Chapter 6

A Direful Howling Wilderness Not Describable¹

Arnold knew that he was almost 200 miles from Quebec City when he wrote Washington on October 13 that he expected to reach Lake Magentic in eight days. The colonel made this bold assertion because he was a hands-on, hard-driving field commander who excelled at motivating his men and achieving his goals. Although Arnold moved confidently among his troops, it must have been unnerving for him to realize that his army had traveled less than 100 miles since leaving Fort Western two weeks earlier and, as he admitted in his letter to Washington, “we have had a very fatigueing Time.”²

Adding to his problems was a dearth of fresh and reliable information about the situation inside Quebec and the location and size of Schuyler’s army. Arnold mentioned his lack of information in his communiqué to Washington: “I have had no intelligence from Gen. Schuyler or Canada [a reference to Arnold’s contacts in Quebec City], and expect none until I reach ChaudiPre pond [Lake Magentic].”³ The colonel’s reference to the expectation of news from Quebec or Schuyler when he reached Lake Magentic is interesting because, barring a miracle, the only way Arnold was going to get information was to dispatch swift couriers to his prewar friends in Quebec, who could rendezvous with him at the lake. This is precisely what Arnold did, calling upon two of his Indians for the job who, until now, had been manning his canoes.

Arnold penned an urgent letter on the night of October 13 to his friend John Mercier in Quebec, “or in his absence to Captain Wm. Gregory, or Mr. John Maynard,” while his Indians made preparations to leave on their vital mission early the following morning. In his letter to Mercier, Arnold said, “I am now on my march for Quebec with about 2000 men [a deliberately exaggerated number], where I expect to have the pleasure of seeing you soon. This detachment is designed to cooperate with Gen. Schuyler to frustrate the unjust and arbitrary measures of the ministry and restore liberty to our brethren of Canada.” The colonel explained that the person delivering the letter was “a faithful Indian,” who would carry back a message with the number of troops in Quebec, “and in short what we have to expect from the Canadians and merchants in the city.” Arnold added that anyone who came out of the city to meet him on the road “would be received with pleasure and handsomely rewarded.” He enclosed a second letter asking Mercier to send it to General Schuyler by express. In this letter, Arnold wrote that “after a very fatiguing and hazardous march over a rough country up the Kennebec river. . . we have at last, arrived at the Dead River, which we have examined to the ChaudiPre pond; and hope in a fortnight of having the pleasure of meeting you in Quebec. Any intelligence or advice you can communicate will be gratefully received. . . .”⁴

Arnold entrusted two of his Penobscot Indians, Eneas and Sabatis, to carry his letters to Quebec.⁵ A French-speaking soldier named John Hall accompanied them. Hall was a deserter from the British army who had joined the Continental Army in Cambridge and volunteered for the expedition.⁶

As Arnold expectantly watched his couriers leave camp, he must have thought about the present location of Schuyler’s army. He wondered if they had already taken Montreal while his expedition was falling behind schedule. He may have felt better about his own circumstances if he knew the sad condition of General Schuyler.

Unlike his friend Washington, who had a robust constitution, Schuyler was not a healthy man. He suffered from rheumatism of the joints and was prone to intestinal and malarial fevers. Advancing from Fort Ticonderoga, Schuyler’s army camped on a swampy island (Ile aux Noix) that commanded the entrance to Lake Champlain. Directing his army from a tent in the cold and damp ground brought on his ailments. In a letter to Washington, Schuyler confided that he had been “much indisposed with a billious Fever,” a term loosely applied at the time to a complex of symptoms comprising nausea, abdominal pains, headache, and constipation.⁷ Schuyler’s condition worsened on the night of September 10. “[M]y Disorder reattacked me with double Violence and every fair Prospect of a speedy Recover vanished,” noted Schuyler, whose wife was summoned to help care for her husband.⁸ On September 16, with his wife at his side, the general was carried in a litter from his tent and gently placed on board a boat that took him back to Fort Ticonderoga. Schuyler eventually recovered his health, but his frail constitution prevented him from rejoining his army in the field. Schuyler turned over the command of his army to Montgomery, the former British army captain who had been commissioned a general by Congress and appointed as Schuyler’s second in command.

As the siege at St Johns wore on, Montgomery’s problems increased. Disease, cold weather, harsh living conditions, and stiff resistance from the post’s defenders weakened his army and eroded discipline. While the general remained outwardly patient with his troops, he vented his frustration in his personal correspondence. To his brother-in-law, Robert R. Livingston, he confided, “The New England troops are the worst stuff imaginable. There is such a equality among them, that the officers have no authority. . . . The privates are all generals, but not soldiers.” In this same letter Montgomery referred to the New Yorkers he commanded as “the sweepings of the New York streets.”⁹

Back at Cambridge, an outwardly cool-headed Washington was penning similar confidential letters about the New England troops he commanded. Writing to his confidant Joseph Reed, who was visiting Philadelphia at the time, the general grumbled:

Such a dearth of Publick Spirit [patriotism] & want of Virtue, such stock-jobbing, and fertility in all the low Arts to obtain advantages, of one kind or another. . . and such a dirty, mercenary Spirit pervades the whole, that I should not be at all surprizd at any disaster that may happen. . . . [C]ould I have foreseen what I have, & am like to experience, no consideration upon Earth should have induced me to accept this Command.¹⁰

Despite all his problems, Montgomery was the bright spot in the Northern army’s assault on Canada. He was resourceful and relentless in his siege against St. Johns, during which he cut off all supplies into the fort to starve the garrison into surrendering. His tactics also included sending several detachments deeper into Canada to create mischief in the British rear and to recruit French-Canadians for the rebel army. One of his units succeeded in capturing Chambly, the British supply depot 12 miles north of St. Johns.¹¹

Washington was aware of the problems with the Northern army, which seemed to be advancing into Canada at a much slower pace than the Arnold Expedition. Based on the reports he was receiving from Schuyler, the commander-in-chief realized that the Northern army had run into unexpectedly strong enemy resistance and might have to retreat back down Lake Champlain. The general expressed his concerns in a letter to Schuyler dated October 6, in which he asked that if the Northern army abandoned its invasion of Canada, “I beg it may be done in such a Manner that Arnold may be saved by giving him Notice.” Washington then told Schuyler that, no matter what happened, “your Army to keep up such Appearances as may fix Carlton and prevent the Force of Canada being turned wholly upon Arnold,” and stressed the importance of keeping pressure on the enemy “that Arnold may have Time to retreat.”¹²

From his little tent deep in the Maine forest, Arnold was unaware of Schuyler’s illness, of his relinquishing the field command of his army to Montgomery, whose advance into Canada was stalled at St. Johns, or of Washington’s troubled letter to Schuyler expressing the possibility that Carlton could continue to delay Schuyler’s Northern army at St. Johns while he sent troops to intercept Arnold’s intrusion. On the other hand, neither Washington, Carlton, Schuyler, Montgomery nor anyone else from the outside world knew that by mid-October Arnold’s intrepid corps of volunteers had finally broken out of the muck and mire of the Great Carry and were rapidly advancing up the Dead River toward Quebec. The corps continued to move in company-size detachments, with the majority of the troops marching on land, weapons at the ready, while their provisions and baggage were transported on the remaining serviceable bateaux. As always, each division was responsible for its own provisions, and according to Arnold’s reckoning there existed a reserve supply of food with Enos’ fourth division.

The Dead River proved to be everything that had been promised by the scouting parties—a narrow, deep river, smooth and almost black in color, with few obstacles to impede a rapid advance toward Canada. “The river is so remarkably still and dead, that it is difficult to determine which way it runs,” noted Private Abner Stocking.¹³ The river, almost uniform in width with steep shores rising eight or ten feet on either side, appeared like a man-made canal. Low, clinging vegetation overlapped the riverbanks and spread out onto the flat land to form a broad flood plain broken by stands of trees. Mountains dominated the view. They were later referred to as the Bigelow Range, Bigelow Mountain, or simply the Bigelows, in honor of Major Timothy Bigelow.¹⁴ Private Stocking from Captain Hanchett’s company took time to write a graphic description of the region in his journal:

The Bigelow Mountain Range, as seen from the upper Dead River.
Amy Lawrence

On our right and left were excessively high mountains, the summits of which were covered with snow and ice. Could I have ascended to the top of one of these mountains I thought I could have overlooked all creation. The land between the mountains appeared to be very rich and fertile—wild grass covered the ground, four or five feet in height, and served us a good purpose for covering for the night.¹⁵

Arnold’s men were feeling that the worst was behind them even as they struggled with a new problem: the shortage of oars to row their bateaux. The expedition had started out with a plentiful supply of oars, but the boatmen had relied on long setting poles to push the bateaux up the shallow Kennebec River. As a result, the men discarded many of the oars by the time the expedition reached the Dead River, where their sturdy setting poles were too short to reach the river bottom. With oars in short supply, the boatmen had to push their bateaux along by grabbing at the bushes and underbrush along the riverbanks.

Adding to the men’s frustrations was that the Dead River meandered through the countryside; despite their constant labors, they always seemed to be looking at the Bigelow Mountain Range. A few rapids and waterfalls on the Dead River, though shorter and gentler than anything the boatmen had experienced on the wild Kennebec, also created problems. The first of these small waterfalls, or ledges, was located about eight miles from where Arnold’s men launched their boats into the Dead River. Although the river only fell about eight feet through these cascading ledges of rock, it was impossible to drag or push the bateaux over them, and everything had to be off-loaded and portaged. This obstruction would later be named Hurricane Falls. According to Lieutenant Steele, who had commanded the expedition’s scouting mission, the cabin of the Indian Natanis lay a few miles beyond the falls, surrounded by a lovely meadow. Dearborn, marching with Meigs’ third division, mentioned the cabin in his journal entry for October 17: “[I]t Stands on a Point of Land Beautifully situated. . . . [T]he river is very Still, and good Land on each side of it a Considerable part of the way. . . .” The passing expedition found the cabin abandoned with no sign of its former occupant, who had concealed himself in the nearby forest and observed their every move.

“[W]e proceeded up the River 5 miles farther,” continued Dearborn in his entry for the 17th, “and found Colo: Arnold and [Lt.] Colo: Green with their Divisions, making up Cartridges, here we Encampt.”¹⁶ Dearborn’s company was managing to move faster than the rest of their division when they came upon Greene’s entire division, in camp on the south shore of the Dead River and busying themselves making cartridges for their muskets while they waited for Enos’ fourth division, with the food reserve, to catch up with them.

Much had happened to Greene’s division in previous days. Greene and his men took the lead from Morgan’s division on the Great Carry when the riflemen were delayed with clearing and widening the trail. Maintaining their position at the head of the main army, Greene’s men portaged around Hurricane Falls on October 16 before camping for the night a few miles farther up the trail, near the site of Natanis’ cabin. Colonel Arnold, in a buoyant mood after a day of good progress up the Dead River, arrived at their camp that night. As promised by his scouts, he found the river relatively easy to navigate, and believed that the expedition could now advance quickly to the Canadian border. However, Arnold’s mood changed when Greene informed him that his division was almost out of food and had stopped to wait for Enos’ rear division to come along with the expedition’s reserve supply. The colonel had a quicker remedy and ordered Major Bigelow (Greene’s second in command) to go back with some men and boats to retrieve food from Enos. Bigelow set out for Enos’ column early the following morning (October 17), taking 12 bateaux and a detachment consisting of three lieutenants, six sergeants, and 87 men. Not knowing exactly how far back Enos was, but expecting Bigelow’s relief party to return shortly with food, Arnold told Greene to stay where he was. Greene was keeping his men busy making cartridges while they waited for Bigelow’s return. Meanwhile, at mid-day on the 17th, Morgan’s division passed through Greene’s camp and reclaimed the lead.

Although motionless, Greene’s division continued to consume food. “[V]ery short of provisions,” wrote one of Greene’s worried officers. “[O]ur company had not five or 6 lb. of flour to 50 men.”¹⁷ This information contrasted starkly to a missive Arnold wrote just a few days earlier to commissary officer Farnsworth, in which he claimed, “The three first divisions have twenty five days provision[s]. . . .”¹⁸

How could Arnold have been so mistaken about his army’s food supply? The answer may be that, while Arnold was an excellent combat officer, he was a careless administrator.¹⁹ He was also inexperienced at this early period in his military career and oblivious of the need to impose strict discipline, tighten-up his straggling column, and get better control of his remaining provisions. There is, for example, no mention in Arnold’s journal, letters, or the journals of any of his officers or enlisted men that he made any effort to get an accurate tally of his provisions during the expedition, and he implemented rationing only when his men were on the verge of starvation. Though they acknowledged his courage, even the common soldiers on the expedition noted Arnold’s lack of military organizational skills. One of the enlisted men called him “our bold though inexperienced general.”²⁰

The men in Greene’s hungry division caught trout and tried hunting for game, especially moose, as they impatiently waited for Bigelow’s return. When Montresor traveled through this region 14 years earlier, he had reported seeing many animal footprints on the sand near the Dead River and concluded that the area was full of game.²¹ Lieutenant Steele’s men had killed several moose along this section of the river when they passed through it earlier in the month during their scouting mission. But the arrival of colder weather, heralding the onset of winter, and the smell and movement of 1,000 men through the region, had frightened off the animals.

Such was the cheerless state of things when Captain Dearborn and his company, from Meigs’ third division, stopped at Greene’s campsite. Meigs arrived at the campsite the following day with the rest of his division, which spent the night before moving out, accompanied by Dearborn’s company, the following morning.

There was no thought of Morgan or Meigs sharing their divisions’ provisions with Greene. It was understood from the outset of the expedition that each division was responsible for its own provisions, and Meigs’ men were already on half rations and needed every ounce they had. However, based on their rapid progress up the Dead River, everyone was optimistic that they would soon reach the French Canadian settlements, where they would find a warm welcome and a plentiful supply of fresh provisions. Besides, there were extra provisions in Enos’ slow-moving rear division, which carried the expedition’s huge food reserve.

Certain that Bigelow would soon return to Greene’s encampment with provisions, Arnold left Greene to catch up with Meigs and Morgan. But Major Bigelow still had not returned from his mission by the evening of the 19th. Unknown to Greene at the time, Enos’ slow-moving division was much farther behind than expected; they were still crossing the Great Carry on the morning of the 17th when Bigelow left Greene’s camp to find them.

Returning to Captain Dearborn for a moment, his diary entry for October 19 included a casual but significant reference about the weather: “The weather Rainy.” On the following day, October 20, he reported more rain in his diary: “Weather rainy all day we Suppose this days March to be 13 Miles.” The heavy downpour continued during the night of the 20th and into the following day; Dearborn described its menacing consequences: “[October] 21, . . . it Rained very fast all [last] Night, the River rose fast.” Historians and meteorologists have concluded that Arnold’s corps was in front of a late-season hurricane, which had crossed over 1,000 miles from the Caribbean to upper Maine, with heavy rains driven by winds strong enough to uproot trees. The Dead River had risen several feet by October 21, but the expedition kept moving through this raging tempest, except for the men of Greene’s hungry division, who remained huddled at their camp waiting for Bigelow’s return. The rain-soaked men of Morgan’s and Meigs’ divisions forced their way up the swollen Dead River, their route often blocked by uprooted trees that had crashed into the stream. They portaged their boats around rapids and small waterfalls that had grown in size and intensity from the steady rainfall. Despite the bad weather, Morgan’s division pushed on and increased its lead over the others.

Meanwhile, Greene’s division remained in its Natanis’ cabin camp during almost three days of heavy rain and wind, keeping an anxious lookout for Major Bigelow’s return. At about 11:00 a.m. on October 21, Greene’s men finally spotted some bateaux coming toward them from the direction of the Great Carry. Surely it was Bigelow’s relief party returning with food from Enos’ much-publicized reserve supply! But as the boats drew nearer, they turned out to be carrying Lieutenant Colonel Enos with some men from his division. Enos landed and told Greene that he had hurried ahead of his division to find Arnold. Greene informed him that the colonel had gone ahead. But where was Major Bigelow and the stockpile of extra food? Enos noted that Bigelow was coming along, but that Arnold was mistaken—Enos had no reserve supply of food and was on half-rations himself. Enos said that he had given Bigelow everything his division could spare, which was only two barrels of flour. With that the conversation ended, and Enos, disappointed not to find Arnold and concerned for the welfare of his men, went back downriver to find his division.

Another drama was about to take place farther up the Dead River. It began when Morgan, Meigs, and Arnold made their separate camps on the night of October 21 on the cold, rain-soaked ground. The army was, as usual, strung out for miles, mindful of Arnold’s instructions for each company to proceed at its own pace. The rain finally stopped during the night, but the winds continued to gust. Many of the men decided it was safer to camp in the open ground near the river, since the high winds were toppling trees and it was dangerous to sleep in the woods. The men managed to kindle fires and attempted to get some sleep.

On the night of October 21, the van of the army consisted of the two Indian couriers and the French-speaking soldier (John Hall), en route to Quebec with a letter announcing the imminent arrival of Arnold’s army. Next in line were Lieutenants Steele and Church, with 20 pioneers and surveyor Pierce, somewhere on the Height of Land clearing the trail. Arnold’s headquarters party was behind them, using a pirogue for speed and mobility. Based on the descriptions in his journal, Arnold camped on the night of October 21 near what today is called Ledge Falls, located 15 miles upriver from Greene’s camp. Morgan’s rifle division was camped about a mile behind Arnold. Meigs’ third division was farther downstream. Behind them were Greene’s division, whose men were still camped near Natanis’ cabin, and bringing up the rear was Enos’ division. As a point of reference, Arnold’s camp at Ledge Falls was 127 miles from Fort Western and 143 miles from Quebec.

During the night of October 21-22, the Dead River suddenly came alive. Arnold said that he was wrapped in his blanket when a distant rumbling noise woke him from a comfortable sleep. Though he could not spot anything in the darkness, the sound kept getting louder. Suddenly, a torrent of water overran his little camp; the heavily swollen ponds and streams of the Chain of Ponds had overflowed and swept down the Dead River in a tidal wave. Precious food casks, equipment, and guns were swept away in the surge, which crashed downriver, striking each sleeping detachment in succession. All were caught by surprise and scrambled for higher ground, grabbing whatever they could carry.

The next morning the Dead River Valley appeared as a flat, featureless flood plain as far as the eye could see. All the landmarks had disappeared under the voluminous water. The flood waters had stranded many men on scattered pockets of dry land, surrounded by a four-foot-deep torrent of terrifying rapidity and overwhelming force. Some of the men reached safety in the remaining boats, but the bulk of the troops had to wait for the floodwaters to subside enough for them to walk to dry land. Even then, they had to make large circuits to avoid flooded areas. Rifleman Henry called it “one of the most fatiguing marches we had as yet performed, though the distance was not great in a direct line.”²²

It seems that the violent flood stunned everyone on the expedition, and kept them occupied for most of the day trying to retrieve and dry their provisions, weapons, ammunition, clothing, tents, cooking utensils, and blankets. Despite the catastrophe, the riflemen and Meigs’ division managed to travel a few miles on that and the next day. Morgan’s proud Virginians left the two Pennsylvania rifle companies and went ahead on their own, even passing Arnold’s headquarters party and reaching the beginning of the labyrinth of lakes and streams known as the Chain of Ponds before making camp on the night of the 23rd. They found the ponds overflowing from the heavy rain, but were somehow able to navigate this maze of waterways by finding a few of the features described by Montresor and locating marks left by Lieutenant Steele’s scouting party.

Fearing the worst, Arnold turned back and linked up with Smith’s and Hendrick’s Pennsylvania rifle companies and Meigs’ third division during the 23rd, all of whom camped at a series of ledges called Shadagee Falls that night. The group felt lucky to be alive and camping on a dry piece of land, which would come to be known as Camp Disaster. Given the grim situation, Arnold asked the officers in camp with him to attend a council of war. On everyone’s mind was the catastrophe of the previous two days—days they had thought would be among their easiest. The run-off from the heavy rains had transformed this normally tranquil section of the Dead River into a funnel of dark, raging water running between the mountains that caused at least seven bateaux to overturn. The men on foot were also in danger, becoming confused and losing their way among the swollen streams and brooks that flowed into the narrow river valley. They sensed that, as they moved farther upstream and the Dead River valley became narrower, their situation would grow worse.²³ But there was no time to wait for the river to subside, as the expedition was now racing against starvation, the approach of winter, and the fear that Quebec would be reinforced.

Arnold held his council of war that dreadful night with the officers present at Camp Disaster: Major Meigs, Captains Smith and Hendricks, and their subordinates. Captain Morgan may also have attended, coming downstream from his camp site. This is the first known record of Arnold calling a council of war since the start of the expedition, but their circumstances were bleak and Arnold, who never would yield to turning back, wanted to measure his officers’ resolve in this crisis.

Arnold and his subordinates discussed their situation, including the fact that they had no news from the French-speaking settler named Jaquin who had been dispatched to make contact with the nearest Canadian settlements, the Indian couriers sent to Quebec, or the 20-man advance party commanded by Lieutenants Steele and Church. They also were unsure of the condition of Greene’s and Enos’ divisions, but assumed they were not far behind and were coming up with large reserves of food. The men camping with Arnold were dangerously low on provisions. The flooding also had ruined their chances of catching fish.

Despite their problems, Arnold was optimistic throughout the meeting; inspired by his commanding presence and courage, his officers voted unanimously to proceed. Bold action was necessary to make up the time lost, and the council decided that Captain Hanchett of Meigs’ division would temporarily relinquish command of his company to take charge of 50 of the best men drawn from the different companies in camp. This choice detachment would push ahead to the nearest Canadian settlement and return with fresh provisions. Americans at the time referred to such elite troops as picked men, and they were the forerunner of the Continental Army’s Corps of Light Infantry.

Arnold believed the closest inhabitants were at a cluster of small, scattered settlements along the ChaudiPre River known collectively as Sartigan. However, he had no idea of the exact location or size of this community of peasant farmers, whether they had any food to sell, or if there were any enemy troops stationed there. Arnold and his officers also decided that Greene’s and Enos’ divisions had to move faster. Believing that Greene’s division had been well provisioned from Enos’ reserves, Arnold and the officers with him decided that these two laggard divisions should advance with as many troopers as they could supply with rations for 15 days, and that the others should return to Fort Western with their sick and feeble men. The council also agreed that anyone at Camp Disaster who was ill or too exhausted to proceed—amounting to 26— should start back the next morning toward the Kennebec settlements under the care of an officer. Having made their decisions, the group did its best to get some sleep.

Arnold awoke the next morning and promptly put the council’s plan into action. He wrote out instructions to Enos and dispatched a courier to find him. His directive read, in part,

Dead River, 30 miles from Chaudiere Pond [Lake Magentic; Arnold’s calculation of his distance from the lake was fairly accurate], Oct. 24, 1775. We have had a council of war last night, when it was thought best, and ordered to send back all the sick and feeble with three day’s provisions, and directions for you to furnish them until they can reach the commissary [a reference to the stock of provisions that Arnold ordered Colonel Farnsworth to establish at the Great Carry] or Norridgewock; and that on receipt of this you should proceed with as many of the best men of your division as you can furnish with 15 day’s provision; and that the remainder whether sick or well, should be immediately sent back. . . .²⁴

Arnold sent a separate note with similar instructions to Greene, unaware that Enos and Greene were camping near each other. Having completed this task, Arnold exchanged a few final words with Captain Hanchett and watched, along with everyone else at Camp Disaster, as his 50 picked men headed upriver for the Canadian settlements. Everything depended on their reaching the French villages and returning with food before the army died of starvation. Arnold then supervised the loading of the invalids onto bateaux for their return trip to the Maine settlements. He also gave part of the gold and silver coins he was carrying to Major Meigs, the senior officer present, for safekeeping, with instructions to split the money with the other division commanders when they reached Canada.

Arnold maintained a bold command presence throughout the crisis. According to Morison, he walked among the troops to quiet their fears before pushing on: “[O]ur gallant Colonel himself, after admonishing us to persevere as he hitherto had done, set out with a guide for the inhabitants in order to hasten the return of provisions.”²⁵ Having done everything he could, Arnold departed Camp Disaster late in the morning of the 24th with nine men, including his aide-de-camp Oswald, and swiftly pushed on to catch up with Hanchett’s detachment, which had left camp earlier in the day.

Greene and Enos never received Arnold’s orders. Disappointed by Enos’ failure to provide his division with food, and lacking any instructions, Greene pondered whether to push on toward Canada where there was the promise of food, or retreat back to civilization while there was still time. Greene decided to keep going and try to find Arnold, who might be able to order some food for his hungry men. His decision was no surprise; Greene was a tough officer who later in the war (1777) would successfully defend Fort Mercer, New Jersey, with 400 men against an assault by 1,800 determined Hessian troops.²⁶

Greene’s division broke camp on the morning of October 22, leaving behind an apparently less courageous and bewildered Lieutenant Colonel Enos and his unhappy division. Greene’s famished men traveled about 15 miles in two days before camping for the night (October 24) near Adler Stream. After attending to his division, Greene started upriver that night in a bateau, hoping to find Arnold. Lieutenant Humphrey wrote in his journal that the last of the provisions were distributed that night. “We are absolutely in a dangerous situation, the men are very much disheartened and desirous to return; however, if their bellies were full, I believe they would rather go forward,” said Humphrey.²⁷ Greene was gone that night and most of the next day, while his division remained in camp. He rejoined them on the afternoon of the 25th empty-handed. Arnold, of course, was far ahead, following Captain Hanchettt’s party toward the French Canadian settlements. Even if Green had found him, Arnold had no food to provide.

Having returned to his division, and lacking any orders or information from Arnold, Greene decided to send all of his sick men back to the Kennebec settlements and push on as quickly as possible with the rest. There were 48 men sick, and Greene left them in the care of a junior officer with orders to make the return trip in three bateaux. It was impossible, however, to fit so many men in just three bateaux, and some of the sick apparently were expected to walk. Greene also dispatched two men from his division as couriers. One headed upriver to report their situation to Arnold, while the other went downstream to find Enos and ask him to parley. Adding to everyone’s misery and gloom was the fact that six inches of snow fell on the night of the 24th, “attended with very severe [cold and windy] weather.”²⁸

On the verge of starvation and in an inhospitable wildness far from civilization, Major Bigelow wrote his wife Anna a melancholy letter that he entrusted to an officer who was returning to the Maine settlements with the sick:

October 25, 1775

On that part of the Kennebec, Called Dead River 95 miles from Norridgewock.

Dear Wife,

I am at this time well, but in a dangerous situation, as is the whole detachment of the Continentals with me. We are in a wilderness, nearly one hundred miles from any inhabitants, either French or English. . . . We are this day sending back the most feeble, and some that are sick. If the French are our enemies, it will go hard with us, for we have no retreat left. In that case, there will be no alternate between the sword and famine.

May God in his infinite mercy protect you, my more than ever dear wife and my dear children.²⁹

After sending back his sick and frail men, and dispatching couriers to find Arnold and Enos, Greene ordered the remainder of his downhearted division to advance. His men managed to trek about three miles along the riverbank before stopping for the night at Arnold’s old campsite at Shadagee Falls, where they waited for their bateaux with their remaining equipment (probably consisting mostly of their tents) and established camp for the night. They must have had some information, probably from the trickle of sick and feeble men returning from the front, about what had happened to Arnold, Morgan, and Meigs, because Lieutenant Humphrey knew that the colonel had sent Captain Hanchett ahead “with a party, the number I do not know, to purchase of the French if possible and to clear the roads.”³⁰

We are fortunate that Dr. Senter—who kept one of the most accurate diaries of the expedition—was traveling with Greene at the time. Senter said that Greene’s men were “almost destitute of any eatable whatever, except a few candles, which were used for supper . . . by boiling them in water gruel.”³¹ But their forlorn camp suddenly came to life when the courier sent downriver returned with news that Lieutenant Colonel Enos was on his way with his officers for a council of war with Greene.

Senter said Enos arrived with five officers from his division, the most important of whom were his three company commanders, identified by Senter in his journal as Williams, McCobb, and Scott. The first officer mentioned was Captain Thomas Williams, who served in Colonel John Paterson’s Massachusetts regiment prior to volunteering for the Arnold Expedition. The second was Captain Samuel McCobb, a resident of Arrowsic Island, Maine, who had fought at the Battle of Bunker Hill. There is no known information about Enos’ other company commander—identified only as Captain Scott—or the other two officers who accompanied him, identified as Lieutenant Peters and “adjutant Hide” (David Hyde, the adjutant of Enos’ division).³² Senter called the lot “grimacers,” because they arrived for the council with cheerless faces.³³ Attending the council from Greene’s division were Lieutenant Colonel Greene, Major Bigelow, and their three company commanders, Captains Topham, Thayer, and Ward.

Senter was an observer to the parley that followed, and he described the event in his journal. He noted that the council began with Enos claiming the right to chair the meeting as senior officer present. Following this, the officers debated whether to proceed or turn back. Enos’ officers were in favor of returning, stating that even if all the remaining provisions were evenly divided, there still was not enough food to feed the men in the two divisions for five days. The matter was put to a vote with predictable results. Greene and his officers voted that all remaining provisions should be divided up equally and as many men as possible should advance, while any sick or “timorous” men should turn back. The officers with Enos disagreed, and voted in favor of everyone turning back. The big surprise was Enos, who cast his vote in favor of proceeding. But Senter felt that Enos had conspired with his officers beforehand and that his vote masked his true intentions, which were to abandon the expedition and return to Cambridge. Senter’s suspicions were confirmed when Enos declared, after hearing the vote of his officers, that it was his duty to remain with his men and to lead them home. Greene and his officers retorted that they were “determined . . . to go through or die,” and asked him to share his provisions with them, to which Enos replied “that his men were out of his power, and that they had determined to keep their possessed quantity whether they went back or forward.”

After a heated discussion, Enos agreed to share his provisions with Greene. With that, Enos started back for camp while Greene ordered his men to abandon their tents and all other camp equipment and head upriver toward Quebec.³⁴ At the same time, Captain Thayer and gentleman volunteer Ogden headed downriver in several bateaux to Enos’ camp to pickup the promised food. Thayer expected to receive at least four barrels of flour and two barrels of pork, but when they arrived at the 4th division’s camp, they were given only two barrels of flour. Despite their entreaties, Thayer and Ogden were told that the 4th division was destitute and could spare nothing more. Thayer, however, was convinced that Enos’ division was “overflowing in abundance of all sorts and had much more food than what was necessary for their return.” As a very angry Thayer prepared to depart, Captain Williams stepped forward and bid him an emotional farewell, saying that he never expected to see Thayer alive again. Then Enos advanced, with tears in his eyes, to say his last farewell to Thayer and Ogden. With that, the two intrepid warriors started back upriver to catch up with Greene, while Enos and his division folded their tents and silently stole away back toward civilization.³⁵

There were probably soldiers in Enos’ division who would have opted to go on if given the chance. However, Enos was in command, and he ordered everyone to turn around and head for home. The situation was just the opposite among Arnold’s other divisions, whose commanders were determined to go on and whose men caught their officer’s spirit, optimism, patriotism, and courage and followed them. If Arnold was half-crazy for pushing on, then Greene, Morgan, Bigelow, and Meigs were as mad as their commander.

Enos defected on the night of October 25, taking with him his three understrength companies—about 150 men—plus another 150 invalids and stragglers, including the 48 sick from Greene’s division.³⁶ The boat repair crew commanded by Reuben Colburn turned back with him. Thayer and Ogden camped in the snow that night, “without the least to cover or screen us from the inclemency of the Weather,” and caught up with Greene and Bigelow the following morning with their two precious barrels of flour.³⁷ They found them in a region called the Chain of Ponds, with the mountains that separated New England from Canada looming in the background.

It took several days for the news to spread up the line that Enos’ division had turned back with the army’s reserve supply of food. Captain Dearborn heard about it on October 27 and wrote in his journal:

Our men made a General Prayer, that Colo: Enos and all his men, might die by the way, or meet with some disaster, Equal to the Cowardly dastardly and unfriendly Spirit they discover’d in returning Back without orders, in such a manner as they had done, And then we proceeded forward.³⁸

Ephraim Squier, a private in Captain Scott’s company of Enos’ division, kept a diary during the expedition. He mentions only that Scott returned from a meeting on October 25 and his company started back toward the Kennebec settlements. They reached Norridgewock Falls four days later and were back at Fort Western by November 4. Squier mentioned a shortage of food only once in his diary, when he wrote that a barrel of flour was lost while one of their bateaux was running some rapids on their return trip. “The loss of the flour much lamented,” wrote Squier, “we being short of provisions.”³⁹

When they got to Fort Western, there were no boats available to take them back to Massachusetts. The fishing boats and coastal freighters that had transported the expedition from Newburyport to Fort Western had returned weeks earlier, forcing Enos’ men to walk back to Cambridge. Typical was Squier’s entry for November 16: “Set out this morning; very bad walking, snow almost knee-deep here. Went-to-day to Wells, 17 miles. Here we got cider and apples plenty.”⁴⁰ On November 23 they arrived back at Cambridge, where Private Squier said his company was disbanded and he returned to his old regiment.

While Enos’ men where making their way back to Fort Western, Arnold’s three remaining divisions were in a life-and-death struggle to reach the Canadian settlements. They were moving through the numerous ponds, lakes, and streams that made up the Chain of Ponds with no accurate maps or experienced scouts to show them the way. In addition, the few landmarks in the region, such as a particular stream or portage, had been obscured when the waterways overflowed their banks. Trail markers, left by scouting parties, were sometimes missed as a result of damage and debris left behind by the recent storm and flood. The men knew that they faced a long overland trek over the Height of Land, which lay beyond the Chain of Ponds, but were unsure of the distance to the closest Canadian settlement and what kind of reception they would receive when they got there.

Washington moved quickly to court-martial Enos, especially since his commission as an officer expired at the end of the year. The commander-in-chief ordered a Court of Inquiry to investigate the circumstances of his defection. The court met on November 29 with Major General Charles Lee as president and completed their business in one day, recommending that “a court martial should be immediately held for his trial.”⁴¹ A court-martial was convened a few days later. This was serious business, and the prescribed 13 officers were appointed to try Enos on charges of abandoning the expedition without the permission of Colonel Arnold.

Enos established his defense strategy in a letter he wrote on November 9 to Washington while en route back to Cambridge. Enos stated that he was short of provisions but shared what he had when he overtook Greene’s division. He stated that a meeting of all the officers present took place, and claimed it was decided that “it was thot [thought] best for my Whole Division to Return & furnish those that proceeded with all our provisions, Except 3 Days to bring us back, wch I did without Loss of time.”⁴²

The court-martial heard testimony from Enos and his officers, all of whom found themselves in the same uneasy position as their commander. Typical was the testimony of Captain McCobb, who swore:

About fifty miles up the Dead River we held a Council of War, at which I assisted as a member; and it was agreed that the whole division under Col. Enos should return [a lie], there not being sufficient provision to carry both divisions through. Colonel Greene’s division being some way ahead [another lie], it was found that we should save two days’ time by letting that division go forward, and time was too precious and provision too scarce to enter into disputes. It was thought best for the service, that Colonel Greene’s division [the weakest division on the expedition] should proceed, and we left them with about five day’s provisions, and returned with three ourselves.⁴³

The situation would have been very different if some of the men Enos abandoned on the Dead River were able to speak out at his court martial, including Private Abner Stocking, whose journal includes a bitter criticism of Enos’ defection:

To add to our discouragements, we received intelligence that Colonel Enos, who was in our rear, had returned with three companies, and taken large stores of provisions and ammunition. These companies had constantly been in the rear, and of course had experienced much less fatigue than we had. They had their path cut and cleared by us; they only followed, while we led. That they therefore should be the first to turn back excited in us much manly resentment.⁴⁴

It is unclear just how much food Enos’ division possessed when it turned back.

The court acquitted Enos because there was no one present to speak out against him. In his ruling, General Sullivan said that the colonel was perfectly justified in returning with his troops because he had sent forward so much of his provisions to support the other divisions, “as left them so small a quantity that their men were almost famished with hunger on their return. . . and that their going forward would only have deprived the other division [Greene’s] of a part of theirs. . . .”⁴⁵

Unsatisfied with Enos’ explanation, Washington referred to his action as “a great defection” in a letter to John Hancock, the president of the Continental Congress.⁴⁶ In another letter to his confidant Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Reed, Washington said that Enos had abandoned Arnold without that officer’s “privity or consent.”⁴⁷ Washington also understood that Enos’ defection reduced the chances of Arnold’s success. Writing Schuyler on November 30, he mentioned the impact of Enos’ action to the success of the mission: “Colonel Enos who had the Command of Arnold’s Rear Division is returned with the greater part of his Men, which must weaken him so much as to render him incapable of making a successful attack on Quebec without assistance from General Montgomery.”⁴⁸

Washington’s observation was correct; Enos’ imprudent action had weakened the expedition’s strength by three companies.

A Map of the Country which was the scene of the operations of the Northern Army; including the Wilderness through which General Arnold marched to attack Quebec.

This map is Plate VI from the atlas that accompanied the five volume, first American edition of John Marshall’s Life of George Washington (1804-1807). The map is generally accurate except that the three ponds (lakes) that comprised the Great Carry between the Kennebec River and the Dead River are missing. Note also that modern Vermont is part of the colony of New York. Author’s Collection.