AS THE 1977 CANDIDATE LISTS were being drawn up, Dayan’s former brother-in-law Ezer Weizman suggested to Dayan that he join the right-wing Likud Party, part of the Knesset opposition since 1948. The disgraced former defense minister did not dismiss the idea but demanded a commitment from the Likud leader, Menachem Begin, that he would not annex the occupied territories if he had an opportunity to make peace with the Arabs. Dayan thought that peace was possible and did not wish to jeopardize its prospects. He and Begin held secret meetings, exchanging formulations on Israel’s policies in the occupied territories and the prospects of peace with Arab states, and they neared an agreement with each other. But they could not reach it in time. A few minutes before the deadline to submit candidate lists, Dayan signed a form that made him once more a Labor Party candidate.1
Nonetheless, after Likud won the election, Begin suggested that Dayan join the government as foreign minister, though before he could do so Begin had to convince his skeptical Likud colleagues. “Dayan enjoys international renown, and statesmen all over the world defer to him,” Begin reasoned. “His reputation is similar among Diaspora Jewry, and he is respected in Arab states. My call to him trumps party calculations. Israel faces a hard time and should enlist its best minds and efforts to protect our national interests.”2
Dayan, however, remained indecisive. “I was plagued by the worst doubts I had ever known,” he admitted. “Would I find a common language with Menachem Begin and his cabinet ministers—even on those political issues where I was closer to Begin than to the then leadership of the Labor Party?” But he knew that to influence possible peace measures, he had to be in the cabinet.3
Consulting Rachel, he sensed that she would have liked him to reject the offer, to avoid facing any more controversy. Ultimately, though, she left the decision to him. “If they’ll just let me,” he said, “I will achieve peace with Egypt.”4 Dayan disagreed with Begin about the future of the occupied territories, but they reached common ground. As Dayan described their position: “The Land of Israel is our ancient homeland, and it is inconceivable that upon Israel’s rebirth and return to Zion, Jews be barred from settling Judea and Samaria, becoming foreigners in that land. We may be exiled from it by force but we cannot cut ourselves off from it voluntarily.”5
Although their areas of agreement were not enough to avert Dayan’s eventual resignation three years later, at that time the Palestinian question was not the top item on the new government’s agenda. Dayan for some time had believed that President Sadat was interested in peace with Israel, and he wished to be part of shaping Israel’s future policy with regard to Egypt. Maybe he was also trying to atone for the fiasco of the Yom Kippur War. Dayan accepted Begin’s offer and on June 23, 1977, was sworn in as foreign minister in the Likud government. He brought Naphtali Lavie from the Ministry of Defense to take charge of Foreign Ministry public relations, and Elyakim Rubinstein, a talented young attorney, to serve as his bureau chief. These two would accompany him on most of his diplomatic trips, documenting his work as foreign minister.6
In the early weeks, Dayan concentrated on finding a mediator who could have direct dealings with Egypt. World leaders were only too pleased to meet with the man still considered the most brilliant, fascinating man in Israel, and in a ten-day period that summer Dayan met with India’s prime minister Moraji Desai, the shah of Iran, and Jordan’s King Hussein, who had been in covert contact with Israeli leaders for some time. But little came of these meetings.
The only mission that produced real results was Dayan’s trip to Morocco on September 4. Israel and Morocco did not have formal diplomatic relations, and Dayan flew to Rabat disguised in a beatnik wig and black mustache. Israel sought King Hassan II’s intercession with Egypt, aiming for an eventual peace treaty. Hassan promised to help, and on September 16, en route to the United States for a meeting with the new president, Jimmy Carter, Dayan slipped away during a stopover in Brussels, drove to Paris by roundabout routes, boarded a Moroccan airplane to Rabat, and met with the Egyptian envoy, Hassan el-Tohami. Dayan’s impression was that Egypt wanted peace, and the two men agreed to exchange document drafts as a basis for further talks, planning to reconvene in Morocco within two weeks. But dramatic events interrupted their momentum.
Dayan reported the developments to Prime Minister Begin and proceeded to New York. Following the Yom Kippur War, the Geneva Conference of 1973 had engendered a diplomatic formula for Israel-Arab conciliation that stipulated peace talks under U. S. and Soviet auspices. Dayan assumed when he took over as foreign minister that the U.S. bid to reconvene the Geneva Conference was on the table. Dayan disagreed with the Geneva blueprint because he opposed Soviet participation. He preferred direct talks between Israel and Egypt with the United States mediating but not dictating terms unilaterally. When he arrived in the United States on September 18, however, he learned that the Americans were assiduously working on a declaration of principles to form the basis of the revived Geneva Conference formula.
While in New York and Washington, he met twice with President Carter and Vice President Walter Mondale, and several times with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and his aides. His first meeting with Carter was unpleasant. Carter, and especially Mondale—apparently playing “bad cop”—freely condemned Israel as intransigent, sabotaging U.S. efforts to reconvene the Geneva Conference. Dayan lost his patience, but kept silent. “There was palpable tension between the two sides of the oblong table,” noted Naphtali Lavie, who was present at the meetings. “Dayan did not hide his resentment at the substance and tone of the conversation. The contribution of Mondale, who stood at Carter’s side and irritated Dayan with snide remarks, was most unfavorable. Dayan showed his anger by ignoring him whenever he spoke from across the table.”7
Recognizing his disgust, Dayan’s hosts became embarrassed. Carter tried to soften his words and invited Dayan for another talk to clear the atmosphere. But the United States planned to issue a joint statement of principles with the Soviets, and this added to the tension. Dayan rejected the proposed draft. “We are not party to this statement, and you did not ask us or attempt to consult with us, though we are directly affected,” he said. “You would do better to give it up and not restore the Soviets to the arena.”8
The official reason for Dayan’s trip was to address the U.N. General Assembly, but he remained in America for four weeks, speaking to Jewish communities from coast to coast and holding numerous meetings with the media and Congress. He did not mask his displeasure with the White House’s Middle East policies, and his condemnation was not lost on the Carter administration. Articles critical of Carter and supportive of Dayan’s position appeared in newspapers all over the United States. The leaders of the American Jewish organizations and communities were not idle either. In four days, the White House received more than seven thousand telegrams and a thousand phone calls protesting U.S. policy.
The pressure was effective, and Carter asked for another meeting before Dayan left New York. Dayan’s impatience was growing. He treated the president respectfully, but when Carter reiterated that Israel could rely on him, Dayan delivered a stirring emotional response. “Mr. President, I may have only one eye, but I can clearly see the dangers posed to our existence as a people if we accept your advice,” he said, referring to Carter’s proposed joint statement with the Soviets which included consideration of the Palestinians’ aspirations and, he felt, preempted the fostering of bilateral negotiations with the Arab states. “Personally, I am no coward, but as a son of the Jewish people I have good cause to be worried. In our own time, disaster already befell us, and there are those among us who experienced it firsthand. As long as it is in our power, we will spare our people another tragedy.”9
Following further clarification, Dayan and Vance formulated a new press statement for the United States to issue jointly with Israel instead of the Soviet Union, establishing a new framework for the pursuit of Middle East peace. Though it was 2 A.M. in New York, Dayan insisted that they first send the watered-down and generalized statement, which was much closer to the government’s initial positions, to Begin for approval, and Israel adopted it as the working paper for negotiations. Dayan considered this an achievement and an important component for pursuing the peace process.
Cairo, too, was evidently concerned about Carter’s wish to revive the Geneva Conference formula, especially his intention of including the Soviets in the process. President Sadat decided that the best plan would be to reach an understanding with Israel before they arrived at the conference. Without consulting any of his colleagues, he boldly announced to Egypt’s parliament on November 9 that he was prepared to set out for Jerusalem to address the Knesset concerning his vision for peace between their nations. After some hesitation, Begin rose to the challenge and issued a formal invitation for Sadat to appear. The dramatic event confirmed Dayan’s assumption that Sadat was interested in peace, but he understood that in exchange for this unprecedented step, Sadat would expect Israel to withdraw from all the territories occupied in 1967. And in that expectation, Israel would clearly disappoint him.
Israelis welcomed Sadat with open arms, though Dayan found little to allay his concerns when he drove with Egyptian Foreign Minister Boutros Boutros-Ghali from the airport to Jerusalem.10 Boutros-Ghali made it clear that Egypt would not consider a peace agreement with Israel that did not include a resolution of the problem of Palestinian self-governance.11
The next day, November 20, Sadat addressed the Knesset, saying much that Dayan had expected: the Palestinian problem was the heart of the conflict, and Palestinians had to have their own state. Nonetheless, he was applauded by his listeners, by the Israeli public, and by the world press. The mutual hope that Sadat and Begin pledged—“No more war!”—became a prayer for the nation.
Still, Sadat was disappointed by the results of his visit; it lasted less than twenty-four hours, and the diplomatic ceremonies left no time for real discussion. The sole tangible accomplishment was an agreement in principle to continue the contacts, a continuation to the process that was reached without imposition by foreign powers. During the visit Defense Minister Ezer Weizman captivated Sadat with his humor and colorful anecdotes. Dayan, in comparison, was tense, his face often sour. His relations with Egypt’s president were proper but cool.
The first attempt at practical negotiation took place two weeks later, when Dayan and Tohami met again in Morocco, at King Hassan’s exotic palace in Marrakech. But Tohami did not seem to have the authority to negotiate; he could only read from a handwritten document he had brought from Cairo. The document further highlighted the differences between Egypt and Israel. Dayan believed that Sadat wanted peace but did not know how to achieve it. He concluded that if there were to be any hope for progress, the Americans had to become involved and throw their weight behind the process.
On December 25, Begin, Dayan, Weizman, and a large entourage of aides and advisers arrived in Ismailia on the banks of the Suez Canal to meet with Sadat. Dayan, dispirited, observed that Egypt’s reception of the Israeli delegation was cool and lacking in ceremonial features: no honor guard, no flags or anthems, no signs of welcome. Dayan focused on the stark contrast to the warmth Israel had shown Sadat a month earlier.
Not surprisingly, the talks did not go well. The attempt to formulate a joint declaration of principles failed. Instead, two committees were established: one for military, the other for political and civilian issues. Dayan, irritated by the fruitless talks, wandered out to the balcony overlooking the canal, where the Bar-Lev Line had once stood, and was overcome with bitter memories of the Yom Kippur War. He gazed at the area he had crossed and decided that Israel faced a brutal choice: “To make heavy concessions or not make peace with Egypt.”12
Weizman headed the military committee appointed in Ismailia and set up a permanent legation of IDF officers in Cairo. The Egyptians liked Weizman’s light-hearted manner and made him feel at home.13 The political committee, however, soon faltered. On January 15, 1978, Egypt’s new foreign minister, Muhammad Ibrahim Kamal, headed a delegation to Jerusalem comprised of professional diplomats who had been influenced by the general feeling in the Arab world. They hardened their position, and the talks were fruitless and acerbic; the visit ended with the two sides breaking off negotiations.
The rift lasted half a year. Begin and Dayan visited Washington, Mondale and Vance visited Jerusalem and Cairo, but none of them was able to revive the process. Palestinian terrorists posed an additional obstacle. On April 11, a particularly brutal attack struck to the heart of Israel. Eleven Palestinian guerrillas landed on a deserted beach between Haifa and Tel Aviv and hijacked a bus to Tel Aviv. The bus was stopped on the outskirts of the city, and most of the terrorists were killed, but they managed to set fire to the bus first, massacring thirty-five passengers. “The peace process that in any case has been hanging between life and death is now dying in the flames of the burning bus,” Weizman lamented.14
Israel decided on a major reprisal, the largest since the Yom Kippur War. The IDF captured an extensive area in Lebanon, south of the Litani River, and held it for a few days. The soldiers destroyed Palestinian strongholds and returned home.
It took the Americans half a year to reach Dayan’s initial conclusion that the declaration of principles must be abandoned and the two parties should directly discuss the contentious issues in detail. On July 17, the United States invited both sides to a conference at a castle near Leeds, England. Dayan was charmed by the ambiance, filled with “ballads and knights, towers, large halls with years of moss in the cracks and hoary walls, abounding with splendor and power.”15 During the discussions, the sticking point remained Egypt’s demand that the talks focus on the Palestinian problem. Dayan, heading the Israeli delegation, thought it possible to reach an agreement on bilateral issues affecting only Israel and Egypt based on relinquishing the Sinai for the sake of peace, but on the Palestinian issue he could not see Begin’s government agreeing to the IDF’s withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza, or recognizing the Palestinians’ right to self-determination. It gradually became clear that the only way forward was to agree that Israel would withdraw from Sinai and to postpone discussion of the West Bank and Gaza, in the meantime giving some form of autonomy to the Palestinians there.
Dayan forced the issue and confronted the Egyptian delegation with a choice: the representatives could discuss the future of Sinai or fruitlessly continue to reiterate their position on the Palestinian issue. As Dayan phrased it to his team, “The Egyptians will not give up the bird they already have in hand.”16 To help Egypt move toward peace without settling the Palestinian issue, Dayan submitted to Vance, as his “personal opinion,” a document containing an agreement to discuss the issue of sovereignty for the Palestinian population after a five-year period of autonomy.
When he returned to Israel, Dayan reported to Begin on the talks and the personal document he had submitted to Vance. Begin was displeased about the document, protesting that Dayan had not consulted him. For Dayan, the freedom to negotiate as he had done was a matter of principle: he did not mind if the government or the prime minister rejected his views as long as they were considered. “I do not think I am able to manage the negotiations if I am not allowed to voice thoughts and make suggestions while stressing that these are my own personal opinions and the government might not accept them,” he told Begin. He made no threats, but it was obvious to both men that he would not back down. If Begin denied Dayan the freedom he sought, he would have to find himself a different foreign minister.17
Dayan was employing the same tactics he had used with Ben-Gurion and Meir, offering his personal views without committing the prime minister at an early stage of the discussion. Begin, too, apparently understood that this was the best method to untangle the negotiations mess. The next day, Dayan was surprised to hear Begin recommend that the cabinet endorse Dayan’s document to Vance.
The Leeds proceedings and Dayan’s document encouraged the Americans to push ahead. It became clear that only Sadat and Begin could exhibit the flexibility required for the negotiations to succeed. In early August, Carter invited both leaders to a summit scheduled for early September at Camp David, Maryland, the U.S. president’s summer resort.
The summit convened on September 5 and lasted thirteen days. Each side arrived with a dozen advisers and aides. Along with Begin, Israel’s team included Weizman and Dayan, who described the meetings as “the most decisive, difficult, and unpleasant part of the peace negotiations with Egypt. Reaching an accommodation involved personal and ideological crises for both sides, abandoning traditional conceptions and adopting new positions.”18 The delegations’ internal discussions were therefore no less important than the bilateral talks.
Camp David’s sports facilities, films, billiard tables, and bars were available to the delegates, but Dayan did not indulge himself. Instead, he took daily walks on the ring road in the compound, seeking the solitude and reflection he needed most to allow his mind to relax.
The opening meetings were highly frustrating, each side obviously having to yield more in response to the United States than in response to the other. As the summit progressed, the Americans held separate talks with each side in an attempt to bridge the gaps. The United States ultimately urged Israel to agree to withdraw from Sinai to the pre-1948 border, dismantle the settlements around Rafah and Sharm el-Sheikh, and relinquish the airfields it had built. The Palestinian question was deferred in return for Israel’s recognition of the Palestinians’ “legitimate rights”; the Palestinians were also to have five years of autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza, at the end of which the two sides would discuss a permanent settlement. The details of this autonomy were to be worked out as soon as a peace treaty was signed.
The Americans greased the process with promises to each side. They agreed, for example, to finance the establishment of Israeli airfields in the Negev to replace those in Sinai, and to support Egypt’s position on the Palestinian question, including the future of Jerusalem. This last commitment nearly derailed the conference. Carter, apparently respecting Dayan’s integrity and creative thinking, occasionally met with him privately, asking that he make every effort to bridge the remaining gaps. When the issue of Jerusalem came up, the talks reached a boiling point. Dayan delivered a heated soliloquy about Jerusalem’s significance to the Jewish people, expressing fervid opposition to Arab sovereignty there, while Carter insisted that he could not renege on his promise to Sadat. Finally, amendments were introduced into Carter’s memorandum, and both Sadat and Begin agreed to attach their own memoranda on Jerusalem’s future.
A fresh disagreement erupted shortly before the summit wound down on September 16. Egypt, with the Americans in agreement, demanded that Israel stop expanding its settlements in the occupied territories during the five-year implementation of the peace treaty. Begin was prepared to call a temporary halt of three months. The discussion ended inconclusively after midnight with a misunderstanding of Begin’s exact undertaking with regards to the temporary freeze on additional settlements. This would mar future relations between Begin and Carter.
Shadowed by this misunderstanding, the agreement was signed in the White House on September 17. Outdoors in Washington, a storm brewed, while indoors great excitement surrounded the historic occasion. The three-way handshake of Carter, Sadat, and Begin immortalized the moment and symbolized the dawn of a new era. Late that night, as the Israelis celebrated at their hotel, Dayan stayed in his room to reflect on the momentous occasion. He recorded in his diary: “This evening was one of the greatest moments of my life. I have traveled a long way since the peace negotiations with King Abdullah, the Sinai Campaign, the Six Day War, and Yom Kippur War. I was gratified to be one of its architects. Though weary, I couldn’t fall asleep. I longed for home…. In Israel, I would have celebrated as I liked. A meal in the kitchen with Rachel…. I wanted to be with myself, with Rachel, and with the history of Israel down the generations.”19
The Camp David Accords merely provided a framework for a peace treaty; a formal treaty would still have to be negotiated. The process, filled with pitfalls and crises, took six months. When the delegations returned to Washington to begin the peace negotiations, Dayan headed the Israeli delegation along with Weizman. This stage of the process became known as the Blair House Conference, after the presidential guesthouse located diagonally across from the White House. The Americans remained involved, offering encouragement, compromise, and pressure. The talks opened on October 12, 1978, one day after Yom Kippur and a full five years after the war that had led to the peace process.
In addition to the differences with Egypt and the United States, the Israeli delegation also differed internally on Jerusalem. As the two countries drew closer to the final wording, Begin recalled Dayan and Weizman to Jerusalem for a cabinet discussion, as their critics believed they had made unnecessary concessions. Dayan increasingly felt that Begin’s camp did not trust him, yet Begin knew he had no choice but to approve the formulations brought from Washington. He persuaded the cabinet to authorize Dayan and Weizman to complete the negotiations, but by the time they returned to Washington, on October 26, clouds had gathered. On November 1, Begin arrived in the United States en route to a state visit in Canada. He spent two days in New York and met officially with Vance and unofficially with Carter, whose suggestions were not to Dayan’s liking.
Dayan, increasingly, felt isolated within the fray. Before returning to Israel, he jotted down a note in his diary about biblical heroes who had suffered lonely deaths: King Saul, who had fallen on his sword in the war against the Philistines; Samson, who had sought love among Philistine women and was friendless among his own people. He ended this sad, begrudging entry with the odd remark: “Why is Samson drawn to fire? Such was the man, and the Bible does not find him wanting.”20
The stalemate continued. Washington offended Jerusalem by hinting that the Israelis were to blame for the deadlock. “We felt we were the victim of a double standard and even being misled,” Dayan vented in his diary. “While Washington firmly refused to agree to Israel’s demands to amend the formulated agreement, claiming that the removal of a single stone would topple the entire edifice, it consented to a good deal more than that to placate Egypt’s government.”21
Not surprisingly, key members of Begin’s party began to clamor against Dayan’s management of the negotiations, and Begin now seemed to share these views. Dayan’s status had plainly eroded, and he felt his authority slipping away. On February 21, the Americans convened another conference at Camp David at the ministerial level. Egyptian Prime Minister Mustafa Khalil represented Egypt, and Dayan represented Israel. But now the asymmetry was reversed: Khalil was authorized to conclude matters, and Dayan was not.
The second Camp David conference was cool, brief, and fruitless. The weather was bitterly cold, with snow and heavy fog obscuring an infrequent sun that appeared equally cold and distant. As inclement winds blew from both Jerusalem and the White House, the two sides seemed farther apart than ever, and continuing the talks appeared pointless. Dayan was peeved and angry, worried and apprehensive. The peace he considered vital to Israel’s security remained elusive.
Hereafter, Carter would be in direct touch with Prime Minister Begin, the only Israeli he deemed actually able to deliver a peace accord. He invited Begin and Khalil to another summit, in Washington, and Dayan remained at home. After intensive talks with Carter, Begin recommended that the delegation approve the formulations, which appeared to Dayan to be no different from those he had achieved in the past. Though slighted, he supported the recommendation in the cabinet. “Even if the new formulations are essentially no different from the previous ones, that is no reason to thwart the agreement,” he noted sourly in his diary.22
A few days later, Carter set out for Cairo and Jerusalem to finalize the agreement and obtain Sadat’s approval for wordings to which Begin had agreed. There were last-minute hitches. Egypt insisted on changing a few words and reiterating other demands: to station communications officers in Gaza and sell Sinai oil to Israel only via an American company. These were symbolic, not substantive, matters, which made them harder to resolve.
Carter arrived in Israel on March 10, 1979, and the next evening a crisis loomed when the Israelis rejected the latest Egyptian amendments. Carter was annoyed and announced that he would return to Washington the following day. Yet to return to Washington without an agreement would have meant a loss of face for Carter. To prevent this from happening, Dayan proposed a number of new formulations, to which Carter and Begin both agreed. Dayan felt that he had saved the day. Back in his hotel room, he permitted himself to boast to Rachel: “I resolved the crisis.”23
Sadat chose to have the official signing in Washington. The public ceremony took place on March 26 at 2 P.M. on the White House lawn. It was another stirring moment, and the photograph of the three-way handshake of Begin, Sadat, and Carter, all looking happy, became the second most important document of accomplishment in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Outside, a handful of Palestinians demonstrated against the agreement. At the time their protest seemed negligible, even pathetic. But hindsight suggests that this minor demonstration was hinting at the failure of the peace treaty to solve the crux of the conflict: the national question of Palestinian Arabs.