In the years 1963 to 1966, Britain’s armed forces fought a little-known conflict against Indonesian regular and irregular forces in Malaysia called “Confrontation”: Konfrontasi in Indonesian. It was, from Britain’s perspective, a model counterinsurgency campaign and deserves far greater recognition and study than it has hitherto received. It came about because of the formation of the Federation of Malaysia. After a costly nine-year counterinsurgency campaign against predominantly ethnic-Chinese communist terrorists (CTs), Malaya gained independence from Britain in August 1957.1 Tunku Abdul Rahman, the first prime minister of Malaya, wished to prevent political dominance of the large Chinese population in the country, so in May 1961 he proposed the merger of Malaya and Singapore with Sarawak, the Sultanate of Brunei, and Sabah to form the Federation of Malaysia.2 The Tunku assumed that the indigenous peoples of Borneo would act as a counterbalance to the Chinese population and help to preserve the dominant position of Malays within the new federation. Britain backed the proposal because it wanted a stable Malay-dominated democratic government in the region, and, as the Cabinet Defense Committee agreed, “it would probably reduce, and certainly could not increase, our commitment to the external defense of the territories concerned.”3 Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew persuaded Singaporeans that they could not stand alone.4 Initially there was no opposition to the formation of Malaysia. Indeed, in August 1961 the Indonesian foreign minister, Dr. Subandrio, indicated his government’s approval of the proposal to British officials.5 However, in 1962 Sukarno, the president of Indonesia, began to speak out against it. Indonesia had gained independence from The Netherlands in 1949 after a violent insurgency campaign.6 Sukarno experimented with democracy in the early 1950s, but then, backed by the army, he banned most of the political parties in Indonesia.7 The army then became a political force in its own right, but Sukarno sought to neutralize its power by cultivating the support of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI), the largest communist party outside the Soviet Union and China. Sukarno was ideologically committed to opposing any political structure that the colonialists left behind that he considered was really intended to preserve their influence (neocolonialism or Neokim). Thus, when he perceived Malaysia as a Neokim enterprise, he was opposed to it.8 He propounded a Filipino proposal to form a loose federation between Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, to be called Maphilindo.9 Malaya and Singapore demurred from this idea, so as the entity of Malaysia hardened toward reality, Sukarno’s rhetoric became more vitriolic against the proposed federation.10 The Malayan government looked upon Sukarno with suspicion because he was seen as dangerously sympathetic to the PKI and politically beholden to it.11 The Indonesian army began to train dissidents and arm potential Indonesian sympathizers, who sought to cross into the North Borneo states to recruit sympathizers, incite trouble, and “persuade” the population not to agree to the Malaysia idea. When that failed, larger bodies of irregulars and, finally, units of the Indonesian forces attacked targets in Malaysia seeking by force to break the federation apart. Under the provisions of the Anglo-Malaya Defense Agreement (AMDA), signed in 1957, the United Kingdom accepted responsibility for the defense of Malaya against external aggression and, during discussions on forming greater Malaysia in 1961, London and Kuala Lumpur agreed that the AMDA would be extended to cover the successor state.12 This mechanism tied Britain into defending Malaysia when Indonesian belligerence began and made it difficult politically for her to do other than see the conflict through.
In the 1960s the world was a volatile place. Nuclear war had been avoided during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, but trouble flared up around the globe. During “Confrontation,” Britain sent troops to Aden, Cyprus (as part of a U.N. force), East Africa, and British Guiana, and faced a Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Rhodesia.13 These commitments stretched Britain’s armed forces. Southeast Asia was seen as a vital area of interest for the United States and the United Kingdom. Both, together with Australia and New Zealand, were members of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), set up to provide stability to the region and to deter communism.14 The 1963 Defense White Paper emphasized the importance of Britain’s contribution toward “the containment of communism” in Southeast Asia.15 U.S. concern about communism spreading in the region led to its growing involvement in South Vietnam. By the end of 1963, the United States had 23,000 military advisers in Vietnam. In March 1964, the first U.S. combat units began to arrive in the country and to prosecute a grim seven-year war against North Vietnam and the Viet Cong in South Vietnam.16 The Kennedy administration in Washington saw Indonesia, with its 100 million people, as potentially the greatest power in Southeast Asia.17 The American strategy was to support the Indonesian generals so that after Sukarno’s death, they would be in a position to take power and thwart communism. Although the United States supported the establishment of Malaysia, they would not do so if this damaged its relations with Indonesia.18 Britain maintained a presence east of Suez to guarantee its oil supplies and maintain its lines of communication to Australia and New Zealand. It retained 17 Gurkha Division based in Singapore (of which 28 Commonwealth Brigade, comprising British, Australian, and New Zealand battalions, was a part) together with significant naval and air forces.19
During Confrontation, there were moves to reach agreement between Indonesia and Malaysia through political dialogue. Initially, Sukarno sought to prevent the Federation of Malaysia actually forming.20 Despite cross-border raids beginning, a cordial meeting between Rahman and Sukarno in Tokyo in May 1963 gave hope for a peaceful resolution of the issue. The United Nations organized a meeting between Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines in Manila in July/August in which the Maphilindo idea emerged. The Malaysians disagreed with the idea but agreed that the United Nations should send a commission to determine whether the North Borneo states were prepared freely to accept the federation. It found that Borneo inhabitants had carefully and thoughtfully considered their political future and decided in favor of Malaysia.21 The verdict was a huge disappointment to Indonesia. The foundation of the Federation of Malaysia (Malaysia Day) duly took place on September 16, 1963. Indonesia stated that it would not recognize Malaysia and broke diplomatic relations. Sukarno began making inflammatory speeches, which included the phrase “Ganjang Malaysia” (Smash Malaysia).22 In addition, the British embassy in Djakarta was ransacked and every British-owned house in the city was sacked.23 As a result, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) suspended Indonesia’s right to draw on loans and American aid programs, which later caused significant economic difficulties.
Armed incursions into Borneo began in earnest, but there were further peace conferences throughout the conflict. U.S.-brokered talks took place in Bangkok in January 1964 and March 1964, but again no progress was made.24 Sukarno then believed he could get no more political or economic assistance from the United States and was reported as saying, “To hell with your aid.”25 Consequently, American attitudes to Indonesia began to change. In June 1964, there were talks in Tokyo, but these broke up once more without result.26 Following attacks on West Malaysia later in 1964, including paratroops landing, Malaysia produced captured Indonesian weapons at a debate in the United Nations, causing uproar.27 A Security Council resolution deploring Indonesian aggression and calling for the parties to settle their dispute amicably gained a majority of nine to two in favor, but it was vetoed by the Soviet Union.28 However, the attacks on West Malaysia made Australia and New Zealand pledge their troops to resist further attack.29 The attacks, coupled with Indonesia’s growing rapprochement with communist China, led the United States into fully backing Malaysia and Britain. At the end of 1965, Indonesia withdrew from the United Nations in protest at the impeding adoption of a Malaysian seat on the Security Council.30 By 1966, Indonesia was almost isolated politically and internal problems brought the overthrow of the Sukarno regime and the end of Confrontation.
The need to provide forces to fight Indonesian-trained insurgents was not welcomed by the British government. Britain in 1963 was still heavily in debt from World War II and seeking to withdraw from empire, yet the Soviet threat to Europe and Britain’s legacy empire commitments forced it to spend 10 percent of its gross national product (GNP) on defense.31 This slowed economic growth, brought difficulty in paying debts, and hindered development of government social aspirations. A reduction to 7 percent of GNP was sought as the number of uniformed personnel reduced by nearly half with the ending of conscription. However, no defense commitments were cut and these significantly stretched the armed services, especially the army, which had only 165,000 men.32 The Malayan Emergency had been extremely costly, requiring 24 battalions of troops to be deployed, as part of up to 300,000 security forces personnel overall, to defeat little more than 6,000 CTs.33 As the campaign went on, the number of British ships, aircraft, and men increased substantially, though never to the number of battalions deployed to Malaya in the 1950s, but the cost of forces east of Suez continued rising above £300 million. Consequently, in 1964 the chancellor of the exchequer, Selwyn Lloyd, forecast that by 1970 it would be £400 million and it would be impossible financially for Britain to support Malaysia; British forces would have to be withdrawn.34 Fortunately for the United Kingdom, Confrontation ended in 1966.
In 1963, the Indonesian Armed Forces posed, on paper, a significant threat. Its army establishment was 200,000 men, with 280,000 thousand reservists, paramilitary, home guard, and police available for operations.35 The Indonesian navy had a cruiser, destroyers, frigates, fast inshore patrol boats, and Gannet aircraft operable. Its air force deployed fighters, bombers, transport, and reconnaissance aircraft.36 The threat could not be ignored, but maintenance standards of ships and aircraft were assessed as poor and training not to a high standard. The army command was riven by factional interests, and, crucially, units were trained predominantly for internal security duties, not for general warfare or insurgency fighting. In Malaya and Borneo, Malays and indigenous peoples totaled just over 4.5 million of the combined Malaysian population of 10 million, with Chinese making up just fewer than 4.5 million and Indians nearly 1 million people.37 Inside the North Borneo states were around 25,000 Indonesian immigrant workers, many of whom posed a potential internal security threat.38 There were also large communities of ethnic Chinese in Borneo, some suspected of being loyal toward the Communist Party and forming the Clandestine Communist Organization (CCO).39 Indonesia sought to exploit these dissident groups and foment trouble wherever possible, hoping to turn the population away from joining with Malaya into the Federation of Malaysia and, when this failed, to terrorize them and seek to make Britain’s AMDA promise untenable.40
Most Commonwealth forces were better trained and equipped than their Indonesian counterparts.41 British troops in the conflict were professionals, and the Gurkhas were also all volunteers. The Gurkha battalions and some of the British troops had recently served in the Malayan Emergency and were jungle trained. All units going to Borneo attended Jungle Warfare School training prior to deployment if they had not done so before.42
The main battleground was the island of Borneo, the northern third comprising Sarawak, Sabah, and Brunei, with the Indonesian state of Kalimantan to the south, the two separated by central highlands. Borneo is the third largest island in the world, measuring some 830 miles long by 600 miles in width.43 The Kalimantan border was almost 1,000 miles long and often ran through dense tropical jungle, along steep mountain ranges, some over 8,000 feet high.44 Borneo was studded with large rivers: these offered the only real means of traveling inland, as there were few roads and no railways.45 The weather was tropical: very hot and humid, with two monsoon seasons and thick morning mists over the jungle, which cleared around 10 a.m., and large thunderstorms that built up during most afternoons and produced heavy downpours of rain.46
The capital city, Kuching, in Sarawak, located only 30 miles from the border, was deemed to be the center of CCO activities.47 Communities of indigenous people, who often lived together in longhouses, occupied the jungle areas, and they were often related to groups across the Kalimantan border, with whom they traded and interacted. As the dispute progressed, as well as East Malaysia (Borneo) incursions, there were also many incursions into West Malaysia, but these, while highly significant politically, were not militarily significant compared with the Borneo campaign.
The Brunei Revolt, which began on December 8, 1962, was seen as the catalyst for Confrontation.48 The revolt’s causes were unclear but were probably largely caused by antipathy to the Sultan of Brunei’s authoritarian rule coupled with an element of anticolonialism. The Sultan asked for British troops to put down the revolt, which largely comprised of North Kalimantan (Borneo) National Army (Tentara Nasional Kalimantan Utara—TNKU) irregulars and Kedayan tribesmen. Under Plan ALE, three battalions of British and Gurkha soldiers from 99 Gurkha Infantry Brigade, together with two Royal Marines Commandos, were quickly flown or sailed in from Singapore. The rebellion was effectively put down in about three weeks.49 The revolt had also spilled over into part of Sarawak, but as the rebels sought to find safety in Kalimantan, they were chased by British troops and mopped up by cordons of indigenous tribesmen. These tribesmen, who had been raised and equipped by British and Australian teams in World War II to fight the Japanese, were called out by the British authorities and some of their old commanders who had settled in Sarawak.50
Tunku Abdul Rahman did not specifically lay the blame for the revolt on the Indonesians, but the Malay press was quick to do so.51 Intemperate language in Djakarta and Kuala Lumpur was magnified by the press in both countries.52 Dr. Subandrio, on January 20, 1963, then declared a policy of Confrontation with Malaya over the proposal to form Malaysia. Neither he nor President Sukarno, in a speech on February 13, made clear what Confrontation meant but they alluded to all political, economic, and military measures short of general war.53 The United Kingdom now considered from intelligence reports that after the Brunei revolt there could now be incursions by Indonesians from Kalimantan into the British North Borneo territories.54 It stated that although 15,000 to 20,000 men could be available, logistics issues were likely to limit action to a single brigade group offensive by land or sea and two battalions by air. In addition, there were approximately 1,500 Indonesian border terrorists (IBTs) supported by an unknown number of Indonesian regulars (masquerading as civilians) and local defense guerrillas who posed the most potent immediate threat.
Initially, Britain maintained one brigade HQ with five to six battalions of infantry, together with supporting ships and aircraft (including 12 to 15 support helicopters) in Borneo to deter and confront any incursion by Indonesian forces.55 In Singapore and Malaya, there were two more brigades of the 17th Gurkha Division, although the Australians and New Zealanders were barred from use in Borneo by their respective governments.56 There was also a commando helicopter carrier group in the region and various other ships including RAN and RNZN vessels. However, the navy’s Achilles’ heel was the lack of fast patrol boats to patrol inshore: only small, slow wooden minesweepers were available for the task.57 The RAF’s Far East Air Force (FEAF) deployed Javelin fighters, Hunter fighter-bombers, Canberra bombers, and several maritime, reconnaissance, air transport, and army support (including helicopter) squadrons.58 British forces could be reinforced by a brigade of 4,000 men from the United Kingdom in nine days if required.59 In the background was the United Kingdom’s ability to send Royal Navy (RN) fleet carrier groups and Royal Air Force (RAF) strategic bombers and all-weather fighters, together with the Strategic Reserve Division, to the Far East in the event of an all-out conflict; frequent deployments of some assets reminded Indonesia that this was the case.60
The General Officer Commanding (GOC) 17th Gurkha Division was Major-General Walter Walker, a Gurkha officer who had won three DSOs commanding units fighting the Japanese in Burma and the CTs in Malaya.61 He became director of operations Borneo, as well as commander British forces (CBF) Borneo.62 Walker, an experienced jungle warrior, had set up the world-renowned Jungle Training School at Kota Tinggi.63 He was the architect of victory. On his way to Borneo, he wrote out five campaign principles: jointmanship (unified operations with the three services and police operating together); timely and accurate information (intelligence); speed, mobility, and flexibility for our forces; security of our bases; and domination of the jungle.64 Some weeks later, after substantial rescue and support operations conducted in January 1963 by British forces when Borneo suffered the worst monsoon flooding in living memory, he added a sixth principle: winning the “hearts and minds” of the people.65 The flooding saw British forces engaging immediately in rescue and flood relief operations, and this went a long way in winning the peoples’ “hearts and minds” immediately. Walker’s six principles proved ideal for Confrontation. The lesson was that clear campaign principles from the outset are essential for conducting counterinsurgency operations.
Walker first established a joint HQ at Labuan, a crucial aspect of his command and control structure, because it determined that this would be a joint campaign, with all three services working together.66 Throughout the conflict, joint action once more proved to be an essential requirement of a counterinsurgency campaign.
Walker’s two commanders in chief Far East (Cs-in-C FE) in succession, Admiral Sir David Luce and Admiral Sir Varyl Begg, bestowed on him essentially operational command (a term not used in the 1960s) of all joint forces in Borneo, directly under the command of the C-in-C himself.67 This command chain made Walker the joint force commander under the C-in-C Far East (FE) as the joint commander (again terms not used in the 1960s),68 bypassing the single-service Cs-in-C. It did lead to some difficulties between Walker and all three (in succession) of his own general officers commanding in chief (GOCs-in-C), largely because Walker was a fiery character who did not suffer fools gladly and failed to keep his own GOC-in-C informed of matters affecting the troops the latter “owned” when not in Borneo.69 Walker’s successor, Major-General George Lea, enjoyed the same command chain and was better at keeping his own GOC-in-C informed. As director of operations Borneo, a post agreed by the Malaysian government, Walker was on loan to that government,70 and he bypassed the previous command powers of the governors of Sarawak and Sabah in prosecuting the campaign.71 A Malaysian National Defense Council chaired by Rahman determined strategic policy for the campaign, consulting with London through the British High Commission. A lower level committee, which included the chief of staff of the Malaysian Armed Forces and the inspector general of police, as well as the C-in-C FE, determined the direction of the operational campaign, and their policy was transmitted to Walker through the C-in-C FE.72 He then turned the policy into military action in Borneo. There were local committees in Borneo to ensure that the governors and the local heads of police and administration were kept fully informed and operated the centrally agreed policy in their own areas. The system worked extremely effectively. The lesson is that a clear command chain, a clear execution chain from strategy to tactics, and a joint HQ to harness the strengths and capabilities of all the services are essential in counterinsurgency.
Having determined his campaign principles, Walker developed his campaign plan. At first he could not see a way to defend North Borneo with the limited number of troops he had, given the distances involved and the geographical and climatic factors with which his men would have to contend. However, with advice from Borneo veterans of World War II, he saw that much of the mountainous, jungle-covered terrain could not be penetrated easily by large bodies of insurgents. There were few, if any, roads, and so jungle tracks and rivers had to be used and most border crossing points were channeled by the terrain.73 He therefore developed an early warning system (a screen) involving small patrols of a few men to spot any incursion, backed up by infantry battalions, which were held back from the border. Lieutenant-Colonel John Woodhouse, CO 22 Special Air Service (SAS) Regiment, persuaded Walker that this role was an ideal job for his men, and two squadrons at a time were deployed in Borneo for the task.74 When two SAS squadrons proved to be insufficient, the Gurkha Independent Parachute Company was committed to the task75 as was 1 (Guards) Independent Parachute Company.76 The SAS and paratroopers lived among the people, earning their trust and assisting with medical and other issues, which contributed greatly to the “hearts and minds” campaign, and the four-man teams did a remarkable job in spotting incursions and gaining intelligence and the trust of the local people near to the border. Their activities did much to benefit the “hearts and minds” campaign. Walker later said that 70 SAS troopers in this “screen” role were more important to him than a battalion of 700 infantry.77 Fifteen hundred local tribesmen were also recruited and trained as border scouts to supplement the forward screen, guard villages, and gather intelligence from both sides of the border.78 This system, coupled with the overall “hearts and minds” campaign, was so successful that the insurgents found an almost complete lack of support among the local population and could hardly move without being reported.79 All initial information was passed through an intelligence assessment process to determine its validity, and companies from the major units could then move forward to chase, block, ambush, and destroy the insurgents.80 The lessons once again are that early warning and good intelligence, from all sources, is key to winning a counterinsurgency campaign and troops highly trained for special operations are essential in the order of battle.
Walker had taken notice of the decisive effect of helicopters during the Brunei Revolt, which had brought vastly increased mobility and improved logistic support to the infantry.81 He therefore determined to use this much-improved (since Malaya) form of transport to move his troops rapidly in Borneo. Newer and more capable helicopters were being fielded, giving Walker the ability to use these vehicles, though not without some risk, in a fire brigade role. The lesson surely is that commanders and staffs need to recognize and use the emerging capabilities of new technology to the full.
The internal threat from almost 60,000 potentially hostile Chinese and imported Indonesian workers could not be ignored either, and although this was a police matter, the military acted in support of the police throughout.82 Troops were on call to assist in internal security duties, as well as counter the external threat from Indonesian-trained groups. The police special branch, working with the army, was able to supply information about local terrorist leaders and their likely hiding places in Sarawak and Sabah, which could then be followed up by patrolling and searching those areas.83 Sarawak police field force officers were trained in military style to operate in the field, and they often accompanied army patrols in these ventures.84 The lesson was that police, civil administrative officer, and military cooperation is an essential feature of counterinsurgency campaigns.
General Sir William Jackson likened Confrontation to a six-round boxing contest.85 Round one saw Sukarno trying to prevent the formation of Malaysia by seeking to undermine the Borneo tribes’ support of the idea. Round two was the breaking of trade and diplomatic links and the first cross-border raids by TNKU “volunteers.” The third round consisted of Indonesian political pressure through the United Nations and an early-1964 Bangkok peace conference coupled with the buildup of regular Indonesian forces in Kalimantan. In round four, Indonesian regular troops began operating in Borneo and in West Malaysia, eliciting British cross-border raids in response, and there was heavy fighting against well-trained troops in dug-in positions: peace talks were held in Tokyo without result during the period and there was fruitless diplomatic activity in the United Nations. Round five saw Singapore withdraw from the federation, shaking Malaysia’s position. Finally, in round six, Indonesia’s economy spun out of control in the second half of 1965, and there was heavy dissension in Indonesia, leading to Sukarno’s overthrow and the end of hostilities.
While Sukarno sought to undermine the formation of Malaysia politically, the first major cross-border event occurred on April 12, 1963, when a group of 30 TNKU insurgents attacked the police post at Tebedu in Sarawak, killing and wounding three soldiers.86 It took three hours for a British relief convoy to arrive because of the poor state of the roads. A second attack took place at Gumbang 10 days later.87 These events resulted in the immediate move of 40 Commando RM to Borneo, with a further battalion of Gurkhas placed on standby to move. Walker now had two brigade HQs (West and East Brigade) and six to seven infantry battalions in place. To provide mobility for the larger force, a new RAF Whirlwind helicopter squadron was formed in Singapore to supply detachments to Borneo88 and to supplement the existing Whirlwind and Belvedere aircraft on detachment there.89 The RN also sent a Wessex helicopter detachment to Borneo to supplement its Whirlwind helicopter detachment.90 There were no other major incursions during the four months following the first raids, but small-scale incursions continued to occur. Two lessons were learned from the attacks: first, the enemy had the advantage of surprise as long as he could move freely on his side of the border, and, second, speed and flexibility could be battle-winners for the defenders. Walker adjusted his tactics accordingly. He decreed that a platoon was always to be held as a quick reaction force (QRF) ready to fly forward by helicopter, thus reducing reaction time considerably.91 This was the first of several tactical changes he made, the lesson being that there is a need to maintain operational and tactical flexibility during counterinsurgency operations.
Following the Tebedu raid, Brigadier Barton RM, commanding 3 Commando Brigade, began to build platoon-size bases next to the border in Sarawak, together with dozens of new helicopter-landing pads, many cut from the jungle. This building program was endorsed and expanded by General Walker.92 More bases were built in other areas along the border. All of these new bases needed to be fortified to withstand the enemy and the weather, and this program involved a significant effort by engineers, the troops themselves, and the supply organization.93 Landing strips were built to permit light aircraft to resupply some bases; others were supplied through parachute drops, by river transport, and by helicopters.94 A large logistics organization was required to undertake this work, especially of river transport for fuel and supplies, as preserving helicopter flying hours was essential.95 The effort was costly, but it reflected the fact that getting logistics right is an essential feature of all military operations and is a major factor underpinning counterinsurgency campaigns.
Helicopter-landing pads and refueling facilities were built at several of the larger bases back from the border, and RN and RAF crews flew Wessex and Whirlwind helicopters from them, colocated with the army units they supported.96 Soon, AAC crews joined them as they changed from flying fixed wing aircraft to Scout and, later, Sioux helicopters.97 Air and ground crews spent long periods with their supported units and got to know the local terrain and weather. This was essential when maps were virtually useless at this stage, making landing points in clearings in the jungle very difficult to find, and clouds covered the mountains, and ridges that had to be negotiated.98 Some considered that helicopters should stay allocated to specific units.99 While there were advantages brought by gaining local knowledge and improving tri-service esprit de corps, it was a wasteful system as scarce assets might sit idly on the ground for periods in one place while other units elsewhere needed them for tasks. Tasking helicopters to work with a unit only when required and moving them on to work with other units for their tasking was a more efficient system, improving utilization and avoiding waste.100 The lesson is that when assets are scarce in a counterinsurgency campaign, central direction and tasking is essential, though there may be occasions when they should be placed in direct support for periods.
Mapping was very primitive at the start as much of Borneo’s interior had never been surveyed properly. Air charts often had little information on them, and the existing information was often in the wrong place. This was a great problem to start with, so local knowledge became the only way to fly accurately to support the troops. Consequently, Canberra aircraft were used to photograph the whole of East Malaysia,101 and survey teams were flown by helicopter to triangulate the hills so that accurate maps could be provided.102 In counterinsurgency, even with modern satellite mapping, maps of jungle or other areas may still be inaccurate, requiring specialists able to produce new ones.
“Heart and minds” work continued throughout. Basing forts next to villages to protect them meant that the troops from all services got to know the local people and to assist them whenever possible, and this again helped to win their “hearts and minds.”103 The headman’s dignity was always upheld: people, animals, and building materials were moved around or brought in. Food handouts were given, advice on crop growing was dispensed, and children’s parties were held. There were medical clinics (known as “sick parades”) for local people, and casualties were evacuated.104 Examples such as when a Gurkha company base was built at Ba’kelalan, helicopters frequently included provisions for the local Muruts who had been deprived of their cross-border trade105 and when a cholera epidemic struck Nanga Gaat, naval helicopters worked with 1 Royal Ulster Rifles to fly the victims to the hospital, often with food, pots, and pans106 show the lengths taken to win local friendship. All personnel contributed in many ways to win “hearts and minds.” General William Jackson is unequivocal. He wrote: “The battle for hearts and minds in Borneo was never lost: in Vietnam and Aden it was never won.”107
The lesson is clear, winning the “hearts and minds” of the local people is utterly essential in any counterinsurgency campaign, and the British did it splendidly in Borneo.
Knowing that conflicts are not won by defensive measures alone, Walker ensured that troops patrolled the border crossing point areas and the tracks around them.108 The patrols sought to dominate the area, reassure the local population, and pick up information from the people as they patrolled. Jungle patrolling in Borneo was physically and mentally demanding. The terrain was severe, the jungle was very thick, and the heat and humidity was very draining to men carrying large loads. Movement was very difficult on foot. It was quite possible at times to take 12 hours to cover just 2 miles.109 The men therefore had to achieve a high level of physical fitness to be able to move and to operate in the demanding conditions of North Borneo while carrying such loads. The lessons are that commanders must seek to fight an offensive campaign and that troops need to be physically fit to conduct counterinsurgency operations in harsh conditions.
British weapons and equipment of the period were heavier than American or Australian equivalents so efforts were made to reduce weight.110 Loads were balanced between life support needs and what could be carried over several days, and units reduced the weight of food carried so that men often lost a percentage of their bodyweight while on patrol.111 Five days was the normal patrol time, though ambush patrols could be longer.112 Attempts were made to obtain lighter weapons, equipment, and rations to reduce weight and, thus, fatigue, but this took time. Procurement of equipment and clothing appeared to be focused on European needs rather than the specific requirements of other theaters, even though fighting was in progress elsewhere. It is a clear lesson that planners must consider procurement of clothing and equipment in the light of all military requirements worldwide, and not be too narrowly focused.
During the April to September 1963 period, there were some 420 intruders into North Borneo, with 37 being killed and 22 wounded or captured. This showed the value of the constant patrolling being undertaken and the troops’ determination to dominate their areas.113 In jungle warfare, British and Gurkha soldiers adopted the ways of jungle animals.114 Senses were heightened on patrol so they did not use talcum powder, hair oil, or soap to avoid smells giving away their presence to an enemy. They showed no lights and did not smoke to avoid giving away their positions. Hand signals were used to avoid being heard. They wore floppy hats to prevent noise from helmets hitting trees, patrolled slowly along trails, were ready to react to meeting the enemy in fleeting encounters at any time, and lay for hours in ambush positions if incursions were reported, tied together with rope or string, which could be tugged to alert all members of the patrol. Gurkhas soon displayed outstanding skill at such patrolling.115 British servicemen grasped the necessary skills to operate effectively in the jungle after jungle training.116 Jungle operations were physically and mentally demanding, so regular rest and recovery periods away from operations were needed, and a roulement policy was adopted. Gurkhas usually completed a six-month tour on the island, whereas their British counterparts only undertook four-month tours.117 The lessons are that in counterinsurgency campaigns, excellent training and regular rest periods for troops under combat pressure are essential.
Communicating in Borneo was a real challenge. No communications network existed on the island, or even a radio station broadcasting to the people, so everything had to be built up from scratch. A radio transmitter was flown by helicopter onto Kota Kinabalu, the highest mountain on the island, to allow radio programs, including government information, to be broadcast to the people.118 Military radio relay and rebroadcast stations were set up on various hills, manned by small detachments of Royal Signals personnel, to bring essential military radio coverage to the battlefield.119 Air-to-ground communication was patchy, as helicopters were often out of radio contact with their units once they left their base and as the RAF helicopters were not fitted with radios compatible with army ground unit radios, thus reducing their situational awareness. Consequently, a Scout helicopter often had to act as a radio relay between the RAF helicopters and the infantry during operations.120 The clear lesson is that on operations, including counterinsurgency campaigns, all vehicles and personnel must have radios that allow personnel to communicate with each other to enhance operational efficiency and situational awareness.
Following Malaysia Day, Indonesia began to build up its regular forces in Kalimantan. Crush Malaysia Border Area Command (KOGA) was set up in October 1963 to coordinate incursions into Malaysia.121 Groups of insurgents began crossing the border more frequently, more widely, and in larger numbers. A major attack by 100 IBTs at Long Jawi in Sarawak on September 28, 1963, killed four defenders and wounded several more.122 Similarly, on December 29, 1963, 8 Malaysian soldiers were killed and 16 wounded when a 130 IBTs led by 35 Indonesian marines, attacked their post at Tawau in Sabah.123 This was the worst loss suffered by Commonwealth forces in the campaign. The attack was a strategic error. It demonstrated that this was not a British conflict alone, hardening Malaysian attitudes and leading to large public demonstrations of hatred against Indonesia.124 The retreat of the IBTs toward Kalimantan was followed up aggressively by well-controlled helicopter-borne infantry, and these were used to great effect, in both follow-up operations, putting in groups of soldiers (known as “stop groups”) to block further enemy movement along their known route, hunter groups to chase them and ambush parties to kill them, and making dummy drops of troops to persuade the IBTs to move in the direction of the ambushes.125 The majority of insurgents in both attacks were killed or captured. British tactics had proved highly successful. The lesson is that tactical decisions in counterinsurgency campaigns, whether by the enemy or one’s own forces, may have strategic repercussions and need to be considered in that light.
Helicopters came of age during Confrontation; without them, it would have been impossible for the Security Forces to control such a vast area against the guerrillas.126 Crews were at risk from a range of aircraft-, weather- and operations-related factors,127 yet daily they deployed troops on patrol, evacuated the sick, resupplied them, carried commanders and officers to conferences and liaison meetings, and, importantly, provided the essential logistics to their bases.128 Walker himself was fulsome in his praise, writing,
Helicopters proved themselves over and over again to be the real battle-winners. They flew tirelessly over the mountains and along the valleys, placing men exactly where they would do most good. For example, reconnaissance patrols were positioned along the frontier to find and report the enemy, and sections were set down neatly in depth to cut off unsuspecting raiders. A clever company commander with a few “choppers” could so block the guerrillas at every turn that they would think an entire army was at their heels.129
Helicopters of all three services provided the mobility over the jungle to meet Walker’s campaign plan. The knowledge that they could be evacuated quickly when hurt or wounded provided the troops with a significant morale boost.130 During operations, commanders flew in helicopters to control the ground forces, notably during an incursion in 1966, when CO 2nd Battalion 7th Gurkha Rifles spent 82 hours in a Bell 47 Sioux helicopter commanding his men from the air, using relays of pilots to keep him aloft.131 Brigadier Cheyne DSO, commanding West Brigade, stated: “I command my brigade with a Scout helicopter. I cannot do it any other way. There is no other way.”132
Walker confirmed that this was to be a helicopter war and stated that in the Borneo jungle one minute’s flying equaled a day’s infantry march, one hour in the air covered five days travel on foot, and a battalion using six troop carrying helicopters was equal to a brigade with none.133 Helicopter operations were conducted with the express directive that the infantry was not to gallop like cavalry over the jungle to assault the enemy but were to be flown covertly to landing sites near to the enemy from which they could move quietly to ambush, surprise, and kill him, while minimizing the risk of being ambushed themselves.134 It was not without loss: aircraft were hit by ground fire and even shot down and several aircraft were lost in accidents, but attrition rates were low for the number of hours flown.135 The lesson from Borneo is that helicopters are essential vehicles in counterinsurgency campaigns, conferring tactical agility, mobility, speed, and some protection on ground forces.
In between the major attacks, low level insurgency continued as IBTs sought to set up camps and arms caches in Malaysian territory from which to launch attacks. Patrols, often led by Iban trackers and Sarawak Rangers who usually deployed with a patrol dog, had many individual and small group clashes with the enemy: they set up ambushes, made finds of caches of weapons, and gathered intelligence of IBT activities.136 Jungle encounters were of a fleeting nature, and often only the front two or three men of a section were engaged. Analysis of these encounters showed that high-quality jungle patrolling was required, as were good snap-shooting skills, sound fire control, and fire-and-maneuver tactics, together with excellent junior leadership. It was disappointing to find that some of these skills had been lost in only six years since the Malayan Emergency had ended and they had to be recovered and retrained.137 This shows the clear need to capture lessons learned from campaigns and to keep them under review continually, to recall them for use when required in future conflicts. It also underlined the lesson that constant, relevant training is essential in counterinsurgency operations, where tactics change rapidly.
In the face of increasing incursions and attacks, the C-in-C FE, requested the Chiefs of Staff (COS) Committee in London to increase force levels in Borneo to three Brigade HQs and eight major infantry battalions.138 The chiefs agreed to an increase and, noting the acute shortage of rotary wing assets in the Far East, determined to increase helicopter resources. A further squadron of RAF Whirlwind helicopters and four more Belvedere helicopters were sent from exercise in Libya to Borneo by aircraft carrier.139 There was further escalation by Indonesian IBTs, with larger groups crossing the border. Walker therefore changed tactics again, and medium artillery pieces were deployed forward to supplement infantry mortars. Following an attack on a forward base that held two guns, Walker discarded artillery unit doctrine that guns should operate as part of a troop and ordered the guns to be deployed singly.140 Later, the guns were moved by helicopter from place to place, to give the impression of larger numbers of guns deployed.141 The Indonesians reported that the British appeared to have artillery in every forward base.142 The lesson for counterinsurgency campaigns is that commanders should not slavishly follow doctrine and must be willing to deviate from it when necessary.
By March 1964, Walker assessed that the number of IBT units inside East Malaysia had increased significantly and Indonesian strength over the border had trebled in number.143 In addition, Indonesian fighter and other aircraft had frequently crossed the Borneo border. Accordingly, in March 1964, he recommended further reinforcement to double the number of troops in Borneo, including use of the Australian and New Zealand battalions, to preempt a major Indonesian offensive. However, Australia and New Zealand still declined to send troops at this point as they had received U.S. requests to send troops to South Vietnam.144 He also requested additional aircraft, helicopters and patrol craft, and possible cross-border retaliation. He did not get all that he wanted. British reinforcements were sent to Borneo, so that 3 Brigade HQs and 10 infantry battalion equivalents were put in place to deter incursions. Company groups were moved forward to the border itself, and the forward operating bases (FOBs) were built up and fortified further, with full artillery and air support available.145 These adjustments brought further logistic and support challenges to build the bases, resupply them, and conduct patrols from them. The additional troops and bases needed more helicopter support, so more aircraft from the Singapore-based RAF squadrons were sent,146 plus Malaysian Air Force Alouette helicopters.147 Walker stipulated that the FOBs were to be held by only a third of the company at a time, with the others out on patrol. In addition, air transport aircraft numbers were increased and Hunter fighter/ground attack aircraft and Javelin fighters were deployed, along with Shackleton Maritime Reconnaissance aircraft and a light antiaircraft gun battery.148 The fighters were sent to police an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) set up over Borneo on February 28, 1964. Indonesian pilots had a healthy respect for their RAF counterparts, and air incursions over Borneo soon reduced significantly.149 A guard ship was positioned off the easterly border of Sabah, and naval patrols by smaller vessels increased. Up to 16 naval vessels operated around Borneo, predominantly minesweepers.150 Finally, HQ 17 Division was sent to Labuan under Major-General Peter Hunt to relieve Walker of a significant administrative burden, so that he could concentrate on operations.151 The fact that no tensions occurred between Walker and Hunt was largely because of their good personal relations and Hunt’s affable nature and his ability to cope with Walker’s fiery temperament. These additional resources gave Walker a better array of tools with which to meet the threat. However, they added to the strain on British Army resources and to the financial cost. The lesson is that commanders in counterinsurgency campaigns must be given appropriate tools for their task, even if costs rise. A further lesson is that the equality in rank between Walker and Hunt might have engendered frictions, so rank equivalents must be considered carefully in operations to avoid any needless friction.
Walker’s recommendation to Admiral Begg to permit British troops to cross the border to a depth of 2,000 meters was to deny the Indonesians safety across the Kalimantan border. As a result, Begg, having consulted London, authorized “hot pursuit” of Indonesian troops recrossing the border up to a depth of 3,000 yards. The utmost secrecy had to be maintained, so no word of this permission became public knowledge, only one company in each battalion could conduct such operations, and only General Walker himself could authorize each operation.152 The decision to permit hot pursuit of the enemy across the Indonesian border was timely, as the number and frequency of incursions and attacks was escalating further. Company-sized battles occurred at “Track 6” on March 7, 1964, and against 240 raiders in the Kling Klang Range of hills a few days later: the latter involved artillery, mortars and armored car fire, helicopters firing air-to-ground missiles, and a full infantry company assault, and showed that the Indonesians were ingressing in sizable numbers.153 Another incursion of 240 IBTs occurred in the Jambu area in April with 50 continuing into Sarawak—a rolling battle in the jungle that lasted for five weeks and saw 17 guerrillas killed and 7 captured, with the rest fleeing back across the border. There was then a short lull during talks in Tokyo in June 1964, but then larger attacks predominantly composed of Indonesian regular troops began in earnest. One at Rasau in Sarawak, that took place 24 hours after the talks broke down, killed five Gurkhas and wounded five more, and showed the Indonesian forces had significant tactical skill. In July, no less than 34 attacks took place.154 Walker recognized that the Indonesians were now attacking in numbers, that the enemy was now determined regulars, often dug in and using medium and heavy weapons. He likened it to World War II fighting in Burma against the Japanese.155 This was tough fighting. He quickly saw that the conflict required a change in British tactics. The lesson is that commanders and their staffs must seek to recognize when the enemy has changed tactics and be prepared to respond rapidly to regain the initiative.
The conflict widened further when from July 1964 raiding parties infiltrated by sea into West Malaysia. The parties tried to conduct attacks on installations in Singapore and West Malaysia.156 They were unsuccessful, but acts of sabotage continued throughout Confrontation. An Indonesian radio station had been set up to spread propaganda and disinformation, which resulted in race riots in Singapore in July and September. In August 1964, a force of 97 men was landed on three beaches in West Malaysia. The majority were caught or scattered, and their equipment captured by Malaysian troops. Indonesian fast patrol boats also clashed with a Malaysian patrol craft. When the Indonesians stated that the Sunda Straits between Java and Sumatra were closed for a month for an exercise, a RN task force built around the aircraft carrier HMS Victorious was sent to the area.157 This worried Indonesia sufficiently that Jakarta announced that the Straits were reopened. A number of plans were drawn up to conduct air and/or sea attacks against a range of Indonesian targets should the conflict escalate to all-out war and airfields in Singapore and Malaysia received antiaircraft artillery to protect them. Notwithstanding these preparations, on the night of September 1, 1964, four Indonesian C-130 aircraft were tasked to drop paratroops in West Malaysia.158 One aircraft was unserviceable, and a second aircraft disappeared en route. The remaining two aircraft, in a storm, dropped 96 paratroops at Labis in Johor region. The paratroops and their equipment were scattered widely in the drops, many groups not linking up with others. Malaysian and Gurkha troops searched for the paratroops. By the end of the month, most of the paratroops had been killed or captured. New Zealand troops, authorized by their government, were involved in the action for the first time and captured two insurgents.159 Penetration of Malaysian airspace by Indonesian aircraft caused a review of the air defense system in West Malaysia.160 The attacks on West Malaysia caused a sea change in the political and military landscape. Australia and New Zealand pledged their troops to defend Malaysia if further attacks occurred. The United States, noting a vitriolic anti-American speech by Sukarno in August, the landings in West Malaysia and Indonesia’s growing rapprochement with China, shifted its policy markedly toward the British and Australian line.161 This dramatically shows again that consideration of the political effect of operations must be an essential feature of counterinsurgency planning.
The fighting in Borneo and the landings in West Malaysia nearly brought Indonesia and Malaysia to open conflict. Britain brought ships out of retirement and sent a second aircraft carrier group to the Far East.162 The Royal Navy fleet in the region numbered 80 warships, including two aircraft carrier groups and a commando carrier group. It was the largest naval deployment since the Korean War and comprised a third of the fleet. Although there were no more parachute drops, incursions by sea into West Malaysia continued. The coast was watched by RN ships and Singaporean and Malaysian police coastal craft, and local and army personnel, and a warning system instigated to report any landings.163 A landing by 52 infiltrators on October 29, 1964, was met by 28 Commonwealth Brigade, including the Australian and New Zealand Battalions. Australian artillery pounded the insurgents, and, within three weeks, all the infiltrators had been killed or captured. Many other attempts to land smaller groups continued, and clashes occurred at sea on several occasions. On March 31, 1965, the total number of attempted landings in West Malaysia stood at 41, with 102 Indonesians killed and 309 captured.164 Attacks with rockets and guns by Hunter and Canberra aircraft were used on some occasions, and these often caused the insurgents to surrender immediately or to move rapidly.165 Helicopters based in Singapore dropped troops to surround, block, and attack the insurgents, and the sound of the helicopters constantly around them demoralized the groups and persuaded many of them to give themselves up.166 The lesson is that air power, when used appropriately in counterinsurgency operations, can be a battle winner.
In August 1964, the government decided that the authority given for “hot pursuit” across the border was to be extended to permit British troops to cross the border to attack Indonesian home bases.167 The authority was granted in the knowledge that the border was ill-defined, so incursions were deniable. The code name for the policy was Operation Claret. Walker had to authorize every Claret operation, and only experienced troops could take part. Every operation had to be planned and executed with maximum security, the men sworn to secrecy with no discussion of the operation at all. The depth of border crossing was limited initially to 3,000 yards, and attacks must be made to thwart anticipated enemy action, not for revenge or to inflict large numbers of casualties on the enemy. They were to be “hit-and-run” raids, to keep the enemy off balance, and to ensure that there was no sanctuary or relaxation for him in his home territory. Every operation had to be rehearsed for at least two weeks using models of the terrain and enemy facilities in the target area built up by using sand (and thus known as “sand tables”), and no soldier taking part was to be captured by the enemy, alive or dead. The depth of penetration was selected because it was within artillery support range. There had to be meticulous planning for each operation, for which approval was then given by the prime minister’s office. In addition, Royal Marine Special Boat Section (SBS) personnel were authorized to make small-scale amphibious raids on either flank on the coast.168 There was no announcement of the policy as it was felt it might do harm to Britain’s reputation, but it was a courageous decision by a government facing a general election. Although the Conservative Party lost the election to the Labour Party, the incoming secretary of state for defense, Dennis Healey, endorsed the policy soon after he took up his post.169 The lessons must be that politicians need to be given the facts on which to base key decisions and counterinsurgency campaigns are greatly assisted by continuity of political support.
Operation Claret changed the whole nature of the campaign in Borneo for the Commonwealth forces. Although defensive tactics were proving immensely successful, now they were not on the defensive the whole time but could hit the enemy offensively too. Attacks by insurgents into East Malaysia were disrupted and thwarted and casualties inflicted at an early stage. In time, the distance across the border was increased to 20,000 yards for some operations. But Claret operations did have their drawbacks.170 The cross-border operations exacted a great mental and physical toll on the troops concerned and on their commanders. Courage and skill were required to overcome the tensions and issues of operating behind enemy lines. Perhaps the main concern of all officers was the problem of getting their own casualties back to Sarawak or Sabah without using helicopters. No border crossing by aircraft was permitted except in dire emergency, though on rare occasions Walker did allow a helicopter to cross the border to pick up casualties. Most of the time, casualties and bodies had to be physically carried back across the border. Amelioration measures were taken: medical orderlies accompanied patrols, soldiers were taught advanced first aid, and some SAS men were trained in basic surgery.171 However, it was fortunate that casualty rates remained low on Claret operations. But Claret proved to be one of the keys to winning the campaign, as the enemy no longer had sanctuary in his own country, a circumstance that undermined his confidence and raised the morale of the defenders significantly. Between May 1964 and January 1965, when the cross-border operations were permitted to 3,000 yards, the security forces had 13 contacts resulting in 37 Indonesians killed and 27 wounded for the loss of 2 dead and 8 wounded. Between January 1965 and May 1966, when the depth was 10,000 yards, there were 125 contacts, which inflicted 502 dead and 166 wounded on the enemy for 18 dead and 39 wounded among the Security Forces. The lesson once again is that offensive action, guided by excellent intelligence, is an essential part of counterinsurgency operations.
In early 1965, Sukarno again sought to increase attacks on Malaysia and the Indonesian forces in Borneo once again increased in size. Walker asked for further reinforcements, and two more battalions were dispatched from the United Kingdom, together with a fourth squadron of Whirlwind helicopters.172 A fourth brigade HQ was formed to control the 12 battalions. Later in the year, a 13th battalion was sent to Borneo,173 and RN Wessex Mk1s were replaced by the much more powerful Mk5.174 Westland Sioux helicopters also arrived for command and control and liaison duties.175 Walker claimed that he had insufficient helicopters for the task,176 though a recent study challenges that assertion.177 The lesson about the essential nature of helicopters during counterinsurgency campaigns is underlined.
By August 1965, there were severe ideological differences between Rahman and Lee Kuan Yew, the prime minister of Singapore, based on Chinese concern about the dominant position of the Malays in politics and the demand that Malay should be the national language.178 Consequently, Singapore withdrew from the federation and decided to stand alone as a nation, but retaining Commonwealth ties. This might have resulted in the breakup of Malaysia and severe difficulties for Britain, as in time British forces would have had to leave the island; but by this time, Indonesia was in trouble economically and was unable to take advantage of the situation.179 Singapore’s withdrawal from Malaysia on August 10, 1965, might have given the United Kingdom the perfect opportunity to withdraw from the AMDA—but clearly this could only have been after Confrontation had been concluded successfully.180
Commonwealth troops were gaining the upper hand in Borneo, and Indonesian raids were now largely hit-and-run affairs, or artillery and mortar attacks, on targets just across the border. Indonesian troops in some areas withdrew more than 10,000 yards from the border; Claret operations could not attack them, but it showed the success of British tactics.181 Clashes continued, but most of these were during Claret attacks across the border. During one of these, Lance-Corporal Rambahadur Limbu was awarded the only Victoria Cross on Confrontation, but the report was carefully worded to disguise the fact that the action took place in Kalimantan.
Political tensions were mounting in Indonesia, caused by accelerating inflation and its resulting civil unrest, together with disquiet among the anticommunists over increasing PKI influence.182 Insurgent attacks began to wane as the Indonesian army was distracted by dealing with internal problems.183 Several temporary suspensions of Claret operations occurred as a result. In September 1965, Sukarno sought to break the power of the army and the PKI attempted a major coup on October 1, 1966, against the military.184 Although some generals were killed and imprisoned, others survived and remained free, notably General Suharto, a dynamic, respected officer who had largely orchestrated insurgent training and planning. He and his surviving colleagues conducted a purge of the PKI, and the army killed and imprisoned thousands of them. Sukarno had lost all support. Consequently, in March 1965, Suharto stripped Sukarno of his powers and took over as president. Although there were still occasional insurgent forays into Malaysia, the impetus had gone and secret talks began to end Confrontation.185 A peace treaty recognizing Malaysia was signed on August 11, 1966, in Bangkok, officially ending the conflict.186 Within two weeks, the bulk of British forces were withdrawn from Borneo, with a few detachments left behind to assist Malaysian troops counter raids by outlaw gangs, which were pursued by both sides.187 These forays were soon brought to an end.
During Confrontation, Commonwealth losses amounted to 114 killed and 180 wounded. The Indonesians officially admitted a loss of 600 men killed, but the total was almost certainly higher as a result of British cross-border operations, which officially never took place.188 It was a classic counterinsurgency campaign fought in difficult conditions with limited resources, and it deserves close study. The men who fought it deserve huge respect. Subsequently, Dennis Healey paid this well-deserved tribute to the armed forces in Parliament:
When the House thinks of the tragedy that could have fallen on a whole corner of a continent if we had not been able to hold the situation and bring it to a successful termination, it will appreciate that in the history books [concluding Confrontation successfully] will be recorded as one of the most efficient uses of military force in the history of the world.189
AAA: Anti-Aircraft Artillery
AAC: Army Air Corps
ADIZ: Air Defense Identification Zone
AMDA: Anglo-Malayan (later Malaysian) Defence Agreement
CBF: Commander British Forces
CCO: Clandestine Communist Organisation
C-in-C: Commander in Chief
C-in-C FE: Commander in Chief Far East
CO: Commanding Officer
COS: Chief of Staff/Chiefs of Staff
CTs: Communist Terrorists
DSO: Distinguished Service Order
FOB: Forward Operating Base
GNP: Gross National Product
GOC: General Officer Commanding
GOC-in-C: General Officer Commanding in Chief
HMS: Her Majesty’s Ship
HQ: Headquarters
HQ FEAF: Headquarters Far East Air Force
HQ FELF: Headquarters Far East Land Forces
IBTs: Indonesian Border Terrorists
IMF: International Monetary Fund
JIC: Joint Intelligence Committee
KOGA: Kommando Siaga (Vigilance of Alert Command, sometimes referred to as Crush Malaysia Border Area Command)
Konfrontasi: Confrontation (Indonesian)
NAS: Naval Air Squadron
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Neokim: Neo-Colonialism (Indonesian)
ORB: Operational Record Book
PKI: Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party)
QRF: Quick Reaction Force
R&R: Rest and Recuperation
RAF: Royal Air Force
RAN: Royal Australian Navy
RM: Royal Marines
RN: Royal Navy
RNZN: Royal New Zealand Navy
SAS: Special Air Service
SBS: Special Boat Section (of the Royal Marines)
SEATO: Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SRB: Squadron Record Book
TNKU: Tentara Nasional Kalimantan Utara (North Kalimantan National Army)
UK: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Britain)
UN: United Nations
1. Will Fowler, Britain’s Secret War: The Indonesia Confrontation 1962–1966 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2006), 3.
2. J. A. C. Mackie, Konfrontasi—The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute 1963–1966 (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), 7.
3. Defense Committee, Minutes of Meeting 11 Aug 1961, The National Archives (TNA), CAB 131/26, D(61)62.
4. Nick Van der Bijl, Confrontation: The War with Indonesia 1962–1966 (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2007), 25.
5. John Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno: British, American, Australian and New Zealand Diplomacy in the Malaysian-Indonesian Confrontation 1961–5 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), 33.
6. Fowler, Secret War, 3.
7. Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), 22.
8. Mackie, Konfrontasi, 32.
9. Fowler, Secret War, 3.
10. Mackie, Konfrontasi, 5.
11. Ibid., 29.
12. Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno, 7.
13. General Sir William Jackson, Withdrawal from Empire: A Military View (London: Batsford, 1986), 189.
14. John K. Franklin, “The Hollow Pact”: Pacific Security and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (PhD diss., Texas Christian University, 2006), 3. ProQuest.
15. Michael Dockrill, British Defence since 1945 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988), 80.
16. Fowler, Secret War, 3.
17. Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno, 11.
18. Ibid., 44–51.
19. Tom Pocock, Fighting General: The Public and Private Campaigns of General Sir Walter Walker (London: Collins, 1973), 115.
20. Mackie, Konfrontasi, 148–65.
21. Ibid., 175–83.
22. Fowler, Secret War, 3.
23. Mackie, Konfrontasi, 165.
24. Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno, 105–8.
25. Mackie, Konfrontasi, 223.
26. Air Marshal Sir David Lee, Eastward: A History of the Royal Air Force in the Far East, 1945–1972 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1984), 209.
27. Van der Bijl, Confrontation, 137.
28. Mackie, Konfrontasi, 265.
29. Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno, 116–17.
30. Mackie, Konfrontasi, 279.
31. Dockrill, British Defence, 68.
32. Ibid., 69.
33. Robert Jackson, The Malayan Emergency and Indonesian Confrontation (London: Routledge, 1991), 115.
34. Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno, 62.
35. Van der Bijl, Confrontation, 19.
36. Minutes of Chiefs of Staff Committee Meeting, January 29, 1963, TNA, DEFE 4/151.
37. Mackie, Konfrontasi, 37.
38. Van der Bijl, Confrontation, 9.
39. Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey, Emergency and Confrontation: Australian Military Operations in Malaya and Borneo 1950–1966 (London: Allen and Unwin 1996), 182.
40. Mackie, Konfrontasi, 213.
41. Fowler, Secret War, 7.
42. Pocock, Fighting General, 189.
43. Borneo, “Compton’s by Britannica,” Britannica Online for Kids (Encyclopedia Britannica, November 29, 2014), Web.
44. E. D. Smith, Malaya and Borneo: Counter-Insurgency Operations 1 (London: Ian Allan, 1985), 55.
45. Dennis and Grey, Australian Military Operations, 181.
46. Harold James and Dennis Sheil-Small, The Undeclared War: The Story of the Indonesian Confrontation, 1962–1966 (London: Leo Cooper, 1971), 87.
47. Jackson, Withdrawal from Empire, 190.
48. Ibid., 194–97.
49. Plan ALE Report, CINC FE 77/63 509/OPS/10, April 22, 1963, TNA, ADM 1-28626.
50. Pocock, Fighting General, 133.
51. Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno, 125.
52. Dennis and Grey, Australian Military Operations, 117.
53. Mackie, Konfrontasi, 125–27.
54. Minutes of Chiefs of Staff Committee Meeting, January 29, 1963, Item on Borneo, TNA, DEFE 4/151.
55. Pocock, Fighting General, 168.
56. Dennis and Grey, Australian Military Operations, 179.
57. Pocock, Fighting General, 139.
58. Lee, Eastward, 185–88.
59. Jackson, Withdrawal from Empire, 187.
60. Jackson, Malayan Emergency, 129.
61. Smith, Malaya and Borneo, 44.
62. Ibid., 54.
63. Pocock, Fighting General, 90.
64. Smith, Malaya and Borneo, 54.
65. Pocock, Fighting General, 137, 145.
66. Ibid., 140.
67. Ibid., 140.
68. Lieutenant-General Sir John Kiszley, “Thinking about the Operational Level,” Royal United Services Institute Journal (December 2005), 38–39.
69. Dennis and Grey, Australian Military Operations, 240–41.
70. Correspondence relating to selection of Director of Operations Borneo contained in Chiefs of Staff Committee Minutes, October 9, 1963–February 28, 1964, TNA, DEFE 7/2221.
71. Pocock, Fighting General, 140.
72. Smith, Malaya and Borneo, 59.
73. Pocock, Fighting General, 141–42.
74. Fowler, Secret War, 9.
75. Smith, Malaya and Borneo, 59.
76. Van der Bijl, Confrontation, 102.
77. James and Sheil-Small, Undeclared War, 67.
78. Judith Heimann, The Most Offending Soul Alive: Tom Harrisson and his Remarkable Life (Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1997), 345–46.
79. Mackie, Konfrontasi, 212.
80. Smith, Malaya and Borneo, 59.
81. CINC FE 77/63 509/OPS/10, April 22, 1963, Plan ALE Report, Annex B, para 2, TNA, ADM 1/28626.
82. Pocock, Fighting General, 167.
83. Fowler, Secret War, 8.
84. Van der Bijl, Confrontation, 67, 70, 89, 117 passim.
85. Jackson, Withdrawal from Empire, 194.
86. Fowler, Secret War, 19.
87. Van der Bijl, Confrontation, 39–40.
88. 103 Squadron Operational Record Book (ORB), August 1963 Report, TNA, Air 27/2963.
89. 110 Squadron, ORB, July 1963 Report, TNA Air 27/2966; 66 Squadron, ORB, August 1963 Report, TNA, Air 27/2949.
90. 845 NAS Squadron Record Book, April 1963 Report, Fleet Air Arm Museum, RNAS Yeovilton.
91. Pocock, Fighting General, 169.
92. Fowler, Secret War, 19.
93. Van der Bijl, Confrontation, 45–47.
94. Fowler, Secret War, 19.
95. Gregory Blaxland, The Regiments Depart: A History of the British Army, 1945–1970 (London: William Kimber, 1971), 389.
96. James and Sheil-Small, Undeclared War, 86–87.
97. Unattributed article “Army Air Corps in Confrontation,” Journal of Army Aviation, Museum of Army Flying, Middle Wallop, Hampshire, 1968.
98. James and Sheil-Small, Undeclared War, 87.
99. Ibid., 86–88.
100. Smith, Malaya and Borneo, 61.
101. Jackson, Malayan Emergency, 127.
102. Flight Lieutenant Elwyn Bell, 110 Squadron History, London, Air-Britain, 1971 and 103 Squadron, ORB, Jul 1965 Report, 20.
103. Smith, Malaya and Borneo, 61.
104. James and Sheil-Small, Undeclared War, 71.
105. Van der Bijl, Confrontation, 166–67.
106. Ibid., 61.
107. Jackson, Withdrawal from Empire, 210.
108. Fowler, Secret War, 19.
109. Dennis and Grey, Australian Military Operations, 181.
110. Van der Bijl, Confrontation, 50.
111. Ibid., 49.
112. Dennis and Grey, Australian Military Operations, 259.
113. Van der Bijl, Confrontation, 68.
114. Ibid., 49–50.
115. Pocock, Fighting General, 189.
116. Van der Bijl, Confrontation, 49.
117. Pocock, Fighting General, 189.
118. Bell, 110 Squadron History, 20.
119. Smith, Malaya and Borneo, 103.
120. Lieutenant-Colonel P. Collins, “The Front Was Everywhere,” RUSI Journal (May 1967).
121. Van der Bijl, Confrontation, 131.
122. Jackson, Malayan Emergency, 124–25.
123. Ibid., 125.
124. Smith, Malaya and Borneo, 61.
125. Van der Bijl, Confrontation, 80–85.
126. Pocock, Fighting General, 160; James and Sheil-Small, Undeclared War, 86; Smith, Malaya and Borneo, 61; and Fowler, Secret War, 10.
127. Paul Rosentall, Konfrontasi: The First Successful Helicopter Campaign, 2012 (MA thesis, University of Buckingham, 2012), 35–36.
128. Christopher Pugsley, From Emergency to Confrontation: The New Zealand Armed Forces in Malaya and Borneo 1949–1966 (London: Oxford University Press, 2003), 302.
129. General Sir Walter Walker, “How Borneo Was Won,” The Commonwealth Quarterly (The Round Table), no. 233 (January 1969), 13.
130. Lee, Eastward, 208–9.
131. Smith, Malaya and Borneo, 95.
132. Ibid., 98.
133. Pocock, Fighting General, 159–60.
134. Smith, Malaya and Borneo, 61.
135. Victor Flintham, High Stakes: Britain’s Air Arms in Action 1945–1990 (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2009), 293–94.
136. Van der Bijl, Confrontation, 55–57.
137. Pocock, Fighting General, 189.
138. Signal CINC FAREAST to MOD SEASEC, September 24, 1963, Assessment of Borneo Ops, TNA, DEFE 7/2372.
139. COS 324/63, September 25, 1963, Signal COSSEA 129 to CINC Far East 8 Oct 63, TNA, DEFE 7/2372.
140. Fowler, Secret War, 19.
141. Pocock, Fighting General, 191.
142. Smith, Malaya and Borneo, 68.
143. Director Ops Borneo, Assessment of Present Operational Situation, CBB 19, March 27, 1964, TNA, Air 23/8642.
144. Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno, 109–10.
145. Jackson, Withdrawal from Empire, 204.
146. 110 Squadron, ORB, July 1964 Report.
147. 846 NAS Squadron Record Book, Report July 1964, Fleet Air Arm Museum, RNAS Yeovilton refers.
148. Minute from the Australia, New Zealand, Anglo-Malaysian (ANZAM) Committee Meeting on 17th March 1964, TNA, Air 23/8642.
149. Jackson, Malayan Emergency, 126–27.
150. Smith, Malaya and Borneo, 88–94.
151. Dennis and Grey, Australian Military Operations, 241.
152. Van der Bijl, Confrontation, 120–22.
153. Ibid., 114–18.
154. Lee, Eastward, 209.
155. Walker, Borneo, 20.
156. Van der Bijl, Confrontation, 132–33.
157. Ibid., 134–35.
158. Lee, Eastward, 210–11.
159. Pugsley, New Zealand, 210.
160. Lee, Eastward, 211.
161. Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno, 122.
162. Van der Bijl, Confrontation, 139.
163. Ibid., 139–40.
164. Fowler, Secret War, 17.
165. Lee, Eastward, 212.
166. 103 Squadron, ORB, March 1965 Report.
167. Van der Bijl, Confrontation, 143–44.
168. Smith, Malaya and Borneo, 75.
169. General Sir William Jackson, Britain’s Defence Dilemma: An Inside View (London: Batsford, 1990), 104.
170. Smith, Malaya and Borneo, 72–75.
171. Van der Bijl, Confrontation, 144–45.
172. Jackson, Malayan Emergency, 130.
173. Pocock, Fighting General, 205.
174. 848 NAS, Squadron Record Book, Report May 1965, Fleet Air Arm Museum, RNAS Yeovilton.
175. Unattributed article on 656 Squadron AAC, Journal of Army Aviation 1988, Museum of Army Flying, Middle Wallop.
176. Walker, Borneo, 18.
177. Rosentall, Konfrontasi.
178. Van der Bijl, Confrontation, 189–90.
179. Smith, Malaya and Borneo, 72–75.
180. Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno, 162.
181. Van der Bijl, Confrontation, 217.
182. Mackie, Konfrontasi, 4.
183. Ibid., 5.
184. Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno, 180–84.
185. Mackie, Konfrontasi, 5.
186. Jackson, Britain’s Defence Dilemma, 110.
187. Bell, 110 Squadron History, 21.
188. Jackson, Malayan Emergency, 139.
189. The Right Honorable Dennis Healey, Secretary of State for Defense, Hansard, Speech on the Defense Estimates 1967, the House of Commons, November 27, 1967.