Notes

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BMA	Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg, Germany
MDS MAGIC	Diplomatic Summaries, National Archives, College Park, Md.
NA	National Archives, College Park, Md.
NANE	National Archives, Northeast Region, Waltham, Mass.
NANY	National Archives, Northeast Region, New York
NHC	Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center
PNS	Portsmouth Naval Shipyard Museum and Archives, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Kittery, Maine
UBA	U-Boot Archiv, Cuxhaven-Altenbruch, Germany
USSBS	United States Strategic Bombing Survey

PREFACE

    1.   Alan S. Milward, War, Economy, and Society, 1939–1945 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 23.

    2.   Ibid., 26.

    3.   Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London: Ashfield Press, 1976), 297.

    4.   Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich (New York: Macmillan, 1970), 215.

    5.   Milward, War, Economy, and Society, 57.

    6.   Ibid.

    7.   Ibid., 58.

    8.   Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1995), 201.

    9.   Milward, War, Economy, and Society, 35.

  10.   Ibid., 31.

  11.   Ibid., 30.

  12.   Ronald Spector, Eagle against the Sun: The American War with Japan (New York: Random House, 1985), 42.

  13.   Saburo Ienaga, Taiheiyo Senso [The Pacific War] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1968), 135.

  14.   Milward, War, Economy, and Society, 139.

  15.   Ibid., 58.

  16.   Ibid.

CHAPTER 1. GENESIS

    1.   John W. M. Chapman, ed. The Price of Admiralty: The War Diary of the German Naval Attaché in Japan, 1939–1943 (Ripe, East Sussex: Saltire Press, 1989), 1:205.

    2.   “Secret Supplementary Protocol, Item V,” in ibid., 3:505.

    3.   “Three Powers Pact,” in ibid., 504.

    4.   Amendment, German Embassy no. G. 1000, “Strictly Confidential,” 27 September 1940, in ibid., 505.

    5.   Jyo-ni no. 134, “Secret Note No. 2,” 27 September 1940, in ibid., 506. Japan was awarded mandate status over Germany’s Pacific possessions as a result of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles.

    6.   “Secret Supplementary Protocol,” 27 September 1940, in ibid., 507.

    7.   Report of interrogation, former Reich war minister Marshal von Blomberg, 13 September 1945, “Five Years of Nazi Germany, 1933–38,” 90, box 721A, RG 165, NA. German irritation at the perceived lack of Japanese reciprocity was not new. German naval officials had been trying to facilitate technical agreements with the Japanese as far back as 1924, and subsequent missions by Adms. Wilhelm Canaris (1924), Karl Witzeil (1937), and Erich Raeder (1941) returned to Berlin with the same fundamental conclusion that cooperation with the Japanese was basically a one-way street.

    8.   “Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine, 1. Skl. Ic No. 5359/41 Geh. 8,” 11 February 1941, “Secret,” in Chapman, ed. Price of Admiralty, 3:534–35.

    9.   Johanna Menzel Meskill, Hitler and Japan: The Hollow Alliance (New York: Atherton Press, 1966), 144–45. The Japanese list of demands has never been located, but it reportedly included substantial requests for artillery, radar, and submarine and aircraft technology.

  10.   John W. Masland, “Japanese-German Naval Collaboration in World War II,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 75 (February 1949): 180.

  11.   “Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Wi-Ru-Amt/Wi VII No. 193/41 Gkdos, Secret Memorandum from General Keitel,” 3 April 1941, in Chapman, ed., Price of Admiralty, 3:541.

  12.   Report of interrogation, von Blomberg.

  13.   Chapman, ed., Price of Admiralty, n. 16, 3:598; 4:1091.

  14.   Ibid., 3:550.

  15.   Ibid., 4:1091.

  16.   Ibid., 3:534.

  17.   Ibid., 4:1090–91.

  18.   Ibid., 948.

  19.   Memorandum, Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces, subject “Japan,” 3 April 1941, in ibid., 3:541–42.

  20.   SRS 549, 20 March 1942, 2, MDS; SRS 682, 13 August 1942, 11–12, MDS. Oshima noted that a German manufacturer who was contracted by the Mitsui Corporation to build “iron manufacturing machinery” had been forced to cease production because of the increase in German munitions demands.

  21.   “Text of German-Japanese Agreement and Supplementary Agreement Regarding Technical Cooperation,” SRS 801, 9 December 1942, attachment E1, MDS.

  22.   SRS 705, 5 September 1942, MDS.

  23.   Meskill, Hitler and Japan, 151–52. The cartridge steel process was under a patent held by the Krupp Armament Company.

  24.   SRS 929, 8 April 1943, MDS.

  25.   SRS 847, 24 January 1943, MDS; SRS 887, 25 February 1943, MDS.

  26.   Memorandum, Col. Russell H. Sweet to Division of Naval Intelligence, attention Capt. John L. Riheldaffer, subject “Captured Documents and Interrogation of Personnel on German Submarine U-234,” 26 May 1945, file “Miscellaneous,” box 3, RG 38, NA.

  27.   Intercepted enemy communiqué, PPB79–80, 16 August 1944, file “U-234,” UBA.

  28.   “Convention between the Grossdeutschen Reich and the Empire of Japan about War-Important Inventions,” (date missing) 1944, frames 4708436–42, roll 74, microcopy T-179, NA.

  29.   Memorandum to Reichsführer SS, “Japanischer Plan, Deutsche Fachkraefte nach Japan einzunfuehren,” 24 August 1944, in “Japan-China, May 1944–December 1944,” frames 0643984–85, roll 92, microcopy T-82, NA.

  30.   Draft of proposal, “Entwurf eines Abkommens zwischen dem Grossdeutschen Reich und dem Kaiserreich Japan uber Kriegswichtige Erfindungen,” 16 November 1944, in “Japan-China May 1944–December 1944,” frames 4708436–42, roll 74, microcopy T-179, NA; Masland, “Japanese-German Naval Cooperation,” 185.

  31.   Memorandum, Dr. Karl Ritter, “Ritter Japan: Aufzeichnung St S Steengracht,” 28 December 1944, in “Japan-China, May 1944–December 1944,” frame 363352, roll 737, microcopy T-120, NA.

  32.   Memorandum to Reichsführer SS from (signature illegible), 24 August 1944, frames 0643984–85, roll 92, microcopy T-82, NA.

  33.   Intercepted memorandum, PPB16, 25 November 1944, file “U-234,” UBA.

  34.   “Minutes of the Conference of the Commander in Chief, Navy, with the Führer,” 3 December 1944, item II.1, in Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1939–1945 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1990), 419.

  35.   Intercepted memorandum, PPB17, 15 January 1945, UBA.

  36.   Intercepted memorandum, PPB48, 23 January 1945, UBA.

  37.   Intercepted memorandum, PPB14, 15 December 1944, UBA; intercepted memorandum, PPB15, 18 December 1944, UBA.

  38.   “Captured German Documents,” USSBS, 145, file la (11), roll 2, microcopy M-1655, RG 243, NA.

  39.   Interview, Dr. Peter Bringewald (Dallas, Texas) with author, 12 June 1998.

  40.   “Preliminary Report on Interrogation of General Ulrich Kessler,” 30 May 1945, file “Kessler, Ulrich,” box 495, RG 165, NA. Japan’s greatest fear was that in retaliation for Japanese connivance with Germany, Russia would grant the United States air bases in Russia from which the Americans could strike at the home islands.

  41.   SRS 929, 8 April 1943, MDS.

  42.   Allison W. Saville, “German Submarines in the Far East,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 87 (August 1961): 85.

  43.   Geoffrey Brooks, “The Voyage of the German Submarine U-234 during the Period March–May 1945 and Its Historical Implications,” unpublished article included in letter from Wolfgang Hirschfeld (Plön, Germany) to author, 16 May 1996.

  44.   “Statement by Dr. Wilhelm Classen,” 18 March 1946, 1–2, box 711, RG 165, NA.

  45.   SRS 1632, 9 April 1945, 5, MDS.

  46.   SRS 1664, 11 May 1945, 10, MDS.

  47.   Ronald Lewin, The American Magic: Codes, Ciphers, and the Defeat of Japan (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1982), 206. Lewin cites the Chief Customs Bureau of the Soviet Union as his source for the German tonnage figures.

  48.   Chapman, ed., Price of Admiralty, 3:566 n. 6. Japan, which had signed a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union, toyed with the idea of sending crated aircraft parts from Berlin through Russia as part of the diplomatic bag and disguised as medical supplies. However, the large crates proved too conspicuous, and Moscow made it “abundantly clear” that it would not tolerate the export of arms through its territory, pointing out that such practices violated Soviet neutrality.

  49.   “Draft of a Military Agreement among Japan, Germany, and Italy,” 11 December 1941, in ibid., 4:923.

  50.   F. H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, abridged ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 138–39.

  51.   Ibid., 306.

  52.   Lewin, American Magic, 210.

  53.   “For the Chief of Special Staff of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht,” 5 January 1945, box 295, RG 226, NA.

  54.   Carl Boyd, Hitler’s Japanese Confidant: General Oshima Hiroshi and Magic Intelligence, 1941–1945 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993), 212 n. 30.

  55.   SRS 929, 8 April 1943, 12, MDS.

  56.   SRS 967, 16 May 1943, 14, MDS.

  57.   SRS 848, 25 January 1943, MDS.

  58.   Chapman, ed., Price of Admiralty, 3:499.

  59.   Ibid., 4:1054–55 n. 29.

  60.   Saville, “German Submarines,” 84.

  61.   Ibid.

  62.   “For the Chief of the Special Staff of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht,” 13 July 1945, box 295, RG 226, NA.

  63.   Ibid.

  64.   Ibid.

  65.   SRS 929, 8 April 1943, MDS.

  66.   Meskill, Hitler and Japan, 141.

  67.   “For the Chief of the Special Staff,” 4.

  68.   Ibid., 2. The container idea was canceled because of the decrease of about half in total cruising range of the submarine, and Italy’s defeat meant that Italian submarines would not be available.

  69.   Saville, “German Submarines,” 84.

  70.   Ibid., 3.

  71.   “Report on the Conversion to Fuel and Ore Freight Carriers of Certain Types of German and Italian Submarines and Their Possible Use as Blockade Runners,” 21 June 1942, box 1, RG 38, NA. German attempts to utilize the type XB were not lost on the Allies; in a 1942 OP-Z-16 report, the ONI reported that “a series of U-boats . . . originally built as minelayers [are] rumored to have been converted to fuel carriers.”

  72.   SRS 967, 16 May 1943, MDS.

  73.   “For the Chief of the Special Staff,” 3.

  74.   “Marineetappe Japan nach stehende Herren als Hilskrafte verpflichet worden,” 10 February 1942, Admiral Canaris, OKW/Ausland IV, Bd. VI, p. 2362, RM 13/1, III M 190/1, BMA. In addition to these personnel moves, the OKM also assigned Hans-Dietrich Leonard to assist at the Japanese port of Yokohama.

  75.   “Kriegstagbuch der Etappenorganisation der Kriegsmarine (Marinesonderdienst),” 10 August 1942, OKW/Ausland IV, Bd. VI, p. 2725, RM 13/1, III M 190/1, BMA.

  76.   Japanese intelligence report, subject “Trade between Japan and Germany,” 27 June 1945, box 295, RG 226, NA.

  77.   Saville, “German Submarines,” 91.

  78.   SRS 1650, 27 April 1945, 2, MDS.

  79.   Ibid., 3, 4.

CHAPTER 2. THE LAST BOAT

    1.   V. E. Tarrant, U-Boat Offensive, 1914–1945 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1989), 10, 7. R. H. Gibson and M. Pendergast state that an average of four U-boats at sea “had forced the most powerful battlefleet in history to abandon its base and retreat to a second . . . and third [base], each being progressively more remote from . . . the North Sea” (quoted by Tarrant, 11).

    2.   Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis, 1911–1918 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1923), 2:1238.

    3.   Anthony Preston, Submarines (New York: W. H. Smith, 1982), 75. Although the Germans pioneered the use of the submarine as a minelayer, they were not the first to build an operational system; the Russian Krab, built in 1908, holds the distinction of being the first minelayer.

    4.   Figures from Tarrant, U-Boat Offensive, 161, 68. In addition to the UC and UE boats, nine of the new Type UCIII submarines were completed after the signing of the Armistice, with fifty-four more scrapped in the shipyards.

    5.   Ibid., 77. The IvS was headed by the wartime chief designer of the Germania Werft in Kiel, Hans Techel, and employed a German naval representative in the person of Cdr. Ulrich Blum. Liaison between IvS and Germany was conducted through a dummy company in Berlin, the Mentor Bilantz, which included a technical department staffed by personnel from the Admiralty Construction Office.

    6.   Preston, Submarines, 93.

    7.   Karl Dönitz, Zehn Jahre und zwanzig Tage [Ten Years and Twenty Days] (Bonn: Athenäum–Verlag Junker and Dünnhaupt, 1958), 10. Germany was allowed to possess 45 percent of the British warship tonnage total, but an exception was allowed for the construction of submarines, the allotment of which could reach up to 100 percent.

    8.   Ibid., 43, 42. Hitler had assured his naval commanders that no war with England would break out in the foreseeable future and that “they had no cause to worry.”

    9.   Ibid., 26.

  10.   Ibid., 42. In a 28 August 1939 memorandum to Commander-in-Chief Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, Dönitz wrote that in order to “operate successfully, we must have at least one hundred [U-boats] always operational [and] we should require a grand total of at least three hundred.”

  11.   Eberhard Rössler, The U-Boat: The Evolution and Technical History of German Submarines, trans. Harold Erenberg (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1981), 110.

  12.   Dönitz, Zehn Jahre, 64.

  13.   Ibid.

  14.   Ibid., 67.

  15.   Rössler cited in ibid., 67.

  16.   Rössler, U-Boat, 108–9.

  17.   Ibid., 110. The SMA was a larger anchor mine than its predecessors that also featured remote magnetic detonation. It measured 215 centimeters (84.7 inches) long by 133 centimeters (52.4 inches) in diameter and weighed 1,600 kilograms (3,528 pounds) but featured a reduced explosive charge of 350 kilograms (772 pounds).

  18.   Ibid., 111–12; Erich Gröner, Die deutschen Kriegsschiffe, 1815–1945 [German Warships, 1815–1945] (Bonn: Bernard and Graefe Verlag, 1983), 77.

  19.   Gröner, Deutschen Kriegsschiffe, 77.

  20.   “Former German Submarine Type XB: Designs, Models, and Plans,” July 1946, 2, report 2G-10B, S1-1 to S1-6, “Surrendered German Submarine Report, Type XB, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, 1946,” PNS.

  21.   Gröner, Deutschen Kriegsschiffe, 77. From 1943 onward, the 10.5-centimeter cannon was removed and the antiaircraft armament was reinforced by the addition of a 3.7-centimeter twenty-five-hundred-round gun and twin 2-centimeter eight-thousand-round guns.

  22.   “Hull Structure,” March 1946, report 2G-10B-S8, “Surrendered German Submarine Report,” 2.

  23.   Ibid., 4.

  24.   “Weight, Stability, and Integrity,” March 1946, report 2G-10B-S29, “Surrendered German Submarine Report.”

  25.   J. P. Mallmann Showell, U-Boats under the Swastika (New York: Arco, 1973), 107.

  26.   Gröner, Deutschen Kriegsschiffe, 77. U-219 (Burghagen) was taken over by the Imperial Japanese Navy in May 1945 and became I-505. She was scrapped by the Allies in 1948.

  27.   Rössler, U-Boat, 249; “Report of the Interrogation of the Crew of the U-234 Which Surrendered to the USS Sutton on 14 May, 1945,” 27 June 1945, 1, NHC.

  28.   Wolfgang Hirschfeld, Hirschfeld: The Story of a U-Boat NCO, 1940–1946, as told to Geoffrey Brooks (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1996), 191. To qualify for a mate’s certificate, a youth had to complete fifty months at sea, at least twenty of which had to be served aboard sailing vessels.

  29.   Ibid.

  30.   Report of interrogation, Johann Fehler, 31 May 1945, 1, box 466, RG 165, NA.

  31.   Hirschfeld, Hirschfeld, 191.

  32.   Clay Blair, Hitler’s U-Boat War: The Hunters, 1939–1942 (New York: Random House, 1996), 406.

  33.   Edward P. Von der Porten, The German Navy in World War II (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1969), 127. The 202 passengers included 140 Americans, 150 missionaries of various nationalities, and members of the British-American Ambulance Corps.

  34.   I. C. B. Dear and M. R. D. Foot, eds., The Oxford Companion to World War II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 93. Although British authorities were aware of the loss of the documents, neither Brooke-Popham, the British public, nor Britain’s allies were told of the loss. Public knowledge was made available only upon the declassification of the MAGIC decrypts in 1980.

  35.   Cajus Bekker, Verdammte See [Hitler’s Naval War] (Hamburg: Gerhard Stalling Verlag, 1971), 213.

  36.   Hirschfeld, Hirschfeld, 192.

  37.   Von der Porten, German Navy, 134.

  38.   Johann Fehler and A. V. Seilwood, Dynamite for Hire: The Story of Hein Fehler (London: Werner Laurie, 1956), 124.

  39.   Report of interrogation, Fehler, 31 May 1945.

  40.   Fehler and Sellwood, Dynamite, 124–25.

  41.   Ibid.

  42.   Report of interrogation, Fehler, 31 May 1945. Fehler told his ONI interrogators that his mission in Kiel had been to “supervise” the building of U-234. However, Fehler had no experience in naval construction or engineering, and it is more likely that, as a first-time skipper, he had been sent to Kiel to observe the boat’s construction as a learning tool.

  43.   Letter, Jürgen Oesten (Hamburg) to author, 30 August 1998.

  44.   Dönitz, Zehn Jahre, 489.

  45.   Fehler and Sellwood, Dynamite, 128.

  46.   Hirschfeld, Hirschfeld, 192.

  47.   Interview no. 59, Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz, 28 June 1945, 12, box 723, RG 243, NA.

  48.   “Report of Interrogation of Crew,” 3.

  49.   Hirschfeld, Hirschfeld, 193.

  50.   Ibid., 194.

  51.   Report of interrogation, Fehler, 31 May 1945, 1.

  52.   Letter, Johann Fehler (Hamburg) to Harry Cooper (Fox Lake, III.), 20 January 1985.

  53.   “Report of Interrogation of Crew,” 4; Alexander W. Moffat, A Navy Maverick Comes of Age (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1978), 136.

  54.   Hirschfeld, Hirschfeld, 197. Hirschfeld stated that the vacuum was so great that Boatswain Peter Schölch’s dental fillings fell out.

  55.   Fritz Von Sandrart, “The Last Trip to Japan of a German U-Boat,” Luftwaffen Review (January/February 1971): 442–45.

  56.   Ronald Lewin, The American Magic: Codes, Ciphers, and the Defeat of Japan (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1982), 211. In a telling statistic, the total material transported by U-boats between Japan and Germany did not amount to more than what could have been delivered in a single load by a surface merchant vessel.

  57.   SRS 990, 8 June 1943, 4, MDS.

  58.   Fehler and Sellwood, Dynamite, 146.

  59.   Message, Fifteenth U-Flotilla to Comsubs Op, Com Adm U/B’s, 16 April 1945, box 113, RG 38, NA.

  60.   “Report of Interrogation of Crew,” 4.

  61.   Memorandum, Jack H. Alberti, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, to Capt. John L. Riheldaffer, USN, subject “U-234,” 22 May 1945, box 13, RG 38, NA.

  62.   “Manifest of Cargo for Tokio [sic] on Board U-234,” inventory of individual cargo spaces, 26 June 1945, microfiche F-3160, NHC.

  63.   Ibid.

  64.   Hirschfeld, Hirschfeld, 199.

  65.   Hirschfeld’s dismissive description of U-235 as merely “a small training boat” is inaccurate. U-235, an operational submarine, was sunk in Kiel Harbor on 14 May 1943 in an Allied air raid. She was raised and recommissioned on 29 October 1943, only to be mistaken by the German torpedo boat T-17 for an Allied submarine and sunk on 14 April 1945 en route to Norway. Letter, Dr. Jürgen Rohwer (Stuttgart, Germany) to author, 22 February 1999.

  66.   Hirschfeld, Hirschfeld, 199.

  67.   Fehler and Sellwood, Dynamite, 148.

  68.   Von Sandrart, “Last Trip to Japan,” 442.

  69.   Fehler and Sellwood, Dynamite, 156.

  70.   Hirschfeld, Hirschfeld, 193.

  71.   “Report of Interrogation of Crew,” 5.

  72.   Hirschfeld, Hirschfeld, 204.

  73.   Message, Fehler to Fifth Flotilla, 25 March 1945, box 113, RG 38, NA.

  74.   Message, Fehler to Fifth Flotilla, 26 March 1945, box 113, RG 38, NA.

  75.   Message, Fifteenth U-Flotilla to Comsubs Op, 6 April 1945, box 113, RG 38, NA.

  76.   Message, Fehler to Comsubs Op, ComAdm U/B’s, Sea Defense Commandant, Oslo Fjord, Port Captain, Kristiansand, 5 April 1945, box 113, RG 38, NA.

  77.   Message, Comsubs Op to Fehler, 12 April 1945, box 113, RG 38, NA; message, Berlin to Fehler, 13 April 1945, box 113, RG 38, NA.

  78.   Message, Fifth Flotilla to Comsubs Op, Com Adm U/B’s, 16 April 1945, box 113, RG 38, NA.

  79.   Telephone interview, Dr. Peter Bringewald (Dallas, Texas) with author, 20 June 1998.

  80.   Message, Tokyo to Berlin, 19 April 1945, box 113, RG 38, NA.

  81.   Message, chief inspector in Germany #165 to chief, Military Preparations, 15 April 1945, box 113, RG 38, NA.

  82.   Von Sandrart, “Last Trip to Japan,” 442.

  83.   Ibid.

  84.   Hirschfeld, Hirschfeld, 204.

  85.   Von Sandrart, “Last Trip to Japan,” 443.

  86.   Ibid.

  87.   Hirschfeld, Hirschfeld, 205–6.

  88.   Ibid., 205.

  89.   Von Sandrart, “Last Trip to Japan,” 444.

  90.   Hirschfeld, Hirschfeld, 206.

  91.   Letter, Wolfgang Hirschfeld (Plön, Germany) to Dr. Dean Allard (Washington, D.C.), 28 February 1992.

  92.   Letter, Jürgen Oesten (Hamburg) to author, 30 August 1998.

  93.   Letter, Wolfgang Hirschfeld (Plön, Germany) to author, 4 February 1996.

  94.   “Following Order Issued by the Grand Admiral,” 7 May 1945, box 113, RG 38, NA.

  95.   Ibid.

  96.   Hirschfeld, Hirschfeld, 208.

CHAPTER 3. THE PROBLEM OF SURRENDER

    1.   Letter, Heinrich Fehler (Hamburg) to Harry Cooper (Fox Lake, Ill.), 21 February 1988.

    2.   “Report of the Interrogation of the Crew, of the U-234 Which Surrendered to the USS Sutton on 14 May, 1945,” 27 June 1945, 5, NHC.

    3.   Wolfgang Hirschfeld, Hirschfeld: The Story of a U-Boat NCO, 1940–1946, as told to Geoffrey Brooks (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1996), 210.

    4.   Independent room conversation, Fehler, 29 May 1945, 1230 hours, 3, box 466, RG 165, NA.

    5.   Independent room conversation, Kessler, 21–22 June 1945, 2330–0010 hours, 2.

    6.   Johann Fehler and A. V. Sellwood, Dynamite for Hire: The Story of Hein Fehler (London: Werner Laurie, 1956), 177.

    7.   Independent room conversation, Fehler, 27 May 1945, 3–4.

    8.   Ibid., 2, 3, 6.

    9.   Ibid., 6.

  10.   Letter, Fehler to Cooper, 21 February 1988; Fehler and Sellwood, Dynamite, 180. Kessler favored surrendering to the United States.

  11.   Report of interrogation, Richard Bulla, 24 May 1945, 2, box 456, RG 165, NA.

  12.   Nagamori Yoshio, “Memories of Two Japanese Officers Who Died the Hero’s Death in the Atlantic,” 4, file II, UBA.

  13.   Message, Vice Admiral Abe, Stockholm, Sweden, to navy minister and chief of staff, Tokyo, 28 May 1945, box 113, RG 38, NA.

  14.   Nemot was reportedly aboard U-501 and Arima reportedly aboard U-134. However, Dr. Jürgen Rohwer disputes these assertions.

  15.   Nagamori, “Memories,” 4.

  16.   Ibid., 2.

  17.   Ibid.

  18.   Message, Abe to navy minister, 28 May 1945.

  19.   Ibid.

  20.   Nagamori, “Memories,” 2.

  21.   Independent room conversation, Fehler, 29 May 1945, 2.

  22.   Hirschfeld, Hirschfeld, 208.

  23.   Letter, Fehler to Cooper, 21 February 1988.

  24.   Fehler and Sellwood, Dynamite, 174.

  25.   Von Sandrart, “Last Trip to Japan,” 444.

  26.   Interroom conversation, Fehler, 29 May 1945, 2.

  27.   Hirschfeld, Hirschfeld, 211. U-234’s doctor, Dr. Franz Walter, later confirmed that at the moment of their discovery, both Japanese passengers were still alive, though in a terminal condition. Dr. Walter pointed out that the amount of Luminal ingested would have killed a European more quickly, but the Japanese constitution was stronger.

  28.   Letter, Fehler to Cooper, 21 February 1988.

  29.   Memorandum, Cdr. B. F. Roeder, USN, to Captain Phelan, USN, “Suicide Note Taken from U-234,” 7 June 1945, box 3, RG 38, NA.

  30.   Ibid.

  31.   Fehler and Sellwood, Dynamite, 183.

  32.   Independent room conversation, Fehler, 29 May 1945, 1230 hours, 3.

  33.   Ibid., 2.

  34.   Nagamori, “Memories,” 1.

  35.   Ibid.

  36.   Fehler and Sellwood, Dynamite, 152.

  37.   SRS 1546, 13 January 1945, 1–4, MDS.

  38.   SRS 1557, 25 January 1945, 4–5, MDS.

  39.   SRS 1568, 4 February 1945, 4, MDS.

  40.   Message, chief inspector in Germany to chief of military preparedness, 26 February 1945, box 113, RG 38, NA.

  41.   Message, Comsubs Berlin to Tokyo, 8 March 1945, box 113, RG 38, NA.

  42.   SRS 1656, 3 May 1945, 1–2, MDS.

  43.   Memorandum, COMINCG and CNO to NAVOP 7, subject “Points of Surrender,” 27 April 1945, box 531, RG 181, NANE.

  44.   Letter, Fehler to Cooper, 21 February 1988.

  45.   Hirschfeld, Hirschfeld, 210.

  46.   Letter, Wolfgang Hirschfeld (Plön, Germany) to author, 4 February 1996.

  47.   Wolfgang Hirschfeld, Feindfahrten: Das Logbuch eines U-Bootfunkers [Enemy Voyage: The Logbook of a U-Boat Radioman] (Berlin: Neuer Raiser Verlag, 1991), 366.

  48.   Letter, Hirschfeld to author, 4 February 1996.

  49.   Hirschfeld, Hirschfeld, 212.

  50.   Ibid.

  51.   Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships (Washington, D.C.: Naval History Division, Department of the Navy, 1976), 6:689.

  52.   V. E. Tarrant, The U-Boat Offensive, 1914–1945 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1989), 138–40. Most of the U-boat action was at sea. However, several boats were sunk in closer proximity to the American coast: U-857 (Premauer) was sunk on 7 April just off Cape Cod, U-548 (Krempl) on 30 April off Cape Hatteras, and U-853 (Frömsdorf) on 6 May south of Long Island.

  53.   Confidential memorandum from Headquarters, First Naval District, Boston, to DIO, subject “Surrendered U-Boats,” 11 May 1945, box 56/C/R45, NHC.

  54.   Secret memorandum for the assistant commandant, operations, subject “U-Boat Situation,” 11 May 1945, box 56/C/R45, NHC.

  55.   Memorandum, T. W. Nazro to commander-in-chief, U.S. Fleet, subject “Capture of U-234, Events Leading To,” 9–17 May 1945, 1–2, box 56/C/R45, NHC.

  56.   Memorandum, commanding officer, USS Sutton, to commander-in-chief, U.S. Fleet, “Capture of U-234, Events Leading To,” 29 May 1945, 2, box 56/C/R45, NHC.

  57.   Memorandum, commanding officer, USS Sutton, to commander-in-chief, U.S. Fleet, 12 May 1945, box 56/C/R45, NHC.

  58.   Memorandum, First Naval District to assistant commandant, operations, subject “U-Boat Situation,” 12 May 1945, box 56/C/R45, NHC.

  59.   Secret war diary, Northern Group, May 1945, 11, box 56/C/R45, NHC.

  60.   Hirschfeld, Feindfahrten, 366.

  61.   Franklin M. Gates, “Officer of Prize Crew Narrates Events in Surrender of U-234 One Year Later,” Portsmouth (N.H.) Herald, May 1946, Scrapbook, vol. 28, 88–89, Portsmouth Public Library.

  62.   Deck log, USS Sutton, 14 May 1945, 1200–1600 hours, 283, box 56/C/R45, NHC.

  63.   Memorandum, “Capture of U-234,” 9–17 May 1945, 3.

  64.   Gates, “Officer of Prize Crew,” 88. See also memorandum, CINCLANT to COMSUBLANT, subject “Prize Crews,” 3 May 1945, box 531, RG 181, NANE. In anticipation of the surrender of U-boats in American waters, CINCLANT ordered the submarine commands at New London, Connecticut, and Portsmouth, New Hampshire, to train and equip at least one prize crew each and have the crew available on twelve hours’ notice.

  65.   Letter, Wolfgang Hirschfeld (Plön, Germany) to author, 13 May 1996; Hirschfeld, Feindfahrten, 367; Hirschfeld, Hirschfeld, 213. Hirschfeld later commented that his personal copy of the KTB was hidden in a closet but was gone when he was released from prison. Regarding the disposal of the microfilm, Schlicke was reported to have said, “And there goes the rocket that could fly the Atlantic.”

  66.   Letter, Fehler to Cooper, 20 January 1985.

  67.   “Report of Interrogation of Crew,” 1.

  68.   Gates, “Officer of Prize Crew,” 89.

  69.   Deck log, USS Sutton, 15 May 1945, 284.

  70.   Ibid., 14 May 1945, 284; Bulla quoted in Gates, “Officer of Prize Crew,” 88.

  71.   Memorandum, CINCLANT to USS Sutton, subject “Delivery of U-234,” 16 May 1945, box 531, RG 181, NANE. The Sutton, Muir, and Carter proceeded to New York, where they underwent upkeep while awaiting further orders.

  72.   Memorandum, First Naval District, Boston, Massachusetts, to watch officers, subject “U-Boat Surrenders in Northern Group Waters,” 3 May 1945, box 531, RG 181, NANE.

  73.   Letter, Capt. V. D. Herbster, USN, to Lt. Charles E. Winslow, commanding officer, USCG Argo, “Personal and Confidential,” 12 May 1945, box 531, RG 181, NANE.

  74.   Secret war diary, Northern Group, May 1945, “U-234,” 12, box 56/C/R45, NHC.

CHAPTER 4. PORTSMOUTH

    1.   Memorandum, Capt. V. D. Herbster, assistant commandant (operations), Eastern Sea Frontier, to commandant, First Naval District, subject “Surrender of German Submarines,” 5 May 1945, secret war diary, Northern Group, May 1945, box 56/C/R45, NHC.

    2.   “Operational Order 3-34: Press Task Unit,” 5 May 1945, secret war diary, Northern Group, May 1945.

    3.   Western Union cable, commander, Eastern Sea Frontier, to commander, Northern Group, 11 May 1945, box 531, RG 181, NANE.

    4.   Operational order PRO-2/0555, commandant, First Naval District, to commandant, Portsmouth Navy Yard, subject “Surrendered German Submarines, Cooperation with Working Press and Radio in Covering,” 11 May 1945, box 531, RG 181, NANE.

    5.   Confidential wire, commander, Northern Group, Eastern Sea Frontier, to Argo, subject “Delivery of Enemy Subs,” 11 May 1945, box 531, RG 181, NANE.

    6.   Portsmouth Periscope, 9 June 1945, 3.

    7.   Memorandum, commander, Northern Group, to Argo, subject “Surrender Stories,” 11 May 1945, box 531, RG 181, NANE.

    8.   Memorandum, commandant to commanding officer, naval air bases, subject “Photos of Enemy Subs,” 12 May 1945, box 531, RG 181, NANE.

    9.   Robert G. Kennedy, “Nazis Won’t Talk to Newsmen; Two More Subs Due,” Portsmouth (N.H) Herald, 16 May 1945, 1(A).

  10.   Memorandum, commander, Eastern Sea Frontier, to commander, Task Group 2.1, subject “Interviewing of Prisoners,” 13 May 1945, box 531, RG 181, NANE.

  11.   Memorandum, Sutton to COMINCH, CINCLANT, subject “Info on U-234,” 15 May 1945, box 531, RG 181, NANE.

  12.   Memorandum, COMINCH to CESF, subject “Disposition of 234 Prisoners,” 15 May 1945, box 531, RG 181, NANE.

  13.   Sidney M. Shalett, “Huge Nazi Sub Seized in Flight to Japan; Three Luftwaffe Chiefs, Two Dead Japs Aboard,” Boston Herald, 17 May 1945, 1–2(A).

  14.   T. W. Nazro, “War Diary Entry,” 14 May 1945, box 56/C/R54, NHC.

  15.   Carlyle Holt, “Big U-Boat Taken by US; Two Jap Suicides Aboard,” unnamed newspaper, 17 May 1945, file “U-234 and General,” PNS.

  16.   SRS 1645, 22 April 1945, MDS. Kase was cautious about supporting the supposed flight of German leaders to Japan, stating that, in view of the “ferocious atrocity campaign” that the Allies were waging against Germany, “identity with the Nazis to the bitter end should be avoided so far as possible.”

  17.   Lester Allen, “Find Three Nazi Chiefs in U-Boat,” Boston Post, 17 May 1945, 1(A).

  18.   “Hint Tops of Nazi Biggies Bound Here on Seized Sub,” Boston Daily Record, 19 May 1945, 3(A).

  19.   “Fourth U-Boat Due Today,” Boston Herald, 19 May 1945, 1.

  20.   Lester Allen, “Big Hunt on for Hitler in U-Boat,” Boston Post, 18 May 1945, 1(A).

  21.   “Log of Public Relations—Restricted,” 17 May 1945, box 531, RG 181, NANE. Cdr. N. R. Collier, district public-relations officer in Boston, opined that the high-ranking official was a Captain Smedburg of COMINCH Ingram’s office.

  22.   Ibid.

  23.   Memorandum, Cdr. N. R. Collier, First Naval District, to Captain Herbster, deputy commander, Northern Group, subject “Publicity on Surrender of U-234,” 18 May 1945, box 531, RG 181, NANE.

  24.   Telephone conversation, Capt. V. D. Herbster and Commodore Kurtz, 18 May 1945, box 531, RG 181, NANE.

  25.   Letter, Hirschfeld to author, 4 February 1996.

  26.   Johann Fehler and A. V. Sellwood, Dynamite for Hire: The Story of Hein Fehler (London: Werner Laurie, 1956), 200. Fehler relates an instance in which, upon refusing to smile for a Coast Guard sentry, he was struck in the jaw with the butt of the sentry’s machine gun.

  27.   Portsmouth (N.H.) Herald, 21 May 1945.

  28.   Wolfgang Hirschfeld, Hirschfeld: The Story of a U-Boat NCO, 1940–1946, as told to Geoffrey Brooks (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1996), 216.

  29.   Memorandum, Lt. (jg) M. T. Brunner, USNR, to commander, naval intelligence, 15 May 1945, box 13, RG 38, NA.

  30.   Enciphered memorandum, authenticated by Brunner, to United States Coast Guard vessel Argo, 16 May 1945, box 13, RG 38, NA.

  31.   Memorandum, Admiral Winters, commandant, Portsmouth Navy Yard, to OTC Surrender Unit, Northern Group, Eastern Sea Frontier, subject “Receipt of Prisoners,” 19 May 1945, box 531, RG 181, NANE.

  32.   Hirschfeld, Hirschfeld, 216.

  33.   Ibid.

  34.   Memorandum, OP-16-Z to OP-16, subject “Souvenirs from Enemy U-boats,” 1 June 1945, box 1, RG 38, NA.

  35.   Memorandum, Jack H. Alberti, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, to Capt. John L. Riheldaffer, subject “Report on Events at Portsmouth Navy Yard in Connection with the Surrender of German Submarines U-234, U-805, U-873 and U-1228,” 22 May 1945, box 13, RG 38, NA.

  36.   Ibid.

  37.   Ibid. Although guards who returned captured articles were afforded leniency, this policy did not extend to the many dockworkers who worked aboard U-234. On 21 May a member of the working party was found to have a deck of German playing cards in his possession; he was arrested and court-martialed by Admiral Winters.

  38.   Telephone conversation, Herbster and Kurtz, 18 May 1945.

  39.   Memorandum, Herbster to Admiral Winters, 18 May 1945, box 531, RG 181, NANE; memorandum, Lt. (jg) F. H. Hanbury, USNR, to Lt. Cdr. T. Hatton, 17 May 1945, box 13, RG 38, NA.

  40.   Edward Lundquist, “What If the Germans Had Listened to U-Boat Skipper?” The Dolphin, 30 September 1983, 18–19. Fritz Steinhoff’s brother was Dr. Ernst Steinhoff, who, like his brother, was a leading proponent of undersea projectile launching. After the war Dr. Steinhoff worked with the U.S. Navy’s Polaris missile program.

  41.   Letter, Johann Fehler (Hamburg) to Wolfgang Hirschfeld (Plön, Germany), 3 February 1981, UBA.

  42.   Quoted from Louis M. Lyons, “Nazi Prisoners to Stay Here Awhile,” Providence (R.I.) Sunday Journal, 13 May 1945, 4(A).

  43.   Joseph M. Scalia, “History, Archaeology, and the German Prisoner of War Experience in Rural Louisiana: The Ruston Alien Internment Facility, 1943–1945.” Louisiana History: The Journal of the Louisiana Historical Association 38 (summer 1997): 314.

  44.   List of suspected political affiliations of U-234 crew, box 13, RG 38, NA. Peter Wiesmayer was considered the leader of U-234’s National Socialist contingent; initial ONI evaluations labeled him a “somewhat psychopathic case, possible fanatic type [who is] overly anxious to please.”

  45.   Interroom conversation, Menzel and Schlicke, 26 May 1945, 1930–1950 hours, box 515, RG 165, NA.

  46.   Telephone conversation, Herbster and Kurtz, 18 May 1945, box 531, RG 181, NANE.

  47.   See Hirschfeld, Hirschfeld, 218.

  48.   Memorandum, Jack H. Alberti to Capt. John L. Riheldaffer, subject “U-234,” 24 May 1945, 1, box 4, RG 38, NA.

  49.   Memorandum, chief of naval operations and commander-in-chief, Atlantic Fleet, to commander, First Naval District, subject “U-234 Cargo, Disposition Of,” 23 May 1945, box 531, RG 181, NANE.

  50.   Memorandum, chief of naval operations to commander, Portsmouth Navy Yard, subject “Mine Tubes, Unloading Of,” 27 May 1945, box 531, RG 181, NANE.

  51.   Geoffrey Brooks, “The Voyage of the German Submarine U-234 during the Period March–May 1945 and Its Historical Implications,” unpublished article included in letter from Wolfgang Hirschfeld (Plön, Germany) to author, 16 May 1996. Boatswain Peter Schlöch, who was supervising the unloading, was aware of the location of the uranium but did not impart this knowledge to his captors.

  52.   Letter, Hirschfeld to author, 16 May 1996. Pfaff’s cooperation with the ONI did not remain secret. Upon his release from Fort Meade he was therefore sent to an “anti-Nazi” internment facility in Louisiana for protective custody. After his repatriation to Germany, Pfaff soon returned to the United States; his immigration proceeded easily and swiftly, in evident recognition of his previous cooperation.

  53.   Ibid.

  54.   Memorandum, “Mine Tubes, Unloading Of; memorandum, CNO to commander, Portsmouth Navy Yard, subject “Cargo U-234, Information On,” 28 May 1945, box 531, RG 181, NANE.

  55.   Alexander W. Moffat, A Navy Maverick Comes of Age (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1978), 136.

  56.   “Manifest of Cargo for Tokio [sic] on Board U-234,” 26 June 1945, microfiche F-3160, NHC.

  57.   Richard E. Winslow, Portsmouth-Built: Submarines of the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard (Portsmouth, N.H.: Peter E. Randall, 1983), 93; memorandum to OP-20-3-G1-A, “Cargo Unloading List for U-234 at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, on and from 23 May 1945,” 23 May 1945, box 13, RG 38, NA.

  58.   Anthony Pritchard, Messerschmitt (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1975), 46–47. The ME 209 holds the speed record for a low-altitude flight by a piston-engine aircraft, which it set on 26 April 1939 with Fritz Wendel at the controls.

  59.   “Material Sent to Wright Field,” no date, “Records of U-234; Aircraft Drawings and Drawing Lists,” box 3, RG 38, NA.

  60.   “ONI Routing Slips,” file “AAF: Final to Wright Field,” box 7, RG 38, NA.

  61.   Memorandum, Col. Russell H. Sweet to Division of Naval Intelligence, attention Capt. John L. Riheldaffer, subject “Captured Documents and Interrogation of Personnel on German Submarine U-234,” 26 May 1945, file “Miscellaneous,” box 3, RG 38, NA.

  62.   Memorandum, Captain Phelan to Commander Watson and Lieutenant Noble, subject “Disposition of Material from U-234,” 4 August 1945, box 5, RG 38, NA.

  63.   Memorandum, Alberti to Riheldaffer, 24 May 1945, 2, 6, box 5, RG 38, NA.

  64.   Memorandum, chief of naval operations to commander, Portsmouth Navy Yard, subject “POW and Fuses from U-234,” 25 May 1945, box 531, RG 181, NANE.

  65.   Memorandum, Alberti to Riheldaffer, subject “Report on Events at Portsmouth,” 22 May 1945, box 56/C/R45, NHC. Erich Menzel confirmed Alberti’s report, lamenting in his cell that he had not been allowed to remove any Hennessy from the boat.

  66.   Ibid.

  67.   Ibid.

  68.   Memorandum, production officer to planning officer, subject “Stability of U-234,” 28 May 1945, box 531, RG 181, NANE.

  69.   Memorandum, chief of naval operations to commander, First Naval District, 26 June 1945, box 531, RG 181, NANE.

  70.   Lee A. White, cited in Robert K. Wilcox, Japan’s Secret War: Japan’s Race against Time to Build Its Own Atomic Bomb (New York: Marlowe and Co., 1995), 160.

  71.   Memorandum, commandant to Commander Phelan, subject “Captured Enemy Equipment,” 5 July 1945, box 531, RG 181, NANE.

  72.   Memorandum, commandant to Bureau of Ships, 8 August 1945, box 531, RG 181, NANE.

CHAPTER 5. THE GENERAL

    1.   Report of interrogation, Ulrich Kessler, 22 May 1945, 3, box 495, RG 165, NA.

    2.   SRS 1650, 27 April 1945, 3, MDS; SRS 1646, 23 April 1945, 9, MDS. In a footnote to the 23 April summary, the intelligence monitor acknowledged that while the 20 April message implied that Kessler was already en route to Japan via submarine, there was no other evidence to suggest that he had actually embarked on his mission or, if he had, aboard which submarine he was traveling.

    3.   “Preliminary Report on Interrogation of General Ulrich Kessler,” 30 May 1945, file “Kessler, Ulrich,” box 495, RG 165, NA.

    4.   Ibid., 3. Kessler claimed that his first article was frequently quoted by American experts when addressing organizational matters. His second article dealt with Winston Churchill and defended the future British prime minister against criticism for his role in the Gallipoli defeat.

    5.   Johann Fehler and A. V. Sellwood, Dynamite for Hire: The Story of Hein Fehler (London: Werner Laurie, 1956), 180.

    6.   “Preliminary Report on Interrogation of General Ulrich Kessler,” 3.

    7.   Ibid., 4.

    8.   Ibid.

    9.   Report of interrogation, Kessler, 22 May 1945. In addition to information regarding military matters and German-Japanese military cooperation, Kessler revealed that he was cognizant of political subjects such as the Japanese-Russian exchange of information in Turkey, the execution of German agents in Japan, German-Russian peace proposals dating back to 1943–44, and details of the conspiracy surrounding the 20 July attempt on Hitler’s life.

  10.   The most recent source of this information was Nieschling; see independent room conversation, Kay Nieschling, 29 May 1945, 1930–2300 hours, box 522, RG 165, NA. Upon hearing reports that Germany’s experimental launching of a submerged rocket had been sabotaged in Austria, Nieschling lamented, “German victory lies at the bottom of an Austrian lake.”

  11.   Report of interrogation, Kessler, 1 June 1945.

  12.   The Dolphin, 30 September 1983, 18–19. Actually, Germany had launched missiles from a submarine. During the summer of 1942, U-511, under the command of Lt. Cdr. Fritz Steinhoff, successfully fired a V-2 missile from a depth of 75 feet near Peenemünde. However, because of the awkward launching apparatus and Hitler’s lack of interest, the project was scrapped.

  13.   Report of interrogation, Kessler, 1 June 1945.

  14.   Ibid., 4 June 1945.

  15.   Clay Blair, Hitler’s U-Boat War: The Hunters, 1939–1942 (New York: Random House, 1996), 764–67. During 1942, 142 Allied ships, comprising 1.07 million gross tons, were sunk along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts of the United States.

  16.   Report of interrogation, Kessler, 4 June 1945, 1.

  17.   SRS 1637, 14 April 1945, 3, MDS. As early as 24 March 1945, the German naval attaché in Tokyo, Paul Wennecker, petitioned Berlin to request that the Japanese grant German personnel in Japan “formal recognition of extraterritoriality” in anticipation of an American invasion.

  18.   Jerome B. Cohen, Japan’s Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1949), 199.

  19.   Report of interrogation, Kessler, 7 June 1945, 1–2.

  20.   Ibid., 28 May 1945, 4.

  21.   Ibid., 3, 1. The plans for the ME 262 had initially been sent to Japan on a submarine in December 1944, but the U-boat had been lost at sea. Kessler admitted that the Japanese test flights had been discovered by Berlin “quite unexpected[ly] and quite by accident.”

  22.   Ibid., 7 June 1945, 4. The implications of a powered test flight pointed to Japanese advances in turbo-jet power plants rather than the aeronautical integrity results provided by a glider flight.

  23.   Ibid. Until the declassification of Kessler’s interrogation records by the National Archives and Records Administration, most scholars agreed with Cohen (Japan’s Economy, 217) that Japan never attempted a test flight of the ME 163 until July 1945.

  24.   Report of interrogation, Kessler, 7 June 1945, 2.

  25.   Ibid., 9 June 1945, 2. It was Kessler’s opinion that the Luftwaffe’s effectiveness had been broken during the 1940 Battle of Britain and that it had never recovered.

  26.   Ibid., 1, 2. The De Havilland Mosquito XVI had a service ceiling of 11,887 meters (39,000 feet) and a top speed of 668 kilometers per hour (415 miles per hour); the ME 163 had a top speed of 949 kph (590 mph); the ME 262 maxed out at 869 kph (540 mph).

  27.   Ibid., 1. This plan of attack was to be especially effective when executed by the smaller, more agile ME 163.

  28.   Ibid., 25 June 1945, 7.

  29.   Ibid., 28 May 1945, 8.

  30.   John Prados, Combined Fleet Decoded: The Secret History of American Intelligence and the Japanese Navy in World War II (New York: Random House, 1995), 716. The Ohka, or “cherry blossom,” was assigned to the Japanese 721st Air Group and made its first appearance during the Okinawa campaign in April 1945.

  31.   Report of interrogation, Kessler, 28 May 1945, 4. The Mistel consisted of a radio-controlled ME 109 ferried into battle by a Junkers 188 bomber. The body of the ME 109 was actually a bomb designed to disintegrate into liquid steel upon contact. Baka was the code name given to the Ohka by U.S. naval intelligence. It is a Japanese word meaning “fool.” Cohen, Japan’s Economy, 217.

  32.   Report of interrogation, Kessler, 28 May 1945, 5.

  33.   Ibid., 8.

  34.   Ibid., 1 June 1945, 1.

  35.   Ibid.

  36.   Ibid.

  37.   Ibid.

  38.   Ibid., 20 September 1945, 1, 2.

  39.   Ibid.

  40.   Ibid., 1.

  41.   William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany, 4th ed. (New York: Touchstone Books, 1988), 372–75.

  42.   Ibid., 907, 1018.

  43.   Ibid., 1019. German bombs of the type designated for the destruction of Hitler’s aircraft made a telltale hissing sound before detonation, which could expose the device. The British device made no such sound and was considered safe from detection.

  44.   Report of interrogation, Kessler, 28 May 1945, subject “Information re Political Alibi of General der Flieger Kessler,” 2.

  45.   Ibid., 3.

  46.   Ibid., 3–4, 7.

  47.   Nagamori Yoshio, “Memories of Two Japanese Officers Who Died the Hero’s Death in the Atlantic,” 5, file II, UBA.

  48.   Letter, Louise W. Boothe (Lenox, Mass.) to Admiral Train, director of the Office of Naval Intelligence, 21 May 1945, box 495, RG 165, NA.

CHAPTER 6. THE PROBLEM OF AIR DEFENSE

    1.   Memorandum, OP-16-Z to OP-16-PT, subject “Passengers on U-234, Now Prisoners of War, Available for Interrogation,” 29 May 1945, 1–3, box 13, RG 38, NA.

    2.   SRS 1054, 12 August 1945, 9, MDS. Oshima described the bombings as “utterly inhumane . . . [The British] used liquid fire composed of benzol, benzine, rubber, and phosphorus. It was practically the same as if they had used poison gas.”

    3.   Saburo Ienaga, Taiheiyo Senso [The Pacific War] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1968), 140–41. Ienaga notes that in the 29 September 1939 issue of Asahi Gurafu, the threat of Allied incendiary bombing was addressed with pictures of Japanese civilians dousing fires with wooden buckets. In the 14 April 1943 issue a similar article carried a photograph of an incendiary raid, accompanied by the caption “Don’t be afraid of this bomb”; aerial defense against the threat of firebombing would be handled by neighborhood defense associations armed with buckets and hoses.

    4.   Quoted in John Toland, The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936–1945 (New York: Random House, 1970), 745.

    5.   SRS 1063, 21 August 1943, 5, MDS.

    6.   Kenneth P. Werrell, Blankets of Fire: U.S. Bombers over Japan during World War II (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1996), 25.

    7.   Peter Calvocoressi and Ben Wint, Total War: The Causes and Courses of the Second World War (London: Penguin Press, 1972), 469. One example of British radar proficiency was the H2S airborne system, which allowed the pilot to “see” his target regardless of visibility or the excessive heights to which he might be forced by antiaircraft fire.

    8.   Werrell, Blankets of Fire, 26.

    9.   Calvocoressi and Wint, Total War, 470–71.

  10.   Horst Boog, Die deutsche Luftwaffenführung, 1943–1945: Führungsprobleme, Spitzengliederung, Generalstabsausbildung [Leadership of the German Luftwaffe, 1943–1945: Leadership Problems, Order of Hierarchy, and General Staff Training] (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1982), 204–14.

  11.   Calvocoressi and Wint, Total War, 471. Britain’s Bomber Command suffered more casualties than any other branch during the war.

  12.   Alan S. Milward, War, Economy, and Society, 1939–1945 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 299.

  13.   Werrell, Blankets of Fire, 29.

  14.   Jeffrey Ethell, Mustang: A Documentary History of the P-51 (London: Jane’s, 1981), 114–15.

  15.   John Costello, The Pacific War, 1941–1945 (New York: Quill, 1981), 526.

  16.   John Keegan, The Second World War (New York: Penguin Books, 1989), 576–77; Michael S. Sherry, The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 277 n. 76. The exact death toll continues to be the subject of debate; the United States Strategic Bombing Survey put the figure at between seventy-nine thousand and eighty-four thousand, but modern estimates claim in excess of one hundred thousand dead.

  17.   Saburo, Taiheiyo Senso, 148.

  18.   Agawa Hiroyuki, The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1979), 127. A notable exception to the refusal of Japanese leaders to recognize the vulnerability of Japan’s cities was Adm. Yamamoto Isoraku. As early as 1939 Yamamoto had warned that Japanese cities, constructed largely of paper and wood, would “burn very easily . . . [and] if there were large-scale air raids, there’s no telling what would happen.”

  19.   Toland, Rising Sun, 745.

  20.   Keith Wheeler, Bombers over Japan (Chicago: Time-Life Books, 1982), 143.

  21.   Lester Brooks, Behind Japan’s Surrender: The Secret Struggle that Ended an Empire (Stamford: De Gustibus Press, 1968), 81.

  22.   Werrell, Blankets of Fire, 276 n. 124, 237.

  23.   SRS 1656, 3 May 1945, 2, MDS.

  24.   Report of interrogation, Erich Menzel, 21 May 1945, 1, box 13, RG 38, NA.

  25.   Ibid.

  26.   Ibid., 2.

  27.   Ibid.

  28.   Ibid., 23 May 1945.

  29.   Ibid., 29 May 1945, 1.

  30.   Ibid., 26 June 1945.

  31.   Ibid., 23 June 1945.

  32.   Ibid., 26 June 1945.

  33.   Ibid., 15 June 1945.

  34.   Ibid., 26 June 1945. Menzel was also to address the matter of Japanese fighter cover and was directed to cooperate with a First Lieutenant Stepp.

  35.   Ibid., 15 June 1945. Menzel listed the following types of German aircraft used for reconnaissance: the Focke-Wulf 200 Kondor; the Blohm and Voss 222 and 138; the Heinkel 111; the Junkers 88, 188, 290 (planned but never utilized), and 388 (trials completed but never utilized); and the Messerschmitt 264 (it is probable that this entry should have read “ME 262,” since about forty of the jet aircraft were utilized for reconnaissance). Alfred Price, The Luftwaffe Data Book (London: Greenhill Books, 1997), 193.

  36.   Report of interrogation, Menzel, 15 June 1945.

  37.   Ibid., 26 June 1945, 1–2.

  38.   Ibid., 2.

  39.   Ibid., 15 June 1945, 2.

  40.   Ibid., 3.

  41.   Ibid; ibid., 13 May 1945.

  42.   Ibid., 7 June 1945, 2.

  43.   Ibid., 5 June 1945, 1.

  44.   Ibid., 2.

  45.   Ibid., 1–2.

  46.   Ibid.

  47.   Ibid., 29 May 1945, 2.

  48.   I. C. B. Dear and M. R. D. Foot, eds., The Oxford Companion to World War II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 516.

  49.   Report of interrogation, Menzel, 7 June 1945, 1.

  50.   Ibid.

  51.   Price, Luftwaffe Data Book, 185.

  52.   Dear and Foot, eds., Oxford Companion, 516.

  53.   Report of interrogation, Menzel, 7 June 1945, 1.

  54.   Ibid.

  55.   Ibid.

  56.   Ibid.

  57.   SRS 1016, 5 July 1943, 3, MDS. In April 1943 Tokyo informed Berlin that “all reports that we have been able to obtain in Japan about [Allied] radar equipment are being turned over to the German Military Attache in Tokyo.” This information was subsequently passed on to German specialists for evaluation.

  58.   Report of interrogation, Menzel, 29 May 1945, 1–2.

  59.   SRS 1047, 5 August 1943, 4, MDS. An example of this phase of cooperation was the Luftwaffe’s 9 June 1943 shipment of technical drawings of its newest radar device, the Würzburg D-type wireless, to Japan.

  60.   Memorandum, Lt. (jg) John G. Faron, USNR, to Capt. G. R. Phelan, USN, subject “Cargo aboard 1600 Ton German Submarine at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, Partial List Of,” 29 May 1945, box 4, RG 38, NA.

  61.   Report of interrogation, Menzel, 29 May 1945, 1.

  62.   Memorandum, “Passengers on U-234,” 1–2.

  63.   Basic personnel record (alien enemy or prisoner of war), Fritz von Sandrart, no. 3WG-1268, box 535, RG 165, NA.

  64.   Report of interrogation, Ulrich Kessler, 9 June 1945, 3, box 495, RG 165, NA. Kessler stated that von Sandrart “was meant to help the Japanese with their AAA [because] he was more versed in tactical than technical knowledge.”

  65.   Report on the interrogation of Fritz von Sandrart by Captain Halle, “Answers to Preliminary List of Questions Submitted by Flak Analysis Section, Tactical and Technical Branch, Analysis Division, AC/AS, Intelligence, A.A.F,” 1 June 1945, 1, box 535, RG 165, NA.

  66.   Memorandum to Captain Phelan, 21 May 1945, 1, box 5, RG 38, NA.

  67.   Ibid., 6.

  68.   Report of interrogation, Kessler, 9 June 1945, 1.

  69.   SRS 1047, 5 August 1943, MDS; intercepted report, item no. 9, “German Aid,” 13 December 1944, USSBS, roll 2, microcopy M-1655, RG 243, NA.

  70.   Intercepted report, “German Aid,” 13 December 1944, 3, 2. These items were probably delivered to Japan aboard the Japanese submarine I-30, which departed Lorient on 23 August 1942 and arrived in Singapore on 11 October.

  71.   Report of interrogation, Fritz von Sandrart, 28 May 1945, 5, 7, 4, box 13, RG 38, NA.

  72.   Ibid., 29 May 1945, 1.

  73.   “Essay by Colonel von Sandrart of the Luftwaffe on the Tactical Use of the Grossbatterie in German A/A Defenses,” no date, 4, box 13, RG 38, NA.

  74.   Report of interrogation, von Sandrart, 29 May 1945, 1.

  75.   Ibid., 2.

  76.   Werrell, Blankets of Fire, 181.

  77.   Report no. M-522, subject “Internal Situation, Japan,” 1 February 1945, oss, box 89, RG 226, NA.

  78.   Report of interrogation, von Sandrart, 25 May 1945, 1.

  79.   USSBS interview no. 59, Karl Dönitz, 7 July 1945, published reports and supporting records, box 723, RG 243, NA.

  80.   “Essay by Colonel von Sandrart,” no date.

  81.   Ibid., 9 June 1945. General Kessler reported that there were at least two anti-aircraft officers from the Imperial Army and one from the Imperial Navy present in Berlin.

  82.   Report of interrogation, von Sandrart, 29 May 1945, “Information on the General Reorganization of the Entire Air Raid Warning Net,” 1.

  83.   Ibid., 1–2.

  84.   Ibid.

  85.   Ibid., 4.

  86.   Speed and ceiling figures from Dear and Foot, eds., Oxford Companion, 145.

  87.   Price, Luftwaffe Data Book, 232. The Mosquito’s maximum ceiling of 11,887 meters (39,000 feet) placed it easily out of the reach of Germany’s biggest antiaircraft gun, the 12.8-centimeter Flak 40, which had a maximum engagement altitude of 10,668 meters (35,000 feet).

  88.   Report of interrogation, von Sandrart, 29 May 1945, “Information on Reorganization,” 4.

  89.   “Essay by Colonel von Sandrart of the Luftwaffe on the Tactical Use of the Grossbatterie.”

  90.   Ibid. The original design for the Grossbatterie system called for eight 8.8-caliber and six 10.5-caliber guns; however, because of the shortage of guns, this scale was achieved only in high-priority areas such as Berlin.

  91.   Ibid.

  92.   Ibid., 1–5.

  93.   Memorandum, “Cargo aboard 1600 Ton German Submarine,” 1–2.

  94.   Interroom conversation, von Sandrart, 15 June 1945, 1145–1700 hours, box 535, RG 165, NA.

  95.   Ibid., 15 July 1945, 1930–2230 hours.

CHAPTER 7. DÖNITZ’S NAVAL MISSION

    1.   “Minutes of the Conference of the Commander in Chief, Navy, with the Führer,” 3 December 1944, in Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1939–1945 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1990), 420.

    2.   Report of interrogation, Gerhard Falcke, 24 May 1945, box 466, RG 165, NA.

    3.   “Prisoner of War Report, Gerhard Falcke,” 21 May 1945, box 466, RG 165, NA; report of interrogation, Falcke, 24 May 1945. ONI interrogators related that Falcke did not attempt to “hide his Nazi leanings” from them. Falcke insisted that Hitler was “an inspiring leader” but had surrounded himself with incompetents, and therein lay the failure of German National Socialism.

    4.   Report of interrogation, Falcke, 24 May 1945.

    5.   Ibid.

    6.   Ibid. The powers that sent technical representatives to Berlin were Russia, Spain, Italy, Bulgaria, Romania, and Japan.

    7.   Ibid.

    8.   Essay, Gerhard Falcke, “Zusammenarbeit der deutsch und japanischen Kriegsmarine” [Agreement between the German and Japanese Navies], no date, box 466, RG 165, NA.

    9.   “Prisoner of War Report, Gerhard Falcke,” 24 May 1945. Falcke claimed that he was one of the few German naval officers proficient in technical matters, and it was for this reason that he had been selected for the mission to Japan.

  10.   Report of interrogation, Falcke, 22 May 1945, 1.

  11.   Ibid.

  12.   Ibid., 5.

  13.   Report of interrogation, Kay Nieschling, 24 May 1945, box 522, RG 165, NA.

  14.   “Zusammenarbeit der deutsch und japanischen Kriegsmarine,” 2.

  15.   Ibid., 4.

  16.   Ibid.

  17.   Ibid.

  18.   Letter, Nomura Naokuni to Gerhard Falcke, 31 July 1941, box 466, RG 165, NA.

  19.   “Zusammenarbeit der deutsch und japanischen Kriegsmarine,” 3, 2.

  20.   Report of interrogation, Falcke, 24 May 1945.

  21.   “Zusammenarbeit der deutsch und japanischen Kriegsmarine,” 3.

  22.   Ibid. 4. Two such sensitive items that were not revealed to the Japanese were “those methods employed in conquering the Belgian Fort Eben-Emael and the actual depth to which German submarines could dive.”

  23.   Ibid., 3.

  24.   “Prisoner of War Report, Gerhard Falcke,” 21 May 1945, 2.

  25.   Report, “Captured German Documents, Accession List,” 5 July 1945, box 4, RG 38, NA. The documents assigned to Falcke were labeled as property of the OKM and were of sufficient intelligence value that the ONI classified them as priority “A.”

  26.   Report of interrogation, Falcke, 24 May 1945, 5.

  27.   Report, “Captured German Documents, Accession List,” 4. Included in the list of patents going to Japanese industry were those from German industrial giants such as Krupp, Zeiss, E. Müller, I. G. Farben, Electroacustic, Junkers, and Lorenz.

  28.   “Arbeitsverhältnisse im Referat A V f,” 22 November 1939, box 466, RG 165, NA.

  29.   Memoranda, 18 November 1941 and 23 March 1942, box 466, RG 165, NA.

  30.   “Arbeitsverhältnisse im Referat A V f.”

  31.   Letter, Hermann Lange to Falcke, 28 September 1943, box 466, RG 165, NA.

  32.   Letter, Lange to Falcke, 14 April 1944, box 466, RG 165, NA. Falcke listed understaffing and a “bad secretary” as the primary reasons for his office’s inefficiency.

  33.   Report of interrogation, Falcke, 18 June 1945.

  34.   Memorandum, Lt. Col. Earl L. Edwards, Provost Marshal General’s Office, to commanding general, First Service Command, subject “Transfer of German Navy Prisoners of War,” 18 May 1945, box 1376, RG 389, NA. Upon their arrival in Portsmouth, U-234’s crew were all sent to the navy’s holding enclosure at Fort Meade, pending final disposition to various POW camps.

  35.   Memorandum, Col. A. F. Tollefson to commanding general, Eighth Service Command, 27 August 1945, box 1376, RG 389, NA.

  36.   Memorandum, Lt. Col. Detlow M. Marthinson, Eighth Service Command, to commanding general, Army Service Forces, 14 December 1945, box 1376, RG 389, NA. The Ruston facility was resigned to surplus status on 31 January 1946.

  37.   Robert S. Allen, “Post-war U-Boat Yielded Top Scientists on Hot Errand,” New York Post, 25 November 1949, 41.

  38.   Report of interrogation, Richard Bulla, 24 May 1945, 1, box 456, RG 165, NA.

  39.   Ibid.

  40.   Edwin P. Hoyt, Raider 16 (New York: World, 1970), 72.

  41.   Ibid., 108.

  42.   Edward P. Von der Porten, The German Navy in World War II (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1969), 134.

  43.   Report of interrogation, Bulla, 24 May 1945, 1.

  44.   Ibid., 2.

  45.   United States Naval Intelligence, German Naval Vessels of World War II (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1993), 204.

  46.   Clark G. Reynolds, “Hitler’s Flattop: The End of the Beginning,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 113 (January 1967): 48.

  47.   Report of interrogation, Bulla, 24 May 1945, 2. Commenting on his being the first German officer sent to Japan, Bulla informed ONI interrogators that the Japanese “had always been very secretive about their naval air force.”

  48.   During his interrogations, Nieschling even identified the weapons that the Nazis were developing. Report of interrogation, Nieschling, 23 May 1945, 2.

  49.   Report of interrogation, Bulla, 15 May 1945.

  50.   Ibid.; Robert C. Mikesh, Japanese Aircraft: Code Names and Designations (Atglen, Pa.: Schiffer Aviation and Military History, 1993), 156–58. Japan had already produced copies of the ME 262 and 163. The Japanese variant of the ME 262, the navy’s Nakajima Kikka, flew only one successful flight during the war; its ME 163 counterpart, the J8M1 Mitsubishi Shushui, flew only in glider prototypes.

  51.   Interroom conversation, Bulla and Hellendorn, 25 May 1945, 0740–1145 hours, box 456, RG 165, NA.

  52.   Ibid., 6 June 1945, 1930–2300 hours.

  53.   Ibid., 5 June 1945, 1145–1700 hours.

  54.   Report of interrogation, Heinrich Hellendorn, 22 May 1945, 2, 1, file “Hellendorn, Heinrich,” box 482, RG 165, NA.

  55.   Ibid., 1.

  56.   Ibid.

  57.   Interroom conversation, Bulla and Hellendorn, 27 May 1945, 1205 hours.

  58.   Ibid., 28 June 1945, 1930–2300 hours.

  59.   Ibid., 24 May 1945, 1145–1700 hours.

  60.   Ibid. 0730–1200 hours.

  61.   Report of interrogation, Bulla, 24 May 1945, 2.

  62.   Interroom conversation, Bulla and Hellendorn, 5 June 1945, 1900 hours.

  63.   Ibid., 24 May 1945, 0730–1200 hours.

  64.   Report of interrogation, Nieschling, 21 May 1945.

  65.   Ibid., 23 May 1945, 1.

  66.   Ibid., 21 May 1945, 2; ibid., 23 May 1945, 1. From March to August 1940 Nieschling served in Norway as a member of the staff of an Admiral Schenk.

  67.   Ibid., 23 May 1945, 1.

  68.   Memorandum, OP-16-Z to OP-16-PT, subject “Passengers on U-234, Now Prisoners of War, Available for Interrogation,” 29 May 1945, 2, box 13, RG 38, NA.

  69.   Gordon W. Prange, Target Tokyo: The Story of the Sorge Spy Ring (New York: McGraw-Hill Books, 1984), xiii.

  70.   Sorge quoted in Andrew Christopher and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev (New York: Harper Collins, 1990), 176.

  71.   Independent room conversation, Nieschling, 31 May 1945, 1930–2245 hours, 1, 2. One of Nieschling’s contacts in the OKM was Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz. After the failed 20 July 1944 attempt on Hitler’s life, Dönitz summoned Nieschling to discuss the extent of the OKM’s involvement in the putsch.

  72.   Memorandum, “Passengers on U-234,” 2.

  73.   Independent room conversation, Nieschling and von Humman, 20 June 1945, 0730–1200 hours, 1, box 522, RG 165, NA; ibid., 12 June 1945, 2115–2130 hours. Nieschling stated that Mein Kampf “was the book of the times,” answering every question in a “most clear and explicit manner.”

  74.   Ibid., 20 June 1945, 0730–1200 hours.

  75.   Ibid., 12 June 1945, 1900 hours; ibid., 31 May 1945, 1600–1700 hours. “Werewolf” refers to postwar Nazi resistance in occupied Germany. Never a force of much consequence, Werewolf members engaged in small-scale terrorism and assassination. The Nazi presence in some U.S. POW camps was infamous for its summary justice; those considered unfaithful to Hitler were often murdered by their fellow prisoners.

  76.   Ibid., 20 June 1045, 0730–1200 hours.

  77.   Report of interrogation, Nieschling, 11 June 1945. Von Baumbach became a political embarrassment and a liability because of his friendship with Graf von Schulenberg, who was suspected of disloyalty and later implicated in the 20 July 1944 attempt on Hitler’s life. As a result, von Baumbach was relieved of his position on 15 July 1944.

  78.   Ibid.

  79.   Independent room conversation, Nieschling, 31 May 1945, 1930–2245 hours.

  80.   Report of interrogation, Nieschling, 25 May 1945.

  81.   Ibid.

  82.   Independent room conversation, Nieschling, 31 May 1945, 1600–1700 hours; report of interrogation, Nieschling, 25 May 1945.

  83.   Report of interrogation, Nieschling, 25 May 1945.

  84.   Ibid., 8 June 1945, 1.

  85.   SRS 1623, 31 March 1945, 2, MDS. Nieschling’s statements regarding German foodstuffs and munitions are questionable; a Vice President Puhl of the Reichsbank commented to Kojiro Kitamura of the Yokohama Specie Bank that the German people “realize that there is a shortage of food, ammunition, etc. . . . and [know] what fate is in store.”

  86.   Report of interrogation, Nieschling, 25 May 1945.

  87.   SRS 1640, 17 April 1945, 4, MDS. German foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop informed Oshima Hiroshi that Germany would “get out of her present crisis by considerably increasing submarine warfare, and by the use of the new fighter planes.”

  88.   Ibid.

  89.   Ibid., 3.

  90.   Report of interrogation, Nieschling, 8 June 1945, 3.

  91.   Ribbentrop informed Oshima that recent interrogations of captured American and British officers indicated a “rather deep-rooted antipathy toward Russia. . . . There are not a few who say that after forcing the collapse of Germany, they intend to beat up Russia.” SRS 1624, 3 April 1945, A-2, MDS.

  92.   Report of interrogation, Nieschling, 8 June 1945, 3.

  93.   Ibid.

  94.   Ibid. Ribbentrop again told Oshima that the antipathy of the United States and England toward Russia was growing, and that they might turn on Russia after defeating Germany. SRS 1626, 3 April 1945, 1–2, MDS.

  95.   Report of interrogation, Nieschling, 8 June 1945, 6.

  96.   Independent room conversation, Nieschling, 20 June 1945, 0730–1200 hours.

  97.   Report of interrogation, Nieschling, 8 June 1945, 4.

  98.   Independent room conversation, Nieschling, 20 June 1945, 0730–1200 hours.

  99.   Report of interrogation, Nieschling, 8 June 1945, 4.

100.   Ibid., 3.

101.   Independent room conversation, Nieschling, 20 June 1945, 0730–1200 hours.

102.   Report of interrogation, Nieschling, 8 June 1945, 5.

103.   Ibid., 6.

104.   Ibid., 5.

CHAPTER 8. THE SCIENTIST

    1.   Karl T. Compton, “Mission to Tokyo,” Technology Review 4 (December 1945): 114–15. Because of its failure to investigate the advantages of modern technological warfare, Japan’s military hierarchy made little use of civilian scientists, and then only under suffocating restrictions of secrecy and suspicion.

    2.   SRS 990, 8 June 1943, 1–2, MDS.

    3.   Ibid., 4.

    4.   Ronald Lewin, The American Magic: Codes, Ciphers, and the Defeat of Japan (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1982), 210–11.

    5.   Memorandum, “To Naval Attache, German Embassy, Tokyo,” manifest of captured correspondence, box 3, RG 38, NA. Tokyo’s population included a substantial German technical presence, as evidenced by the volume of correspondence found in U-234’s captured mailbags to and from various engineers and engineering firms.

    6.   SRS 1546, 13 January 1945, 4, MDS.

    7.   SRS 1656, 3 May 1945, 2, MDS.

    8.   Memorandum, Lt. Cdr. J. H. Marchant to Rear Adm. Luis de Flores, subject “German Scientific Personnel, Russian Exploitation Of,” 2 January 1945, box 1, RG 181, NANY.

    9.   Memorandum, Marchant to de Flores, 14 December 1945, box 1, RG 181, NANY.

  10.   Memorandum, H. Struve Hensel to Robert P. Patterson, 2 January 1946, box 1, RG 181, NANY.

  11.   Michel Bar-Zohar, La Chasse aux savants allemands [The Hunt for German Scientists] (Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1965), 120.

  12.   Naval message, Headquarters G-2, Communications Zone, ETO, Paris, to WAR 36356, 21 July 1945, box 6, RG 181, NANY.

  13.   Bar-Zohar, La Chasse, 121.

  14.   Compton, “Mission,” 118.

  15.   Memorandum, OP-16-Z to OP-16-PT, subject “Passengers on U-234, Now Prisoners of War, Available for Interrogation,” 29 May 1945, 2, box 13, RG 38, NA.

  16.   Letter, Heinz Schlicke (Milwaukee, Wisc.) to author, 22 October 1996. Schlicke, who now resides in the United States, recalled being fed by American Quaker relief workers in Germany after the war; he “walked several miles twice a week for a mug of hot chocolate and two fresh rolls.”

  17.   Memorandum, “Passengers on U-234,” 2.

  18.   Letter, Schlicke to author, 22 October 1996.

  19.   Report of interrogation, Heinz Schlicke, 22 May 1945, 1, box 540, RG 165, NA.

  20.   Letter, Schlicke to author, 22 October 1996. Widely considered the best authority on communications technique, Kuepfmueller was the director of the research division of the Siemens Central Laboratories.

  21.   Report of interrogation, Schlicke, 8 June 1945.

  22.   Ibid.

  23.   “Liste der Japaner, mit denen Dr. Ing. Schlicke in Beruehrung gekommen ist bzw. kommen sollte,” 31 August 1945, box 540, RG 165, NA.

  24.   Report of interrogation, Schlicke, 22 May 1945. After his assignment to Wennecker’s staff, Schlicke was alerted “numerous times” throughout November and December of his impending departure; however, because of the changing nature of U-234’s mission, he did not leave Europe until April 1945.

  25.   Ibid.

  26.   Report, “Captured German Documents, Accession List,” 5 July 1945, 4, box 4, RG 38, NA.

  27.   “Preliminary Report on Interrogation of General Ulrich Kessler,” 30 May 1945, 11, file “Kessler, Ulrich,” box 495, RG 165, NA.

  28.   Memorandum, chief of naval operations to distribution list, “Plans for Extended Exploitation of German Scientists,” 21 February 1946, box 56/C/R54, NHC. In anticipation of the arrival of German scientists, the chief of naval intelligence devised a rating system to segregate scientists on the basis of their value. Category I consisted of those scientists “who have demonstrated scientific talents . . . of unique value to the Navy Department.”

  29.   Letter, Schlicke to author, 16 December 1996.

  30.   Heinz Schlicke, “A Short Report on Training, Knowledge, and Preparation for Special Duties in Japan,” appendix 3, “My Duties in Japan,” no date, box 540, RG 165, NA.

  31.   Report of interrogation, Schlicke, 8 June 1945, 2.

  32.   Schlicke, “Short Report.”

  33.   Ibid.

  34.   Memorandum, “Passengers on U-234,” 3.

  35.   Schlicke, “Short Report.”

  36.   F. H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, abridged ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 602.

  37.   Memorandum, Lt. (jg) John G. Faron, USNR, to Capt. G. R. Phelan, USN, subject “Cargo aboard 1600 Ton German Submarine at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, Partial List Of,” 29 May 1945, box 4, RG 38, NA.

  38.   Schlicke, “Short Report,” appendix 2, no. 1. The Goliath was Germany’s longest-wave transmitter, with an estimated 500 kilowatts of radiated power.

  39.   Letter, Heinz Schlicke to Harry Cooper (Fox Lake, Ill.), 11 March 1993.

  40.   Minutes of meeting, Schlicke and ONI, no date, box 6, RG 38, NA.

  41.   Report of interrogation, Schlicke, 4 June 1945.

  42.   Transcript, “First Lecture Given by Dr. Schlicke at the Navy Department,” 19 July 1945, RG 38, box 13, NA.

  43.   Report of interrogation, Schlicke, 8 June 1945.

  44.   Ibid.

  45.   Letter, Schlicke to Cooper, 11 March 1993.

  46.   Letter, Schlicke to author, 16 December 1996. Schlicke repeatedly referred to Barkhausen as “the famous Dr. Barkhausen”; he was also known as the “Electron Jesus.” It was Barkhausen who initially informed Schlicke of the Japanese ferrite research.

  47.   Ibid. This early research into the potential masking value of ferritic material initiated further investigations, the cumulative results of which led to today’s stealth technology.

  48.   Schlicke, “Short Report,” appendix 9, no. 15.

  49.   Report, “Japan-Unterrichtung über TV und Erprobungen,” 19 September 1944, box 6, RG 38, NA.

  50.   “Report to the Japanese Concerning Absorption Material against Supersonics by Dr. Kneser,” no date, 15, “Lectures on the Present Conditions of the Fernlenk Technik,” fall 1943 through spring 1944, box 711, RG 165, NA.

  51.   ASDIC is an acronym for Allied Submarine Detection Investigation Committee, which in 1917 began to investigate the use of sound waves for locating submerged submarines. In 1943 the U.S. Navy developed a similar system, which it called Sonar.

  52.   “Report to the Japanese.”

  53.   “Report by Dr. Kuepfmueller: Geometric Shapes for the Prevention of Detection by Radar or Supersonic Radiation,” no date, 13, box 6, RG 181, NANY.

  54.   Ibid.

  55.   Report of interrogation, Schlicke, 8 June 1945.

  56.   Ibid., 4 June 1945.

  57.   Ibid., subject “Evaporograph,” 15 August 1945.

  58.   Schlicke, “Short Report,” appendix 2, no. 31.

  59.   Report of interrogation, Schlicke, 4 June 1945, 4–5.

  60.   Ibid., “Flamingo I,” 19 August 1945.

  61.   Ibid., “Flamingo II,” 21 August 1945.

  62.   Ibid., “Flamingo III.”

  63.   Ibid., 4 June 1945, 3.

  64.   Ibid., 4.

  65.   Letter, Schlicke to author, 16 December 1996.

  66.   Memorandum, OP-16-Z to OP-16-PT, subject “Lectures to Be Given by Dr. Schlicke,” 11 July 1945, box 540, RG 165, NA.

  67.   Bar-Zohar, La Chasse, 140.

  68.   “Negatives of Sketches 8–11 of Schlicke’s Lecture,” box 13, RG 38, NA.

  69.   JOIA report, “Heinz Schlicke,” 26 March 1947, file “Status of Aliens 1947–1950,” box 1, RG 181, NANY.

  70.   Bar-Zohar, La Chasse, 129. The initial number of German scientists to be extradited to the United States was three hundred. However, the number that was reported to the American public was substantially smaller to counter the lingering effects of wartime propaganda, particularly fears about “bringing German militarism to the United States.”

  71.   Report by Lt. Cdr. J. H. Marchant, USNR, “Part IV—Guided Missiles,” no date, exploitation lists 1945–51, box 6, RG 181, NANY.

  72.   Letter, Massachusetts Institute of Technology to Cdr. H. G. Dyke, 18 August 1945, box 6, RG 181, NANY; F. H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1979–88), vol. 3, pt. 1, 516n. The Allies, of course, were not ignorant of the uses of infrared technology. The most effective Allied application was in the detection of U-boats, whose Metox receivers emitted detectable radiation. In 1943, upon learning of this, Dönitz ordered the removal of all Metox receivers, and priority was given to the development of the Hagenuk, a nonradiating receiver.

  73.   Letter, chief, Bureau of Aeronautics, to Lt. Cdr. W. H. van Benschoten, Special Devices, Office of Research and Inventions, subject “Request for Establishment of TED ORI-3105: Theoretical Investigation of the Possibilities of Radar Camouflage for Pilotless Aircraft,” 24 October 1945, box 5, RG 181, NANY.

  74.   Memorandum, Lt. C.V.S. Roosevelt, USNR, to Lt. Cdr. W. H. van Benschoten, subject “Additional Personnel for Project 77,” 26 September 1945, box 6, RG 181, NANY.

  75.   Memorandum, Lt. Cdr. W. H. van Benschoten to chief of naval operations, attention OP-23-PT, subject “Alien Personnel for Project 77, Request For,” 31 October 1945, box 6, RG 181, NANY.

  76.   Memorandum, Rear Adm. H. G. Bowen to the provost marshal general of the army, War Department, 1 November 1945, box 6, RG 181, NANY.

  77.   Memorandum, Lt. Kermit Lansner, USNR, to officer in charge, Special Devices Division, Sands Point, New York, subject “Project 77, Developments Affecting,” 30 April 1946, box 1, RG 181, NANY. The project was called Paperclip after the paperclips that were attached to personnel files to identify an alien as acceptable.

  78.   Memorandum, “Plans for Extended Exploitation,” 1.

  79.   Clarence G. Lasby, Project Paperclip: German Scientists and the Cold War (New York: Atheneum, 1971), 184; memorandum, chief of naval operations to distribution list, “Exchange of Technical Intelligence,” 4 October 1945, 1, box 56/C/R45, NHC. With the influx of German scientists and their inventions, American military intelligence officers weighed the wisdom of sharing the most sensitive items with their Soviet allies, who were likewise collecting German scientists. As a result, German technical intelligence was divided into two categories: information that could be revealed to the Soviets and that to which Soviet access would be denied. An 11 October memorandum from Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower to the chief of naval intelligence reiterated the importance of denying the Soviets access to German technology.

  80.   JOIA report, “Heinz Schlicke.” Schlicke’s primary work centered on the “Theoretical Investigation of Radar Camouflage of Air Missiles by the Absorption Method” and “Investigation of Intercept Antenna Techniques over the Electro-magnetic Radiation Range from Forty Megacycles through the Infrared Spectrum.”

  81.   Memorandum, R. W. Weber, CO, Operations and Personnel Division, 23 August 1950, box 1, RG 181, NANY.

  82.   Letter, Schlicke to author, 22 October 1996.

CHAPTER 9. THE MEN FROM MESSERSCHMITT

    1.   Jerome B. Cohen, Japan’s Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1949), 244, 215, 216.

    2.   “Captured German Documents: Synopsis, Japanese Aircraft Industry,” USSBS, 97, file 1a (11), roll 2, microcopy M-1655, RG 243, NA.

    3.   Ibid.

    4.   Ibid., 99, 100.

    5.   Ibid., 97. Because of the infancy of its aircraft industry, Japan’s manufacturing capability was limited to production capacity since it did not enjoy the extensive production procedures of contemporaries such as Germany, England, and the United States.

    6.   Alan S. Milward, War, Economy, and Society, 1939–1945 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 34. Milward points out that with the possible exception of the Soviet Union, Japan had the highest share of its population devoted to agriculture, a full 50 percent at the beginning of the war.

    7.   “Captured German Documents,” USSBS, 99.

    8.   Ibid., 101, 97.

    9.   Ibid., 97.

  10.   Ibid., 143, 145.

  11.   SRS 612, 27 May 1942, 2, MDS, reel 1. It is probable that this reference concerns the highly effective Focke-Wulf, rather than the Fokker, 190.

  12.   SRS 801, 9 December 1942, supplement E1, MDS, reel 3.

  13.   SRS 847, 24 January 1943, 1–2, MDS, box 1. In a footnote to the MAGIC encrypt, the British Air Ministry noted that it had no intelligence regarding either the ME 309 or the ME 264.

  14.   SRS 950, 29 April 1943, 2, MDS, box 2.

  15.   SRS 1141, 7 December 1943, 6, MDS, box 6.

  16.   SRS 1254, 28 March 1944, 11, MDS, box 7.

  17.   SRS 1288, 1 May 1944, 1, MDS, box 7.

  18.   SRS 1254, 28 March 1944, 12, MDS, box 7.

  19.   Interview, Willi Messerschmitt, “Aircraft Plans Given to Japan,” 28 June 1945, 1, file “Japanese-German Cooperation, Consolidated Interrogation Report,” box 721A, RG 165, NA.

  20.   SRS 1254, 28 March 1944, 11, MDS, box 7. Otani claimed to have a clandestine source within the Messerschmitt Company. He also asserted that the Japanese military attaché in Berlin was “on excellent terms with Dr. Messerschmitt’s right-hand man.”

  21.   SRS 1288, 1 May 1944, 2, in MDS, reel 9.

  22.   Memorandum, Col. Russell H. Sweet to Division of Naval Intelligence, attention Capt. John L. Riheldaffer, subject “Captured Documents and Interrogation of Personnel on German Submarine U-234,” 1, file “Miscellaneous,” box 3, RG 38, NA.

  23.   Report of interrogation, August Bringewald and Franz Ruf, 25 May 1945, 1, file “U-234: Interrogations 1944–45,” box 13, RG 38, NA.

  24.   Memorandum, “Captured Documents and Interrogation,” 1. The third submarine, U-876 (Bahn), was scheduled to deliver the ME 410 and ME 323 and other Messerschmitt engineers; however, Germany surrendered before U-876 could depart Kiel.

  25.   F. H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1979–88), vol. 3, pt. 2, p. 332.

  26.   Office of Strategic Services intelligence report RB-8022, subject “New Airplane,” 13 January 1944, file “Confidential Correspondence, 1922–1944,” box 428, RG 72, NA.

  27.   Ibid., notation handwritten on back of report.

  28.   oss intelligence report T2192, 5 August 1944, file “Confidential Correspondence, 1922–1944,” box 428, RG 72, NA.

  29.   SRS 1254, 28 March 1944, MDS.

  30.   SRS 1288, 1 May 1944, MDS.

  31.   Report, Capt. S. B. Spangler, Power Plant Design Branch, to Air Technical Intelligence (OP-16-VT), subject “Comparison between German and Japanese Aircraft, Recommendations For,” 27 November 1944, file “Confidential Correspondence, 1922–1944,” box 428, RG 72, NA. Spangler went on to suggest a comparison of various German and Japanese aircraft to “determine whether such a trend is not already visible.”

  32.   Memorandum, Naval Bureau of Aeronautics, subject “Information on Japanese Instruments,” 24 July 1945, file EF37, RDO, ConCor, box 93, RG 72, NA. Allied suspicions as to the extent of Japanese incorporation of German avionics were evidenced by the listing of “performance data, jet propulsion or pulse jet units, [or] propulsion for rocket bombs or missiles” at the Yokosuka Air Technical Training School on a July 1945 target summary.

  33.   Memorandum, OP-16-Z to OP-16-PT, subject “Passengers on U-234, Now Prisoners of War, Available for Interrogation,” 29 May 1945, 3, box 13, RG 38, NA.

  34.   Report of interrogation, Bringewald and Ruf, 25 May 1945, 1.

  35.   Report of interrogation, August Bringewald, 22 May 1945, file “Bringewald, August,” box 454, RG 165, NA.

  36.   Ibid., 5 July 1945.

  37.   Ibid.

  38.   Ibid., 22 May 1945. Although Bringewald was unaware of Japan’s intentions concerning the ME 163, the Japanese received plans for the aircraft in 1943 and had actually test-flown their own prototype in December 1944.

  39.   Ibid., 3.

  40.   Ibid., 14 July 1945, 3.

  41.   Ibid.

  42.   Interroom conversation, Bringewald, 28 May 1945, 1145–1715 hours, 1, box 454, RG 165, NA.

  43.   Ibid., 2.

  44.   Report of interrogation, Franz Ruf, 5 June 1945, file “Ruf, Franz,” box 534, RG 165, NA.

  45.   Ibid.

  46.   Memorandum, Cdr. B. R. Roeder to OP-20-3-GI-A, attention Captain Phelan, “Contract between Messerschmitt and Mr. Franz Ruf,” 1 December 1945, translated 26 May 1945, file “Memo Series,” box 5, RG 38, NA.

  47.   Report of interrogation, Bringewald and Ruf, 25 May 1945, 1–2.

  48.   Ibid., 2.

  49.   Ibid.

  50.   Ibid.

  51.   Hugh Morgan, ME 262: Stormbird Rising (London: Reed Consumer Books, 1994), 207. Actually, the Japanese were farther advanced in jet aircraft research than previously believed. On 6 August 1945 the Nakajima J9Y1, or Kikka, a smaller variation of the ME 262, made its initial test flight. The Kikka may have been a version of the ME 262, but in the words of the Army Air Corps’ Gen. Harold Watson, it “wasn’t a very good one.”

  52.   Report of interrogation, Bringewald and Ruf, 25 May 1945, 3, 4. Bringewald and Ruf could state their assumptions with relative certainty; the Japanese had signed contracts with the Messerschmitt and Junkers aircraft companies only.

  53.   Ibid., 2.

  54.   Elizabeth-Anne Wheal, Stephen Pope, and James Taylor, eds., Encyclopedia of the Second World War (Edison, N.J.: Castle Books, 1989), 302. The ME 163, or Komet, initially flew in 1941 as an experimental aircraft. After extensive avionic and armament revisions that rendered the ME 163 combat-capable, it was deployed to equip German home defense units in 1944 and made its debut on 14 August by attacking American B-17 bombers.

  55.   Eric Brown, Wings of the Luftwaffe: Flying German Aircraft of the Second World War (London: MacDonald and Jane’s, 1977), 168.

  56.   Report of interrogation, Bringewald and Ruf, 25 May 1945, 3.

  57.   Ibid.; Dennis Piszkiewicz, The Nazi Rocketeers: Dreams of Space and Crimes of War (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1995), 73. Hitler’s insistence that the ME 262 be used as a low-altitude bomber, rather than in the fighter-interceptor role for which it was intended, seriously hampered the aircraft’s efficiency. In addition, by March 1944 Hitler had become convinced that the V-(vengeance-) weapons, particularly the new V-2 missile, would turn the tide of the war in Germany’s favor, and he therefore placed V-2 production ahead of the ME 262 as the top armaments priority. On 13 June 1942 armaments minister Albert Speer witnessed both the successful initial flights of the ME 163 and the unsuccessful first launch of the V-2. The High Command’s belief that the V-weapons, rather than jet aircraft, would ultimately save Germany is reflected in Speer’s memoirs, in which he repeatedly refers to the V-2 while neglecting to mention the ME 163 test flights. Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich (New York: Macmillan, 1970), 368.

  58.   Piszkiewicz, Nazi Rocketeers, 120.

  59.   Report of interrogation, Bringewald and Ruf, 25 May 1945, 4. Bringewald’s and Ruf’s opinions were corroborated by Kay Nieschling, who stated that the Japanese had possessed rocket information “for a long time.” Report of interrogation, Kay Nieschling, 24 May 1945, box 522, RG 165, NA.

  60.   Report of interrogation, Bringewald and Ruf, 25 May 1945, 4. See also report of interrogation, Ulrich Kessler, 7 June 1945, 4, box 495, RG 165, NA. Kessler recalled a conversation with naval attaché Koshima in Berlin in which Koshima revealed Japanese fears that the Americans, who supposedly had seventy-five thousand rockets under construction, planned to use them against the home islands. The Japanese, on the other hand, planned to use the V-l/V-2s to drive the Americans from Japan’s vast Southwest Pacific possessions, particularly the Philippines.

  61.   Letter, Wolfgang Hirschfeld (Plön, Germany) to author, 4 February 1996. Whether the ME 262 that Bringewald presented was the same one that had been on board the U-234 is unknown. However, because of the timeliness of the presentation, the general assumption is that it was the same one, and that Bringewald had directed the assembly of it.

  62.   Memorandum, Col. A. F. Tollefson to commanding general, Eighth Service Command, Dallas, Texas, subject “Transfer of German Prisoners of War,” 14 August 1945, box 1376, RG 389, NA.

  63.   Letter, August Bringewald (Dayton, Ohio) to Wolfgang Hirschfeld (Plön, Germany), 15 April 1988, UBA.

  64.   Directive, Office of the Secretary of War to Office of the Provost Marshal General, 17 December 1945, box 1576, RG 389, NA.

  65.   Memorandum, Tollefson to commanding officer, Fifth Service Command, Columbus, Ohio, 9 April 1946, box 1376, RG 389, NA.

  66.   Memorandum, Tollefson to commanding general, First Army Area, 17 June 1946, box 1376, RG 389, NA.

  67.   Letter, Bringewald to Hirschfeld, 15 April 1988.

  68.   Interview, Dr. Peter Bringewald (Dallas, Texas) with author, 29 April 1998.

CONCLUSION

    1.   Directive, CNO to CINCLANT, COMSUBSLANT, COMEASTSEAFRON, 19 May 1945, box 20, RG 298, NA.

    2.   Directive, CNO to naval districts and departments, subject “Inspections and Tests of Surrendered German Submarines,” 28 May 1945, box 20, RG 298, NA.

    3.   Ibid.

    4.   Letter, Lt. Cdr. H. G. Dyke to Dr. Irwin Stewart, 29 May 1945, box 20, RG 298, NA.

    5.   Memorandum, BuShips to CNO, subject “Recommendations for Trials and Tests of Surrendered German Submarines,” 23 June 1945, box 20, RG 298, NA.

    6.   Letter, Dr. Julian R. Knipp to Lt. Cdr. H. G. Dyke, 29 June 1945, box 20, RG 298, NA.

    7.   Memorandum, commander, Special Submarine Group, New London, Connecticut, to commander, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, 21 February 1946, box 20, RG 298, NA. To ensure that U-858, U-873, and U-234 would remain operational for the entirety of the tests, the CNO granted permission to “cannibalize” U-805 and U-1228 for spare parts; see memorandum, CNO to naval districts and departments, subject “Trials and Tests of Surrendered German Submarines,” 30 June 1945, box 20, RG 298, NA. The Type IXC U-858 was sunk in 1947 during U.S. Navy torpedo trials; the Type IXD/2 U-873 was towed to New York City in 1948, where she was sold for scrap; and the Type XXI U-2513 sailed to the Dry Tortugas, where she was destroyed during rocket firing tests in 1951. The fifth submarine was the Type IXC U-505, which, after a War Bond fundraising tour, was bought by the Museum of Science and Industry in Chicago. Dedicated in September 1955, she remains on display at the museum to this day.

    8.   Memorandum, commander, Special Submarine Group, New London, Connecticut, to commander, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, 10 June 1946, box 20, RG 298, NA.

    9.   John E. Moore, ed., Jane’s Pocket Book of Major Warships (New York: Macmillan, 1973), 44.

  10.   Letter, Lt. Paul C. Stroup (Pensacola, Fla.) to author, 23 March 1998.

  11.   Letter, Myron R. Prevatte (Whigham, Ga.) to author, 17 February 1998.

  12.   Saburo Ienaga, Taiheiyo Senso [The Pacific War] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1968), 107, 109.

  13.   Ibid., 138.

  14.   SRS 1645, 22 April 1945, MDS.

  15.   SRS 1656, 3 May 1945, MDS.

  16.   Secretary of War James Forrestal to Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, 29 January 1946, box 1, RG 181, NANY. See also, for example, memorandum, Lt. Cdr. J. H. Marchant to Rear Adm. Luis de Flores, subject “German Scientific Personnel, Russian Exploitation Of,” 2 January 1945, box 1, RG 181, NANY; and memorandum, unnamed to Dr. Vannevar Bush, January 1946, box 1, RG 181, NANY.

APPENDIX

    1.   Memorandum, Lt. (jg) John G. Faron, USNR, to Capt. G. R. Phelan, subject “Cargo aboard 1600-Ton German Submarine at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, Partial List Of,” 29 May 1945, box 4, RG 38, NA.

    2.   “Manifest of Cargo for Tokio [sic] on Board U-234,” translated 23 May 1945, NHC, microfiche.

    3.   Kawashima Toranosuke quoted in Robert K. Wilcox, Japan’s Secret War: Japan’s Race against Time to Build Its Own Atomic Bomb (New York: Marlowe and Co., 1995), 101.

    4.   Japanese army attaché message translation, SRA 1576, 7 July 1943, box 2, RG 457, NA. The Japanese required radium for its medicinal value, for its phosphorescent qualities, and for the manufacture of butanol, an industrial alcohol.

    5.   Japanese army attaché message, SRA 4221, 1 September 1943, box 2, RG 457, NA.

    6.   Letter, Dr. Kigoshi Kunihiko (Tokyo) to author, 7 August 1998.

    7.   Letter, Dr. Helmet Rechenberg (Munich) to author, 25 February 1999.

    8.   Japanese army attaché message, SRA 6420, 15 November 1943, box 2, RG 457, NA. Although the translated document reads 1 kilogram (2.2 pounds), subsequent messages reveal this to be a typographical error. The actual request was for 100 kilograms (221 pounds).

    9.   Japanese army attaché message, SRA 5501, 20 November 1943, box 2, RG 457, NA.

  10.   Letter, Kigoshi Kunihiko to author, 7 August 1998. Because of strict security, as well as the lingering mistrust between the two Axis partners, neither brother knew of the other’s involvement in the uranium transfer until after the war.

  11.   Gen. Kawashima Toranosuke quoted in Wilcox, Japan’s Secret War, 104.

  12.   Ibid. In his 1980 interview with Robert Wilcox, Kawashima declared that the Germans agreed to supply the Japanese with 2 tons of uranium oxide. However, the 20 November wire from Oshima was the only documented mention of a quantity, and because of the division of the cargo aboard two submarines in 500-kilogram (1,100-pound) loads, it appears more likely that the shipped quantity was actually 1 ton (900 kilograms).

  13.   Carl Boyd and Yoshida Akihiko, The Japanese Submarine Force and World War II (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 132. Ro-501 was in her second incarnation; she had previously been U-1224 and was transferred to the Japanese at Kiel on 28 February 1944. Her Japanese crew had arrived in Germany the year before aboard I-8. General Kawashima, Maj. Kigoshi Yasukazu, and Kigoshi Kunihiko later confirmed that Ro-501 was sunk in the Atlantic in May 1944.

  14.   Letter, Kigoshi Kunihiko to author, 7 August 1998.

  15.   John W. Dower, Japan in War and Peace: Selected Essays (New York: New Press, 1993), 80.

  16.   “Reveal Jap Subs in Atlantic,” Manchester (N.H.) Union, 17 May 1945, 1(A).

  17.   Yamamoto Yoichi quoted in Deborah Shapely, “Nuclear Weapons History: Japan’s Wartime Bomb Projects Revealed,” Science 199 (January 1978): 155. Yamamoto reiterated his acknowledgment of the uranium’s arrival in Japan in a 1980 interview with author Robert Wilcox. Wilcox, Japan’s Secret War, 104.

  18.   According to Dr. Jürgen Rohwer, two Japanese submarines were indeed sunk in the Atlantic by U.S. naval forces during the summer of 1944. Ro-501 was sunk on 3 May at 18°08’ N, 33°13' W, by the USS Francis M. Robinson, and I-52 was sunk at 15°16' N, 39°55' W, by the USS Bogue. However, I-52 was sunk in the South Atlantic, thus adding mystery to the identity of the second submarine that allegedly sortied from Kiel after Ro-501.

  19.   Letter, Kigoshi Kunihiko to author, 7 August 1998. According to Kigoshi Kunihiko, Dr. K. Kimura of the University of Kyoto succeeded in separating uranium from rare-earth minerals; by the end of the war Kimura had separated “hundreds of kilograms [of uranium] from ore.”

  20.   Report by the Departments of State, War, and Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East, “Disposition of Uranium Oxide Impounded by SCAP,” March 1946, 47, box 1, RG 331, NA. According to a postwar inventory, Allied investigators recovered approximately 125 kilograms (275 pounds) of uranium oxide in unopened bottles, an amount deemed “of negligible importance for military purposes.” A 12 April 1948 investigation (SCAP memo, 12 April 1948, box 1, RG 331, NA) further revealed the “presence of radioactive stockpiles in seventy-eight industrial concerns.”

  21.   Letter, Capt. Kitazawa Noritaka, National Institute for Defense Studies (Tokyo), to author, 13 July 1998. Captain Kitazawa points out that the Imperial Navy intended to use the uranium oxide as a catalyst for the synthesized production of methanol, used for aircraft fuel.

  22.   Letter, Dr. Jürgen Rowher (Stuttgart, Germany), to author, 17 February 1998.

  23.   Letter, Capt. Hans-Joachim Krug (Wolfrathausen, Germany), to author, 7 August 1998. Krug, the former first watch officer aboard U-219, was with the German naval and defense mission in Tokyo from August 1944 until the end of the war. He returned to Germany late in 1946.

  24.   Interrogation of Kay Nieschling, 27 July 1945, Command File, World War II, NHC.

  25.   Wolfgang Hirschfeld, Hirschfeld: The Story of a U-Boat NCO, 1940–1946, as told to Geoffrey Brooks (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1996), 199.

  26.   Ibid., 198–99.

  27.   Alexander W. Moffat, A Navy Maverick Comes of Age (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1978), 138.

  28.   Hirschfeld, Hirschfeld, 218.

  29.   Memorandum, chief of naval operations to commanding officer, Portsmouth Navy Yard, subject “Mine Tubes, Unloading Of,” 27 May 1945, box 531, RG 181, NANE.

  30.   Memorandum, commanding officer, Portsmouth Navy Yard, to CNO, subject “Cargo U-234, Information On,” 28 May 1945, box 531, RG 181, NANE.

  31.   Memorandum, “Mine Tubes, Unloading Of.”

  32.   Interview, Karl Pfaff (Bellingham, Wash.) with Robert Wilcox, 24 February 1995.

  33.   Ibid.

  34.   Bob Norling, “Ex-U-Boat Officer Here for Visit; First Saw Portsmouth as POW,” Portsmouth (N.H.) Herald, 9 July 1954, 1(A). Pfaff recalled that although he breathed a sigh of relief once the cylinder had been cut, he shuddered as he discovered an antiaircraft shell within inches of where the torch had cut.

  35.   Interview, Pfaff with Wilcox, 24 February 1995. Pfaff recalled that once the welders opened the cylinders, he noticed “a tall civilian . . . with a large hat” examining the boxes. Because the stranger was rather conspicuous, Pfaff inquired as to his identity and was told that he was “Oppenheimer.” Only later, as a prisoner of war in Louisiana, did he realize that the man with the large hat might have been J. Robert Oppenheimer, director of the Manhattan Project. While it cannot be confirmed that the man Pfaff saw was Oppenheimer, the physicist was in the vicinity during late May and early June 1945. He was in Washington to attend a meeting with Henry Stimson, James F. Byrnes, and Gen. Leslie Groves and the Interim Committee; that he would travel to southern Maryland to examine a captured German stock of uranium oxide is not out of the realm of possibility.

  36.   Memorandum, T. F. Darrah, Ordnance Investigation Laboratory, to chief, Bureau of Ordnance, cc: Lieutenant McQuade, ONI, subject “Manifest of Cargo for Tokyo on Board U-234, Forwarding Of,” 23 June 1945, Command File, World War II, NHC.

  37.   “Agenda for Washington Group Meeting,” 2 July 1945, box number unknown, Manhattan Project files, RG 526, NA. The Washington Group Trust was affiliated with the army’s Manhattan District, with copies of the agenda forwarded to Gen. Leslie Groves, military director of the Manhattan Project. The group’s British counterpart, with which Washington maintained liaison, was known as the London Group; Groves instructed that four days prior to meetings of the Washington Group, the agenda “should be exchanged with the British.”

  38.   Ibid. Item number 4-B concerned the possibility of securing samples of uranium oxide from Turkey; item 4-C examined German geological explorations in Sweden; item 4-D addressed a Dr. Bain’s questions concerning the isotopic content of uranium; item 8 considered the “usefulness of reconnaissance photographs . . . of certain areas where uranium and thorium” might be found; item 10-B arranged a meeting between Dr. Bain and Groves; and item 10-C discussed the Belgian Union Minière mines, the future of which would determine “efficient Trust Intelligence operations.”

  39.   John Lansdale quoted in William J. Broad, “Captured Cargo, Captivating Mystery,” New York Times, 31 December 1995, 22(A).

  40.   Dr. Philip Morrison quoted in David Arnold, “The Uranium Vanishes: A Mystery of World War II,” Boston Globe, 27 July 1993, 1(A).

  41.   Hirschfeld, Hirschfeld, 198–99. Hirschfeld states that when he asked for an explanation for the label, the Japanese replied that the cargo was originally intended to be shipped on the submarine U-235, which was no longer going to Japan. Hirschfeld later discovered that U-235 was a “small Type VII training U-Boat which had never been earmarked for operations outside the Baltic.”

  42.   Interview, Pfaff with Wilcox, 24 February 1995.

  43.   Letter, Geoffrey Brooks (Torremolinos, Spain) to L. Sidney Trevethan (Anchorage, Alaska), 16 January 1999.

  44.   Letter, Richard Rhodes (Madison, Conn.) to author, 14 January 1999.

  45.   Letter, Rhodes to author, 14 January 1999.

  46.   Letter, Dr. Michael Thorwart (Augsburg, Germany) to author, 18 February 1999.

  47.   Letter, Rhodes to author, 14 January 1999.

  48.   Letter, Richard Thurston (Spanaway, Wash.) to L. Sidney Trevethan (Anchorage, Alaska), 31 December 1998.

  49.   Letter, Kigoshi Kunihiko to author, 7 August 1998.

  50.   Alsos mission intelligence report, H. S. Van Klooster, subject “Pyrophoric Thorium Alloys,” 13 July 1945, box 92, RG 72, NA.

  51.   Letter, Kay Nieschling (Bonn, Germany) to Wolfgang Hirschfeld (Plön, Germany), 5 July 1984.

  52.   David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939–1956 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 110.

  53.   Letter, Thurston to Trevethan, 3 February 1999.

  54.   Letter, Thurston to author, 4 February 1999.