CHAPTER 7: MEDITATIONS IN AN EMERGENCY

0.   .  Here, I am counting communities that were appointed managers through Public Act 101 (1988), Public Act 72 (1990), and the earliest stage of Public Act 4 (2011). Among them: Royal Oak Township, Hamtramck, Highland Park, the Village of Three Oaks, Pontiac, Ecorse, Benton Harbor, and twice for Flint. In addition, by Election Day 2011, two school districts received emergency managers, in Inkster and Detroit.

0.   .  About the political calculus: “The only thing I can think of is that the governor had decided that he was going to appoint an emergency manager, and he wanted to do it regardless of whether the white or black candidate was the next mayor. Right, so … that they look like this is a race-neutral decision. If we’re going to do it, we have to announce it before the votes are tallied. That’s the only thing I can think of” (Dayne Walling, interview with the author, Flint, Mich., June 22, 2017).

0.   .  Flint Financial Review Team, “Report of the Financial Review Team,” State of Michigan Department of Treasury, November 7, 2011, https://www.michigan.gov/documents/treasury/Flint-ReviewTeamReport-11-7-.

0.   .  Ibid. Walling disputed that, noting he had to authorize police and firefighter layoffs, and experimented with doing garbage pickup every other week. Dayne Walling, interview with the author, Flint, Mich., June 22, 2017.

0.   .  Dayne Walling, interview with the author, Flint, Mich., June 22, 2017.

0.   .  This number is current as of at least August 2015. Joshua Sapotichne et al., “Beyond State Takeovers: Reconsidering the Role of State Government in Local Financial Distress, with Important Lessons for Michigan and Its Embattled Cities,” white paper, Michigan State University Extension, August 31, 2015, p. 16, http://msue.anr.msu.edu/uploads/resources/pdfs/beyond_state_takeovers.pdf.

0.   .  Chris Megerian, “NJ Has a History of State Takeovers of Local Governments, Agencies,” NJ.com–Star Ledger, July 20, 2010.

0.   .  Pennsylvania law says that a request for a state determination of financial distress can come from a simple majority vote from the city council; the “chief executive officer of any city” or the governing body of a municipality; 10 percent of the electors of the most recent local election; creditors owed $10,000 or more (if they agree to suspend legal action); and six other entities with a stake in the city’s fiscal health. Bob Bauder, “Pittsburgh No Longer ‘Financially Distressed,’ According to State Oversight Team,” Tribune-Review, November 16, 2017; and 47 Pa.C.S. § 202 (1987), http://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/legis/LI/uconsCheck.cfm?txtType=HTM&yr=1987&sessInd=0&smthLwInd=0&act=47&chpt=2&sctn=2&subsctn=0.

0.   .  Jenna Carlesso, “Oversight Board Would Review Cities’ Budget Decisions, Contracts,” Hartford Courant, October 24, 2016.

0. .  The author wrote about emergency management for the New Republic when the city she lives in, Detroit, was put under it (“Detroit’s Least Bad Option,” March 14, 2013). Some of this material first appeared there.

0. .  Danny Hakim, “For Flint, Mich., Takeover Adds to the List of Woes,” New York Times, July 10, 2002. The quoted Michigan treasurer is Doug Roberts.

0. .  On Flint’s early history with emergency management: Elizabeth Carvlin, “Michigan to Weigh Allowing Flint to Issue Deficit Elimination Plans,” Bond Buyer, June 22, 2004; Mary Doidge et al., “The Flint Fiscal Playbook: An Assessment of the Emergency Manager Years (2002–2005),” white paper, Michigan State University Extension, July 31, 2015; Oona Goodin-Smith, “Flint’s History of Emergency Management and How It Got to Financial Freedom,” MLive—Flint Journal, July 16, 2018; Beata Mostafavi, “What Happened Last Time? A Look Back at Flint’s 2002 State Takeover,” MLive—Flint Journal, November 10, 2011; as well as interviews with Senator Jim Ananich (Lansing, Michigan, June 21, 2017); Mayor Dayne Walling (Flint, Michigan, June 9 and June 22, 2017); U.S. Representative Dan Kildee (Flint, Michigan, September 16, 2016); and Richard Baird, Flint native and senior adviser to Governor Snyder (Lansing, Michigan, October 24, 2016); as well as interviews with a large number of people who work and live in Flint and other emergency-managed cities.

0. .  For more on the legal distinction, see, for example, “Frequently Asked Questions: The Suspension of the Emergency Manager Law and Its Implications,” Michigan State University Extension, August 14, 2012, http://msue.anr.msu.edu/uploads/files/Greening/MSUE-PA4Suspension_FAQ-9-7-12.pdf; and Jonathan Oosting, “Snyder Signs Replacement Emergency Manager Law: We ‘Heard, Recognize, and Respected’ Will of Voters,” MLive—Flint Journal, December 27, 2012.

0. .  “The Flint Water Crisis,” Michigan Civil Rights Commission, pp. 110–11.

0. .  A basic principle of municipal law is Dillon’s Rule. Named after a nineteenth-century judge, it says that cities have only the powers that are explicitly granted by the entity that created them. There are some exceptions, such as New York City and Baltimore, that operate on a home rule basis. Nicole DuPuis et al., “City Rights in an Era of Pre-Emption: A State-by-State Analysis,” National League of Cities Center for City Solutions, 2017; Alisha Green, “It’s Complicated: State and Local Government Relationships,” Sunlight Foundation, February 19, 2013; Jesse J. Richardson Jr., Meghan Zimmerman Gough, and Robert Puentes, “Is Home Rule the Answer? Clarifying the Influence of Dillon’s Rule on Growth Management,” discussion paper, Brookings Institution Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy, January 2003.

0. .  David Sands, “Joyce Parker, Ecorse Emergency Manager, Credits Public Act 4 with City’s Turnaround,” Huffington Post, March 15, 2012, updated March 16, 2012; and Tracy Samilton, “Ecorse Financial Emergency Resolved … BUT…,” Michigan Radio, April 30, 2013.

0. .  Brief for the Latino Justice PRLDF and Demos in support of petitioners as Amicus Curiae, p. 16, Bellant v. Snyder on Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, No. 16-1207, May 10, 2017, http://www.demos.org/publication/brief-amici-curiae-latinojustice-prldf-and-demos-support-petitioners-bellant-v-synder.

0. .  “The Flint Water Crisis,” Michigan Civil Rights Commission, p. 109.

0. .  From the Senate Judiciary Committee’s 1982 report that accompanied the extension and amendment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965: “Following the dramatic rise in registration, a broad array of dilution schemes were employed to cancel the impact of the new black vote. Elective posts were made appointive; election boundaries were gerrymandered; majority runoffs were instituted to prevent victories under a prior plurality system; at-large elections were substituted for election by single-member districts, or combined with other sophisticated rules to prevent an effective minority vote. The ingenuity of such schemes seems endless. Their common purpose and effect has been to offset the gains made at the ballot box under the Act.” S. Rep. No. 97-417, p. 10 (1982), as quoted in Presley v. Etowah County Commission, 502 U.S. 491 (1992).

0. .  According to a 2017 report from the National League of Cities, Michigan’s actions were of a piece with a growing tendency of states to preempt local governments on politically divisive matters, such as labor protections or taxing authority. Michigan stands alongside North Carolina, Tennessee, Wisconsin, Louisiana, and Florida as the biggest “preemptor” states in the country, with their power to “preempt” deriving from single-party dominance—that is, Republican control of both legislative chambers and the governor’s office. To many in Michigan, emergency management also seemed like piling on: voting rights had already been diminished through the state legislature’s gerrymandering of congressional and legislative districts. A controversial reapportionment process that basically allows lawmakers to choose their voters had created disproportionately conservative leadership in Lansing—and no one seemed to be stepping up to oppose it or creating a process for fairer representation. Also, in January 2016, Governor Snyder signed a bill that abolished straight-ticket voting in Michigan, even though the practice had been supported in two statewide referendums. The abolishment was passed in an end-of-year amendment with no public hearings. Straight-ticket voting tended to be popular with voters in busy urban—and Democratic—precincts.

0. .  From the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, Kerner Report: “In these cities, the police were compelled to deal with ghetto residents angered over dirty streets, dilapidated housing, unfair commercial practices, or inferior schools—grievances which they had neither the responsibility for creating nor the authority to redress” (p. 288). “The alienation of the Negro from the political process has been exacerbated by his economic and racial isolation” (p. 289). “These conditions have produced a vast and threatening disparity in perceptions of the intensity and validity of Negro dissatisfaction. Viewed from the perspective of the ghetto resident, city government appears distant and unconcerned, the possibility of effective change remote. As a result, tension rises perceptibly; the explosion comes as the climax to a progression of tension-generating incidents. To the city administration, unaware of the growing tension or unable to respond effectively to it, the outbreak of disorder comes as a shock” (p. 289).

0. .  The final count had 52.6 percent of voters against the law and 47.4 percent in favor of it. In the same election, Michigan voters supported President Barack Obama’s reelection over challenger Mitt Romney, a native of the state and the son of former Michigan governor George Romney. They also rejected a proposal to enshrine a right to collective bargaining for public and private workers in the state’s constitution.

0. .  The grand bargain was facilitated by Chief U.S. District Judge Gerald Rosen, acting as a mediator, and U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Steven Rhodes. It involved enormous contributions from philanthropists and charitable foundations: Ford, Kresge, Knight, and the C. S. Mott Foundation were among them. That was leveraged to secure a commitment from the state. This unprecedented public-private deal brought new money to the table, helping to resolve a bankruptcy that otherwise would have likely dragged on with legal challenges that some thought was destined for the U.S. Supreme Court. The foundations made it a condition of their contributions that the unions and pension funds endorse the deal with a majority vote. General retirees ended up with cuts of 4 percent to their pensions; police and fire retirees did not have cuts. It was far less than what was expected from the bankruptcy. The bargain also shifted ownership of the city-owned Detroit Institute of Arts, whose collection was eyed by hungry creditors, to a charitable nonprofit trust. The DIA also contributed to the grand bargain. To date, the best comprehensive account is Detroit Resurrected: To Bankruptcy and Back by Nathan Bomey, a former Free Press reporter who covered it day by day (W. W. Norton, 2016). The Detroit News has a good rundown, too: Daniel Howes, Chad Livengood, and David Shepardson, “Bankruptcy and Beyond for Detroit,” November 13, 2014.

0. .  “Frequently Asked Questions: The Suspension of the Emergency Manager Law and Its Implications,” Michigan State University Extension, August 14, 2012.

0. .  Ibid.; and Ann Zaniewski, “DPS Board Loses Court Battle over Emergency Manager,” Detroit Free Press, October 1, 2014.

0. .  Gerald Ambrose, Emergency Manager Gerald Ambrose to Governor Rick Snyder, Flint, Michigan, April 28, 2015. Regarding the parting order mentioned in the following sentence, this refers to Order No. 20, dated April 25, 2015, and signed by Ambrose. It had a number of stipulations. Among them, in addition to restricting the city leaders from funding the Office of the Ombudsman, it also forbid them from funding the Civil Service Commission. The Civil Service Commission had been established about eighty years earlier to investigate labor disputes between employees and the city and at Hurley Medical Center. Both offices were mandated by the Flint City Charter, and their existence had been supported by voters (though Mayor Walling had been among those who had proposed their elimination, due to budget challenges).

0. .  On the strike: Sidney Fine, Sit-Down: The General Motors Strike of 1936–1937 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1969); Russell B. Porter, “Strikers at Flint March as Victors,” New York Times, February 12, 1937, pp. 1, 15; Louis Stark, “Peace Pact Signed,” New York Times, February 12, 1937, pp. 1, 19; and “The Flint Sit-Down Strike Audio Gallery,” matrix at Michigan State University and Walter P. Reuther Library, http://flint.matrix.msu.edu/strike.phphttp://flint.matrix.msu.edu/strike.php.

0. .  Melissa Mays’s website had a form for people to describe their water, their health issues, and the cost of their water bill; with their permission, the information was sent on to the government.

0. .  Curt Guyette, interview with the author, Detroit, October 21, 2015.

0. .  Curt Guyette, interview with the author, Detroit, September 12, 2017.

0. .  Marc Edwards, Amy Pruden, and Joseph Falkinham, “RAPID: Synergistic Impacts of Corrosive Water and Interrupted Corrosion Control on Chemical/Microbiological Water Quality: Flint, MI,” p. A-1, submitted July 2015, http://flintwaterstudy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/rapid-proposal-final.pdf.

0. .  Ibid.

0. .  Curt Guyette, interview with the author, Detroit, September 12, 2017.

0. .  “Sampling Water for Lead in Flint MI—Instruction Video,” Flint Water Study, YouTube video, 5.34 minutes, August 14, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dEQDaPws2xk.

0. .  This meant that the samples generally had to be collected first thing in the morning or, if nobody was at home during the day, in the early evening. According to the EPA’s Safe Drinking Water Task Force, the six-hour minimum of stagnation time “is used rather than a longer time so as not to discourage people from volunteering to take lead and copper samples” (Task Force Comments on Flint’s Residential Drinking Water Lead & Copper Sampling Instructions, November 23, 2015).

0. .  According to released emails, the MDEQ defended this lead-clearing practice to the EPA that summer, saying that it wasn’t going to change its position unless the agency issued stricter regulations. To date, that loophole has not been closed, though upon review of the sampling protocol that had been used in Flint, the EPA’s Flint Safe Drinking Water Task Force said that it “agrees with the removal of pre-flushing” (ibid). For discussion on the potential revision of the Lead and Copper Rule by the EPA’s National Drinking Water Advisory Council (NDWAC) Lead and Copper Rule (LCR) working group, see its August 2015 report (https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-01/documents/ndwaclcrwgfinalreportaug2015.pdf) and also the dissenting statement by one of its members, Dr. Yanna Lambrinidou (Yanna Lambrinidou, letter to the EPA National Drinking Water Advisory Council, October 28, 2015, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-11/documents/ndwaclcrstatementofdissent.pdf).

0. .  The parallel sampling done directly by the Virginia Tech team also helped the citizen sampling to withstand scrutiny. Curt Guyette, interview with the author, Detroit, September 12, 2017; and Marc Edwards, email message to author, February 17, 2018.

0. .  Curt Guyette, interview with the author, Detroit, October 21, 2015, September 12, 2017; and “Here’s to Flint,” Democracy Now!, March 8, 2016.

0. .  Ibid.

0. .  Curt Guyette, interview with the author, Detroit, October 21, 2015.

0. .  On August 23, 2015, Edwards emailed Adam Rosenthal of the MDEQ; Rachel Ptaszenski of the Genessee County Health Department; and Brent Wright, Flint’s water plant supervisor. He told them that Virginia Tech would be studying Flint’s water, launching a website, and had already visited the city to collect samples from the distribution system. He also said that they were doing a lead study with residents. “Dependent on what we find, it might be desirable to touch base, in advance of our releasing certain findings. We also intend to collaborate with all parties, in an open manner, to the extent that is possible, as our study progresses.” The following morning, Rosenthal forwarded the message to Stephen Busch, who forwarded it to Richard Benzie and Liane Shekter-Smith. Jennifer Dixon, “How the Crisis Unfolded,” Detroit Free Press, January 24, 2016, p. A14.

0. .  That website was WASAwatch, http://dcwasawatch.blogspot.com. Yanna Lambrinidou referred the author to it in a phone interview, November 2, 2017.

0. .  According to the Virginia Tech researchers, 269 were legitimate samples. Those that were excised had not waited for six hours of stagnation, for example, or had used a different faucet for one of its samples. For the complete data set, see Siddhartha Roy, “[Complete Dataset] Lead Results from Tap Water Sampling in Flint, MI,” FlintWaterStudy.org, December 1, 2015. See also “Lead Testing Results for Water Sampled by Residents,” FlintWaterStudy.org, n.d. (but appears to be early September 2015).

0. .  Curt Guyette, interview with the author, Detroit, September 12, 2017.

0. .  The water had a lot of corroded iron in it—51 ppb, for both homes and hospitals. Iron is not regulated the way lead is because it is not nearly as dangerous (and in fact a certain amount of it is essential to human health). But the EPA’s suggested guideline is for iron not to exceed 300 ppb (0.3 milligram per liter) in drinking water.

0. .  Many people began to look back at the boil-water advisories the previous summer and wonder if they had made the lead contamination worse, because boiling concentrated it. According to Edwards, “brief boiling does not remove lead, and does not concentrate it” while long-term boiling “might, but people rarely boil water to the point that concentration occurs.” Marc Edwards, email message to author, February 17, 2018.

0. .  Siddhartha Roy, interview with the author, Blacksburg, Virginia, June 6, 2017. But Roy credited his colleague Anurag Mantha, who kept going. Mantha made dozens of calls, answering every question and listening to the families’ fears and fury at the injustice of it all, Roy said. Sometimes calls lasted an hour.