As shattering as the news of Almeida’s explosion was in Portugal, the nation lost none of its resolve. It now knew that it would be invaded for a third time in as many years and that this invasion would likely be the worst. Nor was the resolve of the British under Wellington affected. The Allies had hoped for the best but, wisely, they had also made elaborate plans for the worst. From now on, the strategy would be to slow down the French army’s progress, strip the countryside of any supplies, indeed anything the French could use, and, if at all possible, severely maul the French before retreating behind the imposing network of fortifications that were being built north of Lisbon. The Allied army was practically intact as only its Light Division had been previously engaged.
The next step would obviously be a gradual retreat westward towards Coimbra as Masséna’s army would now pour into Portugal. Wellington deployed his light troops, and his light cavalry in particular, as a screen to the rear of his retreating army. It was vital that they were constantly aware of the location and movements of the French army.
With the fall of Almeida, Wellington expected Masséna to quickly march into Portugal but the French were short of supplies, transport vehicles and animals and remained at Almeida while these deficiencies were rectified. In the meantime, French patrols reported that the inhabitants had left their dwellings and that the countryside was basically empty except for ‘brigands’ who fired on French troops in much the same way as the guerrillas in Spain. On 4 September, Masséna issued a proclamation to the Portuguese warning that if French troops captured them bearing arms but not wearing uniforms they would be shot. Indeed a few were captured and shot, leading to an exchange of letters between Masséna and Wellington, the former wishing to execute them as common criminals, the latter insisting that, although they had no uniforms, they were part of the Ordenanza. Masséna was also aware that the sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida had weakened his army and wished to wait for Reynier’s 2nd Corps so as to enter Portugal in strength with about 65,000 men.
On 14 September, Masséna’s troops finally started marching westward, the 2nd Corps entered Guarda and the 6th Corps reached Freixedas, driving out detachments of British cavalry in both places. The next day, the French army advanced further and Wellington had expected it to follow the main road south of the Mondego River. Accordingly, he had selected Ponte de Murcella as a good position to make a stand against the French. However, on the 17th, the Portuguese and British scouts reported that the French army was crossing the bridge over the Mondego River at Fornos and taking another route north of the river. They were going towards the town of Viseu, which meant they would have to cross the Alcoba mountain range to get there. This came as a surprise to the Allies but was certainly good news as they knew Masséna’s chosen route was an utterly wretched road. As D’Urban, the Quartermaster General of the Portuguese army put it, this news made ‘Lord Wellington’s game a much simpler one than he expected. Instead of being distracted by the uncertainty’ of the French choosing their approach by ‘three or four routes, he will now only have to look to one [route] and fight upon whatever part of that he likes best.’
Masséna’s reasons for choosing this route remain unclear. Marbot, who was on Masséna’s staff, later related it was due to Commandant Pelet’s influence. Masséna was looking for a large town to replenish his army’s dwindling supplies. The apparent lack of knowledge of the country on the part of the French command was the result of Masséna having very little dependable intelligence available on Portugal. The map of Portugal used by the French was published in 1778 and contained numerous inaccuracies particularly with regard to the more remote parts of the country; its topographical information was minimal, some roads were shown and some were not. The Portuguese officers with Masséna were, unluckily for him, of no help. This part of the country was as little known to them as him, although it seems they were embarrassed to admit it and only made things worse by guessing what lay ahead. Masséna had heard of large field fortifications being erected on the main road to block his way and he probably felt that by using the northern roads he could bypass them, resupply his army at the sizeable town of Viseu, and fall on the north flank of the Allied army.
The hills and valleys near Guarda. West of Guarda, the French army moved into mountainous and difficult terrain. (Photo: RC)
When the French army moved west from Almeida it left behind the flat landscape east of the Coa River and by the time it reached Guarda found itself in mountainous country. As General Foy wrote: ‘nine tenths of the main roads in Portugal are impracticable to vehicles’, which gives an indication of the difficulties facing Masséna.13 The main road to Coimbra south of the Mondego River, even if a crude affair as it must have been in 1810, offered just about the only possibility for wheeled transport in that area. Even today this remains a remote part of Portugal. It is only in the last few years that the fine modern highway between Viseu and Guarda was built. It is mostly used by lorries that, even with all the highway amenities, have some challenging hills to negotiate on the way to and from Spain. The scenery is magnificent but the route must have been nightmarish for the French troops in 1810. This is borne out in the French journals of the campaign. Baron Marbot noted the roads in Portugal – at least in the interior of that country – were almost always little more than rocky paths where most portage was carried out by mule trains. It was bad enough for infantry and cavalry but for an artillery park of some 60 guns with all their limbers and wagons, it turned into a nightmare once they passed the medieval town of Trancoso. The road ceased to exist, artillery colonel Noël related, all that remained was a stony and narrow path. His batteries of field guns were with the main army. His gunners would try to enlarge the road with picks and a terrible climb up would be followed by a perilous winding route down with more hills further on to negotiate – the men were soon exhausted. All order was lost and it became a case of ‘each gun for itself’. The countryside had emptied of its inhabitants but Noël’s men did eventually find an old peasant in a deserted hamlet who confirmed they were on the ‘road’ to Viseu.
Transport of supplies in Portugal was carried on mostly by mule trains, wheeled transport being confined to the few main roads.
Noël finally reached Viseu by 20 September, but the bulk of the artillery park and supply trains still lagged behind. It was only the next day at Sotojal on the Adsomil road that it encountered the first resistance. Colonel Nicholas Trant had been shadowing this French column with his brigade of militia and two squadrons (181 men) from the 6th and 11th Portuguese cavalry regiments. The French column was preceded by a company of grenadiers and a 500-man battalion of the green-coated Irish Legion brought up the rear. Montbrun’s huge column of cavalry was further down the road but too far away to be able to assist immediately. Although his force consisted entirely of untried raw troops, Trant nevertheless attacked. The cavalry squadrons charged the grenadiers head on but the elite French soldiers easily repulsed the troopers, killing about 50 of them according to Marbot. Meanwhile, Trant’s militiamen on both sides of the road opened fire on the train and went in, destroying some wagons, taking about 80 prisoners and calling on the rest to surrender as they were surrounded. French commandant Fontinilly began negotiations to buy time as he knew the escort battalion of the Irish Legion was coming to the rescue. Trant fell for the trick. The Irish were soon in sight and the French officer told ‘the English officer’ that he could no longer negotiate as ‘here is my general coming to my rescue with eight thousand men …’ Trant and his men hastily retired to the hills. As Marbot later observed, had the park and train been destroyed, Masséna’s invasion might have ended at Viseu.14
View of the older part of the city of Viseu where Masséna spent an inordinate amount of time with his mistress. (Photo: RC)
In the meantime between 18 and 20 September the long column of the exhausted French army reached Viseu. This town of 9,000 souls was, to their astonishment, empty of its inhabitants! The only food they could find there in quantity were lemons and grapes, which was not very substantial nourishment. By the time Masséna was moving Ney’s 6th Corps out of Viseu on 22 September, the park and the cavalry reserve had still not reached the town. Masséna himself stayed in Viseu with many of his troops for almost six days, a delay almost as damaging as his decision to take the awful road north of the Mondego Valley in the first place. Rumour in the French army had it that the delay was due to Masséna’s mistress, who was much fatigued by the journey. Finally, on 25 September, Masséna resumed his march west. Trant’s attack had shaken the French high command as it was obvious the park and the supplies had been weakly guarded so it would now be escorted by Junot’s 8th Corps which was left behind for that purpose.
Wellington’s scouts were constantly watching for the next French move. These scouts, according to Marbot, were extraordinary. They were usually lone British officers who were superb horsemen especially mounted on the best thoroughbred horses. One would often be seen on a hill following the French column just out of musket range. French light cavalry might go after the observers but never caught any as they would easily lose them thanks to their race horses. As the French troopers rejoined their column, the British scout on his superb horse would often be seen approaching again. Thus Wellington, who prized intelligence services, was kept constantly informed of his enemy’s movements while as Marbot sadly observed, the French had no comparable source of information.
Wellington now certainly needed all the intelligence he could get on the movements of Masséna’s army. He needed to know where it was going so as to pick a new position where a battle to slow down and maul the French might be fought. The move to Viseu had been unexpected and most welcome as it had given more time for reinforcements to reach Wellington’s army. Some 1,792 officers and men had even formed a new brigade in Brent Spencer’s 1st Division thanks to the timely arrival of the 1/7th Foot and the 79th Highlanders. Wellington expected that, from Viseu, Masséna would want to march southwest to reach the main road to Coimbra south of the Mondego. However, when the advance guard of Ney’s 6th Corps came out of Viseu on 20 September, it marched west towards the Serra of Bussaco. Wellington was immediately notified by his fast-riding scouts. This was good news for the Allied commander as the Bussaco mountain ridge north of Coimbra would form an excellent defensive position. The Allied army would now be deployed there over the next few days. A close watch of the French’s every movement confirmed that Masséna was indeed intending to use that route as reports came in of other troops marching out of Viseu in the same direction. To be on the safe side of possible events, Wellington also called Trant’s militia to cover the area north of Bussaco in case Masséna might try some subsidiary operations against Porto, and posted Spencer’s 1st Division to the south should some of his troops move towards the main road to Coimbra. Hill’s 2nd British Division had acted independently in the past weeks, shadowing especially Reynier’s 2nd French Corps from the south of the Mondego River. Hill was therefore nearing Wellington’s main army and hurried up the pace so he could join it to face the French at Bussaco.
13 Maximilien Foy, Histoire de la guerre de la péninsule, Paris, 1828, II, p. 78.
14 As quoted in Mémoires du Général Baron de Marbot, Paris, 1891, II, p. 378. Oman, III, p. 350, felt that Trant missed ‘a great opportunity’ to destroy the train. Perhaps, but it must be recalled he had raw levies who were incapable of facing regulars. Luz Soriano, III, p. 158, gives Trant’s force as 3,000 militia and 30 troopers. His militiamen were from the Aveiro, Feira, Coimbra, Porto, Maia, Peñafiel and Oliveira do Azemis regiments. Fontinilly’s ‘8,000 men’ were a bluff but Montbrun’s troopers were coming up as well.