CHAPTER 11: TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION

0.   .  Rick Snyder, “2016 Michigan State of the State Transcript,” State of Michigan website, January 19, 2016, https://www.michigan.gov/documents/snyder/2016_Michigan_State_of_the_State_Transcript_511676_7.pdf.

0.   .  A few other notable points from Snyder’s speech: in his telling of the Flint story, he said that the crisis “began in the spring of 2013, when the Flint City Council voted seven to one to buy water from the Karegnondi Water Authority,” omitting the fact that the council vote did not have any power behind it, and he also repeated the misleading claim that the Detroit water department kicked Flint off its water. Picking up on the infrastructure study that he discussed, Snyder later issued an executive order that required the state to confer with local leadership when it did road projects, as it could be an efficient and cost-effective opportunity to replace or maintain underground infrastructure.

0.   .  Lindsay Knake, “‘Arrest Gov. Snyder’ Protestors Chant Outside His Ann Arbor Condo,” MLive—Ann Arbor News, January 18, 2016; Ryan Stanton, “Anti-Snyder Messages Pop Up Around Governor’s Downtown Ann Arbor Condo,” MLive—Ann Arbor News, January 28, 2016; Ryan Stanton, “Gov. Rick Snyder Heckled at Ann Arbor Restaurant over Flint Water Crisis,” MLive—Ann Arbor News, January 28, 2016; and Daniel Bethencourt, “Crowd Calls for Snyder’s Arrest Outside His Ann Arbor Home,” Detroit Free Press, January 18, 2016, updated January 19, 2016.

0.   .  Kathryn Ross, “Government Run as a Business Doesn’t Work,” letter to the editor, Detroit Free Press, January 31, 2016.

0.   .  Ingrid Jacques, “Gov on Flint Crisis: ‘It Will Always Be Terrible,’” Detroit News, January 24, 2016. Snyder also said: “You don’t sleep well … Nothing is as bad as what the people of Flint face themselves, having to deal with bottled water or filters or concerns about lead levels. I mean, they are the ones who are suffering the most. How I’m suffering through this is nothing in relationship to what they are going through.”

0.   .  Ibid. Specifically, Snyder wondered about calling in the National Guard on October 1, 2015, the day that the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services reversed itself on the blood-lead levels of Flint children.

0.   .  Some of the material in this section originally appeared in slightly different form in the Boston Review (“The Struggle for Accountability in Flint,” February 2, 2016).

0.   .  Chad Selewski, “Michigan Gets an F grade in 2015 State Integrity Investigation,” Center for Public Integrity, November 9, 2015, updated November 12, 2015.

0.   .  It was part of cuts across Michigan by MLive, the umbrella company for eight Advance-owned newspapers and a statewide website, eliminating twenty-nine “content positions,” and it came on the heels of buyouts at the Detroit papers that removed a couple dozen veteran journalists from the state’s two largest papers. This material comes from reporting the author did at the time for the Columbia Journalism Review (“Michigan’s MLive Cuts 29 Positions in Latest ‘Restructuring,’” January 7, 2016).

0. .  Paul Egan, “Red Flag on Corrosion Control Overlooked,” Detroit Free Press, January 22, 2016, pp. 1A, 11A. On February 1, 2015, the governor had received a briefing paper from the environmental department, attributing GM’s switch back to Lake Huron only to the fact that its water was softer than that of the Flint River. It made no mention of corrosion control.

0. .  In response to queries by Dennis Muchmore, the governor’s chief of staff, the MDHHS’s Nancy Peeler emailed an update about childhood blood-lead levels in Flint. She directed the Maternal, Infant and Early Childhood Home Visiting program. “Upon review, we don’t believe our data demonstrates an increase in lead poisoning rates that might be attributable to the change in water for Flint,” she wrote in a July 28, 2015, email. This was sent just a few days after Wurfel sent Muchmore an update about the drinking water: “… the bottom line is that residents of Flint do not need to worry about lead in their water supply, and DEQ’s recent sampling does not indicate an eminent [sic] health threat from lead or copper,” Wurfel wrote. To which Muchmore replied simply, “Thanks.” Bridge Staff, “Flint Crisis Timeline: Part 3,” Bridge Magazine, March 1, 2016.

0. .  Ibid.

0. .  Egan, “Red Flag on Corrosion Control Overlooked.”

0. .  Ibid.

0. .  That included the Edward R. Murrow Award (Large Market Radio-News Documentary cagetory) and an Alfred I. DuPont–Columbia University Award.

0. .  Some of the material in this chapter originally appeared in two different articles for the Columbia Journalism Review (“In Flint, a New Era for One of the Oldest Community Media Outlets in the US,” August 30, 2016, and “How Covering the Flint Water Crisis Changed Michigan Radio,” February 16, 2016). For Michigan Radio, one of the consequences of its coverage was a shift in the relationship with Governor Rick Snyder’s office. The office “has not been pleased with all our coverage,” said news director Vincent Duffy, referring in particular to elements of the “Not Safe to Drink” documentary and its online supplements. After the documentary aired, he said, the governor’s office indicated it would communicate over email but would no longer agree to recorded phone interviews, including after the State of the State address. Dave Murray, Gov. Snyder’s press secretary, said that the office “had some concerns that we talked to them about, and we’re working on it together.”

0. .  Matthew L. Wald, “Out-of-Court Settlement Reached over Love Canal,” New York Times, June 22, 1994; and Tom Beauchamp, Case Studies in Business, Society, and Ethics, 4th ed. (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1997), chapter titled “Hooker Chemical and Love Canal,” available online courtesy of Stephen Hicks, Ph.D., http://www.stephenhicks.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Love-Canal-Hooker-Chemical.pdf (last accessed February 24, 2018).

0. .  Danny Gogal, “25 Years of Environmental Justice at the EPA,” EPA blog, November 6, 2017; and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Environmental Justice: Learn About Environmental Justice,” n.d., https://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/learn-about-environmental-justice, last accessed March 4, 2018.

0. .  The U.S. Supreme Court cited the concept of “disparate impact” in a major decision about housing in Texas, pointing out that the consequences of overt discrimination and unconscious bias have essentially the same results. (Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. The Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 2015.) When the Michigan Civil Rights Commission investigated Flint’s water disaster, it owned up to its own susceptibility to this by not grasping the seriousness of the situation sooner. “What we will do, what we must do, is acknowledge that in the earlier stages of this crisis the people of Flint were calling out for help and regretfully, we did not answer the call.… It does not matter whether we failed to act because we concluded that, because there were also white victims race was not playing a role, because we saw the crisis only in economic terms, or because we saw water quality as a scientific issue only. In fact, even if we failed to act because we never heard about the protests in Flint, it would only expose our lack of awareness of an issue that was vitally important to one of the constituencies we are supposed to protect” (“The Flint Water Crisis,” Michigan Civil Rights Commission, p. 117).

0. .  Wendy N. Davis, “Who’s to Blame for Poisoning of Flint’s Water?” American Bar Association Journal, November 2016.

0. .  The announcement came on Friday, April 6, 2018. The state argued that “Flint’s water continues to test the same as or better than similar cities across the state and country. The State of Michigan could have ended bottled water in early September 2017 in accordance with the mediated Concerned Pastors for Social Action Settlement agreed to by the City of Flint, State of Michigan, Concerned Pastors for Social Action, and other stakeholder groups. However, the State of Michigan continued funding the water distribution locations over the past seven months and partnered with the City of Flint, local churches and other non-profit partners, the Food Bank, and the United Way to keep bottled water available until even greater amounts of water quality testing through the community could occur” (State of Michigan Commitment to City of Flint, Michigan.gov, April 6, 2018). Bottled water would be given out until the supply ran out, which led to a rush on the sites that remained open; they were out of water by the following Monday. Residents and elected leaders expressed frustration and anger at the sudden closure of the “pods,” and many traveled to Lansing to protest at the state capitol. U.S. Rep. Dan Kildee’s statement: “The state should provide Flint families with bottled water until all of the lead service lines have been replaced. Flint families rightfully do not trust state government, who created this crisis and lied to our community about the safety of the water. Continuing to provide bottled water service until all lead service lines are replaced will give peace of mind to residents and help restore Flint’s trust in government. Until then, I understand why Flint families still do not trust the water coming out of their taps.” Mayor Karen Weaver wrote a letter to the governor that urged him to reconsider the closure. She told a Detroit News reporter that besides wanting to “re-establish trust when trust has been broken,” she was concerned that lead “particulates can get shaken loose” during the citywide work of pipe replacement, causing a spike in the water supply.
   “We’re not asking for water forever,” Weaver said. “We’re asking for water until we got through the lead service line replacement and everybody knew the time frame. It would take us three years” (“Flint Mayor to Lobby Snyder on Bottled Water,” Detroit News, April 10, 2018).

0. .  Tresa Baldes and Paul Egan, “Judge Approves $87 Million Settlement in Flint Water Lawsuit,” Detroit Free Press, March 28, 2017.

0. .  Editorial, “Michigan Is Forced to Do Right by Flint, Finally,” New York Times, April 3, 2017.

0. .  ACLU of Michigan, “Flint Water Crisis: Settlement to Launch Groundbreaking Program to Assess Impacts on Flint Children,” press release, April 9, 2018; and Lori Higgins, “Up to 30,000 Flint Kids to Get Screened for Lead Impact Settlement,” Detroit Free Press, April 9, 2018.

0. .  Among the news outlets trying to untangle the legal bills: Ron Fonger, “Michigan’s Bills for Flint Water Crisis Attorneys Rises above $20 Million,” MLive—Flint Journal, January 15, 2015; Leonard N. Fleming and Michael Gerstein, “Attorneys Defend Costs as Flint Probe Tab Climbs,” Detroit News, October 17, 2017; Chad Livengood, “Law Firm Billings to State over Flint Water Crisis Hits $14 Million and Rising,” Crain’s Detroit Business, June 29, 2017, updated July 2, 2017; and Emma Winowiecki and Mark Brush, “Taxpayer Tab on Flint Legal Battles Is $15.5 Million and Rising,” Michigan Radio, September 8, 2017.

0. .  The author detailed the charges in the Flint water crisis as of June 2017 in “A Guide to the 15 Powerful People Charged with Poisoning Flint,” Splinter, June 19, 2015. See also: Elisha Anderson and John Wisely, “Records: Falsified Report Led to Charges in Flint Water Crisis,” Detroit Free Press, April 22, 2016; Paul Egan, “These Are the 15 People Criminally Charged in the Flint Water Crisis,” Detroit Free Press, June 14, 2017; and Sara Ganim, “Flint Water Official Says He Could Have Done Things Differently,” CNN, September 7, 2016.

0. .  It was Earley who got the involuntary manslaughter charge, which was added to his case later.

0. .  Monica Davey and Mitch Smith, “2 Former Flint Emergency Managers Charged over Tainted Water,” New York Times, December 20, 2016.

0. .  Schuette’s spokesperson told a reporter that Schuette was aware of the AG office’s signoff on the deal. She said that the assistant attorney general who signed the ACO “did so following a legal review of the document in his role as counsel to the MDEQ. In this case, the signature signifies the AAG made a determination that it met all basic legal requirements as to form, not to content, because no AAG sets policy for a department.” She added that AAGs “are dependent on departmental experts, in this case, DEQ staff, for the factual information used in determining the document was legal as to form. If a department provides false or inaccurate information as the basis for a document like this, the AAG would have no way of knowing.” Paul Egan, “Schuette: ‘Sham’ Order Led to Crisis,” Detroit Free Press, pp. 1A, 6A. See also “Four More Officials Charged in Third Round of Flint Water Crisis Criminal Investigation,” press release, Department of Attorney General, Michigan.gov, n.d.

   30. Darnell Earley, “Column: Don’t Blame EM for Flint Water Disaster,” Detroit News, October 26, 2015.

0. .  Daugherty Johnson, the city’s now retired utilities director, was accused of the same charges as Croft. He would later get a plea deal.

0. .  Wells’s false testimony charge was regarding data on the uptick in Legionnaires’ disease. Some months later, two new charges were added to her case: involuntary manslaughter and misconduct in office. Scott Atkinson and Monica Davey, “5 Charged with Involuntary Manslaughter in Flint Water Crisis,” New York Times, June 14, 2017; Leonard N. Fleming, “Flood Slaps Wells with Involuntary Manslaughter Charge,” Detroit News, October 9, 2017.

0. .  Atkinson and Davey, “5 Charged with Involuntary Manslaughter in Flint Water Crisis”; and Fleming, “Flood Slaps Wells with Involuntary Manslaughter Charge.” Lyon and Wells were also backed by Marc Edwards of Virginia Tech, who testified for the defense during their preliminary examinations in 2018. At Wells’s exam, Dr. Mona Hanna-Attisha also testified for the defense.

0. .  Department of Attorney General, “Schuette Files Civil Suit against Veolia and LAN for Role in Flint Water Poisoning,” press release, Flint, Mich., Michigan.gov, 2016, https://www.michigan.gov/ag/0,4534,7-359-82917_78314-387198—,00.html.

0. .  Steve Carmody, “EPA Target of Latest Flint Water Crisis Class-Action Lawsuit,” Michigan Radio, January 30, 2017.

0. .  Paul Egan, “Flint Investigator Says Greed and Fraud Led to Drinking Water Crisis,” Detroit Free Press, March 23, 2018. The quotations are from Andrew Arena, the former director of the FBI’s Detroit office who was at the helm of the attorney general’s criminal investigation of the water crisis. Arena was speaking to the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on General Government.

0. .  “The Governor had adequate legal authority to intervene—by demanding more information from agency directors, reorganizing agencies to assure availability of appropriate expertise where needed, ordering state agencies to respond, or ultimately firing ineffective agency heads—but he abjured. Flint residents’ complaints were not hidden from the Governor, and he had a responsibility to listen and respond.” Peter D. Jacobson, Colleen Healy Boufides, Jennifer Bernstein, Denise Chrysler, and Toby Citron, on behalf of the University of Michigan School of Public Health, “Learning from the Flint Water Crisis: Protecting Public Health During a Financial Emergency,” January 2018, p. 30.