Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1941

Report of the Commander-in-Chief, Navy to the Führer on 20 April 1941.

1. German operational situation:

Important points in present naval strategy:

a. Cruiser warfare in foreign waters.

b. Submarine warfare.

c. Protection of all transport and convoy traffic to Norway and in the North Sea and Western Area.

Re a: Cruiser warfare is still successful, though restricted to a certain extent by necessary overhauling and replenishment of supplies. At present five auxiliary cruisers are still operating. Ship “10” is on return passage in the North Atlantic.

Ship “41”, operating in the Atlantic, has reported sinking 56, 000 tons since the middle of December 1940. Apart from this, one other auxiliary cruiser is in the South Atlantic, two are in the western Indian Ocean, and one is in the eastern Indian Ocean.

The numerous supply ships engaged in replenishing the supplies of auxiliary cruisers and submarines in the Indian and South Atlantic Oceans have hitherto been remarkably successful. Only one prize tanker was lost. At the moment three prize ships are en route to Germany.

Re b: The northern submarine operational area is being shifted from the region just outside the North Channel to an area farther west, southwest of Iceland, on account of enemy patrols and the short, bright nights.

The number of submarines is gradually increasing. At present there are only thirty operational boats. Taking losses into account, the probable number of operational boats will be as follows: On 1 May, 37; on 1 June, 39; on 1 July, 43; and on 1 August, 52.

Re c: In spite of increased enemy efforts to stop or disrupt transport traffic by air attacks, transports to Oslo have continued without interruption. Losses on the west coast of Norway and in the North Sea and the Channel have been satisfactorily small up to now. This shows the effectiveness of the anti-aircraft guns onboard patrol vessels and mine sweepers!!

The next operation with battleships Bismarck and Prinz Eugen is scheduled for the end of April, when the ships are to leave home waters for the Atlantic.

The questions of anti-aircraft defences for the base at Brest, bomb and torpedo hits on the Gneisenau, and bases on the west coast of France are discussed.

The Commander-in-Chief, Navy points out that the danger to ships under repair in Kiel and Wilhelmshaven is as great at present as it is in Brest, apart from the fact that a single plane can carry a greater bomb load to Brest. In spite of this, until further notice large ships will put into Brest only in exceptional circumstances. The occupation of Ferrol, which the Führer is determined to carry out in the autumn, is of great importance. If possible the Führer would like to see the Todt Organization quickly construct a large dry dock in Trondheim. This is being investigated.

2. Intensification of the use of aerial mines:

A new firing device for aerial mines, combining magnetic and acoustic firing, will be ready in May. It is necessary to employ this new firing method at once and as extensively as possible before the enemy discovers the new principle and develops appropriate methods for sweeping the mines. In view of previous firing devices, a conjecture concerning the combination of the new firing device is comparatively easy, even for the enemy. In connection with the mining of the Suez Canal, a new combination of this sort was supposedly already suspected.

The mining of the Suez Canal, together with the threat to the British lines of communication through the Straits of Sicily by the X Air Corps, is a classic example of a practical mining operation which has achieved the desired strategic effect-by being executed at precisely the right moment. Perseverance in laying the mines and patience in giving them time to take effect are necessary conditions for success.

Continual use of aerial mines at the entrance of harbours is the most effective way of supplementing operations by submarines, surface forces, and aircraft against British supply lines.

Considering that our nines present a grave threat to the enemy, while his countermeasures have reached a high degree of efficiency as the result of one and a half years of wartime experience, it is evident that the outcome of the race between offensive mine warfare and anti-mine defence will be of decisive importance. Offensive mine warfare has the advantage at this time, in view of the new firing device with which our mines will be equipped in the near future. However, it is certain that this advantage will prevail for a limited time only. It is therefore imperative that it be exploited at once to the fullest possible extent. Therefore both the Air Force and the Navy must lay aerial mines in large numbers immediately.

The Führer will see to it that the Air Force acts accordingly.

3. The question of sending German submarines to the Mediterranean:

The present situation in the Mediterranean seems to indicate that operations by German submarines against British transport traffic in the eastern Mediterranean would be particularly desirable and promising. In addition to sinking ships, they would have a strategic effect on Army operations ashore! A detailed examination of the question of sending submarines to the Mediterranean, however, has shown that the disadvantages of doing this probably outweigh possible advantages. The suggestion is therefore to be disregarded.

Reasons:

The main objective of submarine warfare remains the attack on imports to the British Isles. The concentration of supply ships into convoys demands a similar concentration of the attacking forces, especially as sufficient reconnaissance is lacking owing to the fact that air reconnaissance cannot operate as far out as the submarine operational area. At present only thirty operational boats are available, including those being over-hauled. About half of this number are at sea, counting submarines either outward or homeward bound; therefore only one third, or ten, are in the operational area. This small number is sufficient for locating and attacking an occasional convoy in the two main operational areas west of Britain and west of Africa. Any division of forces necessarily reduces the chances for intercepting and destroying convoys.

For operations in the Mediterranean only small boats manned by experienced crews can be considered, in view of the conditions under which they would have to operate. The approach route is very long, and the first boat would not be available in the Aegean or the eastern Mediterranean before 7 May at the earliest; additional boats not until the middle of May.

The effect of single submarines would be very small. At present overhaul and repair is possible only in Italy, which means that boats would have to return to an Italian port after every ten days or two weeks of operations, involving a long voyage to and from the operational area. Really promising operations would therefore be possible only with at least ten boats. This would mean, however, that submarine warfare against the main target, British imports, would be weakened decidedly.

The establishment of an Italian base for our submarines, or a suitable base in Yugoslavia or Greece would require at least four weeks of preparation for installation of necessary workshops, provision of technicians and base personnel, supplies, etc. This would necessarily weaken our submarine bases in Germany and in the Atlantic.

The clear water and the necessity of remaining submerged for pro-longed periods make the situation in the Mediterranean unfavourable for submarine warfare. For this reason alone single boats would not accomplish much.

In summary, the Naval Staff considers that the prospects of success for single boats do not compensate for the disadvantages ensuing from removing them from the main theatre of operations in the Atlantic. It is therefore proposed, as already reported, to withdraw Italian submarines from the Atlantic and to concentrate a strong force of Italian submarines in the eastern Mediterranean.

The present is a good time for the withdrawal, since the Italians must realize that their submarines are badly needed in the eastern Mediterranean.

The Führer is in complete agreement with the decision not to send German submarines into the Mediterranean, likewise with the withdrawal of Italian submarines from the Atlantic.

4. Restrictions on naval warfare as the result of the Pan-American Safety Zone:

In the presence of the German Foreign Minister the Führer decides as follows: In view of America’s present undecided attitude resulting from events in the Balkans, the zone as far as 20° N (that part which is off the U.S. coast) will for the present be recognized, but further south only a 300 mile zone, No note is to be sent to the U.S.A., etc.

5. Sanction for warfare against merchant ships of the U.S.A. according to prize regulations:

For the same reason as stated under “4”, the following procedure is to be used:

For from ten days to two weeks there is to be no change; however, the Bismarck and the Prinz Eugen can receive instructions for action, which can be put into force by means of a code word, as soon as the Führer has decided accordingly.

The Foreign Minister states that he agreed to attacks on neutral hips proceeding alone in the new closed area only providing they are doing escort duty for merchant ships. (According to the definite instructions received from the Armed Forces High Command, unrestricted offensive action was sanctioned against all naval and merchant vessels in the blockade area.)

6. Relations with Japan:

What were the results of Matsuoka’s visit? Was operation ‘Barbarossa’ mentioned during the conference? What views are held with regard to the Russo-Japanese pact?

The Führer answers that Matsuoka was informed that Russia will not be attacked as long as she maintains a friendly attitude in accordance with the treaty; if this is not the case, he reserves the right to take suitable action. The Russo-Japanese pact was concluded with Germany’s acquiescence. The above stand taken by the Führer has had a salutary effect on the attitude of Russia, who will now conduct herself with great correctness and who expects no attack for the present.

The Führer values the Russo-Japanese pact because Japan is now restrained from taking action against Vladivostok and should be induced to attack Singapore instead. Matsuoka and Oshima have assured him that all preparations will be completed by May.

The Commander-in-Chief. Navy draws attention to the extremely vague and non-committal statements of Nomura; he intends to continue to try to influence him.

7. Relations with Russia:

What is the Führer’s opinion of the present change in Russia’s attitude in an obviously pro-German direction?

The Führer replies in the same vein as under Paragraph 6.

The Commander-in-Chief, Navy points out the need for taking effective steps to mine the White Sea Canal so that submarines and destroyers cannot escape into the Arctic Ocean, and the urgent necessity for heavy air bombardment of the locks in the canal, as it is of little use to mine the Neva.

The Führer agrees.

8. Conferences between the Army General Staff and the Finnish General Staff have already begun. When can the naval conferences be expected to begin?

The Führer replies that the conferences so far have been of a very general nature. The time for naval conferences has not yet arrived. Nevertheless the Führer fully realizes the importance of this matter.

9. Relations with France:

Does the Führer still consider operation ‘Attila’ necessary?

The Führer replies that it must be held in readiness for the present, even though he is inclined to believe that Darlan’s attitude is trustworthy.

10. Italo-German co-operation in the Aegean Sea:

The following arrangements have been agreed upon:

Territorial limits. The east coast of Greece, including the Gulf of Athens, comes under the command of the Admiral, Southeast; also the islands off the coast and the islands in the Aegean Sea, as far as they are occupied by German troops. The Peloponnesus and the west coast of Greece come under the command of Italy.

Enlistment of Italian naval forces for duty along the German coastal sector for the defence of harbours and inshore waters and as escorts for coastal traffic and island transports. Request has been made for two torpedo boat or destroyer flotillas of four ships each, three mine-sweeping and three patrol flotillas of six vessels each, two subchaser flotillas, two or three PT boat flotillas of eight boats each, six mine layers, and six submarines, as well as several small transports, tankers, and other supply ships.

The Italian Naval Staff has agreed to provide these vessels, but has pointed out that all available submarines are at present engaged in operations against British transports in the eastern Mediterranean. Apart from the forces applied for, the Italian Naval Staff plans to put Italian forces stationed permanently or temporarily in the Dodecanese Islands at the disposal of the Admiral, Southeast, should he require them.

Liaison between Italian naval forces and the Admiral, Southeast. An Italian Chief of Staff, who will also be the commander of the above Italian naval forces, will be attached to the Admiral, Southeast. The Admiral, Southeast is permitted to transfer sections of these forces to commanders subordinate to him. The Dodecanese naval forces temporarily placed at the disposal of the Admiral, Southeast will be operationally and tactically under his command during this time.

Captain Count Peccori-Giraldi has been selected as Chief of Staff.

(Signed) Raeder.

In Greece the Allied situation deteriorated and on 21 April the Greek Government informed Britain of their inability to resist further and asked the British forces to withdraw. Evacuation began on 22April, and by 26 April the Germans had captured the Isthmus and town of Korinth, entering Athens on the following day. British forces rallied in Crete, and the German began preparing a parachute operation against the island – operation ‘Merkur’. Goering was placed in command of the operation, and the naval share was limited to transport operations from Greece as soon as Crete had been taken.

The attack on Crete began on the morning of 20 May. The attack was in the beginning entirely by air, and the air defences of the island which had been previously reduced to 7 serviceable aircraft were overwhelmed. Ships of the Royal Navy which were disposed for the defence of the island suffered heavily from German air attacks, but managed to destroy the few German transports which attempted to land troops on the island. Air attacks intensified and prevented ships from operating in the vicinity of Crete by day, but night actions were continued regardless of the opposition. British troops, when the action began, had only recently been evacuated from Greece. They were ill-equipped and had little more than rifles and a few light automatics with which to defend the island. Naval vessels had brought in additional supplies, but by 27 May the situation was hopeless, and evacuation began. It was completed by 1 June.

Further exploitation of the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean was envisaged in the following directive from Hitler:

Führer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht

Führer Headquarters 25.5.1941

Top Secret

Führer Directive No. 30 – Middle East

1. The Arabian Freedom Movement is our natural ally in the Middle East against England. In this connection the rebellion in Iraq assumes a special importance. Its influence extends beyond the boundaries-of Iraq and strengthens anti-British forces in the Middle East, it disturbs British communications and ties down British troops and shipping at the expense of other theatres of war.

I have decided therefore, to encourage developments in the Middle East by supporting Iraq.

Whether – and if so by what means – it would be possible afterwards to launch an offensive against the Suez Canal and eventually oust the British finally from their position between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf cannot be decided until operation ‘Barbarossa’ is complete

2. My decisions for the support of Iraq can be summarized as follows:

The sending of a Military Mission

Assistance from the Luftwaffe

The supply of arms

The Military Mission will be commanded by General der Flieger Felmy. (Its code name will be Special Staff F). Its tasks are:

a. to advise and support the armed forces of Iraq.

b. to establish as far as possible military liaison with anti-British forces, including those outside Iraq.

c. to gain experience and information from this area for the German Wehrmacht.

The composition of the mission in view of these tasks will be in the hands of the Chief of the Armed Forces Supreme Command.

The Chain of Command is as follows:

a. The Head of the Military Mission is in command of all members of the Wehrmacht sent to Iraq as well as the Syria Liaison Detachment.

b. The Head of the Military Mission is subordinate to the Chief of the Armed Forces Supreme Command with the proviso that orders and directives for air units shall be issued exclusively by the C. in C. of the Luftwaffe.

c. The Head of the Military Mission will have dealings with military offices only in Iraq. Matters concerning the Mission which require negotiations with the Iraq Government will be handled by the Foreign Office representative in Iraq.

Before any military orders are given which may have repercussions on foreign policy the Head of the Military Mission must obtain the consent of the Foreign Office representative in Iraq.

d. For the present the members of the Military Mission are to be regarded as Volunteers (after the style of the Condor Legion). They will wear tropical uniform with Iraq badges. German aircraft also will show Iraq markings.

4. Luftwaffe

The numerical force of the Luftwaffe which should be employed is to be limited. Its function is not merely that of an arm of the Wehrmacht, but in addition it is that of an agent for prompting greater self-confidence and will to resist among the Iraq Armed Forces and civilians.

The nature and extent of German intervention is to be decided by the C. in C. of the Luftwaffe.

5. Supply of Arms

The necessary orders (deliveries from Syria by virtue of the agreement made with the French for this purpose; and from Germany) will be given by the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

6. The Direction of Propaganda in the Middle East is the responsibility of the Foreign Office, working in this instance with the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

The Basis of the Propaganda is:

“An Axis victory will bring to the nations of the Middle East freedom from the British yoke and the right of self-determination. All lovers of freedom will therefore join in the fight against England.”

Anti-French propaganda in Syria must be suspended for the time being.

7. Where members of the Italian Armed Forces are employed in Iraq, it will be necessary to co-operate with them in accordance with this directive. Efforts are being made to bring them within the sphere of authority of the Head of the German Military Mission.

(Signed) Adolf Hitler.