Sun Tzu pointed out in the chapter entitled “Use of Spies”: “Thus, the reason the enlightened ruler and the wise general conquer the enemy whenever they strike is foreknowledge.” Foreknowledge, in essence, means to know the situation of the enemy and of yourself before the war starts, just as Sun Tzu wrote in the chapter entitled “Offensive Strategy”: “Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles, you will never be defeated. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant both of the enemy and of yourself, you are sure to be defeated in every battle.” No commanders—whether in modern or ancient times, in China or abroad—can afford to ignore this principle.
It is a universal law which is without parallel in history, and it represents the best of Sun Tzu’s thought. Philosophically, it belongs to naive materialism. From the point of view of war theory, it is a fundamental law of making judgment and analysis. And from the viewpoint of directing a war, it constitutes an important choice of first looking for conditions that may lead to victory and then for opportunities that would lead to a sure victory.
The funds that the Soviet Union and the United States spent on intelligence gathering for the purpose of knowing each other’s dealings were enormous. One United States general who had been in charge of intelligence work pointed out that since the end of World War II, the U.S. had spent no less than $50 to $75 billion on the establishment of an intelligence system. He added that in spite of this, the U.S. was in no better a position than it was before the invasion of Pearl Harbor in 1941. This statement was made in the 1970s. Today one can well imagine how high the intelligence expenses are. As for the Soviet Union, it keeps its defense expenses top secret, but it is not difficult to infer how much money it spends on its intelligence work.
Mao Zedong highly appreciated Sun Tzu’s principle, saying that it remains a scientific truth today. In addition, he pointed out in his essay, “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War”: “Some people are good at knowing themselves and poor at knowing their enemy, and some are the other way around; neither can solve the problem of learning and applying the laws of war. There is a saying in the book of Sun Tzu, the great military scientist of ancient China, ‘Know the enemy and know yourself, and in a hundred battles you will never be defeated,’ which refers both to the stage of learning and to the stage of application, both to knowing the laws of the development of objective reality and to deciding on our own action in accordance with these laws in order to overcome the enemy facing us. We should not take this saying lightly.”
Let us examine the theoretical principles of practical significance in The Art of War from three aspects—political, economic, and the art of direction.
Quite a few problems Sun Tzu discussed about war fall within the political sphere. For example, he said: “War is a matter of vital importance to the state; a matter of life or death; the road either to survival or to ruin. Hence, it is imperative that it be studied thoroughly. Therefore, appraise it in terms of the five fundamental factors and make comparisons of various conditions of the enemy and yourself when seeking the outcome of war. The first of the fundamental factors is politics; the second, weather; the third, terrain; the fourth; the commander; and the fifth, doctrine.” “What is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy; next best is to disrupt the enemy’s alliances.”
Most of these statements involve political activities before or during a war. All these doctrines had never been and could never be put forward systematically before Sun Tzu’s time. He systematically brought military actions into the political arena. By politics, he meant the ways to cause the people to be in harmony with their ruler. That is to say, the ruler has to impose his will upon the people and only in so doing can he succeed in making the people accompany him in war and peace without fear of mortal peril. In other words, only when political harmony is achieved can it be possible to defeat the enemy. By the commander, he meant the ability and qualities which a commander should have. And by doctrine, he meant the military organization, system, and regulations. In short, three of the five factors are directly connected with politics. Among the seven elements he mentioned, the first, second, fourth, fifth, and seventh are directly related to politics—namely, which ruler is wiser and more able, which commander is the more talented, in which army regulations and instructions are better carried out, which troops are the stronger, and which side administers rewards and punishments in a more enlightened manner.
Sun Tzu was one of the first persons in ancient China who believed that diplomacy was one of the keys to the outcome of war. In military works before Sun Tzu, there had been similar discussions about the importance of diplomacy, but none had summarized it into theory as Sun Tzu did.
Sun Tzu discussed the relationships between war and politics, and from there, he proceeded to the gravity, cruelty, and disruptiveness of war. He pointed out: “When the army engages in protracted campaigns, the resources of the state will fall short. When your weapons are dulled and ardor dampened, your strength exhausted and treasure spent, the chieftains of neighboring states will take advantage of your crisis to act. In that case, no man, however wise, will be able to avert the disastrous consequences that ensue.”
It is true that Sun Tzu was not able to formulate the scientific principles: “War is the continuation of politics,” “Politics is war without bleeding,” or “War is politics with bleeding,” but he was clearly aware that whether you will be victorious or defeated, much depends upon whether your government is honest and upright and your system is good. He wrote as a conclusion in the chapter “Dispositions”: “Those skilled in war cultivate politics, preserve the laws and institutions, and are therefore able to formulate victorious policies.” It is commendable for Sun Tzu as a military commander to have been aware of the important effect that politics has on war.
Karl von Clausewitz stated: “War is the continuation of politics.” This well-known dictum has been understood in the West to be an insightful remark. Now it has been found that a similar remark was made in an ancient Chinese writing, The Strategy of Warring States, as early as the Qin Dynasty. It explicitly stated: “It is impossible to gain profit without making efforts and to extend one’s territory by sitting idly. Even the five emperors and three kings could not achieve that. The only way to attain that goal is to continue doing it through war.” Obviously, gaining profits and extending one’s territory are both political aims. One has to achieve them through war.
In The Art of War, written by Sun Bin, excavated from the Yin Que Mountains, it is recorded: “It is impossible for a sovereign whose prestige and ability are not comparable to the five emperors and three kings to carry out a policy of humanity, justice, and virtue, and be a model of civility. This was, in fact, yearned for by Yao and Shun [legendary monarchs and sages in ancient China], but found to be impossible. One had to solve certain problems by force.” This is tantamount to achieving a political aim through war.
Before we discuss Sun Tzu’s idea concerning the effects of economics upon war, it is necessary for us to quote relevant passages from Guan Zi, a book published one century earlier than Sun Tzu’s, which reflects Guan Zhong’s thought on military economics, in order to have a better understanding of military theories in ancient China.
In the book Guan Zi, it is written: “If the state is wealthy, it will not be short of supplies even if the war lasts long; if the state has excellent weapons, it will not be exhausted after repeated attacks. If the army has any important matter, it is weapons. If it is not well equipped, you are giving away your troops for nothing. If you fight for one year, ten years’ accumulation will be exhausted. An all-out war will exhaust all you have.” All this means that it is difficult to fight a war without ample funds and excellent weapons.
Sun Tzu also attached great importance to relations between military actions and economics. He wrote: “In operations of war—when one thousand fast four-horse chariots, one thousand heavy chariots, and one thousand mail-clad soldiers are required; when provisions are transported for a thousand li; when there are expenditures at home and at the front, and stipends for entertainment of envoys and advisers—the cost of materials such as glue and lacquer, and of chariots and armor, will amount to one thousand pieces of gold a day. One hundred thousand troops may be dispatched only when this money is in hand. . . . If you fight with such a big army, a speedy victory is required. If victory is long delayed, troops will be exhausted and morale depressed. When troops attack cities, their strength will be exhausted.”
He added: “Those skilled in war do not require a second levy nor more than two provisions. They carry military equipment from the homeland, but rely on the enemy for provisions. Thus, the army is plentifully provided with food.”
“When a country is impoverished by military operations, it is because of distant transportation; carrying supplies for great distances renders the people destitute. Where troops are gathered, prices go up. When prices rise, the wealth of the people is drained away. When wealth is drained away, the peasantry will be afflicted with urgent exactions. With this loss of wealth and exhaustion of strength, the households in the central plains will be extremely poor and seven-tenths of their wealth dissipated. As to government expenditures, those due to broken-down chariots, worn-out horses, armor and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields, protective mantlets, draft oxen, and wagons will amount to 60 percent of the total.”
It is clear that Sun Tzu set great store by economics, namely, the financial situation of a country. His principle of fighting a speedy battle to force a quick decision originated from this idea. He believed that prolonged war was something that exhausted the wealth of a country. If financial resources dried up, additional taxes would be levied on people; as a result, the homes of the people would be stripped bare. This vicious cycle would lead to attacks from neighboring states. In this case, “No man, however wise, will be able to avert the consequences that ensue.”
Sun Tzu was quite practical and realistic. While discussing relationships between war and economics, he emphasized the use of resources and manpower of the enemy state. He wrote: “One zhong [a measurement in ancient China] of the enemy’s provisions is equivalent to twenty of one’s own; one shi [a weight in old China, approximately 60 kilograms] of the enemy’s fodder to twenty shi of one’s own.” He strongly maintained that one should offer big rewards to one’s soldiers and treat the captives well. One should utilize the captured weapons, military materials, and prisoners of war to replenish one’s own troops in order to support the war. These ideas of his were progressive ones of the new emerging feudal class.
During the war of liberation in China, several millions of Jiang Jieshi troops were captured by the PLA and became its staunch fighters after political education. As for the amount of weapons captured from the enemy, including tanks, cannons, warships, and airplanes, it was unprecedented at home and abroad. This he called “winning a battle and becoming stronger.”
Compared with wars in ancient times, the dependence of modern wars on economics is far greater. Even the powerful and financially secure United States felt it difficult to cope with a protracted war in Vietnam. General Westmoreland, the American commander in chief in Vietnam, quoted Sun Tzu as his argument for withdrawing his troops: “There has never been a protracted war from which a country has benefited.”
Therefore, it is clear that the more modernized an army is, the more dependent it is on economics. Sun Tzu’s doctrine about relationships between war and economics has not lost its significance with the passage of time.
We have discussed problems of war from the strategic point of view in previous chapters. In this section, we will approach it from the tactical side—in other words, from the aspect of the art of directing a war. (Sun Tzu made no clear distinction between strategy and direction in his thirteen chapters.) Discussion about the art of direction appeared in several chapters in Sun Tzu’s Art of War. However, here we will limit it to two aspects: initiative and flexibility.
How does one have the initiative? This is the primary question to answer while discussing the art of direction. If you lose the initiative in the battlefield, you will be thrown into passivity and be attacked at all times. Sun Tzu’s idea of maintaining the initiative was primarily reflected in his doctrines “to bring the enemy to the battlefield and be not brought there by him” and “a victorious army tries to create conditions for victory before seeking battle.” All wise generals should try their best to utilize these ideas.
Sun Tzu advocated: “A skillful commander takes up a position in which he cannot be defeated and seizes every opportunity to win over his enemy. Thus, a victorious army tries to create conditions for victory before seeking battle; an army destined to be defeated fights in the hope of gaining victory by sheer luck.” “Generally, he who comes to the battlefield first and awaits his enemy is at ease; he who comes later and rushes into the fight is weary. And, therefore, those skilled in war bring the enemy to the field of battle and are not brought there by him.”
It is a truth that one should try to impose one’s will on the enemy. And only when you take up a position in which you cannot be defeated—in other words, you have the initiative in hand—can you take measures to move enemy troops and lead them to defeat.
When you first occupy a favorable position in the battlefield, you can move enemy troops and transform the conditions between the enemy and yourself, just as Sun Tzu advised. All military scientists, ancient or contemporary, Chinese or foreign, know that war is a contest of strength, and strength can be transformed. When the sides are evenly matched (or even if the enemy is stronger), if we have the initiative, the situation can be transformed. If we are able to tire the enemy who is at ease, we shall succeed in obtaining a favorable situation in which we can await the enemy.
Early in the twentieth century, the Baltic fleet of Tzarist Russia was totally annihilated during the Russian-Japanese War. The victory was achieved—according to Marshal Togo Heihachiro, the Japanese commander of this sea battle—due to the application of Sun Tzu’s doctrine “to wait at one’s ease for an exhausted enemy.” It was true that Russia’s Baltic fleet committed a disastrous mistake by sailing all the way to the Far East, exhausting its sailors, while the Japanese navy was waiting for them at its ease.
The Baltic Sea was tens of thousands of kilometers away from the Sea of Japan. Furthermore, the Russian fleet was not in a position to reach the Far East by passing through the British-controlled Strait of Gibraltar, and then going through the Mediterranean Sea and the Suez Canal, because Britain was an ally of Japan. It had to go around the Cape of Good Hope, an additional voyage of over ten thousand kilometers.
In addition, after the Baltic fleet crossed the Malacca Strait, the Japanese army spread false information (in accordance with Sun Tzu’s doctrine, “War is based on deception”) to the effect that the Japanese navy was ready to launch a surprise attack upon the Tzarist fleet in the South China Sea. Being taken in, the Baltic fleet had to sail all the time in combat readiness, which added to its weariness, and the seamen were totally exhausted when they reached the Tsushima Strait.
The Japanese navy had been waiting at ease and, therefore, won an unprecedented victory over the Russian fleet.
Moving troops flexibly is another important principle in Sun Tzu’s Art of War. He advocated: “Just as water has no constant shape, there are in warfare no constant conditions. Thus, one able to win victory by modifying his tactics in accordance with the enemy situation may be said to be divine.” He added that moving troops should be like the snakes of Mount Chang which respond simultaneously: “When struck on the head, its tail attacks; when struck on the tail, its head attacks; when struck in the center, both head and tail attack.”
In short, he maintained that one should adapt to the enemy’s situation, and he opposed rigid tactics and mechanical materialism in war. He was also opposed to using outmoded methods. He was in favor of using normal and extraordinary forces, the solid and the void, the true and the false interchangeably, in order to confuse the enemy and obtain victory.
For the sake of carrying out his own propositions, Sun Tzu often tried to occupy a position of initiative and take preemptive measures. He pointed out: “Speed is the essence of war. Take advantage of the enemy’s unpreparedness, make your way by unexpected routes, and attack the enemy where he is unguarded.” It was because of these flexible tactics that he could keep the enemy units from uniting, cooperating, and supporting each other.
A commander should be very clear about the field situation and learn an art of direction with which he can manipulate the enemy. Sun Tzu wrote: “One who is skilled at making the enemy move does so by creating a situation, according to which the enemy will act; he entices the enemy with something he is certain to take. He keeps the enemy on the move by holding out bait and then attacks him with picked troops.”
With regard to manipulating the enemy, there is an incisive statement in the chapter entitled “Void and Actuality”: “Analyze the enemy’s plans so that you will know his shortcomings as well as strong points. Agitate him in order to ascertain the pattern of his movement. Lure him out to reveal his dispositions and ascertain his position. Launch a probing attack in order to learn where his strength is abundant and where deficient.” In this way, he can achieve what Sun Tzu said: “His offensive will be irresistible if he makes for his enemy’s weak positions; he cannot be overtaken when he withdraws, if he moves swiftly. . . . When I wish to give battle, my enemy, even though protected by high walls and deep moats, cannot help but engage me, for I attack a position he must relieve. When I wish to avoid fighting, I may defend myself simply by drawing a line on the ground; the enemy will be unable to attack me because I divert him from going where he wishes.”
If you can move as flexibly as Sun Tzu described, you can certainly dominate the battlefield. “Thus, I say that victory can be achieved. For even if the enemy is numerically stronger, I can prevent him from engaging.”
The essence of using troops flexibly is the principle: “War is based on deception.” It is stated in the chapter entitled “Estimates”: “All warfare is based on deception. Therefore, when capable of attacking, feign incapacity; when active in moving troops, feign inactivity; when near the enemy, make it appear that you are far away; when far away, make it seem that you are near.” It all shows flexibility to be capable or incapable, active or inactive, far away or near. For instance, the principle that “when far away, make it seem that you are near” means that you should try to maneuver near the enemy in order to confuse him when you are actually moving troops at a faraway place.
The following are two examples showing two famous generals’ (one ancient and the other contemporary) success in using this principle.
In 205 B.C., Han Xin (of the Han state) wanted to attack Wei Wangbao (of the Chu state) across the Yellow River. Han’s intention was to attack Wei from the rear at Anyi (in the present Anyi County, Shan Xi Province), from faraway Xiayang (in the present Hanchen, Shan Xi Province). But he created a diversion by collecting materials for crossing the Yellow River at a nearby place called Linjing as if he planned to cross the river there. Wei Wangbao was taken in by the action and deployed his main force along Linjing, and Anyi was left unguarded. Consequently, Han Xin’s troops crossed the river at Xiayang without resistance. This was one of the main campaigns between the Chu and Han states.
In the European landing operation during World War II, U.S. General Eisenhower decided that the Allied forces should land at Normandy in the northwest of France. But he hinted that the troops were going to land at the Calais area by the visible movement of army, navy, and air forces, and by establishing a headquarters in that area. Eisenhower also had false information spread and a sham telegram sent in order to confuse Hitler. As a result, Nazi Germany was fooled and concentrated its main force along the Calais area. Finally, the Allied forces landed at Normandy successfully.
In his military writings, Mao Zedong also stressed the important role that initiative and flexibility play in a war. He compared initiative to an army’s freedom of action: “Freedom of action is the very life of an army and, once it is lost, the army is close to defeat or destruction.” He also made brilliant observations on flexibility: “Flexibility consists in the intelligent commander’s ability to take timely and appropriate measures on the basis of objective conditions after ‘judging the hour and sizing up the situation’ (including the enemy’s situation, our situation, and the terrain), and this flexibility is ‘ingenuity in varying tactics.’”
It is entirely practical to examine Sun Tzu’s theory with this yardstick. There is a large amount of practical theory discussed with regard to the art of direction in Sun Tzu’s Art of War. Only notable ideas have been discussed in this writing.
