Chapter 8
The Heartrending Entreaties of the Sick and Helpless1
On November 2, 1775, Dr. Isaac Senter was slowly threading his way through the rocks and underbrush that bordered the Chaudière River when he saw strange creatures coming toward him. “[F]our footed beasts, &c.,” he said, “rode and drove by animals resembling Plato’s two footed featherless ones.”2 Senter wondered if he was seeing a mirage brought on by extreme fatigue and hunger. But as the shapes drew closer, he recognized the one in the lead as his indestructible comrade, Lieutenant Archibald Steele, who was riding on horseback and leading a small herd of cattle being driven by some French-Canadians. Senter and the other soldiers with him cheered as loudly as their feeble condition would permit.
The men butchered a heifer on the spot, each of them receiving one pound of beef that they quickly cooked and ate. Additional relief parties arrived to distribute mutton, meal, and other foodstuffs along the line of march and to help the exhausted stragglers to safety. Colonel Arnold was responsible for organizing the succor that saved their lives. He had raced ahead from the Terrible Carry, promising his men to send relief as soon as he reached the first French-Canadian settlements. Arnold and a small party arrived by boat at Sartigan on the night of October 30, and relief parties, heavily laden with provisions, left early the following morning to locate what remained of the expedition.
All military organization had been abandoned in the final days before relief arrived, as the starving soldiers headed for the closest French-Canadian farms. Several companies, including Morgan’s and Goodrich’s, had lost all their provisions when their remaining bateaux smashed to pieces in the treacherous rock-strewn rapids of the Chaudière. Some members of the expedition were traveling in company size formations, while others were shuffling along in small groups or alone. Private Morison said he was instructed not to stop to help the weak or sick but to “shift for himself, and save his own life if possible.”3
The relief parties reached the first men on November 2 and worked their way up along the river, bringing food and comfort to everyone. Those too sick or feeble to walk to Sartigan were transported there on horseback. Captain Dearborn noted that the three days prior to the arrival of help had been the worst. During this time he witnessed dead men along the route of march, and spotted some of those still living walking barefoot in the snow. Knowing how his men were suffering, Dearborn said that he was moved to tears when he saw the relief parties coming upriver from Sartigan.4 The last feeble stragglers were found and cared for as the remains of Arnold’s ragged, dirty army began limping into the village, thankful to be alive. Hanchett’s detachment probably was the first to arrive, and reached Sartigan on October 31.5
Dearborn’s company were among the next, reaching the settlements at about 5:00 p.m. on November 2. Captain Smith’s rifle company came in with them. Some members of Ward’s company reached the hamlet on the afternoon of November 3. William Hendricks’ Pennsylvania rifle company arrived that evening, along with men from the companies commanded by Thayer and Topham. Rifleman Morison said he arrived on the morning of the 4th with some others, looking “more like ghosts than men, issuing from a dismal Wilderness.”6
Meigs was among the last to arrive. He reached Sartigan on November 4 with the remnants of Hanchett’s company, and wrote in his journal that he had finally arrived in civilization after spending 31 days in an uninhabited wilderness.7 Two Indians found Lieutenant John McClellan of Hendricks’ Pennsylvania rifle company in the woods and carried him to Sartigan in a canoe.8 Sick with pneumonia, he died shortly after reaching the settlements. Rifleman John Joseph Henry lamented McClellan’s death, remembering him as a young man “endowed with all those qualities which win the affections of men.”9
The arrival times of the other men in Sartigan were not recorded, but Morgan’s rifle company, in particular, must have had a terrible ordeal after losing all their provisions when their bateaux were destroyed in the rapids above the Great Falls. The best evidence is that Morgan’s men reached the settlements on November 3.10 Bookish little Aaron Burr, who seemed so frail and unsuited to wilderness life at the start of the campaign, turned out to possess a surprising capacity for enduring fatigue and privation. Rifleman Henry said he saw him hiking along the Chaudière looking fit and encouraging the others to keep moving.11 One biographer attributed Burr’s surprising stamina and skills to a childhood spent fishing, hunting, and boating in the rivers and marshes that surrounded his New Jersey childhood home.12 Another said that Burr’s indomitable will, rather than his physical strength, sustained him through the terrible ordeal.13
By the evening of November 4, 1775, about 600 men had made it to the French settlements. They had walked the last 60 miles through trackless forests, following the course of the river from Lake Magentic to the cluster of peasant farms and Indian tepees known as Sartigan. An estimated 40 to 50 Americans had died trying to reach Sartigan from a combination of hunger, sickness, and fatigue.14 One veteran returned to Maine over the same route a year later, where he saw the remains of some of his comrades, “human bones and hair scattered about the ground promiscuously.”15
Sartigan was not much of a place, just a motley collection of small farms hacked out of the forest and Indian wigwams scattered along the banks of the Chaudière River. There were not enough buildings to shelter all of Arnold’s men, which forced them—in their already weakened state—to build crude lean-tos and constantly tend fires to keep warm.
Their enthusiastic welcome at Sartigan largely was due to the fact that the American rebels—or Les Bostonnais as they were called— arrived with cash and were willing to pay dearly for everything. Many of the officers had money, as evidenced by a message that Arnold wrote to Major Meigs (who apparently had assumed the role of the expedition’s paymaster): “Sartigan, 1st Nov. 1775. You may let each Captain have about twenty or thirty dollars out of the money I gave you, as I suppose they will want a little pocket money for present use, and to supply their men.”16 “The people are civil,” penned Lieutenant Humphrey, “but very extravagant with what they have to sell.”17 Morison also mentioned the high cost of goods in his November 5 journal entry: “[T]he people very hospitable; provisions plenty, but very dear—milk one shilling per quart—bread, one shilling per loaf. . . .”18 Captain Dearborn voiced a similar sentiment: “[T]he inhabitants appears to be very kind, but ask a very Great price for their Victuals.”19
The squalor of the peasant farmers they met upon reaching Sartigan surprised many of Arnold’s men, who tended to come from prosperous farming communities and busy coastal towns in New England. Pierce wrote one of the most interesting descriptions of these people in his entry for November 3, 1775:
all their Farming Tools and household furniture is very Poor—They draw their Oxen by the horns—their Houses and Barns are Chiefly Thatched and very Poor—they Lodge Chiefly on Straw Beds which are Raised on Bedsteads about 2 feet 1/2 [two and a half feet] high—their Windows are Chiefly Paper but Some Glass—A Good Chunked Breed of horses—Small Cattle—Poor Hogs—very Good Fowls of all Sorts—No Chairs to Set on—All Set [sit] on Blocks & Stools. . . . I Slept between two Frenchmen in a French house—it was very odd to hear them at their Devotion.20
Two days later, Pierce made another entry in his journal about the locals:
November 5 1775, . . . It is to be Observed that the French in these Back Settlements are very Stupid not one to 400 that could read one word but were very Precise in Saying their Prayers Counting their Beads and Crossing themselves.21
After organizing succor for his men, Arnold turned the relief work over to his officers and directed his attention to other problems.22 The colonel seemed inexhaustible—“with ability and fortitude rarely if ever surpassed,” was how one of Arnold’s nineteenth-century biographers put it—a trait that helped him earn a reputation as one of America’s best field officers during the Revolutionary War.23 One of Arnold’s highest priorities was to discover what had happened in the war since he departed Fort Western.
Now in British-held territory, Arnold needed to know the situation in Quebec as well as the location of General Schuyler’s northern army. Access to reliable information became critical when the villagers told Arnold that the British knew about his army and a warship had arrived at Quebec to help defend the city. This intelligence contradicted the last information he had received from headquarters (Colonel Reed’s letter dated October 4) that said, “At present there is not a single Regular at Quebeck; nor have they the least suspicion of any danger from any other quarter than Gen. Schuyler.”24
If the peasant’s information was true, then Arnold had lost the critical element of surprise. Was his mind racing as he wondered what had happened to the messages he sent a month earlier to Mercier and Schuyler from the Great Carry? He should have received replies from both by now, especially since common soldier Hall, the French-speaking British army deserter, assured Arnold that he had watched the two Indian couriers depart from Sartigan on the road to Quebec. In fact, the Indians had returned, insisting that they delivered Arnold’s letters to Mercier. The colonel did not know what had gone wrong, but suspected his Indian couriers either had not reached Quebec or had betrayed him. Arnold thought about the contents of the letter that he had written to Mercier from the Great Carry. If it had fallen into enemy hands, he had at least inflated the number of men with him as being 2,000, which might intimidate the reportedly small garrison at Quebec into surrendering. He might already have been thinking about disguising the actual size of his command, if necessary, by marching his men around blazing campfires at night, accompanied by the sounds of shovels digging and officers screaming orders, so as to persuade Quebec’s defenders that he had arrived with a formidable army. General Washington was a master of such deception, which he used successfully later in the war to fool the British into believing that he was digging in to defend Trenton while he slipped away in the night with the bulk of his army to surprise the enemy garrison at nearby Princeton.
But before attempting any tricks, Arnold decided to send another letter to Mercier from Sartigan using a different courier. His second letter shows how eager Arnold was to know the situation inside Quebec. The colonel’s ability to express himself clearly and concisely was much admired by Washington, who wanted his senior officers to be good communicators. Note that the name of Arnold’s courier has been deleted from the letter. This is because the text of the letter comes from the retained, or file copy, which, for security reasons, did not mention the messenger’s name:
Dear Sir,
As I make no doubt of your being hearty in the cause of liberty and your Country, I have taken the liberty to inform you that I have just arrived here, with a large detachment from the American Army. I have several times, on my march, wrote you by the Indians, some of whom have returned and brought no answer. I am apprehensive they have betrayed me. This will be delivered you by _____ on whose secrecy you may depend. I beg the favour of you, on receipt of this, to write me, by the bearer, the number of troops in Quebeck and Montreal; how the French inhabitants stand affected; if any ships of war are at Quebeck, and any other intelligence you may judge necessary for me to know. I find the inhabitants very friendly this way, and make no doubt, they are the same with you. I hope to see you in Quebeck in a few days. In the mean time, I should take it as a particular favour if some one or two of my friends would meet me on the road, and that you would let me know if the enemy are apprized of our coming; also the situation that General Schuyler is in.
Your compliance will much oblige, dear Sir, your friend and humble servant,
B. Arnold25
This letter never reached Mercier, who was suddenly arrested at Quebec on October 28 and thrown into jail.26 Lieutenant Governor Hector Theophilus Cramahé, a Swiss-born retired British career officer, commanded at Quebec in Governor Carleton’s absence. Despite the fact that Carleton had declared martial law in Canada, a delegation of merchants petitioned Cramahé, demanding to know why Mercier had been detained. Cramahé replied, “[T]hat in the present shape of the Province he was not at liberty to acquaint them with his reasons.”27 In truth, a copy of Arnold’s October 13 letters to Mercier and Schuyler, or a summary of their contents, had been delivered to Cramahé, and he and the authorities in Quebec wanted to keep knowledge of Arnold’s approaching army from the city’s residents, who already were unnerved by the news of Schuyler’s advance toward Montreal.
It is unclear how Cramahé learned about Arnold’s letters to Mercier; the traditional story is that one or both of Arnold’s Indian couriers were responsible. But it is more likely that the information came from common soldier John Hall, the French-speaking, alleged British army deserter who volunteered for the Arnold Expedition.28 Hall was a double agent, posing at Cambridge as a deserter but actually working for the Crown. With his soldiering experience and knowledge of French, Hall was a natural for selection by the Americans for the Canadian campaign. Double agent Hall gained a coup when Arnold instructed him to accompany the two Indians carrying his October 13 letters addressed to Mercier and Schuyler. Hall’s instructions from Arnold were, upon reaching Sartigan, to arrange for a Canadian to escort the two Penobscots (Eneas and Sebatis) to Quebec, after which Hall was to gather information from the local people and return to the advancing army.29 Ironically, Arnold sent Hall along because he did not trust the Indians.
Hall probably went as far as Sartigan, per Arnold’s instructions, where he was able to get word to the British authorities in Quebec City (perhaps via the French-Canadian guide he selected at Sartigan to accompany Arnold’s two innocent Indians), alerting them to the rebel column advancing on Quebec and informing them that Mercier was Arnold’s principal contact in the city. The lack of any known published record of John Hall’s activities is not unusual, because he would instantly have been hanged as a spy if the rebels discovered his true identity.
Mercier’s arrest caused concern among Quebec’s inhabitants, who were given no explanation for his apprehension and for why he was not charged with any crime. Mercier was a British citizen and an important merchant in Quebec, and his detention caused a stir as far away as London, where the following anonymously written account of his tyrannous arrest was published in the newspapers:
On Saturday, the 28th of October, Mr. John Dyer Mercier, as he was going into the upper Town, was laid hold of by the Town Sergeant, and conducted to the main guard and there confined, and his papers were seized and examined merely by the order of the Lieutenant-Governour, without any crime or accusation alleged against him, and at daybreak the next morning he was put on board the Hunter sloop-of-war. This was very alarming to the citizens of Quebeck, who there-upon had a meeting, and appointed three of their number to wait on the Lieutenant-Governour, to know the cause of so remarkable step. He made answer, “that he had sufficient reasons for what he had done, which he would communicate when and to whom he should think proper.” But nothing was found that had proceeded from him, or that could serve as proof to convict him of any crime.
The newspaper story, which provided other accounts of the arbitrary detention and mistreatment of Canadians, concluded by saying that the king had surrounded himself with powerful but poor advisors who had become “instruments of arbitrary power over their fellow-citizens. . . . [T]he King was told he was reduced to this alternative: he must part with his Ministers or his Colonies. He has made his choice. He has kept his Ministers, and lost America.”30
It was inevitable that rumors began to circulate inside Quebec that a rebel army, commanded by a Colonel Arnold, had crossed Maine and was marching on their city. Lieutenant Governor Cramahé was a nervous man who did what he could to improve Quebec’s neglected defenses while there still was time.
The Royal Navy sloop Hunter (a small warship armed with ten guns and a crew of 80), Captain Thomas Mackenzie commanding, arrived at Quebec from Boston on October 12 with orders to proceed to Montreal “or to any other part up and down the River as shall be thought best for the Kings Service, endeavouring in all things to demonstrate your Zeal for it by an active and steady discharge of your Duty.”31 Mackenzie decided to anchor his ship at Quebec when he discovered that the city was virtually undefended. The Hunter was the warship that Arnold heard about from the French-Canadian peasants. Although she was small, the Hunter’s ten cannons represented a formidable hurdle for Arnold, whose expedition had neither artillery nor naval support. An even bigger problem for Arnold was that his corps was marching across Quebec province toward the south shore of the St. Lawrence River. Quebec stood on the north side of the river, and the British would undoubtedly use the Hunter to discourage the rebels from trying to cross, or to blow them out of the water if they made the attempt.
On November 5, 1775, Arnold’s problems multiplied with the arrival of the Lizard at Quebec. She was a small Royal Navy frigate (three masts and cannons mounted on two decks), carrying 28 guns and a crew of 160.32 Her arrival meant that Arnold would have to dodge two enemy warships when he reached the St. Lawrence. But there was even more bad news in store for Arnold, who learned that the Lizard had escorted two store ships (the Elizabeth and the Jacob) from England, both of which were loaded with munitions, uniforms, and money.
The arrival at Quebec of H.M.S. Lizard and her consorts was no accident, but rather the result of urgent reports from Governor Carleton for help. Carleton had been sending dispatches to his superiors in London throughout the summer, informing them of Schuyler’s military build-up on Lake Champlain. At the time, Carleton believed he could defend Canada with an army recruited from the local population. With this idea in mind, he asked the home government to rush him weapons, ammunition, uniforms, and money. The Elizabeth and the Jacob were London’s rapid response to Carleton’s urgent pleas. The two heavily laden, unarmed merchant ships sailed from England on August 16, 1775, escorted by the Lizard and with orders to proceed to Quebec, where Governor Carleton would provide them with additional instructions.33
Congress learned about the two supply ships even before they sailed from England. Their information came from American sympathizers in Britain, who tipped off the rebels about the valuable cargo aboard the Elizabeth and Jacob and its destination. Apparently unaware that the two ships were being escorted by the Lizard, or hoping to snag the merchantmen despite the escort, the rebels raced to try and intercept the two unarmed merchantmen at sea. The New England colonies had armed some merchant ships, but because they were embroiled in politics and bureaucracy, they failed to respond to Congress’ plea. John Hancock, the president of the Continental Congress, then informed Washington about the two Quebec-bound store ships in a letter dated October 5, in which he wrote, “The Congress having this day Rec’d certain Intelligence of the Sailing of Two. . . Brigantines, of no Force [unarmed] from England on the 11th of August last, loaded with Six Thousand Stand of Arms, a large Quantity of Powder & others Stores for Quebec, without Convoy [incorrect intelligence], and as it is of great importance if possible to intercept them.”34 Washington, who received Hancock’s letter at Cambridge on the 11th, jumped at the chance. He was in the midst of converting two coastal merchants’ ships, named the Speedwell (renamed Hancock) and the Eliza (christened Franklin).35 Washington immediately informed his military secretary, Joseph Reed, who was in charge of refitting both ships with cannons at Beverly, Massachusetts, of this great opportunity, ordering him to accelerate the work on the Hancock and Franklin and to get them to sea as soon as possible. Reed’s efforts included instructing the officers on the scene, “You will immediately set every Hand to Work that can be procured & not a Moment of Time be lost. . . .”36
The two refitted warships sailed from Beverly on October 22 under the overall command of Nicholson Broughton, an experienced sea captain. Washington gave Broughton sealed orders with instructions not to open them until his squadron was out of sight of land. The sealed orders were part of Washington’s efforts to keep the mission a secret from the British, who had spies and informers everywhere. Upon reaching the open sea, the cankerous Broughton read his orders and decided it was too late in the season to sail into the waters off the mouth of the St. Lawrence River and that he probably had missed the Quebec-bound store ships anyway. Broughton ignored Washington’s explicit orders, deciding instead to raid Charlottetown, the capital of St. John Island (now Prince Edward Island), which he heard was undefended and contained shops and warehouses filled with valuable goods.37 Thus the two store ships, crammed with enough equipment to outfit a small army, safely cleared the North Atlantic and sailed into the St. Lawrence River.
The Lizard carried two additional valuable assets to assist Quebec: a strongbox full of gold and silver coins that would help buy the fidelity of Quebec’s militia, and John Hamilton, the ship’s captain. This capable and experienced officer had been handpicked by the admiralty for what they expected to be a difficult assignment requiring a man of good judgment and independent action. Hamilton lived up to their expectations.
The Lizard reached Quebec on November 5 with the Elizabeth and Jacob. Captain Hamilton hailed the city with a 15-gun salute from the Lizard’s great guns then moored his ship and went into town to confer with Lieutenant Governor Cramahé and Captain Mackenzie, commander of the sloop Hunter. After being briefed on the situation, including the approach of Arnold’s Expedition toward Quebec, Hamilton decided to remain at Quebec rather than proceeding farther upriver to Montreal. As the senior naval officer at Quebec, Hamilton took command of the Hunter and several smaller-armed vessels in the river. He also used the valuable resources of his frigate to help defend the city. The Lizard’s log entry for November 7 gives some of the particulars: “Disembarked our Marines to Assist the Garrison. They being in want of regulars. . . sent on shore 100 Hand Grenades and 10 Fuses for the Use of the Garrison [.S]ent the Sail maker & 2 men On Shore to make sand Bags to Repair the walls.”38 Eventually, Hamilton off-loaded all of his ship’s cannons, which were strategically placed on shore.
Another boost to Quebec’s morale arrived in the person of Colonel Ethan Allen, the famous ringleader of the Green Mountain Boys. This arch-rebel passed through the city in chains en route to stand trial for treason in London. Allen was captured when he made a reckless, premature attack on Montreal with 250 Canadian recruits. His apprehension impressed the French-Canadians and helped boost the morale of Quebec’s defenders. Arnold may have heard rumors of Allen’s capture, which would have come as no surprise, since Arnold had first-hand experience of his behavior. Meanwhile, the American propaganda machine back in Cambridge and Philadelphia had a field day with images of the courageous Colonel Allen being taken away in chains in an effort to convince the people that they were subject to the same brutal treatment by the depraved and tyrannical British government.39
Despite the presence of two Royal Navy warships, the military and political situation in Quebec remained perilous. There were not enough dependable men defending Quebec to man the extensive fortifications that circled the city. Besides, much of Quebec’s seemingly impressive defenses were in disrepair after years of neglect, and could easily be assaulted by a determined attack. In addition, most of the civilian population was apathetic in their loyalty to Britain and indifferent to who occupied the city, so long as their lives, homes, and businesses were safe. The merchants, in particular, were nervous that their wharves and warehouses—stuffed with goods—would be burned by the rebels. They wanted the city to surrender at the first sign of Arnold’s approach. The final straw was Cramahé, who despite his military career, proved to be a government functionary who lacked the determination and enterprise of Governor Carlton. Cramahé seemed resigned that the rebels would take the city and was not interested in getting advice from Captain Hamilton.40 For example, in a letter to General William Howe in Boston, Cramahé wrote, “[I]f attacked before Gen. Carleton’s arrival [return to Quebec with troops] there is too much reason to apprehend the affair will be soon over.”41
While feckless Cramahé went through the motions of defending Quebec, Arnold was 60 miles away in Sartigan, making as much trouble as he could for his opponent. He recruited for his army about 50 Indians, who demanded cash for their services.42
One of the Indians who joined the expedition was Natanis, previously thought to be as “big a rogue as ever existed under heaven.”43 It turned out that he had been shadowing the Americans since their arrival on the Dead River, helping them in small ways without showing himself for fear of being shot. He finally stepped forward at Sartigan, and shook the hand of Lieutenant Steele, whose scouting mission had been ordered to kill him. From that moment onward, Natanis proved to be a friend and ally to the Americans.44
Arnold was also handing out broadsides encouraging the French Canadians to join his army. His proclamations, printed in French, were probably composed back in Cambridge by Major General Charles Lee’s aide-de-camp, William Palfrey, who was conversant in the language. General Lee corrected the French grammar in the original draft of the proclamation.45 The proclamations were printed at headquarters and shipped to Arnold in Maine with a covering letter from Joseph Reed, Washington’s military secretary. The bundle of proclamations caught up with the expedition at Fort Western, and Arnold mentioned their arrival in his September 27 report to Washington: “I have received a Letter from Col. Reed, with the Manifesto’s. . . .”46 The proclamation, titled “Address to the Inhabitants of Canada,” were probably entrusted to Eleazer Oswald, who oversaw their safe arrival in Canada along with most of the expedition’s money and headquarters papers. These broadsides, which arrived in Canada with the expedition’s headquarters baggage, read in part:
Friends and Brethren,
The Great American Congress have sent an army into your province under command of General Schuyler, not to plunder but to protect you. . . . To cooperate with this design. . . I have detached Colonel Arnold into your country, with a part of the Army under my command. . . . I invite you therefore as Friends and Brethren, to provide him with such Supplies as your Country affords; and I pledge myself not only for your Safety and Security, but for ample Compensation. The Cause of America and of Liberty is the Cause of every virtuous American Citizen; whatever may be his Religion or his Descent, the United Colonies know no Distinction but such as Slavery, Corruption and arbitrary Domination may create. Come then, you generous Citizens, range yourselves under the Standard of general Liberty—against which all the Force and Artifice of Tyranny will never be able to prevail.47
The proclamation that Arnold distributed was part of a stream of American propaganda engineered to bring the Canadians into the war as allies. There were compelling reasons for the Canadians to join the rebellion as the fourteenth colony, especially the fact that their country had been conquered by the British just 12 years prior to the start of the Revolutionary War. But there were other circumstances in Canada working against Les Bostonnais, one of which was the loyalty of Canada’s clergy to the British. Canada’s white population of 100,000 was primarily Roman Catholic, and the British did not interfere with the Catholic religion after annexing the former French colony. The Quebec Act of 1774 guaranteed religious toleration, which helped secure the good will of the Catholic clergy, who had great influence over the people, reminding them that the American invaders were Protestants—a religion they considered to be the devil’s work. Washington was aware of the domination of the Catholic Church in Canada and warned Arnold to respect the people’s religious beliefs. The general mentioned this point in the set of written instructions that he gave Arnold before the expedition left Cambridge. Washington told Arnold, “[A]s far as lays in your Power you are to protect & support the free exercise of the Religion of the Country & the undisturbed Enjoyment of the Rights of Conscience in religious Matters with your utmost Influence & Authority.”48
Another problem that Arnold confronted with the civilian population of Canada was that they had no experience with self-government and seemed content to continue living in the highly stratified, class-based system in which the majority of the people were habitants, French-Canadians who rented their land from the rich and powerful seigneurs who owned large estates originally held by feudal grants from the king of France. Thus the richest farmlands in Canada at the time—the acreage along the St. Lawrence, Richelieu, and Chaudière rivers—were divided into large estates controlled by the seigneur class. The merchants and tradesmen living in Montreal and Quebec were more liberal and pro-active in their politics. Some of these urbanites were businessmen who had immigrated to Canada from New England following the British conquest. Called the “old subjects” (as opposed to the French-Canadians, who were called the “new subjects”), these transplanted New Englanders tended to side with the rebellion, but were estimated to be only 2,000 in number and unable to influence the French-Canadians, who were under the control of the priests and seigneurs. Thus, despite all of Arnold’s overtures, promises, and proclamations, he was only able to recruit a handful of Canadians for his army, and had to continue to rely on gold and silver to buy food, labor, shelter, and to hire boats, horses, and wagons from the local civilians. Washington also provided Arnold direction on this point in his written instructions:
You are to endeavor. . . to conciliate the Affections of those People & such Indians as you may meet with by every Means in your Power—convincing them that we Come at the Request of many of their Principal People, not as Robbers or to make War upon them but as the Friends & Supporters of their Liberties as well as ours.49
From the moment that he arrived at Sartigan, Arnold realized that this scattered settlement could only serve as a temporary stopping place to collect and rest his army before moving on. Even if he wanted to camp there for an extended period of time, the area lacked food and shelter to support his men. Arnold himself only stayed at Sartigan for one day before advancing six miles down the river, closer to Quebec City, where on the morning of November 1 he established his headquarters in a wayside tavern. Lieutenant Steele and another officer named John Taylor, from Smith’s Pennsylvania rifle company, were among those who accompanied him and assisted in the purchase and transportation of additional food for their hungry men.
Arnold moved farther down the river valley to St. Joseph, the first real village along the Chaudière, and then to another, larger village named Ste. Marie, which he reached November 5, leaving a trail of cash and proclamations behind him. The land that Arnold was passing through was owned by seigneur Gabriel Elzear Taschereau, who managed his vast acreage in feudal splendor from a manor house located near St. Marie. Like the other seigneurs, Taschereau was a loyalist. He vacated his mansion at the approach of the Americans and ran off to Quebec, where he joined the militia. Arnold occupied Taschereau’s vacant home and enjoyed the comforts of the manor house for one night before advancing closer to Quebec on November 6.
The road north from Ste. Marie paralleled the Chaudière River for four miles, at which point the river cut off sharply to the left and the road angled to the right. Arnold followed the road, which took them through a bleak, almost uninhabited 12-mile stretch of woodlands called the Forest of Sertigan. The village of St. Henri, situated along the banks of the Ethemin River at the northern edge of the forest, was in a thickly populated region only ten miles from Quebec City with a good road connecting it to Pointe de Lévy (also called Point de Lévis, Point Levis, and Point Levi), the name given to the area along the southern bank of the St. Lawrence River directly across from Quebec. Traffic going to Quebec could cross by ferry from Lévis (a village near Pointe de Lévy) to Quebec City, but the British had long since halted this and other ferries along the river and removed all boats from the south side of the St. Lawrence in anticipation of Arnold’s arrival. Some troops caught up with Arnold at St. Henri, which allowed him to dispatch a lieutenant with a detachment of riflemen to reconnoiter the road between St. Henri and Pointe de Lévy. He also sent spies into Quebec City, but its defenders anticipated this move by the Americans and questioned any strangers who entered. Arnold’s spies were discovered in this manner and promptly arrested. Arnold, though dangerously close to Quebec, still only had rumors about the military situation in the city and the position of Schuyler’s northern army. A joining up with Schuyler was a definite option now that it was apparent his expedition had lost any chance of surprise.
The letter Arnold had been hoping for finally came on November 8, when an Indian courier arrived at St. Henri with a message from General Montgomery, Schuyler’s second-in-command. Reliable news from the Northern army at last! Arnold anxiously broke the seal of the dispatch, unfolded it, and started to read its contents. Montgomery’s letter, dated October 29, 1775, was written from St. Johns, Canada. Sadly, there is no known copy of Montgomery’s letter, but we can speculate on its contents based on the last reliable news he had about Arnold’s position and on his own situation at St. Johns. The last information he had about Arnold was from a letter Washington wrote Schuyler, in which he said that Arnold had arrived at Fort Western. Washington included a copy of Arnold’s report from the two scouts who traveled as far as the Dead River.50
There was the possibility that Arnold already had captured Quebec. Whatever the case, Montgomery asked Arnold to report his position and the exact number of men under his command. Montgomery probably explained his situation, as well as Schuyler’s illness and return to Fort Ticonderoga to regain his health. He may have described how he arrived before St. Johns in early September to find the place well fortified with artillery and garrisoned with what informants told him were the majority of the regular troops in Canada plus some militia and Indians, amounting to about 700 men. Arnold knew St. Johns because he had raided the place in May and understood the dangers of bypassing it and moving on to Montreal. The general may also have explained that he commanded 2,000 Connecticut and New York troops, few of whom had any military experience, and how he had lost valuable time waiting for sufficient artillery and mortars to arrive from Ticonderoga to reduce St. Johns. Montgomery recommended that Arnold send him a reply via the two Indians who had delivered his letter.
Arnold immediately responded to Montgomery. In his reply, dated November 8, 1775, the colonel described his little army’s horrendous trek to Canada: “I cannot at present give you a particular detail, but can only say we have hauled our batteaux over falls, up rapid streams, over carrying places; and marched through morasses, thick woods, and over mountains, about 320 miles [a miscalculation, the actual traveled was approximately 270 miles]—many of which we had to pass several times to bring our baggage.” Arnold next told how Enos returned from the Dead River, “contrary to my expectation, he having orders to send back only the sick, and those that could not be furnished with provisions,” and how he had written General Schuyler on October 13 but he was betrayed and the enemy was aware of his movements. The colonel said that all the canoes around Pointe de Lévy had been destroyed, and there were two frigates and several small armed vessels “lying before Quebec, and a large ship or two lately arrived from Boston.” Waiting for Schuyler to arrive, retreating or surrendering were unthinkable options for Arnold. Instead he told Montgomery, “I propose crossing the St. Lawrence as soon as possible . . . otherwise shall endeavor to join your army at Montreal.”51
Arnold wrote a similar letter addressed to General Washington and entrusted both dispatches to Montgomery’s courier, who was intercepted en route by the enemy.52 Arnold’s letters did not give any information about the number of men with him, their weak physical condition, and his shortage of weapons and warm clothing. This type of sensitive information was intentionally excluded as a precaution against dispatches falling into enemy hands. So the British learned little from these latest intercepted dispatches.
Arnold now knew, from Montgomery’s letter, that the northern army could not give him any immediate help. He was on his own in hostile territory with around 600 sickly, poorly armed and equipped soldiers and 50 Indian mercenaries, all of whom were strung out for several miles. Arnold reread the instructions Washington had given him at Cambridge on September 14, in which the general required him to put his corps under Schuyler’s command: “[I]f he should be in Canada upon your Arrival there, you are by no means to consider yourself as upon a Separate & Independant Command but are to put yourself under him & follow his Directions.”53
The prudent course of action was to abandon his attack on Quebec and head west to link up with the northern army. A lesser man might have taken this tact, which could be justified with honor. But Arnold was an assertive, tough officer, and his only thoughts were to ford the St. Lawrence and assault Quebec. To do this, he had to consolidate his corps and get it across the river, no matter how sick, threadbare, and footsore the men were from their terrible ordeal. He therefore sent back an order on the 6th that instructed “every captain to get his company on as fast as possible, and not to leave a man behind unless unfit for duty.”54 The dauntless Colonel Arnold had already worked out a way to get his force across the river under the guns of the two Royal Navy warships. His solution was to wait for a dark, windless night and then silently slip past the enemy warships and patrol boats in Indian canoes.
The scouting party Arnold dispatched from St. Henri on the night of November 6 returned the next morning and reported the enemy had consolidated all their forces at Quebec City. Based on this information, Arnold advanced along the road on the morning of November 7 to Pointe de Lévy to await the arrival of his troops. Pointe de Lévy had been chosen by Arnold, in part, because there was a flour mill at the site with a supply of wheat at hand that could be ground into flour.
The bulk of Arnold’s corps pulled out of Sartigan on November 3 and marched on foot toward the St. Lawrence at the rate of 10 to 20 miles a day. Food was plentiful but expensive, however there was no warm clothing or shoes for sale from the peasants at any price. Unknown to Arnold at the time, ammunition was in short supply, and there were not enough muskets and rifles for all the men; about 100 had lost their weapons during the numerous bateaux accidents that had befallen the expedition along the Kennebec, Dead, and Chaudière Rivers. The sick and feeble soldiers, 96 in number, were too weak to walk and required transport down the Chaudière from Sartigan in rented or purchased canoes. Major Meigs and Captains Topham and Thayer were responsible for the care of the invalids. Captain Dearborn was among the sick, probably suffering with some form of pneumonia. He wrote in his journal that it was snowing when he left Sartigan and that he saw a great number of men who were marching barefoot and “in poor circumstances.”55
And thus the locals observed a rawboned column of American patriots—some without weapons and wrapped in tattered, dirty coats and blankets—marching resolutely toward Quebec. One of the Americans described the scene in his journal: “[O]ur clothes were torn in pieces by the bushes, and hung in strings—few of us had any shoes, but moggasons [moccasins] made of raw skins—many of us without hats—and beards long and visages thin and meager. I thought we much resembled the animals which inhabit New-Spain [South America], called the Ourang-Outang.”56 The Americans’ destitute appearance increased the reluctance of the French Canadians to join them. The locals must also have wondered how these invaders planned to capture Quebec without any warships or artillery.
Arnold’s ragged, poorly equipped men began arriving at Pointe de Lévy, through gusts of snow and strong winds, on November 7, the same day that the smartly dressed and well-armed Marines from the Lizard disembarked to help defend Quebec. The British gained another small advantage on November 9 as evidenced by the log of the Lizard, which reported the arrival at Quebec of “his Majestys Schooner Magdelin Lt. Joseph Nunn [commanding] from Portsmouth [England] with Dispatches[.]”57 The Magdelin’s six cannons added to the defenders’ firepower. Across the river, Arnold and his companions bought extra provisions and supervised the construction of scaling ladders that they were paying the French-Canadians to make. Officers forayed back into the interior, to the villages along the Etchemin and Chaudière, to buy or rent additional boats and canoes, while soldiers made crude shoes from the hides of butchered animals. Dr. Senter arrived on this busy scene on November 8 with “snow over shoes. In open sight of the enemy naught but the river divided us.”58
The British were watching the Americans on the south shore of the St. Lawrence at the same time. The log of the Lizard recorded that “the Charlotte Armd Ship [a sloop with a crew of twenty] made the Signal for the Approach of the Enemy.”59
A man named John Halstead arrived in the rebel camp about this time. Senter described Halstead as a man formerly from “the Jerseys” (New Jersey) who “followed merchandise [a merchant] in Quebec” and an individual the British suspected was “holding a correspondence with the Bostonians.”60 As a precaution, Lt. Governor Cramach ordered Halstead to leave the city immediately, so as to prevent him from aiding the rebels. Halstead headed across the river, where he was welcomed as a “friend of liberty,” while loyalists back at Quebec were calling him “a great scoundrel.”61 Since Halstead knew the river and surrounding terrain, Arnold decided to use him as a pilot for his planned dash across the river.62 Just how many troops Arnold had at Pointe de Lévy by mid-November is uncertain, since Dearborn noted at the time that “a Considerable number of our men are left on the road Sick or woren [worn] out with fatigue & hunger.”63
The men of the Arnold Expedition who reached the St. Lawrence had the exhilaration of viewing their objective for the first time. Death had stalked them over almost 300 miles of waist-high freezing water, dense swamps, torrential rains, raging floods, falling trees, thickets, quagmires, wind, ice, snow, and near starvation, and those who survived the journey were ecstatic about their triumph. “When we halted [we] were within sight of Quebec,” penned private Morison, “the river St. Lawrence between us and the town. We were filled with joy at this event, when we saw ourselves at the end of our destination; and at length freed from the misery we endured in the woods.”64 It was also a personal victory for Arnold who, despite unanticipated obstacles and inaccurate information about his route, had led his men across 270 miles of muck and mire. As a result, their fellow Americans soon would celebrate Arnold as the “American Hannibal” and his officers and men as the “famine proof veterans.”65 General Washington expressed his admiration for their accomplishments in a letter to General Schuyler in early December:
It gave me the highest Satisfaction to hear of Colonel Arnold’s being at point Levi, with his Men in great Sprits after their long and fatiguing March, attended with almost insuperable Difficulties, and discouraging Circumstances of being left by one third of the Troops nearly that went upon the Expedition: The Merit of this Gentleman is certainly great and I have every wish that Fortune may distinguish him as one of the her favorites.66
Even the enemy admired the expedition’s achievement, as evidenced by the following extract from an anonymous letter from Quebec subsequently published in British newspapers:
A View of the City of Quebec, the Capital of Canada. This etching was published by Robert Sayer in London in 1768.
Historic Urban Plans, Inc.
There are about five hundred Provincials arrived on Point Levi, opposite to the Town, by the way of Chaudiere, across the woods. Surely a miracle must have been wrought in their favour. It is an undertaking above the common race of men, in this debauched age. They have traveled through woods and bogs, and over precipices, for the space of one hundred and twenty miles, attended with every inconvenience and difficulty, to be surmounted only by men of indefatigable zeal and industry.67
Having endured great hardships, the expedition’s members experienced one bit of good luck when they discovered that the British had failed to destroy the flour mill at Pointe de Lévy when they withdrew behind Quebec’s walls. Major Henry Caldwell, a retired British officer and reportedly the richest man in Quebec, owned the mill, and he may have interceded to prevent it from being destroyed, hoping he could reclaim it at some future date. Caldwell had recently come out of retirement to command the British residents in the city who had organized into a militia. The rebels not only occupied the working mill, but found a supply of grain on the site from which fresh bread could be made. Halstead knew how to operate the mill, as he once had managed the place for Caldwell.
Captain Mackenzie, who commanded the Hunter, saw the rebel activity on the south shore and decided to send some men to reconnoiter and, if possible, to snatch some boat oars from the rebels. Mackenzie selected his younger brother, a 15-year-old midshipman (apprentice naval officer) for the job. The youngster took a cutter (ship’s boat) loaded with heavily armed sailors from the Hunter and quietly rowed to a secluded section of the shoreline. Their boat made it ashore, but Arnold’s watchful sentries discovered—and shot at—them. Realizing what had happened, Captain Mackenzie began firing his ship’s guns in support of his brother’s landing party. In the melee, the sailors returned to their cutter and hastily rowed out of range, inadvertently leaving behind their commander. Young Mackenzie hid in the underbrush for a while before making a dash for the boat by plunging into the cold water and swimming toward safety. Some of Arnold’s Indians spotted him, jumped into the river after him, and took him prisoner. Mackenzie was the first prisoner of war that Arnold’s men had seized since carrying the war into the enemy’s country, and they were elated with their prize.68
Determined to cross the river and attack the city, Arnold observed Quebec through his spyglass from across the river.69 The city stood on a promontory in a bend of the St. Lawrence. He could see the two Royal Navy warships (Hunter and Lizard) strategically anchored in the river. Commanding the view was the spectacular rock formation called Cape Diamond, which rose more than 300 feet above the river and dominated the landscape. A smaller river, named the St. Charles, flowed into the St. Lawrence above the city. Deep water surrounded Quebec on three sides, and the only land approach was from the west toward the high ground dominated by Cape Diamond. This unique combination made Quebec one of the best natural fortresses in the world, and worthy of the nickname given it in the nineteenth century—“the Gibraltar of North America.”
Arnold put together a plan of Quebec from his various sources, which included his recollections of his prewar visits and a map of the city published in France in 1755. Although out of date, this map, titled Plan de la ville de Quebec, indicated the major features of the city, including the position of its fortifications and gates.70 The map showed, for example, that Cape Diamond divided Quebec into two sections, called the lower town and the upper town.
Lying beneath Cape Diamond, the lower town was located along the river’s edge on a narrow strip of land. Arnold knew that the lower town represented the commercial heart of the city; shops, offices, and warehouses crowded its narrow, winding streets. John Mercier, Arnold’s prewar friend and business associate, had recently built a wharf and warehouse in this district. The poorer people of the city also lived in the lower town, crammed together in small houses scattered among the commercial buildings. Though the lower town possessed no particular military advantage, the upper town, situated on the crest of Cape Diamond, occupied a natural defensive location and had been improved with a wall and bastions (fortified positions) that faced all the land approaches.
The unprotected lower town was relatively easy to conquer with its hodgepodge of narrow streets at the water’s edge. Getting into the upper town was the problem. The only way up from the lower town was to climb hundreds of narrow stone steps or to travel on a steep, circular road. This dirt road (later paved in 1785) was called the Cote de Montagne, and a barrier blocked the approach of potential invaders from ascending from the waterfront. Approaching the upper town from the land side was also problematic. Although Quebec’s defenses were considered to be in disrepair, they were still substantial, consisting of 30-foot-high, 50-foot-thick earthen ramparts faced with stone. The stone had fallen away in some places, but the earthen walls remained intact and protected every land approach to the city. Less strategic sections of Quebec’s walls (facing the sea) were constructed of wooden stockades. Artillery in the upper town faced the river and controlled the passage of ships sailing up or down the St. Lawrence, which narrowed sharply in front of Cape Diamond.
Plan of the City and Environs of Quebec with Its Siege and Blockade by The Americans. (London, September, 1776), by William Faden.
Author’s collection
“A View of Quebec From the East,” by Joseph F. W. Des Barres, ca. 1781.
Library and Archives Canada / C-080270
There were three gates into the upper town from the land side, and Arnold probably knew their locations from his prewar business trips to Quebec. Perhaps the most important of these gates was Porte St. Louis (St. Louis Gate), located near the river. This portal, lined with numerous shops and taverns, opened onto St. Louis Street, the commercial center of the upper town, and ended at the center of the upper town at the Place d’Armes (parade ground). Nearby was the military headquarters of the city, called the citadel (or Fort St. Louis), and the governor’s place, called the Chateau St. Louis, which sat on the crest of Cape Diamond with a spectacular view of the river below. Chateau St. Louis was also known as the government house, as it was the nerve center of the British administration of Canada. The only approach to the palace was past the citadel and through an extensive garden. Inside the palace were a luxurious council chamber on the ground floor and a large room for holding official receptions and banquets. Nearby were the city’s cathedral, government offices, hospitals, and a Jesuit college. During his prewar trips, Arnold probably strolled along St. Louis Street and frequented its coffee houses, where he transacted business and talked politics with his friends. To the north of Porte St. Louis, another gate, called Port St. Jean (St. John’s Gate), rested near some houses and shops, called the suburb of St. Jean, which lay outside the city’s walls. Farther north, another gate opened into the city. Called the Palace Gate, it faced the St. Charles River and two other suburbs called St. Roch and Palais. Abatis (an entanglement of tree branches) and cannons protected all three gates.
Arnold next turned his attention to the ships in the St. Lawrence. He noticed that, besides the two stately warships anchored in the river, there were armed boats patrolling up and down, watching for any attempt by the rebels to get across. Arnold had no intention of letting this formidable naval array interrupt his plans. He would have been further encouraged to make the crossing and attack the city if he had read the confidential report John Hamilton, captain of the Lizard, sent to his superiors in London on November 10. In his report, Hamilton expressed pessimism, saying that he expected Quebec to fall to the Americans:
Lizard at Quebec the 10th Novemr 1775
Please to inform my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty of the Arrival of The Magdalen Schooner at Quebec this day [according to the log of the Lizard, this ship actually arrived at Quebec on the 9th], with dispatches for General Carleton, which was delivered to the Lieut. Governor, but am afraid they will share the same fate of mine [dispatches brought by Captain Hamilton from England for Governor Carleton], that of being brought back again, the Communication being entirely cutt off by the Rebels, between this Place and Montreal where General Carleton is, but cannot learn any Certain intelligence concerning him;—I have offerr’d my Service to the Lieut. Governor several times;—This Evening we are inform’d there is an advanced Party of the Rebels on the South Shore [Arnold’s men] & I fear the Town will soon be invested, their [Quebec’s] defense is weak and the Inhabitants not to be depended on—If it should be necessary to stay here the Winter for the Protection of the Garrison I am greatly afraid I shall lose His Majestys Ship Lizard but I should not hesitate a Moment if I think it will be the Means of saving the City.
The Ships & Vessels of Force [warships] here are—Lizard, Hunter, Magdalen and an Arm’d Vessel of Six Guns & Sixty Men appointed by the Governor—The Weather is already set in severe and if some unforeseen assistance does not speedily arrive I am afraid this City and Province will soon be in the Hands of the Rebels as there is no Military force nor Provisions for carry on a siege—Their Lordships may depend on my Care & Attention and ready Service to co-operate with the Governor on all Occasions for the good of the Service and hope the steps I may be obliged to take will meet their approbation.I am Sir, John Hamilton, R.N.71
How many men were defending Quebec when Captain Hamilton wrote his report on November 10? There is an accurate “Return of Men for the Defense of Quebec,” dated one week later, that stated there were 63 officers and 1,248 men protecting the city.72
Compared to Arnold’s 600, this is an overwhelming number. But a closer examination of the November 16 British strength report reveals fewer available defenders, since it includes 500 civilians only recently pressed into service as militia, 11 officers and 132 soldiers and sailors who were still en route to Quebec from Montreal, 100 new recruits belonging to the Royal Highland Emigrants, plus numerous sailors onboard the warships (too far away to render any prompt assistance if the city were attacked from the land side). The actual number of dependable troops defending the city’s walls, gates, and barricades remains unclear. The Americans believed that the bulk of Quebec’s defenders were indifferent militia who would throw down their weapons and run if attacked. Their sentiment was vocalized in a popular doggerel, circulating at the time in Canada, which lampooned the colony’s compulsory militia service: “Let us take arms, my dear friends, A march to Boston is but a pleasant walk. . . . And cheerfully go and get our throats cut.”73
The rebels also felt that many of Quebec’s residents sympathized with their cause and would join them once the fighting started. But the reliability of the Quebec militia was a matter of opinion and speculation. Some of Quebec’s British and French militiamen were as patriotic as the rebels camped across the river. They were defending their families, homes, and businesses against the Americans. It is probable that some members of the Quebec militia were retired French or British soldiers, or militia, with military experience from the French and Indian War. Such men constituted a dangerous enemy. The military situation inside Quebec remained a mystery to Arnold, who continued to observe the city, watching the endless pacing of armed patrol boats while he waited for the weather to clear.
High winds and rough water between November 10 and 12 deterred the rebels from attempting to cross the St. Lawrence in their canoes. Certain that the weather would soon improve, a restive Arnold held a council of war late on the night of the 12th. During the meeting he confirmed that they would cross the river, under cover of night, at the first opportunity. Then Arnold had Halstead brief them on Quebec’s layout and his conviction that its garrison, composed largely of conscripted militia, would not fight.74
As Arnold had predicted, the weather cleared by midday on the 13th, with the prospects of a dark night and calm water. Morale in Arnold’s camp soared that day when news arrived that St. Johns had surrendered to Montgomery, whose army already was advancing on Montreal.75
With his corps in a conquering mood, Arnold reassembled his officers to finalize their plans for the hazardous crossing they would attempt that night. Attending the meeting were Lieutenant Colonel Greene, Majors Meigs and Bigelow, and Captains Thayer, Topham, Morgan, Dearborn, Hanchett, and Ward. Arnold reported that the expedition had accumulated 40 canoes and dugouts that were hidden in a cove just behind the mouth of the Chaudière River. They agreed that these boats would quietly be moved to the St. Lawrence from their hiding place as soon as darkness fell. Arnold explained that, because there were not enough boats, the troops would have to cross the two-mile-wide river in several trips. He said that 60 men would have to stay behind to guard the baggage and protect their camp if they had to retreat back to Pointe de Lévy, and he selected Captain Hanchett to command this rear guard.
Having made their preparations, the meeting ended, and every man readied himself for the big mission. Crossing in small, open boats in the face of two Royal Navy warships and heavily armed patrol craft was reckless and hazardous, but Arnold’s vocabulary did not include words like caution or retreat, and his bravery infected every man in his corps. Hanchett, however, already resentful of Arnold for denying him the honor of being the first to reach Sartigan, now felt additional hostility toward his commander for being denied a place in the climactic river crossing.
The first American boats started crossing the river at about 9:00 p.m. on November 13, accompanied by the sounds of British patrol boats passing to and fro.76 Arnold, Halstead, Morgan, and a few riflemen occupied the lead boat, followed by Indians with their muskets at the ready. Silently, the boats crossed the river with muffled oars (a figure of speech), passed the British patrols, and set a course for a cove just west of the city. The cove that Arnold and his men quietly paddled toward was the same place where, in 1759, British general James Wolfe landed 4,500 troops for his attack on French-held Quebec. A narrow path leading from the cove, up a steep embankment, ran to pasture land called the Plains of Abraham (also known as the heights), which extended to Quebec’s ramparts and St. John’s Gate. The total distance from the cove (called the Anse au Foulon or Wolfe’s Cove) to Cape Diamond was one-and-a-half miles. In 1759, General Wolfe defeated 5,000 French soldiers (who sallied forth from their encampment to confront the British rather than risk a continued siege) on the Plains of Abraham in one of the world’s most decisive battles. The Battle of the Plains of Abraham represented the climax of the French and Indian War and secured Quebec for the British.
Arnold’s first boats came ashore with no enemy sentinels in sight. Their passage, however, had not been without incident. Stocking mentioned in his journal that “Several of the bark canoes in crossing upset, by which accident we lost some muskets, and baggage, but no lives, though some of us very narrowly escaped.”77
Once ashore, guards were posted and everyone else was ordered to stay quiet and out of sight. The second wave of soldiers made it safely across. But the men were cold and wet, and some built small fires to keep warm. A passing patrol boat spotted the light and headed toward shore to investigate. Seeing the craft approach, Arnold emerged from his hiding place with a number of his men, their muskets at the ready. The sailors in the boat saw the dim forms on the shoreline, who started shooting at them. The boat backed away, rowing frantically as Arnold’s men continued firing; they later claimed to have killed three of the enemy.78
The boat made its escape, and Arnold expected to hear Quebec’s church bells ringing out a warning at any moment. But quiet returned, and the third wave of rebel canoes made it across the river without incident. The boats had completed three round trips by 4:00 a.m. when bad weather forced an end to the operation. The colonel had 500 men on the north side of the river who already were clambering up the cliffs to the Plains of Abraham.79 Upon seeing what he called “Abraham’s Plains,” rifleman John Joseph Henry called it “an extensive chaimpaign [campaign] country” and compared it to places in western Pennsylvania, although he admitted the terrain surrounding Quebec was “on a more gigantic scale” to anything he had seen at home.80
A road across the heights led to St. John’s Gate. Due to the carelessness of the garrison, some stories claim, St. John’s Gate was open and unguarded on the night that Arnold crossed the river. Private Fobes tells the story best: “The city was completely exposed, St. John’s gate was open. We stopped a man that had just come out of it, and could have entered, with nothing to hinder.”81 This tale is repeated in several other contemporary accounts, including a letter written by Lieutenant John Strake, an officer on the Lizard. Writing in early November, Strake explained that “[T]he Inhabitants were in a state of despondency expecting that the Army under General Arnold, which having crossed the River St. Lawrence . . . wou’d advance and enter the gates without resistance, for such was the consternation, that the gates were not shut.”82
Aaron Burr insisted, even 50 years after the fact, that “there were not 100 soldiers in Quebeck upon the arrival of Arnold’s party on the northern shore of the St. Lawrence,” and that all of the gates were open “and the city might have been entered with perfect ease.”83
While the situation inside Quebec during the early morning hours of November 14 remains a mystery, in retrospect, Arnold should have taken the chance and tried to storm the city immediately after crossing the river. Despite the gunfire and noise near Wolfe’s Cove, Cramahé did not know that the rebels had crossed, and would not until the following morning.84
Lacking any accurate information about the situation inside the city, and with his men cold and exhausted, Arnold decided not to risk an assault. Instead he posted guards near the ramparts and proceeded to the nearby suburb of Ste. Foye, over a mile away from Quebec, where he established his headquarters in the mansion of Major Caldwell, who commanded the British militia.85 Arnold arrived at Caldwell’s, surprising several of his servants who had arrived the previous day with carts and wagons to haul away some of their master’s household goods and livestock. Arnold chased them away and seized everything on the property, causing an angry Caldwell to write, “[T]hey lived on my beef and potatoes for a week.”86 Major Meigs noted that the troops occupied “other houses adjacent [to Caldwell’s mansion], which were fine accommodations for our troops.”87
In a surprise maneuver, later that morning a British party sallied out from the city to snatch a drowsy American sentry.88 The incident infuriated Arnold, who decided to test Quebec’s resolve without delay. His first move was to write out a summons for the city to surrender, assuring its residents that they would be safe. Here is the key passage from his warrant:
I am ordered by his Excellency Genl Washington, to take Possession of the Town of Quebec, I do therefore in the Name of the United Colonies, demand immediate surrender of the Town, Fortifications &c of Quebec, to the Forces of the united Colonies under my Command. . . . On surrendering the Town, the Property of every Individual shall be secured to him, But if I am obliged to carry the Town by storm you may expect every Severity practised on such Occasions, and the Merchants who may now save their property will probably be involved in the general Ruin.89
Arnold picked Matthais Ogden to deliver his demand to Lieutenant Governor Cramahé. This youngster, who joined the expedition as a gentleman volunteer with his friend Aaron Burr, had conducted himself admirably during the march across Maine. The colonel wanted to present his terms of surrender in a ceremony contrived to terrorize Quebec’s governor and citizens. He hoped that Quebec’s inhabitants would listen to his generous terms and pressure Cramahé into capitulating, especially since it was known that the British garrison at St. Johns had surrendered to Montgomery. Arnold began by parading his Kennebec veterans to within 800 yards of the St. Louis Gate, where they gave three huzzahs. Then young Ogden marched closer to read the terms of surrender in front of the city’s walls, now lined with curious onlookers. “According to the custom,” Ogden later wrote in his journal, he was carrying a white flag and accompanied by a drummer, who “beat a parley” (from “parler,” the French verb meaning “to speak”). Militiamen, members of the Royal Highland Emigrants, and marines from the Lizard could be seen on the ramparts as Ogden advanced. Lieutenant Governor Cramahé was among them, accompanied by an imposing man in uniform. As Ogden approached the walls, the officer standing next to Cramahé waved his hand, and a moment later a cannon bellowed forth. Its projectile hit the ground near Ogden and his drummer, “spattering us with the earth it threw up.”90 The cannon shot was followed by three cheers from the city’s ramparts, as the dumbfounded rebel emissary scampered back toward his comrades.91 One observer on the ramparts described the scene: “[T]hey huzza’d thrice—we answer’d them with three cheers of defiance, & saluted them with a few cannon loaded with grape & canister shot—they did not wait for a second round.”92
Arnold scowled at the British officer who fired on the white flag. The man stared back. He was a tough, battle-hardened Scotsman named Allan Maclean. Arnold had heard about Maclean from informers and hearsay, but now studied this quixotic figure through his glass for the first time. He saw a barrel-chested, middle-aged man dressed in a smart red uniform and the distinctive bonnet of a Scots Highlander regiment. The Kennebec men would hear a lot more from Maclean in the days ahead, as this charismatic soldier, described by a fellow officer as “brave, indefatigable and experienced,” took control of Quebec’s defenses from the paralyzed civilian authorities.93
Who was Allan Maclean, and how did he manage suddenly to appear at Quebec at a most unfortunate time for Arnold? To appreciate Maclean, we must trace his life up to his hasty arrival at Quebec. He was born in Mull, Scotland, in 1725, the son of Donald Maclean, the 5th Laird of Torloisk and head of the Clan Maclean. His clan supported Prince Charles Edward (known to history as Bonnie Prince Charlie) in his bid to regain the ancient throne of Scotland from the English. The clans rallied to Charles Edward’s side, culminating in the great battle of Culloden Moor in 1745. Young Allan was the second in command of Clan Maclean at the battle, in which the Scots charged massed English infantry with the din of the clan’s bagpipes bellowing out their blood-curdling war chants. The clans, heavily outnumbered, were defeated by an army commanded by the Duke of Cumberland, whose victory the English honored by naming a flower in his honor (“Sweet William”), which the Scots called “Stinking William.” Maclean managed to escape the decimation of Scotland that followed Culloden and fled to the Netherlands, where he joined the Scots Brigade of the Dutch army. He received a lieutenant’s commission and fought at the Battle of Bergen-op-Zoom in 1746.
Maclean returned to Scotland in 1750 after the King of England declared a general amnesty for all former rebels. He settled in Edinburgh, where he lived for a few years before purchasing a lieutenant’s commission in the 60th (Royal American) Regiment, which fought in North America throughout the French and Indian War. Maclean fought the French during the siege of Fort Carillon (renamed Fort Ticonderoga by the British after its capture) in 1758, where he was severely wounded. He recovered from his wounds in time to fight the French again at Fort Niagara in 1759. Promoted to captain in the 3rd Independent Company of New York, Maclean fought in 1759 at the decisive Battle of the Plains of Abraham. Returning to Britain, he raised his own regiment of Scots Highlanders, to be called the Royal Highland Volunteers or Maclean’s Highlanders. However, the war ended soon after Maclean’s regiment reached America. The ministry ordered the regiment disbanded, but rewarded Maclean with a large land grant on St. John Island (today’s Prince Edward Island) and half the annual salary of a major.
Maclean decided to return to Britain, where he lived until the start of the American Revolution. In the summer of 1775, a few months after the start of the war, he received permission from the government to return to America to raise a new regiment of loyal Scotsmen, to be called the Royal Highland Emigrants. Maclean received the rank of lieutenant colonel in the new Loyalist regiment.94 He sailed for America and landed in Boston, where General Gage welcomed him. From Boston, Maclean sent out recruiting officers to enlist men from among the former members of British Highland regiments that had settled in America at the end of the French and Indian War. His recruiting parties raised some troops from among the Scots veterans in upstate New York and the Maritime provinces, and probably reached Quebec in early September with 120 men from his new emigrant regiment.95 Maclean’s stay at Quebec was brief, as he left the city commanding a force consisting of his own men, 60 fusiliers from the 7th Foot, and a detachment of French militia to support Governor Carleton, who was organizing a relief party at Montreal to break Montgomery’s siege of St. Johns, still stubbornly defended by Major Charles Preston.96
Montgomery learned of Maclean’s move toward St. Johns and dispatched a strong detachment north to intercept him. Heavily outnumbered, Maclean hurried back to Quebec, which sat virtually defenseless in the face of the sudden appearance of another rebel force (the Arnold Expedition).
Having beaten off every British attempt to reinforce St. Johns, Montgomery allowed recent prisoners-of-war to confer with Major Preston at St. Johns. These prisoners were proof that there was no hope of relief, and Preston surrendered while Maclean and his Highlanders raced back toward Quebec. Maclean reached the town of Trois Riveres, on the St. Lawrence, on November 8 in an armed brig (a two-masted ship) named the Fell, where he was stalled by the same gale-force winds that prevented Arnold from crossing the river. Realizing that time was critical, Maclean decided to continue his journey by land and reached Quebec City on November 12, just hours ahead of the rebels.97
En route, Maclean intercepted the two Indian couriers carrying Arnold’s November 8 letter (written at the village of St. Henri) to Montgomery. This interception was not as unlikely as it seems. Long-distance travel was confined to waterways like the St. Lawrence, or to a few roads. Maclean’s men literally bumped into Montgomery’s Indians. Maclean read Arnold’s letter, which gave him valuable information about the rebel situation as well as this sobering passage: “I propose crossing the St. Lawrence as soon as possible; and if any opportunity offers of attacking Quebec with success, shall improve it. . . .”98
Maclean got to Quebec just ahead of Arnold with 80 men from his Highland regiment. The Highlanders were the only Regulars in Quebec other than Lizard’s marines and a handful of artillerymen. Maclean augmented this small force with 120 new regimental recruits who arrived in Quebec during his absence. Captain Malcolm Fraser enlisted these men from among the Scots living in Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island, bringing Maclean’s Royal Highland Emigrants—at Quebec on November 12—to a total strength of more than 200 officers and men.99 Although authorized to wear the distinctive Highland uniform of the Black Watch, including kilts, these uniforms were slow in arriving; Maclean’s Highlanders instead donned simple green and buff uniforms.
Lieutenant Governor Cramahé gladly allowed an officer of Maclean’s experience to take charge of Quebec’s defense and put some starch into the people’s will to resist. Maclean got to work immediately.100 Besides chasing off Captain Ogden, he disrupted a gathering of some of the city’s residents to discuss negotiating with the Americans. He burst into their meeting, thundering that there would be no talk of negotiating with the rebels, whom he characterized as thieves and looters.101 He continued his theme of appealing to the self-interests of Quebec’s residents by portraying the Americans as banditti who had come to plunder and pillage their homes and businesses. It was better, he reasoned, for Quebec’s 5,000 inhabitants to help defend their homes and businesses rather than risk the consequences of supporting the half-starved, ill-clothed rebel army trying to seize the city’s riches. Maclean took other measures, including evacuating residents from the exposed lower town to the safety of the walled upper section and leveling buildings near the city’s walls to give his artillerymen a clear field of fire. This move also prevented the rebels from using these vacant buildings as observation or sniper posts. Maclean’s measures seemed to have worked, as evidenced by a letter written by a young Royal Naval officer on November 20, in which he noted that Quebec’s population was more optimistic about defending their city since Maclean’s arrival. “His activity and exertions contributed to give spirits to the people, and rouse them from their despondency,” the officer wrote.102
Although Benedict Arnold was a courageous, tenacious, and natural-born leader, these traits alone were not enough to counter Maclean’s military experience. While Arnold was counting pills in his uncle’s Connecticut apothecary shop, Maclean was commanding British infantry against the flower of the French army in America. Arnold’s slim military experience became evident once the Quebec expedition got underway. For openers, the wily Daniel Morgan duped him at Fort Western, insisting that his rifle companies could not be commanded by any of Arnold’s New England officers. Arnold also failed to maintain tight control of his provisions—imposing rationing only after his supplies had dwindled to dangerously low levels—while his best officer, Lieutenant Colonel Roger Enos, who was no coward, turned back from the Dead River with a third of the expedition’s manpower when he realized they were facing starvation. Many commended Enos’ decision to quit, including William Gordon, who published an eyewitness history of the Revolution in 1788. “A number of officers of the best character,” Gordon wrote, “are fully satisfied, and persuaded that his conduct deserves applause rather than censure.”103 Only through raw determination and willpower did 600 of Arnold’s volunteers make it to Quebec.
Maclean was responsible for the sortie that captured the sleepy American sentry on the morning of November 14, and he chased off Ogden from St. John’s Gate with a burst of grapeshot. Maclean also refused to accept a letter from Arnold protesting the firing on his unarmed envoy. Maclean then tricked Arnold into believing that he was going to come out of the city and attack his camp. This alleged British plan included transporting 200 men at night in boats behind Arnold’s position. Alarmed by the news of a British attack, Arnold ordered an inspection to be made of his corps’ arms and ammunition. Apparently this was the first time he checked on the amount of ammunition he had since investing Quebec. The result was shocking, as Arnold discovered that most of his gunpowder had been lost during the march from Maine, leaving only enough for five rounds per man. He also determined that numerous muskets and rifles had been damaged or lost during the long ordeal. Short of weapons and ammunition, and fearing a British attack, Arnold ordered a hasty retreat 18 miles upriver to the town of Point aux Trembles (modern Neuville) to await Montgomery’s arrival. News arrived that Montgomery had captured Montreal a few days earlier (November 13), and the outwitted Arnold withdrew from within site of his goal (Quebec) to await the arrival of the victorious veteran Montgomery with reinforcements and artillery.
The Kennebec corps’ depressing retreat began on the afternoon of November 18, when they abandoned their campfires surrounding Quebec and started down the frozen road that ran along the northern bank of the St. Lawrence River. It was a bitter defeat for Arnold, who abhorred failure. Rifleman John Joseph Henry recalled years later that the army retreated from Quebec “through a severe winter . . . in a slovenly style, accompanied, probably, by the maledictions of the [Canadian] clergy and nobility.” The men walked and slid along the thin sheets of black ice that littered their route, arriving the following evening at Point aux Trembles, where Arnold reported that he had 650 men (including Canadian Indians), of whom 550 were fit for service.104
Henry described Point aux Trembles “a straggling village . . . where quarters were obtained in the village and farm houses, dispersed over a space of some miles, up and down the river.”105Burr wrote his uncle from there: “I expected some Weeks ago to have had the Satisfaction of writing you a Letter from Quebec—when that Time will be is now very uncertain.”106 After arriving in the village, Arnold’s men spotted a ship on the river heading in the opposite direction. Unknown to them at the time, it was the brig Fell bringing Governor Carlton back to Quebec.
The governor was passing by Point aux Trembles under humiliating circumstances. He had hurriedly abandoned Montreal on November 11 in the face of the approaching rebels. There was a chaotic scene at Montreal’s waterfront, as workers hastily loaded a small flotilla of ships with the doomed city’s most valuable military cargo and its small garrison of regular troops, amounting to about 100 men. Governor Carleton then boarded the armed schooner Gaspe, the flagship of his little fleet. According to one eyewitness account, the scene had the atmosphere of a funeral, as the Gaspe, two other small warships, and eight transports cheerlessly slipped away from the docks, setting a course for Quebec, which lay 150 miles upriver. The rebels triumphantly entered Montreal two days later after negotiating for the city’s peaceful surrender with a delegation of local businessmen. As Montgomery was entering Montreal, Carleton was slowly working his overloaded flotilla down the St. Lawrence toward Quebec.
Carleton, who thought he had escaped Montgomery, was surprised to run into the American artillery that blocked the St. Lawrence River at the village of Sorel. Anticipating that the troops at Montreal would try to flee to Quebec, Montgomery had guns posted at Sorel to blockade the river. The enterprising rebels had even constructed a floating gun battery to block the channel.107
Trapped and reluctant to run the rebel gun batteries (especially with a ship loaded with gunpowder), Carleton decided to escape on his own and leave the rest of his men to their fate. Disguised in peasant clothing, Canada’s distinguished governor-general eased over the side of the Gaspe during the night and slipped past the rebels in a small boat, whose crew paddled with their hands to avoid making any noise. Once by the blockade, oars moved the boat upriver until they happened upon the brig Fell, which took Carleton to Quebec. Back at Sorel, Carleton’s befuddled flotilla surrendered to the rebels with all their valuable military cargo.108
Schulyer reported Carleton’s shabby getaway to his friend Washington, stating that Canada’s illustrious governor, “disguised En Canadien & accompanied by six Peasants, found Means to make his Escape.”109The garrison at Quebec thought differently about Carleton’s brazen escape and ceremoniously greeted him when he reached the capital on November 19. Captain Hamilton rejoiced at the news. He reopened a report he had completed to the admiralty dated November 20 and added the following postscript: “I have the pleasure to acquaint their Lordships that His Excellency Genl. Carleton has just arrived.”110
A similar celebration took place among the rebels on the night of December 2, when General Montgomery arrived at Point aux Trembles from Montreal.111 The general’s approach was heralded by Captain Ogden, who returned from Montreal just ahead of Montgomery with some supplies for Arnold’s hard-pressed corps. The threadbare Kennebec veterans marched down to the shoreline with lanterns and torches to greet their champion. Despite the frigid temperatures and a foot of snow on the ground, Arnold’s men were warm with excitement. Montgomery triumphantly arrived aboard the Gaspe, Carleton’s former flagship, which had been snared by the rebel blockade at Sorel. Arnold’s men strained to see their hero as his long boat came into view. With the exception of Arnold, it was probably the first time that any of them ever saw him. Montgomery came ashore and received Arnold and his corps courteously, with as much military pomp as could be mustered on the blustery night. Afterward, Montgomery made a short but eloquent speech applauding their courage in “passing the wilderness” and hoped that their perseverance would continue.112
Despite the bitter cold, the men answered his little speech with enthusiastic huzzas. Later that night, Lieutenant Humphrey recorded his impression of Montgomery: “[H]e is a gentle, polite man, tall and slender in his make, bald on the top of his head, resolute, mild, and of a fine temper and an excellent general.”113 Private Morison agreed with Humphrey, adding, “Gen. Montgomery was born to command. His easy and affable condescension. . . creates love and esteem; and exhibits him the gentleman and the soldier. He is tall and very well made. . . .”114 Montgomery was equally impressed, calling Arnold’s corps “an exceedingly fine one, inured to fatigue, and well accustomed to cannon shot. . . . There is a style of discipline among them, much superior to what I have been used to see this campaign.”115
Montgomery was worried Arnold might be an insubordinate glory seeker like Ethan Allen. Writing to Schuyler on the subject, Montgomery asked, “Should Arnold come into my neighborhood, has he orders to put himself under my command? You know his ambition.”116 His concerns were put to rest after his first meeting with Arnold, who willingly yielded command of his corps to Montgomery. Besides, Washington had ordered the colonel to put his expedition under General Schuyler’s command if the two armies should meet in Canada. Concerned about Arnold’s reputation for quarreling with fellow officers, Washington cautioned him at Cambridge to “avoid all Contention about Rank.”117
Arnold, however, was in no mood to argue with Montgomery over command. He was relieved that help had arrived and that an experienced officer was on the scene to deal with Maclean’s craftiness. Besides, Arnold and Montgomery liked one another. Arnold’s audacity and eagerness balanced Montgomery’s meticulous planning and military experience, and the two men quickly developed a close rapport. With Montgomery’s arrival, the Arnold Expedition ceased to exist as an independent command, and Benedict Arnold was about to learn how to run an army from an experienced professional.
Looking back over recent events, Arnold wrote Washington, “Had I been Ten days Sooner, Quebec must inevitably have fallen into Our Hands, as there was not a Man there to oppose us.”118 Had Arnold crossed the St. Lawrence on November 4 instead of the 14th, he would have found the city virtually defenseless and the jittery lieutenant governor under pressure from the frightened civilians to surrender. November 5 was the turning point in the city’s resolution to fight. It was on that date the Lizard, with its contingent of marines and two store ships loaded with military equipment and money, symbolizing the British government’s resolution to defend the colony, arrived at Quebec. The situation further improved for the defenders just hours before Arnold crossed the river when feisty Colonel Maclean entered the city with some more troops. Arnold also wrote Schuyler bemoaning his poor timing, stating that “not a minute was lost” in the grueling trek from Fort Western to Quebec, a march “not to be paralleled in history,” but that his Kennebec veterans arrived at Quebec too late to take advantage of its helpless situation.119
Arnold and his disciplined “famine proof veterans” also proved to be a welcome relief for Montgomery, who had struggled from the outset of his campaign with insubordinate troops and argumentative, sometimes cowardly officers. Arnold called Montgomery “my truly great and good friend,” while Montgomery described Arnold as an “active, intelligent and enterprising” officer who had come close to capturing Quebec.”120 Other men might have abandoned a frigid winter campaign against Quebec in favor of celebrating their exploits in warm winter quarters in Montreal. Montgomery and Arnold, however, were of one mind in their determination to push on to Quebec, with Montgomery reporting to have said that he either would eat his Christmas dinner in Quebec or in hell.121
Accompanying Montgomery from Montreal were three armed sloops crammed with everything that the captured city could provide for Arnold’s needy corps: food, warm clothing, blankets, muskets, and ammunition. But the hardships and discord that marked his campaign from its start became apparent when Montgomery was able to bring with him only 300 troops from the 1st New York regiment and 50 artillerymen from Captain John Lamb’s Independent New York artillery company. This disappointing number of men made the 600 survivors of the Arnold Expedition critical to Montgomery’s continued success.122
More troops eventually joined Montgomery and Arnold. They were 160 Massachusetts troops under the command of Major John Brown, camped at the St. Lawrence River town of Sorel. Ironically, these were the same Massachusetts troops raised and commanded by Arnold early in the war to defend the Lake Champlain region. Their current commander, Major Brown, was also well known to Arnold. He first appeared in this narrative as the young Massachusetts lawyer who journeyed to Montreal to measure local political sentiment prior to the start of the war. Brown subsequently participated in the attack on Fort Ticonderoga, for which he received a commission as a major in the Continental Army and assignment to the Northern army. He proved to be one of Montgomery’s best officers, and the general entrusted him with several important assignments, including joint command of the seizure of Fort Chambly.
Brown also was one of Arnold’s earliest and most passionate enemies. The major’s hatred of Arnold had begun when the colonel stormed into the officer’s council chaired by Ethan Allen to finalize their surprise attack on Fort Ticonderoga. Brown decided that Arnold was an arrogant usurper and used his skillful pen to help buoy the military career of the Allen clique (of which he was a part) while working to discredit Arnold. The major must have been shocked to find months later that his old antagonist Arnold was Montgomery’s senior lieutenant and closest confidant. Brown was a shrewd person who, by listening to camp gossip, learned that Captain Oliver Hanchett detested Arnold. Brown would later befriend Hanchett, and manipulated him into a plot to discredit their common enemy while boosting Brown’s own career.
Montgomery left Point aux Trembles on December 3, leading his little army through rain and sleet to reach Quebec the following day.123 His total strength, when assembled at Quebec, consisted of about 1,100 men, if the sick, Indians, and men on detached duty (transporting supplies from Montreal for example) were included.
Montgomery was counting on Canadian volunteers to boost his depleted ranks. The Canadians took the rebels more seriously following Montgomery’s capture of Montreal. Working with Montgomery to recruit the locals were James Livingston, a merchant and farmer born in New York, who married a Montreal woman and was living near Fort Chambly, and Jeremy Duggan, a former Quebec hair dresser. These two newly appointed rebel officers went into the countryside following the capture of Montreal to enlist men for Montgomery’s army. Their mission met with partial success, and they eventually rendezvoused with Montgomery at Quebec with about 200 Canadian recruits.124
Montgomery’s largest unit was Arnold’s corps, which continued to be commanded by the same officers who had participated in the epic trek across Maine. Arnold’s second in command, Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Greene, had refused to turn back with Enos on the Dead River. Next in line of command were Majors Timothy Bigelow and Jonathan Meigs. Then there was Captain Daniel Morgan, commanding the corps riflemen. His Virginia company’s exploits included shouldering their bateaux across the Terrible Carry. Arnold’s remaining company captains included Henry Dearborn, John Topham, Oliver Hanchett, Simon Thayer, and Samuel Ward. The gentlemen volunteers were also present, although Aaron Burr was now an aide-de-camp to General Montgomery. Burr’s friend Matthias Ogden continued to serve under Arnold along with the other gentlemen volunteers on the expedition—Matthew Duncan, John McGuire, David Hopkins, and Charles Porterfield. Christian Febiger continued as Arnold’s adjutant, along with Dr. Isaac Senter and Chaplain Samuel Spring.
We cannot forget those valiant common soldiers, whose names are too numerous to mention, who followed Arnold across Maine and were now marching with Montgomery to Quebec. Just by counting heads, we can see how important Arnold’s Kennebec veterans were to the success of Montgomery’s mission. But Arnold’s corps also gave Montgomery, for the first time since the start of the Canadian invasion, a body of well-disciplined soldiers led by dedicated officers.
Montgomery wrote his commander and confidant Schuyler after arriving at Quebec, saying that he was “at the head of upwards of eight hundred men.” This total did not include the sick and some of the men transporting supplies from Montreal. This command, continued Montgomery, is “a force you will say not very adequate to the business in hand, but we must make the best of it. It is all I could get.”125
Thus, the American siege of Quebec, begun by Arnold, was renewed by Montgomery.