Contemporary counterinsurgency in Iraq relates to classic counterinsurgency theory in some fundamental ways such as its political character, the importance of ideas, and the value of winning hearts and minds. It also presents many complexities due to the unique context and culture of Iraqi society. The ambitious—and sometimes ambiguous—goals for coalition forces in Iraq complicated the situation and made contemporary counterinsurgency there difficult. In particular, the political goal of regime change combined with an imbalance between military preparation and postconflict planning to produce a power vacuum following the conventional campaign. Early coalition counterinsurgency efforts such as de-Ba’athification, search-and-destroy missions, and the use of forward operating bases (FOBs) transitioned slowly to a policy of “clear, hold, build” and the deployment of coalition forces among local Iraqi populations. The Sunni Awakening, the Petraeus Doctrine, and the subsequent surge all improved contemporary counterinsurgency in Iraq. Throughout the experience, coalition forces learned valuable lessons, although the degree to which these conclusions are applicable outside of Iraq remains debated.
There are many valuable principles one can glean from classic counterinsurgency theory. Andrew Mumford points out that “There are indeed some counter-insurgency truths that need to be held as self-evident.” Many scholars and practitioners of contemporary counterinsurgency in Iraq relate it to the Vietnam War. Bruce Hoffman, who served as a senior advisor to the Coalition Provisional Authority on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, remarks that “Vietnam and Iraq thus form two legs of a historically fraught triangle—with America’s experiences in El Salvador in the 1980s providing the connecting leg.” Andrew Bacevich reminds readers that some counterinsurgency advocates even compared Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez to General William Westmoreland and General David Petraeus to General Creighton Abrams. Others urge caution with comparing contemporary counterinsurgency in Iraq with previous experience in Vietnam. Kenneth Pollack and Irena Sargsyan note that “the Vietnam analogy … rarely fits with Iraq.”1
Contemporary counterinsurgency in Iraq shares certain key characteristics with classic counterinsurgency theory. The first is that counterinsurgency is fundamentally and inescapably political in character. This is especially true regarding goals. Andrew Mumford connects this dynamic to Sir Robert Thompson’s work, cautioning readers that “the need for a clear political aim (perhaps the most pertinent of the principles) is not an exclusively anti-Maoist strategic goal.” Other prominent scholars add additional features. Paul Cornish emphasizes the importance of patience in counterinsurgency, linking it to public opinion. This trait is especially relevant in Iraq since forbearance arguably runs counter to demonstrated precedents in American strategic culture that favor quick, decisive, and clear-cut victories in large-scale conflicts. Kalev Sepp highlights the local nature of counterinsurgency, arguing that “They are not a single war, but a hundred different wars, each unique to its valley, village, district or neighbourhood.” Good intelligence, especially human intelligence, is also critical for effective counterinsurgency. Bruce Hoffman applies this tenet to Iraq, noting that it is necessary for ascertaining “basic criteria” such as the types of insurgents and the strength of their organizations. Another shared trait is that counterinsurgency is not exclusively a military activity. Stuart Griffin captures this constant nicely: “One of the most important common features of the works of the prominent scholar-practitioners acknowledged within [counterinsurgency]—notably, Kitson, Thompson, Galula, Smith, Nagl and Kilcullen—is the emphasis they place upon the comprehensive, multidimensional nature of counterinsurgency: success is almost never defined solely by the physical defeat of the insurgent.”2
A foundational component of classic counterinsurgency theory is the value of ideas. Paul Cornish develops the concept of a “narrative,” which he defines as “a statement of identity, cause and intent around which government, people and armed forces (and perhaps even some allies) can unite.” The centrality of ideas within counterinsurgency is often referred to as winning hearts and minds. For some coalition forces in Iraq, especially certain segments of the U.S. military, this approach meant turning away from traditional areas of emphasis such as conventional warfare. Kalev Sepp questions why such a reorientation took so long to occur in Iraq. Other scholars relate winning hearts and minds to political legitimacy. Andrea Lopez argues that counterinsurgency efforts must enable the local government to achieve political legitimacy in the eyes of the population and must also provide incentives for the local population to become participants in that government. While acknowledging the importance of winning hearts and minds, David Petraeus stresses the usefulness of increasing the number of stakeholders in the resulting political structure: “More important [than winning hearts and minds] was the idea of Iraqis wanting the new Iraq to succeed.”3
While sharing some fundamental characteristics with classic counterinsurgency theory, contemporary counterinsurgency in Iraq also represented a new and more complex version of insurgency. This reality should not have come as a complete surprise to policymakers. Iraqi society is notoriously fractured with ethnicity, religion, and tribal affiliation, all providing stronger cultural affinities than Western concepts such as nationalism. The coalition goal of regime change meant completely overturning the entire system that had been in place for 35 years. The Ba’ath Party ascended to power in Iraq in July 1968. Saddam Hussein ruled Iraq as president from July 1979 to April 2003. In addition to the longevity of Ba’ath political rule, the complex demographics of Iraq made counterinsurgency there difficult. The Iraqi population numbers more than 31 million people, divided between three main ethnic groups: Arabs, Kurds, and Turkomans. Iraq is home to approximately 15.6 million Shi’a Muslims, 8.4 million Sunni Arabs, 6 million Kurds, and 1 million Turkomans. There are recurring Kurdish–Arab disputes in northern Iraq over land, much of it containing lucrative oilfields. Most important, the Sunni Arab minority received special consideration throughout the rule of Saddam Hussein. Geraint Hughes comments that “a significant portion of the Sunni Arab community relied on the survival of Ba’athism for its privileged political and socio-economic position.” This complex situation foreshadowed significant discontent for former power brokers once coalition forces overthrew the regime of Saddam Hussein. Even before the invasion of Iraq in 2003, prescient analysts such as Conrad Crane and Andrew Terrill predicted that Iraq would fracture into various tribal divisions after the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime.4
One factor contributing to the complexity of contemporary counterinsurgency in Iraq was that the Iraqi population had differing objectives and was willing to engage in violence to achieve them. Lydia Walker captures this impact: “The division of a nation’s population into separate, competing groups complicates the Galulian triad (people, government, insurgents). Also, the ‘insurgents’ in Iraq are not a monolithic entity.” Andrea Lopez estimates the number of parties initially engaged in insurgency in Iraq during 2003 at 25. In addition to the presence of many insurgent groups, the nature of those factions also diverged. Some of them were local and others were foreign. Some of them were economically motivated and others were ideologically inspired. Lydia Walker portrays the insurgent clusters as forming “independent strands of violence.” Contemporary counterinsurgency in Iraq therefore struggled with a spectrum of threats, including Sunni extremist groups such as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), Shi’a militias such as Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM), and bands that pursued outright criminality.5
Initially, the approach of coalition forces to contemporary counterinsurgency in Iraq was mismatched with the complexities of Iraqi culture. Although British forces had developed robust counterinsurgency capabilities based on experience, senior U.S. military leaders typically eschewed counterinsurgency following Vietnam, evidenced most clearly by the Weinberger-Powell doctrine. Even so, contemporary counterinsurgency in Iraq deviated fundamentally from the context of effective British counterinsurgency efforts in Malaya and Oman. Geraint Hughes notes that “In contrast, the Coalition is fighting adversaries unified by a shared hostility to the occupiers and the post-2005 Iraqi government, but little else.” He aptly characterizes the violence in Iraq as multiple insurgencies, each with a unique instigator, distinctive goal, and characteristic methodology.6
Compounding the complexity of Iraqi culture were the ambitious goals that the Bush administration set for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Maintaining a government through counterinsurgency is difficult enough. Regime change makes counterinsurgency exponentially more challenging. Kalev Sepp characterizes it as a revolution: “Call it militant Wilsonianism, call it expeditionary democracy, call it counterinsurgency, but this is not ‘return to status quo,’ and it is decidedly not stabilizing. It is an overturning of nations. It is, at its core, a revolution. American soldiers are the instruments of this revolution, and its implementers as well … and the US Army in particular must shoulder the burden of these tremendous tasks because there is simply no other agency or department in the US government that can do the job.”7
While much of the violence in Iraq revolved around securing power, the ways in which this occurred were often different from traditional insurgencies. The insurgents were not primarily concerned with controlling territory, fighting a government in power, or building up their own conventional forces eventually to battle coalition forces. Instead, Kalev Sepp’s characterization of insurgents’ preferred role as “spoilers” is quite appropriate. Bruce Hoffman reinforces this conclusion by noting that “Unlike a ‘classical guerilla-type campaign,’ the Iraq insurgency has no center of gravity.” The amorphous nature of contemporary counterinsurgency in Iraq meant that it lacked many of the traits associated with classic counterinsurgency theory. Bruce Hoffman points out that “Indeed, none of the four stages of an insurgency defined in the CIA’s renowned Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency seem to be relevant to the situation in Iraq.”8
The tribal structure of Iraqi society compounded these convolutions. Classic counterinsurgency theory focuses on maintaining the backing of the population. While this principle applies to contemporary counterinsurgency in Iraq, there were often multiple avenues through which coalition forces accomplished this important task. Tribal leaders in Iraq exhibited manifold priorities that sometimes complemented and occasionally conflicted with the priorities of the coalition and even the Iraqi national government. The Sunni Awakening that publicly emerged in 2006 demonstrated the weight of the tribal structure of Iraqi society and highlighted the additional layer of intricacy that it contributed to contemporary counterinsurgency in Iraq.9
Both major coalition partners, the United States and the United Kingdom, had ample previous experience in Iraq. The British presence there lasted from 1917 to 1958, while the United States led a successful international coalition against Iraq in 1990–91. This time the coalition raised the stakes significantly. The underlying rationale for the 2003 invasion of Iraq was to remove the Saddam Hussein regime completely from power. U.S. policymakers also created a heightened sense of urgency based on disputed claims regarding Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program. As a result, the Iraq War was politically contentious from the start. On March 17, 2003, U.S. President George W. Bush announced specific goals for Operation Iraqi Freedom and issued a 48-hour ultimatum to Saddam Hussein. The stated short-term goals were to remove the Saddam Hussein regime and to secure Iraq’s WMD programs. The avowed long-term aspiration was to ensure the emergence of “a new Iraq that is prosperous and free.”10
Coalition forces commenced a “Shock and Awe” aerial bombardment campaign on March 19, 2003. Coalition forces then invaded Iraq on March 20, 2003. The U.S. military labeled the invasion Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), while UK forces named it Operation TELIC. Coalition forces included the United States and its strongest partner, the United Kingdom, as well as contributions from Georgia, Poland, South Korea, Australia, Romania, Estonia, El Salvador, and others. The United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Poland all provided combat troops. U.S. Army Lieutenant General David McKiernan commanded the overall coalition ground campaign that drove north from Kuwait toward Baghdad. McKiernan’s advance consisted of U.S. Army Lieutenant General William Wallace’s V Corps on the western approach and U.S. Marine Corps Lieutenant General James Conway’s I Marine Expeditionary Force on the eastern line of attack. The UK First Armored Division occupied Basra. The conventional military campaign took only three weeks and culminated with the fall of Baghdad on April 9, 2003. By early April, coalition forces had overthrown Saddam Hussein’s regime, and on May 1, U.S. President Bush declared “Mission Accomplished” and proclaimed the cessation of major combat operations in Iraq.11
This rapid military exploit underscored the disparity in planning for the conventional conflict and what was to follow. OIF represented extensive military organization and a virtual absence of postconflict preparation. U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld heavily influenced the military planning, emphasizing high speed and a small presence that were the hallmarks of his defense transformation initiative. In stark contrast to the detailed provision for the conventional military campaign, coalition leaders exhibited a fundamental lack of forecasting the realities that would necessarily accompany regime change. Bruce Hoffman characterizes the result: “Thus a critical window of opportunity was lost because of the failure to anticipate the widespread civil disorders and looting that followed the capture of Baghdad.”12
The quick conclusion of the conventional military campaign occasioned the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime and produced a corresponding power vacuum. Coalition forces were inadequate to provide the requisite security that such a situation demanded. The United States initially deployed approximately 115,000 personnel and the United Kingdom contributed roughly 46,000 soldiers, combining for the majority of coalition forces. Geraint Hughes emphasizes the impact of such minimal numbers in a country with both a large population and vast territorial boundaries: “As a direct consequence of the Bush administration’s neglect of post-conflict reconstruction and security—and the restrictions the Pentagon placed on military planners preparing for the invasion of Iraq—the number of US troops involved in OIF was reduced to a bare minimum. The consequences of this planning decision cannot be underestimated.”13
The formal occupation that followed during 2003–04 encountered a complex insurgency that continually worsened until 2006. Geraint Hughes brands the period between 2004 and 2006 as “a low-level sectarian civil war” that kept Iraq “in a fragile condition” until at least 2010. From the beginning, coalition forces found themselves conducting contemporary counterinsurgency operations in Iraq simultaneous with those in Afghanistan.14
Immediately after the invasion, a host of political issues arose that had profound consequences for contemporary counterinsurgency in Iraq. The Bush administration initially planned for Iraqi exiles to play a prominent role, with Ahmed Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress being the most influential. Even so, the Bush administration dedicated little time, personnel, and strategic guidance to plan the postinvasion strategy prior to March 2003. U.S. President Bush created the Organization for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) on January 20, 2003, with National Security Presidential Directive 24. Retired U.S. Army Lieutenant General Jay Garner headed the organization. Garner and his meager staff started work in Baghdad in late April 2003. ORHA operated from April 18 until May 2003. President Bush’s “Special Envoy for Free Iraqis” Zalmay Khalilzad also held summits to discuss political goals for Iraq on both April 15 and 28, 2003.15
The lack of substantial efforts to institute political institutions had far-reaching results. After the invasion by coalition forces, there was a complete breakdown of stability throughout much of Iraq. Regime change by definition creates a political void, which, if left unfilled, can result in chaos. Such was the result in Iraq. In April 2003 there was widespread lawlessness in Iraq, most notably the looting of the Iraq National Museum and the Iraq National Library. Andrew Mumford illuminates the consequences: “The lack of law and order, as a result of American political failure to plan for the immediate aftermath of the invasion, sent two powerful messages: that the coalition was either powerless or unwilling to halt violence, and that it therefore could not protect the wider Iraqi population.”16
In an effort to broaden the political and development efforts that ORHA had begun, U.S. President Bush established the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and appointed U.S. Ambassador L. Paul Bremer as the new organization’s director in May 2003. Bremer and his staff started work in the Green Zone located in Baghdad on May 9, 2003. Before the end of the month, the CPA made two significant political changes that would influence the situation in Iraq dramatically. With Order Number One, Bremer embarked on a de-Ba’athification program. The edict sought to eliminate the Ba’ath political party in Iraq, removing upwards of 30,000 former Ba’ath leaders from current and presumably any future political power. With Order Number Two, Bremer disbanded the Iraqi military on May 23, 2003. With this pivotal move, Bremer decimated the economic and social prospects of approximately 300,000 trained soldiers and officers. Geraint Hughes remarks that “It is therefore no surprise that humiliated and impoverished ex-officers provided the core of initial insurgent activity against the Coalition.” The political emphasis on de-Ba’athification also shaped early military efforts. The U.S. military sought out Ba’ath leaders throughout 2003, the most notable example being the capture of Saddam Hussein in December of that year.17
In addition to de-Ba’athification, there were other early coalition political and development efforts. One example was the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP). The CPA established CERP initially with captured Iraqi money. The initiative funded small projects that coalition commanders carried out at the local level. CERP funded numerous road, school, water, and small business projects benefiting many Iraqi villages. After the early success of CERP, the U.S. Congress appropriated additional money specifically for the program. Over time, coalition reconstruction efforts increased considerably, reaching approximately $3 billion in CERP and another $50 billion in general reconstruction projects.18
Early coalition political efforts shifted toward a transfer of political power from the coalition to the government of Iraq. The CPA implemented this transfer to Iyad Allawi’s interim government on June 28, 2004, thereby dissolving its own original mandate. From June 2004 to September 2006, the coalition set about the arduous task of reconstituting the Iraqi military. Coalition focus then concentrated on improving the capacity of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). To this end, the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) worked closely with Iraqi institutions such as the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior, and the Counter-Terrorism Bureau.19
Many observers criticize early coalition political efforts as ill-advised and inadequate. The Bush administration’s detailed military planning for the invasion of Iraq underscores the paltry provision for the postconflict political situation. Ensuring political stability is crucial to any counterinsurgency effort. In Iraq, this necessity was even more critical, given the explicit goal of removing the Saddam Hussein regime completely from power. An absence of power was not only possible, but was actually foreseeable. More attention should have been paid to what exactly would fill this void and how. Andrew Mumford observes that the lack of clearly defined political goals, the dearth of opportunities for Iraqis to participate in the legitimate political process, and the resulting negative Iraqi public perceptions regarding early coalition political efforts fueled the insurgency: “The political vacuum left in the wake of coalition indecisiveness was filled by a combination of radical clerics such as Muqtada al-Sadr and foreign jihadi leaders like Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.”20
The initial division of coalition responsibilities tasked the CPA with political and development efforts and Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7) with security duties. The coalition created CJTF-7 on June 15, 2003, and appointed the American military commander in Iraq, U.S. Army Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, as its commanding general. CJTF-7, which included a UK deputy commanding general, led coalition counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq. By July 2003, coalition military leaders including Sanchez and the new Central Command (CENTCOM) commander U.S. Army General John Abizaid characterized Iraq as an insurgency. Violence in Iraq increased dramatically in 2003. During that summer, five attacks on coalition forces per day were common. By the fall of 2003, the number of attacks on coalition forces per day was approaching 40, an increase of eightfold.21
Early coalition counterinsurgency efforts during the fall of 2003 included search-and-destroy missions and an increased use of FOBs. Colin Kahl depicts the initial approach of search-and-destroy missions as “heavy-handed” and focusing predominately on kinetic operations at the expense of nonkinetic operations. The tactic garnered attention, such as the dramatic capture of Saddam Hussein on December 13, 2003, near his hometown of Tikrit. Concurrently, the increased use of FOBs aimed at limiting coalition casualties and avoiding the provocation of the Iraqi populace. While well-intentioned, the method had negative consequences. Andrea Lopez discerns that the FOB tactic turned classic counterinsurgency theory on its head: “The withdrawal of Americans from the cities, coupled with an increase in the use of violence, separated the counterinsurgents from the population. To win a counterinsurgency the government and its allies must do the opposite: they must separate the guerillas from the population.” Early counterinsurgency efforts also included tasking coalition military forces with significant development responsibilities. Examples included Task Force Restore Iraqi Electricity, Task Force Restore Iraqi Oil, and the CERP.22
Two significant challenges to contemporary counterinsurgency in Iraq emerged during 2003: the Abu Ghraib prison scandal and the increased use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by insurgents. The Abu Ghraib prison scandal surfaced in late 2003 with revelations regarding U.S. military personnel abusing Iraqi prisoners through a variety of culturally inflammatory means. In conjunction with revelations regarding coalition involvement in rendition and waterboarding, the scandals tarnished the reputation of early coalition counterinsurgency efforts. Andrew Mumford concludes that the incident “starkly highlighted the imperative of moral and legal probity as an essential counter-insurgency tool.” By April 2004, the widespread dissemination of photographs confirming the graphic abuse of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison by U.S. soldiers outraged many around the world and severely damaged initial coalition counterinsurgency efforts.23
The increased use of IEDs by insurgents also plagued coalition efforts in Iraq from the start. The devices were technologically simple yet highly lethal. Their use by insurgents was highly prevalent in Iraq. The U.S. Congressional Research Service categorized IEDs as “the enemy’s ‘weapon of choice’ in Iraq.” Paul Cornish notes that the pervasiveness of IEDs—along with insurgents’ increasing use of the internet for information operations—illustrates the ability of insurgents to use technology successfully and demonstrates “the danger of assuming insurgents to be technological primitives, armed with nothing more than small arms and hand grenades.”24
During the spring of 2004, CJTF-7 became Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I). Ricardo Sanchez continued as the commanding general and the headquarters remained in Baghdad. It was at this time that violence in Iraq increased intensely. Bing West portrays this period of time as “a Two-Front War” between al-Anbar in the west and Baghdad in the east that resulted in the majority of coalition deaths between 2004 and 2006. He remarks that “by mid-2006, the coalition was losing on both fronts.” Indicative of this difficult time were the battles of Ramadi and Fallujah. Ramadi was a devastating campaign that began in April 2004 when former Iraqi soldiers launched an insurgency there. It reignited 30 months later in June 2006. The battle of Fallujah began on March 31, 2004, when insurgents killed four private military contractors working for Blackwater and publicly displayed their burned bodies. Fallujah is a city located in al-Anbar province with a population of approximately 300,000. In Fallujah, I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) commenced Operation Vigilant Resolve during April and Operation Phantom Fury began in November 2004. Coalition forces, including British, Iraqi, and U.S. marine and army units, controlled Fallujah by the end of November 2004. Ultimately these early coalition counterinsurgency efforts illustrated that the “clear, hold, build” counterinsurgency stratagem worked after November 2004.25
A critical campaign in the contemporary counterinsurgency effort in Iraq was Tal Afar. Located in Ninewah Province with a population of approximately 200,000, Tal Afar was a significant early challenge for coalition forces. Violence was on the rise in early 2005. In May of that year coalition leaders assigned U.S. Army Colonel H. R. McMaster, commanding officer of the Third Armored Cavalry Regiment, and his unit to Tal Afar. Setting an example for future coalition efforts, McMaster began preparing both himself and his soldiers immediately upon receiving his assignment. In many ways, McMaster was uniquely primed for the counterinsurgency mission. He had written a widely read book on Vietnam, had been director of the Commander’s Action Group at CENTCOM, and quickly instituted an innovative approach to predeployment training by enhancing the preparation for counterinsurgency to include culture and language training. Kalev Sepp reminds readers that McMaster’s approach was “a long and comprehensive intellectual preparation of his troops for this kind of war, not just tactical training.”26
McMaster’s approach paid dividends once his unit arrived in Tal Afar. The Third Armored Cavalry Regiment emphasized protecting the local population. It accomplished this through increased security measures, including a dirt berm surrounding the city and checkpoints for anyone wishing to enter or exit the city. McMaster’s unit also increased partnerships with Iraqi military and police units using outposts situated among the local population rather than segregated away from them. For example, coalition forces worked closely with the 3rd Iraqi Army Division in Tal Afar. By September 2005, coalition forces and their Iraqi allies had conducted a successful counterinsurgency effort and as a result controlled Tal Afar. To many observers, the campaign represented an early example of the successful application of a “clear, hold, build” counterinsurgency approach in Iraq. This conclusion was amplified by significant press coverage of coalition efforts in Tal Afar, the most prominent example being Tom Ricks’s series on the campaign published in the Washington Post during 2005. Tal Afar offered an early glimpse of how to conduct successfully contemporary counterinsurgency in Iraq.27
Another critical campaign for coalition forces was Basra. The British Army was deployed to Iraq’s southeastern provinces from 2003 to 2009. One of the main cities within this area was Basra, a densely populated port city close to numerous oilfields. British forces took a nuanced approach to counterinsurgency in Basra. They eschewed harsh tactics. They wore berets instead of helmets, avoided strict regulations such as checkpoints and curfews, and worked closely with local leaders. Following the conclusion of the conventional campaign, British leaders quickly reduced their forces in Iraq. British numbers fell from approximately 46,000 in May 2003 to just over 10,000 only three months later. At the same time, British efforts helped to establish nearly 1,000 Iraqi police. The dearth of civilian training, adequate personnel, and available funding all led to an overall lack of progress. David Ucko characterizes the situation in dire terms: “Meanwhile garbage piled up, electricity outages were frequent and problems with sewage and water caused an outbreak of cholera. These problems, and the looting, turned the population against the occupying forces.”28
Two groups challenged British personnel in Basra: the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, with its militia the Badr Bridgade, and JAM, also known as the Mahdi Army. The Mahdi Army engaged British forces from 2003 to 2004. The CPA ordered the arrest of the group’s leader, Shi’a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, and al-Sadr began an insurgency in April 2004. At that time, the Mahdi Army attacked coalition forces in Nasiriyah and then assaulted coalition forces in Amarah in August 2004. Fighting erupted in Sadr City and beginning in mid-2005, violence in Basra spiked. These two insurgent factions vied for control of Basra. David Ucko articulates why: “The militias competed over three main assets: access to public institutions; control over security forces; and control and trafficking of oil.”29
From October 2005 to May 2006, a rift developed between the provincial council and British forces. At issue was the arrest and handling of Iraqi prisoners by British soldiers. The tensions led to increased violence by the militias in the area. In 2006, British leaders augmented the civilian resources in Basra. The British government created the UK Stabilisation Unit and a provincial reconstruction team. The British military launched Operation Sinbad in September 2006. The operation was a five-month campaign aimed at reestablishing control of Basra. While praising the operation’s “comprehensive” nature, David Ucko admits that “the results were disheartening.”30
In August 2007, Sadr called for a halt to JAM attacks on coalition troops by declaring a temporary cease-fire. The following month, September 2007, British forces withdrew from Basra. On December 16, 2007, provincial Iraqi control was achieved. On March 25, 2008, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki ordered the Iraqi Army to attack JAM in Basra in an operation code-named the “Charge of the Knights.” After the operation, 20,000 Iraqi army troops occupied Basra and its important port. This move denied the militias control of the lucrative customs revenue that Basra’s port generated. On March 31, 2009, UK Royal Marines Major General Andy Salmon transferred command of the Multi-National Division (South-East) to U.S. Army Major General Michael Oates. The name of the command also changed to Multi-National Division (South).31
A critical event related to contemporary counterinsurgency in Iraq occurred on February 22, 2006. On that day, Sunni insurgents bombed the al-Askari shrine (Golden Mosque) in Samarra. The Golden Mosque was a significant Shi’a holy place. The event marked the possible start of a civil war between Sunni and Shi’a Muslims in Iraq. The bombing of the Golden Mosque immediately triggered sectarian violence that increased throughout 2006, marking the high-point of violence in Iraq.32
A pivotal episode in contemporary counterinsurgency in Iraq was the Sunni Awakening. The movement was known alternatively as the Sunni Awakening, the Awakening Movement, or the Anbar Awakening. Sheikh Abd al Sittar Abu Reesha led the Sunni Awakening. The movement began slowly in 2005 and then became public in September 2006. The Sunni Awakening occurred mainly in al-Anbar, a western province of Iraq that had experienced high levels of insurgent attacks up to and including 2006. Observers paint the situation in al-Anbar during the summer of 2006 in ominous hues. Geraint Hughes characterizes the province at that time as “highly vulnerable to a complete insurgent takeover,” while John McCary echoes these sentiments: “By 2006, al Qaeda had become nearly unstoppable as both a political and tactical force in the region, and the U.S. military unofficially declared al Anbar politically and militarily ‘lost.’”33
The precarious position for coalition forces in al-Anbar that existed until 2006 resulted partly because Sunni Muslims and AQI both saw coalition forces as the primary threat to their own power and therefore actively sought to undermine coalition efforts in the province. John McCary describes this dynamic as a “marriage of convenience” between Sunni Muslims and al-Qaeda operatives in the province and illuminates two main factors that eventually undermined this initial accord and triggered the subsequent awakening. First, Sunni leaders began to see al-Qaeda as more of a menace than coalition forces. Second, coalition forces adapted their counterinsurgency tactics in the province. What emerged was the Sunni Awakening. The movement pitted Sunni Muslims in al-Anbar against AQI and increased cooperation between Sunni Muslims and coalition forces in the province. Estimates of the number of Sunnis who participated in the awakening range from 70,000 to 100,000. These Sunnis increasingly collaborated with coalition forces in al-Anbar, primarily the Multi-National Force-West (MNF-W), consisting of approximately 22,000 U.S. marines and 5,000 U.S. Army soldiers.34
Two groups sought alliances with coalition forces during the movement: The Anbar Salvation Council led by Fasal al-Gaoud and the Awakening led by Abd al Sittar. In September 2006, Abd al Sittar publicly announced what Bing West describes as “a tribal rebellion against Al-Qaeda” and made known the Awakening’s intention to work closely with coalition forces in al-Anbar, led by U.S. Army Colonel Sean McFarland. In response, al-Qaeda announced on October 15, 2006, that al-Anbar, along with other provinces, was now the Islamic State of Iraq. Al-Qaeda operatives killed al-Gaoud on June 25, 2007, and Abd al Sittar on September 13, 2007. Abd al Sittar’s brother, Ahmed Abu Reesha, assumed the leadership of the Awakening movement following his brother’s death. The resilience of the Sunni population in light of al-Qaeda attacks underpinned the Awakening. Bing West portrays their “change of sentiment” as “the dominant variable” enabling the awakening to take root and grow.35
Coalition forces also played an important role in the Sunni Awakening by transforming their counterinsurgency tactics. U.S. Army Colonel Sean MacFarland was the coalition officer in charge of Ramadi, the capital of al-Anbar. He worked closely with local sheikhs, especially with their militias. Coalition forces also made changes in their approach to economic development. One specific example was the shift away from strict competition for contracts to a patronage approach, which resonated more strongly within Iraqi culture. John McCary notes the benefits of the patronage system: “By paying the sheikhs directly and allowing them to distribute the money as they saw fit, tribal leaders were able to regain their legitimacy and demand the fealty of their tribesmen as they had done in the past.” U.S. Marine Corps Brigadier General John Allen also instituted novel methods, such as opening dialogue with exiled sheikhs from al-Anbar and imploring them to return to the province in leadership positions. Many of the exiled sheikhs did just that. The adjustments in counterinsurgency tactics that coalition forces made in al-Anbar reinforced the importance of conducting counterinsurgency through means rooted in local culture.36
The results of the Sunni Awakening were significant for contemporary counterinsurgency in Iraq. In al-Anbar, al-Qaeda in Iraq increasingly usurped the power of local sheikhs, eventually causing them to reconsider their resistance to coalition efforts in the province. Prescient coalition military leaders seized upon this shift and adapted their counterinsurgency tactics to reinforce it. The Awakening converted many Sunnis in al-Anbar from their previous roles as insurgents to partners with both coalition forces and the fledgling Iraqi government against al-Qaeda. Violence in al-Anbar dropped precipitously after the Sunni Awakening. This was partly the result of fewer Sunni insurgent attacks and greater cooperation from Sunnis regarding coalition efforts, especially local assistance identifying al-Qaeda insurgents in the province. Once the sheikhs decided to ally with coalition forces and the Iraqi government, they proved instrumental in providing actionable intelligence on al-Qaeda insurgents.37
The Sunni Awakening also demonstrated the complex nature of contemporary counterinsurgency in Iraq. The driving force behind the awakening was the strength of tribal affiliations within Iraqi society. In al-Anbar, the most powerful tribe was the Dulaym tribe. Al-Qaeda provocations threatened to undermine the traditional tribal structure in the province. In response, coalition counterinsurgency efforts reinforced the traditional tribal structure rather than working against it. As a result, the Sunni Awakening provided coalition forces with fewer insurgents, more allies, and stronger capabilities in what had been an area plagued by violence only a short while before.38
An important outgrowth of the Sunni Awakening was the Sons of Iraq movement. This movement sought to extend the successful results achieved in al-Anbar to other areas in Iraq. The Sons of Iraq movement used Iraqi militias, most of whom were Sunni Arabs, to combat al-Qaeda. Coalition forces provided weapons and money to the militias and coordinated with them closely. Beginning on October 1, 2008, the Iraqi government increased its oversight of the Sons of Iraq movement and by April 2009 established more control over it.39
Inextricably linked to contemporary counterinsurgency in Iraq is what has been termed the Petraeus Doctrine. Petraeus commanded the 101st Airborne Division in Iraq, then commanded the Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq and the NATO Training Mission–Iraq. In October 2005, he took command of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Petraeus earned a doctorate from Princeton University and wrote an influential dissertation entitled “The American Military and the Lessons of Vietnam.” Petraeus’s sway on the U.S. Army steadily grew during the 2000s. Andrew Bacevich compares Petraeus’s contemporary status with that held by the iconic U.S. Army General Colin Powell during the 1990s.40
Distilled to its essence, the Petraeus Doctrine relates international instability to U.S. national security, which in turn relates to counterinsurgency. Lydia Walker defines it as the view “that violent instability abroad threatens U.S. security and must be squelched through the strategy of counterinsurgency.” Andrew Bacevich emphasizes that the doctrine extends this correlation into the future as well. According to him, the Petraeus doctrine envisions that upcoming warfare “will be protracted, ambiguous, and continuous—with the application of force becoming a lesser part of the soldier’s repertoire.”41
Petraeus is not the lone supporter of this view and its bold implications. A group of supporters, growing in both size and influence throughout the 2000s, subscribed to the Petraeus Doctrine. One of the most prominent is John Nagl. He is a West Point graduate, Rhodes Scholar who earned a degree from Oxford University, and retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel. In 2002, Nagl published a highly influential book entitled Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. Nagl also served in Iraq as a battalion operations officer. Other prominent supporters of the Petraeus Doctrine include H. R. McMaster and Kalev Sepp.42
In many ways, the emergence of the Petraeus Doctrine represents an institutional debate within the U.S. Army regarding the nature of counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and its relevance to both future conflict and the U.S. Army as an organization. Andrew Bacevich characterizes the contest as a grassroots movement driven predominately by lieutenant colonels and colonels in which “fresh ideas are coming from the bottom up.” He divides the two opposing groups into “Crusaders” who subscribe to the Petraeus Doctrine and “Conservatives” who are wary of it. To supporters of the Petraeus Doctrine, stability has become the pivotal variable in the international security environment. Some observers throughout the U.S. Army (and beyond) are not convinced. They argue that counterinsurgency in Iraq is a unique phenomenon and is not indicative of forthcoming warfare. Colonel Gian Gentile is one such prominent critic. Gentile graduated from the University of California at Berkeley, earned a doctorate in history from Stanford University, and teaches at West Point. He also served two tours of duty in Iraq, one as a squadron commander. In his recent book, Gentile cautions against an exclusive focus on counterinsurgency based on the experience in Iraq due to the opportunity costs in conventional capability that such an approach might entail. The resulting dispute garnered widespread attention well beyond the ranks of the U.S. Army.43
The deliberation concerning the Petraeus Doctrine was not merely theoretical. The ineffectiveness of early coalition counterinsurgency efforts triggered a far-reaching reevaluation of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine, ultimately leading to the publication of a completely new and highly influential publication, Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency. The U.S. military paid scant attention to counterinsurgency prior to OIF. One exception was the U.S. Marine Corps’ Small Wars Manual that was originally published in 1940 but was reprinted in 1987 and again in 2004, the latter time with an addendum.44
A previous review of U.S. Army counterinsurgency doctrine had been conducted and the results published in October 2004. Not satisfied with the outcome, U.S. Army Lieutenant General David Petraeus and U.S. Marine Corps Lieutenant General James Mattis launched a new evaluation in 2005. In November 2005, the Bush administration published National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, which articulated an increased emphasis on the “clear, hold, build” strategy that had been successfully implemented in Tal Afar.45
Fort Leavenworth hosted a conference in February 2006 where both military and civilian leaders examined the draft counterinsurgency manual and considered input from a variety of sources, many of whom were outside the traditional military hierarchy. The result of months of careful consideration and intensive revisions was the publication on December 15, 2006, of the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, most commonly referred to by its U.S. Army designation, Field Manual 3-24 or FM 3-24.46
Military doctrine usually does not garner much excitement outside the military. It sometimes does not even generate any inside the military. FM 3-24 was different. Its initial reception was sensational. Interested readers downloaded the manual approximately 1.5 million times in just its first month of availability. In 2007, the University of Chicago Press published the field manual in book form. FM 3-24 received high-level attention in government circles and, more surprisingly, in the civilian press. Bing West recounts that “It was the only FM ever accorded a New York Times book review, written by a Harvard professor.”47
FM 3-24 updated previous counterinsurgency theory such as the CIA’s 1987 Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency, sometimes referred to as the 1987 Guide. Most important, FM 3-24 shifted the emphasis from the territorial control that the 1987 Guide previously advocated to political control. As a result, FM 3-24 refocused U.S. military doctrine on the political nature of counterinsurgency. In addition, FM 3-24 drew heavily from the influential work of David Galula. He was a French military officer and counterinsurgency theorist who had served in both Indochina and Algeria. Galula’s theories on counterinsurgency have been described by some observers as “the gold standard” and his work heavily shaped FM 3-24. The new document also culled lessons from the successful British counterinsurgency approach during the Malayan Emergency from 1948 to 1960. The resulting doctrine focused on economic development as an aid to counterinsurgency, the possible use of provincial reconstruction teams, and the necessity to address corruption as part of successful counterinsurgency. Paul Cornish highlights the major discussion surrounding FM 3-24 and argues that it focuses on three fundamental issues: the relationship between “kinetic” and “hearts and minds” approaches, the appropriate use of technology in counterinsurgency, and whether counterinsurgency “should be considered the dominant strategic paradigm” in the contemporary international security environment.48
FM 3-24 has its share of critics as well. Lydia Walker argues that FM 3-24 defines insurgency according to “the classic, Maoist definition.” She contends that this definition does not fit the contemporary realities in Iraq, which are more akin to sectarian strife and civil war in which ethnicity, religion, and tribal affiliations mark the fundamental fissures rather than a purely political insurgency. Frank Hoffman criticizes FM 3-24 by characterizing Iraq as “neo-classical counterinsurgency.” Hoffman articulates four main factors that differentiate neo-classical insurgency from classic Maoist insurgency: transnational actors, urbanization, religion, and information. In some ways, the concept of fourth generation warfare is similar to Hoffman’s neo-classical counterinsurgency.49
The results of FM 3-24 were far-reaching. The manual was instantly and widely popular, evidenced by the University of Chicago Press publishing it in book form. Colin Kahl remarked that “the book has helped make counterinsurgency part of the zeitgeist.” The conclusions of FM 3-24 also resonated with many readers. The manual clearly emphasized “winning hearts and minds” over kinetic operations. It also elevated protecting the local population to primary importance. FM 3-24 concentrated thinking about counterinsurgency. Colin Kahl characterizes it as “the single best distillation of current knowledge about irregular warfare.” The manual influenced other important planning documents such as FM 3-07 Stability Operations published on October 6, 2008, and DOD [Department of Defense] Directive 3000.07 published on December 1, 2008.50
Not everyone agreed with the intellectual shift represented by FM 3-24. There was (and is) a school of thought that argued for an approach to counterinsurgency centered on coercion. Craig Collier contends that “Our experience in Iraq verified that lethal operations remain the decisive element of combat power. … The emphasis on [counterinsurgency] turned a popular philosophy into a reigning, almost myopic, orthodoxy.” While this dialogue remains contentious, the fact that FM 3-24 had far-reaching effects and wide-ranging implications is clear. Contemporary counterinsurgency in Iraq therefore triggered a fundamental reevaluation of the role of the U.S. military, especially within the U.S. Army and Marine Corps because those organizations were primarily responsible for carrying out the counterinsurgency mission. Kalev Sepp remarks: “Yet the war has changed markedly, and much of the US Army and Marine Corps with it.”51
Partly as a result of the intellectual shift represented by FM 3-24 and the implementation of many of its core tenets in the subsequent surge, violence in Iraq fell after 2006. Even critics of the manual acknowledge that fact. Most important, FM 3-24 redefined the role of coalition forces waging contemporary counterinsurgency in Iraq. It is this dynamic that simultaneously produced positive results in Iraq and attracted concern regarding its future implications elsewhere.52
By 2006, domestic public support within coalition nations, especially in the United States and the United Kingdom, for contemporary counterinsurgency in Iraq had fallen to a nadir. Polemical debates over the correct course of action in Iraq were the norm. The U.S. Congress considered withdrawal from Iraq prior to the U.S. midterm election in November 2006. That election resulted in a decisive defeat for the Republican Party, in large part due to the violence in Iraq. The devolving situation, both internationally in Iraq and domestically within coalition nations, triggered a complete internal review of U.S. policy on Iraq. By the fall of 2006, the Bush administration and the U.S. National Security Council decided on a new strategy for Iraq. Known as the “New Way Forward,” the fresh approach would include a surge of troops to Iraq to improve the security situation there and ensure a more conducive environment for the much-needed political and economic improvements.53
Coalition military commanders immediately began planning for the surge. In December 2006, III Corps commander U.S. Army Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno issued a “gap strategy,” referring to the gap left by inadequate ISF in and around Baghdad. Odierno’s plan would dedicate half of the troops from the surge to provide security inside Baghdad and half to provide security around Baghdad. U.S. President Bush publicly announced the change in strategy on January 10, 2007.54
The surge added roughly 20,000 soldiers to the approximately 130,000 personnel already in Iraq (an increase of more than 15 percent) beginning in February 2007. Coalition leaders deployed the additional forces primarily to Baghdad. They also situated them more among the Iraqi population than previously. The surge included five U.S. Army brigade combat teams, a U.S. Marine expeditionary unit, two additional U.S. Marine battalions, and the requisite support personnel. U.S. Army General David Petraeus assumed command of coalition forces in Iraq and U.S. Army Colonel Peter R. Mansoor served as his executive officer. These additional troops arrived in Iraq by May 2007 and by the middle of that year coalition leaders fully implemented the surge.55
The goal of the surge was not just to deploy more troops to Iraq. Joseph Collins explains that the surge underscored that “more troops, different techniques, and a new battle plan were necessary.” Some of the changes included an increased emphasis on the protection of the Iraqi population, enhanced partnerships with ISF, and local development projects. One major adjustment embodied in the surge was to shift from the use of FOBs to stationing coalition forces among the Iraqi population. In a July 2008 interview with Charles Gibson, David Petraeus explained that “the only way to secure a population is to live with it—you can’t commute to this fight.” The use of FOBs from approximately 2004 to 2006 received much criticism. Andrea Lopez remarked that “while the withdrawal from cities made sense in light of concerns about US domestic opinion, it otherwise contradicted much of counterinsurgency theory and, indeed, military doctrine.” By April 2007, coalition forces cordoned off communities with walls, berms, and barbed wire. They also controlled access to them through checkpoints and increased identification measures including biometrics. The changed tactics aimed at protecting the Iraqi population led to the innocuous characterization of “gated communities.”56
By most accounts, the surge was successful. It was certainly helped by the Sunni Awakening and the limited cease-fire agreed to by Muqtada-al-Sadr and the Mahdi Army. The surge markedly reduced the level of violence in Iraq. Geraint Hughes estimates that insurgent attacks in al-Anbar declined from over 400 per week to less than 100 per week in one year. He also notes that killings in Baghdad declined by over 75 percent in 2007. David Petraeus assesses that the surge reduced violence in Iraq by approximately 60 percent. Joseph Collins characterizes the surge as “a highly successful adaptation to a changed strategic context,” while Stuart Griffin concludes that the surge “precipitated a remarkable turnaround in the fortunes of the Iraq campaign.” Bing West notes that the increased personnel and the changed tactics of the surge “turned the war around.”57
The reasons for the success of the surge were many. Peter Mansoor argues convincingly that a large part of the surge’s success was due to senior leadership disseminating a common approach to contemporary counterinsurgency in Iraq through FM 3-24. Stuart Griffin highlights the “vastly improved coherence of US military operations across the whole of Iraq between 2006 and 2010,” that resulted from the surge. One final reason for the success of the surge was the increased capability of the ISF. As a result of the success of the surge and the heightened proficiency of the ISF, coalition forces emphasized transferring responsibility of security in Iraq to the ISF from 2008 onward.58
Not all aspects of the surge were positive. The surge diverted attention and resources away from certain areas. One such area was Mosul. Many observers regarded coalition efforts in Mosul as highly successful early in the war. Andrea Lopez characterizes it early on as “the best example of US counterinsurgency policy.” As coalition attention and forces shifted elsewhere in Iraq during the surge, Mosul once again came under insurgent attack. During 2007, AQI increased its presence in Mosul. This in turn necessitated an escalation of ISF and coalition efforts there during 2008 in response. As late as 2009, Mosul exhibited signs of renewed insurgency.59
In November 2008, the United States signed a Status of Forces Agreement with Iraq. The bilateral security agreement, which went into effect on January 1, 2009, specified that all U.S. troops would leave Iraq by the end of 2011. U.S. President Barack Obama announced on February 27, 2009, that the U.S. combat mission in Iraq would officially end by August 2010. In July 2009, British forces withdrew from their primary area of southeast Iraq and by the end of that summer British forces in Iraq numbered less than 1,000. OIF transitioned to Operation New Dawn on August 19, 2010, and the last U.S. combat unit withdrew from Iraq. Immediately thereafter, the U.S. mission became improving the capacity of ISF, specific counterterrorism strikes, and force protection. A transitional force of approximately 35,000–50,000 U.S. troops remained in Iraq after the official combat mission had ended. These soldiers were predominately organized into Advise and Assist Brigades. Kenneth Pollack and Irena Sargsyan depict these units as capable of “full-spectrum combat” and explain that “Thus, these brigades will perform a dual role: they will serve as advisors in peacetime but could quickly become combat brigades in a crisis.”60
Military organizations routinely, albeit not always successfully, derive conclusions from the hard-fought experience of previous conflicts. British observers articulated several important lessons learned from contemporary counterinsurgency in Iraq. David Ucko highlights three critical deductions from the British experience in Basra that made contemporary counterinsurgency in Iraq unique: “the armed forces’ misinterpretation of their own legacy, the absence of civilian support and the lack of strategic guidance from Whitehall.” Stuart Griffin argues that the British experience in Iraq (and also Afghanistan) spurred a reconsideration of British doctrine similar to the U.S. military’s review of their own doctrine that culminated with FM 3-24. For the British, the result was the development of UK Stabilization doctrine, manifested in UK JDP 3-40, Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution.61
Likewise, U.S. observers have drawn lessons from previous conflicts. For example, the U.S. Army established a formal Center for Army Lessons Learned over 25 years ago. Contemporary counterinsurgency in Iraq was no different. Coalition forces, practitioners, and scholars have drawn numerous conclusions from the decade-long counterinsurgency. From the U.S. perspective, David Petraeus distilled 14 key lessons from his time in Iraq, including “Money is ammunition,” “Cultural awareness is a force multiplier,” and “Success in a counterinsurgency requires more than just military operations.” Bing West highlights the critical importance of both the Sunni Awakening and the surge “to turn the war around.” Kalev Sepp emphasizes the vital role of alliances in contemporary counterinsurgency in Iraq, not just internationally with other countries but, more importantly, locally with the Iraqis themselves. John McCary extends this concept of local allies specifically to al-Anbar and connects it to the importance of culture to contemporary counterinsurgency in Iraq. He emphasizes the significance of local authority manifested through tribal affiliations: “Military commanders in Iraq had to find indigenous currents of power and social order, and find a culturally appropriate way to tap into them.”62
There still is no unanimous agreement on the lessons derived from contemporary counterinsurgency in Iraq. Some observers argue that kinetic operations in Iraq outperformed nonkinetic operations, especially economic efforts. Craig Collier reasons that development projects in Iraq were ineffective and contends that “Killing or capturing an insurgent consistently and quantifiably had a more positive impact that anything else we did. … The theory that economic development money poured into an area will effectively dry up the insurgent swamp remains a theory without empirical verification.”63
Two significant conclusions from contemporary counterinsurgency in Iraq remain highly debated. The first is whether that experience represents an indication of things to come or simply an anomaly. The answer to this question has significant repercussions. Many argue that Iraq is the model of future conflict and that the U.S. military needs to extend the lessons learned from contemporary counterinsurgency in Iraq throughout its doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities spectrum to enhance counterinsurgency capabilities that it will likely employ elsewhere. Others urge caution and insist that Iraq is a unique situation militarily, politically, and culturally and that the U.S. military should avoid emphasizing a conflict that is so distinctive.64
The second momentous conclusion from contemporary counterinsurgency in Iraq is the absolute necessity to establish clear parameters to determine when to engage in counterinsurgency in the first place. The Iraq experience presents a cautionary example in this regard. Early political decisions and the lack of postconflict planning undermined coalition efforts and fueled the insurgency initially. Coalition forces and military leaders demonstrated remarkable adaptability in a very difficult situation. Contemporary counterinsurgency in Iraq makes evident the vital obligation to consider fully the political nature of counterinsurgency and ensure that leaders balance the proper ends, ways, and means prior to entering the fray. To do otherwise would be to ignore the lessons of contemporary counterinsurgency in Iraq.
1. Andrew Mumford, “Sir Robert Thompson’s Lessons for Iraq: Bringing the ‘Basic Principles of Counter-Insurgency’ into the 21st Century,” Defence Studies 10:2 (2010), 180; Bruce Hoffman, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29:2 (2006), 104; Andrew J. Bacevich, “The Petraeus Doctrine,” Atlantic Monthly 302:3 (2008), 18; Kenneth M. Pollack and Irena L. Sargsyan, “The Other Side of the COIN: Perils of Premature Evacuation from Iraq,” Washington Quarterly 33:2 (2010), 27. For classic counterinsurgency theory, see Mao Tse-tung, On Guerilla Warfare, trans. Samuel B. Griffith II (Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1961); David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 1964); Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam (St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer, 1966).
2. Hoffman, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 104, 111; Pollack and Sargsyan, “The Other Side of the COIN,” 20; Mumford, “Sir Robert Thompson’s Lessons for Iraq,” 180; Paul Cornish, “The United States and Counterinsurgency: ‘Political First, Political Last, Political Always,’” International Affairs 85:1 (2009), 62, 65–66; Kalev I. Sepp, “From ‘Shock and Awe’ to ‘Hearts and Minds’: The Fall and Rise of US Counterinsurgency Capability in Iraq,” Third World Quarterly 28:2 (2007), 226; Stuart Griffin, “Iraq, Afghanistan and the Future of British Military Doctrine: From Counterinsurgency to Stabilization,” International Affairs 87:2 (2011), 323.
3. Cornish, “United States and Counterinsurgency,” 67, 73, 76–77; Sepp, “From ‘Shock and Awe’ to ‘Hearts and Minds,’” 217–18; Andrea M. Lopez, “Engaging or Withdrawing, Winning or Losing? The Contradictions of Counterinsurgency Policy in Afghanistan and Iraq,” Third World Quarterly 28:2 (2007), 249–50; David H. Petraeus, “Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq,” Military Review 86:1 (2006), 5. For more on the American “way of war,” see Dominic Tierney, How We Fight: Crusades, Quagmires, and the American Way of War (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2010); Thomas G. Mahnken, Technology and the American Way of War since 1945 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008); Colin S. Gray, Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt? (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006); Jeffrey Record, “The American Way of War: Cultural Barriers to Successful Counterinsurgency,” Cato Institute Policy Analysis 577, September 1, 2006; Thomas G. Mahnken, “The American Way of War in the Twenty-First Century,” Review of International Affairs 2:3 (2003), 73–84; Brian M. Linn, “The American Way of War Revisited,” Journal of Military History 66 (April 2002), 501–33; Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973).
4. Geraint Hughes, “The Insurgencies in Iraq, 2003–2009: Origins, Developments and Prospects,” Defence Studies 10:2 (2010), 155; Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, “Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario,” February 2003, available at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=182 (accessed January 10, 2014). For contemporary counterinsurgency theory, see David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerilla (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Mark Moyar, A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009); Robert M. Cassidy, Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular War (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006); David Kilcullen, “Countering Global Insurgency,” Journal of Strategic Studies 28:4 (August 2005), 597–617; Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the Twenty-First Century (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2004).
5. Lydia Walker, “Forging a Key, Turning a Lock: Counterinsurgency Theory in Iraq 2006–2008,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 3210 (2009), 912–13; Lopez, “Engaging or Withdrawing, Winning or Losing?” 247.
6. Hughes, “The Insurgencies in Iraq, 2003–2009,” 152–54, 170. For the Weinberger-Powell doctrine, see Gail E. S. Yoshitani, Reagan on War: A Reappraisal of the Weinberger Doctrine, 1980–1984 (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2011); Kenneth J. Campbell, “Once Burned, Twice Cautious: Explaining the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine,” Armed Forces & Society 24:3 (1998), 357–74.
7. Sepp, “From ‘Shock and Awe’ to ‘Hearts and Minds’,’” 221–22.
8. Ibid., 222; Hoffman, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 114–15. The four stages are pre-insurgency, organizational, guerilla warfare, and mobile conventional warfare. Central Intelligence Agency, Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1987), 3.
9. John A. McCary, “The Anbar Awakening: An Alliance of Incentives,” Washington Quarterly 32:1 (2009), 46.
10. Hughes, “The Insurgencies in Iraq, 2003–2009,” 153–54; President George W. Bush, “Address to the Nation, March 17, 2003,” available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030317-7.html (accessed January 10, 2014). For the British presence in Iraq, see William R. Polk, Understanding Iraq: The Whole Sweep of Iraqi History, from Genghis Khan’s Mongols to the Ottoman Turks to the British Mandate to the American Occupation (New York: HarperCollins, 2005). For the First Gulf War, see William Thomas Allison, The Gulf War, 1990–91 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
11. Congressional Research Service, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Strategies, Approaches, Results, and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2009): 10, 41–42, 51. For shock and awe, see Harlan Ullman, Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1996). For the invasion of Iraq, see Peter R. Mansoor, Baghdad at Sunrise: A Brigade Commander’s War in Iraq (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008); Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006); Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin Press, 2006); Gregory Fontenot, E. J. Degen, and David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005); Williamson Murray and Robert H. Scales Jr., The Iraq War: An Elusive Victory (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2003); Anthony Cordesman, The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics and Military Lessons (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, 2003).
12. Hoffman, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 104. For Rumsfeld, see Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir (New York: Sentinel, 2011); Dale R. Herspring, Rumsfeld’s Wars: The Arrogance of Power (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2008); Andrew Cockburn, Rumsfeld: His Rise, Fall, and Catastrophic Legacy (New York: Scribner, 2007); Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account of the Decision to Invade Iraq (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004); Eliot A. Cohen, “A Tale of Two Secretaries,” Foreign Affairs 81:3 (2002), 33–46.
13. Hughes, “The Insurgencies in Iraq, 2003–2009,” 158.
14. Ibid., 152. For a comparison between contemporary counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan, see Lopez, “Engaging or Withdrawing, Winning or Losing?” 245–60.
15. Mumford, “Sir Robert Thompson’s Lessons for Iraq,” 184; Congressional Research Service, Operation Iraqi Freedom, 39, 45, 47.
16. Mumford, “Sir Robert Thompson’s Lessons for Iraq,” 185.
17. Ibid., 188; Hughes, “The Insurgencies in Iraq, 2003–2009,” 159. For the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), see L. Paul Bremer with Malcolm McConnell, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope (New York: Threshold Editions, 2006); Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq’s Green Zone (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006); Ricks, Fiasco.
18. Petraeus, “Learning Counterinsurgency,” 5; Bing West, “Counterinsurgency Lessons from Iraq,” Military Review 89:2 (2009): 6.
19. Hughes, “The Insurgencies in Iraq, 2003–2009,” 167; Congressional Research Service, Operation Iraqi Freedom, 19.
20. Mumford, “Sir Robert Thompson’s Lessons for Iraq,” 182–83, 189.
21. Congressional Research Service, Operation Iraqi Freedom, 48, 61; Richardo S. Sanchez with Donald T. Phillips, Wiser in Battle: A Soldier’s Story (New York: HarperCollins, 2008): 231–32; Hoffman, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 113.
22. Colin H. Kahl, “COIN of the Realm: Is There a Future for Counterinsurgency?” Foreign Affairs 86:6 (2007), 173; Lopez, “Engaging or Withdrawing, Winning or Losing?” 254; Congressional Research Service, Operation Iraqi Freedom, 63.
23. Mumford, “Sir Robert Thompson’s Lessons for Iraq,” 185. For Abu Ghraib, see Department of Defense, The Schlesinger Report: An Investigation of Abu Ghraib (New York: Cosimo Reports, 2005); Seymour Hersch, Chain of Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib (New York: Harper Perennial, 2005).
24. Congressional Research Service, Operation Iraqi Freedom, 62, 80; Cornish, “United States and Counterinsurgency,” 68–69.
25. Congressional Research Service, Operation Iraqi Freedom, 48; West, “Counterinsurgency Lessons from Iraq,” 2, 10; Kahl, “COIN of the Realm,” 173. For Blackwater, see Erik Prince, Civilian Warriors: The Inside Story of Blackwater and the Unsung Heroes of the War on Terror (New York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2013); Jeremy Scahill, Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army (New York: Nation Books, 2007). For Fallujah, see Bill Ardolino, Fallujah Awakens: Marines, Sheikhs, and the Battle against Al Qaeda (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2013); Bing West, No True Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle for Fallujah (New York: Bantam Books, 2005).
26. H. R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam (New York: HarperCollins, 1997); Congressional Research Service, Operation Iraqi Freedom, 66; Sepp, “From ‘Shock and Awe’ to ‘Hearts and Minds,’” 220.
27. Congressional Research Service, Operation Iraqi Freedom, 66–67; West, “Counterinsurgency Lessons from Iraq,” 9; Kahl, “COIN of the Realm,” 173.
28. David H. Ucko, “Lessons from Basra: The Future of British Counter-Insurgency,” Survival 52:4 (2010), 133–34, 136, 137.
29. Ibid., 137–39.
30. Ibid., 141–42.
31. Hughes, “The Insurgencies in Iraq, 2003–2009,” 169; Ucko, “Lessons from Basra,” 145, 148, 150.
32. Congressional Research Service, Operation Iraqi Freedom, 57.
33. McCary, “The Anbar Awakening,” 44, 48; Hughes, “The Insurgencies in Iraq, 2003–2009,” 167.
34. McCary, “The Anbar Awakening,” 43–44; Allan Orr, “The Strategic Hub Concept: Plan C for Iraq,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31:12 (2008), 1057, 1067; Hughes, “The Insurgencies in Iraq, 2003–2009,” 168.
35. West, “Counterinsurgency Lessons from Iraq,” 3–4; McCary, “The Anbar Awakening,” 47–49, 54.
36. Fred Kaplan, “The End of the Age of Petraeus: The Rise and Fall of Counterinsurgency,” Foreign Affairs 92:1 (2013), 8; McCary, “The Anbar Awakening,” 49–50, 54. For the importance of cultural understanding to counterinsurgency, see Montgomery McFate, “The Military Utility of Understanding Adversary Culture,” Joint Force Quarterly 38:3 (2005), 42–48.
37. McCary, “The Anbar Awakening,” 44, 50–51; Craig A. Collier, “Now That We’re Leaving Iraq, What Did We Learn?” Military Review 90:5 (2010), 88.
38. McCary, “The Anbar Awakening,” 46, 52.
39. Congressional Research Service, Operation Iraqi Freedom, 9.
40. David H. Petraeus, “The American Military and the Lessons of Vietnam: A Study of Military Influence and the Use of Force in the Post-Vietnam Era,” Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1987; Bacevich, “The Petraeus Doctrine,” 18. For the Petraeus Doctrine, see Kaplan, “The End of the Age of Petraeus,” 75–90; James W. Vizzard and Timothy A. Capron, “Exporting General Petraeus’s Counterinsurgency Doctrine: An Assessment of the Adequacy of Field Manual 3-24 and the U.S. Government’s Implementation,” Public Administration Review 70:3 (2010), 485–93.
41. Walker, “Forging a Key, Turning a Lock,” 916; Bacevich, “The Petraeus Doctrine,” 19–20.
42. John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002); Fred Kaplan, The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2013).
43. Bacevich, “The Petraeus Doctrine,” 17–18, 20. Also see Gian Gentile, Wrong Turn: America’s Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency (New York: New Press, 2013); Jennifer Morrison Taw, Mission Revolution: The U.S. Military and Stability Operations (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).
44. Kahl, “COIN of the Realm,” 173; Lopez, “Engaging or Withdrawing, Winning or Losing?” 257; US Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1940), available at http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/FMFRP%2012-15%20%20Small%20Wars%20Manual.pdf (accessed January 10, 2014). For the evolution of US military doctrine, see Taw, Mission Revolution.
45. Kahl, “COIN of the Realm,” 170; Congressional Research Service, Operation Iraqi Freedom, 67–68. For the document, see National Security Council, National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2005), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/iraq_national_strategy_20051130%5B1%5D.pdf (accessed January 10, 2014).
46. Kahl, “COIN of the Realm,” 170. The corresponding Marine Corps’ designation is Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5.
47. Kaplan, “The End of the Age of Petraeus,” 6; US Army and Marine Corps, Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007); West, “Counterinsurgency Lessons from Iraq,” 6.
48. Walker, “Forging a Key, Turning a Lock,” 911–12; Cornish, “United States and Counterinsurgency,” 63; Kahl, “COIN of the Realm,” 171. For Galula, see A. A. Cohen, Galula: The Life and Writings of the French Officer Who Defined the Art of Counterinsurgency (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2012); Grégor Mathias, Galula in Algeria: Counterinsurgency Practice versus Theory (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2011); Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare. For the Malayan Emergency, see Robert Jackson, The Malayan Emergency & Indonesian Confrontation: The Commonwealth’s Wars, 1948–1966 (Barnsley, UK: Pen and Sword, 2008); Donald Mackay, The Domino That Stood: The Malayan Emergency, 1948–1960 (London: Brassey’s (UK), 1997).
49. Walker, “Forging a Key, Turning a Lock,” 909–12, 914; Frank G. Hoffman, “Neo-Classical Counterinsurgency?” Parameters 37/2 (2007): 71–87. For fourth generation warfare, see Pat Phelan, “Fourth Generation Warfare and Its Challenges for the Military and Society,” Defence Studies 11:1 (2011), 96–119; Timothy J. Junio, “Military History and Fourth Generation Warfare,” Journal of Strategic Studies 32:2 (2009), 243–69.
50. Kahl, “COIN of the Realm,” 170–71.
51. Collier, “What Did We Learn?” 88–89; Sepp, “From ‘Shock and Awe’ to ‘Hearts and Minds,’” 217. For a critique of coercion in counterinsurgency, see William R. Polk, Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism, and Guerilla War: From the American Revolution to Iraq (New York: HarperCollins, 2007).
52. Walker, “Forging a Key, Turning a Lock,” 915–16. Also see Taw, Mission Revolution.
53. Hughes, “The Insurgencies in Iraq, 2003–2009,” 167; McCary, “The Anbar Awakening,” 50; Congressional Research Service, Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2, 69–70; West, “Counterinsurgency Lessons from Iraq,” 4.
54. West, “Counterinsurgency Lessons from Iraq,” 4; Kaplan, “The End of the Age of Petraeus,” 7; President George W. Bush, “Address to the Nation, January 10, 2007,” available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070110-7.html (accessed January 10, 2014). For the surge, see Peter R. Mansoor, Surge: My Journey with General David Petraeus and the Remaking of the Iraq War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013); Bob Woodward, The War Within: A Secret White House History, 2006–2008 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008); Linda Robinson, Tell Me How This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq (New York: Public Affairs, 2008); Thomas E. Ricks, The Gamble: General Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin Press, 2006).
55. Hughes, “The Insurgencies in Iraq, 2003–2009,” 167; Collier, “What Did We Learn?” 88; Congressional Research Service, Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2, 71. Also see Mansoor, Surge.
56. Joseph J. Collins, “The Surge Revisited,” Small Wars Journal, November 4, 2013, 2, available at http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-surge-revisited (accessed January 10, 2014); Collier, “What Did We Learn?” 88; Congressional Research Service, Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2, 71–72; David Petraeus, interview by Charles Gibson, World News, ABC, July 28, 2008; Lopez, “Engaging or Withdrawing, Winning or Losing?” 246.
57. Orr, “The Strategic Hub Concept,” 1056; Hughes, “The Insurgencies in Iraq, 2003–2009,” 167–68; Melinda L. Larson, “Petraeus: Violence Down in Iraq; Al Qaeda Still a Threat,” Armed Forces Press Service, December 23, 2007, available at http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=48515 (accessed January 10, 2014); Collins, “The Surge Revisited.”; Griffin, “Iraq, Afghanistan and the Future of British Military Doctrine,” 318; West, “Counterinsurgency Lessons from Iraq,” 5.
58. Peter R. Mansoor, “The British Army and the Lessons of the Iraq War,” British Army Review 147 (2009), 11–15; cited in Griffin, “Iraq, Afghanistan and the Future of British Military Doctrine,” 327–28; Pollack and Sargsyan, “The Other Side of the COIN,” 18; Orr, “The Strategic Hub Concept,” 1055.
59. Lopez, “Engaging or Withdrawing, Winning or Losing?” 248; Congressional Research Service, Operation Iraqi Freedom, 53, 76.
60. Congressional Research Service, Operation Iraqi Freedom, 1, 3, 5; President Barack Obama, “Responsibility Ending the War in Iraq,” Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, February 27, 2009, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-President-Barack-Obama-Responsibly-Ending-the-War-in-Iraq (last accessed January 10, 2014); Collier, “What Did We Learn?” 88; Pollack and Sargsyan, “The Other Side of the COIN,” 29.
61. Ucko, “Lessons from Basra,” 132, 134; Griffin, “Iraq, Afghanistan and the Future of British Military Doctrine,” 317, 319, 320, 326, 327, 332.
62. Petraeus, “Learning Counterinsurgency,” 2–3, 10; West, “Counterinsurgency Lessons from Iraq,” 10; Sepp, “From ‘Shock and Awe’ to ‘Hearts and Minds,’” 223; McCary, “The Anbar Awakening,” 55.
63. Collier, “What Did We Learn?” 91.
64. For the debate within the US Army regarding contemporary counterinsurgency in Iraq and its implications for the future, see Gentile, Wrong Turn; Mansoor, Surge; Fred Kaplan, The Insurgents; Andrew Bacevich, The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife.