HMS Victorious Aircraft Attack (Plan 3)
The squadron led by Lieutenant-Commander (A) Eugene Esmonde took its departure from 58° 58’ N., 33° 17’ W. The Bismarck was estimated to be in 57° 9’ N., 36° 44’ W., steering 180°, 24 knots. The wind was 350°, 25 knots. The squadron went off on a course 225°, 85 knots, flying in broken stratus cloud at 1,500 ft. It was about 2327/24 when an A.S.V. instrument indicated the presence of a surface vessel 16 miles off on the port bow. Three minutes later through a gap in the clouds a glimpse was caught of the Bismarck steering 160°. Then the cloud thickened and she was lost to sight. As the striking force was estimated to be to the westward of the enemy, course was altered to north-east and then round to port. The instruments picked up two ships, one on the port and one on the starboard side. They turned out to be the Prince of Wales, Suffolk and Norfolk and the latter was able to direct them on to the enemy 14 miles on her starboard bow. At 2350/24 there were signs of a vessel ahead and below and the squadron broke cloud to deliver an attack. They found themselves over a United States coastal cutter lying stationary in the Atlantic swell. The Bismarck was six miles away to the southward and, sighting the aircraft, opened a heavy barrage fire. Lieutenant-Commander Esmonde pressed home his attack. It was close on midnight. The eight25 planes that attacked were armed with 18-in. torpedoes, fitted with Duplex pistols set for 31 ft. At midnight, 24th, three planes attacked simultaneously on the port beam. Three others made a longer approach low down attacking on the port bow a minute later. One took a longer course, attacking on the port quarter; one went round and attacked on the starboard bow a couple of minutes after midnight. At least one hit26 was obtained on the starboard side abreast of the bridge. A Fulmar flown off at 2300/24 for shadowing saw a great column of dense black smoke rising from the Bismarck and reported her speed reduced. Two more Fulmars were flown off for shadowing at 0105, but in spite of “the utmost gallantry” were not successful in holding the enemy. Night was falling as the striking force returned (sunset at 0052/25); the homing beacon in the Victorious unfortunately failed; a rain squall hid the ship and the planes of the striking force missed her in the darkness. It became necessary to home them by R.D.F. and the beams of a signal projector. All were landed on by 0201/25. Two of the Fulmars which had left at 2300/24 were still missing and the homing beams kept circling round till 0250/25. It was dark by then and the Rear-Admiral 2nd Cruiser Squadron had regretfully to order the Victorious to extinguish them as their use in the vicinity of the enemy and of possible submarines was too hazardous. Both were lost, but the crews were saved after spending chilly hours in the Atlantic swell. Right up to 0258/25 long signals were coming from the Bismarck probably reporting the attack and possibly a recasting of Admiral Lütjen’s plans. The Prinz Eugen may have parted company at this time. She was not seen after 1909/24.27
Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs 1941
Presumably the Fleet Commander thought that the chances of throwing off the enemy were much better in the south than in the north, and in particular his fear of enemy destroyers and planes, especially planes from the carrier Victorious probably led him to rate the danger in the southern area as less than in the northern area.
Signals sent from Bismarck to Group West
0401/25 Enemy radar gear with a range of at least 35,000 metres interferes with operations in Atlantic to considerable extent. In Denmark Straits ships were located and enemy maintained contact. Not possible to shake off enemy despite most favourable weather conditions. Will be unable to oil unless succeed in shaking off enemy by superior speed. Running engagement at range of 20,800 metres to 18,000 metres. Hood concentrated fire on Bismarck. Hood destroyed through explosion after 5 minutes. After that target shifted to King George which turned off making black smoke after she received some hits and remained out of sight for several hours. Own ammunition 93 rounds. After this King George continued action at maximum range. Bismarck received two hits from King George which reduced the speed and put oil bunkers out of action. Prinz Eugen succeeded in escaping because Bismarck engaged cruisers and battleship in fog. Own radar gear liable to break down, especially when own guns firing. Fleet Commander
25. One had lost contact in the cloud.
26. Commander-in-Chief’s despatch, paragraph 37.
27. A survivor mentioned the Prinz Eugen as leaving at 0509/24. This is evidently much too early, though she may possibly have increased her distance at that time.