Chapter 4

All About Them Stood the Forest Primeval, Dark, Silent and Mysterious¹

Beyond Fort Western, Benedict Arnold was on his own and responsible for the lives of more than 1,000 men and women. Washington’s planning and orders had taken the expedition this far, and its continued success rested with Arnold until he reported to General Schuyler. Arnold’s corps was transporting 100 tons of freight through a virtually trackless wilderness deep into enemy-held territory. By necessity, they had no artillery with them to breach the walls of Quebec, which meant that the success of the mission depended largely on surprise and help from sympathizers within the city’s walls.²

Arnold was particularly counting on the collaboration of John Mercier, his prewar business friend and pro-rebel supporter who resided in Quebec. He believed that the city’s reported weak garrison would lose heart as Mercier and his partisans opened the gates of the city for the American patriots. The success of the operation depended on timing and luck, but the prize was worth the effort, as Washington mentioned in a confidential letter to his brother, John Augustine Washington, written from Cambridge on September 10: “[I]f the Detachment I am sending (though late in the Season) from hence should be able to get possession of Quebec the Ministry’s Plan, in respect to that Government will turn out finely.”³

Where did Washington get the idea that a small army—with no artillery or naval support—could capture a fortified city surrounded on three sides by deep water? The answer is that behind Washington’s temperate, conservative demeanor was a daring and vigorous warrior who thought in terms of audacious action.

As commander-in-chief of the Continental Army, Washington was willing to take risks, especially if they would help bring the war to a speedy and successful conclusion. He expressed this idea in a letter to Governor Nicholas Cooke of Rhode Island early in the war: “[W]e are in a Situation which requires us to run all Risques—No Danger is to be considered when put in Competition with the Magnitude of the Cause.”⁴

When he sent Arnold forth with a lightly armed army in the wilderness, Washington believed that he was taking a calculated risk based on his perception of the military and political situation in Canada at the time. His best intelligence was that Quebec was poorly defended and that its civilian population was friendly to the American cause.

Washington also was counting on Colonel Arnold, whom he had hand-picked to lead the hazardous mission, to handle any unforeseen situations and boldly lead his army to Quebec. Washington would later describe Arnold as “a judicious—brave Officer—of great activity—enterprize & perseverance.”

The Arnold Expedition was not a conventional campaign because of its secretive nature and its emphasis on speed and surprise. The term guerilla warfare did not exist at the time of the American Revolution; the contemporary term for hit-and-run tactics was partisan warfare or petite guerre (small war). However, the Arnold Expedition was not envisioned as a raid against Quebec City. Arnold’s mission was to seize and hold the place until he could rendezvous with Schuyler’s army. The Arnold Expedition is best defined as the equivalent of a modern deep attack.⁵ Its aim was to support the Northern army’s main Canadian offensive by capturing and holding Quebec, the key position along the St. Lawrence River that was Canada’s essential line of communication and supply.

The fact that the campaign came early in the war is important, because it shows that Washington was trying new ideas and learning as he went along. He picked up some important lessons from the Arnold Expedition; the most significant probably being that a relatively large operation sent deep into enemy territory was risky and expensive.

Another explanation for Washington’s organizing such a bold exploit early in the war was his fascination with military science. He was an avid reader of military textbooks (the presentation of the principles of a subject) and treatises (a detailed discourse on a specific subject) and was anxious to employ what he had learned. Washington was not alone in his interest in reading military textbooks and treatises. With few experienced European-trained officers available to instruct them, Americans tended to educate themselves on military subjects by reading, especially in the years just prior to the American Revolution. The most popular military book in America at the beginning of the Revolutionary War was Humphrey Bland’s Treatise of Military Discipline; In Which is Laid down and Explained The Duty of the Officer and Soldier. . . . First published in England in 1727, Bland’s was the basic primer for new officers and included information on how to drill troops and fire muskets in platoon formations.⁶ Washington included Bland’s Treatise of Military Discipline in a recommended reading list that he included in a letter of advice to a newly appointed Continental Army officer written at the time of the Arnold Expedition. The other books on Washington’s 1775 “must read list” are more interesting to our story, because they help us understand his decision to launch his daring and novel assault on Canada. The books are: (1) An Essay on the Art of War; (2) Military Instructions for Officers Detached in The Field; (3) The Partisan: or, The Art of Making War in Detachment (originally published in France in 1759, the first English language edition appeared the following year); and (4) Manoeuvres, or Practical Observations on the Art of War.⁷

These four books were advanced texts on warfare with “how to” ideas about seizing enemy fortifications and enlisting the aid of non-combatants. For example, there is a chapter about seizing enemy posts in Military Instructions for Officers Detached in the Field that could have been Washington’s inspiration for his attack on Quebec:

A surprize in war is an unexpected attack by suddenly assaulting the enemy when he least expects it. . . . We may refer all sorts of surprizes to two kinds; the one is, by means of ambuscades to attack the enemy on his march. . . ; the other, by making sudden irruptions into the posts of the enemy and seizing them by open force. . . .

The text explains how to capture an enemy post and includes the following advice:

All the environs that have any relation to the place the enemy occupies must be known; on what side lie the avenues, morasses, rivers, bridges, heights, woods, and all covered places that are in the neighbourhood without which it is scarce possible to regulate approaches prudently.⁸

Military Instructions for Officers Detached in the Field also includes practical information about attacking an enemy position including using bad weather to your advantage:

[I]f the storm forms, and the wind increases, direct your approaches in such a manner, that you may always have the wind on your back, because if you have it in your face, the enemy’s centries [sentries] can look forward and discover you; . . . You need be in no uneasiness about the enemy’s centries seeing you, or hearing the noise of your march, because the severity of the weather obliges them to enter their boxes [sentry boxes], and turn their backs to the wind . . .⁹

Arnold likely shared Washington’s interest in reading military textbooks and treatises. He only had a few months of experience as an officer prior to his appointment by Washington to lead the corps assigned to capture Quebec. The majority of Arnold’s military contacts at the time were with New England merchants and farmers who, like himself, became full time soldiers for the first time when the Revolutionary War started. It seems logical that Arnold acquired some of his military education from the same books that Washington had read. Perhaps with one or two of his military textbooks in his personal baggage, Arnold was ready to strike out from Fort Western for Quebec.

Arnold agonized over the recent report from Colburn’s scouts that enemy lookouts, hostile Indians, and British Redcoats were stationed along his intended route. He selected Lieutenant Archibald Steele of Smith’s Pennsylvania rifle company, one of his best young officers, to command a scouting party whose mission was to follow the expedition’s planned route as far as Lake Magentic and return to meet the advancing army with their findings. This was a dangerous assignment, but Steele was suited for the job from his prewar life on the Pennsylvania frontier, where he had learned wilderness skills that included how to move stealthily through hostile Indian country. Steele left Fort Western on Sunday morning, September 24, with 12 men in two birch bark canoes. His orders included capturing or killing the Indian Natanis who told scouts Getchell and Berry that he was a lookout for the British.

That afternoon, Arnold dispatched a second party from Fort Western commanded by an officer identified as Lieutenant Church. This party consisted of a guide, a surveyor, and seven soldiers. Their mission was to measure and map the army’s route as far as the Dead River.¹⁰ The chapter titled “Reconnoitring” (Reconnoitering) in Instructions for Officers Detached in the Field stressed the importance of sending a surveyor in advance of the main army:

Parties ordered to reconnoiter, are to observe the country or [sic] the enemy; to remark the routes, conveniences and inconveniences of the first & the position, march, or forces of the second. In either case, they should have an expert geographer [surveyor] capable of taking plans readily. . . . All parties that go for reconnoitering only, ought to be but few in number. . . . It is incontestable, that a numerous party cannot guide along so imperceptibly as a small handful of men.¹¹

Historians frequently have ignored the important role that surveyors played in the American Revolution. No army at the time would move without a surveyor, and General Washington, who was one in his youth, was aware of their value. The surveyor in Lieutenant Church’s party is of special interest, because he kept one of the most accurate and detailed journals of the expedition. His name was John Pierce, and he was a native of Worcester, Massachusetts. He earned his living as a surveyor before the war and was a corporal in the Worcester militia company commanded by Timothy Bigelow, a neighbor and friend. Pierce marched off to Cambridge with his militia company at the start of the war, agreeing to stay on active duty for five days. He reenlisted for an additional six months, during which time he volunteered to join the Arnold Expedition. Pierce was 30 years old at the time he became the expedition’s surveyor and engineer, a dual title he received because the word “surveyor” described his occupation, while “engineer” stated his function in the army. The title of engineer did not come with any particular military rank, but indicated that the title-holder was responsible for laying out fortifications, selecting routes, and mapping terrain. The British army had excellent engineers, many of whom were graduates of the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich, England. The Americans, however, had no formally schooled men but appointed experienced surveyors like Rufus Putnam and John Pierce to the position.¹²

These men learned their trade by working as apprentices and reading textbooks, such as Samuel Wyld’s The Practical Surveyor (London, 1725, with numerous subsequent editions) or John Love’s Geodaesia: Or The Art of Surveying and Measuring Land Made Easy (first published in London in 1688). Eventually, skilled engineers from France arrived to assist and train the Americans. These foreign engineers played an important role in designing the field fortifications that helped win the decisive actions of the war, including the surrender of Burgoyne at Saratoga in 1777 and Cornwallis’ defeat at Yorktown in 1781.

The diarists on the Arnold Expedition seldom mentioned Pierce because his surveying activities were a common occurrence in colonial America. However, Pierce was important to the success of the Arnold Expedition and interesting to modern historians. The British and American armies were always accompanied by surveyors, whose responsibilities included determining the routes for the army to follow, where rivers and streams should be forded or bridged, and where the army should camp. Pierce went ahead of the Arnold Expedition, laying out the exact route for it to follow and posting direction signs. Typical of Pierce’s signs was one that read, “Gentlemen these are to inform you that I have Discovered a much Better Landing Place about 20 Perches up the river on the Left which you may find by advancing.”¹³ More about perches in a moment.

Pierce probably possessed the standard surveying instruments of the day—a surveyor’s compass, a pole, and an iron chain. His compass determined direction by reading a pointer on the dial of the instrument that showed orientation from magnetic north. His compass was a large instrument mounted on a sturdy tripod and equipped with a hairline sight that allowed him to take precise readings by aiming at a specific distant object or landmark. An assistant would stand at a distance with a pole that had a painted ball on top for Pierce to sight on if there was no object at which to aim, such as in a featureless open field or a forest. Pierce used his sixty-foot long surveyor’s chain made up of one hundred precisely made iron links. It was divided into various measurements, including a perch (also called a rod), which was sixteen and one-half feet long. The surveyor’s standard sixty-six foot chain can be equally divided into four perches. Pierce’s assistant would physically run out the chain on the ground and push a metal pin, called an arrow, in the ground at the far end of the chain, after which the chain could be run out as many times as necessary to measure a specific distance. One chain equals four perches, and eighty chains equals one mile.

It is evident that Pierce was measuring some distances with his surveyor’s chain from a sign that he posted at the expedition’s first portage. It included the direction that the army was to follow on their hand-held compasses, which Pierce stated as 23 degrees west from magnetic north. The sign read:

1st Carring [carrying] Place, W. 23 degrees N. 9 perches on the Left hand the river. Please to let this Paper Stand that all may Know the Course and Distance and you’ll oblige Gentlemen. Yours to Serve Jno. Pierce Surveyor.¹⁴

Pierce could also take several sightings from the same position with his compass and use geometry to determine distance in rough terrain over which it was not possible to run out a chain. However, there is no indication that Pierce carried out extensive surveys or drew any maps during the expedition, because the army was moving quickly and had no plans to return over the same route. His principal function was to use his experience and common sense to find the best route for the army to follow.

After taking the prudent steps of dispatching reliable scouts and a surveying party, Arnold turned his full attention to the organization of his expedition. At Fort Western, Arnold divided his army into four divisions instead of the two infantry battalions and one rifle detachment under which his corps had thus far been operating. He opted for four divisions to have smaller units whose departures from Fort Western could be staggered to prevent bottlenecks at the portages and campsites en route. Arnold designated his three rifle companies as his first division, which he put under the field command of Captain Daniel Morgan, who would spearhead the expedition’s march to Quebec. He put the riflemen out in front because they were his strongest and most able-bodied men. Arnold also wanted his riflemen in front because, like other American officers at the time, he viewed them as his light infantry—the best troops he had—and he wanted them to be the first to face any attack by the enemy. Their skills as woodsmen and frontier warriors made them best suited to blaze a trail, clear campsites for the infantrymen, and detect and repel any potential Indian ambush. By comparison, many of Arnold’s musket men were from long-settled towns along the coast, where they worked as farmers, tradesmen, and laborers before the war. These men had less pre-war experience in the use of weapons than the riflemen, as much of the larger wild game had been hunted in the settled areas of the colonies and the hostile Indians killed or forced to move farther west or to Canada.

Colonel Arnold initially assigned Lieutenant Colonel Greene and two musket companies to the first division. But Morgan was unhappy with this arrangement, as Greene outranked the rifle company’s officers. Morgan confronted Arnold, complaining that the New England musket companies would only slow down his riflemen. He also insisted that Washington had assured him that the rifle companies on the expedition would only be subject to Arnold’s orders. The story was a bluff; Washington had never made any such promises to Morgan, but Arnold could not risk any further delays and removed Greene and his two musket companies from the first division.¹⁵

Greene was given command of three musket companies designated as the second division. Arnold put Major Meigs in command of the third division, which consisted of four musket companies. Meigs’ company commanders included Henry Dearborn, who kept one of the most important diaries of the expedition, and 19-year-old Samuel Ward Jr., a recent graduate of the College of Rhode Island (today’s Brown University). His father, Samuel Ward, one of the founders of the college and former governor of Rhode Island, currently represented his colony in the Continental Congress. Arnold gave the fourth division to Lieutenant Colonel Enos. It consisted of three musket companies plus Captain Colburn’s company of 20 boat repairmen. Arnold placed a special trust in Enos because his fourth division would be bringing up the rear, as well as carrying a disproportionally high percentage of the expedition’s food and equipment. The thinking in giving Enos’ division extra provisions and equipment to carry was that they would have the benefit of following a cleared trail, with campsites and shelters left behind for their use by the three divisions that proceeded them.

The expedition’s gentlemen volunteers were distributed throughout the divisions as officer assistants. Burr was assigned to Greene’s second division. The future vice president of the United States wrote his sister a letter from rustic Fort Western on September 24. “We are necessarily detained here a Day or two,” he explained, but assured her that his next letter would be written from Quebec. He also told her that he was enjoying the hospitality of the neighborhood people, “falling on roast Chickens and wallowing if I please in a good feather Bed. . . . But adieu to these soft scenes—tomorrow I traverse the Woods.” Young Burr closed his letter with a pledge to write again from Quebec in “three Weeks or less.”¹⁶

Nine Indians accompanied the Arnold Expedition. Four of them were the St. Francis braves who came from Quebec with Chief Swashan earlier in the year. After arriving in Cambridge with Colburn, Chief Swashan met with the local military and civilian authorities and answered their questions, especially those regarding efforts being made by the British to recruit Indians to fight the rebels. Following their meetings it was agreed that “the said Chief, with his Interpreter . . . would proceed to Fort Ticonderoga” to assist Gen. Schuyler, “while the four braves who came down with him should remain in Cambridge, under the direction of his Excellency General Washington.”¹⁷ These four Indians eventually joined the Arnold Expedition, traveling to Fort Western on their own.¹⁸

The other five Indians on the campaign were members of the Penobscot tribe who had chosen to remain in a remote section of Maine rather than flee to Canada. Once the principal tribe of the Abenakis confederation, the Penobscots had been numerous and powerful at the start of the seventeenth century, inhabiting some of the best locations along the coast and hunting in the interior of Maine.¹⁹ But the English settlers had taken most of their land, and disease and warfare had sharply reduced their numbers, so that by the time of the American Revolution there were but a few hundred people living along the banks of the Penobscot River near the present-day city of Bangor. Especially devastating to the Penobscots was their alliance with the French against the British during the colonial wars that preceded the American Revolution. A proclamation by Massachusetts’ royal governor at the start of the French and Indian War helps explain the tribe’s demise:

[W]ith the Advice of his Majesty’s Council thought fit to issue this Proclamation and to declare the Penobscot Tribe of Indians to be Enemies, Rebells and Traitors to his Majesty King George the Second. And I do hereby require his Majesty’s Subjects of this Province to Embrace all opportunities of pursuing, captivating, killing and Destroying all and every of the aforesaid Indians.²⁰

The Penobscots did not formally side with the rebels in the Revolutionary War, but allowed their young men to join the American military, without committing the tribe as a whole. The five Penobscots known to have been recruited for the Arnold Expedition are identified as Soncier, Eneas, Sebatis, Metagone, and Sewanockett.²¹

There are only a few brief references to the Indians on the expedition by the various diarists, and the majority of them likely crewed the large canoe carrying Arnold and Oswald. Arnold needed mobility to move quickly between the advancing divisions, and he opted to travel in a canoe manned by Indians who knew how to handle it. Since the Indians almost certainly were inexperienced in handling batteaux, Arnold hired veteran Kennebec rivermen, including Samuel Berry, the four Getchell brothers, and a French-speaking Huguenot named Jaquin, who were dispersed throughout the corps to teach the soldiers how to handle the clumsy boats and navigate the river. The expedition did not need the Indians as guides or scouts; they had Montresor’s map and diary and experienced frontier riflemen to move ahead of the army. Arnold also wanted to keep his Indians with him to use as couriers and for special assignments.

The majority of each division marched on land and followed the Kennebec, while the bateaux carried the bulk of the expedition’s provisions, gunpowder, musket balls, tents, and other heavy equipment. Arnold could move rapidly between the various divisions in his canoe to supervise the operation and give orders. Couriers deployed to maintain communications among the four divisions. Thus, Arnold was not alarmed that Enos’ fourth division was still at Colburn’s boatyard with a party of men off-loading the last cargoes from the ships on the same day that Morgan’s first division started upriver from Fort Western. Enos had time, because his division was not due to depart Fort Western until three days later.

Arnold allowed his four divisions to spread out and advance at their own pace to the Canadian border. Once they entered Canada, they faced a greater possibility of being attacked and would have to advance in a close formation, prepared to defend themselves. The rendezvous point for the expedition was Lake Magentic, the large body of water that lay just over the border (according to Montresor’s map). “I design Chaudiere Pond [Lake Megantic],” Arnold wrote Washington, “as a general Rendevouze, and from thence to march in a Body.”²² All four division commanders received copies of Montresor’s map, which showed the location of the lake.

The expedition was launched from Fort Western with the help of local people, who descended on the post with their wagons and teams of animals. They offered to transport some of Arnold’s freight along the first leg of the route, which was an old military road that ran between Fort Western and another abandoned military post upstream called Fort Halifax. The local population’s enthusiasm was not wholly patriotic, as they expected to be paid for their work. Money was scare in the region, and the arrival of Arnold’s army to this edge of civilization was an economic boon.

Arnold quickly put his plan for advancing on Quebec into action, as evidenced by a report he penned to Washington dated September 25. The colonel’s communiqué included news of his safe arrival in Maine and the scouting party he had dispatched under Lieutenant Steele. Arnold also informed the commander-in-chief that he had sent Lieutenant Church and “seven Men with a Surveyor & Pilot [expert river man], to take the exact Courses & Distance to Dead River so called, a Branch of the Kennebec.”²³

Each division left Fort Western on schedule. The three rifle companies, comprising the first division, started out on Monday, September 25, with a 45-day supply of food. Captain Dearborn recorded the riflemen’s departure in his journal: “Captains Morgan, Smith and Hendricks, with their Companies of Rifle Men embarked on Board their Batteaus, with orders to proceed up the River as far as the great Carrying place. . . .”²⁴ With the riflemen leading the way, the balance of the army, unevenly but eagerly, followed in the coming days. Meigs’ diary confirms the departure of the second division a day behind the riflemen: “[September] 26th. [Lieutenant] Colonel Green embarked on board battoes, three companies of musketmen,...on their tour to Canada.”²⁵ The third division left the following day under the command of Major Meigs, who wrote in his diary on the date of his departure, “I embarked on board my battoe with the third division of the army, consisting of 4 companies of musketmen, with 45 days’ provision, and proceeded up the river, hoping for the protection of a kind Providence.”²⁶ The fourth division, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Enos, consisted of three musket companies and Colburn’s boat repairmen. Their job included picking up stragglers from the divisions ahead of them and providing a rear guard.

Arnold remained at Fort Western to supervise the departure of his entire corps. He was there on the morning of September 29 to watch two of Enos’ musket companies depart. Arnold then wrote out orders for Enos, who was bringing up the rear with the third company in his division: “Leave two or three men with the Commissary [Joseph Farnsworth] to assist him, and hurry on as fast as possible without fatiguing the men too much. Bring on with you all the carpenters of Capt. Colburn’s company, and as much provision as the batteaux will carry.”²⁷

Having done everything possible at Fort Western, Arnold and his aide Oswald boarded a large birch-bark canoe manned by some of the expedition’s Indians and started upriver to join his advancing army. However, Arnold soon discovered that his canoe leaked, and rather than lose time making repairs, he switched to a sturdier pirogue (a dug-out canoe made from a single tree trunk) at Vassalborough and quickly closed in on the men ahead of him.²⁸

In his letter to Washington, Arnold noted that the distance between Fort Western and Quebec City was 180 miles, and that his corps would make the trip in 20 days. “I have engaged a Number of good Pilots, & believe by the best Information I can procure, we shall be able to perform the March in twenty Days—the Distance about 180 Miles,” he wrote.²⁹ Arnold knew that there were 87 miles of rapids and waterfalls from Fort Western to the Great Carry, after which he believed the route became easier, allowing his army to quickly advance to Quebec.

Out on the river, the inexperienced boat crews were having a difficult time. The Kennebec was unpredictable, because its depth, width, and current changed with the seasons and weather. The water level was at its lowest point of the year, which added to the number and length of places where the boats had to be manhandled through shallow water and exposed rocks. But the low volume of water in the river also provided some advantage, in that the intensity of the rapids diminished.

A three-man crew usually manned each boat—two men handling the oars or poles and the third in the rear steering with a pole or oar. The number of crewmen varied with river conditions, and up to five men might be used at times to work the boats. The expedition was moving against the current, which required continuous rowing of the bateaux with oars or, more commonly, propelling them upstream with long, iron-tipped poles—called setting poles—that pushed the boats against the flow. In a strong current, ropes had to be thrown to the shore and the boats dragged upstream by teams of men, a technique called cordelling. Common soldier George Morison mentioned the hazards of such an effort in his diary: “[W]e were often obliged to haul the boats after us through rock and shoals, frequently up to our middle and over our heads in the water; and some of us with difficulty escaped being drowned.”³⁰

Morgan’s riflemen came to the end of the old military road and emerged at Fort Halifax, situated on a high plateau where the Sebasticook River flowed into the Kennebec. This strategic site was first fortified in 1754. The British army and militia had connected it by road to Fort Western so that the two forts could reinforce one another. When Montresor arrived at Fort Halifax from Quebec on July 9, 1761, he found it to be a busy place. “Fort Halifax was built by Mr. Shirley in 1754, to awe the Indians and cover the frontiers of New-England,” he recorded in his journal. “The fort is garrisoned by a company of New-Englanders and supplied from the settlement below [Fort Western].” Montresor noted that the fort’s defenses were “more than sufficient against an enemy who has no other offensive weapons than small arms.”³¹ This probably was a reference to the fact that, following his journey across Maine, Montresor realized it would be impossible to transport artillery over the route. The fort did not endure, however, and Morgan’s riflemen arrived there 15 years after Montresor to find nothing but an abandoned, decaying relic from the past.

Morgan’s riflemen began arriving at Fort Halifax on the evening of September 27, with the rest of the army struggling into the decrepit fort over the next four days. It took each division an average of two-and-a-half days to travel the 18 miles between Fort Western and Fort Halifax. The exhausted boat crews did not realize that the stretch of river they just traveled was smooth compared to what lay ahead on the tempestuous Kennebec. This first portion of the trip was easier because the men did not have to portage their boats. Also, the boats were not fully loaded, as part of the expedition’s freight had been transported by wagons and carts along the old military road. But Arnold had reasons to feel optimistic: Monstresor had recorded that it took him only 12 days to travel from Fort Halifax to Lake Magentic.³² Also, scouts Getchell and Berry had informed Arnold back at Fort Western that the Kennebec and Dead Rivers were pretty passable, “the water, in general., shoal., on account of the late dry season. The trees were well marked, as far as we went, and the way is so direct as may be easily found.”³³

The men fully loaded the bateaux at Fort Halifax and resumed their voyage upstream. There was no road beyond Fort Halifax, and the men marching on land had to be guided along a rough trail on the eastern side of the river. The heavy boats did not have far to go to meet the Kennebec’s next challenge, which was a half-mile of swift water cascading over a series of rock ledges called Ticonic Falls. This was the expedition’s first portage. The men poled and dragged the boats as far as possible into these rapids. When they could advance the boats no farther, they muscled them to the western bank of the river for portaging, and tons of food and equipment—plus the heavy bateaux—were carried around the rapids. Meanwhile, the men in the land party were being led up the east side of the Kennebec. They had to wade across the river to the west side, where the best portage lay. Once across, they helped to carry the freight and boats around the rapids. Local farmers arrived with teams of horses and oxen to help. The fully loaded bateaux were too heavy to drag ashore, so the men waded into the cold water to unload their cargoes. Everything in the boats was off-loaded and carried to dry land. Even empty, the heavy bateaux were hardly manageable. The men pulled and dragged them out of the water and onto dry land, where they turned them over and carried them across the portage on their shoulders. Diarist Morison noted how some of the men aided their efforts by passing handspikes under the bottoms of the bateaux at the portages.³⁴

A minimum of four men were needed to lift the 400-pound empty boats using this technique, one man on each corner. There was a trail to follow, but it traveled over rough terrain, resulting in the men weaving and stumbling over inclines, declines, and slippery rocks. “Our progress under these immense burthens,” Morison wrote in his journal, “was indeed slow, . . . having to lay them down at the end of every few rods to rest.”³⁵

The tons of food, tents, gunpowder, weapons, medical stores, and other miscellaneous equipment and supplies had to be portaged beyond the falls, where the men put the boats back into the water and carefully reloaded their cargoes. The length of the portage around Ticonic Falls was about three-fifths of a mile, and it took the better part of a day for each division to portage around this first obstacle. Though members of the expedition continued to receive help from civilians as they moved upriver, the number of people they encountered diminished as they continued upstream.

Ticonic Falls provided an indication of what lay ahead. Five Mile Ripples, a long stretch of swift water, was the next dangerous section of the river that the bateaux navigated fully loaded. Captain Dearborn described the passage on September 30:

Proceeded up the River this Morning, found it exceeding rapid and rocky for five miles, so that any man would think, at its first appearance, that it was impossible to get Boats up it, I fill’d my Battoe to day [Dearborn’s boat filled with water], and wet all my Baggage, but with the greatest difficulty, we got over what is call’d the 5 mile ripples, and then encampt, and dryed my Cloathing as well as I could.³⁶

Wet clothing and bodies had serious implications; winter came early to the region, and the men made huge fires at night to dry their belongings. William Humphrey wrote on September 28 that “it now begins to grow uncomfortable.”³⁷ Two days later, he recorded an apparent sharp drop in the nighttime temperature: “last night it froze so hard as to freeze our wet clothes. . . and ice was as thick as window glass.”³⁸ The men on the boats could not keep dry, and colder temperatures exacerbated the problem. The plummeting nighttime temperatures were a reminder that the expedition had been racing against the weather since its inception. A speedy arrival at Quebec before the region became encased in ice, snow, and freezing temperatures was critical.

The Kennebec River turned tranquil beyond the Five Mile Ripples, giving the men a much needed respite. They now were in a section of the river that the settlers had named Canaan. Arnold’s bateaux must have made a spectacular scene as they passed by the small settlements and isolated farms that dotted the shoreline of this northern paradise ablaze with autumn colors. This pleasant stretch of the river ended abruptly as the expedition approached Skowhegan Falls.

Spelled differently by nearly every one of the diarists (Arnold called it Souheagen Falls, Major Meigs wrote it as Scohegin Falls, and Morison reported it as Cohegan Falls), Skowhegan Falls brought misery and danger to the expedition. It was the expedition’s second portage. This dangerous section of the river began with a right angle into a narrow gorge of rapidly moving water. One moment the bateau men were gliding along tranquilly and the next they were poling their boats with all their strength through a raging chasm. Protruding ledges of rock surrounded them on both sides, making it impossible to get ropes to men on the shore. The crews poled their boats through this torrent, fighting against the current, and when they could pole no farther they got into the cold, foaming river and pulled the bateaux through the raging water with ropes. The rapids continued beyond the gorge, but at least lines could be thrown from the boats to men on shore who helped pull them upriver against the swift current. Still, no one rested easy, because they could look upriver and see the menacing waterfalls that blocked their passage. As they neared the 20-plus-foot-high Skowhegan Falls, they could see that there was a rocky island in the middle of the waterfalls surrounded by cascading water. The best portage around the falls was up and over the rocky island, which extended upriver to calmer water.

The Indians had showed the first white settlers the way—they maneuvered their canoes to the base of the falls and then hoisted them with ropes to the summit of the rocky island. Arnold’s men planned to use this old Indian portage, but instead of lifting lightweight birch bark canoes up and over the precipice, they had to haul 220 clumsy bateaux plus the tons of food, guns, ammunition, tents, and medical supplies up to the rocky island with dangerous white water all around them. The scene must have been incredible as the men used ropes and pulleys to lift the boats up the steep face of the island with the waterfalls pummeling around them. The Indians had cleared some ground on the far end of the island, which they used as a camping ground. Arnold’s men found this place and were happy to rest for a while after their long ordeal. The portage at Skowhegan Falls continued for days, as each division made its way up and over this formidable obstacle.

Some of the crews had to stop for almost a week above Skowhegan Falls to repair their battered boats. “Could we have then come within reach of the villains who constructed these crazy things, they would fully have experienced the effects of our vengeance” noted Private Morison.³⁹ Historian Justin Smith echoed these sentiments when he wrote, “Without a doubt the feebleness of the bateaux was a vital defect in the preparations for Arnold’s enterprise. . . . The need of strong boats could not have been understood at Cambridge. . . .” Smith blamed the mistake on “haste and scanty knowledge of the conditions.”⁴⁰

Today’s historians continue to blame the bateaux for the problems of the expedition, with comments like, “Why canoes were not used on an expedition up a river so full of rapids and falls is not clear,”⁴¹ and, “Perhaps the greatest mistake in Arnold’s Expedition was the use of the heavy bateaux instead of light canoes, which could have been carried easily across the portages and maneuvered more surely in the rapids of the rivers.”⁴² The 220 clumsy bateaux take on a growing importance as Arnold’s men stopped beyond Showhegan Falls to scrutinize the damage.

A strong indictment against the bateau is the fact that those members of the expedition who were using Indian canoes seemed to move quickly and easily along. Arnold, for example, appeared to be gliding effortlessly back and forth among his divisions in a dug-out canoe. The decision to use bateaux was Washington’s. He had experience on the frontier, especially as a young surveyor navigating the rivers of western Virginia and Pennsylvania. Even if Washington did not know about river craft, Arnold certainly did. He saw the big canoes commonly used as transports on the St. Lawrence River during his prewar business trips to Canada. However, a close examination of the situation reveals that Washington made the right decision in using bateaux instead of canoes, despite the comments of the inexperienced men on the expedition and numerous historians.

Arnold loaded his Indian canoe lightly, with only a few personal items. Canoes were easier to handle in rough water, provided they were lightly loaded. However, a heavily loaded canoe, lying low in the water, was difficult to control. In fact, a heavily laden bateau was more seaworthy than a similarly loaded canoe. The secret of the bateau’s seaworthiness is the angle of its flared sides, which makes it almost impossible to overturn.

Washington opted for bateaux because they could be built quickly and cheaply by semi-skilled labor.⁴³ They were plentiful on the lower Kennebec, where the river flowed comparatively wide and deep, and where carpenters and tools were available to build them. In addition, the expedition’s boats were disposable, to be used to get the army’s freight to Canada after which they would be abandoned. Bark canoes were expensive and time-consuming to build, and few white men knew how to construct them. In addition, the rock formations in the Kennebec had shale ledges with sharp-edged rocks that could tear out the bottoms out of bark canoes. Only a lightly loaded and skillfully handled canoe had an advantage over a bateau on the Kennebec River.

Another problem that became evident as the expedition moved upriver was the inexperience of the boat crews in handling the craft. Some of the men may have lied about their experience with small boats in order to secure a place on the expedition. This resulted in numerous accidents, as boats smashed against rocks or stranded in shallow water. It also took a lot of experience and skill to load and trim small boats with heavy cargo. Thus, the inexperienced crews caused some of the mishaps attributed to the boats. Aaron Burr acknowledged this problem in one of his letters: “Imagine to yourself 200 Battoes managed by men—two thirds of whom had never been in one. . . .”⁴⁴ The idea of relieving the boat crews with fresh men from the marching column did not work. The problem was that Arnold did not have enough experienced men to relieve his tired crews, and it was not logical to replace men who had mastered the rudiments of handling the boats with beginners from the marching column. One historian claims that the short and frail-looking Burr was one of the best boatmen on the expedition. He learned to handle small boats while growing up near the Elizabeth River in New Jersey.⁴⁵

Emergency repairs were made to the bateaux by Colburn’s crew at Skowhegan Falls, and the journey resumed. The changing character of the Kennebec continued as the expedition moved upstream. Along one stretch of the river north of Showhegan Falls the men were running their boats through rapids called the Bombazee Rips that ended abruptly in a majestic stretch of calm river surrounded by beautiful countryside. One of these tranquil places occurred where the Sandy River emptied into the Kennebec from the west. This was the landmark that warned the river guides that the expedition was approaching its next formidable obstacle: a one-mile series of rapids and waterfalls known as Norridgewock Falls. The river climbed 90 feet during this one-mile stretch, and no boat could possibly survive in the torrent. The expedition approached the falls via an old Indian village—Norridgewock—that stood about a mile below the cataract. Norridgewock was once a large Indian settlement and the site of a French Catholic mission.

Contemporaries described the Indians who once lived here as “fierce denizens of the wilderness”: they came from various tribes and sub-tribes of the Abenakis who had left their native haunts to live under the direction of missionaries.⁴⁶ The last French priest at the site was Father Sebastien Râle (pronounced Rall by most of the New Englanders), whom the English colonists believed was encouraging his Indian converts to attack settlements in Maine and New Hampshire. Many people in New England at the time of the Revolutionary War knew the story of how a party of colonial militia had attacked the village in 1724, burned it to the ground, and killed many of its inhabitants, including Father Râle. Some of the Indians returned to bury Râle and erect a cross over his grave. Arnold’s men arrived at the site to find a large open tract of land where the village had stood. They did some sightseeing among the ruins of the village, viewing the remains of the Catholic Church built by Father Râle as well as his grave, which was marked by a large wooden cross. The story served as a reminder that the majority of Canada’s white population was Catholic, while the liberating American rebels were staunch Protestants.

Norridgewock Falls was the expedition’s third portage. The expedition hired all available teams of horses and oxen in this sparsely settled region to help haul the boats and baggage past this obstacle. Even the oxen brought along for beef were pressed into service. Like the two previous portages, the work was arduous and time consuming. But the job got done, and the divisions, each in turn, arrived safely upriver from the falls.

Norridgewock Falls was an important landmark on the Kennebec River, and every diarist mentioned the date they arrived there. We can get a sense of how spread-out the expedition had become from the dates that each division reached the falls. According to Arnold’s journal, he arrived on the morning of October 2, only to find that Captain Morgan’s first division had just completed portaging their boats and baggage around it.⁴⁷ Greene’s second division was just approaching the falls on that same date, while Meigs’ third division, accompanied by some of Colburn’s company of civilian carpenters, did not reach the site until the night of October 4.⁴⁸ Enos’ fourth division was two days behind Meigs, arriving at the falls on the 6th and not clearing it until the night of the 7th.⁴⁹ Arnold spent almost a week at Norridgewock supervising the passage of his entire command past this formidable obstacle before resuming his journey upriver.

Arnold used the opportunity of the Norridgewock portage to take an inventory of his army’s food supply. The results were shocking, as he realized that a large quantity of food had spoiled from water damage. The bateaux were taking a terrible beating with water shipping (the nautical term for seeping) into them through gaps in their seams and from the spray flying into the boats as they traversed the rapids. As the expedition’s medical officer, Doctor Senter’s responsibilities included the inspection of food. His journal entry from Norridgewock Falls, dated October 5, describes how the river water ruined their provisions:

The fish [dried cod] lying loose in the batteaux, and being continually washed with the fresh water running into the batteaux. The bread casks not being water-proof, admitted the water in plenty, swelled the bread, burst the casks, as well as soured the whole bread. The same fate attended a number of fine casks of peas. These with the others were condemned. We were now curtailed of a very valuable and large part of our provisions. . . .

The hasty preparation of provisions at Gardinerston at the start of the expedition accounted for additional spoilage. Senter mentioned this problem in his same October 5 journal entry: “A few barrels of salt beef remained on hand, but of so indifferent quality, as scarce to be eaten, being killed in the heat of summer, took much damage after salting, that rendered it not only very unwholesome, but very unpalatable.”⁵⁰ In addition, the men had wasted some of their provisions along the march, believing that they had an abundant supply. Arnold supervised the grim task of inspecting the expedition’s dwindling food supply and dumping spoiled and rotten provisions. He should have taken action to impose food rationing when he realized the expedition was falling behind schedule and much of the food had been ruined.

Hunting game to supplement their food supply seemed a logical solution to the problem. But the noise and smells created by over 1,000 men had frightened away almost all of the game along the route. Besides, there were orders not to fire any weapon for fear it would give away the expedition’s position to any Indian war parties that may have been dispatched from Canada to watch and listen for signs of rebel movement from Maine. However, despite the food shortage, there was no talk of turning back. Everyone tightened their belts and resumed the trek, hoping that the worst was behind them.

For the moment, the spirits of the men improved as they continued upriver. They now traveled in a beautiful wilderness that few white men had ever seen. The Kennebec flowed broad and smooth through this region of lush vegetation. Dearborn called this area “exceeding good,” but the pleasures of the passage were soon spoiled by a cold rain that drenched the men and their baggage. Greene’s second division and Meigs’ third division passed the mouth of Seven Mile Stream (today’s Carrabassett River) in the rain. Mountains became visible in the distance for the first time, giving the Kennebec—now devoid of the rivers that fed it—the appearance of a mountain stream. But one more obstacle remained to be conquered before reaching the Great Carry: Carritunk Falls.

Carritunk Falls, known today as Caratunk or Solon Falls, actually was a series of rapids when Arnold’s army ascended the Kennebec River. After seeing the place, diarist Greenman called it “Hell Gate Falls”; Humphrey referred to it as “Devil’s Falls.”⁵¹ Even the Indians respected this place: the word Carritunk means “rough.” What prompted these names was a series of ledges composed of dark rocks with sharp edges at an upward angle. The portage around Carritunk Falls was about a quarter-mile and Morgan’s riflemen led the way, arriving at the falls on October 4.⁵²

Dr. Senter portaged around Carritunk Falls on October 10 and camped for the night about a mile above the place. His diary entry for the following day is rich in the details of the march. According to Senter, he “Decamped the usual time, viz., at the rising sun and that he continued his march mostly by land this day and that the men were now scattered up and down the road [route] at the distance of ten or twelve miles. At 7 in the evening we quit the water,” he continued, “and with the greatest difficulty procured a fire. . . . Sprung our tents and made an exceeding luxurious bed with the blue joint grass, which this river land produces in great plenty.”⁵³

The diaries show that the individual companies within the four divisions advanced at their own pace, as there were few open spaces along the upper Kennebec where large numbers of men could camp together. The selection of campsites normally was the responsibility of the quartermaster, who selected sites based on a variety of particulars, including defense, open ground for tents, and accessibility to fresh water. Surveyor Pierce probably selected and marked the campsites on the Arnold Expedition, leaving little for the quartermasters to do. In addition, as the rest of the army moved upriver, they utilized the campsites established by Morgan’s riflemen.

Dusk was the signal for the scattered companies to stop for the night and make camp. Most of the men were trekking on land while the bateaux transported their equipment and most of their provisions. The marching column carried two days’ rations with them, consisting of salted beef (which may or may not have been cooked) along with some flour and biscuits. The expedition followed the rough Indian trails, which tended to weave in and out from the shoreline, as much as a half-mile inland, following the best terrain. The rifle companies who led the way marked the route for the other divisions to follow. They used axes to clear the rough, narrow trail. The possibility of a surprise attack existed, particularly by Indians sent from Canada, so the men kept their weapons with them at all times. Some of the experienced frontiersmen on the expedition wrapped a greased or waxed cloth around the lock (firing mechanism) portion of their weapon to keep it dry, clean, and ready for action.

At dusk, if everything went well, the men headed down to the riverbank, where they met their boats and camped for the night. The forest frequently came down to the banks of the river, making it necessary for the men to camp among the trees. Some unloaded the bateaux while others organized their campsite and prepared the evening meal. Everyone, including the officers, probably slept in small “A” or wedge tents, made of canvas held upright by two wooden poles. The soldiers looked for a level, smooth patch of ground with strategically placed trees from which to string their tents, and a company-size campsite was sometimes scattered over one or two acres. Each tent slept five or six men who bundled together to keep warm.⁵⁴

The expedition’s officers slept in these same small tents, but with fewer men per tent. One advantage that many officers enjoyed was the services of a private soldier drawn from the ranks to act as a servant. This practice was wide-spread in the British army, and the status-conscious Americans copied this custom as a convenient way for an officer to have a personal servant, also called a “waiter.”⁵⁵ The soldiers encouraged this practice as a way of being exempt from ordinary duty, and apparently did not mind acting as a combination valet, butler, cook, and groom for their officer. There are clues that Arnold and his officers had servants, including an entry in surveyor Pierce’s diary that reads, “my waiter remains at Point Aux trembles”; diarist Stocking mentioned that “a waiter of Captain Morgan was drowned.”⁵⁶

Captain Dearborn’s journal entry for October 25 also indicates that personal servants were on the expedition: “This Night I was Seized with a Violent Head-Ach and fever, Charles gather’d me some herbs in the woods, and made me Tea of them.”⁵⁷ The “Charles” mentioned by Dearborn was Charles Burget, a French youth who enlisted in Dearborn’s company at Fort Western and was known to have been the captain’s servant. Dearborn mentions Arnold’s waiters in a later entry: “I met one of Col. Arnolds Waiters.”⁵⁸ And then there is Stocking’s journal, in which he notes, “A servant of Colonel Arnold’s who had been taken prisoner. . . .”⁵⁹ Slave-owning southern officers frequently brought a slave with them to act as their servant, and it is possible that Daniel Morgan, who was from Virginia and owned slaves, had a slave attending him on the Arnold Expedition.⁶⁰ Morgan’s officers, all of whom were from Virginia, might also have brought slaves with them from home to attend to their feeding and grooming on the trek to Canada.

The five or six enlisted men who shared a tent also cooked and ate their food together. They were called an eating mess, or mess, and this arrangement was common in both the British and American armies during the Revolutionary War. There were no common kitchens or eating places. The commissary officer or his assistants issued the messes their uncooked rations. The campfires that Arnold’s men made each night were probably huge affairs. Lieutenant Humphrey gives us a clue when he wrote on September 29, “we made large fires and refreshed ourselves.”⁶¹ Each mess had its own campfire, started in an open area with the small, dry pieces of wood that littered the forest floor. A handful of birch bark was the preferred kindling because it ignited quickly and flared fiercely. Small dead tree trunks and branches were added once the fire got going. The men piled the wood lengthwise and cris-cross on the fire. As one end of the pile burned down, a fresh length was pushed into the fire. This method saved a lot of time and effort, and provided a long-lasting fire for men who had been working hard all day. As soon as they could, the men would strip off their wet clothing which they dried on ropes strung near the roaring fire.

The messmates cooked their food in their camp kettle. No stone fire rings have been found in any of the campsites known to have been used by the Arnold Expedition. If anything, they would have moved some rocks around to serve as seats. Instead, to save time and labor, they cooked their food on a bed of hot coals over which they suspended their kettle. Salted beef or pork was a basic food, along with flour and biscuits. Dried peas (also spelled pease) were issued if available. The messmates poured some of their flour into their kettle to thicken their food, which they called stew. If they added fish to their other ingredients, they called it chowder. There were plenty of brook trout and round whitefish in the Kennebec. Atlantic salmon could also be found in the upper section of the river in September prior to spawning. Or, the soldiers could make chowder using the dried fish issued by the commissary. They poured their stew or chowder over some of their biscuits and subsisted on this simple diet day after day.

There probably was little activity in camp after the food had been cooked and eaten. The men, exhausted from their labors during the day, went right to sleep and awoke at dawn to begin the long process of loading their bateaux and continuing their march toward Quebec.

The terrain became rougher beyond Carritunk Falls, as the foothills of the mountains reached down to the riverbanks. The river was still wide and impressive, but tangled growths of trees and bushes now hugged the shoreline, giving the river a wild and rough appearance. The Kennebec is formed deep within this rugged country by two smaller meandering rivers named the East Branch and the West Branch. Montresor had explored both branches in 1761 with his Indian guides and indicated their labyrinthine courses on his map. He followed the meandering East Branch on his trip from Quebec to Maine, starting from its source, which was Moosehead Lake, deep in northern Maine. On his return trip, Montresor took the West Branch (which was also called the Dead River). The Dead River was so named because it was a tranquil stream that seemed to have no current. Like its sister the East Branch, the Dead River also serpentined through northern Maine.

The Indians showed Montresor a short-cut between the Kennebec River and the Dead River, which made it the shortest and most practical route between Quebec and Maine. Known as the Great Carry, this shortcut was a 11-mile portage from a point above Carritunk Falls on the Kennebec across three lakes to the Dead River. The Dead River was easy to follow to its source, a chain of ponds near the border between Maine and Quebec. The Indians showed Montresor the way among the numerous ponds and streams in the region, and he marked the route on his map. After crossing the chain of ponds, Montresor’s guides took him through a pass in the Appalachian Mountains that brought him to Lake Megantic in Canada. The intrepid British engineer’s map and journal was the key to crossing from Maine to Quebec. By 1775, few white men living in Maine had been curious enough to trek across the Great Carry to the Dead River. The anticipation of reaching the portage increased as the expedition drew closer to it. They believed that they would have an easier time as they moved rapidly across it and emerged onto the tranquil and deep Dead River, which pointed due north to Canada. By this time they had fought their way 87 miles up the Kennebec from Fort Western.

Morgan’s rifle company reached the Great Carry on October 6. Its men recognized the place by locating a mountain peak that looked like a sugar loaf, directly below which a stream flowed into the Kennebec. The source of this stream, called Carrying Place Stream, was the first of the three ponds that comprised the Great Carry. It had taken the expedition much longer than expected to reach this milestone on their march to Canada, but morale was high despite the hardships and delays, and everyone expected the worst was behind them as they neared the overland portage. Morgan’s riflemen beached their boats among dense underbrush and trees, and rested after their long and arduous ordeal.

Back in Cambridge, Washington was unaware of the expedition’s position when he wrote Schuyler that Arnold must be nearing Quebec. The commander-in-chief hoped that the colonel would “have no Difficulty in regulating your Motions with Respect to him.”⁶²

Little did he know that Arnold’s corps was still 200 miles from its destination.