INTRODUCTION

During the 1920s and 1930s the concept of a heavy “breakthrough” tank was a common theme in European military thinking, when mechanized and armored doctrine was in its post-World War I infancy. Throughout this period, former combatants wrestled with how best to use armor to help avoid repeating the previous war’s static and wasteful trench warfare. Soviet futurist military thinkers such as Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky envisioned integrated “mobile groups” spearheaded by heavy, multi-turreted T-32s and T-35s that had been organized into independent units. Lighter vehicles, operating much like the Russian cavalry during the Russian Civil War (1917–23), would then be used to quickly push through the breach to initiate “deep battle” missions to disrupt their adversary’s command, control, and communications abilities.

Following its proxy participation in the Spanish Civil War (1936–39), leading thinkers in the Red Army refined their views on armor, and while they missed many of the conflict’s tactical lessons they excelled in the technical arena. The “mobile fortress” approach with its multitude of guns was seen as flawed and such systems were replaced with single-turreted designs that emphasized simplicity and reliability: assets for the large, undeveloped areas in which such vehicles would operate. Production quantities were also of primary concern and anything that was not absolutely necessary to achieve this goal was suspect. Crew comfort was generally a low priority in Soviet armor thinking, and fatigue and lessened performance was often a problem in the utilitarian working environment.

Throughout World War II armor development and doctrine underwent considerable changes, especially within the accelerated crucible of the Eastern Front. The Soviet T-34/76, introduced during Operation Barbarossa in 1941, shocked the Germans with its thick, sloped skin, excellent mobility, and powerful armament. Although the German heavy Tiger I tank was made operational in August 1942, and could effectively contend with the T-34, the latter’s considerable production numbers outpaced the capabilities of the German industry, with the result that the Soviets could better weather a war of attrition. As a result of the rapid arms race in the east where each side attempted to maintain a battlefield edge, vehicle weight, armor protection, and firepower all increased.

After the fighting around Kursk in mid-1943, the Soviets looked to produce a vehicle that had thicker armor to better resist the German high-velocity 88mm gun and a main armament that could handle the armor mounted on the enemy weapon. When the IS-2 (“Iosef Stalin”) entered the field in April 1944, its 122mm round imparted considerable force, which helped to make up for its average penetrating ability. In combat it proved well suited for its task as a “heavy” breakthrough tank that could stand up to the German Tiger I and Panther. During the previous month, however, the new German Tiger II had been deployed, and would soon be sent to the Eastern Front.

Although officially designated as “Panzerkampfwagen Tiger Ausf. B,” the Tiger II was more often known by its unofficial name, initially coined by the Reich Ministry for Armament and Ammunition, “Königstiger” (“Bengal Tiger”), which was incorrectly translated by Allied intelligence as “King Tiger” or “Royal Tiger.” By expanding on the thick armor and large main armament of the Tiger I, and the more modern design of the Panther, the 70-tonne Tiger II presented a formidable battlefield solution. During the final ten months of the war it was as suited to the defensive fighting Germany was forced to undertake as the IS-2 was to spearheading Soviet offensives across Eastern Europe. By 1945 both vehicles represented the epitome of operational heavy tank design that greatly contributed to the postwar, multirole “main battle tank” embodied in, for example, the German Leopard I and II and the T-54/55.

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A pristine, two-tone Tiger II with a “series production” (Henschel) turret. It has probably just been produced considering it lacks its bow and cupola armament, spare turret tracks, side skirts, glacis-mounted Bosch headlight, and tow shackles on its drive sprocket guides. (DML)