What is it like to be a bat?: Nagel 1991, 165-180.
Paraliterature: Delany 2000, 203ff.
Sapience (understanding, intelligence) vs. sentience (awareness, irritability, arousal): Brandom 1994, 5ff.
Wrongly attributed to Francis Bacon: Pesic 1999.
Latour and Stengers: Latour 1999; Stengers 2010 and 2011. Whitehead: Whitehead 1978, 5.
Abduction: Peirce 1931-1958, 2:544 and passim.
Brembs: Brembs 2015. See also Brembs 2009.
Fruit fly behavior: Maye et al. 2007.
Trees: Trewavas 2003.
Bacteria: Ben-Jacob et al 2006.
Slime molds: Latty and Beekman, 2010.
Eric Schwitzgebel on science fiction: Schwitzgebel 2014a.
Rehearsal: Peckham 1967 passim; and Peckham 1979, 204.
Feed forward: Hansen 2015, 141 and passim.
Whitehead on feeling: Whitehead 1978, 164.
Spinoza on affection: Spinoza 2002, 240. Ethics, Book I, Definition 5: “By mode I mean the affections of substance, that is, that which is in something else and is conceived through something else”. Cf. Deleuze 1988, 48ff.
James on emotion: James 1983, 1058-1097.
Kant on thoughts without content: Kant 1998, 193 (B75/A51).
Merleau-Ponty on self-awareness: Merleau-Ponty 2012, lxxiii.
Sellars, the myth of the given: Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, in Sellars 2012. See also Jelaca 2014.
Kant, aesthetic ideas: Kant 2000, 192.
Raffman qualia: Metzinger 2004, 72-74.
Marder, non-conscious intentionality: Marder 2013, 153ff.
Nonintentional sentience: Shaviro 2014, 108-133.
Plant sentience: Chamovitz 2013.
The story of Mary: Frank Jackson’s original 1986 paper, and numerous subsequent replies to it and reconsiderations to it (including by Jackson himself), are collected in Ludlow et al. 2004.
Eric Schwitzgebel: Schwitzgebel 2012.
Inverted spectra: See for instance, “The Inverted Spectrum”, Shoemaker 2003, 327-357; although the story has been discussed widely, and apparently dates back to John Locke.
Worlds in which water is not H2O: Putnam 1973.
Brains in vats: Putnam 1981, 1-21.
Zombies: Chalmers 1997, 93-122.
Scores of articles: Ludlow et al 2004; Nida-Rümelin 2010.
Jackson’s change of position: Ludlow et al 2004, 409-442.
Daniel Dennett: Dennett 1991, 398-400 and 386.
David Lewis: Ludlow et al. 2004, 77-104.
Michael Tye: Ludlow et al. 2004, 143-160.; see also Tye 2000, 27.
Robert van Gulick: Ludlow et. al. 2004, 365-405.
David Chalmers: Stich and Warfield 2003, 102-142.
What is it like to be a bat?: Nagel 1991, 165-180.
Whitehead, we see with our eyes etc: Whitehead 1978, 170.
William James on emotion: James 1983, 1058-1097.
Alva Noë: Noë 2004.
Thomas Metzinger: Metzinger 2004.
“There seems to be phenomenology”: Dennett 1991, 366.
Scott Bakker: Bakker 2013b.
Galen Strawson: Strawson 2010, 52.
Deleuze and Guattari: Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 18.
Stoljar and Nagasawa: Ludlow et al. 2004, 16-18.
T. S. Eliot: Eliot 1971, 39.
Kant on aesthetic experience: Kant 2000, 90 (204) and 95 (209).
Kant on intuitions and concepts: Kant 1998, 193-194 (A51/B75).
Kant on aesthetic ideas: Kant 2000, 192 (314) and 218 (342).
Massumi, unqualified affect: Massumi 2002, 28.
Kant, pure categories of the understanding: Kant 1998, 204ff (A67/B92ff).
Sellars, the myth of the given: Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, in Sellars 2012. See also Jelaca 2014.
As Dennett claims: Dennett 1991, 398.
Sellars, awareness of redness vs. sensations of red: Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, in Sellars 2012.
Whitehead, presentational immediacy and causal efficacy: Whitehead 1978, 121.
Vicariously: Harman 2007.
No “direct account of immediate experience”: Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, in Sellars 2012.
Anthropological science fiction: Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, in Sellars 2012.
Allusion to what cannot be shown: cf. Harman 2007.
Cognitive estrangement: Suvin 1979; Freedman 2000.
Altering sense ratios: McLuhan 1992, 18.
Accelerando: Stross 2005, 315.
The New Reality: Harness 1950.
Solaris: Lem 2011.
Ubik: Dick 2012.
Sellars on determinables and determinates: Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, in Sellars 2012.
Metzinger on phenomenal content: Metzinger 2004, 72-73, 79.
Dark phenomenology: Roden 2013; Roden 2014, 85-96.
Dark with excessive bright: Milton, Paradise Lost, III 380.
A special form of darkness: Metzinger 2004, 169.
“The Kingdom of the Blind”: McHugh 2011.
Broken hammer: Heidegger 1962, section 15.
Fish and water: McLuhan 2001, 175.
Bergson on perception: Bergson 1991, 38.
Latour on actants: Latour 1988, 159ff; Latour 1999, 303.
Bennett on the power of things: Bennett 2010, 1.
Hyperobjects: Morton 2011.
Black box: Latour 1999, 304.
Units: Bogost 2012, 25.
Purposiveness without an end: Kant 2000, 111; 226 in original edition.
Hard problem of consciousness: Chalmers 1995.
Affective computing: Picard 2000.
What is it like to be a bat?: Nagel 1991, 165-180.
The universe is nothing but information: Lloyd 2007; Vidral 2010.
Autopoiesis: Bryant 2011, 140 and 147.
Dissipative systems: Prigogine and Stengers 1984.
Autopoesis in biology: Marturana and Varela 1980.
Operational closure: Luhmann 2012.
Drive to reduce energy gradients: Schneider and Sagan 2006.
“The primary meaning of life: Whitehead 1978, 102.
Erin Manning on autism: Manning 2013, 224-230.
Flat ontology: Delanda 2005, 58.
Kant on intuitions and concepts: Kant 2000, 193-194; A51/B75. Brembs on animal behavior: Brembs 2009.
Alva Noë: Noë 2004.
Consciousness cannot be separated from function: Cohen and Dennett 2011, 363.
Indeterminable and unfit for cognition: Kant 2000, 213.
The Lifecycle of Software Objects: Chiang 2010.
Computers playing Go: Levinovitz 2014.
David Lewis: Ludlow et al. 2004, 77-104.
Meillassoux on “Hume’s Problem”: Meillassoux 2008, 90-91.
As I argue elsewhere: Shaviro 2016.
Historical route: Whitehead 1978, 64.
Real but not actual: Deleuze 1994, 208; Whitehead 1978, 214.
Science fiction and extro-science fiction: Meillassoux 2015, 5 and 36.
What Did You Do in the Revolution, Grandma: Originally published in 1983. Republished in Russ 1984.
Conformation: Whitehead 1927, 41.
Stubborn fact: Whitehead 1978, 43.
Computational modules: Pinker 2003, 40.
Jerry Fodor: Fodor 2000.
Facial recognition: Sacks 2010.
Plasticity of the brain: Malabou 2008.
Bakker on heuristics: Bakker 2013a.
Latour on enlisting allies: Latour 1988, 168-169.
Rodney Brooks: Brooks 2003.
Use the world as its own model: Brooks 1987, 139.
Levinasian sense of obligation: Levinas 1969.
Levy, Love + Sex With Robots: Levy 2007.
Searle, Chinese Room argument: Searle 1980.
Ray Kurzweil on the Singularity: Kurzweil 2006, 264-265.
Stephen Hawking: Phys.org 2014.
Elon Musk: Gibbs 2014.
Nick Bostrom: Bostrom 2014.
Kurzweil on Moore’s Law: Kurzweil 2006, 35-36.
Sapience vs. sentience: Brandom 1994, 5.
Kurzweil on intelligence: Kurzweil 2006, 364.
Extended mind: Chalmers and Clark 1998.
Transcend our biology, but not our humanity: Kurzweil 2006, 136.
Self-enjoyment: Whitehead 1938, 150.
Affect cannot be independent of cognition: Zajonc 1984.
Neuropath: Original UK and Canadian edition: Bakker 2008.
Slightly modified US edition: Bakker 2009.
Ray Brassier on the death of meaning: Brassier 2011b.
Benjamin Libet’s famous experiments: cf Libet 1999.
Mark Hansen on the limits of consciousness: Hansen 2015.
Philosophical Investigations: Wittgenstein 1953.
David Chalmers: Chalmers 1995.
Daniel Dennett: Cohen and Dennet 2011; Dennett 1988.
Thomas Metzinger: Metzinger 2004, 85.
William James: James 1912/1996, 39-91.
Descartes: Descartes 1998, 62.
Folk psychology: Stich and Warfield 2003, 235-255.
“Not I, but the wind that blows through me”: D. H. Lawrence, “Song of a Man Who Has Come Through”, in Lawrence 1994, 195.
Ray Brassier on scientific evidence: Brassier 2011a.
Bakker on the “view from nowhere”: Bakker 2012.
William James on consequences: James 1975.
Sherlock Holmes: Arthur Conan Doyle, The Sign of the Four. Not a Nothing either: Wittgenstein 1953, section 304.
Metzinger’s philosophy of mind: Metzinger 2004, 13ff.
Phenomenal self-model: Metzinger 2004, 299ff.
Philosophical zombies: Chalmers 1997, 93-122.
Wild Minds: Swanwick 2008.
C-fibers: Cf. the parodic account in Rorty 1979, 70-98.
Folk psychology: Churchland 1981, 67.
General intellect: Virno 2001.
Axiom of equality: Rancière 1991, 16.
Second machine age: Brynjolfsson & McAfee 2014.
Tendential fall in the rate of profit: Marx 1993, 317-377.
New spirit of capitalism: Boltanski and Chiapello 2007.
Taking responsibility: Mind Tools 2015.
Precarity: Srnicek 2012.
Medial neglect: Bakker 2013c.
Richard Dawkins: Dawkins 2008.
Sam Harris: Harris 2005.
Christopher Hitchens: Hitchens 2009.
Brights: Dawkins 2003.
Tensengricity: cf. Fuller 1961.
Incentives: Landsburg 1993.
Rational choice theory: Levin & Milgrom 2004.
What it is like: Nagel 1991, 165-180.
Reinhardt’s subtractive aesthetic: ARTNews 2015.
Blindsight: Watts 2006.
Logical space of reasons: “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind”, section 36, in Sellars 2012.
Brassier on narrative: Brassier 2011b.
Folk psychology: Stich and Warfield 2003, 235-255.
Manifest image: “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man”, in Sellars 2012.
Technology as prosthetic: Stiegler 1998.
Sex organs of the machine world: McLuhan 1992, 46.
Echopraxia: Watts 2014,
Cotard’s Syndrome: Metzinger 2004, 455ff.
Notes and References: These appear at the end of Watts 2006. An expanded version is available online at http://rifters.com/real/shorts/PeterWatts_Blindsight_Endnotes.pdf.
Harman on Metzinger: Harman 2011, 23-24.
Naive folk-psychological notion: Metzinger 2004, 207.
Naive realism: Metzinger 2004, 292.
Roden, disconnection thesis: Roden 2014, 106; and more generally 105-123.
Libet: Libet 1999.
Vampires: in addition to the novel and its Notes and References, see Watts 2005.
What it is like to be a bat: Nagel 1991, 165-180.
Alien phenomenology: Bogost 2012.
Allusion: Harman 2007.
Disinterested: Kant 2000, 91 (205). Also see the discussion in Shaviro 2014, 151-153.
Vicarious: Harman 2007.
Aesthetic judgment is not cognitive: Kant 2000, 95 (209). Wittgenstein, wrong to say I know what I am thinking: Wittgenstein 1953, 222.
Ryle: Ryle 2009, 137-138.
William James: James 1983, 1066.
Chinese room: Searle 1980; Cole 2014.
Turing test: Turing 1950.
Hard problem of consciousness: Chalmers 1995.
Other philosophers have argued: e.g. Dennett 1991, 435-439.
Adam Glaz: Glaz 2014.
Noë on machines vs amoebas: Noë 2014.
Roden on setting limits to posthuman possibility: Roden 2014, 88, 173.
Nemocentric: Metzinger 2004, 336; Brassier 2011a, 18.
Brassier on rationality: Brassier 2011a, 9.
Consciousness cannot be separated from function: Cohen and Dennett 2011.
Expenditure without return: Bataille 1991.
Biological exuberance: Bagemihl 2000.
Sexual selection: for a recent scientific discussion, see Cronin 1993. For a speculative account, see Grosz 2011.
Kant on hunger and aesthetic pleasure in food: Kant 2000, 95-96. Brassier separates agency from selfhood: Brassier 2011a, 23. Brassier on aesthetics: Brassier 2009.
Kant on purposiveness: Kant 2000, 125.
MacLeod on spam: MacLeod 2000.
Species-being: Marx 1959.
War universe: the phrase is from Burroughs 1991.
General characteristics of slime molds: Stephenson and Stempen 2000.
Speed of motion in Physarum: mentioned in passing in many studies, e.g. Saigusa et al. 2008; Ball 2008.
Parts and whole in Physarum: Latty and Beekman 2010.
Deleuzian multipicities: Deleuze 1994, 182.
Model organism: see Beekman and Latty 2015, which pulls together and summarizes most of the research that I discuss in this chapter.
Solving mazes: Nakagaki 2001.
External spatial memory: Reid et al 2013; Beekman and Latty 2015.
Extended mind: Chalmers and Clark 1998.
Originary deficit: Stiegler 1998, 114 and passim.
Combes, critique of Stiegler: Combes 2012, 68-70.
Overflowing surplus: Marx 1959; Bataille 1991.
Consciousness as a biological phenomenon: Searle 1993.
Intracellular memory: Beekman and Latty 2015.
Temporal anticipation: Saigusa et al 2008; Ball 2008.
Slime mold music: Miranda et al. 2011.
Kant, universal communicability: Kant 2000, 102ff. (218ff).
Ontology of vibrational force: Goodman 2010, 81ff.
Throbs of emotional energy: Whitehead 1978, 116.
Optimizing networks: Zhang et al 2015.
Tokyo metro: Tero et al. 2010.
Other transit networks: Adamatsky et al. 2012
Ancient Roman routes in the Balkans: Evangelidis et al. 2015.
Self-assembly of robust networks: Rossi 2004.
Complex nutritional challenges: Dussutour et al 2010.
Simultaneous processing of inputs: Mayne and Adamatsky 2015.
Algorithms derived from slime mold behavior: Tero et al. 2006; Beekman and Latty 2015.
Slime molds as biological computers: Adamatsky 2015; Mayne and Adamatsky 2015; Schumann and Adamastsky 2015.
Game of giving and asking for reasons: the phrase is from Brandom 1997, 123; although he attributes it to Sellars.
Modeling living phenomena in a variety of ways: Evangelidis et al. 2015.
Bees and honeycombs: Karihaloo et al. 2013.
Slime mold irrationality: Beekman and Latty 2015; Latty and Beekman 2010.
Decoy effect: Huber et al. 1982.
Departs from axiomatic rationality: cf. also Waksberg et al. 2009. Determinism vs indeterminism: Brembs 2010.
Complex decisions: Latty and Beekman 2015.
The individual slime mold acts as a brain: Beekman and Latty 2015. Physarum polycephalum as model decision maker: Beekman and Latty 2015.
Kant on the unity of experience: Kant 1998, 230-234.
Latency and bandwidth: Watts 2015a.
Dispersed consciousness of the octopus: Watts 2015b.
Adversion and aversion: Whitehead 1978, 254 and passim.
Dark phenomenology: Roden 2014, 85.
Afterword
Metastability, individuation: Simondon 2005.
Dissipating energy: Schneider and Sagan 2006.
Thermostat: Chalmers 1997, 293ff.
Receptacle: Whitehead 1967, 150.