In spite of the outstanding success in repulsing Grant’s raiding force, there now could be no doubt in the minds of Lignery, his officers, and his men, that the powerful Anglo-American army was nevertheless irrevocably advancing towards Fort Duquesne thanks to its road-building and the methodical progress it could afford to take. With what must have seemed to the French like a nearly limitless amount of men, supplies and money, the Anglo-American army could afford to build strong positions along the way, the latest being Fort Ligonier. It was clear that Fort Duquesne would have to be abandoned sooner or later. Although allied Indians had greatly profited from Grant’s fiasco, they now had increasing misgivings about the capacity of the “Great White Father” to prevail in this conflict and many were leaving to go back to their homelands. Nevertheless, the French officers were not discouraged.
Fort Ligonier as reconstructed. This view shows the west side of the fort with its elaborate outer defenses. (Author’s photo)
The latest action had shown again that, except for rangers, British and American troops were not apt to fight in forest warfare. On the contrary, the French commanders now mooted a raid on the new British Fort Ligonier at Loyalhanna, probably at the behest of Captain Aubry who would lead the raiding force. The French and Canadians certainly did not perceive that this would stop the Anglo-American army, but it might delay it and give them more time to evacuate by putting the enemy on the defensive. Allied Indians would also see there were still plenty of opportunities to fight and take booty for a few more weeks. Accordingly, a party of about 450 soldiers and Canadian militiamen with some 150 allied Indians marched out of Fort Duquesne under the command of Captain Aubry. By early morning on October 12, from the nearby hills, they could see Fort Ligonier surrounded by small tent cities punctuated by corrals for horses and bullocks. Aubry’s attack plan is not recorded, as with much else on the French side of the 1758 Ohio campaign, but, from what is known of the action, it was the classic “hit unexpectedly, strike hard and fast, then cover,” all of which was well led. With about 600 men, the attack could come from several directions and it obviously did, judging from the Anglo-American accounts.
At the time of the attack, Colonel Bouquet was away from Fort Ligonier and the senior officer present was Colonel Burd of the 2nd Pennsylvania. He appears to have believed that this was a small raid on the horse and bullock corrals and sent the small Maryland Battalion to scatter the raiders. The decision spelled disaster for that battalion, which suffered high casualties. It was a full-scale attack coming seemingly from several sides; even if it did not, the important thing in the Canadian raid tactic was that the enemy would believe it did. Aubry and his men achieved their objective; the Anglo-American soldiers ran for the fort. There probably were pockets of resistance, but the results of an outstandingly successful raid were there: a much larger force of British regular and American provincial soldiers was reduced to run for shelter from a smaller group of French colonial regulars, Canadian militiamen, and Indian warriors who now had all the leisure to ravage the abandoned camp around the fort. Although a map by American Colonel Burd mentions “the French army’s line of attack” being to the east, where it quickly overcame the encampment of the Maryland and Carolina provincial troops, the main thrust seems to have been made on the lowlands at the southwest side of the fort, initially across Loyalhanna Creek. The accounts are somewhat imprecise on both sides. For instance, it has been said that the French raiding force neglected to seal the eastern side of the fort. Yet it overran the encampment of the Maryland and Carolina provincials detachments on that side. However, the fact that the east side of Fort Ligonier might not have been sealed, does not mean that the road leading into it was not a danger zone. General Lévis’ journal adds an important sidelight to the operation with regards to the allied Indian warriors. Many of them, as was their habit, were waiting concealed to attack whatever traveled on that road and they struck gold that day by intercepting an incoming convoy.
Aubry’s raid on Fort Ligonier
The failure of Grant’s raid had shown that the Anglo-American troops were unprepared for war on the frontier, unlike the woodcraft-wise French colonial troops, Canadian militiamen, and allied Indians. Captain Aubry pressed this advantage by mounting a raid on Fort Ligonier, the closest fort built by General Forbes’ army. By early October, the fort was largely complete and surrounded by “tent cities” and fenced enclosures for horses and cattle. French, Canadian, and Indian raiding parties surrounded the fort and, with the garrison distracted by a clash between one of the parties and an Anglo-American patrol to the southwest, burst from cover, overrunning the camps. Faced by this sudden attack from small parties of French soldiers, Canadian militiamen and Indian warriors that were far more adept at hand-to-hand fighting, the Anglo-American troops fled back to the safety of the fort. It was an outstandingly successful raid.
Captain Pouchot’s journal records news of the raid that was received in Fort Niagara. After the initial clash with the party of American provincial troops, Aubry’s men pursued “those who had been put to flight, the French came across the small camp, took it by surprise and sent the garrison fleeing for the main retrenchment, which they only just reached in time.” According to a marginal note in his journal, a French soldier entered a tent in the “small camp” during the attack “and found there an officer drinking his tea. He said to him: ‘What’s this then? Your comrades are fighting and you are sitting here in comfort. You don’t deserve to live.’ With one blow of an axe, he killed him. For two days [actually one day], M. Aubry formed a kind of blockade around it. He had 200 cattle or horses killed. Almost all our men returned [to Fort Duquesne] on horseback,” related Pouchot.
General Montcalm wrote to his superior, Marshal Belle-Isle, that “Captain Aubry, of the Louisiana troops, has gained a tolerably considerable advantage there on the 12th [of October]. The enemy lost on the occasion a hundred and fifty men, killed, wounded and missing; they were pursued as far as a new fort called Royal Hannon [Ligonier], which they built at the head of the River d’Attique [Loyalhanna Creek]. We had only two men killed and seven wounded” (DCHNY, X: pp. 900-901). As noted above, General Lévis also had news of Aubry’s raid. His journal mentioned that “a party of 600 men under the orders of M. Aubry, captain of the marine troops of Louisiana, [left Fort Duquesne] to disrupt the enemy during their [construction] work and to take some of its [supply] convoys. Mr. Aubry advanced with his detachment up to a half-league from Royal-Hanon [Fort Ligonier], where he came upon [an outer] guard of 50 men that retreated and he followed it up to entrenchments where the army of General Forbes took up its arms, but without daring to come out [of the fort]. Mr. Aubry [and his men] shot at the entrenchment [with muskets] for the rest of the day and had everything outside burned; his Indians fell upon a convoy and took 300 heads of cattle or horses. It was estimated that the enemy lost over 200 men and we had only eight killed or wounded.”
Fort Ligonier, 1762. This rare view of the fort was made by Lt. Archibald Blane of the 60th (Royal Americans) Regiment on June 30, 1762. It shows the east wall’s gate and its horizontally laid logs, the location of the flagpole, and the tops of the buildings within. The pointed logs at the top of the walls in place in 1758 were apparently removed by the time this rendering was made. (Collection and photo: Fort Ligonier Museum, Ligonier, Pennsylvania)
John Ligonier, First Earl Ligonier, 1760. Lord Ligonier was commander-in-chief of the British army from 1757 to 1759, thus at the time of Forbes’ advance in 1758, and Fort Ligonier was named in his honor. He became Master-General of the Ordnance from 1759 to 1762. (Portrait by Sir Joshua Reynolds. Collection and photo: Fort Ligonier Museum, Ligonier, Pennsylvania)
Aubry had never intended on a siege but on a raid, which is a very different operation. Normally, now having successfully surprised and driven the enemy inside its fort and destroyed its camp, it was time to leave before they would make a sortie or, even worse, a relief enemy force arrived on the scene. Instead, probably based on intelligence reports telling him that the troops in the fort seemed shocked and that no other enemy troops were seen approaching from the east, Aubry opted for a short blockade of the fort. He had limited numbers of French soldiers and Canadian militiamen to devote to such a static role. Every one of them was needed to face the numerous British and American troops, who simply remained safely huddled behind their field fortifications, not daring to come out.
OCTOBER 12, 1758
With the Anglo-American forces on the back foot, Captain Aubry led a raiding party of 450 French soldiers and Canadian militiamen, supported by some 150 allied Indians, to within sight of Fort Ligonier. He divided his force into smaller groups and spread them out around the fort. As the raiding parties closed in, one across Loyalhanna Creek ran into an Anglo-American patrol of about 50 men and quickly put them to flight. With the element of suprise vanishing, French and Canadian forces erupted from all sides and attacked Fort Ligonier’s outer camps. The Anglo-American troops were caught off-guard, outfought in hand-to-hand combat, and forced to flee to the safety of the fort’s stockade. To the east, allied Indians fell upon a British convoy. Instead of swiftly withdrawing, as was usual after a successful raid, Aubry’s force blockaded the fort, keeping twice their number bottled up. Some ineffective artillery fire was the garrison’s only response – in the words of General Forbes, “above 1,500 effective men within… neither made one sortie or followed them half a yard”. Hoping that an ambush could be sprung on any such sortie, the raiders lay in wait overnight, before riding back to Fort Duquesne with many captured horses.
EVENTS1 Mixed groups of French soldiers and Canadian militiamen close around Fort Ligonier. To the east, allied Indians fan out to block the road.
2 One of the raiding groups skirmishes with an Anglo-American patrol.
3 The raiders launch their attack against the fort’s outer camps.
4 British and American troops in the outer camps are surprised and outfought by the raiders, then forced back to the security of Fort Ligonier’s stockades.
5 A British convoy is intercepted by the raiders.
6 Fort Ligonier becomes the refuge of some 1,500 British regular and American provincial soldiers.
That such a superior Anglo-American force should be reduced to a defensive position for over a day by a raiding party consisting of a few dozen regulars with a few hundred Canadian militiamen and Indians speaks for itself. General Forbes, who was in Fort Bedford at the time, recognized this in his report of the action to his superior, General Abercromby, stating that “above 1500 effective men within our breast work, exclusive of sick…neither made one Sortie or followed them half a yard, but shamefully” instead allowed the French and Indians to control everything outside Fort Ligonier. And, he added, “nor did we pursue one inch” after the enemy departed (this part of the dispatch was later stricken out as per WO 34/34). A pursuit might have been impractical although the Anglo-Americans probably were not fully aware of the main logistical reason. Lévis further wrote that “Mr. Aubry withdrew at dawn and, two days later, was back in Fort Duquesne.” Aubry’s force effectively blockaded Fort Ligonier for a night; the silence broken by Indian war whoops and the cannon fire and “a number of shells from our mortars” to keep the French and Indians at a safe distance, according to the October 26 issue of the Pennsylvania Gazette – a somewhat ironic comment considering the superior numbers of the Anglo-American garrison. Besides cattle, General Forbes mentioned the final inglorious event in that “all our horses” kept in corrals around Fort Ligonier were taken by the French. This allowed nearly all of them to ride back to a triumphal arrival at Fort Duquesne.
This was not the last action that Fort Ligonier’s garrison would experience. In early November Lt. Corbière, heading a party of about 40 to 45 soldiers, Canadian militiamen, and Indians, according to Pouchot, was lurking about in the forest near Fort Ligonier. Exact numbers and composition of his force are unknown, but a large one is unlikely; this was not a raiding party but a patrol to keep an eye on major Anglo-American movements at a time when Fort Duquesne’s garrison was then being reduced. Indians that were formerly allied were much fewer and becoming neutral by the day. This was due to persistent efforts to convince the Indian nations in the Ohio to stop fighting with the French. General Forbes did not waste the authority over Indian diplomacy that Abercromby had bestowed upon him in July. Colonial officials were also anxious to arrive at an armistice with the native warriors, many of whom were now thinking that the French were just too weak to resist Anglo-American might in Pennsylvania. At another meeting at Easton in late October that was attended by many nations, the Delaware and other Ohio nations agreed to cease hostilities; an outcome due in no small measure to a letter by General Forbes addressed to the chiefs that called on them to return to their families and let the French and the English fight their own battles. This call for neutrality was undoubtedly greeted with relief and by early November Indian runners were dispatched to spread the word. This peace treaty was a tremendous advantage for Forbes’ army, which would seal the fate of the French presence in the Ohio. Without the Indian allies, they were next to powerless.
But the French and Canadians could still be lethal. On November 12 Corbière and his men encountered a party – its strength is unknown – of American rangers patrolling at about three miles (5 km) from Fort Ligonier. He and his men probably did not know how strong the enemy party was, but in Canadian forest warfare numbers did not matter as much as gaining the element of surprise. Without hesitation, Corbière attacked the rangers, who ran back to the fort. General Forbes, who thought this was a raid on his army’s horses and cattle, immediately sent 500 men to give chase to Corbière’s party under colonels Mercer and Washington. Some of Mercer’s men made contact with some of Corbière’s men, shooting erupted in the forest near the fort, and, in the confusion and musket smoke, nervous Virginia Regiment soldiers started shooting at other indistinct shadows. They turned out to be their own men, and soon two groups of American troops were shooting at each other in a tragic case of friendly-fire. George Washington later recalled being never “in more imminent danger” in trying to stop the firing “between two [lines of] fire, knocking up with his sword” the pointed muskets. At least 11 men were killed and probably many more wounded on the Anglo-American side (Cubbison: p. 153). This time, however, some American provincials managed to capture three of Corbière’s party including one Richard Johnson. What Forbes learned from him would change the entire operation against Fort Duquesne.