When at 2054/23 the Hood shaped course at 27 knots to cut off the enemy, her six destroyers were told to follow at best speed if unable to keep up. They were able, however, to maintain their speed and were with her during the night. At 2318 they were ordered to form screen No. 4 ahead of the fleet. At midnight (23/24) reports put the enemy 120 miles 10° steering approximately 200°. The Hood was then steering 285° at 27 knots with the Prince of Wales 90° from her. The wind was north, blowing strong (force 4-5) with a moderate swell. Shortly afterwards (0008/24) speed was reduced to 25 knots and course was altered to north (0° at 0017/24). It was expected that contact with the enemy would be made at any time after 0140/24, and at 0015 final preparations were made and battle ensigns were hoisted. It was just then that the cruisers lost touch with the enemy in a snowstorm and for some, time no reports were coming in. At 0031 the Vice-Admiral signalled to the Prince of Wales that “if enemy were not in sight by 0210 he would probably alter course to 180° until cruisers regained touch and that he intended both ships to engage Bismarck, leaving Prinz Eugen to Norfolk and Suffolk.”7
The Prince of Wales’ Walrus was ready for catapulting and it was intended to fly it off, but visibility deteriorated and it was defuelled and stowed away. It was then about 0140 and at 0147 the Vice-Admiral signalled “If battlecruisers turn 200° at 0205, destroyers continue to search to northward.” Visibility was poor at the time and it is uncertain whether this signal was received by all of them. Course was altered at 0203/24 to 200°. As there was little chance by then of engaging before daylight the personnel was allowed to rest. At 0247 the Suffolk regained touch and by 0300 bearings were coming in again. The Hood increased speed to 28 knots at 0353, and at 0400/24 the enemy was estimated to be 20 miles to the north-west. By 0430 visibility had increased to about 12 miles and orders were accordingly given .at 0440 to refuel the Prince of Wales’ aircraft, but owing to delays, due to water in the fuel, it was not ready before the action commenced and being damaged by splinters and constituting a danger was jettisoned into the sea. The Hood was steaming hard at 28 knots to the south-west, on a course 240°; at 0450 the Prince of Wales was made guide of the fleet and Hood took station on her port bow (230°) resuming guide of the fleet at 0505. At 0510 first degree of readiness was ordered. Day was dawning out of the twilight. At 0535 a vessel could be seen looming on the horizon to the north-west. It was the Bismarck. She was some 17 miles away bearing 335°. The Prinz Eugen was ahead of her.
Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs 1941
What was most surprising, and of decisive importance for the further course of the operation, was the probability, established for the first time, that the enemy possessed evidently excellently functioning radar equipment. This eliminated entirely the advantage of poor visibility for the breakthrough of the task force, and prevented a swift escape from the enemy.
7. There is no record of this signal having been passed to the two cruisers, nor was it received by them.