The members of Arnold Expedition were ready to leave Cambridge on Monday, September 11, after only nine days of planning and organizing. It was an extraordinary accomplishment for the fledgling Continental Army and its commander, George Washington. Colonel Arnold also deserves credit for skillfully carrying out Washington’s instructions. In fact, Arnold had managed to get his military career back on track in less than three months from the time of his quarrel with Colonel Hinman over the command of the troops at Fort Ticonderoga. Arnold was now a colonel in the Continental Army commanding an independent corps, one of the most coveted assignments in the army. He also had the support of Washington and Schuyler, two of the most influential men in America.
But Washington still had lingering concerns about Arnold’s reputation for confrontation, warning him at the start of the expedition that he must cooperate with Schuyler and put himself under that officer’s command if the two armies should meet in Canada. “Upon this Occasion & all others, I recommend most earnestly to avoid all Contention about Rank,” Washington exhorted Arnold. “In such a Cause every Post is honourable in which a Man can serve his Country.”2 Washington paraphrased this advice to Arnold from his favorite play Cato and he used it on other occasions. For example, writing to General John Thomas on July 23, 1775, Washington said, “surely every Post ought to be deem’d honourable in which a Man can serve his Country.”
The first part of the 1,150-man Arnold expedition consisted of an overland march from Cambridge to the Massachusetts port town of Newburyport, where boats were waiting to transport the corps to Maine. Arnold did not assemble his army at Cambridge, to avoid drawing attention to the movement of so many men.3 Instead, they left quietly in detachments following different routes to Newburyport. This plan also allowed the men to find better sleeping accommodations in the smaller towns and villages along their various routes. Dr. Senter liked the idea of dividing the expedition during the march to Newburyport “for the more convenient marching and lodging.”4
Based on the existing roads at the time the distance from Cambridge to Newburyport was about 34 miles. The three frontier rifle companies were the first to leave, departing Cambridge on schedule on the morning of September 11. The two New England musket battalions were scheduled to follow later that day, but they refused to march until they were paid the one month’s advance wages that had been promised them.5 It is no wonder that Washington would later write privately about his New England troops, “such a dirty, mercenary Spirit pervades the whole, that I should not be at all surprizd [sic] at any disaster than may happen.”6 It took two days to get the money to pay the New Englanders, who left Cambridge on September 13, as the frontier riflemen were approaching Newburyport.
The three rifle companies traveled together. After months of dull camp life the men must have been pleased to be on the move and heading toward combat. The frontiersmen moved rapidly through the Massachusetts countryside and reached the outskirts of Newburyport by the evening of the 13th, but decided to stop and camp for the night so they could make a dramatic entrance into town the following morning.
The two New England infantry battalions also made good time. Both departed Cambridge on Wednesday, September 13, but at different times. Greene’s battalion left in the morning while Enos’ waited until evening. Major Meigs, second in command of Enos’ battalion, wrote that his unit left Cambridge on Wednesday night and marched due north as far as the village of Medford before stopping. Their march resumed the next morning, and by taking country roads east through Malden, Lynn, and Salem they arrived at Danvers, where they camped for the night. A common soldier in Enos’ battalion named Abner Stocking, from Chatham, Connecticut, wrote, “This morning we began our march at 5o’clock and at sunset encamped at Danvers. … The weather through the day was very sultry and hot for the season of the year.” Stocking mentioned the morale of the men during the trip: “We were all in high spirits intending to endure with fortitude, all the fatigues and hardships, that we might meet with in our march to Quebec.”7
Enos’ battalion resumed its march the following morning, passing through the Massachusetts towns of Beverly and Wendham to encamp at Rowley, where they spent the third night of their journey. From Meigs’ account, we know that the battalion completed the final leg of the trip on Saturday morning, arriving in Newburyport at about 10:00 a.m. Arnold’s entire corps was in Newburyport by Saturday night, September 16. However, the men were not all camped together. The riflemen bivouacked in a field in the neighboring village of Newbury, in an area known today as the upper common. The two divisions of musketmen bunked in Newburyport, where they occupied the town meeting house and two unused rope works.8 Arnold and several of his senior officers were the guests of Nathaniel Tracy at his Newburyport mansion, located on Fish Street (today’s State Street), a few blocks away from the town’s bustling waterfront. Other officers found housing across the street from Tracy’s mansion at an almost equally fine home owned by Tristram Dalton, another patriotic member of Newburyport’s thriving business community.
Tracy and Dalton were gracious hosts. Major Meigs wrote that he spent two nights in Newburyport as the dinner guest of Mr. Tracy on one night and Mr. Dalton on the other.9 The other officers lodged—not unpleasantly—down the street at the renowned Wolfe Tavern, which was owned by William Davenport. Dr. Senter mentioned in his journal that he “took lodgings at Mr. Devenport’s [Davenport’s], an Innholder.” Senter said that he enjoyed his brief stay in Newburyport, and referred to it as “a very agreeable place.”10
Arnold did not accompany his corps on its march from Cambridge to Newburyport. He assigned command of the routine trek through friendly country to Greene and Enos while he made the trip in a small rented coach, called a pantheon, accompanied by his aide Eleazer Oswald. They completed the trip in one long and busy day, during which they made some important purchases in the seaport town of Salem. Leaving Cambridge on Friday morning, Arnold and Oswald arrived in Salem at mid-day, where they purchased two hundred pounds of ginger “and engaged a teamster to transport that and two hundred and seventy blankets, received from the Committee of Safety.”11 Ginger, believed at the time to prevent scurvy, usually was sold in powdered form and mixed with drinking water. It was a popular food additive during the French and Indian War, especially among frontier troops, but its use as an anti-scorbutic declined during the course of the American Revolution.12 Arnold and Oswald left Salem in the evening and arrived in Newburyport later that night.
The colonel spent the next day, Saturday, in Newburyport “buying a quantity of small stores” and attending to some other last minute details.13 This is an important statement to note, because it shows us that a wealthy man such as Arnold had enough money and the access to transportation to take personal items with him on the expedition, the most important being additional foods. Arnold shopped in Newburyport for provisions for his personal use on the expedition: wine, preserved jams and jellies, sugar, coffee, tea, dried beef, pickles, salted pork, portable soup (bouillon), tinned butter (preserved between layers of salt), and spices to supplement his army rations. His purchases were not unusual, since wealthy officers tried to make life as pleasant as possible for themselves in the field. Officers could bring anything they could afford with them, including wagon loads of elegant tents, furniture, clothing, food, liquor and wines, and servants. Since the Arnold Expedition was traveling light and fast in small boats, the amount of personal baggage an officer could carry with him was limited. There are clues; however, in the diaries from the expedition that Arnold’s officers brought some stocks of personal food with them. For example, Dr. Senter wrote on October 20, 1775, in his journal, “I was obliged to draw forth my small butter box containing about half a dozen pounds [of butter],” and Major Meigs reported losing his kettle, butter, and sugar in a boating accident.14 Some enlisted men also purchased food but were generally confined by their budgets and limited space to taking few nonessential items with them.
Arnold’s corps paraded in an open field early on the morning of Sunday, September 17. A number of the diarists recorded the event, including Ebenezer Wild, who wrote in his journal, “This day [September] 17th had a general review, and our men appeared very well and in good spirits, and made a grand appearance. …”15 Seeing Arnold’s command lined up in formation must have been a stirring sight for the pro-rebellion population of Newburyport, who turned out to witness this proof of the 13 colonies’ determination to fight.
Arnold’s corps assembled in full martial array: serried ranks of sturdy young men, many of whom were still teenagers. Few, if any, wore uniforms. They dressed in civilian clothing, and only their shouldered firearms and cartridge boxes made them resemble soldiers. An onlooker could make out the figure of Colonel Arnold with his small headquarters staff facing his corps of 1,150 men. Rifleman John Joseph Henry was in the ranks and remembered Arnold long after as “a short handsome man, of a florid complexion and stoutly made.” Henry called him “a remarkable character … brave, even to temerity and beloved by the soldiery.”16 But despite his bulky, athletic look, Arnold’s eyes— described as marvelously strange like those of an animal or some predatory bird, pale as ice, unblinking—were likely his most distinguished feature.17
The public was treated to watching Arnold review his troops lined up facing him from right to left. The three rifle companies were probably on the right in the position of honor, with the 1st Battalion, commanded by Green next to them, followed by Enos’ 2nd Battalion on the extreme left. During his inspection, he would have seen the only known black soldier on the expedition. His name was Benjamin Butcher and he was a private in Captain Hubbard’s company.18 Butcher was probably a free black man who volunteered for the mission.
Since few of Arnold’s officers were wearing uniforms, their military ranks were identified by a rosette or gathered piece of ribbon, known as a cockade, displayed on their hats. Cockades were in fashion at the time among most European armies, and the Americans copied the idea from the British. The wearing of colored cockades was a rudimentary system implemented by Washington at the start of the war. The regulation authorizing the use of cockades appeared in the army’s General Orders for July 23, 1775, that recommended “some Badges of Distinction may be immediately provided.”19 The orders specified red or pink cockades for field officers (colonels, lieutenant colonels, and majors), yellow or buff for captains, and green for subalterns (lieutenants and other low-ranking officers). Sergeants, according to the General Orders, “may be distinguished by an Epaulette, or strip of red Cloth, sewed upon the right shoulder; the Corporals by one of green.”
A few of Arnold’s officers might also have been wearing a crimson-colored sash, which served as a badge of office or function (such as adjutant or officer of the day). Some other officers may have worn a small plume or decorative feather in their hats to further distinguish themselves from the common soldiers. The variety of symbols to indicate rank and function during this early period of the American Revolution existed because the army had to make do with whatever was available.
A careful observer to the parade at Newburyport would have noticed that Arnold and his officers carried a diversity of weapons. Most officers carried swords, and though a wealthy officer might have owned several different types, the majority would likely have carried a practical, short-bladed sword known as a hanger (or cutte) on the expedition. Arnold and his officers also armed themselves with a variety of pistols and a European pole-arm known as a spontoon, a six- to eight-foot-long wooden pole with a spear-like metal tip. Washington favored this weapon for his officers as a symbol of rank and as a signaling device. It also freed the officers to focus on leading their troops rather than being distracted with the loading and firing of a musket or pistol.20 Even if they were wearing civilian clothing, it was easy to distinguish Arnold’s officers from the enlisted men because the officers usually had the money to afford a better quality of cloth and tailoring than the enlisted men.
There is no mention among extant documents of flags on the expedition. The main army at Cambridge had them, and it is likely Arnold’s corps brought along a few, which were unfurled and flying when the complete expedition mustered at Newburyport. The Americans had no national flag at this point in the war, and the flags they flew were more or less square in shape and festooned with painted patriotic slogans.
The colonists felt at this time that theirs was a “loyal protest” and that they fought to redress their grievances with their mother country. The rebels liked flags and standards with patriotic and martial images, and slogans that expressed their sentiments. Popular designs at the time were a red flag with the word LIBERTY written across in bold letters or the outline of a pine tree above the words An Appeal to Heaven.21 Sometime late in 1775, General Washington unfurled an unofficial national flag, called the Grand Union or Continental flag, at Cambridge. It represented the 13 rebelling colonies with 13 alternating red and white stripes. There was a canton (a square or rectangular section in the upper-left corner of the flag next to the staff) in the form of a British Union Jack to represent the colonists’ fundamental allegiance to their mother country.22 There is a slim possibility that the Arnold Expedition had a Grand Union flag with them.
Music was played during the campaign, and we can envision Arnold’s fifes and drums grouped together during their muster at Newburyport for maximum impact. The musicians had the practical role of relaying commands to the troops through specific fife and drum calls. Our visualization of Arnold’s force at the Newburyport muster should also include a number of dogs that became attached to Arnold’s corps. Soldiers throughout history have loved having dogs with them, and the Arnold Expedition was no exception.
The overall effect of Arnold’s assembled army at its Newburyport parade was a practical earthy look with splashes of color and military organization. “We passed the review with much honor to ourselves,” Abner Stocking penned in his journal, “and went through with the manual exercise [drilling with their muskets] with much alacrity.”23 The common soldiers in Arnold’s corps were healthy young men who had been drawn to Cambridge by a common dislike of the British and a sense of adventure. Although Arnold’s army may have appeared somewhat unsoldierly when it mustered at Newburyport, it was a potent fighting force. Similarly armed and equipped colonists had already dealt the British deadly blows at Concord and Bunker Hill.
Following their Sunday morning muster in the field, the expedition’s members marched into town. Newburyport was situated in a commanding location on the south shore of the Merrimac River with easy access to the sea. The town had a commercial look about it, with numerous warehouses and merchants’ homes lining its streets.24 The corps proceeded to the First Presbyterian Church to attend a special service as patriotic townsfolk lined the way. As many soldiers as possible marched into the church with the expedition’s colors flying and drums beating.
The men formed two ceremonial lines inside the church and presented arms. As drums rolled, Chaplain Spring solemnly walked between the lines of soldiers to the pulpit. The men stacked their arms in the aisles, after which the chaplain preached extemporaneously. Following the service, the church sexton led Chaplain Spring, Colonel Arnold, and his senior officers down a flight of stairs to the crypt below the sanctuary, where the remains of charismatic English evangelist George Whitefield lay entombed. The sexton removed the lid from Whitefield’s coffin, and Arnold and his officers gazed upon the remains of the great cleric. Whitefield’s body had decayed, but some of his clothing remained intact. The sexton solemnly reached into the coffin and removed the clerical collar and wristbands from the corpse. He cut them into small pieces with a pair of scissors and gave a piece of the precious relic to each officer to take with them to Quebec. As the coffin was closed, they prayed for the success of their enterprise.25
Nathaniel Tracy arranged for the transport of Arnold’s army from Newburyport to Fort Western in 11 fishing boats and small merchant ships provisioned and waiting at the wharves on Water Street. Tracy gathered an assortment of single-masted sloops, double-masted fishing boats, and coastal traders normally used to transport loads of lumber, salt fish, and animal hides along the coast. One diarist described them as “dirty coasters and fish boats.”26 They carried no cannons nor did the rebels have any warships to serve as escorts. Enemy warships were known to patrol the area, and Arnold’s unarmed ships would be easy prey if they were intercepted by even the smallest Royal Navy vessel. Washington anticipated this danger when he warned Arnold to use caution before putting out to sea. The general instructed him, “When you come to Newbury Port you are to make all possible Inquiry what Men of War or Cruizers there may be on the Coast to which this Detachment may be exposed on their Voyage to Kennebeck River. …” Washington told Arnold to march his troops overland to Maine: “if you shall find that there is Danger of being intercepted. …”27 For all the Americans knew, a flotilla of Royal Navy warships could be just over the horizon, waiting to pounce on Arnold’s defenseless fleet.
Tracy also worried about the American military activity taking place at Newburyport in anticipation of the expedition’s arrival. Writing to Joseph Trumbull on the subject, Tracy said, “[T]he place they are destined for, may be kept a Secret, but it is impossible to prepare so many Vessells, without having it known, they are bound on some expedition.”28 Tracy helped by sending three patrol boats on Saturday to search the coastline as far as the Kennebec River for British warships. The boats returned on Monday, September 18, with assurances that the waters between Newburyport and the Kennebec were clear of the enemy.
Since Arnold’s troops were getting restless, this news came at an opportune time. Based on the favorable reconnaissance report, Arnold began sending his men on board the transports late that afternoon. They remained on board ready to sail on the first salutary wind. The expedition’s troops were evenly distributed among the 11 vessels, with about 100 men per ship. Tuesday morning, September 19, saw a favorable wind blowing, and the flotilla raised anchor. An enthusiastic crowd gathered at the waterfront to shout huzzahs as the expeditionary force sailed out of the harbor with their drums beating, fifes playing, and colors flying.29 By 11:00 a.m., all the ships were safely out to sea, except for the schooner Swallow, which ran aground on a sandbar in the entrance to the harbor. The expedition lost valuable time as the soldiers aboard her transferred to other ships. The crew remained on board, and Arnold instructed them to proceed to the Kennebec River with their cargo as soon as possible. Then, the little unarmed flotilla sailed out into the open sea and plotted a course for Maine. A worried Arnold scanned the horizon for enemy warships. He had every reason to be concerned, as the Royal Navy knew all about his expedition, including its exact location.
The first known British reference to the Arnold Expedition was a note dated September 8, 1775. General Thomas Gage, who commanded the British army in North America (with the exception of parts of Canada), wrote the memo to Vice Admiral Samuel Graves, his counterpart in the Royal Navy, asking for warships to intercept the rebels at sea. Mr. Washington’s so-called secret expedition had not even left Cambridge when Gage moved to destroy it.30 Gage’s message to Graves read as follows:
Boston September 8th 1775—
I have certain Advices by two Deserters, that about 1500 Men have Marched from Cambridge which are said to be gone to Canada, and by way of Newberry [Newburyport], but by that Route they may be intended for Nova Scotia; I should therefore think it exceedingly necessary some small Vessel should be immediately sent to Watch their motions, … I should hope that the Naval Force you have in that Province would with timely Notice be able to defeat any Attempts the Rebels can make at Sea for a Descent there.31
The fact that information from two American deserters, who crossed into British lines somewhere around Boston, reached Gage’s headquarters was not a bit of luck, but the result of meticulous intelligence work, the scope of which we probably will never know because of the secrecy surrounding it. Both the British and Americans were obtaining useful information by methodically interrogating deserters and prisoners. Both sides were also getting input from civilian sympathizers, spies, double agents, and paid informers. They employed other techniques such as intercepting enemy dispatches, or writing false dispatches that were allowed to fall into enemy hands. The British also were trying to turn American officers with bribes or promises. Other favorites in the British bag of tricks were printing counterfeit money and adding false paragraphs to authentic letters that they planted in newspapers to discredit or embarrass Washington and other rebel leaders. The capture of an enemy vessel at sea was a valuable coup, every piece of paper aboard scrutinized for useful information. Anything interesting, gathered from any source, made its way to headquarters for evaluation and review by trusted officers and civilians who performed this work in addition to their other duties. General Washington, for example, preferred to work behind closed doors, probably evaluating intelligence information with his military secretary (Joseph Reed at the time) and his aides-de-camp.
The British scored an intelligence triumph in the early months of the war, while the Arnold Expedition was still being organized, when they got Dr. Benjamin Church Jr. to pass them information about rebel plans.32 Church had a mansion and a mistress and he turned to providing General Gage with information in order to finance his expensive life style. Church’s treason was uncovered in October 1775, but we do not know the extent of the damage. Equally dangerous to the Americans at the time was Major Benjamin Thompson, a New Hampshire militia officer who worked as a British undercover agent. Thompson was observing the American camps and fortifications around Boston and reporting everything he saw to General Gage in Boston via innocent-looking letters that included intelligence data written in invisible ink.33 The Americans staged their own intelligence tour de force when they stole all of General Gage’s official papers from his Boston headquarters.34
The next known item in the paper trail of British documents concerning the Arnold Expedition is a follow-up note from General Gage to Vice Admiral Graves dated September 27, which showed that Gage knew that the rebel expedition had sailed in a flotilla of boats to Maine’s Kennebec River. Gage, however, still believed that its objective was Halifax:
Boston September 27th 1775
Sir, Since Conversing with you this Morning on the Subject of the Rebels Embarking a Number of Men at Newberry, I have again considered that matter, and think it absolutely Necessary you should Immediately send some Ships of War to look after them. It is possible they may be some Days about Kennebec, or Mechias [Machias, Maine] to try to augment their Force, and to procure more Boats, to land their Men in the Province of Nova Scotia. …35
That the authorities in Halifax had been alerted to the possibility of a rebel attack by October 17, 1775, is evidenced by a report written by Nova Scotia’s Governor Francis Legge to his superiors in London, which included: “I am inform’d that Fifteen hundred of the Rebels had marched Eastward under the Command of General Thomas [John Thomas, an American general, which was incorrect]… that their design is to destroy the Navy Yard here. …”36
The British realized their mistake about the objective of the Arnold Expedition by mid-October, as demonstrated by an excerpt from a November 27, 1775, summary report from General William Howe to London. Howe replaced Gage, who was recalled to England in September 1775. Although Howe’s comments were dated late November, they prove that he had knowledge of the Arnold Expedition much earlier. In this report, Howe referred to a British raid on the coastal town of Falmouth (modern Portland), Maine, that took place on October 18, 1775:
On the return of this detachment, the 5th instant [November 5], I received confirmation, that the party from the Rebel Army, under the command of a Colonel Arnold, of which I presume your Lordship would have advice from General Gage, had gone up the Kennebec River, intending to enter Canada by the River Chaudiere; that they had got to Fort Halifax, about sixty miles from the mouth of the Kennebeck, from whence they had sent back about two hundred sick; nothing further has been since heard of them.37
With the above intelligence in hand and knowledge of the movement of Schuyler’s northern army, the British in Boston tried to reinforce Quebec City during October 1775. But a lack of cooperation from the Royal Navy, whose ships were the only way to get reinforcements quickly from Boston to Quebec, frustrated their efforts.
The most revealing document in the exchange of notes between the army and navy is an October 12 missive from Vice Admiral Graves to General Howe, in which the admiral explains why he refused to provide transportation for troops bound for Quebec. Because of its importance, Graves’ note is presented in is entirety:
Boston 12 October 1775
Sir,
From different Conversations I have had on the subject of navigating in the River St. Lawrence at this time of the year, and on the probability of Vessels getting to Quebec, I have been led to take the Opinions of Captains Hartwell and Macartney upon the likelihood of the Cerberus [a Royal Navy frigate] and Transports arriving at Quebec, supposing they were now ready to depart: these Gentlemen assure and authorize me to say, the Attempt is extremely dangerous and that to persevere after getting into the River will be fatal to the whole, and that they look upon the Scheme to be impracticable: the reasons they have given me are so forcible, that I am intirely of their Opinion, and think it not adviseable [sic] to attempt it.
I am Sir &c
Sam Graves38
In the end, the Royal Navy did nothing to help get reinforcements from Boston to Quebec. But the question that remains is why Graves did not send warships to destroy Arnold’s unarmed transports while they were vulnerable at the wharf in Newburyport or at sea en route to Maine? The accepted explanation is that Graves was sadly handicapped by the small number of ships assigned to him and that none were available to intercept Arnold’s unarmed flotilla. Graves only had a handful of ships designed to fight on the open seas, and with them he was expected to patrol the labyrinthine American coastline from the mouth of the St. Lawrence River to the Florida Keys. Graves was saddled with fifty-gun double-deckers in a situation that required a fleet of easily maneuverable, shallow-draft warships.39
But there is another explanation for Graves’ failure, one that begins with his background. Graves, though a competent sailor, had never held a high post prior to his appointment to command the North American Station in 1774. He seemed befuddled with this great responsibility and incapable of figuring out how to use his resources to his best advantage. One official report described Graves as “a corrupt Admiral without any shadow of capacity.”40 In another appraisal, a British officer wrote home about Graves’ lack of initiative, saying, “[H]e was not supporting in material points the dignity and terror of the British Flag.”41
With some imagination and determination, Graves could have stretched his resources to take advantage of the golden opportunity he had to crush Arnold’s unarmed transports, either at Newburyport or while they were sailing unprotected along the New England coast. The Royal Navy finally dismissed Graves in a curt letter from the admiralty, dated February 22, 1776, which read: “The service on which you have been employed being at an end, you are hereby required and directed to strike your flag and come on shore.”42 But all was not lost for the British—the Arnold Expedition had within its ranks a spy, a man posing as a deserter from the British army.
* * *
Arnold’s fleet sailed unmolested by British warships from Newburyport to the Kennebec River. Faced with favorable weather and a good breeze, the fleet traveled the roughly 100 miles in about 24 hours.
Captain Dearborn included in his journal a list of six flag signals supplied by Arnold, to be used to communicate instructions to the flotilla. Signal number five, for example, was an “Ensign [flag] at the Main-Top Peak.” This was the signal “for dispersing and every Vessel making the Nearest Harbour.”43 Major Meigs’ journal entry for September 19 (the day the flotilla sailed from Newburyport) shows that he also recorded the signals, adding “I was very sea-sick.”44 His ailment was common among the expedition’s soldiers—who were unaccustomed to the sea—and the situation was aggravated by sailing in small, overcrowded ships that reeked with the smell of dead fish or animal hides. Arnold, however, was an experienced sailor who must have enjoyed his temporary job as commodore of the fleet. He was aboard the schooner Broad Bay, designated the flagship of the flotilla, and sailing in the lead. The colorless transports sailed along briskly but hove to (slowed down) when they sighted two fishing schooners. A sailor on the Broad Bay shouted across the open sea, asking if they had seen any ships of the Royal Navy. The reply was an agreeable “no,” and the fleet sailed on.
As the day wore on, the weather turned foggy and the seas became rough, causing most of the troops, according to Dr. Senter, “to disgorge themselves of their luxuries [good food] so plentifully laid in ere we embarked.”45 Gale-force winds ensued, adding to the men’s misery and the difficulty of keeping the ships on course. At midnight, Arnold gave the signal to anchor for the night off Wood Island, which lay a little southwest of the intricate entrance to the Kennebec River. The foul weather continued into the following morning, “very thick and foggy, attended with rain,” but the ships groped their way along the coast and began arriving at the mouth of the Kennebec River around 9:00 a.m. on September 20. Meigs, who was aboard the sloop Britannia, recorded his arrival in his journal:
In the morning we made the mouth of Kennebeck, right ahead, which we soon entered. … We were hailed from the shore by a number of men under arms [local militia], which were stationed there. They were answered, that we were Continental troops, and that we wanted a pilot. They immediately sent one on board. … I would mention here, that this day makes fourteen only, since the orders were first given for building 200 battoes, collecting provisions for and levying 1,100 men, and marching them to this place. …46
Major Meigs was fairly accurate in his calculation. The expedition commenced only 18 days earlier, on September 2, when Washington wrote out instructions to Tracy to assemble transports at Newburyport. Therefore, in less than three weeks a corps of over 1,000 armed, equipped, and healthy men sailed up the Kennebec River. It was an incredible achievement for Washington, Arnold, and the fledgling Continental Army.
Not only is it difficult to comprehend how the British failed to intercept Arnold’s unarmed transports at sea, but it is equally puzzling to understand Washington’s long delay in informing the Continental Congress of the existence of the Arnold Expedition. Washington first informed Congress of the mission in a report he wrote them on September 21, by which time the expedition was already in Maine. His deliberate delay in informing Congress—who were his civilian bosses—of the strategically important and costly campaign can be justified as part of his effort to keep the Arnold Expedition a secret. However, the real reason for Washington’s wait was that he had decided, at the outset of his command, to maintain tight control of the army and allow little outside interference from Congress in matters of strategic planning and troop deployments. In other words, his delay in notifying Congress of the expedition was part of an intentional policy of withholding information from them.
While Washington was an astute politician who worked diligently to maintain a good relationship with Congress and other government officials, he was determined to make his own decisions, and report them after the fact. Congress aided Washington in establishing his independence by issuing vaguely worded instructions to him. In their directive to Washington, dated June 22, 1775, Congress said, “many things must be left to your prudent and discreet management, as occurrences may arise upon the place or from time to time fall out.”47
Congress had granted Washington discretionary powers because they had no experience in operating an army and trusted their new commander: they believed he was a dedicated member of Congress and an experienced soldier.
Washington decided to adopt a broad interpretation of his instructions, and began establishing his independence from Congress within a few days of his arrival in Cambridge. He did this in a shrewdly worded statement, included in his first report to them, dated July 10, 1775. The text is complicated but well worth comprehending, as it shows how Washington eliminated any sort of shared command of the army with Congress:
My best Abilities are at all Times devoted to the Service of my Country, but I feel the Weight, Importance & Vanity of my present Duties too sensibly, not to wish a more immediate & frequent Communication with the Congress. I fear it may often happen in the Course of our present Operations that I shall need that Assistance & Direction from them, which Time & Distance will not allow me to receive.48
Washington’s report to Congress about the Arnold Expedition included some additional insights regarding his decision to launch the mission. For example, it emphasized Washington’s belief that he could spare the men from his army for an intrusion into Canada because the British in Boston showed no signs of stirring from their elaborate fortifications. Here is the text of Washington’s report to Congress, in which he gave them the electrifying news that he had sent an expedition to capture Quebec:
I am now to inform the Honbl. Congress, that encouraged by the repeated Declarations of the Canadians & Indians, & urged by their Requests, I have detached Col. Arnold with 1000 Men to penetrate into Canada by Way of Kennebeck River, &, if possible to make himself Master of Quebeck. By this Manoeuvre I proposed, either to divert Carleton from St Johns, which would leave a free Passage to General Schuyler, or, if this did not take Effect, Quebec in its present defenseless State must fall into his Hands an easy Prey. I made all possible Inquiry as to the Distance, the Safety of the Rout[e], & the Danger of the Season, being too far advanced, but found nothing in either to deter me from proceeding, more especially, as it met with very general Approbation, from all, whom I consulted upon it. … They have now left this Place [Cambridge] 7 Days, &, if favoured with a good Wind, I hope soon to hear of their being in Kennebeck River. …
I was the more induced to make this Detachment, as it is my clear Opinion, from a careful Observation of the Movements of the Enemy, corroborated by all the Intelligence we receive by Deserters, & others, of the former of whom we have some every Day, that the Enemy have no Intention to come out, until they are re-inforced. They have been wholly employed for some Time past, in procuring Materials for Barracks, Fuel & making other Preparations for Winter. These Circumstances, with the constant Additions to their Works, which are apparently defensive, have led to the above Conclusion, & enabled me, to spare this Body of Men, where I hope they will be usefully & successfully employed.49
On September 20, while Washington was writing his report to Congress, Arnold’s flotilla began its passage up the Kennebec River to Fort Western. After entering the Kennebec, Arnold’s flag ship, the Broad Bay, sailed six miles upriver to a small cove called Parker Flats, where it anchored and waited for the rest of the flotilla to arrive. Arnold called the place Eels Eddy and said that many of his men were extremely seasick from the rough voyage from Newburyport. He sent some of them on shore for “refreshments” (typical of his concern for the welfare of the soldiers under his command). But, after waiting six hours, only eight out of the 11 ships in the convoy reached the rendezvous. The colonel could only account for the Swallow, which had run aground on a shoal in Newburyport harbor. Worried about the fate of his two missing ships, the sloops Conway and Abigail, but unwilling to wait any longer, Arnold ordered the assembled fleet to weigh anchor, break out their sails, and continue upriver. It turned out that the missing sloops had sailed past the entrance to the Kennebec in the morning fog and rain and up the nearby Sheepscot River, mistaking it for the Kennebec. Luckily, river pilots were able to navigate the two stragglers through the maze of interconnecting small rivers and channels, where they rejoined the fleet on the following day.
As Arnold’s ships began their passage upriver, members of the expedition stood at the rails to look at the passing shoreline. What they saw were farms—sliced out of a curtain of stately spruce, hemlock, and pine trees—hugging the shoreline and an occasional village or country inn nestled in the forest. Autumn came early to this region; the trees showed the first signs of fall colors as Arnold’s convoy threaded its way into Maine’s interior. Feeling safe from the Royal Navy, at least one of Arnold’s ships probably triumphantly unfurled a rebel ensign from its mast: a scarlet flag with the word LIBERTY painted in bold white lettering. Another of his ships likely hoisted a scarlet ensign with the words An Appeal To Heaven blazed in large white letters.
The arrival of Arnold’s flotilla was an exciting event for the people of this remote region, and those on shore stopped what they were doing to watch the ships sail past. Most locals sided with the rebellion and were thrilled to see these shiploads of American troops brandishing their weapons in defiance to British rule. Some of the men on the expedition came from this part of Maine. They had traveled to Cambridge at the start of the war and now were passing through their homeland as volunteers in Arnold’s corps. They recognized the landscape and started looking for family and friends among the people excitedly running down to the shore. Coasters, fishing boats, and bateaux sailed by, exchanging greetings and huzzahs with the men on the transports. Almost everyone in the Kennebec Valley knew the stories of the ancient Indian trail from Maine to Quebec, and reckoned that these American soldiers were coming up the Kennebec to follow that fabled route to Canada.
The river valley that the flotilla entered had been largely unsettled just 25 years before, and much of its development was due to the efforts of Dr. Silvester Gardiner. Gardiner was a Rhode Islander by birth who went to London and Paris to study medicine when he was a young man. After completing his education, Gardiner returned to America and settled in Boston, where he used his European contacts to branch out into the pharmaceutical trade, importing medicines for distribution and sale. Gardiner also opened a chain of successful apothecary shops in Boston and got involved in land speculation in 1753, becoming the principal investor of the Kennebec Purchase Company. Founded in 1661, this firm owned a huge land grant in Maine that extended for 15 miles on both sides of the Kennebec River. But the company had been unable to attract many settlers to the region due to its remote location and opposition from the local Indians. Gardiner took charge of the business and successfully lobbied for the construction of Fort Western in the middle of the land grant, to provide security against Indian attacks and convince settlers that the valley was a safe place to live.
Having solved the problem of security, he turned his attention to attracting settlers to his property. Gardiner did this by offering free land to new settlers in British and American newspapers. A 1761 newspaper advertisement, for example, promised 200 acres in the Kennebec River Valley “to each family who shall become Settlers on Condition that they each build a house not less than 20 feet square, and seven feet stud; clear and make fit for tillage five acres within three years, and dwell upon the premises personally, or by their substitutes for the term of seven years or more. …” The glowing ad claimed that the Kennebec River and nearby sea abounded with various kinds of fish, and that the land along the Kennebec was fertile, with “plenty of meadows and intervale, that many settlers have carried with them 20 head of cattle which they have been able to keep year round. … It is well stored with great quantities of the best and most valuable timber.”50
Gardiner’s final claim was that settlers living on his land had easy access to the Boston market by ship, “which was 24 hours with favorable wind.” His promotion brought settlers into the region, and Gardiner and his fellow investors made money by charging them for a variety of services, including milling their wheat and selling choice parcels of land at an immense profit. The Kennebec Land Purchase Company also allocated parcels of land to be used for towns, which they sold at premium prices.
The bulk of Arnold’s men came from Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Connecticut, and marveled at the development in this remote region. Where they expected to see forests with a few primitive cabins, they gazed instead upon a luxuriant valley dotted with neat farms. They even viewed some stately homes, frequently situated on well-chosen high ground overlooking the beautiful river. This lowermost section of the Kennebec River Valley was called Georgetown (the area today includes the towns of Bath, West Bath, Georgetown, Phippsburg, Woolwich, and Arrowsic Island). The most populated place in the Georgetown region was expansive Arrowsic Island, whose intricate shoreline included many attractive coves and inlets. Major Meigs from Connecticut commented favorably about the island’s “handsome meeting-house, and very good dwelling houses.”51 For sport, the men aboard the schooner Betsy shot at seals they spotted in the coves along the island’s coastline.52
One of Arnold’s ships anchored at Arrowsic Island to rendezvous with Captain Samuel McCobb, who was waiting there with 20 additional men for the expedition. McCobb, who made his home on the island, was active in local politics. Inspired by the first news of the fighting around Boston, he organized a company of his fellow residents, who marched under his command to Cambridge, where they were assigned to Colonel John Nixon’s Massachusetts regiment. McCobb’s company was among the patriots who boldly occupied Bunker Hill and Breeds Hill on June 16, 1775. In the ensuing Battle of Bunker Hill, 2,500 British troops dispatched from nearby Boston forced the rebels off the hilltops but with terrible casualties; more than 1,000 British attackers were killed or wounded in the effort.
Due in large part to his courage at Bunker Hill, McCobb was invited to join the Arnold Expedition. Many of McCobb’s veterans joined him for the campaign, but he needed additional recruits to complete his company, and he rushed back to Georgetown to enlist more men with the understanding that he would rendezvous with the expedition at Arrowsic Island.53
Though Arnold was glad to have McCobb’s additional men, he was upset with the slow progress of his convoy. The local pilots who came on board at Parker Flats warned him that the water level upriver was low at this time of the year, and there was danger that his heavily laden transports would run aground in the shallow water. It is surprising that Arnold, an experienced New England-based sailor, did not consider this problem beforehand. Fearful of attempting to navigate the tricky river in the dark, Arnold ordered his ships to drop anchor at dusk just upriver from Arrowsic Island, near the present site of the town of Bath, which had several shipyards. Some of the officers, including Captain Dearborn and gentleman volunteer Burr, went ashore for the night to get away from the foul-smelling, overcrowded transports and enjoy the hospitality of the enthusiastic local residents. Dearborn, who had fought at Bunker Hill, must have thrilled his hosts with an account of the battle, while young Burr could describe his college days at Princeton. There were few college graduates in the colonies, especially in an area as remote as the Kennebec River Valley, and the cultured Burr must have been a favorite guest.
At dawn on September 21, Arnold’s convoy resumed its historic passage up the Kennebec. As the day progressed, the ships gradually separated in the tricky currents until they were out of sight of one another. Farms and hamlets could still be seen on both sides of the river, whose rock-strewn shoreline and waters were teeming with geese, gulls, ducks, and many kinds of fish. Despite their slow progress, everyone aboard was in good spirits and eager to buy potatoes and pork from the cash-starved farmers who were hawking food to the troops as they rowed their boats alongside the convoy.
After passing through a narrow stretch of the river dotted with small islands, the transports filed into Merry Meeting Bay, a wondrous phenomenon of nature located 20 miles from the sea.54 In truth, this large, shallow bay is a tidal riverine, but the earliest colonists called it Merry Meeting Bay and the name stuck. Arnold’s men passed tidal marshes along the bay’s shoreline that were a haven for migrating water fowl. Five miles farther upstream from Merry Meeting Bay was Swan Island, a favorite camping ground of the Indians who once inhabited the region. The schooner Betsy sailed through this section of the river on the afternoon of September 21 while the officers aboard feasted on “Salmon and Lobsters in Betsyes cabbin.”55
The Swallow rejoined the others during the day, reporting that she had passed two of the transports (the Houghton carrying 120 troops and the Eagle 84) that had run aground in shallow Merry Meeting Bay.56 Arnold ordered the Swallow to take aboard some extra men and go back to help the two stranded ships off the shoals by attaching ropes and towing them off with row boats. Several of Arnold’s ships anchored near Swan Island on the night of September 21. The officers went ashore that night, and the island’s residents fed and entertained them. Aaron Burr was believed to have been among the men who visited Swan Island, where he first met, as the legend goes, the beautiful Indian princess Jacquetta. After a night together, the young woman agreed to accompany Burr as his concubine.
Continuing upriver, the ships next passed another settlement on the west bank of the Kennebec, named Richmond, where they saw the remains of an old military post (Fort Richmond) built on the site in 1721. This fort was a reminder of how the early colonists of Maine needed to defend themselves against surprise attacks from the French and Indians. However, some of the men aboard the ships were probably too busy shooting at the cranes that inhabited this section of the river to pay much attention to the dilapidated structure. Sailing farther north, the transports passed Pownalborough (now Dresden) on the east side of the river. Captain Dearborn reported seeing “a Court-House and Goal [jail]—and some very good Settlements” at this place.57 Some men went ashore at Pownalborough to a tavern, where they drank egg rum and “Lt. Lyman [from Capt. Hubbard’s company] held a young woman in his Lap.”58
A little farther north brought Arnold’s ships to another settled area called Gardinerston (also called Gardiner’s Town, Gardinerston Plantation, and Gardinerstown, the place named in honor of Dr. Silvester Gardiner), where the ships sailed between “a more level flat country” covered with pine trees and a scattering of spruce and hemlocks.59 There also existed some cleared pastureland in this region, as well as fields of Indian corn, “Dwelling houses,” two saw mills, a liberty pole erected by the local rebels, and Reuben Colburn’s boatyard.60
The plan was to take delivery of the expedition’s 200 bateaux at Colburn’s boatyard while the transports continued nine miles farther upriver to Fort Western, which had been designated by General Washington as the advance base for their ascent into the wilderness. Colburn’s bateaux were critical to the success of the mission to capture Quebec before it was reinforced or winter—which came early to this region—trapped the expedition in the wilderness. The Broad Bay, which had raced upriver, reached the vicinity of Gardinerston on September 21 just as the wind died. Arnold was so anxious to reach Colburn’s that he ordered a longboat to row him the rest of the way.
As Arnold’s longboat raced on, everyone on board her strained their eyes, looking upriver for Colburn’s boatyard and the promised flotilla of bateaux. Suddenly the men in the longboat cheered as they saw hundreds of boats, “all Lying on Shore ready to receive our Detachment.”61 In all likelihood Reuben Colburn was standing alongside his splendid little armada waving triumphantly to an elated Colonel Arnold. So far, all of General Washington’s planning had gone reasonably well. Despite some mishaps and delays, all 11 transports carrying the expeditionary force arrived safely at Gardinerston by Saturday, September 23. Everyone aboard the vessels was healthy and rested, and Colburn’s 200 bateaux were ready to take them the rest of the way to Quebec.
The construction of the Arnold Expedition’s bateaux was a minor miracle and a testament to Yankee ingenuity. Colburn received his contract at Cambridge on September 3 and Arnold arrived at Gardinerston 18 days later to find his 200 boats waiting for him. The actual construction time was something less than 18 days, since it took at least two days for Colburn to travel from Cambridge to Gardinerston after receiving his contract.62
A full description of how these boats were built is in order. The term bateaux describes any boat with a flat bottom and sharply pointed bow and stern. There were many ways to build a small boat, and Colburn probably used the simplest technique, called clinker-built construction. In this type of boat building, the sides of the vessel are created by overlapping planks of wood, as opposed to carvel construction, where the edges of the planks meet to form a smooth surface. The long, wide planks used to form the sides of clinker-built boats are called strakes. Arnold’s bateaux were probably three strakes high. Narrow curved pieces of wood called “ships knees” attached to the bottom of the boat and held the strakes together. This part could be fabricated quickly from curved tree roots and branches. Another shortcut used by Colburn was to build his boats with what are called hard clines. In boat parlance, this means that there is a sharp edge instead of a graceful curve, where the sides and the bottom of the boat are joined.
It was a monumentally difficult task to build 200 clinker-built, hard cline boats in less than three weeks using the tools available at the time. There is no known record of how Colburn built his fleet, but modern-day boat builders believe Colburn created what may have been the first assembly line in America in order to produce 200 boats in less than eighteen days. Colburn probably divided his work force into specialized teams who kept making the same part. One team, for example, cut and nailed planks together for boat bottoms. This was the first step in the building process. The assembly line came into play when a finished bottom passed to another team that nailed three ships knees onto each side. This gave Colburn the skeleton of his bateaux. The upright, unsupported ships knees were held in position with braces, after which it is believed the bottom of the boat was turned upside down and raised onto saw horses. The ships knees then faced downward, making it easy for another team of workers to nail the strakes to them. The ends of the strakes were curved to form the pointed ends of the bateau. This was possible to do quickly because the strakes were supple green lumber. Oakum, a caulking material made from rags, loose hemp, and jute fibers soaked in tar or creosote was used to seal to the seams along the bottom of the boat and between the strakes. Workmen forced the oakum into the seams using primitive caulking guns. With the addition of a few details, such as thole pins (oarlocks), Colburn had a finished bateau. He and his workmen must have worked around the clock to get them finished so quickly.
Arnold walked through Colburn’s wood chip littered boatyard, examining his freshly made flotilla of bateaux. The colonel was familiar with boat construction from his pre-war days as a merchant in New Haven and captain of his own ships. Passing along rows of bateaux, Arnold was able to make an expert inspection of Colburn’s work. He knew immediately that his bateaux were constructed from green timber, which emits a distinctive strong odor because it is still full of sap. The colonel also knew that Colburn’s bateaux would leak as the unseasoned wood planking lost its moisture and shrank, opening the seams between the planking. He recognized that the boats were too small. While the contract did not specify the length of the bateaux, Arnold stated in his letter to Colburn dated August 21, 1775, that he wanted boats that could carry six or seven men. Arnold’s instructions in this regard were clear: “Two hundred light Battoes Capable of Carrying Six or Seven Men each with their Provisions & Baggage (say 100 wt to each man).”63
Colburn knew that this size payload required a bateau that was at least 30 feet long. However, he built boats that were probably no more than 26 feet in length. Colburn was right in building smaller boats than specified in Arnold’s instructions, because he knew something about the rough conditions that the expedition would face on the upper Kennebec River. He built sturdy boats for the campaign, with thick sides and bottoms that were capable of withstanding a lot of knocking around. He also knew that the boats would have to be lifted or dragged around rapids and waterfalls. Even so, each of the 26-foot-long boats weighed almost 400 pounds empty. This was a lot of weight for teams of men to carry around slippery, rock-strewn rapids and waterfalls. Thirty-foot boats would have been even heavier and almost impossible to carry over the portages that lay upstream. Granted, boats built from seasoned wood would have been lighter, but Colburn had to work with the materials he had on hand. His experience told him that a 400-pound boat was the maximum weight load that the men could handle.
The bateaux that Colburn built were crude by any standards. However, both Arnold and Colburn knew that expensive, well-built boats were unnecessary in this situation, since they only would be used for a short time, on a one-way trip to get Arnold’s provisions and equipment as far as the St. Lawrence River. Arnold was not expected to return via the same route, and he would have no further use for this fleet of shallow river bateaux once he reached Canada. Colburn had done his job well; he had built 200 inexpensive and durable boats in less than three weeks.
A careful reading of Arnold’s letters and journals reveals no condemnation of Colburn’s work. Arnold was a wily businessman who understood that Colburn was running a small business on the edge of the wilderness and it was unreasonable to expect him to have had enough seasoned wood on hand to build 200 boats on short notice. Arnold’s familiarity with business also made him wise to the fact that Colburn would never build hundreds of boats without a contract. Still, the boats that Colburn built were too small to accommodate all the cargo that the expedition had to transport to Quebec. Arnold judiciously solved this problem by negotiating with Colburn to build an additional twenty boats at a reduced price to compensate for the shortage of load capacity specified in the contract. It is interesting to see, as our story continues, that Arnold was better at interacting with businessmen than with his fellow army officers. Arnold expected his boats to leak at their seams; thus Colburn’s original agreement also specified that he would accompany the expedition with a company of boat builders to help keep the flotilla afloat.
Colburn kept his word, built the additional bateaux, and accompanied the expedition up the Kennebec with 20 workmen. He never received full payment for his boats or services from Congress, who disputed his invoices. Colburn relentlessly pursued his unpaid bill for years and went so far as to visit General Washington’s home at Mount Vernon, arriving apparently unannounced on December 15, 1799, to ask the retired general (and former president) to help him get his money. But when he knocked on the door, he was told that Washington had died the previous day. Colburn petitioned the United States Senate as late as 1824 for payment on his 1775 boat contract. His appeals were denied because he could not produce any records or receipts to support his claim. Colburn years earlier had foolishly turned over his supporting documentation to the government, which had lost or misplaced his paperwork. Some other records pertaining to his contract were destroyed when the British burned Washington D.C. during the War of 1812.64
Part of Colburn’s claim against the government, reaching back to 1775, was that Washington and Arnold instructed him to send a scouting party along the Quebec expedition’s intended route and submit a written report upon their return describing everything they had seen. Arnold wrote to Colburn on August 21 asking him to organize the reconnaissance:
you will Also get particular Information, from those People who have been at Quebec, of the Difuculty attending an Expedition that way, in particular the Number, & length, of the Carrying Places, wheather [whether] Over, Dry land, Hills, or Swamp… all which you will Commit to writing & Dispatch an express to his Excellency as soon as possible, who will Pay the Charge & expense you may be at in the Matter.65
Colburn promptly complied with Arnold’s request by employing two experienced river men named Dennis Getchell and Samuel Berry to reconnoiter the intended route. Getchell and Berry lived along the Kennebec in a settlement called Vassalborough, located a short distance upriver from Fort Western. With their contract from Colburn in hand, Getchell and Berry headed for the wilderness in a canoe on September 1. They hired an Indian guide to accompany them as well as three other white men, one of whom was Dennis Getchell’s brother Nehemiah. The intrepid rivermen returned in two weeks, feeling lucky to be alive. As agreed, they submitted a written report to Colburn of their reconnaissance, dated September 13, which they gave to him along with their bill.
In their report, Getchell and Berry said they traveled up the Kennebec, crossed the Great Carry, and, by their own reckoning, paddled an additional 30 miles up the Dead River. While traveling through this lonely, desolate country distinguished by marshes and mountains and infrequently visited by small Indian hunting parties, they met a Norridgewock Indian named Natanis living alone in a cabin. The Indian claimed that he was being paid by Governor Charlton to watch for spies or a rebel army trying to enter Quebec via the Kennebec-Chaudiere route. Getchell and Berry reported this story along with other information given to them by Natanis, who said that British lookouts were stationed at the headwaters of the Chaudiere River and a detachment of Redcoats were quartered just over the Canadian border.
After hearing these stories, the Indian guide leading Getchell and Berry refused to go on, and they took the chance of paying Natanis to take them farther upriver. With Natanis in tow, the little scouting party continued their hurried inspection until they ran into some shallow water and decided to turn back. Their decision not to continue, as specified in their instructions from Colburn, to the headwaters of the Chaudiere (Lake Magentic) was also based on information from an Indian woman they met en route who told them that “at Shettican [Sartigan] the uppermost Settlement on the Chaudiere there was a great Number of Mohawks that would have killed us.”66 Colburn handed their alarming report to an apparently skeptical Arnold who, as we shall see, sent his own scouting party upriver under the command of a reliable officer, with orders to kill Natanis and see if there were actually any hostile Indians or British troops along his intended route.
Colburn also gave Arnold a map of the expedition’s route drawn by Samuel Goodwin (1716-1802), an early settler to the region who originally worked as a surveyor. He subsequently became the owner of an inn and general store in Pownalborough. Goodwin had traveled extensively in Maine as a surveyor and claimed he had journeyed to Quebec following the legendary Kennebec-Chaudiere route. Colburn approached Goodwin prior to Arnold’s arrival, asking him to make a map of the route. Goodwin complied, as evidenced by a letter he sent to General Washington in which he described his services to Colonel Arnold and encouraged the Continental Army to build a military road between Fort Western and Quebec. The following excerpts from Goodwin’s letter confirm the existence of his map and describe its contents:
Pownalborough, District of Maine, Octor 17th 1775
According to your Excellencys Verbal orders to Collo. Benenedeck Arnold I supplyd him with A Plan of the Sea Coast from Cape Elizabeth to Penobscut and the River Kennebeck to Ammeguntick Pond [Lake Magentic], and Shaddair River [Chaudiere River]… which Shaddair, Emptys into the River St Lawrance about four miles above Quebeck[,] and the Passes and Carrying Placeses [places] to Quebeck, and also made Several Small Plans for Each Department [Arnold’s principal officers] for their Guid, [guidance or perhaps copies for guides or scouts], and also Gave him [Arnold] a Copy of A Journal which Represeted all the Quick watter & Carrying Places to & from Quebeck. …
Mr Ruben Coalborn informed me you wanted a Plan I begain it about three weeks before Collo. Arnold Arived or I Could not have Gott it Redy for him. Please to Excuse the Smallness of the paper for there is a famin [famine; shortage] of it here.
I am Sir with all Due Respects your most Obedeant Devoted and very humbl. Servtt
Samuel Goodwin67
There are no references to Goodwin’s map in any of the extant diaries, letters, and reports from the expedition. Everyone on the march seemed to be using copies of Montresor’s map and journal, which was probably more accurate and detailed than whatever information Goodwin supplied.
General Washington selected Fort Western as the staging place for the expedition because it was the farthest point upstream an oceangoing ship could travel (the height of deep water navigation) on the Kennebec River. The old fort sat on a strategic bluff overlooking the Kennebec about 10 miles upriver from Colburn’s shipyard and a total of 45 miles from the sea. Upon arriving at the fort, Arnold made his headquarters at the nearby home of Esq. Howard and his family, whom Dr. Senter described as being “an exceeding hospitable, opulent, polite, family.”68
Fort Western had been an important frontier post during the early years of the French and Indian War when it was feared that the French might attempt to invade New England via the Chaudiere-Kennebec route. This threat ended when the British army captured Quebec City in 1759, making Fort Western unnecessary. What Arnold’s troops found there on September 23, 1775, was a run-down trading post located in the wreck of an abandoned military post at the edge of civilization. The old fort’s wooden barracks, blockhouses, palisades, and storehouses had fallen into disrepair and were rotting.
The expedition’s stay at this depressing place was busy and frustrating because of the low water level in the river. Either Washington and Arnold had been misled, or they had overlooked making inquiries about the water level of the Kennebec, which was especially low at this time of the year. The problem was that melting snow, which fed the regions waterways, had ended until the following spring. Only after his arrival did Arnold realize that the river was too shallow to allow his heavily laden ships to sail beyond Gardinerston. He tried off-loading some of the ship’s cargo into his new fleet of bateaux and other boats hired from the locals so as to get his transports to float higher in the water. But the effort failed: the river was still too shallow for the larger ships to reach Fort Western even after some of their cargo had been transferred. As a result, Arnold and his men lost precious days of good weather as they transported tons of provisions and supplies from Gardinerston to Fort Western in small boats.
Just how much freight was the expedition carrying? Dr. Senter left an accurate record of the cargo that Arnold had accumulated at Fort Western, which he estimated to be a total of 100 tons. Senter included the weight of the bateaux, food, weapons, ammunition, equipment, and supplies. He started by figuring the heaviest category first, which were the bateaux. He calculated that they weighed 400 hundred pounds each, for a total of 40 tons. He estimated that the basic food for 43 days for each man weighted 35 tons. This did not take into account other commissary stores, which included sugar, salt, yeast, and butter. Senter next calculated the expedition’s ammunition and weapons. He knew that 100 rounds of ammunition were brought for each man. He estimated their combined weight at four tons, plus another five-and-a- half tons to account for the weight of the rifles and muskets. Then there were tents, blankets, and all kinds of camp equipment, which added another 10 tons to the load. He figured that the hundreds of shovels and axes being taken added another ton to the baggage.
Senter next added all the personal baggage of the officers and common soldiers (extra shoes and clothing plus personal belongings), which he estimated at 10 pounds per man, equaling a total of six tons. In addition there were medical supplies, nails, black smith tools (to repair weapons), and other miscellaneous items. When Senter added it all up he came to a grand total of 100 tons, all of which had to be carried around waterfalls and rapids on the river and portaged overland from one river to another. Since time was against them, Arnold’s corps needed to carry all their baggage with them. There was no time to move provisions forward and establish advance supply bases. Speed was essential, and all the expedition’s men, food, and equipment had to move along together.
When Arnold’s provisions and equipment finally were assembled, the scene at Fort Western must have been impressive. We can picture Dr. Senter walking along the bluff alongside Fort Western among the rows of stockpiled food and equipment. All of the expedition’s food was packed into large wooden casks (the preferred cargo container of the time) because they could be sealed tight and moved easily by rolling them along the ground. The armies subsisted on three food items: beef, flour, and biscuits. The beef was cut up into four-lb. sections that were heavily salted and packed in tightly sealed casks filled with brine. Each cask of beef weighed 220 pounds. The flour destined for the expedition was also packed in casks. It could be used to bake bread, but an army on the move did not stop long enough to build ovens and bake bread, so they used the flour to thicken stews and chowders. While there is some speculation that the expedition carried portable iron bake ovens with them, this is not logical, because the weight of the ovens, even if they were available, were too heavy for the bateaux and inconsistent with how armies in the field had used flour for centuries prior to the American Revolution.
The third basic food item carried by Arnold was bread, and the expedition’s journalists use the word constantly—which adds to the belief that the men were baking bread en route. However, what these men called bread was actually biscuits. The word is derived from the Latin words bis (twice) and coctus (cooked).69 Flour prepared in this manner was known by many names, including ship’s bread, sea biscuit, hard bread, biscuit marin, and hardtack. The biscuit baked during the Revolutionary War was a dense, tough product whose greatest attribute was its long-lasting nature. Biscuits were baked prior to a military campaign and packed in casks. The biscuits supplied to Arnold were probably thin and oval shaped.
While the expedition moved through developed areas, the men supplemented their diet with food purchased from local farmers and merchants. When the civilians living in the vicinity of Fort Western heard the jingle of money, they rushed to sell the 1,000-plus soldiers fresh meat, smoked fish, vegetables, liquor, cider, bread, pies, cakes, and dairy products. However, this situation changed once the expedition got beyond the frontier and had to subsist mainly on the beef, flour, and biscuits they carried with them.
Once Arnold reached Fort Western, he began to apply his considerable energy and talent to the exact route that his corps would take to Quebec. Arnold’s knowledge of his route consisted of a copy of Montresor’s map and journal, the fresh report from scouts Getchell and Berry, Goodwin’s map and journal, plus some scraps of information given to him by the local settlers. This accumulated knowledge gave Arnold some idea of the course and the obstacles blocking their path. He knew the route was difficult, and called for maneuvering the boats through rapids and portaging past several waterfalls. He also was aware that, far upriver, the Kennebec narrowed into a shallow, fast-moving highland stream. In this region the corps would leave the river and follow an overland shortcut across three ponds (the Great Carry) that would take them to the Dead River. Montresor’s journal entry for July 13, 1761, explained the reason for striking overland to the Dead River:
We came this day to where we were to begin our portage across the country westerly to the western branch of Kennebec river, called the Dead River, which western branch [swings to the north just before joining the Kennebec] … the eastern branch of the Kennebec, has a great many windings, is full of islands, shallow and rapid. To avoid these inconveniences it is usual to carry the canoes through the woods till you meet the river [the western branch of the Kennebec called the Dead River], where it is of great depth and its current hardly perceivable. This portage is divided by three different lakes, each of which is to be passed before you can arrive at the Dead River.
Montresor commented that the local Indians, called the Abenaquis, had left no trail markers, and disturbed the land as little as possible to hide the way. “No nation, having been more jealous of their country than the Abenaquis,” Montresor wrote in his journal, “they have made it a constant rule to leave the fewest vestiges of their route.”70
Arnold knew that the Dead River led to a series of lakes, called the Chain of Ponds, located in a mountainous region of western Maine that would take the expedition to a ridge of mountains called the Height of Land, which separated New England from Canada. The expedition would emerge from this barren mountain region onto a beautiful meadow from which Lake Megantic could be seen, the source of the Chaudiere River. Arriving on the south shore of the lake, they would launch their bateaux, follow it down the Chaudiere to the French-Canadian settlements, where they expected to get a warm reception. The expedition would then push on to the southern shore of the St. Lawrence River. Arnold’s plan was to cross the St. Lawrence in their bateaux at night, and rush into Quebec City and overpower its small, disheartened complement of British troops with the help of American sympathizers. He believed that the route would be fast and easy once he got to the Great Carry.
Arnold was out of contact with General Schuyler’s Northern army by the time he reached Fort Western. The last reliable news he had about them was based on a letter from Schuyler written from Fort Ticonderoga on August 31.71 Schuyler’s communiqué reached headquarters on or about September 8, as Arnold was in the final stages of preparing to leave for Canada.72 According to Schuyler’s report, his 2,000-man army was moving north toward the Canadian border, where spies had informed him that Governor Carlton had concentrated his best troops at St. Johns. The garrison at St. Johns was reported to consist of about 475 British regulars from the 7th and 26th Regiments plus 38 gunners from the Royal Artillery and some Canadian volunteers. Arnold knew the place because he had raided it in May, after capturing Fort Ticonderoga. He recalled that it sat on the west bank of the Richelieu River, approximately 26 miles southeast of Montreal.
Fort St. Johns was the gateway to Canada from Lake Champlain and the key to taking Montreal, which was a poorly protected commercial city of 8,000 whose prosperity depended predominantly on the fur trade with the western Indians. There was another fort between St. Johns and Montreal called Chambly. However, Schuyler had reports from spies, sympathizers, and informants that the British used it as a military depot. They described Fort Chambly as more of a hotel than a fortress, because it housed many women and children belonging to the British troops defending St. Johns.73
Schuyler could have circled around St. Johns and headed directly for Montreal, but that would only encourage the troops at St. Johns to attack his army from the rear. Furthermore, to ensure that Schuyler would not go around his stronghold, Carleton had an armed schooner named the Royal Savage strategically stationed in the Richelieu River near the fort. It was the largest warship in the region, and if Schuyler dared to bypass St. Johns, the Royal Savage could sail onto Lake Champlain and sever his supply line from Fort Ticonderoga. Schuyler was aware of the situation and determined to capture St. Johns before moving on to Montreal. His August 31 communiqué sounded positive, containing the first news of his army’s movement north into Canada with a force believed to be almost three times the size of the garrison at St. Johns. “Gen. Montgomery leaves Crown Point to day with twelve hundred Men, and four twelve pounders [a reference to artillery], I follow him this Evening. … I Shall then be near two thousand Strong,” Schuyler wrote.74
Schuyler’s intelligence gathering included an interview with Captain Richard Jenkins (perhaps a ship’s captain), who had been in Quebec in July. In a report dated September 10, Jenkins described the situation there. The interview and report are a further indication of the intensive intelligence gathering activities carried out by both sides during the Revolution. Jenkins’ report confirmed that Quebec’s garrison had been stripped to reinforce St. Johns, leaving the city virtually unprotected.
Here are the highlights from Jenkins’ intelligence report, a copy of which likely made its way to Washington’s headquarters, adding to the commander-in-chief’s conviction that the Arnold Expedition was a smart move:
Information of Capt. Jenkins, Rec’d September 10, 1775
Capt Richard Jenkins, arrived at Quebec sometime in July … left it the 21st—found six or seven Transports there, from Boston loading with Provisions & Wood for General Gage—That the Brig. Gaspee the only Armed vessel there. … That there are not more than twenty five Soldiers in Garrison, & Chief of the Artillery gone to St. Johns, where the Soldiers have hard Duty in preparing floating Batteries, intending to retake Ticonderoga [an exaggeration]. By the best Information the Canadians are much in favor of the Colonies. Quebec easily taken. Governor Carleton, has between 5 & 600 hundred Soldiers. Indian Sachems declare their hatchets are buried and will not take them up. … The addresses and petitions of the Congress & others has got among the Canadians & that the Governor was much enraged at it.75
Arnold launched his invasion of Canada on Sunday, September 24, believing that Schuyler’s army quickly would reduce St. Johns and continue north toward Montreal. However, unknown to Arnold at the time, Schuyler’s novice Northern army had tried twice in mid-September to capture St. Johns but was repulsed each time by the tough British garrison defending the place. The failure to seize St. Johns by a direct assault forced Schuyler to undertake a time-consuming and costly siege to capture it, which made a quick link-up between Schuyler’s and Arnold’s forces out of the question. Arnold did not know it when he left Fort Western, but his expedition headed toward Canada with no possibility of help from Schuyler’s paralyzed Northern army.
The Arnold Expedition was officially launched when the colonel ordered Morgan’s riflemen to advance up the Kennebec River from Fort Western. Rifleman George Morison wrote in his journal on the eve of his departure with Morgan that he knew he faced a difficult journey: “111 miles through frightful wilds, craggy and almost impassable hills and mountains, obstructed with falling tress, thickets and quagmires.”76
Morison’s appraisal was way off on all counts. The journey was far more difficult than anything he imagined, and the actual distance between Fort Western and Quebec, using the route that Arnold planned to follow, was more than twice as long, at 270 miles.77 What followed is one of the greatest adventure stories in American history.