Statement made by Mtr. Gfr. (Ord. Seaman) H. Manthey
About 1700 on Friday 23 May 1941, a smoke cloud was sighted. At this time I was on my action station No. 5 starboard 2-cm gun. Immediately afterwards the enemy cruiser opened fire. The cruiser was astern, Bismarck replied with turrets C and D. I do not know how many salvoes were fired. The cruiser thereupon turned off but maintained contact. On the loud speaker system it was announced that the enemy cruiser had made a signal giving Bismarck’s position. Half an hour later it was announced that the enemy cruisers were shooting at each other. After that we were relieved. The night was quiet.
At about 0600 on Saturday 24 May, it was announced over the ship’s broadcast that smoke clouds had been sighted. Action stations were sounded. Shortly afterwards the smoke clouds could be seen with the naked eye. At this time I belonged to No. 5 port 2-cm gun. On action stations the starboard watch came on and I had to change over to No. 5 starboard 2-cm gun. A few minutes later the first enemy ship opened fire. At this time I did not know which enemy ships were concerned. Shortly afterwards Bismarck and a second enemy ship opened fire. The bridge issued an order concerning the distribution of fire. The two forward turrets fired against the Hood, whilst the after turrets fired against the King George V. The names of the enemy ships were announced after the action. Three salvoes were fired against the Hood.
Whilst this firing was going on the anti-aircraft crews were sent under cover because of the splinter effect and the air pressure of our own guns. Out of interest in the battle, however, many comrades remained on deck amidships and in the superstructure. During this firing I myself was under cover (deck house). Already after our second salvo had been fired it was announced “enemy is burning”, after the third salvo “enemy is exploding”. During this engagement with the Hood, the after turrets which were directed from the after control position, had been scoring hits. King George V thereupon turned off. Hood was sunk about the same time. The general enthusiasm was great. It became still greater when it was announced from the bridge that the enemy were the largest British battleships. At the same time it was announced that Hood had been sunk and that King George V had turned off. Only now I heard that yet another enemy cruiser was firing on us. The engagement lasted for about another 10 minutes. At the end of the action we learned that Bismarck had received three hits. In my opinion these three hits were caused by the last enemy heavy cruiser. One hit in the ship’s side (at the bows). The second hit went through the starboard picket boat and detonated in the water. Comrades told me that the third hit had gone into the port oil bunker, compartment XV to XVII. I went there myself and saw that oil was pouring out and was also spilled on the upper deck. The damage itself was under water and could not be seen. This was about 2 hours later.
At this time it could be noticed that the forecastle lay deeper in the water and that the ship had a very slight list to port. I also heard at this time that the electrical engine room No. IV had broken down owing to penetration of water. A little later it was said that the damage had been repaired by divers and damage control parties. A gunner’s mate who belonged to my gun said that only the ship’s side had been torn open; others maintained that the shell had gone through but had not detonated.
At this time the sea was calm and visibility was good. The ship reduced speed and a collision mat was got out on the forecastle and divers were sent down into the ship to find out the damage. I heard that it had been very difficult to get into the compartments full of water. The divers however succeeded in making a pipe connection to the oil bunkers, so that the oil could be pumped aft. In the meantime they succeeded in stopping the leak. As far as I can remember the outboard work took about 2 hours. The ship then increased speed again. During this time pumping was continued below deck. It was continued the whole day as well as the night. During Saturday morning I noticed that the forecastle was slowly rising again. On Saturday about noon one flying boat appeared. From the type it was first thought to be a Do 18. From talk I heard I know that a recognition signal was demanded and that the aircraft made the correct answer. This was announced through the telephone. When the aircraft, approached to within 4,000 metres, the anti-aircraft office Lt. Gdr. Gellart recognized it as an aircraft of American build. Thereupon the 10.5cm guns opened fire on the aircraft. The aircraft turned off and tried a few more times to approach again but was forced to turn off every time. The aircraft remained then outside the range but maintained contact.
At about 2300, three flights (27 aircraft), bi-planes appeared to attack. First of all they tried to attack together from port. When they could not succeed in this, they attacked singly from starboard, ahead and astern. All available guns, including the 38-cm guns, participated in the defence. The attack lasted about an hour and altogether 5 aircraft (according to statements made by my comrades) were shot down. This was confirmed on the order transmission system. I do not know how many aircraft were actually shot down. On my request my anti-aircraft officer Lt. Doelker told me that two flights of torpedo carrying aircraft and one flight of bombers had been involved in the attack. Owing to the continuous zig-zagging (avoiding torpedoes) the anti-aircraft defence was particularly difficult. The aircraft only scored one torpedo hit, starboard amidships, below the aircraft catapult. The torpedo detonated on the ship’s side and left merely scratches in the paintwork. Ldg. Seaman Kirchberg who was standing on the starboard 10.5-cm gun was thrown by the air pressure against the hangar and was killed. This was the first fatal casualty onboard. I do not know if other comrades were injured.
Shortly after the end of the engagement with the aircraft King George V opened fire on us. Bismarck returned the fire with one or two salvoes. As far as I know no hits were scored on either aide. As far as I can remember the night of 24/25 was quiet. On the telephone it was announced that the enemy was maintaining contact. On 24 May I was on watch on the gun from 2000-0000.
Prinz Eugen I saw for the last time on the morning of 24/5 about 0600, when the action with the Hood was in progress. At noon nothing could be seen of her.
About 0300 on Sunday 25 May, it was announced through the telephone that of the 27 enemy aircraft which had attacked us only one had returned to the aircraft carrier. At this time the forecastle was again low in the water. Owing to the violent manoeuvres during the air attack the follision mats had broken and water had again penetrated into the forecastle. Speed was reduced, the sea was fairly rough. The damage control parties worked during the whole of Sunday until the next engagement which was on Monday 26 May in the evening. I do not know if the damage control parties continued to work after this engagement on the evening of 26/5.
On Sunday 25 May, about 1200, the Fleet Commander spoke to the crew. As far as I can remember the Fleet Commander said amongst other things the following: “We were not intended to fight enemy warships but wanted to wage merchant warfare. Through treachery the enemy had managed to find us in the Denmark Straits. We took up the fight. The crew have behaved magnificently. We shall win or die.”
After the speech of the Fleet Commander the situation became clear to the crew and the mood became serious.
On Sunday afternoon a second funnel was built. On this occasion the spirits of the crew rose again. It was piped that the non-duty watch was to go into the second funnel to smoke.
Otherwise nothing special occurred on Sunday, 25/5.
After the air attack on 24/5, both watches ate and slept on their stations. The stations were not left again until the sinking. Enemy shadowing aircraft (2) maintained contact from Monday morning (1000-1100) onwards. Sometimes they tried to approach closer but were each time forced to turn off by the anti-aircraft defence. As far as I know no recognition signals were exchanged. They were two bi-planes. In the evening between 2100-2200 the anti-aircraft control station reported 16 enemy aircraft at great height over the ship. Repel aircraft stations were sounded. They did not try to attack but flew off again. We did not open fire. About 10 minutes later I saw three enemy aircraft (bi-planes) bearing approximately 200°, approach our ship from the clouds. Immediately afterwards aircraft approached us from all sides. It was fairly cloudy. I do not know the exact number of aircraft. All anti-aircraft weapons opened fire. At this time I felt two heavy shakings in the ship, one shortly after the other.
According to statements of my comrades three depth charges lying on the quarterdeck were thrown overboard by the air pressure of the 38-cm guns which were firing on a torpedo track. I do not know whether the shakings originated from the depth charges. The attack was broken off after about 30 minutes owing to the heavy anti-aircraft fire.
The attacks were dive bombing attacks coming from the clouds down to about 10-20 metres above the water. Generally speaking we had the impression that the attacks were made very pluckily. 7 Aircraft were shot down. From the main anti-aircraft control position it was announced: “Rudder jamming hard to starboard. Ship goes in circles”. I do not know how many torpedoes hit. In my opinion one torpedo hit went aft into the steering compartment and another hit near compartments VII-VIII. Some men were injured on port gun No. 4. Through the telephone I heard that the divers were trying to couple in the hand rudder. After 20-30 minutes we heard again through the ship’s telephone that the hand rudder had been coupled in. Shortly afterwards a second report: Rudder absolutely clear again. Whilst the rudder was out of action it was tried to steer the ship with the screws. As far as I can remember the ship after the hit reduced right down from her cruising speed of 24 knots. She was going in circles. By going astern with the screws the ship was put against the sea. When the hand rudder was coupled in, the ship went first of all 13 knots and later increased to 24 knots.
When cruising at 24 knots enemy destroyers made an attack (from memory at 0000). Action stations were sounded. First of all I did not know whether the attack came from starboard or port, however, I remembered afterwards that it started on the port quarter and a little later shifted to the starboard sides. I did not notice that Bismarck made an alteration of course. At this time it was announced over the ship’s telephone that one destroyer was sinking and two more burning.
I myself did not see anything of this. During action stations which lasted until about 0700 on Tuesday 27 May, the enemy continuously fired stars hells. Occasionally it became clear as day. On Monday night various congratulatory telegrams arrived, amongst them one from the Führer awarding the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross to the Senior Gunnery Officer. The Captain read these telegrams to the crew. Furthermore 81 aircraft were promised for the next day. One U-boat was supposed to be very near to us and all U-boats had been warned. One tanker and two tugs were also on the way to help us. These announcements lifted the morale of the crew again. Many sang. Otherwise nothing on Monday.
About 0200, 27 May 1941, more enemy destroyers had approached to within 3, 000 metres. The 38-cm, 15-cm, and 10.5-cm guns were firing. The 3.7-cm and 2-cm guns had orders to wait for special permission to open fire. Of these destroyers one was set on fire; this I observed myself as she was on the starboard beam. Before the attack of the destroyers, i.e., before 0200 an aircraft made a dive-bombing attack from the clouds. Anti-aircraft fire forced the aircraft to turn off. The action with the destroyers lasted until about 0600. No torpedo or gunnery hits ware scored. Bismarck was making way until this time (0600) I do not know the speed. About 0600 a stand-easy was ordered. I do not know for what reason. She had a slight list to port. Heavy seas. The waves came up to the upper deck. During the night an attempt was made to start the ship’s aircraft, but did not succeed. Reason; No compressed air and too such pitching. One aircraft was thrown overboard. It drifted in the water with the floats on top.
During the stand-easy it was piped: All non-duty officers into the charthouse. Immediately afterwards action stations were sounded. Nothing could be seen of the enemy. It was said that smoke clouds had been sighted. Before our own guns fired, enemy shells dropped close to the ship. After about one hour the first hits were scored on our ship. I myself was wearing the telephone. The connection broke off. I took off the telephone. From this time onwards no orders were given by the anti-aircraft control to my gun. As the hits increased the anti-aircraft crews went under cover. We had the impression that m were fired at from all aides. First I was with a group of 20 men in the after gunnery position. After a few hits close by we fled behind the turrets C and D on the upper deck. Before that we threw about 5-6 rafts on the deck below and went with the rafts behind the turrets. Through a hit all rafts except one or two were destroyed. We had now several injured. At this time turret D was still firing.
At this time my Comrade Herzog came to me. We saw a carley float between turret C and D. With the help of several others we released it. This carley float we pulled behind turret D. There several comrades left us. Through a hit which went into the water, i.e., the wave, the carley float and we three were thrown overboard. Nobody was actually on the float. We all three swam towards the float. We only succeeded in reaching it after about 15 minutes as hit after hit landed in the water. Nearby another raft was drifting with one injured and 5-6 other comrades. In the carley float we drifted astern. The ship herself we only saw when we were on top of a wave. Once I saw the Bismarck was getting a list to port. It appeared that the ship had made a little way to port. Shortly afterwards I could see Bismarck no longer, but only a smoke cloud. I did not hear an explosion. Not far from us I saw two cruisers making towards the place where Bismarck was. These cruisers were firing. We had nothing to eat or drink in the raft. The raft which in the beginning had been near us had gone out of sight. I do not know what time we were washed overboard. When the sun was directly over us and we had practically given up all hope of being rescued, we sighted a “Kondor” or FW 200. We waved to it but could not ascertain whether we had been seen.
We felt tired. My comrade Herzog had been injured in the foot. In the evening shortly before 1900 a U-boat suddenly surfaced close to us. We were taken onboard and immediately packed into bunks and fed. The U-boat – she was U 74 – searched for two days for survivors. Only corpses and wreckage were sighted.
I do not know about the radar gear. I did not hear anything about it onboard.
I do not know anything about damage to the W/T station. Neither did I see whether the aerials had been shot away.
(Signed) Herbert Manthey.
Mtr. Gfr. (Ord. Seaman)
Note: As with Signals in Führer Conference of Naval Affairs 1941, Prince of Wales was mistaken for King George V.
Report rescued by U 74.
The operation was reported to Hitler on June 6.