Mao Zedong wrote in an article: “Where do correct ideas come from? Do they drop from the skies? No. Are they innate in the mind? No. They come from social practice, and from it alone. They come from three kinds of social practice: the struggle for production, the class struggle, and scientific experiment.”
Sun Tzu lived in the later Spring and Autumn Period, a time when ancient Chinese society was changing from a slave to a feudal society. This was the time when there was fierce class struggle reflected in wars. Prior to this period, five bo [a title of nobility in ancient China equivalent to an earl]—Qi Yuan, Jin Wen, Qin Mu, Chu Zhuang, and Song Rang—were fighting for dominance, and the whole social system was in turbulence.
According to historical records for the early Spring and Autumn Period, there had been more than 130 small states fighting against one another. In the process, there emerged five powerful states: Qi, Jin, Qin, Chu, and Song (in fact, Song was not as strong as the others). They fought for overall control, bullying smaller and weaker states and invading their neighbors. During the period of about two hundred years before Sun Tzu lived, there had occurred three to four hundred wars among them. In addition to military struggles, which produced a diversified art of war, history had witnessed political struggles, economic struggles (reflected mainly in commercial relations and in the seizure of other states’ wealth by economic practices), and diplomatic struggles (usually in alliances and counteralliances, and protection of smaller states in order to enlarge one’s sphere of influence). Sun Tzu’s Art of War was indeed a summary of the experiences of these wars. It is, therefore, still immortal over two thousand years after it was written as far as many of its principles are concerned.
Sun Tzu’s Art of War seems to be speaking in abstract terms. But when we relate it to various wars that occurred before Sun Tzu’s time, things become clearer. Of course, it is not the intention of the author to link each and every principle of Sun Tzu’s Art of War to an historic event. Only one or two examples are to be given to elaborate upon Sun Tzu’s central ideas.
“Estimates,” the first chapter of Sun Tzu’s Art of War, appraises the role that preliminary calculations play in a war: “If the calculations made in the temple before a battle indicate victory, it is because careful calculations show that your conditions for a battle are more favorable than that of your enemy; if they indicate defeat, it is because careful calculations show that favorable conditions for a battle are fewer. With more careful calculations, one can win, with less one cannot. How much less chance of victory has one who makes no calculations at all! By this means, one can foresee the outcome of a battle.”
The “preliminary calculations” in modern times mean the decisions made by the highest command before a war after meticulous analysis regarding various factors of war. One does not enter a war if one is not sure to win. That is to say, the decision as to whether to enter a war is the outcome of a comprehensive study beforehand of various factors of political and military experience, and of diplomacy and geography. The following example should suffice to show what is meant by this.
The War of Cheng Pu in 632 B.C. was one of fairly large scale during the Spring and Autumn Period. It was also a war enabling Jin Wen Gong to secure his position of dominance and it laid the foundation for the Jin state to be supreme among states for a long time. Before the war, the monarch of Jin and his officials carefully weighed various factors pertaining to both sides. Zou Zhuan, a book about Chinese history, has a very vivid description of the war as follows: “In winter, Chu and its followers besieged Sung. Gongsun Guru of Sung went to Jin for help.”
Xian Zhen, one of the marshals in Jin, said: “This is the time for us to pay our debt of gratitude to Sung by coming to their rescue. It is also the time for us to obtain hegemony in the area.”
Hu Yen, a Jin general, also remarked: “Chu secured the Cao state not long ago and it had matrimonial relations with the Wei state. If we attacked Cao and Wei, Chu was sure to come to their rescue. Then Qi and Sung would certainly be relieved of Sung’s siege.” Jin Wen Gong, the sovereign of Jin, followed their advice.
The next spring Jin’s troops attacked Cao and Wei, and were victorious. But things turned out unexpectedly. Zi Yu, a senior general of Chu, continued the attack on the state of Sung, which again sent Man Yin to Jin to ask for emergency help.
During the discussion, Jin Wen Gong stated: “If we do not try our best to help Sung, it will break off relations with us. If Chu is not in a mood of reconciliation, we shall have to go to war against it. In that case, it is essential to get help from Qi and Qin. But what if they decline?”
Xian Zhen replied: “Tell Sung not to ask us but pay handsome tributes to Qi and Qin, and then ask them to plead with Chu. In the meantime, we, having kept the sovereign of Cao in captivity, will give a part of the territories of the Cao state and Wei state to Sung. Being closely allied with the two states, Chu will not tolerate it. Pleased with Sung’s tributes and annoyed with Chu’s stubbornness, Qi and Qin will certainly resort to arms with Chu.”
As we have already observed in Sun Tzu’s Art of War, there are such important principles as: “to attack the enemy’s strategy,” “to disrupt enemy’s alliances,” and “to subdue the enemy without fighting.” That is to say, in fighting a war one must first attack the enemy’s strategy and disrupt his diplomacy in order to subdue his troops without fighting.
Sun Tzu was against fighting a reckless war in the field with the enemy. He stressed: “The next best is to attack the enemy’s army and the worst policy is to attack a walled city.” Both of these, he thought, should be done only when there is no alter native. This is really a wise remark of an experienced person in commanding battles. His conclusion was: “To subdue the enemy’s troops without fighting is the supreme excellence.”
Was this conclusion Sun Tzu’s wishful thinking or was he just following his own inclinations? The answer is negative, because he came to this conclusion after summing up many war experiences in history.
Zou Zhuan recorded many outstanding military strategists who, with or without a powerful backup force, defeated a stronger enemy with the help of their wisdom, courage, insight, and eloquence. They achieved the aim of subduing the enemy without fighting. There were two well-known wars before Sun Tzu’s time which proved that principle.
In 656 B.C., Qi Huan Gong—allied with the states of Lu, Song, Chen, Wei, Zheng, Xu, and Cao—attacked the powerful Chu state in the south. Facing aggressive troops from all sides, Chu was obviously inferior in numbers.
The emperor of Chu sent an envoy to Qi, asking Qi Huan Gong: “You are in the north and we are in the south. We have nothing whatsoever to do with each other. What is the reason for your invading us, pray?”
Guan Zhong, a minister of the Qi state, instead of replying, brought the envoy to account for not paying tributes to Emperor Zhou (the common puppet monarch of all the states, in whose name Qi Huan Gong had launched the war against Chu). He also blamed Chu for the drowning of King Zhou Sao, which had already taken place a long time ago. The envoy of Chu admitted guilt in not paying tributes and promised to restore them soon, but denied any responsibility for King Zhou Sao’s death. Qi was dissatisfied with the reply and continued its advance.
The sovereign of Chu sent another envoy, Qu Wan, to Qi to make further representations. While receiving the envoy, the sovereign of Qi purposefully asked his guards to create an impressive formation in an attempt to coerce Qu Wan into signing a treaty favorable to the state of Qi.
In a neither haughty nor humble manner, Qu Wan said: “Who dares to disobey you if you placate various sovereigns with virtue and morals? But if you intend to use force, Mount Fangcheng would be our city wall and the Hanshui River, our city moat [meaning that the city will be impregnable]. Even though you have a powerful army, it would be useless.”
This was diplomatic language used with perfect assurance. Qi Huan Gong had to sign a peace treaty (not entirely favorable to Qi) with Chu and withdraw his troops. This example was significant in that Qi was powerful while Chu was gifted and just with its language. Both sides achieved their respective goals but the real winner was Chu.
In 579–546 B.C., there was an anti-war movement launched by Hua Yuan and Xiang Shu, two militarists of the weak Sung state, which serves as a good example of subduing an enemy without fighting. At that time, smaller states, like Zheng and Sung, sandwiched between the more powerful states of Jin and Chu, were often harassed. Zheng used to amass large numbers of slaves and jade and silk objects at the border, and give them as state gifts to whomever came to cause a skirmish. Sung suffered even more and, in one siege by Chu, its subjects had to swap their children to be eaten as food.
The anti-war movement was launched under this circumstance and was successful. Sung persuaded all the neighboring states (including Jin and Chu) to conclude a treaty with both Jin and Chu as leaders of the alliance.
The contents of the treaty included the provision: “Jin and Chu shall not use force against each other. They shall be bound by a common cause and go through thick and thin together. . . . Whoever breaks its pledge shall be struck dead by Heaven.”
The treaty also stipulated that the smaller states should pay tributes to Jin and Chu. Apparently, it was better for them to give out some money and valuables than to suffer from calamities of war. After the signing of this treaty, there emerged among the states a situation of tranquility, particularly after the movement launched by Xiang Shu. For more than thirty years, there was no major war between them.
The above-mentioned events were just as familiar to Sun Tzu as the wars of the past hundred years are to us. He had as much knowledge of the antiwar drive launched by Xiang Shu as we do of the history of the two world wars in the twentieth century. Therefore, his doctrine that “the best way is to subdue an enemy without fighting” was based on historical fact.
As a whole, Sun Tzu attached great importance to employing politics, diplomacy, and strategic considerations for the purpose of subduing an enemy. To some extent, this was a strategy based on one’s economic strength. Obviously, Sun Tzu was of the opinion that one should make the enemy yield by means of one’s powerful political and diplomatic capability and economic and military strength rather than by means of war. In today’s language, this is called a “policy backed by up strength,” or strategy of nuclear deterrence. Sun Tzu was certainly the first person in world history to have put forward this doctrine.