Of the thirteen chapters in Sun Tzu’s Art of War, four chapters—“The Nine Variables,” “Marches,” “Terrain,” and “The Nine Varieties of Ground”—deal with the relationships between geography and military affairs. In other chapters, there are also passages relating to geography.
The “Terrain” chapter pointed out: “Conformation of the ground is of great assistance in battle. Therefore, to estimate the enemy’s attempts and to calculate the degree of difficulty and distances of the terrain in order to control forces of victory are tasks of a superior general. He who fights with full knowledge of these factors is certain to win, and he who does not is sure to be defeated.”
It must be made clear that what Sun Tzu meant by terrain is not the same as a modern definition. It is rather a concept which has the implications of the modern “topography” and “military geography.”
Although Sun Tzu thought conformation of ground an assistance in battle, he asserted that a senior commander must be fully aware of the degree of difficulty and distances of terrain. Facts have proven his assertion. There have been numerous examples, abroad as well as in China, in which an army was defeated because of ignorance of terrain.
For example, in the year 645 B.C., the kingdoms of Qin and Jin fought at Han Yuan (in present Shanxi Province). The war chariots of Jin got stuck in the mire because the Jin commanders were ignorant of the terrain there. As a result, the Jin army was not only defeated, but Jinhuigong, the commander, was also captured.
In the year 589 B.C., Qi kingdom was defeated by Jin. In retreating, its chariots were entangled in a big clump of trees, almost resulting in the capture of its sovereign.
Sun Tzu, summing up numerous examples of this kind, explained some of the effects that geography has on war. In the chapter entitled “Terrain,” he classified it in six types: “accessible,” “entangling,” “temporizing,” “narrow passes,” “precipitous,” and “distant.” These types are terrains that are natural to a battlefield, and which fall generally into the category of topography.
In the chapter entitled “Nine Varieties of Ground,” he categorized ground as “dispersive,” “frontier,” “key,” “open,” “focal,” “serious,” “difficult,” “encircled,” and “desperate.” These anticipated geographical situations, which include strategic places beyond a boundary, are generally related to military geography.
In his book, Sun Tzu discussed each category in detail and the ways to handle them. He gave much emphasis to fighting in a marsh or in a covered place. He pointed out: “In crossing marshes, do it speedily. Do not linger in them. When on march you find dangerous defiles or ponds covered with aquatic grasses, or hollow basins filled with reeds, or woods with dense tangled undergrowth, search them out carefully, for these are places where ambushes are laid and spies are hidden.”
This principle is still applicable in modern wars. In World War I, one hundred thousand Russian troops led by General Shamansonov were completely annihilated by the German army in a marsh. And one can cite a number of examples in the modern history of war in which troops were intercepted and defeated at dangerous defiles and covered places.
The importance of focal ground in connection with the strategic deployments developed by the United States and the Soviet Union [during the latter half of the twentieth century]—is obvious and will be considered here.
Sun Tzu’s definition of focal ground is: “The area which is at the junction of three states is focal. He who gets control of it will gain the support of surrounding states. . . . On focal ground, make allies of those states. . . . And I should consolidate my alliances.”
Focal ground, generally speaking, is outside one’s own territory, but it is strategically most important. If one occupies it first, one will be in a most favorable position. Apparently, since the focal ground is outside one’s boundary, it can be far away. It is not easy to get control of it by mobilizing one’s troops. Therefore, Sun Tzu’s means of taking control was to make allies of the states neighboring the focal ground, which seems to be reasonable and feasible.
In the book Sun Tzu’s Art of War as Annotated by Eleven Authors (Sung Edition), eight of the writers had the same explanation with regard to focal ground. They all believed that it is a strategically important place which has roads extended in all directions. It is vital, therefore, to have it under control first. The means to obtain it is, however, not by force but by diplomacy.
The following comment by Mr. He is representative of the opinions of others: “Focal ground is a junction which extends in all directions. Take hold of it first and the others will obey you. It gives security to get but is dangerous to lose.
“The sovereign of Wu once asked Sun Tzu: ‘If we are far off from the focal ground, we won’t be able to reach it first even if we drive our horses and chariots as fast as possible. What shall I do?’
“Sun Tzu replied: ‘The distance is the same to us and to the enemy. To get control of the focal ground, we must attach more importance to wealth than force. If you reward your prospective allies with valuables and bind them with solemn covenants, you are there first even if your troops have not arrived. You are aided and your enemy is not.’”
The meaning of his comments is clear. The main idea is to adopt diplomatic measures and economic means to win over the state in which the focal ground is situated.
Sun Tzu’s theory in this respect is of practical significance, which can be proven by examples of rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. Karl von Clausewitz often proved the correctness of his theoretical conclusions by giving examples from war history. He also attached great importance to topography and once said that it is of special significance for the headquarters of the general staff to have knowledge of geography. And one can always find records of terrain in war history. Therefore, each headquarters of the general staff presently in various countries has set up a specific department to study geography.
According to the definition Sun Tzu gave to focal ground and the annotations on it, there are quite a few strategically important places which can be said to be focal ground: the Strait of Gibraltar, the Suez Canal, and the Strait of Bosphorus—the three passages in the Mediterranean Sea and the southern wing of NATO; the Strait of Malacca, between Indonesia and Malaysia; the Panama Canal in Central America; and the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Mexico—one in the East and one in the West.
As is known, one of the superpowers found it difficult to lay its hands on the Strait of Gibraltar, which was firmly in the hands of the United Kingdom. But it spent several billion dollars as military and economic “aid” to Egypt in order to get the right of passage through the Suez Canal; it gave one billion dollars as “aid” to Turkey, and its principal leader visited the country personally to ensure its right of passage through the Strait of Bosphorus, which it succeeded in obtaining. The aircraft carrier S.S. Kiev secured a smooth passage through the Strait of Bosphorus into the Mediterranean, which was not permitted according to an international treaty. What this superpower did was in line with Sun Tzu’s principle: “One should attach enough importance to giving aid and send more envoys. . . .”
The United States and the Soviet Union fought for control of Afghanistan and several other countries around the Persian Gulf. The policy of Cuba, the focal ground east of the Gulf of Mexico, greatly changed the strategic positions of the two superpowers in North and South America.
Tonga, a small country in the South Pacific, is at the strategic point among three allies: the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. The Soviet Union once tried to cater to this country by “giving economic aid and sending a number of envoys” in an attempt to get a foothold in the South Pacific. It did not succeed because its scheme was seen through.
The world has entered the space age, and various kinds of satellites have been widely used for military purposes, especially the space shuttle. All this has made it possible for a future war to be fought in space. But nothing can completely escape the confines of earth. Satellites and space shuttles alike are both launched from the ground, where the strategic points and economic bases are also located.
Therefore, geography is one of the four indispensable factors—in addition to the enemy’s and one’s own situations and the element of time—to be taken into consideration before making decisions and laying out plans. No doubt, this is taught in all military academies in the world. When we study Sun Tzu’s Art of War, we should in no way neglect the practical significance of his doctrine with regard to geography.
Places of strategic importance include straits, canals, airports, gulfs or bays, and launching sites for guided missiles which are worthy of blockade and control. There are generally two ways of controlling them before the enemy does: One is to make an ally through diplomacy of the country where the place is situated; the other is to rent or lease the place through friendly negotiations so that it may not be used by the enemy.
Deserts, big marshes, forests, uninhabited areas, plagued regions, and high mountains where the air is thin are unfit places for a military troop to inhabit for long.
There are places one must fight for militarily. They include centers of communication or of military, political, or economic importance. It is advantageous to occupy places where one can be the master of the situation, preserving the freedom to move troops. Places from which one can attack as well as retreat, where one can keep plentiful supplies, and where one can adapt to all kinds of changes are all important.
Tactically valuable places generally are commanding heights above a battlefield, hubs of communication, solid and strong buildings on flatlands, bridgeheads, and certain places for crossing along a river.