The basic thesis of Sun Tzu’s Art of War is to try to overcome the enemy by wisdom, not by force alone. Sun Tzu believed that a military struggle was not only a competition between military forces, but also a comprehensive conflict embracing politics, economics, military force, and diplomacy.
The attitude of Sun Tzu towards war is one of extreme prudence, earnestness, and seriousness. He said: “War is a matter of vital importance to the state; a matter of life or death; the road either to survival or to ruin. Hence, it is imperative that it be studied thoroughly.”
Sun Tzu said: “One should appraise a war first of all in terms of five fundamental factors and make comparisons of various conditions of the antagonistic sides in order to assess the outcome. The first of the fundamental factors is politics; the second, weather; the third, terrain; the fourth, the commander; and the fifth, doctrine.” In summary, Sun Tzu believed that one has to deliberate on the basic conditions which decide a war, and among them, five fundamental factors (supra) and seven elements (infra) are the primary ones.
In terms of politics, he meant that the sovereign should use political pressure or other means to bring the people into harmony with him. As for weather, he referred to the interaction of natural forces; the effects of day and night, rain and fair weather, cold and heat, time of day and seasons, and to make full use of favorable conditions and avoid any negative factors. By terrain, he meant distances, whether the ground is traversed with ease or difficulty, whether it is suitable for offensive or defensive tactics, and whether it is fit for the deployment of troops. As for the commander, he specified the general’s qualities of wisdom, sincerity, benevolence, courage, tenacity, and strictness. By doctrine, he meant the discipline and organization of troops, the assignment of appropriate ranks to officers and their respective duties, regulations, and management of logistics.
These are the fundamental factors Sun Tzu believed to be imperative for analyzing and judging victory or defeat in a war. To analyze these factors, one has to answer the following questions, which were known as the “seven elements.”
1. Which of the two sovereigns is more sagacious?
2. Which of the two commanders is wiser and more able?
3. Which of the two armies has the advantages of nature and the terrain?
4. On which side is discipline more rigorously enforced?
5. Which of the two armies is stronger?
6. Which side has the better trained officers and men?
7. Which side administers rewards and punishments in a more enlightened manner?
After making a comprehensive analysis, one will be able to forecast which of the two sides will be victorious. Of course, from the point of view of a modern war, these conditions are obviously insufficient. It was commendable, however, for Sun Tzu to discover these fundamental factors over two thousand years ago.
During China’s war against Japan, Comrade Mao Zedong wrote a brilliant military essay, “On the Protracted War,” in which, having analyzed the various factors of politics, economics, military affairs, diplomacy, and geography, he came to the conclusion that China would eventually be victorious over the Japanese invaders. History proved him to be right. China’s enemy in a future war against aggression will be different from the Japanese, and the Chinese army will also be different. But Sun Tzu’s ways of analyzing a war will remain practical and significant for China’s war strategies.
Sun Tzu was extremely prudent as far as strategy was concerned. He considered it best to subdue the enemy’s army without fighting. He pointed out: “To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the supreme excellence.” He reached this conclusion after carefully summing up the experience of past wars at that time.
Sun Tzu’s principle of field operations was to take preemptive measures and seek quick decisions in campaigns. This principle was formulated from the historical and social conditions of that time. In his chapter entitled “Waging War,” Sun Tzu said: “When the army engages in protracted campaigns, the resources of the state will not suffice. When your army is exhausted and its morale sinks and your treasure is spent, rulers of other states will take advantage of your distress and act. Then, even though you have wise counsellors, none will be able to make good plans for the future. Thus, though we have heard of excessive haste in war, we have not yet seen a clever operation that was prolonged.” He again pointed out in the same chapter: “Those adept in waging war do not require a second levy of conscripts or more than two provisionings. They carry military equipment from the homeland, but rely on the enemy for provisions.”
Why are quick decisions and preemptive measures required in a battle? This is determined by various social conditions, especially by the economic factors prevalent at the time of war. In Sun Tzu’s time, a state was smaller than a province is today. Its population was small and materials limited. Thus, it was unable to support a protracted campaign.
Marshal Liu Bocheng believed that one had to take into consideration the following five “taboos” in making strategic decisions:
1. Do not fight a war if the country is not powerful enough (including manpower and financial and military strength).
2. Do not fight a war if the situation is unfavorable (including the international situation and the attitudes of neighboring countries).
3. Do not fight a war if there is no domestic tranquillity.
4. Do not fight a war if the people do not support it.
5. Do not fight a war if the country has to fight on two or more fronts.
It is important to consider these five conditions in making a strategic decision, but they are not all required before a war is fought, nor are they of equal importance. The first and fifth conditions are more important than the others. Obviously, the victim of aggression should not be bound by those five taboos when it fights against the aggressor. And what is also obvious is that China should pay adequate attention to its defenses when it emphasizes economic construction while the international situation is still in turbulence and factors of war exist.
Marshal Liu also cited a number of examples to explain the five taboos: “It was stupid of General Tojo [of Japan] to unleash the Pacific War in 1941. While he was unable to pull one of his legs from the mire of China, he put the other leg into Southeast Asia, thus fighting on two fronts (against China and the United States, two big powers, on the one hand and the Southeast Asian countries on the other).
“Stalin was wiser. He had tried his best to come to terms with Japan while fighting against Nazi Germany. Meeting personally with the Japanese ambassador, he repeatedly expressed his wish to keep friendly relations with Japan and abide by the mutual nonaggression treaty between the Soviet Union and Japan. He declared war on Japan only when Germany had been defeated.” There have been quite a few cases in which an army was defeated while fighting against more than one enemy; Hitler and Napoleon were only two of them.
It is always for a country’s own fundamental interests and strategic posture that it make an alliance, conclude a treaty, or sign an agreement or convention with other countries after serious deliberations. After a treaty is concluded, unless it is an unequal one, it should be abided by within its period of validity; otherwise, the country or leader will lose credibility in the eyes of the world. Hitler was a man of such perfidiousness.
Sun Tzu pointed out in The Art of War: “What is of supreme importance in war is to upset the enemy’s strategic plans. Next best is to disrupt his alliances by diplomacy and the next best is to attack his army. The worst policy is to attack cities.” This principle of Sun Tzu’s is the quintessence of strategic ideas, which has been greatly valued by militarists in history, and is also a general rule to be observed in all anti-aggressive wars.
Sun Tzu did not elaborate upon his idea of upsetting the enemy’s strategic plans. It is, therefore, necessary to give a few examples to explain what he meant. I think that Sun Tzu had a two-fold meaning: to make strategic decisions and to defeat the enemy with strategy. There have been numerous examples in China’s history of war which can elaborate this principle.
During the period of the Three Kingdoms (220–265 A.D.), Liu Bei went to the thatched cottage of Zhuge Liang three times, requesting assistance in Liu’s struggle for domination of China. In The Dialogue at Longzhong (Shangyang County, Hubei Province), Zhuge put forward three principles which were typical strategic calculations:
1. Advance westward and occupy Sichuan as a base, and then wait for the appropriate time to advance to the Central Plains (comprising the middle and lower reaches of the Yellow River).
2. Form an alliance with the kingdom of Wu in order that the forces of (Shu) Han will not be destroyed one by one.
3. Boycott Wei (Cao Cao) in the north, thus making the political situation clear to the people, winning them to Liu’s side.
Before Liu Bei asked Zhuge Liang to be his chief of staff, he had relied upon Yuan Shao to assist him. Liu Bei then went to Liu Biao for assistance without trying to have his own base. Why? This was because Liu Bei did not make a general analysis of the national situation and did not have a correct strategic decision. The Central Plains at that time were the scene of bitter struggles between various warlords. For this reason, there was hardly any possibility of Liu Bei establishing his own base there or setting up an army to fight against Cao Cao. Nor could he gain any advantage by making use of conflicts among warlords on the Central Plains.
Zhuge Liang made a thorough study in The Dialogue at Longzhong of the strategic position of Sichuan and came to the conclusion that Liu Bei must establish a reliable base there. Let us further analyze the three points in The Dialogue at Longzhong:
First, once it had Sichuan as a base, Liu Bei’s army could recuperate and build up its energy before attacking the Central Plains. Sichuan, being rich in manpower and raw materials, had always been a land of abundance, and was, therefore, a reliable economic base for Liu Bei. Second, Liu Bei could avoid the danger of fighting on two fronts against Cao Cao as well as Sun Quan. Third, Liu Bei’s army could take the initiative of advancing while carrying out an offensive and defending itself while retreating.
Liu Bei should make an alliance with the kingdom of Wu because at that time Wei in the north and Wu in the southeast were the only two powerful states left. To ally himself with Wu and boycott Wei would avoid fighting on two fronts and secure a peaceful environment in which to build up his strength. This policy made a clear distinction between enemies and friends.
Liu Bei should boycott Cao Cao because the power of the Han Dynasty then was, in fact, in the hands of Cao Cao, who in an attempt to put all of China under his rule gave orders to all the sovereigns in the name of the Emperor. It would be politically disadvantageous not to boycott Cao Cao. Liu Bei decided to revitalize the Han Dynasty in the name of being a close relative of the monarchy. His state of Sichuan was mountainous in the north, which was excellent for defense. Therefore, Cao Cao did not dare to attack Sichuan before he had conquered the kingdom of Wu in the east.
The purpose of expounding the strategy as Zhuge Liang stated in The Dialogue of Longzhong was to prove the importance of the idea of attacking an enemy’s strategy.
Another typical example of subduing the enemy by wisdom occurred in 354 B.C. The capital of Zhao at that time was Handan (in the present Hebei Province); the capital of Wei was Daliang (the present Keifan in Henan Province); and the capital of Qi was Linzi (the present Zibo in Shandong Province).
General Pang Juan of Wei directed an army of one hundred thousand men and surrounded Handan, the capital of Zhao. Zhao sent an emissary to Qi to ask for help. The sovereien of Qi summoned his generals and officials to discuss a plan to rescue Zhao. General Tien Ji offered himself as commander of a force of one hundred thousand men to fight against Pang Juan in order to rescue Zhao from the siege. But Qi’s military adviser, Pang Bin, objected to it, saying that the best way of rescuing Zhao was to send an army to besiege Daliang, Wei’s capital. He pointed out that the crack troops of Wei had all been sent to Handan, leaving its capital an unprotected city. When troops were sent towards Daliang, the sovereign of Wei would certainly order Pang Juan to come back and defend Daliang. The siege of Handan would be avoided without a fight. And when Pang Juan’s troops were coming back to its aid, Qi’s troops would choose a place to have a battle with Pang’s troops to defeat them.
This strategem was “to attack where he is sure to come to its rescue.” It was a much better strategem than General Tien Ji’s plan to fight a battle with Pang Juan near Handan after a long and tiring march. Therefore, Qi’s sovereign decided to send troops to Daliang under General Tien Ji’s command with Sun Bin as his military adviser. When Qi’s troops were on their way to Daliang, the sovereign of Wei, as expected, ordered Pang Juan to hurry back to Daliang with his army. The siege of Zhao was indeed ended without a fight. While the troops of Wei were retreating to Daliang, they came across Qi’s troops at Kuanlin district, and were defeated. This was called the Battle of Kuanlin. In retrospect, we can conclude that Tien Ji’s plan to help Zhao was one of attacking the enemy with strength, while Sun Bin’s plan was to defeat the enemy with wisdom.
In 1763 B.C., Yi Ying defeated his enemy by strategic considerations after analyzing the situation and weighing the advantages and disadvantages. Yi Ying was one of Sun Tang’s important officials, entitled Ah Heng—an official equivalent to a prime minister and chief of staff of the army. Yi Ying made suggestions that Sung Tang should refuse to pay tributes to Xia Jie in order to test his popularity and power over his people. Sung Tang accepted this suggestion and stopped paying tributes that year. Jie was furious and dispatched troops from nine tribes to attack Tang. Since Jie was still popular among his subjects, Yi Ying advised Tang to apologize to Jie and pay more tributes to him.
The second year Tang again refused to pay tributes. Jie was even more angry and wanted again to dispatch troops from the nine tribes to Tang. But this time the tribes were not so ready to send troops, complaining that they were poor. As a result of dispatching them every year, the soldiers were weary. Only three tribes answered the call and dispatched troops. Thereupon, Yi Ying said now that Jie had lost his popularity and fighting capacity and the morale of the troops sent by three tribes was low, this was the time to fight Jie. Sung Tang followed his advice and, together with the troops of other sovereigns, lay in ambush at Ming Tiao of Anyi (in the present Shansi Province) and defeated Xia Jie there. Then Tang established the kingdom of Shang. Historically, this is known as the Battle of Ming Tiao. It is a typical example of finding an appropriate opportunity to defeat the enemy after analyzing the situation.
Sun Tzu attached great importance to diplomacy. He used to make alliances with forces in order to fight against a common enemy. The Wu kingdom at this time was situated at the place of the present Suzhou and Wusi. To its west was the powerful Cu kingdom, (in present Hubei, Anhui, and Hunan provinces). They adjoined one another and had repeated border conflicts. Sun Tzu was eager to ally the Wu and Qi kingdoms in the north in order to alleviate pressure from that source and concentrate its forces in the fighting against Cu. The policy of disrupting an enemy’s alliances in Sun Tzu’s Art of War is a strategy of practical importance. This means to secure an advantageous posture strategically through diplomacy. It is also the idea of defeating the enemy by strategic considerations. The following three examples will suffice to elaborate this idea.
Before World War II, the Soviet Union tried its best to sign an agreement of mutual assistance with Britain and France in order to prevent the invasion of Nazi Germany. But the British and French rulers at that time attempted to direct the scourge of Germany towards the East—the Soviet Union. As a result, several talks between the three powers failed in spite of efforts made by the Soviet Union. Under the circumstances, Stalin could not have acted otherwise but to sign a nonaggression pact with Germany, which stopped the German advance for a certain period and thereby gave time for Soviet preparation. The British and French rulers were not as alert as the Soviet Union and suffered more immediately the force of Hitler’s blitzkrieg. This was described by Comrade Mao Zedong as “to lift a stone just to crush one’s own feet.” Stalin’s tactic of delaying the attack by Hitler through diplomatic means, thereby gaining time for preparation, was wise and desirable from a military strategic point of view.
During the Warring Period (475–221 B.C.), the kingdom of Qin wanted to attack Qi, but it feared the Qi-Cu alliance. Zhang Yi was, therefore, sent by Qin to Cu as an envoy to disrupt the Qi-Cu alliance. Upon arriving in Cu, Zhang Yi approached Queen Nan and presented her with a precious gift of pearls and jade and asked her to convey the following message to the sovereign of Cu: “Zhang Yi has been sent to Cu as an envoy to meet the sovereign of Cu. Qin is ready to cede six hundred li of its territory to the kingdom of Cu. What Qin asks for from Cu is only friendship and nonaggression.”
The sovereign of Cu met with Zhang Yi, who tried all he could to persuade Cu of the advantages of being on good terms with Qin. The sovereign of Cu was overwhelmed by its offer of territory (the equivalent of two hundred miles of land) as a reward for friendship and promised to be on good terms with Qin.
The sovereign of Qi was furious when he heard about the news of reconciliation between the sovereign of Cu and Zhang Yi, which he believed to be a conspiracy against Qi. After this, Qi and Cu became enemies.
In fact, the offer of two hundred miles of territory was a deception. When the envoy of Cu went to Qin to accept the territory, Zhang Yi said that what he had promised was not two hundred miles of Qin’s territory but two miles of his own property. The Cu sovereign was extremely angry when he discovered this. He sent troops to attack Qin but was defeated. From then on, the kingdom of Cu became isolated from all sides. As a result, Qin’s disruption of the Qi-Cu alliance laid the foundation for the defeat of Qi and Cu, respectively.
During the Spring and Autumn Period (770–476 B.C.), Zheng kingdom’s disruption of the alliance between Jin and Qin kingdoms while being attacked by them was another convincing example of the use of diplomacy to weaken two allies. Zheng was a small state sandwiched between the two powerful neighboring states—Jin and Qin. Zheng, being allied with Cu, hoped Cu would come to its rescue. Being afraid of Jin’s and Qin’s strength, Cu dared not to send any troops. Zheng was in a desperate situation.
Zheng’s sovereign then sent his veteran official, Zhu Zhiwu—an experienced diplomat who was eloquent, courageous, and resourceful—to Qin to meet their sovereign in person. Zhu Zhiwu asked the sovereign of Qin for the reasons of its support to Jin in attacking Zheng. Qin’s sovereign said he supported Jin because Zheng acted faithlessly towards Jin.
Zhu Zhiwu said: “Zheng did break its promise with Jin, but it has always highly admired and respected the great Qin. Your Excellency is wise and generous. You helped Jin in its establishment of the state. Now you are again helping Jin conquer Zheng by tiring your troops on a long expedition. Zheng is far away from Qin, and you would in no way be benefited if Zheng is conquered. On the contrary, if Zheng were occupied by Jin, it is Jin that would be greatly strengthened. And since Qin and Jin are adjoined to each other, if Jin becomes even more powerful, it will surely be a potential threat to Qin. I am worried for Qin’s future. Jin is not a state that is unswervingly sincere and faithful. It promised once to cede its territory west of the Huang River to Qin, but it did not keep its promise. Moreover, it dispatched troops to the border to threaten the safety of Qin. Do you like to feed a close neighbor who is a tiger? In my opinion, the best thing for Qin to do is to withdraw from this expedition and come back. This is in Qin’s interest. If Qin follows my advice and withdraws its troops, Zheng is willing to be Qin’s protectorate, and, if necessary, provide military bases when Qin passes through the Central Plains. Zheng can also serve as a natural screen to protect Qin in the east and west against any threats from Jin.”
The sovereign of Qin was left without any argument by this ingenious remark. A tacit understanding was then reached, and Qin withdrew its troops on its own. Seeing Qin’s troops being withdrawn, and being aware that Cu was an ally of Zheng and that Cu would certainly come to its defense if Zheng were attacked, Jin also withdrew its troops immediately. The siege of Zheng was thus ended without a fight. This is one of the typical examples in China’s war history in which a siege was avoided thanks to diplomacy only.
Regarding the principle of “the next best being to attack the army,” it does not mean that one should try to defeat the enemy only by force. In fact, wisdom is extremely essential on any battlefield. There have been numerous examples of the need for strategic wisdom in China’s history of war.
In the year 383 B.C., General Fu Jian of the earlier Qin Dynasty led his army southward in an attempt to conquer East Jin. Xie Xuan and Xie Shi, who were Jin generals, ordered their armies to the southern bank of the Feishui River to resist Fu Jian, whose army (numbering more than three hundred thousand) was decidedly superior to that of Jin, which numbered only eighty thousand. Obviously, Xie Xuan and Xie Shi had to defeat their enemy with wisdom.
Xie Xuan’s analysis of the two armies confronting each other across the Feishui River was that Fu Jian’s army was superior in number, but its command was not unified. Infantry and cavalry were mixed and the vanguard and followup units were far apart. Moreover, the generals in Fu Jian’s army had no strategic considerations. If its vanguard units were defeated, victory would be an easy task for East Jin.
Xie Xuan surmised that if he could attack the Qin army while it was in disorder, he would surely win. Then he sent an envoy to Qin, asking them to retreat for a certain distance so that the Jin army could cross the Feishui River and fight a decisive battle with Qin. The commander of the Qin army agreed and an order was given to retreat. There naturally was some disorder in the Qin army while it retreated, owing to its weak command.
Furthermore, Zhu Xu, a Jin officer who had surrendered to the Qin army, seized the opportunity to create disorder by shouting to the follow-up units, “The Qin army is defeated.” The Qin soldiers in the rear were fooled by this ruse, and the infantry and cavalry vied in retreating. As a result, there was great confusion in the Qin army. The Jin army, after crossing the Feishui River, took advantage of this disorder, and swiftly attacked the Qin army and defeated it. Fu Jian, commander of the Qin army, was hit by an arrow, then fled alone to the north of the Hui River on horseback. This is known as the Battle of the Feishui River.
Another example of strategic wisdom in a war occurred in the year 202 B.C. The sovereign of Western Han asked Marshal Han Xin to direct the Battle of Gaixia against the Cu army, commanded by Xiang Yu, the sovereign of Western Cu. The Cu army was fairly powerful with a force of more than ninety thousand. In addition, Xiang Yu was valiant and courageous, and no one in the Han army dared to fight him alone. Pondering the problem carefully, Han Xin decided to devise a scheme. His army laid an ambush at the Jiulishan Mountain region. He asked Li Zuoche to enrage Xiang Yu and lure his army into the ambush. To make matters worse, Han Xin sent different units to fight against Xiang Yu in turn. The Cu soldiers could get neither food nor rest. Han Xin concentrated all his forces and fought a decisive battle against Cu.
During the battle, Xiang Yu was ambushed three times, and he had to lead the army personally more than a dozen times while attempting to escape, resulting in casualties of more than ten generals. In the end, Xiang Yu had to order a retreat because the soldiers were without food and reinforcements. Han Xin followed up his victory with a quick pursuit, not allowing Xiang Yu’s men even a breathing spell. Xiang Yu committed suicide by cutting his throat. The remnants of the Cu army surrendered.
We can conclude that the Battle of Gaixia was won by Han Xin because of his correct strategy. If he had tried to win merely by force, it could have been a very different outcome, to say nothing of a complete annihilation of the Cu army.
Let us summarize what we have learned so far about Sun Tzu’s theories relating to strategic considerations. At the very beginning of Sun Tzu’s Art of War, he pointed out: “War is a matter of vital importance to the state; a matter of life or death; the road to survival or ruin. Hence, it is imperative that it be studied thoroughly.” Therefore, one should appraise it in terms of the five fundamental factors and compare the seven elements. One has first to analyze and deliberate on the fighting capacity and advantages and disadvantages of one’s own army and of the enemy. What is required of a commander is to “subdue the enemy troops without a fight” and to win by strategic considerations.
As we have seen, Sun Tzu advocated that in a war, generally the best policy is to attack the enemy’s strategy. Next best is to disrupt his alliances by diplomacy. The next in order is to attack the enemy’s army in the field, and the worst policy is to attack cities. His doctrine was that to fight a war is not only a matter of military affairs, but a matter relating to politics, economics, diplomacy, climate, and geography. Only when all these factors are taken into consideration comprehensively can one defeat the enemy. He was in favor of gaining the initiative by striking first, fighting a quick battle to force a quick decision, and not protracting a war. (These conclusions were reached according to the political and economic conditions in Sun Tzu’s time.)
Sun Tzu believed that the state should make up the strategy of war, and the commander should organize and direct the battles. In other words, one should first devise a strategy in a safe command position that will ensure victory on whatever battlefield. All factors have to be considered practically and realistically without any wishful thinking.
Sun Tzu advocated that one should take the initiative and be flexible in fighting a war. Try to grasp the crux of the battle and attack where the enemy feels invulnerable, thus bringing about a decisive change. Then make the best use of the situation and guide the fighters to victory.
Devise a strategy in line with the fundamental and long-term interests of the state, not just expediency. It is much more complicated to devise a strategy than to lay a plan for a battle. One has to consider a much wider scope and take into consideration disadvantages as well as advantages, and try to develop and make use of all positive factors while reducing negative ones. (It is almost impossible to totally avoid the latter.)
Lastly, all things in the world have their strong and weak points, their advantages and disadvantages. They are dialectical and are transformed into their opposites under certain circumstances. But it is always the primary and key factor that is decisive, so one should never be misled by complicated minor factors.
