Sun Tzu attached great importance to gaining the initiative in any confrontation. His principles of taking pre emptive measures, of fighting a quick battle to force a quick decision, bringing the enemy to the battlefield instead of being brought there by him, are all for the sake of gaining the initiative in a war.
Mao Zedong said: “Losing the initiative means to be defeated, to be annihilated.” Mao Zedong advocated that in fighting a battle you must bring the enemy where you want him to be, not run after him. He thought it better to gain mastery by striking only after the enemy has made the first move so that you may ascertain the enemy’s weak points.
Initiative also means mobility and flexibility for the army. It means when it attacks, it is irresistible; when it defends, it is impregnable; and when it retreats, the enemy does not dare to pursue. There are many important statements to this effect in Sun Tzu’s Art of War.
In the chapter entitled “Void and Actuality,” Sun Tzu wrote: “An army may be compared to water, for water in its natural flowing avoids the heights and hastens downwards. So in a war, an army should avoid strength and strike at weakness. As water shapes its flow in accordance with the nature of the ground, an army manages to be victorious in relation to the enemy it is facing. As water retains no constant shape, so in war there are no constant conditions. One who can modify his tactics in accordance with the enemy’s situation and succeed in gaining victory may be called divine.”
In regard to “Maneuvering,” he stated: “In war, practice deception and you will win victory. Move when it is advantageous to you. Concentrate or disperse your troops according to circumstances.”
Writing about “Terrain,” Sun Tzu said: “The general who is experienced in war once in motion is clear in his destination and never bewildered; once he acts, his resources are limitless and tactics varied. Therefore, I say: Know the enemy, know yourself, and your victory will never be endangered. Know the ground, know the weather, and your victory will be complete.”
In referring to “Offensive Strategy,” he wrote: “Know the enemy and know yourself, and in a hundred battles you will never be defeated. If you know only yourself, not the enemy, your chances of winning and losing are equal. If you are ignorant of either the enemy or yourself, you will surely be defeated in every battle.”
The chapter entitled “The Nine Variables” pointed out: “A general who does not understand the advantages of the nine variable factors will not be able to use the terrain to his advantage, even though he is well acquainted with it. A general who directs troops and does not understand the tactics suitable to the nine variable situations will be unable to employ the troops effectively, even if he understands the ‘five advantages.’” He emphasized in this chapter: “For this reason, a wise general in his deliberations always considers both favorable and unfavorable factors. By taking the favorable factors into account, he makes his plan and decision feasible; by taking into account the unfavorable, he may avoid disasters.”
Sun Tzu’s “The Nine Varieties of Ground” pointed out: “The skillful commander may be likened to shuai-ran, which is a kind of snake that is found in the Chang Mountains. When this snake is struck on the head, its tail attacks; when struck on the tail, its head attacks; and when struck in the center, both head and tail attack. . . . Therefore, exhibit the coyness of a maiden, until the enemy loses his alertness and gives you an opening, then move as swiftly as a hare, and the enemy will be unable to resist you.”
While being aware of the disposition of an army, and of the extraordinary and normal forces, one must at the same time gain initiative and flexibility in employing troops. Sun Tzu wisely observed: “As water retains no constant shape, so in war there are no constant conditions.” He meant there should be no fixed formulae for employing troops. One will surely be defeated by trying to apply one particular way of fighting to different situations or using a certain tactic derived from a specific instance for complicated battles. The way of staging a suitable campaign in a mountainous and forested area may not be applicable on the plains, and vice versa. Therefore, one should try to study and create new ways of fighting in accordance with the facts of each practical situation that presents itself.
The most important principle for directing a war is that there is no shortcut to master its laws. In a battlefield, events change quickly and often appear to be unpredictable. In fact, if one uses the theory of dialectical materialism in observing and analyzing the essence of war one will discover that (whether on the offensive or defensive, with strong forces or weak) there are always two sides to a question which are closely related and transform themselves into their opposites under certain conditions. Therefore, only when a commander engages in a war can he gain insight into the objective factors that promote this transformation of opposites, and avoid disadvantages and make correct decisions leading to victory.
In this respect, Marshal Liu Bocheng stresses deftness, fierceness, and swiftness. He said: “Flexibility in employing troops is reflected by taking measures of void or actuality deftly, such as making a feint to the east and attacking in the west, changes in the extraordinary and normal forces, diverting the enemy as you wish and making him take what you want to give, and attacking where the enemy is sure to come to the rescue and where it is most unexpected.”
One of Mao Zedong’s most valuable attributes was his initiative and flexibility in directing a war. He often defeated his enemy by a surprise move. The Battle of the Cheshui River during the Long March was a typical example.
The Cheshui River winds through the borders of Yunnan, Guizhou, and Sichuan Provinces. In January 1935, Mao Zedong decided that the Red Army should march northward from Zunyi (by way of Tongzi, Songkan, and Tucheng) and then cross the Cheshui River. The enemy was very worried about this movement. The pursuing Central Army and the provincial troops of Sichuan, Guizhou, and Hunan quickly concentrated in that area, trying to encircle the Red Army.
Aware that it was now impossible to cross the Yangzi River, Mao Zedong ordered the Red Army to assemble in that area and await new opportunities. When he found out that the enemy in Guizhou Province was weak, he ordered the army to advance suddenly eastward, crossing the Cheshui River again, and went back to attack Tongzi and Zunyi (both in Guizhou Province) again. During the march, the Red Army annihilated twenty regiments of the enemy. Jiang Jieshi was extremely dismayed by the defeat and moved troops again in a new attempt to besiege the Red Army in the Zunyi Area.
In order to confuse and then move the enemy troops, Mao Zedong ordered the Red Army to march through Renhui and cross the Cheshui River for the third time at Maotai; then he advanced northward to southern Sichuan. Seeing this movement, Jiang Jieshi believed that the Red Army would cross the Yangzi River again and join forces with the Fourth Front Army. So he ordered the provincial troops of Sichuan, Guizhou, and Hunan and the Central Army to encircle the Red Army again in an attempt to wipe them out in a single strike.
Judging that the enemy was being moved according to his plan, Mao Zedong directed the Red Army to suddenly turn east, crossing the Cheshui River for the fourth time, and, in a rapid march along the right wing of the enemy troops, crossed the Wujiang River and marched towards Guiyang (the capital of Guizhou). While the main force of the Red Army feigned an attack on the capital, other troops broke through the area between Guiyang and Lungli, crossing the Hunan-Guizhou Highway, advancing towards Kuanming (the capital of Yunnan Province).
Discovering that they had been taken in, the enemy marched over 300 miles to come back to defend Kuanming. By this time, the Red Army had already crossed the Jingsa River with seven small boats in nine days and nights, reaching Huili in Sichuan. Thus, the Red Army had extricated itself from the pursuit and encirclement tactics of the Guomindang troops and realized its strategic aim of crossing the Yangzi River and going to the north of China.
From the above example, we can see Mao Zedong’s masterful use of flexible tactics and excellent art of war. He directed the operations of the Red Army with miraculous skill, often beyond the expectations of the enemy. The Red Army advanced in great strides, puzzling and directing the enemy, making them weary and finally succeeding in freeing itself from their pursuit.
Mao Zedong’s example illustrates the importance of selecting proper generals. An inadequate commander may succeed in one action but may well lose the overall situation. It is because he cannot adapt himself to radical changes in the field and, therefore, is unable to put into effect his superior’s strategic intention. For example, during the period of the Three Kingdoms, Zhuge Liang could well be called an effective chief of staff who was good at tactical planning, but he made a mistake in assigning Ma Su as a general for the defense of Jie Ting. Ma Su had some military knowledge; however, he lacked the ability to take charge of the overall situation, and did not have the experience of employing troops flexibly. He was, in fact, a pedant.
During the period of the Three Kingdoms, Jingzhou was occupied by the kingdom of Shu and was garrisoned by the famous general Guan Yu. The kingdom of Wu had tried to reclaim its possession of Jingzhou but had been unsuccessful. In 219 A.D., the sovereign of Wu, following General Lu Meng’s advice, made an agreement with Cao Cao to attack Jingzhou from the north and south simultaneously (Cao’s army from the north to be led by General Cao Ren; Wu’s army from the south to be led by Lu Sun).
At first, Lu Sun’s army was led by Lu Meng, who was well known for his resourcefulness and bravery. Guan Yu was most cautious regarding him. Lu Meng thought of a scheme of luring the enemy away from its base. He pretended to go back to Jianye because of illness and recommended that Lu Sun take his place. When Guan Yu heard the news, he was relieved. Thinking that Lu Sun was a young general who had not much fighting experience, Guan Yu attacked Shangyang and Fancheng in the north with crack troops led by him personally, leaving Mi Fang and Fu Shireng to guard Jingzhou.
When Lu Meng learned all this, he knew his scheme was successful. He ordered several hundred men disguised as merchants to go to the northern boundary between the kingdoms of Zhu and Wu and strike at the fortresses along the river with many troops, forcing Mi Fang and his men to surrender.
However, the northward advance of Guan Yu’s troops progressed smoothly. They captured Xiangyang and threatened the city of Fancheng. Yu Jing and Pang De, Cao Cao’s senior generals, were both captured, and large numbers of their troops were annihilated. Cao Cao was panic-stricken and began to think about moving his capital.
Guan Yu was bitterly remorseful when he learned that Jingzhou had been attacked and taken by the Wu army. He immediately withdrew his troops and retreated towards Maicheng where he was besieged by the Wu army. Guan Yu fell into an ambush and was captured.
Lu Meng’s scheme of luring the enemy away from its base was successful because he knew Guan Yu was arrogant and had a fondness for the grandiose. Lu Meng asked Lu Sun to take his place in order to completely disarm Guan Yu psychologically. The way Guan Yu led all his troops northward was a manifestation of his desire for honor. It is extremely important for a commander to know the characteristics of his opponents’ generals and try every means to win the battle with strategy.
During the Chinese War of Liberation [1945–49], the tactical situation in the northeastern battlefield under Lin Biao was unfavorable as a whole to the PLA. He had besieged Changchun and crossed the Songhua Jiang River three times, but had not gained the initiative or flexibility in the campaign. Lin Biao’s forces were superior to Wei Lihuang’s, the Guomindang general. However, in the opinion of the PLA’s Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, this was because of errors made by the PLA commander in that region.
After deep deliberation, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai decided to attack Jingzhou, which was considered a strategic move whereby the enemy would be obliged to defend a valuable position. Jingzhou was the key junction for the passage of supplies between northern and northeastern China. If Jingzhou were taken, supplies for the Guomindang army in the northeast region would be cut off. Moreover, the mutual strategic support of the enemy forces in the northern and northeastern regions would also be lost. If Jingzhou were attacked by the PLA, the enemy would have to come to its rescue in a strategically weak position by the PLA’s initiative. If reinforcements were to be sent, the Guomindang army would run the risk of being wiped out while they were in motion, thus creating the conditions for the PLA to move troops flexibly.
History proved the correctness of the decision made by Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. Just as expected, when Jingzhou was being attacked by the PLA, reinforcements were sent from northern China by the enemy, but were intercepted by the PLA and failed to reach Jingzhou. The Guomindang troops were also dispatched from Shenyang to rescue Jingzhou and were intercepted and annihilated at Dahushan. Later, the enemy in Changchun had to surrender. In this campaign, a total of more than 470,000 Guomindang troops were wiped out. The whole of the northeastern region was liberated.
It can be concluded that strategic initiative is not innate in a battle, but has to be created by wise commanders. Flexibility of tactics in a campaign is generally obtained on the basis of strategic initiative. The Liaoxi-Shenyang campaign illustrates the truth of this theory.
Grasp the key point which affects the whole campaign: Deftness, fierceness, and swiftness should be understood correctly. Deftness means that a plan is put into execution craftily; fierceness is an overwhelming superiority of force, as a fierce tiger springs upon a goat; swiftness means that a battle is ended as suddenly as a flash of lightning.
Initiative and flexibility require that feints and strikes be varied, moves of the enemy be planned and directed. Attack where the enemy will surely come to its own rescue, and have several feasible alternatives in hand before starting a campaign.
Initiative in a campaign is not innate but has to be fought for. It largely depends upon the commander’s ability to direct a battle in accordance with the change of events. One can change an unfavorable situation into a favorable one and passivity into initiative (e.g., the four-time crossing of the Cheshui River and the Battle of Jingzhou). Those who employ troops flexibly usually will have the initiative.
Choose a suitable commander who has creativity of thought and the ability to react speedily. There is neither a set form of employing troops nor an overall rule for winning a war. One has to blaze new trails constantly.
Attach importance to the creation of a brain trust, which knows how to train staff officers as thinkers. They should not be used as copy clerks or orderlies. This is the only way in which a commander can pool the wisdom of his staff.
