Destroyer Shadowing Operations

At the time of the Piorun’s report, the destroyers were steering 120°. They were at once ordered to take up shadowing positions, and four minutes later the Bismarck opened a heavy fire with main and secondary armaments on the Piorun and Maori. Two attempts were made by these ships to work round to the northward of the enemy, but they were silhouetted against the north-western horizon, and the Bismarck’s fire was unpleasantly accurate, though neither ship was actually hit. The captain of the Maori therefore decided to work round to the southward, and altered course accordingly.

The Piorun closed the range, and herself opened fire at 13,500 yards but after firing three salvoes, she was straddled by a salvo which fell about 20 yards from the ship’s side, and, ceasing fire, she turned away to port under smoke. During this engagement, she lost touch with the British destroyers, and her movements thereafter are somewhat uncertain. She remained under fire for about an hour, fortunately without suffering damage, and during this time appears to have worked round to the north and east of the Bismarck, with whom she eventually lost touch at 2355.

The remainder of the destroyers, meanwhile, had been working round to the southward of the enemy to take up shadowing positions to the eastward of him. Soon after the initial contact, it was evident that the Bismarck’s speed had been so seriously reduced that interception by the battlefleet was certain, provided she could be held. In these circumstances, Captain Vian defined his object as firstly, to deliver the enemy to the Commander-in-Chief at the time he desired; and secondly, to sink or immobilise her with torpedoes during the night, provided the attack should not involve the destroyers in heavy losses. Accordingly, a signal was made at 2248/26 ordering them to shadow, and this operation was continued throughout the night, though torpedo attacks were carried out later under cover of darkness,

As darkness came on, the weather deteriorated and heavy rain squalls became frequent. Visibility varied between 2½ miles and half a mile but the Bismarck, presumably using R.D.F., frequently opened accurate fire outside these ranges.

About half an hour after sunset, the destroyers were ordered at 2324 to take up stations preparatory to carrying out a synchronised torpedo attack. This was subsequently cancelled on account of the adverse weather conditions, and they were ordered to attack independently as opportunity offered.62

At about 2300 the Bismarck had altered course to the north-westward: this general direction, apart from periodical drastic alterations to open her A arcs, or to avoid torpedoes, or to throw off the shadowing destroyers, she maintained for the rest of the night.

At this time the Zulu was in touch with her, and kept her under observation from the southward. At 2342 the enemy opened fire on the Cossack, then about 4 miles to the S.S.W., and shot away her aerials. The Cossack turned away under cover of smoke, shortly afterwards resuming her course to the eastwards, and gradually hauling to the northward.

A few minutes later, at 2350, the Zulu came under heavy fire from the Bismarck’s 15-in. guns: the first three salvoes straddled, wounding an officer and 2 ratings. Drastic avoiding action was taken, as a result of which the Zulu lost touch. The Sikh, however, who had lost sight of the enemy half an hour previously, had observed her firing at the Cossack, and now succeeded in shadowing from astern until 0020, when the battleship made a large alteration to port and opened fire on her. The Sikh also filtered course to port, intending to fire torpedoes, but the view of the Torpedo Control Officer was obscured by shell splashes, and she withdrew to the southward without making an attack.

During this engagement, the Maori was close on the Sikh’s beam;63 she now took up the shadowing, and at 0025 reported the Bismarck’s course as 230°, but lost touch a few minutes later, probably on account of the enemy altering back to the north-westward.

For the next half hour, it seems that no destroyer was in touch with the Bismarck. Star shell were fired by the Maori at 0052 to indicate the position in which she-had last been seen: but nothing was sighted until she was picked up again by the Zulu at 0100.

62. As things turned out, the Cossack and Maori were able to fire torpedoes from opposite sides of the Bismarck within three minutes of each other.

63. Maori’s report. This does not agree with position of Maori and Sikh at this time as shown in plan 8, drawn from the tactical plot accompanying Capt. D 4’s report. The Maori’s report is quite definite : “At about OQ20/27, Bismarck opened fire on Sikh… Bismarck was then bearing 330° from Maori, steering approximately 320°. Maori was close on Sikh’s beam. At 0025 salvoes started falling very close to both ships…”