When the Hood blew up, the Norfolk was 15 miles to the northward coming up at 28 knots. By 0630 she was approaching the Prince of Wales, and Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker, signalling his intention to keep in touch, told her to follow at best speed. The Hood’s destroyers away in the north-east were ordered to search for survivors, but found only three.11 The Prince of Wales reported that she could go 27 knots and was told to open, out to 10 miles on a bearing 110° so that the Norfolk could fall back on her if attacked. Far off the enemy cruiser Prinz Eugen could be seen working out to starboard of the Bismarck while the chase continued to the southward.
At 0757 the Suffolk reported that the Bismarck had reduced speed and appeared to be damaged and shortly afterwards a Sunderland flying boat from Iceland, sighted at 0810, reported that she was leaving behind her a broad track of oil. The Commander-in-Chief with the King George V was still a long way off (about 360 miles to the eastward) and Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker on the bridge of the Norfolk had to make an important decision: was he with the help of the Prince of Wales to renew the action or was he to make it his business to ensure that the enemy should be intercepted and brought to action by the Commander-in-Chief. A dominant consideration in the matter was the state of the Prince of Wales. Her bridge had been wrecked, she had 400 tons12 of water in her stern compartments, two of her guns were unserviceable13 and she could not go more than 27 knots.14 She had only recently commissioned and barely a week had passed since Captain Leach had been able to report her ready for service. Her turrets were of a new and untried model, liable to “teething” troubles and evidently suffering from them, for at the end of the morning action her salvoes had been seen falling short and wide. In a nutshell, it was doubtful whether in her then state she was a match for the Bismarck. It was on these grounds that Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker decided that he would confine himself to shadowing and would not attempt to force on an action. The forenoon passed. Soon after eleven the visibility began to decrease and the enemy was finally lost to sight at noon in a mist of drizzling rain. The Prince of Wales had closed in and was ordered to keep astern. She was still clearing up the wreckage of her bridge.
Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs 1941
After the victorious engagement the Fleet Commander continued to proceed south. The position at 1400 was in quadrat AK 11, which is about 240 miles east of the southern tip of Greenland. The Prince of Wales made off for the time being and the cruisers Norfolk and Suffolk maintained contact, which was later resumed by the Prince of Wales also. At noon the Fleet Commander announced his intention of making for St. Nazaire and of releasing the Prinz Eugen to carry on warfare against merchant shipping. If no further engagement ensued, he planned to withdraw during the night.
In the evening Group West sent a radio message (Radiogram 1842) agreeing with the Fleet Commander’s proposal to send away the Prinz Eugen to take part in the war against merchant shipping, and expressing the opinion that in case the Fleet Commander is able to elude the enemy, it would seem expedient for the Bismarck to wait for some time in a remote sea area.
Signals sent from Bismarck to Group North
0801/24 1) Electrical engine room No. 4 broken down. 2) Port boiler room No. 2 is making water, but can be held. Water in the forecastle. 3) Maximum speed 28 knots. 4) Two enemy Radar sets recognised. 5) Intentions: To put into St. Nazaire. No losses of personnel. Fleet Commander
Signal sent from Bismarck to Naval War Staff and Group West
1348/24 1400 approximate position 60 20N, 36 20W. King George with cruiser is maintaining contact. Intention: If no engagement, intend to attempt to shake off enemy during night. Fleet Commander
11. Reports from Prince of Wales, Echo, Icarus, Achates, Malcolm and Flag Officer, Iceland. The Anthony and Antelope had been detached by the Hood to Iceland to fuel at 1400/23. When the report of the enemy came in on 23rd May, they were ordered by Flag Officer, Iceland, to join the Ist B.C.S. and sailed at 2100/23. Four destroyers remained with Hood (Echo, Electra, Icarus, Achates). They had difficulty in maintaining station in the heavy sea when the Hood went on to 27 knots at 2054/23. At 2120/23 Rear-Admiral 1st B.C.S. Signalled his intention to spread destroyers 70° 7 miles apart at 2300. At 2318/23 destroyers were ordered to form screen No. 4 (i.e., ahead). At 2359/23 the Hood turned to North. At 0147/24 destroyers were told that if battlecruisers turned to 200° they were to continue to northward. It is clear, that they did continue to the northward for when the action started at 0555/24 they were all some 30 miles to the northward or north-westward. At 0637/24 they were ordered by Rear-Admiral 1st Cruiser Squadron to search for survivors. They reached the scene of the explosion about 0745/24. It was marked by a large patch of oil, wreckage, hammocks. Balsa rafts, splinters and charred wood. Only three survivors were picked up (by the Electra). The Malcolm arrived from Iceland add was searching all day without result. She reported the scene of the disaster to be in 63° 14’ N., 32° 22’ W. The Echo reports that she with the Icarus, Achates, Antelope and Anthony proceeded at 0900/24 to Hvalfjord to fuel, arriving at 2000/24.
12. Later 600 tons.
13. Four guns of the after turret were unserviceable from 0613 to 0720 and two guns up to 0825.
14. Later 26 knots.