The Commander-in-Chief (Admiral Sir John Tovey) at Scapa in the King George V brought the King George V and the 2nd Cruiser Squadron Rear-Admiral A. T. Curteis (Galatea, Aurora, Kenya and Neptune), to short notice. Rear-Admiral W. F. Wake-Walker, R.A. 1st Cruiser Squadron who was already in Denmark Strait4 with the cruisers Norfolk and Suffolk, was told to continue his patrol. The battlecruiser Hood (Vice-Admiral L. E. Holland) with the new battleship Prince of Wales and six destroyers (Electra, Anthony, Echo, Icarus, Achates, and Antelope) was ordered to cover the Norfolk’s patrol in Denmark Strait. They passed the Hoxa boom at 0050/22. The Manchester and Birmingham (12 6-in.) who were already patrolling between Iceland and Faroes, were ordered to fuel at Skaalefjord (Iceland) and resume their patrol.
The battlecruiser Repulse was at the Clyde and the aircraft carrier Victorious at Scapa, due to sail on 22 May with a troop convoy (WS8B for the Middle East). Their sailing was cancelled and they were placed at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief. A bombing attack despatched to the Norwegian coast proved abortive. The coast was wrapt in fog, and only two aircraft succeeded in reaching the fjord. They saw nothing of the enemy. Such was the situation on 21 May. On 22 May the weather was worse. In the North Sea there was cloud down to 200 feet; in Denmark Strait aircraft reported unbroken cloud down to 300 feet with heavy continuous rain and a visibility of less than half a mile. The air patrols could see nothing. Everywhere there was fog and uncertainty. It was under these conditions that the Commanding Officer, Captain H. L. St. J. Fancourt, at Royal Naval-Air Station, Hatston, Orkneys, sent on his own initiative a plane across the North Sea.5 It entered the Bergen fjords, and, under heavy fire, forced home a skilful and determined reconnaissance. The ships were not there. The information reached the Commander-in-Chief at 2000/22. Where was the enemy bound? To Northern Norway or to Iceland or to attack the Atlantic trade routes? The Commander-in-Chief considered the last to be the greatest menace and took immediate steps to counter it.
The Suffolk was ordered to rejoin the Norfolk in Denmark Strait. The Arethusa was to join the Manchester and Birmingham to form, a patrol line between Iceland and the Faroes. Vice-Admiral Holland, with the Hood and Prince of Wales, then on their way to Iceland, was told to cover the patrols in Denmark Strait, North of 62° N. The Commander-in-Chief would cover the passages south of 62° N. Air reconnaissance was arranged for Denmark Strait (180 miles), Iceland to Faroes (255 miles), Faroes to Shetlands (165 miles) and the Norwegian coast.
Meanwhile the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen had sailed at 1945/21; they passed Trondheim on 0700/22, proceeding north at 24 knots as far as 64°. At 2100/22 they were in 68° N., 2° W., heading for Denmark Strait.
Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs 1941
The first portion of the undertaking, that is, the break-through into the Atlantic, if possible unobserved, was regarded as the most difficult part of the operation. Previous experience had shown that enemy forces might appear in the Denmark Straits as well as in the lceland-Faroes passage. Under suitable weather conditions it was considered certain that there would be enemy air reconnaissance in the Denmark Straits. The lightness of the nights made an unobserved break-through all the more difficult. On the other hand we could expect that air reconnaissance over the northern part of the North Sea would provide an adequate picture of the enemy’s disposition, and that in the Denmark Straits, at the ice border, poor visibility would favour the break-through. Since so far it had not been established that British ships were equipped with radar, as a matter of fact, observations made so far seemed to indicate that they definitely were not so equipped, an unnoticed break-through was feasible.
4. Between Iceland and Greenland.
5. It carried Commander G. A. Rotherham, R.N., an observer of much experience, and was piloted by Lieut. (A) N. N. Goddard, R.N.V.R.