The origins of the French ‘Army of Portugal’ lay in the 25,000-man force with which General Junot had successfully occupied Portugal in November 1807. Repatriated to France under the terms of the Convention of Sintra in the autumn of 1808, it had been sent back into Spain and, for this third French attempt to invade Portugal, had been considerably reinforced. Under the overall command of Marshal André Masséna, it now had three Corps under Marshal Ney and generals Junot and Reynier totalling over 65,000 men including 2,475 officers. Ney’s 6th Corps was the strongest with over 24,000 men while the two other corps each had about 17,000 men. The army had a cavalry reserve of some 3,500 men.5
From 18 February 1808, each regiment of French infantry was to have five battalions, four service and one depot. The service battalions had a company of grenadiers, one of voltigeurs – light infantry skirmishers – and four of fusiliers, all companies having 140 men including three officers. With battalion staff, eagle bearers and musicians, the regimental establishment totalled 3,908 men including 78 officers. The actual strength of the regiments in the field was often much less, as can be seen in the orders of battle. A few regiments also added a 6th battalion. The light infantry Chasseurs had the same establishment except that their grenadiers were termed Carabiniers, although they were armed with ordinary muskets rather than rifles (‘carabine’ in French). French cavalry regiments usually had five squadrons each having two companies, but these were often dispersed in different armies. The artillery was considered one of Europe’s finest and served the dependable Gribeauval system guns.
Officer, French 3rd Hussar Regiment, c. 1806–10. The 3rd Hussars were part of Marshal Ney’s 6th Corps and performed brilliantly during the battle of the River Coa. (Print after Hoffman)
One of the enduring misconceptions about the French infantry in the Napoleonic wars is that it always attacked in columns while its opponents would be formed in lines – the so-called ‘column versus line’ tactics. The French infantry would indeed normally march up in columns. But, as they neared their opponents, would deploy into lines as specified by their 1791 drill. In line, French infantrymen were formed three ranks deep and were always preceded by a screen of light infantry voltigeurs. But this was not always followed in the peninsula. In practice they often could not deploy into line from column in the type of terrain Wellington cleverly chose, and Bussaco was a good illustration of this difficulty for the French. Their firepower, while typical of a modern army, was inferior to the exceptionally murderous volleys of British and Portuguese troops. They were, however, very fearsome in bayonet attacks.
French Foot Artillery, c. 1810–11. The guns and their carriages are of the French Gribeauval artillery system. (Print after L. Sergent)
Shako plate from the French 75th Infantry of the Line, 1810. This plate was found in Almeida, where the 75th was posted in 1810. It was a new, unissued plate from the regimental store as it had never been bent and pierced to be attached to a shako. The plate is of the 1810 model. (Moutinho Borges Collection, Almeida)
The French cavalry in the Peninsula was generally very dependable and manoeuvred quite competently. It was a well-trained body of troops usually kept under reasonable control in battle. Masséna’s army had four units of light cavalry, the 1st and 3rd hussars and the 15th and 25th Chasseurs à cheval, and some medium cavalry, dragoons detached from a dozen regiments, but no heavy cavalry such as cuirassiers. All units in Masséna’s army had previously served victoriously in other parts of Europe so they had numbers of experienced campaigners within their ranks.
The French army in the Peninsula was prone to indiscriminate marauding, which would sometimes culminate in the wholesale slaughter of dozens of innocent civilians. Histories have often recounted examples in Spain but what went on in Portugal may well have been even worse if one considers the smaller population and size of the country. It certainly began at an earlier date; as early as December 1807 during the first French occupation, which terrorised the population and practically ruined the country. The 1809 invasion of the north by Marshal Soult’s army lasted only a few months but the devastation and robbery was widespread and the innocent deaths rose to thousands in Porto. To this day the village of Arrafina, south of Porto, remembers 17 April 1809 when a detachment of the 34th French Line Infantry came and cold-bloodedly slaughtered 62 men – all civilians and the bulk of its male population.
The behaviour of the French troops during the 1810 campaign was no different. However, some things had changed. The Emperor himself was now questioning the behaviour of some of his generals, such as the notorious Loison. In addition the effect of the behaviour of the French on the Portuguese was quite unprecedented: as Masséna and his troops advanced into the country, they were amazed to find that it emptied before them. Faced with the French barbarity the Portuguese preferred to destroy their own farms and crops. This created chronic logistics and supply problems for the French. The French blamed Wellington and the Portuguese government’s orders to leave nothing to the enemy but, in reality, the true culprit was their own previous indecent conduct.6
Private, 95th Rifles, c. 1810–15. (Print after P.W. Reynolds)
The British army’s organisation was not as refined as the French in that there was no corps structure. Wellington’s army was divided into large divisions with some independent brigades added. The great majority of the army consisted of infantry and most of that was line infantry. By 1810 most of the 104 regiments of the line had two battalions, only one usually being deployed in a theatre of operation. For instance, the 2nd Battalion, 24th Foot was in Portugal with Wellington’s army but the regiment’s 1st Battalion was in India. The strength of a British regiment could vary greatly. For example, in Cole’s 4th Division, the 2/53rd Foot had 25 officers and 448 men while the 1/40th Foot in the same division had 48 officers and 1,007 men. Such differences were not only due to lack of recruits and to casualties but also to the numbers of their authorised ‘establishment’ as voted by Parliament at various times. Hence the considerable differences in numbers one routinely sees in British army listings. Wellington’s ‘British’ army included a sizeable number of Germans, mostly Hanoverians, in the King’s German Legion who gave excellent service. From September 1809, Portuguese brigades were added to the British divisions but, although well trained, no one knew for certain how they would perform against the French. The British army in Portugal was about 30,000 strong, nearly all of it in the field with Wellington.
Officer, 95th Rifles, c. 1810–12. (Print after Goddard & Booth)
The British line infantryman carried the India Pattern musket with its socket bayonet. This was a very sturdy, practical weapon, which fired a .75 calibre bullet. The 60th and 95th Rifles were armed with rifles, a very accurate weapon for skirmishers. The uniform was red except for the rifle units, who wore dark green. The men’s shakos were of black felt with brass shako plates. White breeches and black knee gaiters were the regulation dress but, in Portugal, the infantry more usually wore comfortable white linen or grey pantaloons. While the British army’s clothing was mostly reported as good in 1810, there were deficiencies across the various regiments. Even the Brigade of Foot Guards reported the ‘jackets of the [2nd] Coldstreams are very short in the waist, those of the 3rd [Scots Guards] Regiment altho’, in general, a better length’.7
British soldiers were not above stealing and, in a few cases, murdering innocent civilians. This meant death by hanging if caught. The standard of discipline was one of the toughest in Europe with offences punished by floggings with the ‘cat-o’-nine-tails’. For all that, offences were frequent with drink being the main culprit. British soldiers manoeuvred and drilled according to the practical 1788 ‘19 steps’ by Sir David Dundas. Drill was most rigorous and British soldiers, even in two lines, could fire some of Europe’s most murderous volleys three times a minute. Such firepower was matched by precise manoeuvres and considerable coolness in battle. The officers were generally talented individuals who had their men’s respect. As a whole, the spirit of the army was excellent.
Gunner, Royal Horse Artillery, c.1810–15. (Print after P.W. Reynolds)
In early 1809, it was clear to the Portuguese government’s Council of Regency that its army could only be transformed into a modern military machine with British help. That the Portuguese even made such a request shows the strength of character and commitment to the common cause. British MajGen William Carr Beresford was made marshal and given the task. A brilliant and tireless military administrator, he brought in over 300 British officers while replacing many more conservative Portuguese officers with keen young men. As there were about 2,500 Portuguese regular officers in the new army, many of them of senior rank, the reforms were largely carried out by them and not exclusively by British officers. Unlike the British army, which was made up of volunteers, the Portuguese army was filled by drafting men, sometimes by force. As a British private recalled, ‘… their ranks were recruited by compulsory conscriptions. We often witnessed their levies arrive guarded by cavalry, and fastened by ropes, in the manner of convicts are sent off for transportation. These recruits were as dirty and ragged as can be imagined; barefooted and covered with large broad-brimmed hats, and at first sight they appeared as so many miserable old men; but when clothed, we were often surprised to see them as it were metamorphosed into a body of athletic young fellows.’8 In the fortress of Peniche, transformed into a general training depot, they were disciplined and drilled as British soldiers were and even taught command words in English as they would be called to manoeuvre in battle with British troops.9
Trooper, 1st Portuguese Cavalry Regiment, c. 1809–10. In this print after Bradford, the helmet is missing its brass plate and the piping is erroneously shown as a button-wide bar. (Pedro de Brito collection, Porto)
The army had 24 infantry regiments, each of ten companies (including one of grenadiers and one of light infantry), four regiments of artillery, each of ten companies, 12 cavalry regiments of four squadrons each and six battalions of light infantry Cazadores of six companies each (including one of ‘Tiradores’ sharpshooters) besides a number of small specialised units. The effective strength of most infantry regiments in 1810 was about 1,400 to 1,500 officers and men, artillery from 1,100 to 1,400, cavalry at about 550 and Cazadores battalions at around 620. The whole regular army amounted to about 45,000, the militias to about the same number. Some 32,000, mostly regulars, formed the major part of Wellington’s army in the field during 1810.
Infantrymen of the 13th, 4th and 16th Portuguese line infantry regiments, 1810. Portuguese infantry, artillery and cavalry uniforms were blue and trimmed according to the May 1806 Portuguese regulations except for the Cazadores, who wore brown uniforms. (Museu Militar do Porto)
Drummer, 5th Cazadores, and Private, 6th Cazadores, c. 1810–15. The 5th was part of Gen Lecor’s Portuguese Division posted south of the Mondego River. The 6th was part of Campbell’s 5th Independent Portuguese Brigade at Bussaco. Cazadores had brown uniforms trimmed with black with battalion facing colours at the collar and cuffs. From August 1810, Baker rifles were issued to sharpshooters but two-thirds of the men were armed with muskets and most of the musicians were drummers. (Bill Younghusband, from The Portuguese Army of the Napoleonic Wars (2), Osprey Men-at-Arms Series No. 346)
Weapons were supplied from Britain and similar to those used by the British army. It is however important to bear in mind that the Cazadores battalions were not armed with Baker rifles until early August 1810. Thus, the 1st and 3rd had none at the River Coa in July but, in August, the battalions were each issued with 200 rifles so they had them at Bussaco. The rest of the men, about 400 per battalion, continued to carry smooth-bore British India Pattern muskets.
For all their rigorous training, most Portuguese troops had not seen action. For instance, the 8th Portuguese infantry was almost entirely made up of recently incorporated peasants whose first engagement would be at Bussaco. The quality of the revitalised Portuguese army in battle was certainly demonstrated in the Bussaco campaign. The French initially despised the Portuguese troops and took little account of them, but experience made them change their minds. Perhaps the most telling comment on the renewal of the Portuguese army came from the commander of their enemies, Marshal Masséna. He later wrote that: ‘Most of the line regiments who had been recently formed were made up, it is true, of four fifths of recruits, but the Portuguese soldier, intelligent, sobre and untiring on the march, when commanded by British officers and trained in the British discipline, could be at par with the Anglo-Hanoverian and surpass them.’10
5 These figures are after Oman according to the French military archives. Marshal Marmont’s memoirs give remarkably precise figures that put Reynier’s and Ney’s corps at 59,665 men including 10,998 cavalry, their artillery and train having 5,942 horses and 1,019 vehicles of all types. General Junot’s corps is given as having 15,000 men. Mémoires du Maréchal Marmont, Duc de Raguse (Paris, 1857), IV, pp. 14–15. This is partly explained in that the Army of Portugal had some 86,000 men but some remained in Spain so that 65,000 constituted the invasion army. The French then had some 300,000 men in Spain.
6 Many reports of awful abuses by the French troops were reproduced in Luz Soriano, III. The lack of discipline among their British allies, especially due to drink, was also noted by the Portuguese but incidents, although frequent, paled in comparison to the vast scale of crimes committed by French troops. Of course, a French straggler that fell into the hands of vengeful peasants lurking in the hills with scores to settle – such as the rape and murder of a family member – was likely to suffer horribly before death provided a merciful release.
7 PRO, WO 27/102.
8 A Private Soldier, ‘Two months recollection of the late war in Spain and Portugal’, United Services Journal, 1830, pp. 416–417
9 Lord Liverpool to Wellington, Downing Street, 15 December 1809, PRO, WO 6/34. Their pay, which had been amongst Europe’s worst, was considerably improved and, from December 1809, Britain paid for 30,000 men in the Portuguese army. Although nearly ruined, Portugal paid for the remaining 15 to 20,000 regulars plus the militia and Ordenanza. The British bill came to £980,000 including £130,000 for the increased pay of officers.
10 Quoted in Luz Soriano, III, p, 181.