While the aircraft of the Victorious were making their attack, the Norfolk sighted a ship to the south-west and gave the order to open fire. The Prince of Wales was able to identify it in time as an American coastguard cutter,28 but in the movements preparatory to opening fire the Norfolk lost touch with the enemy for a time and it was not till 0116 that turning to 220° she suddenly sighted the Bismarck bearing 204° only 8 miles away. There followed a brief exchange of fire. The Norfolk and Prince of Wales turned to port to bring their guns to bear and the latter was ordered to engage. It was then 0130/25. The Prince of Wales fired two salvoes at 20,000 yards by R.D.F. and the Bismarck replied with two29 which fell a long way short. The light was failing and the enemy was again lost to sight. By 0141/25 it was growing dark and in order to maintain contact, the Suffolk, which had the most reliable R.D.F. set, was told to act independently so as to keep in touch while the Norfolk with the Prince of Wales astern followed in close support. The chase continued while the Suffolk kept touch with the enemy who at 0229/25 was bearing 192° 20,900 yards and steering 160°. His speed had dropped to 20 knots. The night was light with a visibility of about six miles and the Suffolk resumed her zigzagging. At 0306 the enemy was located again. The bearing was the same. This was the last contact. The Suffolk at this time had commenced an outward zigzag of 30° which lasted ten minutes.30
When it was evident that the enemy was lost, the Suffolk signalled at 0401/2531 to the Norfolk that the enemy had either worked round to eastward under their stern or turned westward and that he was acting on the latter assumption. At 0411/25 the Suffolk sent another signal stating that she had lost touch. This reached the Norfolk at 0504/25 and was followed by another made at 0505/25 and received at 0515/25 “Have lost touch with enemy at 0306.” This signal made it clear that they had been out of touch with the Bismarck for over two hours. At 0552/25 the Rear-Admiral asked the Commander-in-Chief and the Victorious for an air search at dawn. The enemy had been lost. From examination of the plot it appeared to Rear-Admiral 1st Cruiser Squadron that the enemy must have made a large turn to starboard at about 0310. Accordingly at 0605/25, when it was growing light, the Rear-Admiral ordered the Suffolk to search to the westward and made a signal to the Commander-in-Chief “Enemy lost at 0306B. Suffolk is being sent to search to westward. At daylight Norfolk follows Suffolk and Prince of Wales will be sent to join you.” This signal, received in the King George V at 0607/25, upset the expectation of meeting the enemy at 0900/25. The enemy had slipped away in the treacherous twilight of a northern middle watch.
Signal sent to Bismarck from Group West
0846/25 Last enemy contact report 0213 from K3G. after that three figure tactical reports but no open position reports. We have impression that contact has been lost Operational signals are repeated to Bermuda and Halifax but not to Gibraltar or Force H which is suspected to be in Eastern Atlantic. Group West
Signal sent to Fleet Commander from C-in-C, Navy
1152/25 Heartiest congratulations on your birthday. May you continue to be equally successful in this coming year. C-in-C, Navy
Signal sent to Bismarck from Group West
1152/25 7 U-boats will form patrol line between appr. positions 47 10N, 15 10W and 45 00N, 10 50W. One U-boat in appr. position 47 50N, 16 50W. Group West
Signal sent to Fleet Commander from Adolf Hitler
1625/25 Best wishes on your birthday. Adolf Hitler
Signal sent to Bismarck from Group West
1932/25 Strong air forces available for arrival Bismarck. Battle formations up to 14° West. Patrol line in accordance with my 1313 with 5 U-boats in appr. position 47 50N, 16 50W, and 47 50N, 12 20W. 3 destroyers for escort. Outer channels of Brest and St. Nazaire under control. If necessary possible to put into La Pallise as well. Report when passing 10° West. Group West
28. Believed to be the Modoc.
29. The Prince of Wales says “three flashes”; Rear-Admiral 1st Cruiser Squadron says “two salvoes.”
30. “The loss of touch, when it came, was caused primarily by over-confidence. The R.D.F. had been giving such consistently good results and had been used so skilfully that it engendered a false sense of security… The Suffolk was shadowing from the extreme range of her instrument, losing touch on those parts of her zigzag which took her furthest from the enemy. The enemy altered sharply to starboard, while the Suffolk was moving to port, and by the time she got back had gone.” (Commander-in-Chief’s despatch. Par. 45: C.B. 04164, page 18.)
31. Received in Norfolk 0445/25.