying at just below the level of the clouds. Just over 50 minutes later, at 0732hrs, the strike force was flown off too. This was a gamble – if the Tirpitz remained undetected, then all the aircraft would eventually have to return and refuel, which meant it would be almost noon before another strike could be launched. However, at 0803hrs, Tirpitz was spotted west of the Lofoten Islands, heading south, escorted by the newly refuelled Friedrich Ihn. Soon three of the search aircraft were shadowing the battleship. They were spotted by the Germans at 0810hrs, and just over 20 minutes later Tirpitz flew off one of her Arado spotter planes, to act as her own scout. The Arado attacked one of the shadowing Albacores, but was hit itself. Leaking fuel, the Arado made off towards Bødo airfield, 75 miles to the south-east, as the Tirpitz wasn’t prepared to stop to recover the aircraft.
At 0805hrs the sighting report was passed to Lucas, and he adjusted his course to intercept. Meanwhile Ciliax realized that a carrier was close by, and that a naval air strike was likely. So, he altered course towards the east, heading for the Moskenes Strait, between the Lofoten Islands and the Norwegian mainland. This was the entrance to the Vestfjorden, which led to Narvik. He also notified the Luftwaffe airfield at Bødo, requesting air cover. While records show that this message was received, cooperation between the Luftwaffe and the Kriegsmarine was poor, and the request was bogged down in official channels. Even though a squadron of modern Fw 190 fighters was just ten minutes’ flying time away, Tirpitz and her attendant destroyer were left to fend for themselves.
Then, at 0842hrs, Lucas spotted the Tirpitz. She was 20 miles to the south-west, steaming east at high speed. At the time the strike aircraft had been flying at 500ft, below the level of German coastal radar, but on spotting the Tirpitz Lucas ordered his aircraft to climb into the clouds, so they could approach without being seen. However, a fully laden Albacore had a top speed of just 130 knots, and Lucas’ planes were flying into the face of a 35-knot wind, blowing from the east, so it would be at least 30 minutes before the aircraft would be in a position to begin their attack. The 12 Albacores were divided into four sub-flights, each of three aircraft. Effectively Lucas led the strike, as its commander overall as well as of the two sub-flights of his own 832 Squadron. Lieutenant Commander Sugden commanding 817 Squadron officially commanded the planes of his own squadron, and one from 832 Squadron. However, during the attack the four sub-flights became intermingled, and Lucas directly commanded a sub-flight from each squadron (1/832 Squadron and 2/817 Squadron), while Sugden led the remaining two sub-flights. (1/817 Squadron and 2/832 Squadron)
Operation Sportpalast, 9 March 1942
On 6 March 1942, Tirpitz sailed from the Trondheimsfjord in an attempt to intercept and destroy Convoy PQ-12. Codenamed Operation Sportpalast, this sortie was well planned, but it was dogged by bad weather, and the convoy eluded the battleship. Eventually Vice Admiral Ciliax ordered her to return to port. Then, early on the morning of 9 March, search aircraft from the British carrier Victorious spotted the battleship and an escorting destroyer to the west of the Lofoten Islands. A naval air strike was launched, made up of 12 Albacore torpedo bombers. They sighted Tirpitz at 0842hrs, and their strike leader divided his force into two groups, so it could attack the battleship from two sides at once.
The first wave attacked from port at 0920hrs, but all six torpedoes missed. It was now up to the six Albacores who were manoeuvring to attack the battleship from her starboard side. They began their approach, but were hampered by the slow speed of their biplanes and a strong headwind. Eventually, however, they reached their attack positions about 2,000 yards off the starboard beam of the battleship, and dropped to 100ft to begin their torpedo run. The German flak was intense, coming both from the Tirpitz and the destroyer Friedrich Ihn. The Albacores dropped their torpedoes at 0925hrs, then began banking away to the south. However, two were hit before they released their torpedoes. This captures the moment when Lieutenant Commander Sugden’s sub-flight of 817 Squadron launched its attack. Albacores 5B and 5L have launched their 18in torpedoes, but in the foreground 5C has been hit, and is about to crash into the sea. All the torpedoes missed, largely because the battleship began turning as the airmen made their attack. Six naval airmen were lost in the abortive strike.
Lucas then gave the order that all sub-flights would make individual attacks, rather than attacking together. This reflected contemporary Fleet Air Arm tactics. According to the textbook, the ideal attack involved getting about a mile-and-a-half ahead of the ship, then peeling off to port or starboard before beginning the attack run. The idea was for half of the strike to attack the target from port, and the rest to starboard. The torpedo planes would drop down to 200ft while they manoeuvred, but during the attack run they would descend to between 50 and 100ft before releasing their torpedoes. Each Albacore carried a single 18in torpedo. This could run at 40 knots for 1,500 yards, and its warhead of 388lb of explosives detonated on impact. From 1,500 yards this would therefore take about 68 seconds to reach its target. As it was moving too, then the Albacore had to ‘lead’ the target, so that both it and the torpedo reached the same spot at the same time. In the case of Tirpitz, steaming at 28 knots, this meant launching a torpedo at a point 1,400 yards ahead of the ship.
The textbook called for the launch of torpedoes at a range of 1,000 yards from the target. However, the compilers of the textbook weren’t being shot at while making their frustratingly slow approach, and while the air crews of Victorious were fairly experienced, it took more than training to press home a perfect torpedo attack in a lumbering biplane. The further a torpedo dropped from its target, the longer it took to reach it, and the further the aiming point had to be from the ship. A longer run made it more likely that the crew of the target ship could react by turning away from the oncoming torpedoes, thus ‘combing’ their tracks.
At 0917hrs, the strike aircraft broke through the cloud cover and began their attack. At that point Tirpitz was ahead of them, steaming at full speed in the same direction. As the strike force split into its four sub-flights, two edged forward towards the port beam of the battleship, and two to starboard. It was Lucas who launched the attack. By 0920hrs his 1st sub-flight of 832 Squadron aircraft (4A, 4B and 4C) were a mile away from the battleship, on her port beam. The flak was heavy, but it could have been worse, as the gunners divided their fire among the four groups of aircraft. On Lucas’ order his sub-flight turned to starboard, and at 30 seconds past 0920hrs they launched their torpedoes. The range was a little under 1,500 yards. On the bridge of Tirpitz, Captain Topp saw the launch and immediately ordered his ship to turn hard to port. While that meant heading towards the three oncoming torpedoes, it also meant that it turned the ship away from the six Albacores gathering off his starboard beam.
In this photograph, taken from an Albacore of the second wave, which is still manoeuvring into position, the Tirpitz can be seen turning hard to port, to avoid the torpedoes launched at her from the low-flying aircraft of the first wave.
A pair of Albacores – 5L and 5B from 817 Squadron – try to bank and climb after releasing their torpedoes at the Tirpitz. The photograph was taken from Albacore 4R of 832 Squadron, which was 500 yards to starboard of the pair when they launched their torpedoes. All three aircraft made it back to Victorious.
The three torpedoes passed astern of the battleship. Meanwhile, Lucas’ second strike – aircraft 5M, 5H and 4G of 817 Squadron – found themselves to starboard of the battleship’s track, so they crossed her wake, and made their approach off her port quarter. When Tirpitz turned to port it put them in a better position. The sub-flight dropped its torpedoes 30 seconds after 0921hrs, then turned away. However, the torpedo run was excessive – almost 2,000 yards – and again the torpedoes missed their target. Lucas reported that the closest only came within 150 yards of their target.
That left the two sub-flights led by Lieutenant Commander Sugden (1/817 Squadron and 2/832 Squadron), who ordered them to keep on the starboard side of the battleship and to try to get ahead of her. The six aircraft now attracted all the German flak, from both Tirpitz and the Friedrich Ihn. The two sub-flights were flying almost directly into the 35-knot wind, so progress was agonizingly slow. Then, at 0925hrs, Tirpitz began turning to port, as Topp resumed his easterly course. This also put Sugden’s aircraft in a better attacking position.
They were now about 2,500 yards off the battleship’s starboard bow, with one sub-flight ahead of the other. On Sugden’s command they both turned and began their torpedo runs. To the south 4M of 832 Squadron dropped its torpedo 30 seconds after Tirpitz began her turn, while 1,000 yards to the north two aircraft from Sugden’s sub-flight of 817 Squadron (5L and 5B) released their torpedoes at virtually the same moment. The sixth aircraft, 4R of 832 Squadron, was on Sugden’s starboard quarter, and it dropped its torpedo with the others. However, as they began their run two of the aircraft – 4P from 832 Squadron and 5C from 817 Squadron – took direct hits and both aircraft crashed into the sea. Somehow the other aircraft managed to avoid the storm of flak, and released their torpedoes.
Four torpedoes were now heading towards the Tirpitz, which had completed her turn, and was settling onto her new easterly course. All of them had dropped their torpedoes early, though – post-engagement reports estimate that the distance was 1,600 yards. Once again, Tirpitz was able to comb the oncoming torpedo tracks. All of the torpedoes passed in front of her, although one was within 20 yards of the battleship. On board Tirpitz, Lieutenant Räder recalled seeing a British airman, sitting on the top wing of his biplane as it wallowed in the swell. As the surviving aircraft flew out of range, the battleship continued on towards the Vestfjorden, and shortly before 2000hrs she dropped anchor in the Bogenfjord, a small arm of the larger Ofotfjorden, facing Narvik.
The surviving Albacores all made it back to Victorious by 1100hrs that morning, but no further strikes were attempted. In his report, Captain Bovell of Victorious criticized the inexperienced Lucas for attacking from a disadvantageous position. However, while the Fleet Air Arm officially deemed the strike ‘disappointing’, Vice Admiral Ciliax praised the courageous nature of the attack. The fact remained, however that the Fleet Air Arm had missed a rare opportunity to attack the Tirpitz at sea. Few knew it at the time, but it would also be the Home Fleet’s last chance to strike her on the open sea.
Tirpitz remained in the Bogenfjord for three more days. Then, just before midnight on 12 March, the battleship and five destroyers slipped out of the fjord, hidden by darkness and poor visibility. The British were unaware that the Tirpitz had sailed south until the evening of 13 March, when Norwegian agents reported her arrival back in the Faettenfjord. While Operation Sportpalast might have been a failure for both sides, it had one lasting consequence. When he learned of the air strike Hitler ordered that in future the battleship would only sortie if British aircraft carriers were neutralized first. Meanwhile, Tirpitz would remain in the Faettenfjord.
Once again, Bomber Command was ordered to deal with the battleship. Daytime attacks were ruled out, as the greater risks outweighed any improvement in bombing accuracy. Any attack would be carried out at night, preferably when moonlight illuminated the target. Given the range, this necessitated starting the raid from north-eastern Scotland. This time, two new types of ordnance were available. The first of these was the 4,000lb HC ‘blockbuster’ bomb (nicknamed the ‘cookie’), which had to be dropped from at least 4,000ft to avoid damaging the aircraft. A spherical contact mine was also available, having been modified so it could be dropped from a heavy bomber.
Built to specifications issued by the Air Ministry in 1936, the Handley Page Halifax proved a reliable four-engined heavy bomber, although it was less versatile than the Avro Lancaster, as its bomb bay was incapable of being modified to fit extremely large bombs such as the Tallboy.
On 27 March, 44 and 97 Squadrons from 5 Group sent 12 Lancasters to Lossiemouth, six from each squadron. 10 Squadron of 4 Group also arrived with ten Halifaxes, while the 12 Halifaxes of 35 Squadron and ten from 76 Squadron from the same group went to nearby airfields at Tain and Kinloss. All of these planes were modified to take extra fuel. The idea was to arm the Lancasters and 76 Squadron with 4,000lb ‘cookies’, as well as 500lb bombs. The Halifaxes of 10 and 39 Squadrons would each carry four mines.
The ten Halifaxes carrying the ‘cookies’ would fly up the fjord and precision-drop their bombs on Tirpitz from a height of 4,000–5,000ft. After releasing the ‘cookies’, they were to circle around and use their 500lb bombs to target nearby flak positions. Meanwhile the 12 Lancasters would drop their ‘cookies’ on nearby Vaernes airfield. It was expected that this phase would take place on 30 March between 2145hrs and 2230hrs.
This second phase involved the 22 mine-carrying Halifaxes approaching Tirpitz from the west, then releasing the mines from 600ft. The aim was to target the stern, or just behind it, or to drop the mines between the battleship and the shore. The hope was that the damage caused would force Tirpitz to return to Germany for repairs. Both weapons, though, were untested on capital ships.
At the last moment the Lancaster part of the operation was cancelled. So, at 1800hrs on 30 March, the 32 Halifaxes took off and headed out over the North Sea. Destroyers were stationed along the route in case aircraft had to crash-land in the sea. The flying time to the target was three-and-a-half hours, and the return leg, which passed close to Orkney and Shetland, was 30 minutes longer. When the bombers got within 100 miles of the Norwegian coast they dropped to 500ft, to reduce the risk of detection by German radar. In fact, they were detected and the defenders were ready for them.
The flight to the target was uneventful, but when the first wave of Halifaxes from 76 Squadron reached the fjord they found that cloud formed a dense band from 1,000 to 6,000ft. Tirpitz was completely obscured. At 2200hrs the flak batteries opened up as the bombers approached the unseen battleship, their crews hoping for a break in the clouds. On board Tirpitz they heard rather than saw the aircraft, but Captain Topp ordered the ship’s anti-aircraft guns to hold their fire for the moment, to avoid revealing their position.
Still, the flak from the shore batteries was heavy, and four bombers were shot down over the fjord. Some 25 bombs were dropped on flak positions but Tirpitz remained untouched. The aircraft circled around until fuel began running low, and then they headed home. Two more damaged bombers were forced down in the North Sea , which brought the total losses to six aircraft – two from 10 Squadron, three from 35 Squadron and one from 76 Squadron. The official report on the mission concluded that ‘Thick cloud over the target and mist in valleys and fjords made identification of the battleship impossible’. In fact they never even got close to spotting it.
For the moment the bombers were returned to their regular schedule of raids over Germany. Meanwhile, PRU flights revealed a strengthening of the anti-aircraft defences in the area, and the reinforcement of the air base at Vaernes. Tirpitz remained in the Faettenfjord, covered by her camouflage screen and protected by torpedo nets. Churchill and the War Cabinet insisted that another attempt be made as soon as possible, so the planners at Bomber Command set about organizing a further strike. The basic plan would remain the same, but the attack would take place later – around midnight – as it was thought the defenders would be less alert.
Experience had shown that releasing a ‘cookie’ at anything below 6,000ft risked damage to the aircraft, so the height of the bombing run was altered accordingly. Similarly, trial and error during practice flights had shown that the optimum height for dropping the mines was 150ft, so this release height was changed too. The bombers would now fly closer to Orkney and Shetland on both legs, to improve the chances of rescue if forced to ditch in the sea. Also, a model of the Faettenfjord had been produced, and this greatly helped the crews understand the geography of the target area.
The planners were aware that on the last occasion the Germans had been ready for them, and they put this down to the efficiency of the German radar chain. So, both before and during the raid, secondary attacks would take place elsewhere to distract the radar operators. A squadron of Hudsons would raid shipping off Ålesund, 150 miles south of Trondheim, while pairs of Beauforts would carry out hit-and-run raids on Lade and Vaernes airfields near Trondheim, as well as Herdla airfield near Bergen.
In the final briefing, the bomber crews were ordered to fly up the Trondheimsfjord, then begin their bombing runs over Saltøya Island, 1½ miles west of the Tirpitz. After the attack they were to turn to port, passing over the Lofjord before heading back along the northern shore of the Trondheimsfjord. For those planes carrying mines, it was stressed that if they couldn’t see the target they should drop their mines over the high ground beside the battleship. That way the mines might roll down the slope and explode between the ship and the shore. At 150ft, though, that meant having to avoid her mainmast, the tip of which was 165ft above the battleship’s waterline.
The mission was due to begin on the evening of 25 April, but for the next two days the airfields were fogged in. Finally, at 2000hrs on 27 April, the bombers took off. Two Lancasters were forced back due to mechanical trouble, but a reserve Lancaster was sent up to take their place. A total of 42 bombers were now en route to the target, 31 Halifaxes and 11 Lancasters, all flying at 5,000ft.
The route took them north past Shetland, and then north-east to a point 70 miles from the Norwegian coast at Ålesund. They would then fly north, before turning west-north-west for their final approach to the fjord. The first wave was due over the Trondheimsfjord shortly before midnight. Two hours into the mission one more Halifax was forced back due to engine failure. The rest finally crossed the Norwegian coast above Kristiansund, climbed to 12,000ft and began their final approach.
Despite all the diversions the Germans spotted the bombers on radar, and were ready for them. One airman recalled, ‘As we neared the coast we could see flak inland, and as we crossed it our worst fears were confirmed.’ This was due to the diversionary raid on Trondheim by Beaufighters. All it really achieved was to keep the anti-aircraft gunners alert. So, as soon as the bombers appeared over the Trondheimsfjord they encountered heavy flak.
500lb general purpose (GP) bombs being loaded into the bomb bay of a Halifax heavy bomber. During the Bomber Command raids on Tirpitz in early 1942, this bomb type was among the assortment of ordnance used against the battleship, or carried to deal with flak batteries around the Faettenfjord.
In the Faettenfjord the crew of the Tirpitz had to become adept at camouflage. Sharp surfaces were draped with tarpaulins and any other material that came to hand, while fir trees were used to break up the lines of the deck. Eventually a series of camouflage nets attached to the shore and to rafts moored at the bow of the ship would shroud the ship even more effectively.
The first wave consisted of the Lancasters carrying the 4,000lb ‘cookies’. The Halifaxes of 76 Squadron followed behind them. As the bombers made their final approach they found that some flak batteries on the high ground flanking the fjord were actually firing down at them. Searchlights, flares and lines of tracer lit up the sky. This time, with the clouds above the bombers, and the area illuminated, the battleship was clearly visible.
As the bombers passed Saltøya Island they encountered a box barrage of flak. One of the Lancasters from 97 Squadron was hit and spiralled downwards to crash in the mountains to the east. None of its seven-man crew survived. Somehow the other bombers made it through and at 0006hrs the leading Lancaster of 44 Squadron dropped its ‘cookie’ over the target from 7,500ft. The rest of the wave did the same. Some of the crews thought they saw their bombs hit the ship, but in fact none of the bombs struck their target.
At this stage Tirpitz was still visible, as her smoke screen still hadn’t been deployed. The smoke was finally released at 0012hrs, and was fully in place when the mine-dropping Halifaxes arrived. Many of the crews didn’t get a clear view of Tirpitz during their attack, and dropped their bombs or mines on where they thought the battleship was through the smoke. Still, the bombers in the wave completed their run, and banked away to the north. Some even circled round for a second pass before dropping their bombs and banking away. One Halifax of 76 Squadron left it too late and dropped its ‘cookie’ on the Admiral Scheer instead.
BOMBING TECHNIQUES EMPLOYED AGAINST TIRPITZ, 1942–44
This diagram illustrates the four bombing techniques used against Tirpitz during her time in Norwegian waters. At the top is an Avro Lancaster heavy bomber, carrying a single 12,000lb deep penetration bomb, or Tallboy. The optimum height for the bomb’s release was 13,500–14,000ft, with the aircraft flying level at approximately 200mph. In fact, release heights during the three Tallboy attacks on Tirpitz varied from 12,000 to 17,400ft. The release point was calculated by means of a specially developed SABS Mark IIA bomb sight, and the bomb rotated rapidly as it fell, which increased accuracy considerably. Its strong construction and high terminal velocity ensured that it would penetrate the armour of the battleship, while even a near miss would rely on the ‘earthquake’ effects of the bomb’s blast to cause severe underwater damage to the target.
During the RAF’s raids on the Faettenfjord in 1942 it was intended that the Handley Page Halifax heavy bombers who took part in the missions would fly over the target at an altitude of around 6,000–8,000ft, maintaining a steady airspeed of around 220mph. However, after the first attack in January, it was felt that accuracy would be improved by reducing the bombing height to around 6,000ft. Any lower and those bombers using the 4,000lb HC bombs that some of these bombers carried on the spring raids risked being damaged by the explosion of their own ordnance. Those Halifaxes carrying spherical mines dropped them from 200–250ft.
When the Fleet Air Arm used the Fairey Barracuda dive/torpedo bomber to attack Tirpitz in the Kaafjord during the late spring and summer of 1944, the aircraft approached the target at a height of around 5,000ft; they would then dive at an angle of around 45 degrees or more, before releasing their bombs at a recommended height of 3,500ft. A dive angle of 65 degrees or more would place a dangerous strain on the airframe of the bomber. The heaviest piece of ordnance carried in these strikes was the 1,600lb AP bomb, which was aerodynamically designed to spin quickly as it fell, and to strike the ship at a high velocity, which increased its ability to penetrate the deck armour of the target.
Finally the Fairey Albacore was also capable of carrying bombs, but the diagram here shows how the aircraft was used during a torpedo attack of the kind conducted by the Fleet Air Arm against Tirpitz in early 1942. On approaching the target the biplane would fly at an altitude of around 2,000ft, then drop down to within 100ft of the sea before releasing its 18in torpedo. At this point its airspeed would be around 100 knots. The ideal range was about 1,000 yards from the target, but in practice the ordnance was often released sooner, at ranges of up to 1,500 yards. The torpedo travelled at 40 knots. Ideally the torpedo would be aimed ahead of the battleship, to compensate for the movement of both the torpedo and the target, until ideally both converged at the aiming point.
The job of the first wave wasn’t done. They still had to release their 500lb bombs on flak positions, and then circle, drawing flak away from the second wave. The second wave, the mine-carrying Halifaxes of 10 and 35 Squadrons, flew past Trondheim at around 0025hrs. However, by the time they reached Saltøya Island the Faettenfjord was filled with smoke. By then the bombers had dropped down to 250ft, and with 35 Squadron leading, they began their attack at 0040hrs.
Although the German flak batteries were fully alert, they had been firing at high-flying bombers, so at first these low-flying newcomers took them by surprise. Most of the bomber crews never saw the battleship through the smoke, but their study of the model of the fjord paid off. Of the 11 aircraft in 35 Squadron, seven dropped their mines in the area of the target. Of the others, one bombed a patrol boat, and another Halifax was shot down over the Åsenfjord before it reached its target.
As soon as the bombers released their mines they banked to port, and skimmed over the Lofjord before making their escape up the Trondheimsfjord. The last group to make its attack was the Halifaxes of 10 Squadron. They approached the target at about 0105hrs, and dropped their mines from heights of 200ft or more, in the vain hope of seeing the battleship’s masts above the smoke. One airman, Flying Officer Watts, recalled the experience as he entered the Faettenfjord: ‘At that very moment we flew into a smoke screen so dense it seemed to be solid. It was like flying in cotton wool. There was no sense of motion, no spatial relativity. We knew we were thundering alongside a solid rocky cliff wall … speeding towards an equally solid cliff wall not far ahead – all sight unseen.’ He released his bomber’s mines when he thought the Tirpitz was roughly beneath them, and the pilot banked away, hoping to clear the cliff ahead of them. As Watts put it dryly, ‘No one would have wished to end their life like a fly squashed on the wall.’
By 0120hrs, the last of the bombers was heading homeward. One of the 10 Squadron bombers had to ditch in the Trondheimsfjord, while another damaged plane crash-landed further inland, on the frozen surface of Lake Hoklingen. Both crews survived, and apart from one injured airman they even escaped captivity by making it over the Swedish frontier. In total five aircraft were lost – four Halifaxes and one Lancaster. However, for all this effort and these losses, the Tirpitz was completely undamaged. All of the ‘cookies’ missed, while the smoke screen protected her from the mines. At dawn the crew of the Tirpitz found the surface of the Faettenfjord covered by dead fish, killed by the exploding mines. So, as the exhausted bomber crews returned to their rooms and slept, the decision was made to repeat the attack the following night.
The British 500lb semi-armour piercing bomb was used against the Tirpitz in all three of the RAF raids on her in the Faettenfjord during the spring of 1942, and the Fleet Air Arm attacks on the battleship in the Kaafjord during the summer of 1944.
The only major change was in the timing. By the time the mine-dropping aircraft reached the Faettenfjord the Tirpitz had been hidden by smoke. So, this time a tighter schedule was planned, with very little gap between two waves. This time, the first wave consisted of nine Halifaxes from 76 Squadron and six Lancasters each from 44 and 97 Squadrons. All but one of these bombers would carry a 4,000lb ‘cookie’ and 250lb or 500lb GP bombs, while one Lancaster attached to 76 Squadron only carried a mixture of the smaller bombs. Once again, the 15 remaining Halifaxes from 10 and 35 Squadrons were armed with five spherical mines apiece.
On the evening of 28 April the bombers took off from 2030hrs, with the 76 Squadron Halifaxes joining up with the Lancasters to form the first wave. One of the mine-laden Halifaxes failed to take off due to mechanical trouble, which reduced the strength of the second wave to 14 aircraft. This time there was a scaled-back version of the diversions intended to confuse the German radar operators. Also, they would take place just before the bombers arrived, to avoid alerting the defenders. Ahead of the bombers a diversionary force of four Beaufighters crossed the coast, and kept a lookout for enemy fighters. In fact although several ‘nightfighters’ were reported over Trondheimsfjord, no German aircraft were in the vicinity. The likelihood is that these were actually the Beaufighters, which were circling over Trondheim as the first wave flew past. Only one German fighter was in the area, and it was ordered to keep out of the way of the flak barrage.
The British plan called for the first wave to release their 4,000lb bombs between 0030hrs and 0040hrs. The second wave, flying in low, were expected to drop their mines between 0041hrs and 0050hrs. After bombing the main target, the bombers would bank away to the north, releasing their smaller bombs over flak batteries or other targets before heading home. By now the force had been reduced further, as two Halifaxes from 35 Squadron had been forced back due to engine failure. Visibility was good, but the crew of the Tirpitz were forewarned, and this time the smoke screen was deployed before the first wave even reached the target.
The ‘cookie’-armed bombers dropped their ordnance into the smoke from 6,000–8,000ft. Some of the Lancasters held on to ‘cookies’ and instead they released them over the Admiral Scheer and Prinz Eugen, in the Lofjord, which for some reason was free of smoke. It was significant that while some of these crews later asserted that the flak was heavier than the night before, some of the crew of the second wave claimed the opposite. This suggests that the flak guns were targeting the higher-flying bombers. It was only after the second-wave bombers climbed out of the smoke that they faced the full brunt of enemy flak. The bombers dropped their smaller bombs at targets between the Faettenfjord and the Lofjord, but one plane, forced off course by flak, released its ‘cookie’ over Vaernes airfield, a few miles away to the south.
Then it was the turn of the mine-laden Halifaxes. This time the majority of them released their ordnance from around 150–250ft, and strangely, while the smoke screen obscured the target, a gap in it appeared during the bombing run, so some of the aircraft had a good clear view of the Tirpitz. Until then the battleship’s anti-aircraft gunners had held their fire to avoid revealing their position. Now they blazed away. Several of the bombers were damaged, but somehow all of them made it out of the fjord. In one Halifax from 35 Squadron the pilot recalled that ‘We were so low on the treetops that the mid-upper gunner reported that we had disturbed a bird from her nest, to which the rear gunner added that there were four eggs in it!’
Again, the bombers released their smaller 500lb bombs over flak installations to the north of the Faettenfjord. Then the planes turned west over the Lofjord. A few bombers found that their mines were jammed in their bomb bays, and had to be prised out during the flight home. Two Halifaxes from 35 Squadron were shot down in the raid. One limped up the Åsen valley, flying west until it crashed on the shores of Movatnet (Lake Movaten), just 3 miles beyond the spot on Lake Hoklingen where another Halifax from the same squadron had crashed the night before. The second caught fire and spun down into the Åsenfjord. In both cases the majority of the crew survived the crash, but became prisoners of war.
In all, 18 ‘cookies’ and 48 mines were dropped that night, but none of them hit the Tirpitz, or at least caused her any damage. Many of the mines lodged in the steep wooded slope on the north side of the fjord. Others landed in the fjord, and the battleship’s crew could feel the pressure waves from their explosions transmitted through the water. Once again, though, the only significant casualty was the fish of the Faettenfjord. The smoke screen had done its job.
Despite plans for more operations, it was decided that this would be the last raid by Bomber Command for some time. These had been night raids, carried out by night bombers, and with spring turning to summer the days were getting longer. So, further attacks were suspended until the autumn. The air crews needed a break too. They had suffered significant losses: 10 Squadron had lost four Halifaxes, 76 Squadron had lost one and 35 Squadron seven bombers. One Lancaster of 97 Squadron had also been shot down. A total of 60 airmen had been killed during the three missions, and 18 taken prisoner. That amounted to approximately 12 per cent of the men who had participated in the attacks. All this sacrifice had been in vain. Tirpitz remained undamaged, and the threat she posed to the Arctic Convoys was as great as ever.
This failure by Bomber Command was to have grave consequences. It was now late spring in the Arctic, and the days were getting longer. The long winter nights had helped screen the convoys from Luftwaffe search planes and U-boats, but now the season of near-perpetual sun was approaching. During the winter the Luftwaffe had reinforced its air bases in Norway, and now Luftflotte 5 had the capacity to search far out into the Arctic Sea, and carry out large-scale attacks using torpedo- and bomb-armed aircraft. While the Admiralty would have liked to suspend convoy operations until the autumn, Churchill was under pressure from both Roosevelt and Stalin, so he ordered that they continue, regardless of the risk. What followed would show just how much an influence the Tirpitz exerted on this naval campaign.
Tirpitz in the Bodenfjord near Narvik, photographed in July 1942 by a high-flying PRU plane. The battleship is protected by a double line of torpedo nets, while supply and support vessels cluster around her. While this base was beyond the effective range of bombers flying from Britain, she was still at risk from attacks launched by British carriers.
In mid-May 1942, the Admiralty learned that the Germans were planning a strike against the next Arctic Convoy. Codenamed Operation Rösselsprung (the knight’s move in chess), this would involve a task force commanded by Admiral Otto Schniewind, whose flagship was Tirpitz. On 27 June, Arctic Convoy PQ-17 sailed from Hvalfjörður in Iceland, bound for Archangel. It consisted of 35 merchant ships and 14 escorts, while a ‘Covering Force’ of four heavy cruisers shadowed it. Admiral Tovey commanded the ‘Distant Covering Force’ of two battleships and the carrier Victorious. In theory this should have been a powerful enough force to thwart any move made by Admiral Schniewind.
On 1 July, PQ-17 was spotted by a U-boat, and at 2000hrs the next day Tirpitz put to sea, accompanied by the armoured cruiser Admiral Scheer, the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper and four destroyers. A second armoured cruiser, Lützow, was damaged by grounding while attempting to accompany Schniewind’s force, so she returned to Narvik for repairs. By the morning of 4 July the German task force was anchored in the Altenfjord, near the northernmost tip of Norway. There, Schniewind waited for the order to strike.
Tirpitz in the Altenfjord in July, waiting to play her part in Operation Rösselsprung – the attack on Convoy PQ-17. As the sun is setting, her anti-aircraft guns are elevated, ready to counter any sudden air attack from either the Fleet Air Arm or the Soviet Air Force.
The Tirpitz, photographed in the Faettenfjord by a low-flying PRU aircraft during the winter of 1942–43. She lies at her regular berth on the north side of the small fjord, surrounded by a cluster of smaller vessels, with pontoons carrying camouflage netting sitting off her bow and stern.
Meanwhile PQ-17 continued its voyage, the escorts successfully fending off attacks by German torpedo bombers. However, that afternoon the British Admiralty learned that Tirpitz was in the Altenfjord, just a few hours away from the convoy. Neither the cruiser covering force nor the escort could protect the convoy from Tirpitz, and Tovey’s capital ships were 350 nautical miles to the west – too far away to intervene. PQ-17 was on its own.
The First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, then made one of the most controversial decisions of the naval war. At 2100hrs that evening he ordered the convoy to scatter, and the cruisers to withdraw to the west. For the next few days, the merchant ships tried to reach the safety of Soviet ports. Most never made it, being picked off by U-boats and Luftwaffe bombers. Of the 35 merchant ships which sailed from Iceland, only 11 made it to safety.
In this high-altitude photograph taken by a Soviet reconnaissance plane in May 1943, and subsequently marked by Admiralty intelligence analysts, Tirpitz can be seen moored close to the north-western side of the Kaafjord, while support vessels are anchored further north, and in the small bay off Kvenvik, to the south-east.
Ironically, the First Sea Lord gave his ‘scatter’ order when he thought that Tirpitz was about to fall upon the convoy. In fact, she remained in Altenfjord until 1120hrs on 5 July. Even then, after a brief sortie (5–6 July), Hitler was alarmed that a British carrier was at sea, and that evening he cancelled the operation and ordered Schniewind to return to the fjord. Ironically, Victorious was too far away to intervene. By 9 July, Tirpitz was back in the Bogenfjord, near Narvik. The whole operation revealed just how much Hitler feared British naval air power, and just as significantly, how much Tirpitz was viewed as a ‘bogey man’ by the British Admiralty.
The extent to which Tirpitz dominated naval planning was displayed again later in July, when Convoy PQ-18 was postponed. The reason was that PRU flights over the Faettenfjord had revealed that the battleship’s moorings were empty. This led to Stalin accusing the Royal Navy of shirking a fight at a time when Russian servicemen were fighting for their very survival. Actually Tirpitz was still in the Bogenfjord taking part in gunnery exercises. By 24 October she was back in the Faettenfjord. It was there that the British carried out another attack on her. Operation Title involved the ferrying of human torpedoes (known as ‘chariots’) across the North Sea from Shetland, towed beneath Norwegian fishing boats. Once in the Trondheimsfjord they and their two-man crews would be sent off to attack the battleship. The operation was due to be carried out during the night of 30/31 October. However, unexpected rough weather led to the attack being abandoned. At the time the chariots were in the Åsenfjord, just 5 miles from their target.
Tirpitz in the Kaafjord in late September 1943, pictured by a PRU aircraft in the immediate aftermath of Operation Source, the attack on her by British midget submarines. Oil can be seen leaking from her fuel tanks, while various small support vessels cluster around her, inside her torpedo nets. Astern of her is a walkway linking her to the shore, and the small boat landing stage is on the spit behind her.
During all this, the idea of carrying out another bomb attack on the Tirpitz never really went away. In June a plan for a Lancaster raid was drawn up, flying from Lossiemouth. This time the bombers would carry either 4,000lb ‘cookies’ or smaller AP bombs. This scheme was put on hold when the Tirpitz spent the summer in the Bogenfjord, as it was beyond effective range. The return of Tirpitz to the Faettenfjord led to the scheme being revived. This developed into a daylight attack using 81 Lancasters, but by November the notion was shelved again, largely due to the onset of the long winter nights. Another scheme using US Air Force B-17s was mooted, flying from a base near Murmansk, but this was never fully pursued. So, as 1942 drew to a close Tirpitz remained a latent threat.
What almost ended this threat without a bomber being risked was the battle of the Barents Sea. On New Year’s Eve 1942 Lützow, Admiral Hipper and seven destroyers attacked the Arctic Convoy JW-51B. The Germans were driven off by British light cruisers and destroyers, and Hipper was damaged. Hitler was so outraged by this failure that he threatened to disarm the Kriegsmarine’s larger surface ships and use their guns as coastal defence pieces. He had never grasped the notion of ‘a fleet in being’, whereby the presence of Tirpitz, for example, tied down a larger number of enemy warships. This led to the resignation of Grand Admiral Raeder, and his replacement by the U-boat chief, Admiral Dönitz. For a while the fate of Tirpitz looked bleak, but in February Hitler relented, and the battleship was spared. In fact, under Vice Admiral Oskar Kummetz she became the flagship of a battle group that also included Scharnhorst and Lützow. Meanwhile, in late February, Captain Topp was promoted, and Captain Hans Meyer became the new commander of Tirpitz.
By the start of 1943 Bomber Command began exploring other options, including the use of a ‘bouncing bomb’ of the kind used by Lancasters of 617 Squadron during their attacks on German dams that May. However, despite extensive testing, it never proved suitable for attacks on a battleship. By the spring the daylight heavy bomber raid planned the previous year might have been resurrected but in mid-March a PRU flight revealed that the Faettenfjord was empty again. This caused concern in the Admiralty, who feared that Tirpitz might be attempting a break-out into the North Atlantic. Then, on 24 March, she reappeared in the Kaafjord, at the end of the Altenfjord, her base during Operation Rösselsprung the previous summer. This would be the battleship’s new lair for the next 16 months.
The ship’s band of the Tirpitz play to celebrate the birthday of the battleship’s commander, Captain Topp. The band also gave regular concerts on board, to help boost morale, as well as performing ceremonial duties. In action, the bandsmen served as medical orderlies.
The Kaafjord was well beyond the range of most aircraft flying from Britain. The exception was the US Army Air Force’s new B-17F, but while the Americans proved amenable to the idea of using it for a long-range strike, the RAF opposed the plan, as by this stage of the war their priority was the bombing of Germany by both day and night. So, while plans to use Soviet airfields continued to be unfeasible due to diplomatic bureaucracy, Tirpitz was left to her own devices, save for flights by the PRU. In September Tirpitz, and Scharnhorst sortied to bombard Spitzbergen, in an operation designed as much as a training exercise as a demonstration of naval potential. However, German naval power in the Arctic was about to be dramatically undermined.
At 0812hrs on 22 September Tirpitz was rocked by two massive explosions. The cause was large mines, placed there by two British midget submarines, or ‘X-Craft’. This attack, codenamed Operation Source, had been months in the planning, and involved the towing of six of these X-Craft to the mouth of the Altenfjord by British submarines. Once released, three were to attack Tirpitz, two Scharnhorst and one Lützow. In the end the only two X-Craft to reach their target were X-6 and X-7 which laid their charges beneath the Tirpitz before they were detected, forced to the surface and their three-man crews captured. The first charge exploded level with the battleship’s forward turrets, and jammed the mounting. The second buckled the ship’s bottom, causing extensive flooding. The result was that Tirpitz was put out of action, and would now need extensive repairs before she was operational again. But instead of returning to a German shipyard, the work would be done in situ in the Altenfjord. A steamer carrying 750 civilian workmen was sent north, and through that winter these artisans did what they could to repair the damage.
The second blow to German naval power in the region came on 26 December 1943, at the battle of North Cape. In a scheme dubbed Operation Ostfront, Scharnhorst sortied from the Altenfjord to intercept the Arctic Convoy JW-55A. The convoy was successfully screened by British cruisers, and the German battlecruiser turned away. Before she could reach the Norwegian coast she was cornered and sunk by the Home Fleet, led by its new commander, Admiral Fraser, whose flagship was the battleship Duke of York. Her 14in guns made short work of Scharnhorst, which sank, taking all but 22 of her crew down with her.
In a few months, what had once been a powerful German battle group had now been neutralized. That winter, PRU Spitfires as well as Soviet reconnaissance flights reported that the steamer Monte Rosa housing the civilian workers was berthed alongside Tirpitz, as was a 20-ton floating crane and the repair ship Neumark. A flak ship and five destroyers guarded her from a distance, while the fjord was now ringed by anti-aircraft defences and smoke generators, mounted either on the shore or on board moored fishing boats. By late January 1944 the PRU reported that her gun turrets were now able to rotate again, but signal intercepts revealed that she still had engine problems. So, although work on Tirpitz was progressing, it would be some while before she was operational.
On the night of 10/11 February a force of 15 Soviet Pe-2 twin-engined bombers took off from Vaenga airfield near Murmansk, each carrying a single 2,000lb bomb. Although the operation began in good visibility thanks to a full moon, by the time the bombers reached the Altenfjord the target area was obscured by squalls of snow. The Tirpitz was taken unawares, and there wasn’t time to deploy her smoke screen before the bombers arrived. However, owing to the poor visibility only four of the planes spotted the target and were able to release their bombs from 4,000ft. All of them missed the battleship, although the Soviets later claimed that one had been a near miss. Two days later, the Soviets agreed to allow a PRU detachment to be based at Vaenga, and by the end of the month these planes were operational. However, a spate of bad weather and the short days meant that it would be April before these were able to achieve worthwhile results. The images were flown back to Britain by Catalina seaplanes.
This was important, as by the middle of March Tirpitz was operational again, although she still had problems with her engines and gun turrets. Only a spell in a German dry dock could fully restore her to her former condition. However, she could steam at 27 knots, despite the vibrations caused by her engine defects. With her guns largely repaired, she could also fight. Consequently the Admiralty still considered her a major threat to convoy operations. Fortunately for them, the Home Fleet now had the strength not only to fully screen these convoys, but also to take offensive action against the Tirpitz using naval air power.
In late January 1944, the Admiralty ordered Admiral Forbes commanding the Home Fleet to draw up plans to attack the Tirpitz in the Altenfjord. They added that the ideal time for this would be 7–16 March – the same time as the battleship was carrying out her post-repair trials. The hope was to catch her manoeuvring in the fjord, beyond the range of her shore-based flak batteries and smoke screens. In fact Forbes was one step ahead of the Admiralty. The previous December he had ordered his deputy, Vice Admiral Sir Henry Moore, to draft plans for a naval air strike on Tirpitz, while the battleship was still in the Kaafjord. Moore certainly had enough air power at his disposal, and the operation he came up with would involve no fewer than five aircraft carriers and over 100 aircraft. Still, the operation had to wait until late March, when the fleet carrier Victorious would rejoin the fleet after a refit. This attack – the largest air strike yet staged by the Fleet Air Arm – was codenamed Operation Tungsten.
Before Operation Tungsten commenced, the air crews were briefed on their mission using a detailed scale model of the south-eastern end of the Altenfjord and the Kaafjord. Here, Commander Selwyn Harrison of HMS Furious is describing the area’s flak defences to the crews of a sub-flight of 830 Squadron's Barracudas.
While Victorious completed her refit the air crews practised the attack in Loch Eriboll, on the west coast of Scotland. The refit in Liverpool was speeded up, so that by the time a dress rehearsal was staged over the loch on 28 March, Victorious was able to take part. Two days later, on 30 March, Victorious accompanied Forbes’ two battleships as they left Scapa Flow and headed towards the Arctic Sea. Ostensibly Forbes put to sea to cover the sailing of an Arctic Convoy, JW-58. His main aim, though, was to link up with another task force, which had departed in secret and was already at sea. This consisted of the carrier Furious and the escort carriers Emperor, Fencer, Pursuer and Searcher, plus escorts. Once the task forces combined, they would then move into position to the west of North Cape.
Hellcats of 800 Squadron ranged on the deck of the escort carrier Empress on the morning of 3 April 1944, before the start of Operation Tungsten. The fleet carrier Furious is astern of Empress, followed by the escort carriers Searcher and Pursuer, and an escorting light cruiser.
The operation was scheduled for 4 April, but the report of good weather over northern Norway encouraged Forbes to bring the attack forward by 24 hours, to 3 April. The two forces rendezvoused in the afternoon of 2 April, and after detaching Victorious to join the carrier group, Forbes with his battleships and their escorts left the rest of the force, and moved away to the north-east, where he could cover both the carrier group and the convoy. By dawn on 3 April, the carriers and their escorts, now redesignated as Force 7, were in position. This was 77 nautical miles from the coast and 124 nautical miles north-west of the Tirpitz, which the PRU reported was still moored in the Kaafjord. Best of all for the British, it appears that their presence was completely undetected, despite the clear skies and excellent visibility. It couldn’t have been a better start to Operation Tungsten.
Fleet Air Arm armourers fusing 600lb AS bombs on the deck of Victorious before the launch of Operation Tungsten, on 3 April 1944. The chalked ‘5P’ on the nearest bomb indicates that it is destined for Barracuda 5P of 827 Squadron.
The main strike force was made up of 32 Barracuda dive bombers, divided into two wings, each theoretically consisting of 16 planes. To help the speed of flying off, there had been a bit of ‘cross-decking’ – the moving from one ship to another, so that both Furious and Victorious carried part of each wing. Using the two carriers simultaneously would greatly speed the take-off and assembly of each strike. The first of these, 8 Wing, was made up of Barracudas from 827 and 830 Squadrons, while 52 Wing, which would fly off second, consisted of 829 and 821 Squadrons. ‘Top cover’ fighters would be provided by the 21 Corsairs of 1834 and 1836 Squadrons, flying from Victorious. For escort during the flight, 40 Wildcats of 881, 882, 896 and 898 Squadrons launching from Searcher and Pursuer, and 20 Hellcats of 800 and 804 Squadrons from Emperor, would protect the Barracudas from the Luftwaffe. So, the strike was made up over 100 aircraft, more than half of which were fighters.
Finally, a combat air patrol (CAP) of 18 Seafires of 800 and 801 Squadrons operating from Furious would form a protective shield around the task force to safeguard it from enemy air attacks, while the 12 Swordfish of 842 Squadron embarked in Fencer would fly anti-submarine patrols around it. The whole complex operation had been planned by Vice Admiral Moore, who was now on board the battleship Anson, which formed part of Forbes’ distant covering force. While he retained overall direction of the operation, due to radio silence direct hands-on control fell to Rear Admiral Bisset in the anti-aircraft cruiser Royalist, commanding Force 7. The plan called for the dive bombers to carry out their attack in two waves, preceded by the Hellcats and Wildcats, which would swoop in and strafe both the battleship and the flak batteries.
The Barracudas carried a mixture of ordnance: AP bombs, three 500lb SAPs and either three 500lb MCs or two 600lb anti-submarine bombs. All of the Barracudas were ordered to begin their dive from 10,000ft, and release their ordnance at 3,500ft. The idea was that the large bombs would pierce the battleship’s armoured deck, while the smaller bombs would cause extensive damage to her superstructure, sensors and weapons mounts. The idea behind the anti-submarine ordnance was that they would be just as effective for this as conventional bombs, with the added bonus that if they missed the ship then they would explode in the fjord, where they might still cause underwater damage. Zero Hour, when the flying off began, was set at 0415hrs.
The Hellcats of 804 Squadron lined up for take-off on the small flight deck of the escort carrier Empress, at the commencement of Operation Tungsten. These ten fighter aircraft would form part of the second wave during that morning’s attack on the Tirpitz.
During the voyage north the air crews all had the chance to study models of the Altenfjord, and so were familiar with the geography of the area. A final briefing was held at 0330hrs, and then at 0416hrs 11 Corsairs were flown off from Victorious. Unlike the other planes they had spent the night ranged on the carrier’s flight deck, and so while the briefing was being held the flight deck staff were kept busy de-icing them. Still, they all took off successfully, and were followed eight minutes later by the 21 Barracudas of 8 Wing, launched simultaneously from Furious and Victorious. While they were taking off, the Hellcats and Wildcats were launched from the three escort carriers and formed up above the bombers. The second wave would follow an hour behind the first. By 0437hrs the first wave of the strike had formed up, and it set off towards the target, flying on an east-south-easterly course of 120 degrees. The flying time to the target was around 50 minutes.
The Tirpitz in her first mooring place in the Kaafjord, in the little bay of Barbrudalen, on the north-western side of the fjord. The photograph was taken by a British PRU flight. The battleship was screened by torpedo nets, and a walkway from her stern led to the spit astern of her, and a small boat dock. Tirpitz was in this mooring during Operation Tungsten, but in the spring of 1944 she moved to a second mooring, 300 yards to the south-east.
At first the strike force stayed low, below 4,000ft, to avoid detection by German coastal radar. Then, when they were 25 miles from the coast, the Barracudas climbed to their optimal dive-bombing height of 10,000ft. The Corsairs circled above them, while on the flanks of the dive bombers the smaller fighters had to circle and weave, to keep pace with the slower strike aircraft. They reached the coast at 0515hrs near the small island of Loppa, some 40 nautical miles north-west of their target. The route took them over snow-covered mountains and two smaller fjords, the Øksfjord and the Langfjord, both of which were used as destroyer anchorages. Sure enough, some crews saw two ships open fire, but they were well out of range. Then, 10 miles or three minutes’ flying time from their target, Lieutenant Commander Baker-Falkner, who commanded the strike, ordered 830 Squadron to tuck itself in behind 827 Squadron. He planned to attack in a long single column of bombers.
During Operation Tungsten, on 3 April 1944, Tirpitz was taken by surprise as she was putting to sea. This shows her after the attack by the first wave, manoeuvring in the Kaafjord, with her protective smoke screen only just beginning to cover the fjord. A few minutes later she was attacked by the second wave of Barracudas.
This photograph of Tirpitz was taken during Operation Tungsten, on 3 April 1944, shortly after the end of the first wave’s attack. The battleship has been hit, and smoke is pouring from the port side of its forward superstructure. The battleship is moving slowly into the fjord, while the shore-mounted smoke generators are only just beginning to spread a covering layer of white smoke over the area.
A young New Zealand airman from 827 Squadron remembered flying towards a final ridge in front of the fjord: ‘Then suddenly, with a surge we were over the top, and there beneath us lay the Tirpitz, and in exactly the place we’d been told to look for it.’ For the crew of the battleship, the appearance of the aircraft came as a complete surprise. She was just about to slip her moorings and put to sea, to carry out speed trials near the seaward end of the Altenfjord, and many of her crew were on deck, getting ready to cast off. From the bridge, Captain Meyer sounded ‘Action Stations’, and the flak crews ran to their posts, while the order was given to start releasing the smoke screen. By then, though, it was too late. The British aircraft were upon them. As his Barracudas lined up to start their dive-bombing run, Baker-Falkner gave the order ‘All fighters – anti-flak’. So, while the Corsairs stayed aloft, watching out for the Luftwaffe fighters that never appeared, the Wildcats and Hellcats swooped in low, shooting up anything they could find.
The Wildcats of 882 Squadron led the way, dropping down over the hills to fly up the fjord in a straggling line abreast, guns blazing. It was 0528hrs. The bullets from their 50-calibre Browning machine guns tore into the German sailors, trying to find cover on the battleship’s exposed upper decks. The other fighters followed, and within seconds Tirpitz resembled a charnel house. However, this was only the start. A minute behind them, at 0529hrs, the first of the Barracudas began their attack. They swooped down towards the target in a ragged line, two or three planes wide. Most of the pilots were new to the job, even though the strike leader was an old hand and a veteran of the Taranto raid. So, while the official dive angle was 45 degrees, most left it a little late to start their dive from 10,000ft, and so had to dive more steeply. At 65 degrees, a dive steeper than the Barracuda was really designed for, a few pilots experienced a negative g-force, which made their job even harder.
The prescribed release height for the 1,600lb bombs was 3,500ft, but in the excitement most of the inexperienced crews held on a little longer, and most bombs were dropped from about 2,500ft. As soon as they released their ordnance, the Barracudas would bank, then try to dodge the flak which was now flying around them. Bombs of various sizes were hitting the Tirpitz, which soon became shrouded in smoke and flame. The dive bombers behind the first had to aim into the middle of what looked like a blazing inferno. Most crews watched as their bombs hurled down into this, but fresh explosions and flashes suggested they’d scored hits. As Baker-Falkner led his aircraft through a gap in the hills on the north-west side of the Kaafjord, he glanced at his watch. The attack had lasted exactly one minute.
During the strike, some of the air crew had noticed columns of white smoke rising from the shore. These were the smoke screen generators, started up too late to make any difference. However, the blanket would be in place by the time the next wave arrived over the ship. As the last flak guns fell silent the crew of the Tirpitz began to take stock. The attack had taken them completely by surprise, so only a few of the ship’s flak guns had been able to open fire before the attackers had gone. Those that had done so had quickly run out of ammunition, as the handlers bringing fresh rounds forward were either hit or unable to bring them up from below decks. Both the strafing and the bombs had hit these flak crews badly, as well as the sailors on the exposed forecastle and quarterdeck, preparing to unmoor ship. Still, those who survived obeyed their orders and pulled their dead companions aside so they could slip the lines. That at least allowed the Tirpitz to manoeuvre before any more planes arrived.
Barracudas returning from their strike on the Tirpitz on 3 April 1944, photographed from the deck of the fleet carrier Furious. In the distance is the Victorious, with both carriers preparing to land their aircraft. This was done one plane at a time, with the deck crews having to clear it away before the next Barracuda made its approach. Priority was given to damaged aircraft.
Meanwhile, the second wave had taken off. The first Barracudas flew off from Furious and Victorious at 0525hrs – just as the first wave were approaching the target. The launch hadn’t been straightforward – one plane from 829 Squadron remained behind with engine trouble, while another crashed into the sea just after take-off and its three-man crew were killed. That left 19 Barracudas in the strike, and these formed up as before, with the Corsairs from Victorious circling above them and the smaller fighters forming up on either side of the dive bombers. As they crossed the coast at Loppa they saw a column of black smoke ahead of them. It was the Tirpitz burning, 40 miles and 12 minutes’ flying time away. On the way the strike commander, Lieutenant Commander Rance, ordered each squadron to form into its own column. He knew the flak crews would be fully alerted, so he planned to offer a less conspicuous target for the flak gunners to aim at.
Operation Tungsten
Force 7 (Rear Admiral Bisset, flying flag in Royalist )
Fleet carriers (2×): Furious, Victorious
Escort carriers (4×): Searcher, Pursuer, Emperor, Fencer
Light cruisers (2×): Royalist (flag), Belfast
Destroyers (6×): Marne, Matchless, Meteor, Milne, Ursa, Undaunted
First strike
8 TBR Wing: 12× Barracudas (827 Squadron) from Victorious (two with 1× 1,600lb AP, eight with 3× 500lb MCs, two with 2× 600lb ASs); 9× Barracudas (830 Squadron) from Furious (five with 1× 1,600lb AP, four with 3× 500lb SAPs)
11× Corsairs (1834 Squadron) from Victorious
10× Hellcats (800 Squadron) from Emperor
10× Wildcats (881 Squadron) from Pursuer
10× Wildcats (882 Squadron) from Searcher
Second strike
52 TBR Wing: 11× Barracudas (829 Squadron) from Victorious* (four with 1× 1,600lb AP, four with 3× 500lb SAPs, three with 500lb MCs); 8× Barracudas (821 Squadron) from Furious** (all with 3× 500lb SAPs)
10× Corsairs (1836 Squadron) from Victorious
10× Hellcats (804 Squadron) from Emperor
10× Wildcats (896 Squadron) from Pursuer
9× Wildcats (896 Squadron) from Searcher
* There were originally 12× Barracudas in the wave, but one failed to take off due to engine failure.
** There were originally 9× Barracudas in the wave, but one crashed in the sea on take-off, killing its three-man crew.
Combat Air Patrol (CAP)
9× Seafires (801 Squadron) from Furious
9× Seafires (802 Squadron) from Furious
8× Wildcats (842 Squadron) from Fencer
Anti-Submarine Patrol (ASP)
12× Swordfish (842 Squadron) from Fencer
DAMAGE INFLICTED DURING OPERATION TUNGSTEN
This diagram is based on the Fleet Air Arm assessment of damage inflicted on Tirpitz during Operation Tungsten (3 April 1944), compiled a day after the attack. It replaced an earlier more optimistic account sent to the Admiralty immediately after the completion of the operation. In addition, considerable fire damage was reported in four locations – abaft ‘Bruno’ turret, around ‘Caesar’ turret and in the vicinities of secondary turrets PII and SIII.
First wave
A 1,600lb AP hit on starboard side of forecastle, forward of ‘Anton’ turret (1)
A 1,600lb AP hit on port side of catapult deck (9)
A 600lb AS (MC) hit on the funnel (8) [initially placed to port of funnel]
A 500lb SAP hit on the bridge (4) [initially placed starboard side of catapult deck]
One or two 500lb MC hits on port side of ‘Bruno’ turret (2)
A probable 500lb SAP hit on port side of after superstructure (11) [initially placed on catapult deck]
A probable 500lb SAP hit on starboard side of boat deck (7) [initially placed on catapult deck]
A probable 1,600lb AP hit on starboard side of foremast (6) [initially placed on catapult deck]
Second wave
A 1,600lb AP hit on starboard of after superstructure (12) [initially placed on hanger]
One or two 500lb MC hits on starboard beam, just inboard of SIII secondary turret (10)
A probable 500lb SAP hit on starboard side of quarterdeck (14)
A probable 500lb SAP hit on starboard side of ‘Caesar’ turret (13)
A probable 500lb MC hit on secondary turret SI (3)
A probable 500lb MC hit immediately forward of foremast (5)
In fact, despite the downgrading of the initial damage assessment, only three 1,600lb AP bombs hit the ship, at locations (1), (6), (9), and (12), as well as five 500lb SAP bombs at (4), (7), (11), (13), and (14) and four 500lb MC bombs at (2), (3), (5), (8), and (10). However, several near misses caused most of the flooding suffered by the battleship during the attack.
Once again, on reaching the Kaafjord from the north the Hellcats and Wildcats went in first, the former strafing the flak batteries along the north-western side of the fjord, while the Wildcats targeted the battleship herself. Rance noticed that the heavier flak batteries were setting their shells to burst at 3,000ft, but by then most of the Barracudas had dived through it and had released their bombs. By now the Tirpitz was manoeuvring slowly in the fjord, and when the second wave appeared she was lying across it, so that her starboard flak guns had a clear field of fire up the fjord. However, the air crews described her fire as light – they had more problems from the flak batteries on the shore. One Barracuda was shot down though – a plane from 829 Squadron, which was hit as it passed over the battleship. It dropped its ordnance, but crashed into the hillside on the south side of the fjord, exploding in a ball of flame. Then the fjord was clear again. Once again the attack had lasted no longer than a minute.
The Tirpitz looked a real shambles, with jagged, twisted metal everywhere, bomb holes in the deck, spouting smoke and flame, and everywhere the smell of burning. Below decks there was serious flooding, and the ship was listing slightly to starboard. Still, the damage control parties set to work, and soon the fires were extinguished and the flooding contained or stopped completely. Then the officers took stock. A total of 122 crewmen had been killed during the attack, and another 316 wounded. These included Captain Meyer, who was badly wounded as he watched the first wave attack his ship. His second-in-command, Captain Wolfe Junge, took over, and it was he who manoeuvred the battleship out into the fjord. While the ship looked a scene of disorder, the damage control reports proved encouraging. Much of the damage was largely superficial, and no bombs had penetrated the ship’s armoured decks or put her guns out of action. Despite the mess, the Tirpitz was still operational.
In all, the ship’s Chief Engineering Officer reported that she had been hit by 12 bombs, and four near misses had caused further damage. One of these near misses from a 1,600lb bomb had caused most of the flooding, as its blast on hitting the water had ripped a hole in the hull below the waterline. Three of them hit the ship, but failed to penetrate the armoured deck, largely because they were dropped from too low an altitude. This deck was one deck below the upper deck of the ship, and although they had gone through this upper less-well protected deck, smashing up the wardroom and a galley, the ship’s armoured citadel remained undamaged. While the other hits from the smaller ordnance had caused extensive damage to the battleship’s superstructure and flak defences, none of these was seen as of critical importance. However, with so many of their comrades dead or wounded, the morale of the crew had taken a hefty blow.
Barracudas flying over the Altenfjord, on their way to the Kaafjord. During the Fleet Air Arm strikes of 1944, the Barracudas flew in at around 5,000ft, with the escorting Corsairs flying above them. They then dived to 3,500ft or less to release their ordnance – if they could see the Tirpitz through her protective smoke screen.
Back on board the carriers the air crews felt they’d inflicted more damage than they actually had. The Barracuda crews all reported seeing the battleship on fire and that their bombs had hit her. They reported seeing explosions, smoke and flame, and all the signs of damage. From the radio report from the strike leader, Vice Admiral Bisset concluded in a signal to Forbes and Moore: ‘It is certain that Tirpitz is badly hit by first strike.’ The debrief of the crews confirmed this, and after studying photographs taken during the raid, Bisset concluded that Tirpitz had been struck by 17 bombs, including three 1,600lb armour-piercing ones, which landed near the forward superstructure. That evening, he signalled to his two superiors that ‘I believe Tirpitz to now be useless as a warship.’
On board Anson, Moore had planned to send his planes in again the following day. Now, though, he concluded that there was no need to risk the crews, and he called off the attack. By the afternoon of 6 April the carriers returned to Scapa Flow, their arrival cheered by the other ships of the fleet. Celebratory signals arrived from both the King and the Prime Minister. The celebrations were premature. PRU flights over the coming days and weeks revealed that although Tirpitz had been badly battered, she was still afloat, and that the damage appeared largely superficial. So, on 13 April, the First Sea Lord, Sir Andrew Cunningham, called both Forbes and Moore and ordered them to carry out another attack. Admiral Fraser was reluctant, as he felt the efforts would be wasted, but eventually he acquiesced, and Moore was ordered to draw up fresh plans.
Part of Fraser’s reluctance was that he was convinced that if the Tirpitz was only lightly damaged after a surprise attack, his naval airmen would have much less chance of success against a fully alerted target. This was particularly true in light of fresh evidence that the Germans were strengthening the anti-aircraft defences around the Kaafjord, and upgrading their chain of coastal radar stations. These were due to be fully operational by the end of June. However, he agreed to let Moore carry out another attack, codenamed Operation Planet. It would use the same carrier force that had participated in Tungsten, except this time the escort carrier Striker replaced the Fencer.
The carriers sailed from Scapa Flow on 21 April, accompanied by Moore in the battleship Anson, and a screen of escorts. They reached their flying-off position on 24 April, and the crews prepared to launch the strike shortly before midnight. Then, late that afternoon word reached Moore that the weather had deteriorated over the Altenfjord and any chance of carrying out a successful attack had gone. So, Operation Planet was cancelled, and the task force returned south, managing only a small consolation prize of a successful attack on coastal shipping off Bødo, south of Narvik. On 15 May the Home Fleet tried again. This time the attack on the Tirpitz was codenamed Operation Brawn. The carrier strike against the Tirpitz would be carried out by Furious and Victorious. This time, no escort carriers would take part. In this operation, 28 Barracudas formed the main striking force, escorted by 28 Corsairs, four Seafires and four Wildcats. They took off successfully late in the evening, but as the aircraft reached the Altenfjord they found the whole area was blanketed in low cloud. The strike force was recalled, without even venturing near the Kaafjord.
Just ten days later, on 25 May, Moore and his carriers left Scapa Flow again, and three days later they were in their now familiar launch point to the east of the Altenfjord. This attack, codenamed Operation Tiger Claw, was similar to its predecessor in terms of scale, with just Furious and Victorious involved, but it was similar in outcome too. Once again the strike was cancelled due to bad weather, although this time it happened before the strike was launched, and the carrier group headed south again, its air crews taking out their frustration on coastal convoys near Ålesund.
Undeterred, the Home Fleet decided to launch yet another attack, codenamed Operation Mascot, which was scheduled to be carried out in mid-July. This time the meteorologists predicted fair weather and clear skies. In these northern latitudes the summer sun never properly sets, so the operation was timed to take place when the ‘midnight sun’ was at its lowest. The day before, Admiral Fraser had hauled down his flag as commander of the Home Fleet. His place was taken by his newly promoted deputy, Admiral Moore, who was a staunch advocate of naval air power. As in previous Home Fleet air strikes Moore played a major part in the planning. For Operation Mascot, he planned to draw on considerable naval aviation resources, committing three fleet carriers to the operation – Formidable, Furious and Indefatigable. Victorious was no longer available, as she had been ordered to the Indian Ocean, so the newly completed Indefatigable took her place.
Operation Mascot
Home Fleet (Admiral Moore, flying flag in Duke of York)
Fleet carriers (3×): Formidable, Furious, Indefatigable
Battleships (1×): Duke of York (flag)
Heavy cruisers (2×): Devonshire, Kent
Light cruisers (2×): Bellona, Jamaica
Destroyers (16×): Burges, Bulldog, Hoste, Inman, Marne, Matchless, Milne, Musketeer, Nubian, Scourge, Verulam, Vigilant, Virago, Volage, plus Algonquin, Sioux (both Royal Canadian Navy)
Strike aircraft
8 TBR Wing: 12× Barracudas (827 Squadron) from Formidable (six with 1× 1,000lb AP, six with 3× 500lb SAPs); 10× Barracudas (830 Squadron) from Furious (six with 1× 1,600lb AP, four with 3× 500lb SAPs)
9 TBR Wing 12× Barracudas (820 Squadron) from Indefatigable (six with 1× 1,000lb AP, six with 3× 500lb SAPs); 10× Barracudas (826 Squadron) from Indefatigable (five with 1× 1,600lb AP, five with 3× 500lb SAPs)
18× Corsairs (1841 Squadron) from Formidable
12× Fireflys (1770 Squadron) from Indefatigable
18× Hellcats (1840 Squadron) from Furious
Combat Air Patrol (CAP)
12× Seafires (880 Squadron) from Furious
16× Seafires (894 Squadron) from Indefatigable
8× Wildcats (842 Squadron) from Fencer
Anti-Submarine Patrol (ASP)
3× Swordfish (842 Squadron) from Furious
2× Barracudas (830 Squadron) from Furious
2× Barracudas (826 Squadron) from Indefatigable
Operation Mascot would involve 48 Barracudas, flying from Formidable and Indefatigable, escorted by 18 Corsairs, 18 Hellcats and 12 Fireflies. Moore would command the fleet from his flagship Duke of York, while the carriers were controlled by Rear Admiral Rhoderick McGrigor, flying his flag in the Indefatigable. Once again the air crews practised their attacks over Loch Eribol, before the force sailed from Scapa Flow on 14 July. The attack was scheduled for the night of 16/17 July. By the late afternoon of 16 July the task force was in place, a little to the north of its position in previous operations. The Corsairs took off from Formidable at midnight, followed by the Barracudas, which were split into two wings. At 0135hrs, the strike force was fully assembled, and it set off towards the Tirpitz, flying at 50ft to avoid showing up on radar. There was no sign of enemy aircraft, and for once there was no low cloud to obscure the target.
However, this time, at 0200hrs, the Germans picked up the low-flying strike on their recently improved radar system, and the Tirpitz was warned even before the strike reached the coast. Just as importantly, a newly installed set of German electronic stations began jamming the British radio signals. A few minutes later, at 0210hrs, Tirpitz began deploying her smoke screen, which had recently been expanded by adding more smoke generators at the top of the heights overlooking the Kaafjord. Also, since Tungsten in April, the Germans had installed a mountaintop observation post on the crest of the high ground on the north-western side of the fjord, and it had a direct communications link to the battleship. Not only did this serve as a lookout, reporting on the course, number and height of the approaching planes, but the post also contained a flak direction team.
As for the flak itself, thanks to the arrival of new airburst shells, the Tirpitz was able to add the weight of her main and secondary guns to the flak barrage. In all, some 39 38cm flak shells were fired during the attack, as well as another 359 rounds from her secondary 15cm guns. While of limited use save as a deterrent, these larger shells added greatly to the strength of the flak barrage thrown up from the battleship by her dedicated 10.5cm flak guns. In addition her 3.7cm and 20mm guns were sending up streams of tracer, as were the flak batteries lining the fjord. It was into this maelstrom of smoke and fire that the strike aircraft began their attack, at around 0234hrs. As before it was the fighters who led the way, the Hellcats and Fireflies swooping down into the fjord to strafe the battleship and any flak batteries they spotted on the shore. In fact the target was completely obscured by smoke. The best the pilots could do was to fire into the murk. They did, however, manage to strafe the German destroyer Z-33, patrolling in the mouth of the Kaafjord, as well as a small patrol boat – a converted trawler – which duly ran aground.
Then, at 0249hrs, the Barracudas began their attack. Once again there was no sign of the battleship, but the dive bombers made their run, in batches of four or six planes at a time. Afterwards, only two pilots claimed they were actually able to see the Tirpitz through the smoke. Some air crews avoided releasing their bombs, as they found nothing to aim at, while others released their ordnance in the direction of the flak climbing out of the smoke towards them. All they had to show for their efforts was one near miss. However, other targets presented themselves – one Barracuda released its bombs over a flak position and another made an unsuccessful bombing run on the hapless Z-33.
Within 20 minutes it was all over. The planes climbed out of the fjord and headed back to their carriers. Two aircraft were lost during the attack – a Corsair and a Barracuda – but several other dive bombers were damaged, and were lucky to make it back to their ship. The Corsair crashed in the fjord, and the pilot was rescued and captured, while the Barracuda managed to reach the carrier group but was unable to land, and was forced to crash-land in the sea next to the Indefatigable. Her crew were rescued by a destroyer. One of the damaged Hellcats managed to land, but the aircraft was so badly damaged that it was written off, and thrown overboard. Yet again a Fleet Air Arm attack had ended in disappointment. Moore planned to repeat the attack the following morning at 0800hrs. The strike aircraft were actually ranged on deck for this second attack, when the appearance of fog, both around the carriers and in the target area, led to the attack being cancelled.
Corsairs of 1841 Squadron ranged on the deck of HMS Formidable being prepared for take-off during Operation Goodwood. Each of them carries a long-range fuel tank. Astern of the carrier, the heavy cruiser Berwick is deployed as part of the task force screen, providing extra anti-aircraft protection for the carriers.
Tirpitz had survived Operation Mascot unscathed, and work continued on repairing the damage suffered during Operation Tungsten. Hundreds of civilian workers had cut away her damaged superstructure, repaired her guns, and patched the holes in her deck – often using wood and concrete if nothing else was available. Although her captain described her as fully combat ready, the battleship had never fully recovered from the damage she suffered from Operation Source, and more recently from Tungsten. At best, she could steam at 20 knots, which meant she could be overhauled by just about every surface warship in the Home Fleet. Still, at the end of July she left her moorings, and ventured out into the mouth of the Altenfjord, where she conducted various exercises, protected by a watchful screen of destroyers. When the Admiralty learned of this they feared that Tirpitz was ready to carry out operations again, and so once again she would be a threat to the Arctic Convoys. So, she had to be dealt with. By then, though, the Home Fleet was busy planning an even larger and more sustained operation. This time, the carrier group would keep launching attacks until the job was done.
The Arctic Convoys had been suspended since May 1944, due to the coming of the long summer days. War materials were stockpiling in Britain, Canada and the United States, so it was imperative that they should resume in mid-August, when the days were beginning to get shorter again. Despite her reduced abilities the Tirpitz remained a potent threat to these convoys, particularly if she sortied under the cover of German aircraft. So the First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham, ordered the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet to do what he could to sink the battleship, or at least to neutralize her. As a result, Admiral Moore and his staff set about planning what would become the biggest British carrier operation of the war.
This operation would serve a double purpose. Not only would it deal with the Tirpitz, but by putting to sea the Home Fleet could also cover the first Arctic Convoy of the season. The 34 merchant ships of convoy JW-59 were due to leave Loch Ewe on 15 August, bound for Murmansk. They had a strong escort, including the escort carriers Striker and Vindex, and the Soviet battleship Archangelsk (formerly the British Royal Sovereign). However, the powerful carrier strike force could also support the convoy if required. On 18 August, Force 1 left Scapa Flow and headed towards the Arctic Sea. It consisted of Moore’s flagship Duke of York, the fleet carriers Formidable, Furious and Indefatigable, and a screen of escorts. These were the carriers which had spearheaded Operation Mascot. Force 2 accompanied it, a much smaller group centred on the escort carriers Nabob and Trumpeter. Together, though, these carriers gave Moore the chance to launch an even larger strike than he had done during Operation Tungsten.
Just as importantly, Force 9 was also heading north – a group of two fleet tankers and their escorts, which gave Moore the ability to linger on station for several days. This reduced the risk of the whole operation being cancelled due to bad weather, and also allowed Moore to carry out flying operations for up to nine days. This meant that more than one strike against the Tirpitz could be attempted. On the evening of 20 August the carriers arrived at their flying-off position to the north-west of the Altenfjord, and as far as Moore could tell, their presence hadn’t been detected. The first strike was scheduled for the following morning. However, bad weather intervened and the attack was postponed for a day. Moore used the opportunity to refuel his screen of destroyers and frigates, so that they could remain on station.
The plan was to carry out the strike with the Barracudas armed with a single 11,600lb AP bomb apiece. As in previous operations the Corsairs would provide ‘top cover’, along with the Fireflies and a squadron of Seafires. This time, though, the Corsairs also carried 500lb bombs, so they could dive-bomb the target if the opportunity arose. The Hellcats would provide close escort, but carried 500lb bombs as well. Meanwhile other Barracudas would fly on anti-submarine patrols around the task force, while Seafires and Wildcats would screen it from enemy air attacks. The large number of Seafires carried showed just how serious a threat Moore considered the German bombers to be. Finally, the Avengers carried in the escort carriers would drop mines in the Kaafjord to seal the Tirpitz off from the sea.
Operation Goodwood
Home Fleet
Commander-in-chief: Admiral Moore, in Duke of York
Second-in-command: Vice Admiral McGrigor, in Indefatigable
Force 1
Battleships (1×): Duke of York (flag)
Fleet carriers (3×): Formidable, Furious, Indefatigable
Heavy cruisers (2×): Berwick, Devonshire
Destroyers (14×): Cambrian, Myngs (flotilla leader), Scorpion, Scourge, Serapis, Verulam, Vigilant, Virago, Volage, Whirlwind, Wrangler, Stord (Royal Norwegian Navy), Algonquin, Sioux (both Royal Canadian Navy)
Force 2
Escort carriers (2×): Nabob, Trumpeter
Heavy cruisers (1×): Kent
Frigates (6×): Aylmer, Bickerton, Bligh, Grindall, Keats, Kempthorne (all 5th Escort Group)
Force 9
Destroyer (1×): Nubian
Corvettes (3×): Poppy, Dianella, Starwort
Fleet oilers (2×): Black Ranger, Blue Ranger
Air assets
12× Barracudas (827 Squadron) from Furious
12× Barracudas (820 Squadron) from Indefatigable
12× Barracudas (826 Squadron) from Formidable
12× Barracudas (828 Squadron) from Formidable
18× Corsairs (1841 Squadron) from Formidable
12× Corsairs (1842 Squadron) from Formidable
12× Hellcats (1840 Squadron) from Indefatigable
8× Avengers (846 Squadron) from Trumpeter
12× Avengers (852 Squadron) from Nabob
6× Wildcats (846 Squadron) from Trumpeter
4× Wildcats (852 Squadron) from Nabob
12× Fireflies (1770 Squadron) from Indefatigable
12× Seafires (801 Squadron) from Furious
12× Seafires (880 Squadron) from Furious
16× Seafires (887 Squadron) from Indefatigable
16× Seafires (894 Squadron) from Indefatigable
At 0530hrs on 22 August, with the promise of better flying conditions to come, Moore made the decision to launch the strike at 0830hrs that morning. However, the continued bad weather led to a postponement, and it was 1100hrs when the Corsairs took off from Formidable and climbed above the carriers. The rest followed, and by 1150hrs the strike force was on its way to its target. It consisted of 31 Barracudas, drawn from all four squadrons, as well as 24 Corsairs, 11 Fireflies, nine Hellcats and eight Seafires. The Avengers were left behind on the escort carriers, as there were only enough mines for one operation. As the planes couldn’t land with them if the sortie was aborted, and would have to ditch them in the sea, Moore decided to wait for better flying conditions before he used them. The strike force flew towards the coast at 500ft, and only started to climb to 10,000ft when it got within 15 miles of the coast.
However, the Norwegian coast ahead of them was blanketed in a thick low cloud, at 1,500ft. This meant it would be impossible to carry out a successful dive bombing, so the strike leader, Lieutenant Commander West, ordered the Barracudas and Corsairs to return to the carriers. The fighters pressed on, though, seeking out targets to attack. The Seafires strafed Banak airfield and a nearby seaplane base, the Fireflies did the same to flak positions around the Kaafjord, while at 1249hrs the Hellcats attacked the Tirpitz. The Germans were taken by surprise, so at first flak was relatively light. One Hellcat claimed to have hit the battleship just behind her forward superstructure, but otherwise she was unscathed. One of the Hellcats was shot down in the attack, as was a Seafire as it flew over Kolvik seaplane base. The only other loss of the strike was a Barracuda from 827 Squadron, which messed up its landing back on Furious and ended up ditching in the sea, from where its crew were rescued by a destroyer.
This attack, known later as ‘Goodwood I’, was in line with Moore’s tactic of carrying out ‘teasing tactics’ if the weather precluded the launch of a full-scale strike. It was repeated that evening, when in a sortie grandly known as ‘Goodwood II’, six Hellcats and eight Fireflies from Indefatigable took off at 1830hrs, heading back towards the Tirpitz. Once again the Hellcats carried 500lb SAP bombs. They appeared over the Kaafjord at 1910hrs, and once more the low-flying fighters took the crew of the battleship by surprise. When they appeared the smoke screen still hadn’t been deployed. Flying conditions were good, but still none of the bombs hit the ship. The fighters shot up other targets of opportunity on the way back up the Altenfjord, and all aircraft returned safely.
So far, Goodwood had cost Moore three aircraft, but this was partly mitigated by the fact that the Seafires patrolling over the task force had shot down two German reconnaissance flying boats. Much more serious was the operational loss of the escort carrier Nabob. The task force had been sighted by U-354, a Type VIIC U-boat commanded by Lieutenant Commander Sthamer. That afternoon, Moore detached Formidable and Furious to refuel from his fleet tankers, which were over the horizon to the west. He also sent Force 2 westwards, to refuel their escorts from their own fuel tanks. This unwittingly brought them within range of the U-boat, whose spread of torpedoes launched at 1755hrs hit the escort carrier Nabob and the frigate Bickerton. While the other escorts chased Sthamer, the crew of the Nabob fought to save her. Eventually, she limped off, protected by a screen of escorts. The stricken Bickerton, though, was a complete wreck, and had to be scuttled. This deprived Moore of the ability to launch his mine-carrying Avengers, so that part of the plan had to be abandoned. He probably found some consolation in the news that two days later U-354 was sunk with all hands by depth charges dropped from a Swordfish operating from the escort carrier Vindex.
Nabob limped south towards Scapa Flow, protected by the rest of Force 2. Moore ordered his fleet carriers to regroup, and in the meantime, with one carrier at his disposal, he planned to launch another ‘teasing attack’ the following day. By dawn on 23 August both Formidable and Furious were still absent, so the attack would go ahead with just the Hellcats, Fireflies and Seafires from Indefatigable. Once again, however, bad weather led to the cancellation of the strike, as fog blanketed the area. Still, this allowed the detached carriers to rejoin the fleet, and so, in hope of better weather to come, Moore and his staff spent the day planning for a full-scale attack to be launched the following morning.
On 22 August, during Operation Goodwood, the escort carrier Nabob was torpedoed by the German U-boat U-354. Ironically, Nabob was attached to the carrier group in order to provide anti-submarine air patrols. Despite listing to port and down by the stern the carrier made it back to Scapa Flow under her own steam, before being towed to Rosyth for repairs.
As dawn broke on 24 August it was clear that flying was still impossible. So the crews waited, until at 1330hrs Moore gave the order to go ahead. An hour later, at 1430hrs, the first of the strikes began taking off from the three carriers; ‘Goodwood III’ was under way. This time 33 Barracudas formed the heart of the strike, made up from all four squadrons. Each carried a single 1,600lb AP bomb. The remaining operational Barracudas were deployed on anti-submarine patrol. Of the 24 Corsairs in the strike, five carried 1,100lb APs, while each of the ten Hellcats was armed with 500lb APs. Ten Fireflies provided dedicated ‘top cover’, as this time the Corsairs were ordered to peel off over the Kaafjord and attack targets of opportunity. In addition, eight Seafires took off to ‘shoot up’ Banak airfield, while others formed a combat air patrol over the task force. Conditions that afternoon were near perfect, and the air crews flying in at 500ft were able to see the coast from 60 miles away.
This time the German radar operators saw them coming, even before they climbed to their bombing height on reaching the coast. At 1541hrs the Tirpitz sounded her air attack warning, and as her crew scrambled to man their guns the smoke screen generators got to work. Meanwhile, as the strike aircraft flew over the Langfjord they came under attack from the flak guns of the destroyers anchored there. Over the Kaafjord the Germans were throwing up a strong box barrage at 3,000–4,000ft, but this diminished slightly when the fighters swooped in to attack the flak positions on the shore. It was now 1559hrs, and the Hellcats peeled off to attack the battleship. By now, however, she was completely obscured by smoke. Despite the heavy flak many of the pilots circled round for another bombing run, before making way for the Barracudas. All they had to show for it was one hit on the battleship’s ‘Bruno’ turret. One Hellcat was lost during this attack, while a second Hellcat would go down while attacking a wireless station on the shore some ten minutes later.
Behind them came the five bomb-armed Corsairs, one of which mistakenly claimed a hit on the battleship with its 500lb bomb. Three of the five, though, were shot down, while a fourth was so badly damaged that it had to ditch next to Formidable after making it back to the task force. Behind the Corsairs the Barracudas were starting their attack. Again, almost none of the crewmen could actually see their target, and were reduced to aiming at the source of the tracer coming towards them through the smoke. The 33 Barracudas attacked in waves of five or six aircraft, and virtually all the pilots released their bombs from a height of around 4,000ft, well above the smoke and the box barrage exploding beneath them. They had to dive through it, however, and several of the aircraft were hit. One 1,600lb bomb struck the port side of Tirpitz, near the side of her bridge, but otherwise none of the bombs hit their target, thanks to the impenetrable smoke.
On the way home the strike aircraft attacked any targets they came across, from flak positions to patrol boats, destroyers and flak ships. Apart from the Hellcat that crashed during this phase, and the Corsair that ditched next to its carrier, all of the other surviving aircraft made it back. Many of the Barracudas were badly battered, though, and would have to be patched up before they could fly again. After the sortie, Moore counted the cost. He had lost six aircraft over the Altenfjord, and one more while landing on. In exchange he had reduced the flak defences surrounding the anchorage and scored two hits on the battleship. Of these, the 1,600lb bomb had pierced five decks, but failed to explode. The 500lb bomb dropped by a Hellcat had demolished the quadruple flak gun mounted on the top of ‘Bruno’ turret, but otherwise had inflicted no other damage. In all, Tirpitz had lost eight men dead and 18 wounded in the attack.
After the operation it was clear that the elderly Furious was suffering mechanical problems and running low on fuel, so she was detached early on 25 August. Moore took part of Force 1 over to the Faroes to refuel, while the carriers and their escorts did the same from the Force 9 fleet tankers. At 0300hrs on 29 August, the two parts of Force 1 were reunited 250 nautical miles west of the Altenfjord. They steamed inshore during the night, and by noon they had reached their old launching position, 80 nautical miles off the coast. The weather looked unpromising, but conditions soon improved, and at 1530hrs ‘Goodwood IV’ began as the first aircraft took off from Moore’s two remaining carriers, Formidable and Indefatigable. Twenty-five minutes later, after forming up, they set off towards the Kaafjord.
Operation Goodwood III, Kaafjord, 24 August 1944
On 18 August 1944 a British carrier force left Scapa Flow bound for the waters off the Altenfjord. There they launched the first of a series of naval air strikes against the Tirpitz, which was moored in the Kaafjord. This undertaking, codenamed Operation Goodwood, involved the launching of coordinated strikes from five aircraft carriers, supported by a screen of fighters. The first two strikes, Goodwood I and Goodwood II, were launched on 22 August, but low cloud hampered the first strike, while the second was little more than a small-scale bombing and strafing attack, carried out by Fireflies and Hellcats.
Two days later, on 24 August, the Fleet Air Arm tried again. This time weather conditions were more favourable, and a strike of 33 Barracuda dive bombers took off. Preceding them were five Corsair and ten Hellcat fighters carrying smaller bombs, while fighter cover was provided by 19 Corsairs and ten Fireflies. The attack began at 1559hrs DBST, as the fast bomb-armed fighters made their run, attacking at low level. By then, though, the Tirpitz was wreathed by her protective smoke screen, and by the time the first Barracudas arrived, the battleship was hidden by the smoke. Still, the attack went ahead as planned, with each wave of five or six Barracudas diving from 5,000ft to release their 1,600lb AP bombs at the spot where their crews thought the battleship lay.
The bombers had to dive through a heavy layer of flak, and many aimed at the source of the tracer from light anti-aircraft guns, emerging through the white smoke. However, only two bombs hit the Tirpitz during the attack. Several Barracudas were damaged, but miraculously none were shot down during the attack. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of Tirpitz’s smoke screen demonstrably showed that this sort of attack was unlikely to succeed. So, after one more attempt the operation was called off, and the Admiralty were forced to ask Bomber Command for their help in sinking the German battleship.
This time the strike force was made up of 26 Barracudas, each carrying a single 1,600lb AP bomb. Two Corsairs carried single 1,000lb APs, while three Hellcats were equipped with 500lb APs. Four other Hellcats equipped with target indication flares and 15 more Corsairs flew as escorts, together with ten Fireflies. Seven more Seafires also took off to cause a diversion, by shooting up coastal shipping off Hammerfest. The aircraft were detected by German radar at 1640hrs, and thanks to a strong wind the strike made landfall some miles to the south of their usual spot over Loppa. For once they were approaching the Tirpitz from the south-west, rather than the west. Actually, this made almost no difference. The smoke screen was deployed long before the first aircraft appeared over the Kaafjord, and once more the air crews were attacking a target they couldn’t see. The innovation of using four Hellcats to drop coloured smoke flares would have helped the dive bombers to identify the target, but by the time they arrived the Tirpitz was completely obscured.
At 1702hrs the bomb-armed Hellcats and Corsairs made their run, but all five bombs missed their target. Happy that no enemy fighters were in the area, the rest of the fighter escort and the flare-carrying Hellcats dropped down into the smoke to strafe the hidden battleship as best they could, or shoot up flak positions along the edge of the fjord. Then, 15 minutes later, the Barracudas began their attack, having formed a column several aircraft wide. They dropped their bombs from 3,500ft or above, and some kept diving until they were swallowed up by the thick white smoke. While the crews later claimed a score of two hits, in fact the Tirpitz emerged completely unscathed. This time a Corsair and a Firefly were shot down over the Kaafjord as they made their strafing run. Two more badly shot-up Barracudas made it back to their carriers, but were so badly damaged that they were ditched over the side.
Wing Commander J. B. Willy Tait DSO DFC (1916–2007) was the commanding officer of 617 Squadron, and the leader of the three Lancaster missions against the Tirpitz in 1944 – Operations Paravane, Obviate and Catechism. In all he flew over a hundred bombing missions during the war, but he is best remembered as the man responsible for the sinking of the Tirpitz.
On board the Tirpitz, the only material effect of these four Operation Goodwood attacks, apart from the loss of a handful of her crew, was the damage caused by an equally small number of bomb hits, the most serious of which was from a 1,600lb bomb that failed to explode. This damage, though, was easily patched. Less easy to replace was the ammunition she had expended. During the attacks she had fired off a total of 201 rounds from her 38cm main guns, 1,141 rounds from her 15cm secondary guns, and roughly 60 per cent of her smaller-calibre anti-aircraft rounds. In the late summer of 1944, as Allied tanks were racing through France towards the German border, the chances of replenishing all this ordnance looked slim.
After recovering their aircraft the carriers returned to Scapa Flow with an escort, while the rest of the Home Fleet set off to cover the transit of another Arctic Convoy, this time the homeward-bound RA-59. Moore’s force finally reached its base in Orkney on 3 September. It was there that the Home Fleet’s commander learned from Ultra signal intercepts that the damage of these raids on the German battleship had been negligible. So, gallant though it undoubtedly was, the Fleet Air Arm offensive against the Tirpitz had been a failure. Tirpitz still remained a threat to the Arctic Convoys, and by now it was clear that the Royal Navy lacked the ordnance needed to deal with her. It was now up to the RAF to take up the torch, and to deal the knock-out blow.
Various alternatives were now considered. These included using fast twin-engined Mosquitos to attack the ship, launched from the Home Fleet’s carriers. It was felt that they would be fast enough to confound the enemy’s smoke screen and so have a clear run at the Tirpitz. However, they were all needed in the main theatre of war, so the use of them was denied. So too was another request to use American B-17 bombers, flying from Soviet airfields. They were required for the round-the-clock bombing of targets in Germany. So it fell to Bomber Command to do the job. That meant using the Lancaster.
This rare photograph shows a 12,000lb Tallboy bomb being dropped from a Lancaster of 617 Squadron during a training exercise in August 1944, before the squadron carried out its three attacks on the Tirpitz. Thanks to a new precision bomb-aiming device, a high degree of accuracy could be assured, if only the aimer could see the target prior to the bomb’s release.
Fortunately, since Bomber Command’s last attempt on Tirpitz, new ordnance had been introduced which was particularly well suited to the task. These ‘JW’ bombs were mine-bombs designed to repeatedly rise and sink while moving laterally through the water. When they made contact with the underside of a ship they would explode. While this was ingenious, a much more effective piece of ordnance was the newly introduced ‘Tallboy’. When dropped over land, this highly aerodynamic, hardened-steel 12,000lb bomb reached a supersonic terminal velocity, could penetrate up to 16ft of concrete and produced its own earthquake when it then exploded underground. It had already proved its worth in attacks on German rocket sites, and it was felt that it could be equally effective if dropped on a battleship.
Fleet Air Arm attacks
Kaafjord, April–August 1944
TIRPITZ ANCHORAGES
A. Tirpitz summer anchorage
B. Tirpitz winter anchorage
EVENTS
Operation Tungsten: 3 April 1944
Cloud cover 2/10ths at 10,000ft, visibility good
1. 0521hrs. On shore, smoke generators start releasing smoke screen around Tirpitz
2. 0524hrs. Corsair and Hellcat fighters strafe the Tirpitz and the shore defences
3. 0528hrs. First wave. Nine Barracudas of 830 Sqn attack Tirpitz as she is manoeuvring in the fjord. One shot down, no bomb hits achieved.
4. Second wave. 12 Barracudas of 827 Sqn attack as as Tirpitz is returning to her anti-torpedo cage.
Operation Mascot: 17 July 1944
Cloud cover 5/10ths at 6,000ft, visibility good
5. 0232hrs. Smoke screen deployed. Within 10 minutes it completely obscures Tirpitz and is 1,000ft high.
6. 0234hrs. Hellcat and Firefly fighters sweep down Kaafjord, strafe Tirpitz and other targets on the shores
7. 0249hrs. Bombing run by 44 Barracudas, deployed in waves of 5–6 aircraft. Target is completely obscured by smoke. No losses, no bomb hits.
Operation Goodwood: 22–29 August
Operation Goodwood I and II: 22 August 1944. Cloud cover 8/10ths at 1,500ft, visibility reasonable
8. 1249hrs. Hellcats bomb Tirpitz with 500lb bombs.
9. 0710am. Surprise attack by seven Hellcat fighter-bombers, diving from the clouds. Seven Fireflies follow the attack with a strafing run. No smoke screen deployed before raid finished. No aircraft losses, no bomb hits.
Operation Goodwood III: 24 August 1944
10. 1554hrs. Forewarned of attack, the Germans deploy their protective smoke screen
11. 1559hrs. Five Corsairs and ten Hellcats attack Tirpitz, releasing 1,100lb and 500lb bombs respectively, then strafe her before engaging targets on the shore or on other ships in the Altenfjord. One 500lb bomb hits the battleship. Four Corsairs and two Hellcats shot down.
12. 16.02hrs. 33 Barracudas attack from 4,000ft, deployed in waves each of 5–6 aircraft. By then Tirpitz was completely obscured by smoke, to a height of 1,000ft. All the pilots could do was to aim at the flashes of the AA guns. One aircraft shot down, one 1,600lb bomb hit.
Operation Goodwood IV: 29 August 1944. Cloud cover 4/10ths at 8,000ft, visibility good.
13. 1648hrs. The Germans are warned of approaching aircraft, and deploy smoke screen. Target completely obscured during all attacks.
14. 1702hrs. Three Hellcats and two Corsairs drop 500lb and 1,100lb bombs on the battleship. No hits scored. 15 Corsairs and ten Fireflies follow, strafing Tirpitz and shore defences.
15. 1717hrs. 26 Barracudas attack in waves of 5–6 aircraft, each releasing bombs from 3,500ft–4,000ft. No aircraft lost, no hits scored.
Bomber Command realised that the Altenfjord was beyond the range of Lancasters operating from air bases in north-eastern Scotland. So it was decided to fly a bomber force to the Soviet Union, and base it in an airfield near Archangel. From there the bombers could reach their target if they were modified slightly with additional fuel tanks and the removal of their upper gun turret. Better still, by approaching the Kaafjord from the east, it was hoped that the attackers would avoid being detected by the German radar stations until it was too late to deploy the smoke screen over the Kaafjord.
The obvious choice for this operation was 617 Squadron (‘the Dambusters’), commanded by Wing Commander ‘Willy’ Tait, based in Woodhall Spa in Lincolnshire. Their Lancasters had been converted to use the Tallboy, and the crews were used to unusual missions. Accompanying them would be 9 Squadron, commanded by Wing Commander Bazin, based in nearby Bardney. Their bombers could also accommodate the new bomb. In late August, 5 Group of Bomber Command were ordered to draw up plans for the attack, codenamed Operation Paravane.
Early on, it was decided that a Soviet airfield should be used. The original idea was to fly to forward bases in north-east Scotland, then bomb the Tirpitz before heading east to land on an airfield in northern Russia. However, the high risk of bad weather over the Altenfjord meant that this scheme was shelved on 11 September. Instead, the bombers would fly to Yagodnik airfield near Archangel, and launch their attack from there. The airfield lay in an island in the Dvina River, 12 miles south-west of Archangel and 610 miles from the Kaafjord. The only problem was getting there. At 1900hrs on 12 September, 18 fully armed Lancasters of 9 Squadron took off from Barney, accompanied by two Liberators carrying spare parts and ground crew, a Lancaster from 463 Squadron which was there to film the operation and a PRU Mosquito, to check that the Tirpitz was still where it was supposed to be. Another 20 Lancasters from 617 Squadron also took off from Woodhall Spa. The operation was under way.
This image was taken from a Lancaster carrying a film crew on 15 September 1944. Taken from about 20,000ft, it shows the opening stages of Operation Paravane, when Tirpitz was attacked in the Kaafjord by Lancaster bombers carrying Tallboys and JW mines. The bomber in the picture, part of ‘Force A’, is flying at approximately 15,000ft, flying up the fjord towards the battleship, having already released its Tallboy. The German smoke screen is already thickening, and beginning to obscure the target, which is just off the top edge of the photograph.
Air Vice Marshal Ralph Cochrane (1895–1977), the Scottish-born commander of the RAF’s No. 5 Group, championed the use of his bomber squadrons in specialist precision attacks. The most famous of these was the Dambuster Raid of May 1943, carried out by 617 Squadron. He saw the potential of the Tallboy, and two of his squadrons were equipped to use the giant bomb when in August 1944 his group was ordered to sink the Tirpitz.
The flight path took them north over Lossiemouth, where the Liberators stopped to refuel, then on past Orkney and Shetland. Only one Lancaster had to turn back due to engine failure. From there they headed west over central Norway and Sweden, the Gulf of Bothnia and then Finland, before crossing into the Soviet Union west of Lake Onega. Before leaving, the crews had been assured that the weather would be favourable and visibility good. Instead, they found the whole region of endless forest, lake and swamp blanketed in thick low cloud, low mist and lashed by heavy rain. Most had been given the wrong radio frequencies too, so the crews had to navigate using outdated maps and dead reckoning. Consequently, only 23 Lancasters made it to Yagodnik. The other 14 Lancasters either landed on secondary airfields in the Archangel region or were forced to crash-land in the rare patches of boggy meadow they found.
The next day, Tait set out in an old Soviet biplane to look for the stragglers, while others flew on to Yagodnik after refuelling. He found five at Keg-Ostrov beside Archangel, and more at nearby Talagi, but others were as far away as Onega, 70 miles to the east. By the end of 12 September, 31 Lancasters had been gathered at Yagodnik. Six others – four from 9 Squadron and two from 617 Squadron – had to be written off due to damage. At least these would provide spare parts for the serviceable aircraft, several of which needed urgent repairs. During all this the Soviet servicemen they encountered were extremely helpful, doing whatever they could to help Tait gather his bombers together. The ground crews worked hard through 13 September, and by the following morning a total of 27 Lancasters were ready to fly. Of these, 20 were armed with a single Tallboy while the remaining six carried a payload of JW mine-bombs. The film unit Lancaster was also fully operational. Early that morning the PRU Mosquito inspected the Kaafjord, but reported that the area was covered in low cloud: the 0800hrs take-off was postponed for a day.
The day was spent playing football and being entertained by the Russians, who produced copious amounts of vodka for the British airmen. Meanwhile, Tait revised his plans. The two squadrons would form up together, then fly east over Finland, keeping below 500ft to avoid being detected by the German radar station at Kirkenes, 70 miles north-east of Murmansk. Then, over Lapland the attackers would split into two groups. Force A, with the Tallboys, and accompanied by the film plane, would climb to 20,000ft and approach the target in four ‘gaggles’ of five aircraft. Three planes of the first ‘gaggle’, all from 9 Squadron, would fly on ahead to check out the weather conditions over the Kaafjord before the rest of the Lancasters arrived. The six JW-armed bombers of Force B would fly in at 16,000ft.
Before dawn on 15 September the Mosquito set off for the Kaafjord, and at 0900hrs DBST (0700hrs Soviet local time) it reported that conditions there were favourable. Thirty minutes later at 0930hrs DBST the Lancasters took off, and headed west over the White Sea. On the way, six of the bombers were forced to turn back due to mechanical failure, but the rest continued on towards Norway without being detected. A little before 1200hrs Tait ordered them to climb, and 40 minutes later they spotted the Altenfjord ahead of them. Tait ordered Force A to drop down to their bombing height of 14,000–18,000ft. They were also spotted themselves, and as they neared their target they could see the smoke screen spreading out over the Kaafjord. Still, at 1256hrs the first ‘gaggle’ from Force A were able to drop their Tallboys before the Tirpitz was completely obscured. One of them – possibly the one dropped from Tait’s bomber – hit the battleship. The other ‘gaggles’ were less fortunate and, although 17 of the 20 Tallboys were dropped, could only target the source of the tracer climbing towards them. A few bombers even made more than one pass, in the vain hope that a rift would appear in the smoke screen.
Force B had a plan which should have obviated the smoke. First they circled around, to keep out of the way of Force A’s bombs. Their bomb sights were targeted at a feature on the hill on the north-west side of the Kaafjord, which was above the smoke. By adjusting their sights, they hoped to ensure that the JW bombs would land around the battleship. Most of them released their bombs according to plan, dropping them from a height of 10,000–12,000ft, but none of them caused any damage. By 1307hrs the attack was over and the bombers had turned back towards Russia. The one exception was the film Lancaster, which flew on to Waddington in Lincolnshire, landing there just before 2300hrs DBST, after a flight lasting almost 13½ hours. The others flew back to Yagodnik, where the Soviets welcomed them with a marching band and more vodka. The following morning most of the jaded airmen flew home to Lincolnshire, where they expected to learn if their mission had been a success or not. One Lancaster from 617 Squadron crashed near Nesbyen in Norway on the flight home, killing all the men on board.
In fact, of all the ordnance dropped that day, only one Tallboy hit the Tirpitz. It landed near the bow, on the focsle beneath the guns of ‘Anton’ turret. It went right through the armoured deck, and continued on to pierce the starboard hull of the ship below the waterline. There it exploded, causing extensive underwater damage. One officer likened the huge hole in the focsle to ‘a barn door’. There was extensive flooding forward, with 2,000 tons of water flooding the forward compartments, while internal bulkheads were buckled by the blast. One Norwegian described the hole below the waterline on her starboard side as being large enough to sail a ship’s boat into. The concussion from the ‘earthquake bomb’ damaged the ship’s engines, turbines and much of her auxiliary machinery. It was five days before a PRU Mosquito could photograph the Tirpitz, and this showed that her bows were down in the water, and covered by some form of screen.
The full extent of the damage would soon be revealed through Ultra intercepts of German signals. On 19 September these reported that Tirpitz had been hit by a large bomb, but despite the substantial impact this had on the battleship’s seaworthiness, official statements should say that Tirpitz only sustained light damage. At a meeting in Berlin on 25 September, presided over by Dönitz, it was estimated that it would take nine months to make the battleship seaworthy again. At that stage of the war this was far too long, so Dönitz ordered that she remain in Norway, serving as a floating gun battery to deter any coastal invasion. This meant that from that point on, Tirpitz was no longer considered a fully operational warship. A suitable spot had to be chosen for her, in an area worthy of being defended by her guns, but in an anchorage shallow enough that if hit, she could not be sunk. That way she could still serve as a static gun battery, even if her main decks were all but awash.
To fit the 12,000lb Tallboy into a Lancaster, the bomb bay doors had to be adapted so that they bulged out to accommodate its unusually large maximum diameter of 3ft 3in for the body of the bomb, and 3ft 6in for its tail fins.
The Germans finally selected a spot in the Sørbotn Channel, off the small island of Håkøya, 3.5 miles west of Tromsø in northern Norway. At noon on 15 October, Tirpitz left the Kaafjord for the last time, and slowly made her way up the Altenfjord under her own steam, but aided by tugs. She could only manage 3 knots. Apart from a 25-mile stretch beyond the mouth of the Altenfjord, the route to her new anchorage ran through sheltered coastal waterways, protected from the sea by a barrier of islands. The Kriegsmarine were taking no chances, though, and as a wolfpack of U-boats patrolled offshore, a screen of destroyers and smaller craft escorted the limping battleship south towards Tromsø. By 1500hrs GMT the next day she was in place, lying off Håkøya. On 18 October she was spotted there by British reconnaissance planes. All her flak defences and smoke screen equipment were still being dismantled and shipped south. Until they arrived, the battleship lay largely unprotected, apart from her own guns, and those of two flak ships moored nearby. Bomber Command was aware of this too. It had a unique ‘window of opportunity’ to bomb the Tirpitz before her defences were strengthened. So, orders were issued to 5 Wing that the two Lancaster squadrons would have another go.
Operations Obviate and Catechism
Off Tromsø, October–November 1944
KRIEGSMARINE SHIPS
A. Tirpitz
B. Nymphe AA ship
C. Thetis AA ship
RAF Units
1. Operations Obviate: 37 Lancasters of 617 Sqn and 9 Sqn, in waves of 4–6 aircraft at 13–15,000ft
2. Operation Catechism: 38 Lancasters of 617 Sqn and 9 Sqn, in waves of 4–6 aircraft at 13–15,000ft
EVENTS
After being crippled while anchored in the Kaafjord in September 1944, temporary repairs were carried out, allowing Tirpitz to be moved 120 nautical miles further south, to a new berth near Tromsø. It was acknowledge the battleship could never put to sea again – her new role was merely to act as a floating gun battery, to deter any attempted Allied landing in the area. While she was no longer a threat to the Arctic Convoys, the British had no idea how badly damaged she was. So, the air attacks continued. In late October the RAF carried out another major attack using Avro Lancasters, converted to carry the Tallboy bomb. Although this sortie – Operation Obviate – was foiled by low cloud obscuring the target, the two Lancaster squadrons earmarked for the operation were ordered to have another go. The result was Operation Catechism, and this time the skies over Tromsø remained clear. Even more surprisingly, the Luftwaffe failed to intercept the bombers. So, for the third time in three months, Tirpitz was attacked using Tallboys. This time her luck ran out. She was hit by at least three bombs, and mortally wounded. After 30 minutes she capsized and sank, taking almost 1,000 men down with her.
Operation Obviate (29 October 1944)
Cloud cover 8/10ths, 6,000ft. Visibility: Good. Bombing height: 14,000 feet
1. 7.49am The 20 Lancasters of 617 Sqn commence their attack, dropping Tallboy bombs from heights ranging from 13,000–15,000ft. Target almost completely obscured by clouds. No aircraft lost, but no bombs hit their target.
2. 7.55am The 17 Lancasters of 9 Sqn commence their attack, but again, visibility through clouds is poor, and three bombers failed to release their bombs, as their crews were unable to see the target. No aircraft lost, but four hit by flak. No bombs hit their target.
3. 8.05am The strike leader Group Captain Tait circles the area, watching the attack. Some bombers make more than one attempt due to poor visibility through cloud, circling round and following the same attack profile. Eventually, Tait orders the aircraft to withdraw.
Operation Catechism (12 November 1944)
Cloud cover 3/10ths, 18–20,000 feet. Visibility: Good Bombing height: 14,000ft
4. 9.42am the first wave of six Lancasters of 617 Sqn. released their Tallboy bombs from between 12,500 and 15,000 feet. After this, as his leading aircraft withdrew, Group Captain Tait circled round to watch the subsequent waves of bombers make their run. All 18 Lancasters of 617 Sqn. released their bombs in the space of three minutes, between 9.42 and 9.45am.
5. Just after 9.45am the first of ten Lancasters of 9 Sqn. released their bombs. The squadron’s attack continued until 9.49am, by which time it was clear the Tirpitz was listing heavily. The final three Lancasters of the squadron elected to save their bombs, as their mission had been accomplished.
6. Apart from two, all the bombers in the strike crossed over the ship, and banked to port, to cross over Kvaloy island. from there they headed out towards the open sea. the two exceptions were Tait’s Lancaster, which circled the area throughout the attack, and the photographic Lancaster, which also circled the target.
7. The Tirpitz had been hit by at least two Tallboy bombs, causing major damage to her. She began listing, and at approximately 10.04am a major explosion ripped through the bow of the battleship, as a magazine exploded. She then began to capsize, until only her upturned hull could be seen above the water.
Tirpitz, photographed in her final mooring place off Haakøy Island near Tromsø. In this photograph, taken in early November 1944 by a PRU plane, the battleship can be seen lying close to the south-east corner of the island, surrounded by torpedo nets. In the distance, to the north, lies one of the two flak ships assigned to protect the battleship. The second was anchored just off the bottom right of the photograph.
For Bomber Command, the advantage of Tromsø over the Altenfjord was that it lay 200 miles closer to Britain, and in theory just within flying range of a Lancaster flying from an air base in north-east Scotland. The added weight of a 12,000lb Tallboy decreased this range slightly; it also got in the way of the necessary extra fuel tanks, until someone thought of using one of the long thin ones from a Wellington bomber, which could sit inside the fuselage on either side of the bomb bay. This was augmented by a drop tank from a Mosquito. Altogether these held another 300 gallons of fuel, giving a total of 2,406 gallons – just enough to see the bombers to Tromsø and back again.
However, this extra fuel meant that with their payload of one Tallboy apiece, the bombers were now 2 tons overweight. In the Lancasters of 9 and 617 Squadrons, the upper turret had already been removed for Operation Paravane. Rather than strip out another turret, the ground crew removed the armour protecting the underside of the cockpit. To provide additional power, all of the older bombers were fitted with Merlin T24 engines. Now, theoretically at least, the bombers could reach their target.
Planning was difficult, as these two squadrons based in Lincolnshire were on stand-by for urgent specialist missions over Germany, if requested by Supreme Allied Headquarters. The other factor was the weather over Tromsø, which by October was turning fickle again, foreshadowing the return of the long Arctic winter. However, by late October the long-term forecast suggested clear skies over the target area. So on 28 October the two squadrons were ordered north from Barney and Woodhall Spa, to Lossiemouth and Kinloss, two of the forward airfields used in the bombing raids on Tirpitz during 1942. In addition the smaller airfield of Milltown near Elgin was used to house the visiting bombers and their ground staff. In all, 36 Lancasters were scheduled to take part in the mission, 18 from each squadron.
That evening the crews underwent their final briefing. This mission, codenamed Operation Obviate, would involve the two squadrons flying north along the now familiar route past Orkney and Shetland, before heading north-west towards the Norwegian coast at a low altitude, making landfall well south of Tromsø. That was where intelligence had found a gap in the German radar chain between Bodø and Trondheim. There the bombers would form up for the attack over a lake in the mountains, then head north-west to reach the target. It was thought that the high ground would help screen their approach. Ideally, the battleship would be bombed from a height of 13,500ft. The bombers of 617 Squadron would lead the attack, flying in column, followed by 9 Squadron. At midnight on the evening of 28 October, a PRU Mosquito flew over Tromsø and reported that conditions were favourable. Between 0103 and 0255hrs GMT the bombers took off. Once again they were accompanied by a film unit carried in a Lancaster from 463 Squadron. Their strength was augmented by three extra bombers, two from 9 Squadron and one from 316 Squadron, so a total of 40 Lancasters flew on the raid, including the film unit aircraft.
This approach flight went smoothly, the aircraft flying at 1,500ft for most of the journey. They crossed the coast without interference and began climbing to 10,000ft. At that point one bomber from 9 Squadron was forced to turn back due to engine problems. The rest assembled over Lake Torneträsk, just over the border in Sweden and 100 miles south of Tromsø. As the bombers approached the target area Tait ordered them to form into a column, flying at 14,000ft. They came out of the mountains near the head of the long Balsfjord which led north-west towards Tromsø. That way they would be approaching the target from an unexpected angle. So far the weather had been good, and the sky clear. This, though, was about to change. At 0750hrs GMT, just as the target came into view, the airmen noticed that the wind had veered, and was now coming from the west. The line of low cloud over the coast began creeping towards Tromsø, and by the time the first bombers reached the target at 0759hrs the Tirpitz was completely obscured. A minute earlier and she would have been fully visible.
The flak proved intense, as although only half of the guns from the Kaafjord had been set up in their new locations, Tromsø itself had its own flak batteries. Tirpitz joined in too, as did the two flak ships moored to the east and north-east of her. The attack went ahead anyway, even though the bombers had nothing to aim at through the impenetrable layer of low cloud. A total of 32 bombers released their Tallboys, even if many of the pilots circled round for a second or even a third run. One bomber from 617 Squadron was hit, and forced to limp off towards Sweden. Four retained their bombs due to a lack of a target, and two others failed to reach the target area in time. Three Lancasters were hit by flak, but escaped any significant damage, and Tait led the bombers back home. All of them returned safely, but a mood of bitter disappointment hung over the crews, who had flown so far, only to be thwarted at the last minute.
All of the bombs missed the Tirpitz, but one near miss landed 50 yards from her stern, the blast buckling her port propeller shaft. Despite Tait’s plan the Germans had been forewarned of the bombers’ approach as they passed over the coast, so the air raid warning was sounded in Tromsø and on board Tirpitz. While the flak gunners had done well, their fire augmented by the ship’s 38cm and 15cm guns, any boost to morale was countered by the realization that they hadn’t managed to break up the bomber formation before it attacked. Few of the German sailors were in any doubt that the bombers would return. The planners of Bomber Command were less certain. It was now almost November, and daylight was a rare commodity beyond the Arctic Circle. Still, as the two squadrons flew back to their home airfields, the PRU flights continued, as did the stream of meteorological reports. The next time conditions were favourable – really favourable this time – the bombers would be sent back to finish the job.
In this photograph, taken during the opening moments of Operation Catechism, Tirpitz has received an initial hit amidships, and smoke is pouring from her superstructure. This was taken at around 0843hrs, from the 617 Squadron Lancaster flown by Flight Lieutenant Knights.
On 4 November, Captain Junge stood down as commander of Tirpitz and was sent to the Kriegsmarine’s headquarters in Norway. His place was taken by his second-in-command, Captain Robert Weber, a gunnery specialist. By then dredgers were at work to reduce the depth of water under the battleship’s keel, the smoke generators had arrived and were beginning to be installed, new flak guns were being emplaced, the torpedo nets had been laid and a direct phone link had been established to the Luftwaffe, so air support might actually arrive for once. Weber was confident that within three weeks the days would be so short that his battleship would be relatively safe from enemy air attack until the following spring. Until then, though, he needed low cloud and bad weather.
Bomber Command’s 5 Group planners were conversely keen for a spell of clear and cloudless skies. The mere prospect of just such a spell was enough for 9 and 617 Squadrons to be ordered north again on 4 November, just in case these conditions might actually be met. Instead, northern Norway was swept by a winter gale. Then, on 11 November, the bombers were recalled to Scotland, as meteorological reports suggested that a spell of good weather was expected over Tromsø, which might last for up to two days. A Spitfire was dispatched to Tromsø, and reported that there were cloud patches over the target area. Although there were no guarantees, and this seemed far from favourable, the mission, now codenamed Operation Catechism, was confirmed. The crews were given a final briefing, and tried to rest before their departure early the following morning. The plan was largely the same as for Operation Obviate. The only difference was that a new intelligence report said that a squadron of German fighters had recently arrived at Bardufloss airfield, 42 miles south of Tromsø and almost astride the bombers’ approach path to the target.
At 0259hrs GMT on 12 November the first of 32 bombers took off from Lossiemouth, Kinross and Milltown, the 13 operational bombers of 9 Squadron and 18 more from 617 Squadron accompanied once again by the Lancaster from 463 Squadron carrying the film unit. Once more they flew across the North Sea at 1,500ft, flying north, then veering towards Norway once they reached Shetland. The Norwegian coast was reached without incident, and the aircraft, widely separated in the darkness, now headed for their rendezvous point over Lake Torneträsk. Tait, who commanded the mission, was one of the first to arrive, and as he circled he saw other bombers straggling in. When all but two of 9 Squadron’s bombers had appeared, Tait fired a flare pistol to signal that they should move off towards the target (the two stragglers returned to Britain after realizing they had missed the rendezvous). The sun was just beginning to rise over on the eastern horizon, but as they continued the light improved, until as one airman described it, the air was ‘gin clear’. This could only be good for the bombing run, but the air crew also knew it would benefit the pilots of any German fighters scrambling from Bardufloss.
They climbed steadily to their prearranged bombing height of around 14,000–15,000ft, flying in ‘gaggles’ of four to six bombers, with 617 Squadron leading the column and 9 Squadron following behind. Tait’s Lancaster was at the front. They spotted the Balsfjord, and banked to port to follow it towards the Tirpitz. They spotted the battleship 20 miles ahead of them, and this time there was no cloud to protect her – or a smoke screen. She appeared black, in contrast with the white snow-clad islands and coast around her. Tait felt she looked like a ‘spider in her web’, surrounded by her torpedo nets. The target might have been unprotected by smoke, but there was plenty of flak, including big orange air bursts from the battleship’s 38cm main guns. The bomber crews held their nerve, and their course, although the flak intensified as they drew closer to their target.
It took five minutes to reach the bombing point after first spotting the target, and Tait noticed how the battleship lay with her bows pointing towards the north-east, so she was almost beam-on to the approaching bombers. The south-eastern side of the island of Haakøy lay about 400 yards off her port beam, while the side of the ship itself twinkled with flame as her flak guns fired at the approaching bombers. Her main gun turrets were trained to starboard, but the bombers were now too close for the big guns to bear on the attackers. Then they were approaching Grindøy Island, and the release point for the Tallboys.
This photograph of the Tirpitz was taken from 13,400ft during Operation Catechism at around 0844hrs on 15 November, from the Lancaster of 617 Squadron flown by Flight Lieutenant Knights. It shows the battleship belching smoke and flame, while a Tallboy explodes on the nearby island of Haakøy.
The 18 Lancasters of 617 Squadron approached the target in ‘gaggles’ of from four to six bombers, flying at a range of heights from 12,650 to 16,000ft. This meant that some bombers were flying lower than their prearranged bombing height, in accordance with the ‘gaggle’ tactic of varying heights to make the approaching group of aircraft harder for flak batteries to target. Then at 0941hrs GMT the automatic bomb release mechanism triggered on Tait’s plane, and his Tallboy began its descent. It took roughly 30 seconds to reach its target, and as Tait and his crew flew over the battleship, banking to port, they saw it head towards it. Other bombers reported that it had hit. By then the rest of the squadron were releasing their bombs too, and Tirpitz was now hidden in a pall of smoke, flame and spray from near misses. The film crew were busy recording all this, and their footage shows a big mushroom cloud appear near the bow of Tirpitz, probably from Tait’s Tallboy. Other bombs can be seen to fall, then at 0943hrs another big hit amidships enveloped the ship in smoke.
In this photograph, taken from around 16,000ft at 0849hrs during Operation Catechism, from the Lancaster carrying the film crew, the Tirpitz is completely obscured by smoke, as a large explosion erupts from her stern. This was the moment when ‘Caesar’ turret was blown out of the dying ship.
Behind 617 Squadron, the 11 bombers of 9 Squadron added their contribution to the scene of destruction, with the first of their bombs falling at 0945hrs. By now the smoke was making it hard to see the target, so a few of the pilots went round for another run. The film plane was circling too, as was that of Tait, who was watching his aircraft finish the job he started. Then, at 0949hrs, it was over. The last of 9 Squadron’s bombs had been released, and at least one major hit had been scored by the squadron. The smoke surrounding Tirpitz made it difficult to assess the damage. However, as the bombers departed, the battleship was clearly listing to port, and at 0949hrs a big explosion was seen, followed by at least one smaller one two minutes later. Tait led his Lancasters away towards the south-west, and the open sea. Only the film unit bomber remained, her crew disappointed that the battleship was still afloat. Then, as they watched, she heeled over to port, and then capsized. Soon only the red of her upturned hull was showing above the water of the fjord. The beast had finally been slain.
On board Tirpitz Captain Weber had plenty of warning of the approaching bombers, and his gun crews were ready for them. However, despite the increasingly frantic calls to Bardufloss, no air cover appeared. The Luftwaffe later blamed a ‘clerical error’ for this. So, apart from the shore-based flak guns, the Tirpitz was on her own. At 0802hrs local time (0902hrs GMT) ‘Action Stations’ was sounded, and at 0838hrs Tirpitz opened fire. None of the bombers were hit, and at 0841hrs local time (0941hrs GMT) the crewmen manning their stations on the upper deck watched as the first of a series of huge bombs fell towards them.
The first bomb landed forward, on the port side behind the funnel, astride the aircraft catapult deck. Another landed a little further aft, also on the port side. Both bombs ripped through the battleship’s armoured deck and exploded inside her, causing extensive fire and flooding. Tirpitz began listing to port, but what really finished her was the near misses. Several bombs landed next to her in the water, and while their blasts caused underwater damage and flooding, they also blew huge craters in the seabed beneath her. Weber ordered his crew to deal with the flooding, and to evacuate the armoured citadel, but it was too late.
The ship was already listing 15 degrees, and the angle was increasing. Weber expected the ship to settle on the seabed, just a few metres below her keel, not knowing that the mud and sand beneath the keel had literally been blown away. Then at 0850hrs local time (0950hrs GMT) a huge explosion in the magazine for ‘Caesar’ turret ripped through the stern of the ship, and blew the 700-ton gun turret out of the ship. Moments later the list became more pronounced, until the battleship was lying on her side. At that point Weber gave the order to abandon ship. For most of his crew the order came too late. More, smaller explosions followed, and the heeling continued, until most of the superstructure was submerged. She hung there for a few moments, then rolled over completely.
Inside the hull, thousands of men were trapped, bulkheads collapsed, escape routes became jammed, the lights went out, and most of the young men inside the battleship’s hull either died in the dark, or struggled to survive, kept alive by the slim hope that they might somehow be rescued. Very few were. Of the 1,700-strong crew of the Tirpitz, almost 1,000 were trapped inside her, or were killed at their posts. Of these, only 84 were ever rescued, escaping through holes cut in her hull during the days that followed. Meanwhile, all of the bombers returned safely.
Operation Catechism, Tromsø, 12 November 1944
After the damage suffered on 15 September 1944 during Operation Paravane, the Tirpitz was no longer considered combat effective. So, unable to undertake any more sorties, she was relegated to the role of a floating coastal defence battery, and moored in a new berth off Haakøy Island near Tromsø. It was there on 29 October that she was attacked by Lancaster heavy bombers of 9 and 617 Squadrons, flying from bases in the north-east of Scotland. On that occasion low clouds foiled the mission, codenamed Operation Obviate. Undeterred, Bomber Command waited for a more suitable opportunity. It finally came two weeks later on 12 November. The same two squadrons were involved in this mission, codenamed Operation Catechism, and this force of 30 Lancasters was led by Wing Commander Tait, the commanding officer of 617 ‘Dambusters’ Squadron.
Flying conditions over northern Norway were perfect, and the Tirpitz was spotted while she was still 20 miles away. The bombers approached the target from the south-east, flying in ‘gaggles’ – groups of four to six bombers, operating in a loose formation, and at varying heights, to make it harder for flak gunners to target them. Tait and 617 Squadron led the way, followed by 9 Squadron – a force of 29 bombers in all, each armed with a single 12,000lb Tallboy bomb, and a 30th Lancaster, there to film the operation.
The attack began at 0841hrs, and the first Tallboy hit the battleship 30 seconds later. Soon she was half-hidden by a plume of smoke and flame, as numerous other bombs either hit her, or landed close by her in the water, causing underwater damage to her hull. The attack lasted just eight minutes, and by its end it was clear that the battleship was finished. She was listing heavily to port, and then as the bombers departed the first of two more explosions wracked the ship. As the lingering film crew watched, Tirpitz slowly rolled over and capsized, so that only her upturned hull could be seen above the water. This plate shows the aircraft of 617 Squadron flying over Haakøy Island after completing their bombing run, while behind them the Lancasters of 9 Squadron are dropping their Tallboys on the target. One 12,000lb bomb has hit the shore of the island – a detonation that left a crater which can still be seen there today – while others are falling around the battleship itself, which by now is in her death throes.
