OPPOSING PLANS

Hood’s campaign objective could be summed up in two words: stop Sherman. The problem was how.

Hood’s go-to solution was to attack. He tried that at the battles of Peachtree Creek, Atlanta, and Ezra Church. All ended as bloody Confederate defeats and contributed to Hood’s being forced to abandon Atlanta to Sherman. Now Hood was outside Atlanta, and outnumbered by Sherman within Atlanta. A direct attack was out. So was a direct defense – allowing Sherman to attack him. Hood lacked the strength to prevent Sherman from advancing further. The army which had forced Hood out of Atlanta could force Hood to yield anything held by the Army of Tennessee. Hood could expect no reinforcements.

The Atlantic and Western Railroad between Chattanooga and Atlanta was over 100 miles of mostly single-line track with sidings at depots. Supplies reached Sherman’s army in Atlanta on its two thin lines of steel rails. Hood planned to draw Sherman out of Atlanta by attacking the railroad. (National Archives)

Since he could not attack directly, Hood came up with an indirect plan: “By maneuvers, to draw Sherman back into the mountains, then beat him in battle, and at least regain our lost territory.” The capture of Atlanta put the Union Army at the end of a long and tenuous supply line. It was over 100 miles from Chattanooga to Atlanta and all supplies for Sherman’s 65,000 men came down the single-track Western and Atlantic Railroad. While Sherman could guard the various depots and stations along the route from cavalry raids and partisan bands, the Union Army lacked the strength to hold the entire route against Hood’s entire army.

The Union Army had a new source of manpower in 1864: the US Colored Troops – regiments of black soldiers led by battle-experienced white officers. The soldiers were mostly runaway slaves, and eager to fight for their freedom. (Author’s collection)

Move north against the railroad, Hood reasoned, and Sherman had to follow. Once back in the mountains, Hood could find a convenient spot to attack part of Sherman’s forces, and destroy them in detail; fall back away from the railroad, regroup, and do it again; and never allow his smaller army to be trapped by Sherman’s superior numbers. Hood’s forces could move faster than the Yankees.

At best, this strategy would force Sherman back to Chattanooga or at least the line formed by Taylor’s Ridge and White Oak Ridge. If it forced Sherman to abandon Atlanta, it could possibly still tip the 1864 Presidential election in favor of George McClellan, running as a peace candidate. At worst, it would draw Sherman’s forces into a game of “run sheep run” with the Army of Tennessee, which would keep the North from further ravaging the Confederacy.

In late September 1864, Confederate President Jefferson Davis travelled to Palmetto, Georgia to meet Hood, and hear Hood’s plan to contain Sherman following the fall of Atlanta. Hood outlined this new strategy. Davis gave it reluctant approval, largely because no other solution was obvious.

This strategy’s chief risk was it exposed Georgia and the Confederate heartland to Sherman’s forces. Hood’s army would be north of Sherman, in a position where it could not challenge a further penetration by Sherman. What would Hood do then?

Hood outlined an alternative strategy, more audacious still. If Sherman went south, Hood would go north. Sherman would have to respond to a full-up invasion of Tennessee. Instead of cutting Sherman’s supply line between Chattanooga and Atlanta, Hood would cut it between Nashville and Chattanooga. Hood would bypass Chattanooga, crossing the Tennessee River somewhere in Alabama, between Bridgeport and Decatur. From there he would drive north to Nashville, deep in the Union rear.

Nashville was the most important logistics center and transportation hub in Tennessee, and really anywhere between the Mississippi River and the Appalachian Mountains. Capture it, and Union communications would have to make a wide detour through the Northern states. Nashville was also the capital of Tennessee. Hold the statehouse, Hood believed, and Tennesseans loyal to the Confederacy would flock to the colors.

Nashville would also serve as a launching platform for movement into Kentucky. There, too, loyal Kentuckians would rally to the Confederate cause. This logic seemed inescapable to Hood, a Kentucky native who was certain most Kentuckians believed in the Confederacy as he did. With Tennessee and Kentucky firmly in Confederate hands, the North would have to sue for peace and recognize the Confederacy as an independent nation.

The realities behind Hood’s assumptions made this plan less tenable. No vast numbers of Tennessee or especially Kentucky residents secretly loyal to the South existed. Those loyal to the South were already fighting for the South. The rest either wished to be left alone or supported the North, often with as much passion as Hood supported the South.

Hood’s plan also required speed and surprise to succeed. Its key assumption was the Army of Tennessee would hit the Yankees where they were not. It would be an end run around the main Union Army, avoiding an engagement with Sherman until after the Union supply lines were cut. Preferably, that battle would be fought defensively, with the Confederate Army dug in between Sherman and the Union Army’s supply base. There was also the implicit assumption the Army of Tennessee could trap an isolated part of the Union Army and destroy the outnumbered detachment before the latter could concentrate.

The Union also used the rivers of the Mississippi basin for supply. The Tennessee and Cumberland rivers connected with Northern industrial centers such as Cincinnati, Chicago, and Pittsburgh either directly by water or by rail connections to the Mississippi or Ohio rivers. (Library of Congress)

The plan required the Confederate Army, moving by road during wet fall weather, to travel faster than Union forces, which could travel by rail and river. It also required supplying an army from the Tennessee River to Nashville on Cumberland River, by road over a distance exceeding 100 miles. It would be Sherman in Atlanta in reverse, with the added disadvantage of lacking rail lines to supply the Confederate Army.

Nashville was both a river port and a major railroad hub. The Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad Depot in Nashville could move cargos arriving from either the Cumberland or Tennessee rivers south into Alabama and Georgia. (Library of Congress)

Yet Hood’s plan, as rickety as it seemed, was still a plan. It was the only plan anyone came up with, and it had the advantage of changing the strategic equation if it was successful. It also required no new allocation of resources to carry out. Davis blessed the invasion, if Hood’s attempts against Sherman’s supply line failed to draw Sherman north.

Davis placed only one caveat. If Sherman moved south, Davis wanted the Army of Tennessee’s cavalry, Wheeler’s Corps, to follow Sherman. This would leave Hood without cavalry, critical to the success of the proposed invasion. To rectify that, Forrest’s Cavalry Corps would be transferred from the Department of the Mississippi to the Army of Tennessee. Hood would launch his invasion of Tennessee only after Forrest arrived.

Thomas’s campaign objective could be summed up in two words: stop Hood. Also, Thomas had two significant advantages in meeting his objective which Hood lacked. The first was Thomas had the resources available to achieve his goal. Hood ultimately required Sherman’s cooperation: Sherman had to behave as Hood expected. This was Thomas’s second advantage. Sherman had his own plans, independent of Hood and the Army of Tennessee. The only way for Hood to succeed was to run the table: capture Nashville while destroying a Union army considerably larger than his own.

Sherman realized Atlanta was untenable. He could hold it only at the price of paralysis, which would not contribute to Union victory. This view was confirmed after attempting to stop the Army of Tennessee’s moves against the Union supply lines to Atlanta. Even before then, Sherman decided on a bolder course: abandon Atlanta, and take his best troops in a march to the Atlantic coast, a march which would “make Georgia howl.” Sherman’s plan invalidated Hood’s strategy. Sherman’s real risk was getting stalled before reaching the Atlantic. The only thing which might deter Sherman was Hood’s army in front of him. This would have increased Sherman’s risk through the potential of slowing Sherman’s advance. Hood behind him was something Sherman willingly accepted.

Johnsonville, Tennessee was the site of a major Union Depot in 1864. The Nashville and Northwestern Railroad had been extended to Johnsonville from Kingston Springs, providing a rail connection from the Tennessee River to Nashville. There was a mile of wharves at Johnsonville, filled with supplies. (Author’s collection)

That left the issue of how to deal with the Army of Tennessee. Sherman solved that question by giving the problem to George Thomas. Sherman split the Mississippi Military Division, keeping 65,000 men, including portions of Thomas’s Army of the Cumberland, for the March to the Sea. Sherman put the rest under the command of George Thomas, effectively promoting Thomas to an army group commander. Thomas was given two goals. He needed to ensure Hood’s army did not attack Sherman’s rear. Thomas also needed to protect Tennessee, due both to its strategic position and to protect loyal Tennesseans.

Thomas’s task was complicated. Just as Hood could not attack Sherman directly, Thomas could not knock out Hood by going directly after Hood. If Thomas independently chased Hood, Hood would simply fall back on his own supply centers while drawing Thomas away from the Union ones. Hood could also move faster than Thomas in a foot race, where both armies were marching. When Thomas was overextended, Hood could race around Thomas and cut him off, especially if Thomas followed Hood well south of the Tennessee River.

If Hood lunged after Sherman as Sherman moved through Georgia, then Thomas could pursue. Unless Hood called off the pursuit of Sherman, the Army of Tennessee would find itself trapped between Thomas’s forces and Sherman’s forces, and the sole remaining field army in the central Confederacy would find itself crushed. The percentage move was what Thomas did: hold the line of the Tennessee River by placing fortified garrisons at obvious crossings, while concentrating a strong field force where it could pursue Hood if he chased Sherman.

Obvious crossing points were at Chattanooga, Bridgeport, Decatur, and Florence. Thomas garrisoned the first three, as well as placing forces at Stevenson, Huntsville, and Athens, all rail centers and transportation hubs near the Tennessee River. The two corps left behind by Sherman were at Pulaski, Tennessee. It was a convenient location to watch the Army of Tennessee.

The weak spot in Thomas’s line was Florence, Alabama. Decatur and Bridgeport were railheads, with lines. Those towns could be easily supplied and easily reinforced. Florence was a railroad terminal, the end of a spur line running north across the Tennessee connecting to the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, which ran along the south side of the Tennessee at that point. Florence could be supplied by river, but camp the Army of Tennessee on the south bank and Florence could be cut off.

Additionally, Florence was on one of the few parts of the Tennessee where the Union Navy could not break up a Confederate crossing. It was on a shallow stretch of the river near Muscle Shoals. Heavily armed ironclads were of limited use due to their deep (for riverboats) draft, while the shallow-draft timberclads and tinclads lacked the armor to slug it out with Confederate artillery.

Recognizing that reality, Thomas put only a light screening force there; enough to foil a cavalry raid, but not enough to stop the Army of Tennessee. Even if Hood crossed there, it was far to the west of Georgia. Hood crossing at Florence allowed Thomas to concentrate against the Army of Tennessee without fear Hood could then move against Sherman.

Nor could Thomas realistically expect to keep Hood south of the Tennessee. Rather, Thomas’s deployments were intended to buy time. Thomas’s forces were widely scattered. The Military Division of the Mississippi may have been the home team, with the advantages short supply lines and rail transportation bring, but in campaign terms, until Thomas could concentrate his troops, he risked being defeated in detail. Hood would start any move concentrated, and within the scope of the campaign operate on interior lines.

The key was to force Hood west, well away from the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, and to delay Hood long enough to concentrate. Only after Hood committed his army could Thomas concentrate his scattered troops. The Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, including the cities along the route, was the only territory in Tennessee Thomas absolutely needed to hold. Thomas’s goal was Hood’s army. As long as Hood was kept away from the Nashville and Chattanooga and Thomas had time to concentrate, Thomas was unconcerned about where Hood marched his army.

Thomas excelled at allowing an opponent to expose himself during an attack, stopping that attack, and then launching a devastating counterblow. He had done this at Chickamauga, only to be denied a counterblow by Rosecrans. He argued against Grant’s prematurely attacking with the Army of the Cumberland at Chattanooga. When Thomas’s troops finally attacked, they launched the knockout blow there. What Thomas wanted was a situation where he could bring the full weight of the troops Thomas had against the Army of Tennessee. Then, and only at the right moment, would Thomas strike.