CHAPTER 9: SWITCHBACK

0.   .  “Here’s to Flint: Broadcast Premiere of ACLU Documentary on the Fight for Democracy & Clean Water,” Democracy Now!, March 8, 2016. Connecting to Detroit water was deemed the quickest way to get corrosion control running through Flint’s pipes again, and more and more people had begun advocating for it. On September 28, 2015, Senate Minority Leader Jim Ananich sent an email to Governor Rick Snyder’s office demanding a “swift transfer to a safe source of water until the Karegnondi Water Authority is complete next year.” Dennis Muchmore, the governor’s chief of staff, was already crunching the numbers for a switchback on October 1, the day of the state’s reversal, though he also harbored concerns about how “some of the Flint people respond by looking for someone to blame instead of working to reduce anxiety,” according to one of his internal emails. “We can’t tolerate increased lead levels in any event, but it’s really the city’s water system that needs to deal with it.” But, in an update to Snyder, Muchmore also said that a reconnection “may well be the only way to bring any confidence back to the community.” Snyder replied: “We should help get all of the facts on the consequences of changing back vs. staying and then determine what financing mechanisms we have available. If we can provide the financing, then we should let Flint make the decision.” Jim Lynch, Chad Livengood, and Jonathan Oosting, “Snyder Emails Detail State’s Missteps in Flint Crisis,” Detroit News, January 20, 2016, updated January 21, 2016.

0.   .  LeeAnne Walters, written testimony to the Michigan Joint Select Committee on the Flint Water Public Health Emergency, Flint, Michigan, March 29, 2016.

0.   .  LeeAnne Walters’s testimony in the 67th District Court, Flint, Michigan, on January 8, 2018, during the preliminary examinations in the criminal case against four MDEQ employees.

0.   .  Marc Edwards, “Saving Humankind from Itself: Careers in Science and Engineering as Public Policy,” SciFest presentation, St. Louis Science Center, February 22, 2017.

0.   .  Monica Davey, “Flint Will Return to Using Detroit’s Water After Findings of Lead in Local Supply,” New York Times, October 8, 2015.

0.   .  City of Flint and Genesee County Drain Commissioner, “License to Transmit Water,” October 14, 2015.

0.   .  Editorial Board, “Flint Water Crisis: An Obscene Failure of Government,” Detroit Free Press, October 8, 2015. The switchback happened on October 16, 2015.

0.   .  Dominic Adams, “Toxic Lead Levels Found in Water at Three Flint Schools,” MLive—Flint Journal, October 8, 2015.

0.   .  Amanda Emery, “Flint Reconnects to Detroit Water, May Take 3 Weeks to Clear All Pipes,” MLive—Flint Journal, October 16, 2015, updated September 19, 2017.

0. .  Michael Freeman, phone interview with the author, January 2016; and “Notice of Class Action Administrative Complaint Against the United States Environmental Protection Agency,” April 25, 2016, http://www.flintwaterclassaction.com/wp-content/uploads/Flint-EPA-Complaint.pdf.

0. .  Marc Edwards, email message to the author, February 17, 2018.

0. .  “I am proud of the many accomplishments that I have been a part of over the years, including assisting in the development of our fifty year Master Plan, a multi-year Capital Improvement Plan, and a prioritized plan to deal with the aging infrastructure,” Croft added in his letter. He also said he’d “like to applaud all of the departmental employees who by no fault of their own have encountered drastic changes in staffing, equipment, and work environment, yet they continue to provide daily services to the absolute best of their ability.” Howard Croft, letter to Natasha L. Henderson, city administrator, City of Flint, November 16, 2015.

0. .  John Wisely and Robin Erb, “State Admits Mistakes in Flint Water Switch,” Detroit Free Press, October 19, 2015.

0. .  “Lime softening was used to address the hardness of the water,” Wyant said. “While this has an impact on pH, testing bore out that more needed to be done.” When a Detroit News reporter put Edwards’s contention before the director, he said simply that he was “relaying what staff and consultants have indicated to me.” “DEQ Director Dan Wyant Issues Statement About Flint Drinking Water,” Michigan Department of Environmental Quality, October 19, 2015, http://www.michigan.gov/deq/0,4561,7-135—367529—,00.html.

0. .  Jim Lynch, “Michigan DEQ Vows Changes in Flint Water Crisis,” Detroit News, October 18, 2015, updated October 19, 2015.

0. .  “It is important for large systems and primary agencies to take the steps necessary to ensure that appropriate corrosion control treatment is maintained at all times, thus ensuring that public health is protected.… Corrosion control can come in many forms. For this reason, it is important to conduct a system-wide assessment prior to any source water and/or treatment modifications and to identify existing or anticipated water quality, treatment or operational issues that may interfere with or limit the effectiveness of corrosion control treatment.” Peter C. Grevatt, “Lead and Copper Rule Requirements for Optimal Corrosion Control Treatment for Large Drinking Water Systems,” U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Memorandum to EPA Regional Water Division Directors, Regions I-X, November 3, 2015.

0. .  Tinka G. Hyde, “Transmittal of Final Report—High Lead at Three Residences in Flint, Michigan,” memorandum to Jim Sygo, Michigan Department of Environmental Quality, and Howard Croft, director of Flint Public Works, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, November 4, 2015. Hyde added that the final report did have some new information: it recommended that residents be notified about “the potential risks of increased lead levels in drinking water when work is undertaken that may disturb lead service lines.” The final report itself was dated October 21, 2015.

0. .  The five-member task force included Ken Sikkema, senior policy fellow at Public Sector Consultants and a former senate majority leader; Chris Kolb, president of the Michigan Environmental Council and a former state representative; Matthew Davis, professor of pediatrics and internal medicine at the University of Michigan Health System and professor of public policy at the university’s Ford School; Eric Rothstein, national water issues consultant for Galardi Rothstein Group who advised on the creation of the Great Lakes Water Authority; and Lawrence Reynolds, a Flint pediatrician who served as president of the Mott Children’s Health Center. “Transitioning back to the Detroit Water and Sewerage Department-Great Lakes Water Authority is a good first step to protecting public health in Flint, but it’s not the last step,” said Snyder in the press release. “Bringing in outside experts to evaluate our actions and help monitor and advise on potential changes to law, procedures and practices will be key to continuing work on the comprehensive action plan and ensuring safe drinking water for all the residents in Flint and all of Michigan.” “Gov. Rick Snyder announces Flint Water Task Force to review state, federal and municipal actions, offer recommendations,” press release, Office of Governor Snyder, October 21, 2015.

0. .  Flint Water Advisory Task Force, letter to Governor Snyder, December 28, 2015. The task force also said that, after meeting with MDEQ director Dan Wyant, it was “disappointing to hear his weak defense” of the corrosion control decision.

0. .  It was only six months later, after the residents and the Flint Water Study group had conducted the citywide lead test, that the EPA took formal steps to provide two experts to the MDEQ who could give technical assistance in Flint. (Susan Hedman, the Region 5 director, had also offered them to Mayor Dayne Walling in July 2015.) Internal emails and “Notice of Class Action Administrative Complaint Against the United States Environmental Protection Agency,” April 25, 2016, http://www.flintwaterclassaction.com/wp-content/uploads/Flint-EPA-Complaint.pdf.

0. .  Senate Minority Leader Jim Ananich was livid. “It is clear from several, now available documents, that certain MDEQ and EPA staff chose to put their reputations ahead of the safety and health of Flint citizens,” he said in a statement. “We do not know whether the misapplication of federal rules was intentional or due to negligence.” He pushed for a robust investigation that would ensure that “those responsible for Flint’s water crisis are held accountable” (John Wisely, John Erb, and Robin Erb, “State Admits Mistakes in Flint Water Switch,” Detroit Free Press, October 19, 2015). Later, Ananich described his incredulity at how people in the state’s government “lied to my face … multiple times” when he inquired about the water in Flint, speaking both as the community’s elected senator and as a resident whose young family had been drinking water. “And I still can’t understand why” (Jim Ananich, interview with author, Lansing, Mich., June 21, 2017).

0. .  Dan Wyant directed the Department of Agriculture under Governor John Engler and Governor Jennifer Granholm. He became the director of the MDEQ in January 2011. In accepting his resignation, Snyder called it “appropriate.” Marc Edwards and Dr. Mona Hanna-Attisha told a reporter they felt that it was something of a surprise that Wyant was the first to resign due to the Flint water crisis. “I’m glad that someone is sorry and someone is being held accountable,” said Edwards. “But Dan Wyant would not be at the top of my list—or even on the list. I feel strongly he was misled by his staff at every point, and he was put in publicly embarrassing situations by the staff’s misinformation.” Hanna-Attisha said he was a “nice person” who “wasn’t directly involved,” and that “there are other people, particularly in [the Office of Drinking Water and Municipal Assistance] that need to take some responsibility.” Jim Lynch, “Flint Water Report Prompts Apologies, Resignations,” Detroit News, December 29, 2015. In January 2016, according to his LinkedIn profile, Wyant returned to a previous job: president of the Edward Lowe Foundation in Cassopolis, Michigan (last accessed March 4, 2018).

0. .  Emily Lawler, “DEQ Spokesman Also Resigns over Flint Water Crisis, Says City ‘Didn’t Feel Like We Cared,’” MLive—Flint Journal, December 30, 2015. Wurfel went on to work at a government consulting firm that specializes in Lansing lobbying, according to his LinkedIn profile and the website of Kandler Reed Khoury & Muchmore (both last accessed March 4, 2018).

0. .  Emery, “Flint Reconnects to Detroit Water.”

0. .  Katrease Stafford, “Faces of Flint,” Detroit Free Press, January 22, 2016.

0. .  Ron Fonger, “See How Flint Supported Mayor Karen Weaver in Election Win,” MLive—Flint Journal, November 11, 2015.

0. .  Ron Fonger, “Mayor Karen Weaver Declares Water Crisis State of Emergency in Flint,” MLive—Flint Journal, December 14, 2015, updated December 15, 2015. Fonger goes on to report on how the council’s response was mixed, unclear about the ramifications. Councilman Scott Kincaid said that it would help the community show “that we need resources” and make it possible for Flint “to apply for state and federal funds.” Councilman Joshua Freeman said that he didn’t want residents to expect the declaration to result in immediate help, particularly with the lead service lines. “We need to find a way to actually fix the problem. This declaration does not [do that].”

0. .  There were exceptions, of course, including a New York Times story on Flint’s return to Detroit water, but they were usually in the form of an independent dispatch, rather than the sustained attention usually given to a disaster that affects tens of thousands of people.

0. .  As before, some of the material on Michigan Radio appeared in an earlier form in “How Covering the Flint Water Crisis Changed Michigan Radio,” Columbia Journalism Review, February 16, 2016.

0. .  Lindsey Smith, “Not Safe to Drink,” Michigan Radio, December 15, 2015. It aired one day after Mayor Weaver declared a state of emergency on December 14, 2015. “Knowing I was giving this to my kids makes me sick, because we should be able to trust the fact that we’re paying for this service,” LeeAnne Walters told Smith on the broadcast. “And we should be able to trust the fact that it’s not going to harm our kids.”

0. .  The series “An American Disaster: The Crisis in Flint” earned Rachel Maddow a 2016 Emmy Award from the National Academy of Television Arts and Sciences for “Outstanding News Discussion and Analysis.” About a month after she began reporting on the water, Maddow hosted a live town hall in Flint, broadcast from the Brownell/Holmes STEM Academy. It featured a number of residents as well as Mayor Weaver, Dr. Mona Hanna-Attisha, Marc Edwards, master plumber Harold Harrington, and UM-Flint professor Marty Kaufman, who was leading a team working to rebuild Flint’s spotty water records. State Rep. Sheldon Neeley, U.S. Senator Debbie Stabenow, Rev. Jesse Jackson, and Rev. Charles Williams II, president of the National Action Network’s Michigan chapter, were also at the town hall. With a five-hundred-person capacity, tickets for the town hall sold out. Watch parties sprung up around the state.

0. .  Jan Worth-Nelson, phone interview with the author, January 2016.

0. .  Ibid.; and Jan Worth-Nelson, “Beam, Arch, Pillar, Porch: A Love Story,” in Scott Atkinson, ed., Happy Anyway: A Flint Anthology (Cleveland: Belt Publishing, 2016). This quote from Maddow appears to be from her December 18, 2015, show, “Is Flint habitable anymore? Really?,” The Rachel Maddow Show, MSNBC, http://www.msnbc.com/transcripts/rachel-maddow-show/2015-12-18.

0. .  Nearly fifteen years of work went into evaluating how the city should get its drinking water, predating the era of emergency management.

0. .  Paul Egan, “Did DEQ Budget Cuts Contribute to the Flint Water Crisis?,” Detroit Free Press, March 23, 2016.

0. .  It was then about $1.53 million a year, down $300,000 from the previous year. Public Water System Supervision Program, Office of Ground Water & Drinking Water, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Final Report: Program Review for the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality Water Bureau,” prepared by the Cadmus Group, Washington, D.C., August 30, 2010, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-11/documents/program-review-mdeq-water-bureau-20100830-76pp_0.pdf. See also Ted Roelofs, “Signs of Trouble at MDEQ, Years before Flint Lead Crisis,” Bridge Magazine, February 10, 2016.

0. .  “The Flint Water Crisis,” Michigan Civil Rights Commission, p. 112.

0. .  Michael Glasgow, written testimony to the Michigan Joint Select Committee on the Flint Water Public Health Emergency, Flint, Mich., March 29, 2016; and Dayne Walling, testimony to the Michigan Joint Select Committee on the Flint Water Public Health Emergency, Flint, Mich., March 29, 2016.

0. .  For his part, Mayor Walling felt that the KWA plan still supported regionalism, but of a different kind: it banded together communities along the I-69 corridor (interview with author, Flint, Mich., June 22, 2017). Jeff Wright felt that Schroeck and others used “Southeast Michigan” rather loosely. “When Detroit, Wayne, Oakland, and Macomb Counties want something like water revenue, Flint and Genesee County become a part of Southeast Michigan. But, when those governments are not looking for something, Flint and Genesee County are not. When there is federal money to be distributed, Flint and Genesee County are nowhere near Southeast Michigan much less a part of it.” Jeff Wright, “The Flint Water Crisis, DWSD, and GLWA: Monopoly, Price Gouging, Corruption, and the Poisoning of a City,” written testimony, Michigan Civil Rights Commission, November 22, 2016, p. 27.

0. .  That was Ed Kurtz. Later, when he testified before a congressional committee, he said that his job was “strictly finance” and “did not include ensuring safe drinking water.” He said he did not have a responsibility to prevent lead contamination; that was the responsibility of the MDEQ and EPA, he said. He also claimed that he “never made a decision to use Flint River water” as a temporary source. Ron Fonger, “Former Flint EM: ‘My Job Did Not Include Ensuring Safe Drinking Water,’” MLive—Flint Journal, May 2, 2017; Ron Fonger, “Detroit Was ‘Mad, Angry Vindictive’ in Flint Water Talks, Former EM Claims,” MLive—Flint Journal, May 2, 2017.

0. .  For the backstory on the politics of the KWA, the author owes a great deal to Wayne State University law professor Peter Hammer, both for an interview in Detroit, August 18, 2016, and for the testimonies he gave before the Michigan Civil Rights Commission, as well as the responding testimony it prompted from Jeff Wright. Peter J. Hammer, “The Flint Water Crisis, KWA and Strategic-Structural Racism,” written testimony, Michigan Civil Rights Commission, July 18, 2016; Peter J. Hammer, “The Flint Water Crisis, KWA and Strategic-Structural Racism: A Reply to Jeff Wright,” written testimony, Michigan Civil Rights Commission, December 31, 2016; and Wright, “The Flint Water Crisis,” Civil Rights Commission.

0. .  The email was sent on December 19, 2013, from Nicole Zachado, an enforcement specialist in the Water Resources Division, to her boss, William Creal. “Having met with Steve Busch and others … my suspicions have been confirmed and this really does not strike me as our issue” in the Water Resources Division, she added. Creal relayed this to Liane Shekter-Smith, the drinking water chief, and asked if the request for an environmental order in Flint would be better handled by her staff. Shekter-Smith replied, “That’s part of my conundrum. We don’t have an enforcement action with them,” adding that “I need to speak to Steve Busch to understand what the ‘ask’ is.” In the end, “the order was officially handled by a third DEQ section, the Office of Waste Management and Radiological Protection,” writes Paul Egan of the Detroit Free Press, “though records show Busch played an active role in finalizing wording that would be agreeable to KWA bond attorneys.” Paul Egan, “‘Sweetheart’ Bond Deal Aided Flint Water Split from Detroit,” Detroit Free Press, May 11, 2016, updated May 12, 2016.

0. .  Hammer, “The Flint Water Crisis, KWA and Strategic-Structural Racism: A Reply to Jeff Wright,” p. 28.

0. .  Ibid., p. 18.

0. .  Ibid., pp. 29–30.

0. .  Egan, “‘Sweetheart’ Bond Deal.”

0. .  Flint Water Advisory Task Force, “Final Report,” March 2016.